User:Katangais/sandbox/Eland

Eland Mk7
Eland Mk7 at the Tempe School of Armour, Bloemfontein
Type	Armoured Car
Place of origin	South Africa
Service history
In service	1962 – 1994 (South Africa) 1967 - (other)
Used by	See Operators
Wars	Angolan Civil War Rhodesian Bush War 1981 Entumbane Uprising South African Border War Western Sahara War Second Congo War Chadian Civil War Northern Mali conflict Boko Haram insurgency
Production history
Designer	Sandock-Austral
Designed	1962
Manufacturer	Sandock-Austral Reumech OMC
Produced	1964 – 1986
No. built	1,600
Variants	See Variants
Specifications
Mass	6 tonnes (6.6 short tons; 5.9 long tons)
Length	5.12 m (16 ft 10 in)
length	4.04 m (13 ft 3 in) (hull)
Width	2.01 m (6 ft 7 in)
Height	2.5 m (8 ft 2 in)
Crew	3 (commander, driver, gunner)
Main armament	90mm Denel GT-2 (29 rounds) 60mm K1 mortar (56 rounds)
Secondary armament	2x 7.62mm M1919 Browning machine guns (2400 - 3800 rounds)
Engine	General Motors 2.5 L (150 in3) inline 4-cylinder water-cooled petrol
Transmission	6-speed manual constant mesh
Suspension	Independent 4X4; active trailing arms
Ground clearance	380 mm
Fuel capacity	142 litres
Operational range	450 km
Maximum speed	100 km/h

The Eland is an air portable light armoured car based on the Panhard AML. Designed and built by South Africa for long-range reconnaissance, it mounts either a 60mm (2.4 in) breech-loading mortar or a Denel 90mm (3.5 in) gun on a very compact chassis. Although lightly armoured, the vehicle's permanent 4X4 drive makes it faster over flat terrain than many tanks.

Eland was developed for the South African Defence Force (SADF) in South Africa's first major arms programme since World War II, with prototypes completed in 1963. By 1991, 1,600 examples had been built for home and export; prominent foreign operators included Morocco and Zimbabwe. Local overhauls incorporating lessons from internal operations have resulted in a vehicle capable of withstanding the unforgiving Southern African environment and highly mobile operational style of the SADF.

Development history

Background

For many years the standard armoured car of the South African Defence Force was the Daimler Ferret, which was developed in the late 1940s and armed with a single general-purpose machine gun. By the mid 1960s, Ferret spares were becoming difficult to obtain, and its armament was considered less than adequate. In 1961, South Africa accordingly secured a similar platform with a much wider range of armament installations: the French Panhard AML. That July a South African military delegation headed by Minister of Defence Jacobus Johannes Fouché and Commandant-General Pieter Grobbelaar, chief of the SADF, went to France to negotiate a licensing agreement with Panhard. The AML was favoured because the SADF's priorities at the time were fighting a possible counter-insurgency campaign or an unconventional bush war, the basic requirements of which were light armoured vehicles with the greatest mobility and most simplified maintenance.

One hundred AMLs were purchased, presumably for preliminary evaluation purposes, as well as enough turrets, engines, and other associated parts for the later assembly of another 800 in South Africa. Panhard also approved a licence for domestic production of the AML chassis in South African plants. A separate licence was obtained from the French government's Direction technique des armements terrestres (DTAT) between 1964 and 1965 for the manufacture of the AML turrets and armament. The result was the VA (Vehicle A) Mk2, first offered to the SADF's armoured car regiments and reconnaissance commands in 1964. Bids were accepted from four local companies for the manufacture of 300 AMLs with working armament, along with another 150 turretless demonstrators; this contract was claimed by Sandock-Austral, now Land Systems OMC. The production lines were set up with technical assistance from Henschel, an engineering firm based in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Comparison of the rear hulls and cooling systems of an Eland Mk6 and a Panhard AML.

Sandock VAs initially fared rather poorly; all 56 models furbished in 1966 were rejected by the South African Army. An extensive rebuild programme followed - the Panhards were returned to the manufacturer, completely disassembled, restructured, and trialled again. These new vehicles claimed a local content of forty per cent but remained heavily bolstered by components imported from France in 1961. Upon undergoing several upgrades to the steering (Mk2) and brakes (Mk3), each vehicle was also equipped with a custom fuel system; the electric clutches were concurrently replaced by more conventional pressure plate clutches (Mk4). While South Africa's AMLs remained externally similar to their French counterparts, up to two-thirds of their parts were of local origin by 1967, the main part of that balance being a new water cooled inline-4 cylinder petrol engine installed in the Mk5. Subsequent models were officially designated Eland.

Panhard's initial licensing contract with the South African government extended to the local assembly or manufacture of up to 1,000 AMLs. Furthermore, all vehicles produced under the terms of this licence could only be re-exported with written permission from the French Minister of Defence. It is unclear whether these restrictions extended to the second generation of Elands, which were produced with wholly South African parts and components beginning in 1973. South Africa may have renewed the original Panhard licence as part of a larger agreement with France concerning the transfer of arms and defence technology around January 1974; another 700 Elands were manufactured between 1974 and 1986. By 1985 production had reached two hundred vehicles a year.

Operated by a crew of three, each Eland was built on a small and remarkably lightweight 4X4 chassis with a height of 2.5 metres, a length of 5.12 metres, and a weight of 6 metric tons. The Eland had a maximum range of 450 kilometres and a mileage of 2 kilometres per litre. As South Africa was primarily interested in a light patrol vehicle armed for counter-insurgency purposes, most Elands were armed with the 60mm Brandt Mle CM60A1 gun-mortar, better known by its South African manufacturing code K1 and also designated in SADF service as the M2, as well as two 7.62mm Browning machine guns. This was known as the Eland-60.

The second most common variant was designed specifically to fulfill a South African requirement for a gun-armed armoured car capable of furnishing mobile fire support for the mounted units and undertaking aggressive reconnaissance as needed. As the SADF had been organised along the lines of Commonwealth doctrine in general and British doctrine in particular, it wanted a vehicle capable of filling the same role as the Alvis Saladin. Although the Saladin was evaluated favourably since it shared most of its interchangeable parts with the army's Alvis Saracen armoured personnel carriers, the AML licence had already been purchased and there was an advantage to fulfilling the same requirement with another preexisting vehicle type. In response to SADF inquiries concerning an AML variant with equal or superior firepower to the Saladin, Panhard produced the AML-90, which carried a 90mm low-velocity rifled cannon for direct fire support. This evolved into the Eland-90 in South African service.

Service life

Elands formed the mainstay of the South African Armoured Corps for nearly three decades, although as early as 1968 SADF officials were discussing their replacement or supplementation with something more suited to countering tank warfare as the prospect of conventional military conflict in southern Africa became increasingly likely. That year the armoured corps undertook a feasibility study for replacing the Eland with a larger, more mobile, and more heavily armed wheeled vehicle. While acknowledging the Eland was sufficient for border patrol and counter-insurgency, South African strategists were also concerned that it was unsuited for conventional battlefields. During a wargaming exercise designed to simulate a foreign invasion of South West Africa, the SADF found that the Eland-90 suffered from three major disadvantages: it had no trench-crossing ability, its off-road mobility was limited due to its four wheels and high ground pressure, and the 90mm cannon was ineffective against enemy armour at ranges of over 1,200 metres. In 1969, South African officials proposed fitting the existing fleet with ENTAC wire-guided anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). This was never implemented but the advantages of an ATGM capability in armoured car regiments were recognised as a means to compensate for the mediocre range of the Eland-90's main armament. Another proposal for an Eland variant armed with an autocannon appeared in 1971. The armoured corps evaluated several Elands armed with 20mm and 40mm autocannons between 1971 and 1972 and finally settled on the Hispano-Suiza HS.820 as its armament of choice. This was known as the Eland-20 but was not adopted by the SADF.

In 1970 the South African Army was operating 500 Elands of various marks, with another 356 on order. The fleet then consisted of 369 Eland-60s and 131 Eland-90s. This was followed by the Eland Mk6 programme, which entailed older models upgraded to Mk5 standards. By 1975 the army had 1,016 Eland Mk5s and Mk6s in service. The Eland was first tested in combat that year against Cuban and People's Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) forces during Operation Savannah. Reports of PT-76 and T-34-85 tanks being fielded by FAPLA during the Angolan Civil War perturbed South African military advisers then involved in training FAPLA's rivals, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and its armed wing. The advisers reported that UNITA's anti-tank capabilities were next to nonexistent and requested a squadron of SADF armoured cars, along with their crews, to help turn the tide against FAPLA. Twenty-two Eland-90s were flown out to UNITA's headquarters at Silva Porto in mid-October 1975, and soon clashed with FAPLA armour. Elands were to acquire a fearsome combat reputation in Angola, where they earned the moniker "Red Ants" due to unorthodox but effective crew tactics and the lack of any equivalent Cuban or FAPLA vehicles. Less than two months later, Cuban general Abelardo Colomé Ibarra cited his inability to counter the Elands' superior manoeuvrability as one of the greatest tactical challenges facing the Cuban-FAPLA coalition in Angola. Nevertheless, with the onset of the Angolan rainy season the wheeled vehicles were increasingly hampered by mud, and their crews found fighting capability constrained when operating on terrain better suited for tracked vehicles. They criticised the lowness of the hull as well, which made sighting difficult over thick bush. The Elands' reliability was also somewhat called into question: nearly half the armoured cars in the squadron were rendered unserviceable at one time or another due to engine failures. These limitations emphasised the need for the development of a new mark of Eland further modified for southern African conditions.

The Eland continued to enjoy distinction in SADF service, especially with the Special Service Battalion and 61 Mechanised Infantry Battalion Group. During Operation Protea and Operation Askari in 1981 and 1983, respectively, Eland-90s proved capable of eliminating Cuban and FAPLA T-34-85 and T-54/55 tanks at close range.The SADF began to gradually retire its Elands beginning in the mid-1980s, replacing them with the larger and notably more dependable Ratel-90 and Ratel-60 infantry fighting vehicles, which could carry the same armament but also a squad of infantry.

I turned to see one of our small, odd-looking Eland armoured ‘Noddy' cars with its long 90-millimetre gun barrelling towards us at almost top speed from across the chana...it turned nimbly, kicking up a cloud of dust as he came directly through our scattered line and then turned again, this time towards the tank. The little armoured car came to a quick stop right in the middle of the open ground about 80 metres from the tank, waited a couple of seconds and then fired one shot from [its] 90-millimetre with a loud bang. The shot was right on target. When the smoke drifted away the T-34's turret was lying off to one side and the open body was burning, belching dense black smoke.

South African paratrooper describes a standoff between an Eland and a T-34-85 during Operation Protea. It was common for armour contacts to be fought at extremely close range in the Angolan bush.

Once envisaged only as a scout car, the Eland auspiciously doubled in the role of an assault gun and an ersatz tank destroyer—but its obsolescence was highlighted by several factors, namely a flammable petrol engine which was especially vulnerable to rocket-propelled grenades or mine explosions, and its limited off-road mobility. The effectiveness of the low-pressure 90mm gun against modern tanks was also questionable; during Operation Askari Eland-90s' high-explosive anti-tank shells rarely penetrated enemy T-54s without multiple hits.

Although they remained relatively popular with the armoured corps, Elands were not well-regarded by the mechanised infantry due to several unsuccessful attempts to integrate it with Ratel-mounted combat teams. The Eland simply lacked the range and mobility to keep pace with the Ratels during a firefight, and was more prone to technical malfunctions in the bush. The squat, compact vehicles were often ridiculed as "noddy cars" by infantrymen due to their quaint profile and small size as compared to the much heavier Ratel. This derisive nickname may have also been a reference to an Eland-90's tendency to rock while firing its main gun. Nevertheless, it was later adopted with affectionate pride by Eland crews.

The final variant to enter production, the Eland Mk7, was introduced in 1979. It possessed new power brakes, a modified transmission, and a lengthier hull for accommodating taller South African crewmen. A domed cupola with vision blocks was also added over the commander's hatch. Hard lessons driven home by Operation Savannah ensured the new Elands were also designed for operating long distances from supply and logistical centres, with maximum ease of maintenance in the field. For example, the engine was now mounted on a rail frame so it could be removed and replaced in under forty minutes. The Eland Mk7 was kept in production for another eight years, until its basic technology had become quite dated despite continuous upgrades. The South African Armoured Corps retired most of its Elands from combat service in the late 1980s, utilising them primarily for training Ratel-90 crews. In October 1988, South Africa unveiled a new indigenous armoured car known as the Rooikat. The Rooikat, which had emerged from the original requirement for a larger and more effectively armed vehicle to supplant the Eland series on conventional battlefields, was much more mobile and carried a sophisticated 76mm high-velocity cannon capable of engaging armour at longer standoff ranges. In 1994, the Eland-60 and Eland-90 were formally retired from the newly integrated South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in favour of the Rooikat.

Combat history

South African Border War

Initial service

South Africa's determination to retain the disputed territory of South West Africa, which it had governed essentially as a fifth province since World War I, resulted in an armed insurgency by the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), the militant wing of the nationalist South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO). Insurgent activity took the form of ambushes and selective target attacks, particularly in the Caprivi Strip near the Zambian border. Reflecting a trend characteristic of many Anglophone Commonwealth states, local police were initially granted responsibility for managing counter-insurgency operations rather than the South African armed forces. However, by 1969 the security situation in Caprivi had deteriorated to the point that the SADF was forced to deploy a troop of Elands and several companies of infantry there.

A year later, PLAN began adopting mine warfare as an integral part of its attempts to hinder the mobility of South African convoys on the limited road network. Mine-laying was often used as a means to throw the convoys into disarray prior to an ambush. This tactic resulted in some of the heaviest SADF and police casualties thus far and evolved into one of the most defining features of PLAN's war effort for the next two decades. The SADF's immediate solution was to utilise its Elands for convoy escort purposes, as they were the only vehicles it possessed capable of surviving a mine explosion and also suppressing an ambush. An Eland-60 or Eland-90 was delegated to lead each convoy, with the other drivers continuing in its tracks. However, it soon became clear this practice was not an effective countermeasure. The armoured cars' petrol engines were vulnerable to the risk of fire whenever they detonated a mine. PLAN also responded by acquiring anti-tank mines, namely Soviet TM-46s, in large quantities.

On one occasion an Eland-90 detonated two TM-46s, which sent the vehicle airborne and hurled it about thirty metres away, after which it landed on its turret. Although the three crew members escaped serious injury, incidents like these demonstrated that the Eland simply lacked the mass to absorb the explosive force of an anti-tank mine. For the SADF and the police, the only other viable option was the adoption of armoured personnel carriers with mine-proof hulls that could move quickly on roads with little risk to their passengers even if a mine like the TM-46 was encountered. This would trigger a series of experiments aimed at producing a new class of military vehicle, the mine resistant and ambush protected vehicle (MRAP). From 1974 onward, Elands began to be replaced in their traditional role of convoy escort by specialised mineproofed vehicles.

Operation Savannah

Elands in forward staging areas prior to Operation Savannah.

The collapse of Portuguese colonial rule in South West Africa's northern neighbour, Angola, led to dramatic changes in South African foreign and defence policy. Factional infighting between the three rival Angolan nationalist movements pursuing their own separate strategies directed towards consolidating political power and influence in the colonial state was almost inevitable; by mid 1975 the country had degenerated into outright civil war. South Africa discreetly sponsored two of three Angolan factions, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), in the hopes of eliciting their cooperation with the SADF to deny PLAN sanctuary in Angola; this project was known as Operation Savannah. However, both UNITA and the FNLA were defeated and driven from the Angolan capital, Luanda, by the third faction—People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) that July.

Unlike the FNLA and UNITA, the MPLA possessed a militant wing, the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA), which was well-equipped for conventional warfare and aided by an infusion of arms from the Soviet Union and Cuban military advisers. Instrumental in its capture of Luanda were a number of second-hand Soviet T-34-85 tanks, likely manned by well-drilled and experienced Cuban crews. Neither the FNLA nor UNITA possessed anti-tank weaponry, and their lightly armed troops were no match for the FAPLA armour. As part of its own covert intervention programme in Angola, the Central Intelligence Agency was able to persuade Zaire to donate some Panhard AML-90s and M40 recoilless rifles to the FNLA and UNITA in exchange for receiving more modern American weaponry. South Africa assembled an advisory and liaison team which included six armour instructors to train the UNITA AML crews. The SADF advisers planned to have three crews trained in several weeks, but they were not afforded this luxury as a FAPLA offensive was already underway to seize UNITA's headquarters at Nova Lisboa. Permission was granted by the South African political leadership to have the AMLs manned by the instructors until such a time as the UNITA crews could be trained to a minimal standard. UNITA and the SADF advisory team first clashed with a FAPLA armoured unit at the village of Norton de Matos, where they came under heavy fire from T-34-85 and PT-76 tanks. The South Africans attempted to fight off their opponents with their AML-90s and some ENTAC anti-tank missiles, but were forced to withdraw after a fierce skirmish.

The action at Norton de Metos had deeply shaken South Africa's confidence in UNITA's ability to win the war against FAPLA on its own, especially with its limited arsenal. During a meeting with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and the heads of the advisory mission on October 7, the SADF instructors argued that they would need better armour assets than the handful of dilapidated AMLs possessed by Savimbi. Their request was approved on the condition that any extension of the SADF's operational capacities in Angola remain strictly covert. All equipment, weapons, vehicles, and ammunition bound for the Angolan front were to be supplied through nonconventional channels and unmarked. SADF uniforms and insignia were explicitly prohibited. On October 9, a squadron of Eland-90s and their crews were hurriedly deployed to the border, ready to be airlifted deep into Angola five days later. The personnel involved were stripped of all their identifiable equipment, even their dog tags, and re-issued with nondescript uniforms and personal weapons impossible to trace. They were told to pose as mercenaries if questioned. Officials exempted Elands from the ban on South African weapons because it was well known that UNITA and the FNLA operated the externally identical AML, and they were regarded as suitably anonymous. To reinforce this impression, SADF crew members painted the armoured cars with UNITA slogans. The Elands were attached to two separate composite battlegroups of motorised infantry, code named Task Force Zulu and Task Force Foxbat, respectively. Their objectives were to destroy the FAPLA forces south of Luanda and advance northwards, seizing as much territory as they could for the FNLA and UNITA before Angola's formal independence date on November 11, six weeks away. It was intended for Eland troops to merely support motorised infantry on roads, but since no other armour was available the South Africans deployed them as column spearheads. Eland-90s performed reconnaissance by fire, depending on their speed and mobility to carry them through potential ambushes. The SADF's use of light, fast-moving Elands backed by truck-mounted infantry advancing at full speed allowed it to retain the initiative and keep FAPLA continually off balance. Task Force Zulu was able to cover about ninety kilometres per day, even when the rainy season slowed momentum. By the time FAPLA redeployed sufficient forces along its southern front to halt the SADF advance, Zulu and Foxbat had advanced over 500 kilometres and captured eighteen major towns and cities.

Eland crews pose with their vehicles during Operation Savannah. Note the nondescript uniforms.

FAPLA hastily established a rough line of defence from Norton de Matos to the strategic railway junction at Catengue, which lay on the highway between Nova Lisboa and Luanda. Unbeknownst to the SADF, Catengue was situated near a FAPLA training camp which housed a significant contingent of Cuban advisers. The Cubans planned an elaborate defence of Catengue, intending to pin the South African armoured cars on the road and strip away the supporting FNLA foot soldiers with a composite battery of 82mm mortars and Grad-P 122mm rocket artillery. As the Eland crews attempted to redeploy to suppress the defenders, a FAPLA anti-tank section with B-10 recoilless rifles and RPG-7s would finish them off. Although they had to come to a halt to return fire, the Elands escaped destruction during the actual engagement by rapidly manoeuvring between firing positions. While the armoured cars laid down suppressing fire on the mortar pits and kept the FAPLA troops preoccupied, the supporting SADF and FNLA infantrymen regrouped and carried out a successful flanking attack. The defenders were routed. Four Cubans had died during the battle for Catengue, seven were wounded, and another thirteen listed as missing in action.

Unaware that Catengue had fallen, several companies of Cuban and FAPLA infantry and an armoured reconnaissance platoon advanced south to reinforce the junction. The Eland-90s took up positions alongside the narrow highway and ambushed the approaching FAPLA vehicles one at a time, destroying them. Meanwhile, the revelation that Cuban advisers had been engaged by South African regulars with armour of their own prompted President Fidel Castro to approve a request from FAPLA for direct military assistance. In the following weeks, Cuban combat troops began arriving in Luanda by sea and air. Upon their arrival, they were supplied with T-34-85 tanks, hundreds of which had been shipped directly to Luanda by the Soviet Union to avoid transshipment delays in Havana.

The next major engagement between the Cubans and South African armour did not occur until November 23. One of the last settlements the SADF needed to capture before it could reach within striking distance of Luanda itself was Porto Amboim. To slow the SADF's advance, Cuban sappers had destroyed all the bridges over the Cuvo River south of Porto Amboim. Undeterred, both South African battlegroups began searching for alternative routes towards the east. More Cuban units redeployed to block their advance again at Quibala, a town which sat astride the only other highway to Luanda. While reconnoitering potential routes by which to attack Quibala from the east, Foxbat encountered an intact bridge over the Mabassa River near the village of Ebo. The defenders had anticipated that the SADF might attempt to cross the river there and had laid an ambush with recoilless rifles, BM-21 Grads, an a ZiS-3 anti-tank gun. When the South African armoured cars began crossing the bridge, the Cubans opened fire. The first Eland on the bridge was immediately knocked out by an RPG or recoilless rifle round, followed in rapid succession by three more. The surviving Elands on the opposite bank found it difficult to take evasive action due to their inability to manoeuvre in thick mud, and another three were destroyed. Futile attempts were made to recover the armoured cars for several hours, after which Foxbat withdrew. FAPLA later extricated the damaged and wrecked Elands on site and towed them away for propaganda purposes.

An Eland-90 driving into Lobito in November 1975.

With its advance stymied for the time being, the SADF continued its search for alternative routes to Quibala and discovered another surviving bridge on the Nhia River, which had been damaged but not thoroughly demolished by Cuban sappers. This was known informally as "Bridge 14". South African army engineers began to repair the bridge under the cover of darkness on December 11, allowing the accompanying Elands to launch a surprise attack across it at dawn. Cuban mortar crews and anti-tank platoons armed with 9M14 Malyutka missiles had begun to deploy into ambush positions just beyond the bridge; however, several were wiped out when the SADF took the precaution of shelling the opposite riverbank with artillery. As they advanced the Eland crews also avoided the centre of the bridge, where the Cubans had trained their missiles. Taken by surprise, the defending Cuban and FAPLA units began a disorderly withdrawal. They regrouped at the village of Catofe, about sixteen kilometres south of Quibala, where they were reinforced by a company of T-34-85 tanks and prepared to make a final stand. Foxbat's Elands approached within five kilometres of Catofe but did not advance any further, owing to concerns about having overextended their lines.

While the campaign south of Quibala was in progress, two new battle groups modelled after Foxbat and Zulu, codenamed X-Ray and Orange respectively, had been formed in Silva Porto to fight the Cuban-FAPLA alliance in eastern Angola. Orange was dispatched northwards to capture Malanje while X-Ray moved further east to secure the railway line from Benguela. On 18 December, the first armour-to-armour engagement between South Africa and Cuba occurred when a troop of Eland-90s attached to Battle Group Orange reconnoitring potential river crossings east of Bridge 14 encountered three T-34-85s on the opposite bank. The Elands opened fire, destroying the lead tank and forcing the others to withdraw.

South Africa's decision to terminate Operation Savannah in the face of heavy international opposition and an increasingly formidable Cuban troop presence was made around January 1976, and the last SADF forces departed Angola in March. A detailed study of the Eland's advantages and shortcomings during that campaign was subsequently undertaken by the South African Armoured Corps. Much of the lessons learned from Angolan operations could also be readily applied to northern South West Africa, where the characteristics of the annual rainy season, compounded by dense vegetation and muddy terrain, were quite similar. Eland crews found that the density of the bush impeded their mobility, line of vision, and the traversing angle of their turrets. The region was also prone to dry flood plains, which filled into marshlike oshanas during the rainy season and posed a notoriously difficult obstacle for the four-wheeled armoured cars. While the Eland-90s brought to bear enormous firepower, they possessed limited ammunition stowage capacity. During Operation Savannah, it was not uncommon for an Eland to expend all its stored ammunition during a firefight and have to withdraw to the rear to resupply. Fourthly, the Eland was not designed as a troop-carrying vehicle. It possessed no interior space to accommodate an infantry section, forcing the attached SADF infantrymen to proceed on foot or ride in unarmoured trucks which offered minimal protection during ambushes. These issues highlighted the need for a dedicated infantry fighting vehicle in SADF service, which soon emerged in the form of the Ratel.

Operations Reindeer and Sceptic

Eland-60 with its mortar at maximum elevation. Its role during external raids into Angola was to escort rear echelon units.

Elands were again mobilised by the SADF for Operation Reindeer in May 1978, a coordinated strike on three suspected PLAN training complexes in Angola. For the purposes of this operation, the SADF experimented with an integrated combat team consisting of mechanised infantry mounted in the new Ratels, backed by attached Eland-90s providing fire support as needed. Three combat teams of Ratels and Eland-90s were created for the assault on a heavily fortified PLAN camp known as the "Dombondola Complex", also code named Objective Vietnam. One troop of Eland-90s would follow the Ratels during the attack, while the other two were to redeploy on the nearby highway linking Cuamato to Chetequera, where they could intercept stragglers potential guerrilla reinforcements. The combat teams were backed by rear echelon which included a battery of towed BL 5.5-inch Medium Guns and logistics vehicles carrying enough fuel and ammunition for the journey; these were escorted by Eland-60s in a supporting role.

During the course of Operation Reindeer, numerous Elands repeatedly stalled in mud and even loose sand, leaving no alternative but to tow them out with the much heavier Ratels. The speed at which the combat team was able to cover ground was negatively affected by the Elands' poor momentum on broken terrain. Their petrol engines were also an issue, since this factor necessitated a separate logistics apparatus from those of the Ratels. When the attack on Vietnam began, the Eland-90s deployed into a static formation and began firing on the PLAN defenders. This would prove to be a fatal error, as the close proximity of the Elands to each other and their crews' failure to exploit their mobility allowed the guerrillas to concentrate their mortars and anti-tank weapons on the lightly armoured vehicles. It also limited their arcs of fire. Due to poor visibility on the battlefield, turret crews were inclined to leave all their hatches open for maximum situational awareness. The open hatches resulted in injuries and deaths due to mortar fragments. Additionally, the crews raised complaints about the 90mm ammunition, which was difficult to load and resulted in stoppages due to some inefficient plastic components.

As a result of the lessons incorporated during Operation Reindeer, the SADF and Sandock-Austral made several changes to the Eland and its main armament. The latest mark of Eland to be introduced incorporated a raised commander's cupola with vision blocks, similar to that of the Ratel. This improved the crew commander's observation capacity without compromising the protection afforded by the turret armour. Furthermore, the use of 90mm ammunition sourced from France was discontinued and production of local 90mm ammunition optimised for the Eland was accelerated. Finally, the armoured corps acknowledged that in a composite mechanised infantry group, the Eland-90 was not suited to fight in tandem with the Ratel. The former's fire support potential was useful, but its mobility was inferior to that of the Ratel and the need to maintain a separate logistics apparatus for a separate vehicle type, especially one with a petrol engine, was not deemed economical. These concerns were addressed in the short run by mating a Ratel chassis to an Eland-90's turret and 90mm gun, creating the Ratel-90. The Ratel-90 was seen as the ideal solution, since it simplified logistics and did not compromise the overall mobility of a mechanised combat team. Its six wheels, longer operating range, and 72 stowed rounds of 90mm ammunition were also considered much more suitable for mobile bush operations.

In June 1980 the SADF launched Operation Sceptic, the largest combined arms operation undertaken by any South African military force since World War II. Sceptic was essentially identical to Reindeer in terms of objectives and organisation: there were three mechanised combat teams equipped with Ratels, including the new Ratel-90s; interestingly, the SADF also attached a fourth combat team consisting of Eland-90s and support infantry in Buffel armoured personnel carriers. There were also fifth and sixth combat teams composed entirely of paratroops, who functioned as light infantry, and a rear echelon. Their objective was to eliminate three PLAN training camps in southern Angola. The Eland-90s were given the task of leading the combat teams because the narrow width of their wheels made it difficult for them to follow in the wide tracks left by the Ratels. South African strategists also recognised that the Elands retained the poorest momentum and placed them at the front of the column to prevent them from being separated from the Ratels in the thick bush. As a consequence of this decision the combat teams advanced at a maximum speed of about 20 km/h. When the terrain became more challenging, the advance slowed to about 10 km/h. Due to their limited operating range several of the Elands ran out of fuel and had to be towed to the objective. When the combat teams reached the first PLAN facility, the stalled Elands were inadvertently towed by the Ratels into an insurgent ambush. Their crews found themselves unable to support the mechanised assault group while fighting for their own survival, and the 90mm guns were used as extremely close range to suppress counterattacking PLAN forces. The Elands were later instrumental in knocking out a number of fortified anti-aircraft positions crewed by PLAN fighters who attempted to use their ZPUs against the advancing infantry. More of them exhausted their fuel during the attack, however, prompting their recovery under fire by Ratel crews.

Operation Protea

A year after Operation Sceptic, the SADF launched Operation Protea to strike at PLAN's external sanctuaries again and cut known insurgent infiltration routes into South West Africa. Protea was mounted on an even larger scale than Sceptic; it was also notable for involving major pitched battles with FAPLA for the first time since 1975. PLAN had carefully sited its training camps adjacent to FAPLA brigade headquarters so it could take advantage of the security provided by the attached Angolan armoured and mechanised units. The SADF remained conscious of this fact and established a number of dedicated anti-tank platoons composed of Ratel-90s and Eland-90s to eliminate the FAPLA tanks if necessary. The decision to incorporate Elands into at least one anti-tank platoon attached to the mechanised combat teams proved to be an unpopular one. Combat team leaders insisted that the smaller, slower vehicles were incapable of conducting rapid fire and manoeuvre drills in concert with the Ratels. During training exercises in preparation for Protea, Ratel crews frequently left the Elands behind during their manoeuvres because they were unaccustomed to the latter's lesser terrain capabilities and technical shortcomings. Over half the armoured cars also broke down before the exercises were completed. Despite these developments, there were insufficient Ratel-90s available for all the anti-tank platoons, necessitating continued operational dependence on the Eland-90s. During Protea they were to face several companies of FAPLA T-34-85 and PT-76 tanks stationed near PLAN training facilities and command posts at Ondjiva and Xangongo.

FAPLA T-34-85, one of several encountered by Eland-90s during Operation Protea.

The objective of the FAPLA tank companies outside Ondjiva and Xangongo was static defence; they were to provide security for the nearby FAPLA brigade headquarters. Half of the tanks were not mobile but had been dug into fortified hull down positions accordingly. This proved to be a serious handicap when they were encircled or outflanked by the rapidly manoeuvring SADF anti-tank platoons. However, at normal standoff distances the Eland-90 and to a lesser extent, the Ratel-90 were at a distinct disadvantage. The FAPLA T-34-85s possessed slightly better fire control, and the effective range of their main armament was also superior. Whenever they entered combat with any type of FAPLA armour, South African anti-tank platoons benefited from the heavy foliage cover in southern Angola, which lessened the disparity between them by reducing the average range of engagement. It was quite common for skirmishes between Eland-90s and T-34-85s to be fought at distances of under a hundred metres. Both sides broke contact at dusk, since neither the FAPLA tanks nor the South African vehicles then possessed night fighting capability.

One troop of Eland-90s and two troops of Ratel-90s were deployed as part of a blocking force on the highway through Xangongo, facing Cahama, where it was hoped that their speed on tarred surfaces could be better exploited. During the night a FAPLA convoy composed of a motorised infantry element and a battery of towed artillery and BM-21 rocket launchers was spotted approaching their position. The convoy was being screened by a single BRDM-2, driving with infrared lights on. The Ratel-90s and Eland-90s promptly opened fire, destroying the BRDM and three trailing BTR-152 armoured personnel carriers. A number of the remaining vehicles in the convoy were captured intact. Eland-90s also played a key role in the capture of Ondjiva's airport, where one demolished a light FAPLA aircraft as it was attempting to take off. During the attack on that settlement, a combined force of Ratel-90s and Eland-90s encountered a defending FAPLA tank company which had cleared fields of fire and dug a number of anti-tank trenches. The longer Ratels apparently forded the trenches without difficulty, but two of Elands fell into them, one overturning in the process, and had to be recovered under fire. By the time Protea was over, the Ratels and Elands had destroyed at least sixteen T-34-85s. When the SADF departed, it left behind two companies of regular infantry, its unconventional 32 Battalion, and a single squadron of Eland-90s to guard Xangongo and prevent PLAN or FAPLA from reoccupying that settlement.

Operation Askari

Its confidence buoyed by the previous successful incursions into FAPLA-held territory, which had achieved marked success at only minimal cost in lives and materiel, the SADF scheduled Operation Askari for December 1983. Like Protea, Askari was a major combined arms assault on PLAN base areas and supply lines in southern Angola; it also entailed the planned destruction of adjacent FAPLA air defence installations and brigade headquarters. The SADF was destined to encounter unexpectedly stiff resistance from FAPLA, which brought its front-line armoured units, equipped with more sophisticated heavy armour—namely T-54/55 tanks—into offensive action for the first time. Askari brought South African troops within striking distance of four FAPLA composite brigades, or one seventh of its entire army. Each brigade possessed one or two attached companies of T-54 and T-55 tanks.

In an unexpected departure from precedent, the SADF organised its mechanised combat teams into two distinct task forces codenamed X-Ray and Victor, respectively. The bulk of X-Ray's manpower was provided by the 61 Mechanised Battalion Group, which had fulfilled a pivotal role during previous external operations and was well-equipped with a single independent squadron of Ratel-90s and a dedicated anti-tank platoon, also mounted in Ratel-90s. Victor's manpower was drawn entirely from reservists. It possessed no Ratel-90s, only a composite squadron of Eland-90s which had been scraped together from two separate reserve armour units: Regiment Mooirivier and Regiment Molopo. This reflected one of Victor's many irregularities: unlike X-Ray, it was not an especially coherent task force relying on a single unit for much of its manpower. A second, regular squadron of Eland-90s from 1 Special Service Battalion (known as Combat Team Tango) was deployed to assist Victor with diversionary actions, but was not expected to play a decisive role, leaving the reserve armour crews to shoulder the bulk of the fighting.

The decision to incorporate a reservist task force with Elands into Operation Askari would prove to be a highly controversial one. Three-quarters of the reservists' Ratels had unserviceable weapons and insufficient maintenance tools, leaving them dependent on the attached Elands for fire support. Victor also experienced firsthand the inability of the Elands to keep pace with the Ratels during convoy formation. At first Ratels and Elands were inter-dispersed throughout the formation as it advanced; while they set an acceptable pace on open terrain problems were soon encountered in the dense Angolan bush. The Ratels simply drove over fallen tree trunks, while the more compact Elands had to drive around them, slowing the convoy. On several occasions a small tree broken by a leading Ratel would catch the Eland behind it due to its lower ground clearance; sometimes the tree even regained its upright position and lifted the armoured car off its wheels. As a consequence of this practical dilemma all Elands were relegated to the rear of the column.

Victor's objective was the PLAN logistics base and headquarters at Cuvelai, a town which was also home to the headquarters of FAPLA's 11th Brigade. Initially prohibited from making frontal attacks that could be costly in lives or resources, the SADF spent several weeks harassing FAPLA with air strikes, artillery bombardments, and light probing. The 11th Brigade was to be fixed in place and intimidated until it was compelled to withdraw of its own accord. Forcing the brigade to abandon Cuvelai would allow Victor to focus on destroying the PLAN base without being engaged by FAPLA regulars with their own armour and heavy weapons. During this time, Tango's Elands were utilised for their traditional role of reconnaissance: probing FAPLA positions and marking targets for air strikes.

FAPLA T-54 or T-55 tank. Able to turn more sharply than the enemy tanks, Elands and Ratels used flanking manoeuvres to reach a T-54/55's rear.

By late December 1983, the South African political leadership was reconsidering Operation Askari in light of its apparent failure to dislodge the FAPLA brigades; convinced of the need for a major victory before the new year, the SADF issued a series of new orders to X-Ray and Victor accordingly: probing actions were to cease, and the enemy attacked "forcefully" before December 31. In line with his new directives, Greyling planned an assault on Cuvelai from the northeast. The Ratel-mounted mechanised infantry led the attack, accompanied by the Eland-90 squadron, moving along a second axis to the left and prepared to establish a direct fire support base as needed. Their advance was slowed by the Cuvelai River, which was in flood due to the onset of the rainy season. The Elands and Ratels frequently got stuck as they struggled through the muddy banks of every stream, losing their place in the order of march and throwing the attackers into disarray before they reached the FAPLA positions. Faulty intelligence also complicated the attack: the South Africans were unwittingly assaulting the most well-defended and fortified sector of FAPLA's lines. The defenders had cut down a number of trees at stump level to snag the axles of the Ratels, slowing their advance and making them easy targets for ZU-23-2s being used in the ground support role. One infantry company, call sign Juliet 19, was reportedly fired on by T-54 tanks. Greyling's incomplete intelligence suggested the defenders possessed only obsolete T-34-85s, and that these were dug into static hull down positions. The T-54s had indeed been in fixed positions until shortly before Operation Askari was launched, when the defenders moved them on the advice of their Cuban armour instructors. As his men were poorly equipped with anti-tank weapons, Greyling's Eland-90s had to contend with the tanks, a task they found impossible since the range of necessary manoeuvres could not be completed in the dense undergrowth. Spotting the T-54s, which had low profiles, was also difficult.

Sensing an opportunity to disengage, Greyling called off the attack after taking a number of casualties. This did nothing to lift the spirits of the demoralised reservists, and the withdrawal soon degenerated into a disorderly route. Defence headquarters demanded he resume the advance—Greyling retorted he would not do so without more concise planning or reconnaissance. The reserve infantrymen from Regiment Groot Karoo and some of the armoured car commanders from Regiment Mooirivier refused to launch another attack because they were disinclined to be sacrificed as "cannon fodder". The presence of mobile T-54s had also caused some anxious moments. One rifleman who participated in Victor later recalled, "It was said no tanks were at Cuvelai....during the attacks, we realised that the T-54s were driving around like golf carts on a golfing range. That shocked my confidence in intelligence officers for good. Not even a single one of their claims ever proved to be accurate. The attack also proved the fallacy of tanks dug in in static positions. Those tanks sure did move a lot, and fast". It eventually fell to an overworked X-Ray to complete the capture of Cuvelai. Due to the higher profile of their Ratel-90s they could locate the T-54s over dense vegetation before the Angolan crews in turn spotted them, an advantage Elands did not possess. A second attack spearheaded by X-Ray in concert with Victor on January 3, 1984 failed due to the flooded conditions and bad weather. A third attack was launched on January 4, along the same lines as the first: the Ratel-90s were to eliminate the tanks while sappers plotted a path through the minefields around the town. The Eland-90 squadron also engaged some of the T-54s as well. They were assisted by the fact that FAPLA had inexplicably returned a few T-54s to static hull down positions. South African and Soviet sources alike noted that several T-54/55s were knocked out by Eland-90 fire, presumably during this offensive.

The South Africans' inadequate low velocity 90mm cannon had great difficulty against the T-54s, often dispensing multiple shells before penetrating the tanks' armour. Crew tactics were to encircle single tanks with multiple Eland-90s or Ratel-90s and keep on shooting until their target burned. This required intense coordination between the vehicle commanders, who directed each other by radio until they were able to concentrate their fire on a T-54's exposed side or rear, preferably while its turret was pointed in another direction. The SADF finally took what was left of Cuvelai on January 7. The Ratels and Elands had knocked out or otherwise neutralised eleven of the 11th Brigade's T-54s.

Operations Moduler and Hilti

Operation Askari marked the last occasion the Eland was deployed as part of a primary battle group during an external operation into Angola; it was thereafter regarded as unsuitable for the increasingly conventional nature of the fighting. The mediocre performance of Ratel-90s and Eland-90s as improvised tank destroyers at Cuvelai convinced Ep van Lill, commander of 61 Mechanised, that his men could no longer be asked to fight tanks with armoured cars. Van Lill was adamant that the Ratels and Elands simply could not stand up to the heavier protection and armament of a T-54s and T-55s. As demonstrated during Askari, crew morale was negatively affected when ordered to take on T-54s in their vulnerable vehicles. This contradicted armoured corps doctrine, which was to fight tanks with tanks.

The South African government had initially refused to authorise tanks during external operations because their primary target had always been PLAN guerrillas rather than heavily armed conventional troops. But the aggressive deployment of FAPLA T-54/55s during Askari led to a reversal of this decision and the deployment of an organic Olifant tank squadron to the border. With the introduction of the Olifant and larger quantities of Ratel-90s, most Elands were gradually retired from combat service and relegated to the role of training vehicles at the SADF's School of Armour near Bloemfontein. Both the Eland-90 and Eland-60 were used to familiarise future Ratel-90 and Ratel-60 crews with their respective turret systems.

In August 1987, the SADF launched Operation Moduler to turn back a major FAPLA offensive in southern Angola, sparking what would later become known as the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. Aside from the mechanised combat teams carrying out the primary objectives, there were also a number of smaller, independent elements tasked with operating along Moduler's periphery against FAPLA. One of these units was Battle Group Zulu, which consisted of one rifle company from 201 Battalion, a Ratel-mounted mortar section, two platoons of paratroops, and a combat engineer group, with an attached troop of BL 5.5-inch Medium Guns. Zulu was also provided with a squadron of Eland-90s from 1 Special Service Battalion, presumably because no Ratel-90s were available. Zulu was directed to defend Ondjiva and stop any FAPLA units attempting to re-occupy that settlement as part of their winter offensive; the SADF had received intelligence that a column of motorised infantry was en route with that objective in mind. The Eland-90 squadron obligingly took up concealed ambush positions outside Ondjiva, on the highway towards Luanda. The armoured cars' low silhouettes and the thick vegetation allowed them to park less than ten metres from the road surface, with their turrets pointed north at a 180-degree angle. Most of the infantrymen were armed with a combination of anti-tank rifle grenades and RPG-7s in the event they needed to support the Elands against FAPLA tanks. Due to a shortage of troop-carrying vehicles, some were transported riding atop the armoured cars. They did not have to wait long. On the morning of October 5 a large FAPLA motorised contingent was sighted approaching Ondjiva, consisting primarily of truck-mounted infantry and a few BTR-60 and BTR-40 armoured personnel carriers. The advance was being screened by a reconnaissance troop of BRDM-2s, which blundered into the killzone and were engaged by the Eland-90s. While taking evasive action, one of the BRDMs drove off the road and collided with an Eland, causing momentary confusion. Most of the FAPLA column was destroyed in the ensuing firefight.

The ambush on October 5 is not mentioned in official Soviet or FAPLA communiques. However, an Angolan state bulletin dated September 13 alludes to an unspecified attack on FAPLA by SADF or SWATF troops specifically involving Eland-90s and Eland-60s. It is unclear whether this is a reference to the same action, as FAPLA claimed the South African unit responsible was 32 Battalion, which was not deployed near Ongiva at the time and only equipped with Ratel-90s. According to the bulletin, four Elands were destroyed during that engagement. Soviet sources specifically mention three Eland-90s lost to FAPLA actions between November and December 1987, although like the FAPLA communique it is unclear what units they were attached to. The first was observed by FAPLA's Soviet advisers on a road near the Chambinga river crossing on 17 November 1987, and had apparently suffered a catastrophic kill as a result of being impacted by a BM-21 rocket. The other two were reported as destroyed by FAPLA's 59 Brigade on 2 December 1987.

Operation Moduler was followed rapidly by Operation Hooper and Operation Packer in the vicinity of Cuito Cuanavale and the Tumpo River; however, the battle lines abruptly shifted south when Cuba deployed fresh combat troops in division strength west of the Cunene River. The Cuban forces concentrated there began advancing southwards towards South West Africa, and because so many of its regular units were otherwise engaged at Tumpo the SADF was slow to mount resistance. The only units near the border it had available on short notice to counter an enemy force of this size were some light infantry battalions and a few troops of Eland-90s being held in general reserve. By comparison, the Cubans were believed to possess at least one armoured brigade with T-55 and T-62 tanks. On 24 June 1988, two troops of Ratel-90s and a platoon of infantry fought a brief delaying action against Cuban T-55s between Xangongo and Cuamato. The following day twelve Eland-90s were dispatched to Cuamato to help stop the tanks. However, the anticipated Cuban attack did not materialise, and the armoured cars were subsequently withdrawn without incident. Three were detached to safeguard the hydroelectric dam at Calueque, while the others returned to South-West Africa. One was destroyed in an air strike by Cuban MiG-23s just outside Calueque on 27 June.

Internal security operations

For the first decade of the South African Border War, tanks and heavier armoured fighting vehicles had low priority in the SADF, since the Eland-90 and Eland-60 had proved adequate for counter-insurgency. Elands were perceived as being more than capable of patrolling known PLAN infiltration routes into South West Africa, and combating the occasional incursion by poorly armed guerrilla fighters. During the mid-1970s, PLAN's new strategy of mine warfare and adoption of improved anti-tank weapons such as the RPG-7 somewhat evened the odds by posing a major threat to the light armoured cars. Nevertheless, the SADF continued to deploy Elands widely in the traditional counter-insurgency role until the early 1990s, albeit with several modifications to existing doctrine. For example, the armoured cars no longer carried out their patrols without the protection of accompanying infantry. A support troop of infantrymen began preceding the Elands on foot during patrols. When an ambush was encountered they fell back while Eland crews held their positions and returned fire. Under the cover of their suppressing fire, the vehicles then withdrew to where the infantry had taken up new positions. Later on the support troop was carried in Buffel armoured personnel carriers. They continued to precede the Elands on patrol, since the Buffels were far more effective at weathering the heavy vegetation and clearing a path for the smaller armoured cars to follow. Close cooperation was practised in suppressing ambushes, with the Eland-90s utilising their main guns while the infantry deployed mortars from the Buffels.

Eland convoy in South West Africa.

The chief objective of border patrols was to locate insurgent tracks, and for this purpose the Elands and Buffels were often accompanied by specialist trackers. Whenever suspicious tracks or other signs of a large PLAN cadre in the area were located, the patrol radioed for a reaction team (known informally as a "Romeo Mike"), one of which was on standby at every SADF and SWATF unit headquarters. The reaction team would then either drive to the patrol's location or more likely, be flown in by helicopter to cut off the insurgents' avenue of retreat.

Aside from border security duties, the Elands frequently patrolled South West African roads to deter PLAN saboteurs and escort local convoys. After the insurgents began laying increasingly powerful anti-tank mines along convoy routes, the armoured cars were always preceded by a mine-protected vehicle. In the mid 1970s this usually consisted of a Hippo armoured personnel carrier, which was later phased out in favour of the Buffel and the Casspir. An Eland-90 would follow immediately behind the lead vehicle to suppress ambushes as needed, with at least one other armoured car present somewhere in the trailing convoy.

The rise of an interim South West African government during the late 1970s and early 1980s was accompanied by a defence policy dubbed "Namibianisation", a reference to the Vietnamization programme the United States had pursued during the Vietnam War. Increasingly the SADF's war effort rested on what limited white manpower could be raised in South West Africa itself, and local black units drawn from the San, Ovambo, Kavango, and East Caprivian (Lozi) ethnic groups. The main objectives of Namibianisation were to establish a self-sufficient military infrastructure in South West Africa, reduce casualty rates among South African personnel, and reinforce the perception of a domestic civil conflict rather than an independence struggle. As part of the Namibianisation programme, the SADF established an auxiliary arm, the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF), which was placed under the theoretical control of the interim government. South Africa equipped the SWATF with a single regiment of Eland-90s and Eland-60s at its inception in 1980, drawing their crews from local national servicemen. The regiment rarely operated as a cohesive unit. Rather, its squadrons were attached on a rotating basis to a variety of modular infantry battalions. Much like their counterparts in the SADF, SWATF Eland crews launched search and destroy operations, conducted road patrols and road checkpoints, and guarded static installations.

The SWATF was demobolised and disarmed by the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in mid 1989. While as a matter of policy UNTAG impounded the SWATF's small arms and ammunition, it returned all the heavy equipment collected during the disarmament process—presumably including Eland armoured cars—to South Africa.

Elands were not only deployed in the internal security role in South West Africa; as sectarian violence increased in South Africa's own volatile townships during the mid-1980s, the armoured cars were utilised for domestic riot control operations. South African officials questioned the suitability of the Eland for this role on more than one occasion, pointing out its smallest armament (the co-axial 7.62mm machine gun) was incapable of firing single shots with any accuracy. Firing the co-axial machine guns—to say nothing of the turret-mounted mortar or cannon—risked collateral damage in densely populated urban districts. This resulted in so much controversy that around 1986 the SADF issued a new directive to Eland crews in the townships prohibiting them from operating their turret armament. If self-defence became necessary they were only permitted to use hand-held personal weapons from inside their vehicles.

Rhodesian Bush War

Eland armoured cars of the Rhodesian Armoured Corps in 1979.

During the Rhodesian Bush War, the Rhodesian Air Force (RhAF) was perturbed by the likelihood of guerrilla saboteurs disturbing the security of its key air bases, forward airfields, or other rear guard installations which were vital to its operational capabilities. By 1971, airfield and base defence had assumed greater importance; this prompted the establishment of a new Security Training Unit (STU) to instruct air force recruits on patrolling the perimeters of RhAF facilities. The STU was largely trained and equipped with assistance from South Africa, which provided radios, small arms, and weapons instruction. Requests for new equipment were made through a liaison officer attached to the Rhodesian Special Branch.

In 1972 it became clear that the STU would benefit greatly from armoured vehicles, which could enable the tactical deployment of security personnel and permit them to aggressively engage the enemy as far away from high value assets as possible. The SADF concurred and donated twelve Eland-60 armoured cars to the STU for this purpose. The first Rhodesian Eland crews underwent a twelve week training programme in Bloemfontein alongside their South African counterparts; subsequent intakes received their armour instruction at Inkomo Barracks outside Salisbury. All of Rhodesia's Eland-60s were initially deployed to New Sarum Air Base, where rivalries soon arose between the STU personnel and the air crews. The latter were annoyed by the armoured cars' high fuel consumption, given that the necessary petrol was appropriated from their own motor vehicle section. RhAF parachute instructors mockingly referred to the STU troops as "Desert Rats", a reference to the 7th Armoured Division of World War II fame. This evolved into a running gag that culminated in ratlike caricatures being spraypainted on the Eland-60 hulls. STU armour crews embraced the mascot and adopted "Desert Mice" as an informal callsign. Their motto, "Seek and Squeak", parodied the "Seek and Strike" maxim of No. 4 Squadron, RhAF.

As the scope and intensity of its counter-insurgency operations continued to increase, the RhAF became dependent on a network of twelve forward airfields. These airfields were widely dispersed and located in operational areas, which hampered attempts to secure them by traditional air base defence concepts. Furthermore, security troops had the added responsibility of conducting logistics convoy and escort duties in addition to guarding key resources. The Eland-60s quickly became crucial to the forward airfields' security system. They not only escorted convoys but also circled the perimeter of the surfaced runways before each aircraft landed.

Rhodesia, which unilaterally declared its independence in 1965 and, subsequently, the formation of its own republic in 1970, was the first foreign government to receive the Eland. At least twelve Eland-60s were delivered by South Africa in 1967. Another seven arrived in 1971. These were handed over to the Rhodesian Air Force (RhAF), as sabotage was a widespread concern and airfield security considered imperative for the war effort. Air Force crews were trained at the School of Armour in Bloemfontein, alongside their South African counterparts. Their Eland-60s were later demonstrated for the Rhodesian Army, whose officials undertook the first order in 1975. Thirty Eland-90s were delivered, and served with the Rhodesian Armoured Corps until the end of the country's long-running bush war.

Shortly after the arrival of Elands at New Sarum Air Force Station, rivalries intensified between the armoured car personnel and the flying corps. Airmen were annoyed by the Eland-60s' fuel consumption, given that the necessary petrol was appropriated from their own stocks. Rhodesian parachute instructors mockingly referred to crew members as "Desert Rats": a running gag that culminated in ratlike caricatures appearing on vehicle doors. The unit eventually embraced the mascot and adopted "Desert Mice" as an informal callsign. Their motto, "Seek and Squeak", parodied the "Seek and Strike" maxim of No.4 Squadron, RhAF.

Based out of King George VI Barracks in Salisbury, the Rhodesian Armoured Corps (RhACR) was formed as a reserve unit. It inherited Daimler Ferrets from 1 Reconnaissance Troop, Rhodesian Light Infantry, and some decrepit T17 Staghound scout cars of World War II vintage. Crew members completed a year's training in March 1974, undergoing basics as support infantry before 26 weeks of armour instruction. The following year they received the first shipment of Eland Mk4s.

Rhodesian armoured doctrine called for Elands to be used in border patrol, convoy escort, picket duty at key junctures, and "showing the flag" - or creating a visible government presence - in remote areas. Reconnaissance was carried out on the same doctrine laid down by the British for Humber and Marmon-Herrington armoured cars during World War II. Movement behind foreign lines or areas heavily occupied by insurgents was based on Israeli mechanised doctrine for entering "occupied territories". To compensate for their frequent lack of air, artillery, or even infantry support in dangerous regions such as the Honde Valley, RhACR crews developed tactics emphasising movement, speed, and offensive action. Late in the war, Rhodesian engineers proved that AP rounds fired from an AK-47 could penetrate an Eland's frontal armour, but they conceded that this disadvantage was offset by the vehicle's speed and weapon range.

As the Elands had been procured from South Africa, local security forces initially disguised them with number plates registered to the South African Police (SAP), which had a presence on the Rhodesian border. This facade was abandoned after the police were recalled in 1976, though South African authorities - fearing the consequences of any escalation of conflict between Rhodesia and her neighbours - barred their deployment in external raids. Nevertheless, the departure of the SAP made this unenforceable, and Rhodesia's Eland-90s were sent into Mozambique during Operation Miracle (1979). Under the command of American major Darrell Winkler, they spearheaded the assault on "Monte Cassino", a hillside defended by ZPU and ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns in the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) complex at New Chimoio. A counterattack by Mozambican tanks caused some anxiety, but the Rhodesians were able to disperse them with Ordnance QF 25-pounders and two Hawker Hunter jets without committing their armoured cars.

Zimbabwe

Eland-90 in Zimbabwean tigerstripe camouflage. What its firepower could do to the thinly armoured BTR-152 was gruesomely demonstrated at Entumbane in 1981.

Operation Miracle had been conventional ground warfare in all but in name, convincing the Rhodesian leadership that their insurgency was now being waged on a scale they could not hope to win. Less than ten days after the raid, a constitutional conference on Rhodesia was held at Lancaster House and chaired by Lord Carrington. In attendance were representatives of both ZANLA and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), its rival militant wing, along with their respective political heads. The conference concluded after forty-seven plenary sessions with agreements on a new constitution for majority rule, arrangements for a transitional period preceding recognised independence, and a ceasefire on 15 December 1979. South Africa began withdrawing its support.

On 18 April 1980, Rhodesia became the new Republic of Zimbabwe, with avowed Marxist Robert Mugabe as premier. Determining that any Elands remaining in the former Rhodesian Army pool must not be permitted to fall into Mugabe's hands, a South African fifth column recruited conspirators in the Zimbabwe Defence Forces to repossess the armoured cars. This attempt fell through when a senior Zimbabwean general officer backtracked on their agreement. He still had time to serve before qualifying for a pension and was not keen to provoke the regime. The SADF remained understandably reluctant to leave its own sophisticated hardware with an army which might well become its future opponent, and explosive charges were uncovered in the Eland-90 fuel tanks later that year.

Sporadic fighting broke out between ZANLA and ZIPRA militants in 1980, and again in 1981. Being relatively neutral in the inter-factional strife, the former Rhodesian Armoured Corps (now known as the Zimbabwe Armoured Corps, or ZACR) was a prime candidate for maintaining order. In January 1981, ZACR was persuaded to dispatch a single troop of Eland-90s to 1 Battalion, Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR), then keeping the peace in Harare. The cars were manned by national servicemen and led by Sergeant "Skippy" Devine, an Australian veteran of the Rhodesian Light Infantry. Their first action came at Glenville, Bulawayo, during the second Entumbane Uprising, when Zimbabwe's 13th Infantry battalion succumbed to infighting. In the absence of the unit's British instructors, the RAR was tasked with quelling the altercation. Late on 8 February 1981, Devine's Elands obligingly charged the 13th battalion encampment and flattened several dissidents beneath their spinning wheels. Three days later, ZIPRA reinforcements in the form of BTR-152s were spotted approaching Bulawayo. Devine was ordered to intercept and destroy them. He was joined by the RAR's support company in infantry fighting vehicles. The Elands promptly identified and knocked out a BTR at an outlying intersection. Taking up positions on the high ground overlooking Selborne Avenue, they stayed in place until two more BTRs attacked, firing indiscriminately with DShK machine guns. Both were destroyed by 90mm shells at two hundred metres. Devine conducted a sweep of the area the next morning, capturing several ZIPRA T-34 tanks without resistance.

At independence, Zimbabwe had inherited between 26 and 28 Eland-90s, which were integrated into a single squadron with the 6 remaining Air Force Eland-60s. After Entumbane, these were deemed insufficient. The Defence Ministry wanted another three squadrons of armoured cars. If the need arose each squadron could theoretically be attached to a brigade. More to the point, Elands were already suffering from poor maintenance and lack of spares. General Solomon Mujuru tasked a five-man procurement team, including Bruce Rooken-Smith (commander of the ZACR) to find a suitable complement. They did review the Lynx turret, which was mounted on the Panhard ERC-90 and later versions of the Panhard AML, but there is no indication that Harare was interested in refurbishing its existing fleet or purchasing an updated AML. Mujuru settled on Brazil's EE-9 Cascavel and the first models were commissioned by Mugabe in 1984. The Elands were still in service as late as the Second Congo War.

Western Sahara War

Captured Moroccan Elands in the Polisario Military Museum, Algeria. Note the Eland-20 to the left.

Prior to the outbreak of the Western Sahara War, the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces (FAR) received relatively little modern armament, particularly from non-Francophone states. Meanwhile, the Polisario Front, intent on waging an armed struggle for Sahrawi independence, had stockpiled weapons from Algeria and seized additional equipment during raids on Moroccan forces. The hardware attrition rate spiralled upwards after the Madrid Accords and it quickly became apparent that new suppliers were needed to fill the bulk of FAR's needs. A gradual arms buildup in the Sahara began in 1976. Financial assistance from Saudi Arabia allowed Rabat to tap a broad supply network: weaponry was obtained as far abroad as Iran, West Germany, and Belgium. Orders for Panhard AML-90s were placed with France; although some did arrive in second-hand condition, Panhard had long closed its production line and referred Morocco to South Africa. The first Eland Mk6s were clandestinely imported in 1976. Others appeared with Ratels in the FAR after 1978. They were accompanied by eight South African instructors for training Moroccan crews, though other personnel were expressly forbidden to approach them.

Morocco grew more concerned with each successive FAR setback, and in September 1979 General Ahmed Dlimi adopted a new strategy of consolidating the occupation forces spread out across Western Sahara. Individual garrisons were mustered into tactical groups for massed search and destroy operations against Polisario guerrillas menacing Dakhla, Zag, and Tarfaya. FAR's Elands were first sighted during Operation Imam, one such attempt to break the encirclement of Zag. The Moroccan crews proceeded through a narrow valley against the counsel of their South African instructors, who correctly suspected a Polisario ambush. A large guerrilla force was able to trap and cut off the column of armoured cars in the valley. Over 30 Elands were captured during the failed offensive and some were destroyed. Domestic markings had been censored prior to export, but the vehicles were identified by an Afrikaans inscription on their intact fill caps. Eland-90s remained a notable feature in El Aaiún's anniversary parades for several years to come.

Other conflicts

South Africa supplied 40 Elands of unknown designation to the Ugandan People's Defence Force in the mid-1990s, along with Buffel mine-protected troop carriers. The cars likely entered service during the Second Congo War, and may have seen action with Ugandan armour at Kisangani. They were later deployed against the Lord's Resistance Army. Local media also published reports that Nelson Mandela's administration offered Elands to Pascal Lissouba before his loyalists were defeated by Angolan invaders in the Republic of the Congo Civil War. These claims could not be independently verified. Another source maintains that the original Congo order was placed in 1994 and only one was delivered.

At least 100 Eland-90s and 20 Eland-60s were emptied from SANDF surplus in 1999 and handed to a Belgian defence contractor (Sabiex) for resale. In September 2006, it emerged that President Idriss Déby of Chad was negotiating their purchase. The first 40 were delivered via France on March 3, 2007 and soon blooded in the fighting against a rebel faction encroaching on Adré. While Belgium reported the 1999 deal to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, it neglected to offer any details regarding Chad. Sabiex could neither confirm nor deny the sale to Amnesty International. The Wallonia Directorate for Arms Licences merely recalled authorising export to a buyer in France, without any restrictions as to further sales or transfers. Chad has since used its Elands on routine patrols near the Sudanese border, and against Islamic radicals in northern Mali.

Because the Eland is regarded as a cheap alternative to improvised technicals in areas where climate, terrain, and lack of support infrastructure or technical skill forestall the operation of large heavy armour forces, it has remained popular with sub-Saharan armies and insurgent groups.

Description

Rear of an Eland Mk7. The engine compartment is a recognisably South African feature.

Eland hulls are constructed of a welded homogenous steel that provides moderate protection against grenade fragments, antipersonnel mines, and light weapons. The driver is seated at the front of the vehicle and is provided with a one-piece hatch cover that swings to the right. He has a total of three integral periscopes, which may be replaced by passive infrared or night vision equipment for driving in darkness. The turret is in the centre of the hull, where two other crew members are alternatively seated by variant. The rear power plant is completely enclosed in the hull with air intake and exhaust openings safeguarded through a ballistic grille conceding unrestricted air passage.

An Eland's gearbox has one reverse and six forward gears. It is crosswise, coupled to both sides of the bevel pinion. Drive is transmitted from the gearbox to two lateral transfer boxes via pinions to the rear wheels and drive shafts that follow the hull to the front wheels. The shafts have extra universal joints beneath the turret. Each shaft drives a second cam type differential which bar either of the two wheel pairs from exerting a speed radically different from the other. In this respect Elands are less likely to experience transmission fouls and tyre wear than other armoured cars with a single central differential. The Panhard electric clutch, a major stumbling block for inexperienced drivers, has been replaced by a more concurrent hydraulic system for easier maintenance and reduced crew training time.

Also noteworthy is the independent suspension consisting of coil springs and hydropneumatic shock absorbers on trailing arms in the wheel mechanism; South Africa later adopted this design for the Rooikat. All four wheels are of the split rim type and fitted with Dunlop 12.00x20 tyres. There are two hydraulic braking systems, one for the front and one for the rear.

External

A squat, four wheeled, vehicle, the Eland slopes downwards at the front and less prominently at the rear. There are large semicircular wheel arches, which are obscured by storage bins adjacent to each rear wheel. Sand channels are stowed across the front of the hull, with headlamps located on either side of the towing shackle, beneath the channels. There are three periscopes over the driver's position. Turrets are shallow and rounded, with sloping sides and a prominent sighting periscope to the right. There is a domed cupola over the commander's hatch.

Variants

Rooikat prototype built on an Eland drive train.

Eland-60

Modelled after Panhard's AML HE-60-7, the Eland-60 was the first Eland variant to enter service. It is armed with twin 7.62mm machine guns on the left and a single 60mm mortar on the right. Unlike its French predecessor, only one machine gun is mounted coaxially in the turret. A second was typically carried on a pintle for anti-aircraft use. The mortar has an elevation of +75° and a depression of -11°. A single type of mortar is available: the Hotckiss-Brandt CM60A1, produced under licence as the Model K1. It can be fired on a flat trajectory and is effective up to 300 metres in the direct role, or 1,700 metres in the indirect role. No more than 56 rounds of 60mm and 3,800 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition are carried. South African crews usually stored 44 mortar bombs per vehicle.

Eland-60s have a rounded turret with a large, dual-piece, hatch cover opening front and rear.

Eland-90

Modelled after Panhard's AML H-90, the Eland-90 functioned as a fire support platform and assault gun. In this role it was easy to underestimate. During combat against tanks, its biggest edge was superior mobility, although this was diminished somewhat by the lack of a stabilised cannon. The armoured cars were often decisively outranged by the Angolan tanks, and their inability to fire on the move resulted in a poor rate of engagement. Eland-90s are equipped with a Denel GT-2 90mm gun; a coaxial 7.62mm machine gun is also mounted to the left of the main armament. The GT-2 has an elevation of +15° and a depression of -8°. Turret rotation is manual and takes approximately twenty seconds. A gunner is seated on the right and has a one-piece hatch cover. The loader or commander is on the left of the gun and a single hatch cover provided for the commander. Total ammunition capacity is 29 rounds of 90mm and 2,400 rounds of 7.62mm.

When needed, Eland-90s could accommodate two ENTAC or SS.11 missiles, both of which slide out of external rails to be launched.

Eland-20

The Eland-20 was a base Ratel's turret atop the Eland chassis. It is fitted with a 7.62mm machine gun and 20mm GI-2 (M963 F2) autocannon offering an elevation of +38° and a depression of -8°. The 20mm cannon has a cyclic rate of fire of 750 rounds per minute. If required, another 7.62mm machine gun can be mounted on the turret roof.

Destined for export, Eland-20s were marketed primarily to Morocco. At least 18 of Ireland's AMLs were also upgraded to this standard by South Africa and redesignated "AML H-20".

Other variants

In 1994, an Eland was showcased with a turbocharged diesel four-cylinder powerpack developing 103 hp at 4,000 rpm. This was mounted on a sliding frame to facilitate easier engine removal and maintenance. Apart from the new engine, other changes were made to enhance performance in tropical climates. These included modified air conditioning and cooling systems. Reumech OMC—then a subsidiary of Vickers—marketed the design as Eland Mk7 Diesel Turbocharged, or simply "Eland Mk7 DT". An estimated 200 Mk7s were haggled from the SANDF for diesel conversion.

Mechanology Design Bureau, another South African firm, has proposed removing the Eland-90's turret altogether and replacing it with a giant cupola. This relieves ground pressure considerably, allowing for the installation of a specialised electronic reconnaissance suite. A similar upgrade was proposed for the Eland-60, although the latter retains its original turret.

Several foreign companies currently offer extensive rebuild or overhaul programmes for the Eland, particularly with regards to improving engine performance and reliability. Saymar, an Israeli firm, has proposed a modified Eland with a two-litre Toyota diesel engine developing 76 kW (102 hp). Another upgrade programme is being marketed by Belgium's Sabiex International, which includes the complete refurbishment of the vehicle's transmission, electrical system, and drive train.

Various demonstrators have been built at the SANDF School of Armour utilising an Eland drive train, suspension, or chassis. Examples include an armoured personnel carrier resembling the Panhard M3 and an 8X8 Rooikat prototype.

Armament and ammunition

90mm GT-2, shown here outside a Free State shellhole.

The modular design of Eland weapon systems allowed Sandock-Austral to update or downgrade armament with ease according to prospective clients' wishes. Ranging is manual and Eland-90s assisted by a non-stabilised optical fire control system.

Like the AML, the Eland is equipped with a two-person turret. The original Eland-60 had an unusual combination of the 60mm K1 mortar and two medium, or one heavy, machine guns - a combination inspired by French experiences in the Algerian War. The mortar weighs 75 kg and is 1.8 metres long. Maximum effective range of the K1 as produced by Denel Land Systems is stated to be 1,700 metres. An Eland-60 was always present in every South African support troop due to the effectiveness of its illumination bombs during night operations.

It was the SAAC which first recommended an AML with heavier armament: they were then looking for a fire support platform to complement the Alvis Saracen. Due to parts compatibility the Alvis Saladin was an obvious initial choice. Nevertheless, the AML licence had already been purchased, so there were obvious advantages in filling the same role with an existing vehicle. Panhard's response was the AML H-90.

The 90mm GT-2 gun, which fires fin-stabilised high-explosive (HE) and high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) projectiles, is heavier than that mounted in the Saladin and provides the Eland with a very potent form of armament, considering its small size and speed. It weighs 380 kg and has a double baffle muzzle brake. With the muzzle brake, it measures 4.1 metres in length. Low-angled rifling is used in the barrel. The breech of the gun is semi-automatic and fitted with a vertical sliding wedge breech block. The firing mechanism utilises a mechanical firing pin which was prone to sticking and malfunction in dusty climates. There is also a recoil control mechanism consisting of a single cylinder with a constant stress spring and a hydropneumatic recuperator designed to return the GT-2 to its original firing position. This process entailed releasing oil into a nitrogen reservoir as the gun recoiled upon firing. Oil levels and the nitrogen pressure had to be monitored frequently; if neither was sufficient turret crews were forced to physically manhandle their gun back into position. During the 1970s, the recoil systems in all the Eland-90s were modified to allow the gun to be fired in all directions from the fully traversing turret without the risk of knocking the extremely lightweight armoured car over. In theory, these modifications also permitted the gun to be fired while the vehicle was in forward motion, although crews were prohibited from doing so due to the likelihood of transmission damage.

South Africa began producing its own 90mm ammunition in large quantities after French high-explosive rounds were blamed for causing stoppages in Eland-90s during Operation Reindeer.

Eland-90 ammunition

Type	Model	Weight, kg (catridge/projectile)	Filler	Muzzle velocity, m/s
HEAT-T	OCC F1	7.077 / 3.65	RDX/TNT, 670g	760
HEAT-TP	TP-T BSCC 90 F1	7.077 / 3.65	Aluminum, tracer	760
HE	OE F1	8.662 / 5.27	RDX/TNT, 945g	650
WP-SMK	OFUM F1	9.07 / 5.4	White phosphorus, 800g	650
Canister	Canister GT-2	-	1100 lead spheres, 4 kg	450
Blank	Blank cartridge, 90mm F1 with shortened primer	3.4 / -	-	-

Maximum effective range of the Denel GT-2 is stated to be 2,200 metres (HE). The HEAT-T round will penetrate 320mm of armour at a zero angle of incidence or 150mm of armour at a 60° angle of incidence. A locally manufactured fin-stabilised, shaped charged, projectile was also under development in 1976. The complete round weighs 7 kg of which the projectile itself weighs 3.65 kg. The complete round is 654mm in length with the projectile being 500mm in length. This round has an m/v of 750 m/s and a maximum velocity of 760 m/s, and effective range is given as 1,200 metres.

Doctrine

The Eland's first combat deployment to the Caprivi Strip revealed major flaws in South African armour doctrine. Firstly, the SAAC learned that significant swathes of Namibian (and Angolan) terrain were not ideal conditions for military vehicles. Caprivi had thick bush which restricted movement, turret traverse, and visibility. It also confounded textbook formations. Second, Eland crews were trained on the arid flats of Bloemfontein and Walvis Bay. The conditions they encountered were quite unlike anything the SADF had prepared them for.

Much was learned from Elands' performance in Operation Savannah. Their ability to move so swiftly over tar and packed gravel surprised FAPLA on multiple occasions. They were also rather silent; a quiet petrol engine enabled stealth during ambush or evasive manoeuvres. Furthermore, the Eland-90 proved that it was powerful enough to defeat the heaviest armour ranged against it, the Soviet T-34. Savannah was the SAAC's first experience of mobile warfare in the Angolan bush, creating a laboratory where new tactics could be tested.

The Eland possessed the greatest power-to-weight ratio of any vehicle in the SADF.

According to the South African Military College at Voortrekkerhoogte, which clearly recognised the Eland's weakness in attrition warfare, SADF doctrine was to be "based on not to hold ground but to create the design of battle in such a way that you would lure the enemy into killing ground and then [with] the superiority of fire and movement, you would kill him completely." Factors such as rapid movement, striking from the flank, surprise and confusing the enemy with continuous manoeuvring thus became integral components in the new SAAC. That Voortrekkerhoogte was worried about the Eland's light construction was apparent. It subsequently issued a requirement for a "heavy armoured car" and grafted support infantry into the existing squadrons to deal with the threat posed by RPGs. Due to lack of space in an Eland to accommodate support troops, infantry mobility vehicles were called for. The SADF experimented with Land Rovers, Bedford RLs, and Unimog trucks before United Nations Security Council Resolution 418 further limited their choices. There were logistical incentives for adopting the Panhard M3, which shared many interchangeable parts with the Elands, but this notion was rejected: Pretoria wanted a true MRAP. After dozens of trials and modifications the Buffel was finally born.

Eland squadrons operated on the troop (platoon) level in operational areas: one was assigned to virtually every major settlement (i.e. Rucana, Ondangwa, Eenhana, Katima Mulilo, etc.). There were four Elands in a troop - Bravo Car, Alpha Car, Charlie Car, and Delta Car. Alpha and Charlie were the troop sergeant and leader respectively. Bravo was always an Eland-60. Delta was the additional option: either a second Eland-60 or a support infantry Buffel. This provided an excellent mix of direct and indirect fire to troop commanders. Bravo could release illumination bombs for night attacks or create a smokescreen. Charlie and Alpha laid down suppressive fire. If present Delta infantry debussed and attacked on foot from the nine o'clock position. Communication in the troop was essential, as fire had to be lifted once Delta moved to target.

The armoured car troop was expected to operate independently. Its own crews carried out repair and recovery with limited resources. Operations were dictated by the amount of fuel, ammunition, water and ration that could be carried per vehicle. The Eland's easy maintenance allowed them to operate on makeshift repairs in the field for up to seven days, hunting SWAPO cadres by day and forming open laagers by night.

One of the first major breakthroughs of the late 1970s was the development of the Ratel. Three years after Springfield-Bussing built the first prototype in 1974, Magnus Malan reported to Parliament that the Ratel was "successfully industrialised". Ratels replaced Buffels in support troops and by 1982 all armoured car regiments had been retrained to depend on mechanised infantry during conventional operations. A second watershed came when twelve junior officers and senior noncoms underwent training as tank commanders in the Israeli Defense Forces, which had amassed considerable experience with mobile mechanised warfare. Officers who attended courses at the IDF combat school included the later commanders of 61 Mechanised, including Gert van Zyl and Ep van Lill. The acquired expertise in armour tactics was implemented in SAAC curricula and manuals, replacing the archaic British doctrine of World War II. Commands became more concise, emphasis shifted to reaction speed, and evaluation methods improved substantially. Nevertheless, the SAAC defeated the purpose of Israeli tank drills by applying them directly to armoured cars, setting a trend that continued throughout the border war.

Throughout the 1980s, Elands played a supporting role for the Ratel-mounted mechanised combat groups. Specific infantry battalions such as 61 Mechanised also held generic platoons of Eland-90s or Ratel-90s as an antitank reserve. The latter was preferred, as Elands experienced difficulty observing other forces in thick bush. Spotting tanks was a particular problem. Their crews had an even chance of noticing FAPLA T-54/55s, which also had low profiles. This poor visibility in vegetation also complicated command and control, frustrating both driver and troop leader to no end.

Gunner's view from the turret of an Eland-90. A FAPLA T-34-85 looms beyond the muzzle brake.

For decades, Elands were widely deployed in lieu of tanks in the SAAC. The main danger with this policy was that crews and commanders were often forced to use them against Angolan or Cuban tanks. Whenever T-55s appeared on the battlefield, they caused anxious moments for the Eland-90. The tanks carried stabilised cannon, so they could fire on the move, whereas the Eland-90 needed to come to a stop before discharging its main gun. Firing the 90mm GT-2 while in forward motion was theoretically possible but disrupted the recoil procedure and risked catastrophic damage to the vehicle's transmission. Their inferior armament and optics meant that Elands had to close in on a tank to eliminate it, which demanded considerable skill. Where possible gunners aimed for the rear, flank, or a vulnerable margin beneath the turret front. Naturally the tank would also turn to avoid exposing its thinner armour, so expert manoeuvring was required before they could get behind a T-55 and destroy it from there.

Eland-90 troops always identified one tank as a priority target. Then, when the chance came, the Elands fired simultaneously—knocking out the tank. To avoid being hit between volleys, they had to keep moving. This protocol was derived from SADF experience fighting T-34s and later applied to T-55s. Armoured car commanders believed it wouldn't have fared well against T-62s. Eland-90s struggled in big, dense, bushes while attempting to carry out their usual tactic during Operation Askari and were hereafter deemed unfit for high intensity campaigns.

Survivors

South Africa formally retired its Eland-90 fleet in 1994. The last SANDF exercise involving Elands of any description was held in 1996. Of the 1,268 still accounted for in 1991, only 235 remained by 1998. A statistic released by the Department of Defence in 1997 confirmed that Elands valued in excess of 41.3 million rand had been scrapped. In October 2005, all the SANDF's remaining Elands were offered for sale. Tenders for Eland-90s were still available in 2009.

In January 2005, two Elands at the South African National Museum of Military History were repossessed and impounded by the SANDF. Government records suggested they had been marked off for disposal some time prior. Why the vehicles were maintained at the museum without the SANDF's apparent knowledge remains a mystery. In July 2015, they were finally returned and overhauled by Denel at its own expense.

Both the South African Armour Museum in Bloemfontein and Sandstone Estates in Ficksburg have preserved at least one Eland-90 and Eland-60 apiece. Others survive on SANDF bases as gate guardians. Four armoured units are known to have retained individual Eland-90s for ceremonial purposes: 1 Special Service Battalion, the Umvoti Mounted Rifles, Regiment Mooirivier, and Regiment Oranjerivier. These vehicles participate in parades, public exhibitions, and fire gun salutes during special occasions, such as the anniversary of the South African Armoured Corps. Turretless Elands modified with ring-mounted handrails are still used for transporting SANDF dignitaries on parade grounds during official inspections.

An Eland-90 was sold at a private auction in Portola Valley, United States, on July 11–12, 2014. Another Eland was sold to Jordan by an unidentified supplier in the United Kingdom the following year, possibly for exhibition at the Royal Tank Museum in Aqaba. Other foreign museums known to possess Elands in their collections include the Gweru Military Museum in Zimbabwe and the Sahrawi People's Liberation Army Museum in Algeria.

For several decades, an Eland captured by FAPLA during Operation Savannah was publicly displayed in a square near the centre of Luanda. This vehicle has undergone at least one restoration and now resides at the Angolan Museum of the Armed Forces.

Operators

Operators of the Eland. Red = Former, Blue = Current.

• Benin - Beninese Army: 3 Eland-90s, supplied from unidentified source in 2010. Beninese crews schooled by 1er RHP, France.
• Burkina Faso - Burkinabe Army: 4 Eland-90s, supplied from unidentified source in 2006.
• Chad - Chadian Ground Forces: 82 refurbished Eland-90s purchased from a Belgian firm in 2007.
• Gabon - Gabonese Army: 4 Eland-90s and 4 Eland-60s in service with the presidential guard.
• Ivory Coast - Ivorian Gendarmerie: Unidentified number of Elands.
• Malawi - Malawian Army: 13 Eland-90s purchased from the SANDF in 1994.
• Morocco - Moroccan Army: 60 Elands delivered in 1981; provided with instructors for training the Moroccan crews.
• Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic - Polisario Front: Presumably captured from Morocco.
• Senegal - Senegalese Army: 47 Eland-90s purchased in 2005.
• Uganda - Ugandan Land Forces: 40 Elands purchased prior to the Second Congo War.
• Zimbabwe - Zimbabwe National Army: 28 Eland-90s and 6 Eland-60s inherited from Rhodesian predecessor at independence in 1980.

Former operators

• South Africa - South African Army
• South-West Africa - South West African Territorial Force: At least 40 Elands provided by the SADF; deployed exclusively with 91 Brigade and the 34th Kavangoland Battalion.
• Rhodesia - Rhodesian Army: Up to 34 Eland-90s and Eland-60s acquired or on loan from South Africa, which initially limited their use in external raids. Disguised with South African Police licence plates prior to 1976.

In popular culture

Eland-90s make an appearance in Call of Duty: Black Ops II, battling FAPLA troops during a fictitious engagement of Operation Alpha Centauri. A number are destroyed by T-62s outside Jamba in the protagonist's first mission, "Pyrrhic Victory".

In the Larry Bond novel Vortex, an Eland squadron annihilates a Cuban T-62 company during a hypothetical SADF invasion of Namibia. The armoured cars are able to accomplish this by attacking from the rear; they later run low on fuel and are dug into hull down positions around Walvis Bay. This gives the T-62s an opportunity to close range and overrun them.

Mothballed Elands are surreptitiously appropriated by a mercenary unit with the connivance of two corrupt SANDF officers in The Liberators, by Tom Kratman. At one point during the novel, an Israeli firm proposes upgrading the turrets with a 60mm hyper velocity gun. Eland-90s are eventually retained for their greater effectiveness against bunkers and fortifications.

Gallery

• 
  Eland-60, Tempe School of Armour
• 
  Eland-90, Tempe School of Armour
• 
  Driving compartment
• 
  Gun selector switch box
• 
  Gunner's sight
• 
  Eland-90 gate guardian, Tempe School of Armour
• 
  Plinthed Eland-90 in Irene
• 
  Chadian Eland on patrol in the Central African Republic

External links

External image
Photo of the Eland-20

• Photo gallery at Primeportal.net
• Photo gallery at SA Transport
• "Rhodesian Armoured Cars", July 2011 - South African Military History Society
• Selected short stories from Billy: Reminiscences of an Eland-90 commander
• Sentinel Projects: Personal accounts of military service in the SADF and Border War
• Eland (Armoured) Noddy Car
• 61 Mechanised Battalion Group Veterans' Association