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Trade

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In the Safavid Dynasty, the central and local governments could influence trade in aspects such as security (war, road safety), rules and regulations, conflict resolution, monetary and fiscal practices.[1] For example, under Abbas’ reign, centers for merchants in Isfahan's sub-urban areas and a network of caravansarais were the infrastructures that promised the economic prosperity.[2] He also restored road security by making provincial governors responsible for the security of travelers and their products.[3] Apart from minor interventions in the market, Iran under the Safavids had an open economy overall.[4] The main international trade routes are the maritime routes via the Persian Gulf and several overland routes connect the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Pakistan, and Central Asia.[5]

Merchants

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The Iranian merchants dominated both foreign and domestic trade. There were merchants from all over the world in Isfahan, including Iranian people (Muslims, Jews, Armenians, and Georgians), Indians, Central Asian Tartars, Turks, Arabs, English, Dutch, French, Italians, and Spaniards. Armenians and Indians dominated foreign trade.[6] Local distribution and retail trade in Isfahan were dominated by Muslim merchants.[7]

Under Shah Abbas I's reign, the settlement of Armenian Merchants also boosted the economy. As a result of the Ottoman-Safavid War, more than 5,000 Armenians were forced to leave Eastern Anatolia and settle in Isfahan's New Julfa circa 1604.[8] The Julfans were granted rights including the permission to ride caparisoned horses and the unrestricted sale of land and goods.[9] Iranian silk was one of the most profitable goods in the Armenian-dominated long-distance commerce by the mid-fifteenth century.[10]

International trade

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Safavid Iran was mainly self-sufficient, with agriculture accounting for the majority of its GDP. However it also needed to import some certain products such as metals, sugar, dyes, pepper, spices and fabrics (for the wealthy). Iran's only source of specie and bullion was international trade because it had no operational gold or silver mines.[11] Shah Abbas once prohibited the export of gold and silver in 1618 to prevent the outflow of bullion out of Iran.[12] He also increased the number of silk and cotton manufactories constructed under Shah Isma'il's reign and all of Iran's main cities had royal factories.[13] Customs dues and road tolls also provided a significant portion of state revenue.[14]

Abbas attempted to improve contacts with the West in order to reduce Ottoman Customs income while increasing Safavid revenues. He aligned with English forces to reclaim Hormuz from the Portuguese in 1622 and signed treaties with both EIC and VOC in 1617 and 1627.[15] However, the Armenian merchants'overland route to the West was consistently more profitable than the Gulf and it could benefit the Safavid court dorectly. For example, in 1619, Armenian merchants outbid the EIC for the right to receive the shah's monopolized silk.[16]

Polity

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The shah was the sole source of political authority in Safavid Iran's patrimonial political system. A huge number of subordinate patrimonial houses competed vertically and horizontally in the Safavid society. To improve one's power, one must gain the ear of someone higher up the corporate ladder.[17] Many corporate groupings enjoyed a high degree of autonomy, as did the numerous administrative authorities.[18] The central government focused on tax collection while delegating the responsibilities of providing public services and maintaining order to local governors and elites.

[19]

The Qizilbash

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The Qizilbash emirs were Ismail's personal guardsmen and followers, without their efforts and support it would have been impossible for Ismail to become a war-leader.[20] After Ismail's conquer (1501-1514) of many territories from Anatolia, Syria, Caucasus, the eastward in Khorasan to Transoxiana, the Qizilbash assisted him to rule these territories.[21] In the early Safavid state, most provincial governors were qizilbash, the political and social elite.[22] However, Ismail was concerned about the Qizilbash's power. He also needed to solidify his rule of the acquired regions through the experienced Tajiks or Persians/Iranians who had previously served as administrators.[23] The division between Turk and Persian matched to the classical Islamic categories of "men of the sword" and "men of the pen" under Shah Ismacil I.[24] The qizilbash believed that the Tajiks (non-Turks) should be excluded from military power while the Tajiks believed the qizilbash should stay away from knowledge of statecrat.[25]

After Ismail's defeat at the Battle of Chaldiran, his relationship with the Qizilbash worsened, and he began to rely more on the Tajiks.[26] Ismail's on Tahmasp succeeded his in 1524, witnessed the conflicts between different fractions and took powerl in 1533.[27] In this period the Ottomans attempted to use the internal struggles to invade Safavid territory, the Qizilbash tribes who were displeased with the Shah supported them.[28] By increasing the strength of non-Turkoman forces, particularly royal slaves, Tahmsp I hoped to minimize his reliance on qizilbash soldiers. These changes were not enough to prevent the civil war (1576–87).[29] When Shah Abbas I succeeded, he enforced the changes made by his grandfather by greatly expanding the size and prestige of the royal slave corps.[30]

The Ghulam

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The ghulams were originally drawn from the major cities such as Chaghatay, Arab, and Persian tribes of Khorasan, Azerbaijan, and Tabaristan, as well as riffraff.[31] Ghulams can be divided into two types: those who were eunuchs (khvja) and those who were not (sda).[32] The latter served in army, administration, and royal workshops.[33] The Ghulam crops were made up with Shi'i converts from Georgian, Armenian, and Circassian.[34]

Because of the events happened after Shah Tahmsp I, Shah Abbas I attempted to decrease the qizilbash's influence thus created a "third force", who are Armenian, Georgian and Circassian, to protect his sovereignty.[35]


Non-Muslims (might delete this part later)

The Ilkhanate in Iran improved the condition of Christian and Jewish communities because of their policy of non-identification with any specific faith.[36] Prior to Ghazan Khan's accession, non-Muslim minorities, particularly Christian and Jewish communities, increased their power in the state. In the meantime, non-Sunni Muslims, particularly Twelver Shiites also grew more influential.[37] The establishment of Islam as the official religion at the start of Ghazan Khan's reign put an end to non-Muslim communities' freedom.

Religious Power

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References

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  1. ^ Floor, Willem (2021). The Safavid world. Rudolph P. Matthee. Abingdon, Oxon. p. 264. ISBN 1-000-39287-2. OCLC 1253291779.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  2. ^ Newman, Andrew J. (2009). Safavid Iran : rebirth of a Persian empire. London: I.B. Tauris. p. 60. ISBN 978-1-4416-1605-0. OCLC 430224867.
  3. ^ Matthee, Rudolph P. (1999). The politics of trade in Safavid Iran : silk for silver, 1600-1730. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. p. 67. ISBN 0-521-64131-4. OCLC 40820895.
  4. ^ The Safavid world. Rudolph P. Matthee. Abingdon, Oxon. 2021. ISBN 1-000-39287-2. OCLC 1253291779.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) CS1 maint: others (link)
  5. ^ Floor, Willem (2021). The Safavid world. Rudolph P. Matthee. Abingdon, Oxon. p. 265. ISBN 1-000-39287-2. OCLC 1253291779.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  6. ^ Floor, Willem (2021). The Safavid world. Rudolph P. Matthee. Abingdon, Oxon. p. 267. ISBN 1-000-39287-2. OCLC 1253291779.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  7. ^ Floor, Willem (2021). The Safavid world. Rudolph P. Matthee. Abingdon, Oxon. p. 267. ISBN 1-000-39287-2. OCLC 1253291779.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  8. ^ Newman, Andrew J. (2009). Safavid Iran : rebirth of a Persian empire. London: I.B. Tauris. pp. 60–61. ISBN 978-1-4416-1605-0. OCLC 430224867.
  9. ^ Newman, Andrew J. (2009). Safavid Iran : rebirth of a Persian empire. London: I.B. Tauris. p. 86. ISBN 978-1-4416-1605-0. OCLC 430224867.
  10. ^ Newman, Andrew J. (2009). Safavid Iran : rebirth of a Persian empire. London: I.B. Tauris. p. 61. ISBN 978-1-4416-1605-0. OCLC 430224867.
  11. ^ The Safavid world. Rudolph P. Matthee. Abingdon, Oxon. 2021. p. 269. ISBN 1-000-39287-2. OCLC 1253291779.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) CS1 maint: others (link)
  12. ^ Matthee, Rudolph P. (1999). The politics of trade in Safavid Iran : silk for silver, 1600-1730. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. p. 68. ISBN 0-521-64131-4. OCLC 40820895.
  13. ^ Matthee, Rudolph P. (1999). The politics of trade in Safavid Iran : silk for silver, 1600-1730. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. p. 66. ISBN 0-521-64131-4. OCLC 40820895.
  14. ^ Matthee, Rudolph P. (1999). The politics of trade in Safavid Iran : silk for silver, 1600-1730. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. p. 68. ISBN 0-521-64131-4. OCLC 40820895.
  15. ^ Newman, Andrew J. (2009). Safavid Iran : rebirth of a Persian empire. London: I.B. Tauris. p. 61. ISBN 978-1-4416-1605-0. OCLC 430224867.
  16. ^ Newman, Andrew J. (2009). Safavid Iran : rebirth of a Persian empire. London: I.B. Tauris. p. 62. ISBN 978-1-4416-1605-0. OCLC 430224867.
  17. ^ The Safavid world. Rudolph P. Matthee. Abingdon, Oxon. 2021. p. 203. ISBN 1-000-39287-2. OCLC 1253291779.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) CS1 maint: others (link)
  18. ^ The Safavid world. Rudolph P. Matthee. Abingdon, Oxon. 2021. p. 204. ISBN 1-000-39287-2. OCLC 1253291779.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) CS1 maint: others (link)
  19. ^ The Safavid world. Rudolph P. Matthee. Abingdon, Oxon. 2021. p. 204. ISBN 1-000-39287-2. OCLC 1253291779.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) CS1 maint: others (link)
  20. ^ van den Berg, Gabrielle, Weeda, Claire; Stein, Robert; Sicking, Louis (eds.), "The Safavids Between Pen and Sword", Comparative Rural History of the North Sea Area, vol. 20, Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols Publishers, p. 295, doi:10.1484/m.corn-eb.5.129382, ISBN 978-2-503-59446-0, retrieved 2022-05-27
  21. ^ van den Berg, Gabrielle, Weeda, Claire; Stein, Robert; Sicking, Louis (eds.), "The Safavids Between Pen and Sword", Comparative Rural History of the North Sea Area, vol. 20, Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols Publishers, p. 297, doi:10.1484/m.corn-eb.5.129382, ISBN 978-2-503-59446-0, retrieved 2022-05-27
  22. ^ Savory, Roger (1974). "The Safavid State and Polity". Iranian Studies. 7 (1/2): 195. ISSN 0021-0862.
  23. ^ van den Berg, Gabrielle, Weeda, Claire; Stein, Robert; Sicking, Louis (eds.), "The Safavids Between Pen and Sword", Comparative Rural History of the North Sea Area, vol. 20, Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols Publishers, p. 298, doi:10.1484/m.corn-eb.5.129382, ISBN 978-2-503-59446-0, retrieved 2022-05-27
  24. ^ Savory, Roger (1974). "The Safavid State and Polity". Iranian Studies. 7 (1/2): 195. ISSN 0021-0862.
  25. ^ Savory, Roger (1974). "The Safavid State and Polity". Iranian Studies. 7 (1/2): 195. ISSN 0021-0862.
  26. ^ van den Berg, Gabrielle, Weeda, Claire; Stein, Robert; Sicking, Louis (eds.), "The Safavids Between Pen and Sword", Comparative Rural History of the North Sea Area, vol. 20, Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols Publishers, p. 300, doi:10.1484/m.corn-eb.5.129382, ISBN 978-2-503-59446-0, retrieved 2022-05-27
  27. ^ van den Berg, Gabrielle, Weeda, Claire; Stein, Robert; Sicking, Louis (eds.), "The Safavids Between Pen and Sword", Comparative Rural History of the North Sea Area, vol. 20, Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols Publishers, p. 301, doi:10.1484/m.corn-eb.5.129382, ISBN 978-2-503-59446-0, retrieved 2022-05-27
  28. ^ van den Berg, Gabrielle, Weeda, Claire; Stein, Robert; Sicking, Louis (eds.), "The Safavids Between Pen and Sword", Comparative Rural History of the North Sea Area, vol. 20, Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols Publishers, p. 301, doi:10.1484/m.corn-eb.5.129382, ISBN 978-2-503-59446-0, retrieved 2022-05-27
  29. ^ Floor, Willem (2021). The Safavid world. Rudolph P. Matthee. Abingdon, Oxon. p. 226. ISBN 1-000-39287-2. OCLC 1253291779.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  30. ^ The Safavid world. Rudolph P. Matthee. Abingdon, Oxon. 2021. p. 226. ISBN 1-000-39287-2. OCLC 1253291779.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) CS1 maint: others (link)
  31. ^ Floor, Willem (2021). The Safavid world. Rudolph P. Matthee. Abingdon, Oxon. p. 226. ISBN 1-000-39287-2. OCLC 1253291779.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  32. ^ The Safavid world. Rudolph P. Matthee. Abingdon, Oxon. 2021. p. 226. ISBN 1-000-39287-2. OCLC 1253291779.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) CS1 maint: others (link)
  33. ^ The Safavid world. Rudolph P. Matthee. Abingdon, Oxon. 2021. p. 226. ISBN 1-000-39287-2. OCLC 1253291779.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) CS1 maint: others (link)
  34. ^ The Safavid world. Rudolph P. Matthee. Abingdon, Oxon. 2021. p. 125. ISBN 1-000-39287-2. OCLC 1253291779.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) CS1 maint: others (link)
  35. ^ Savory, Roger (1974). "The Safavid State and Polity". Iranian Studies. 7 (1/2): 196. ISSN 0021-0862.
  36. ^ SAVORY, ROGER M. (2003-10-01). "Relations between the Safavid State and its Non-Muslim Minorities 1". Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations. 14 (4): 437. doi:10.1080/0959641032000127597. ISSN 0959-6410.
  37. ^ SAVORY, ROGER M. (2003-10-01). "Relations between the Safavid State and its Non-Muslim Minorities 1". Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations. 14 (4): 439. doi:10.1080/0959641032000127597. ISSN 0959-6410.