Talk:Zionism

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A subsection about evolution of the "national home" concept - take 2

About a month ago I started a discussion about a subsection describing evolution of the "national home" concept, but the discussion has been archived before a consensus about the precise formulation and appropriate location of that section had been reached.

To remind you, the subsection which I wrote a few days prior to that discussion, has been moved around the article several times and eventually removed altogether - a move I strongly objected, since the exact nature of the "national home" envisioned by the Zionist movement is a key part of its ideology and history.

I would like to restore this subsection and merge it into the "Claim to a Jewish demographic majority and a Jewish state in Palestine" subsection, and would also suggest to replace the "Jewish state" in the name of the subsection with "home for the Jewish people" or with "national home", in order to reflect the initial ambiguity of the concept.

Below is the proposed phrasing, that includes all the edits made by me and other editors, before the section was removed, as well as several changes taking into account the comments made in earlier discussion.

---

"Home for the Jewish people" - evolution of the concept

The Zionist concept a "home for the Jewish people", as articulated, for example, in the Basel Program, or a "national home for the Jewish people", as it was later referred to in the Balfour Declaration, initially encompassed diverse views on its nature and scope. Early Zionists initially envisioned a limited autonomy within a larger multinational framework. During the British Mandate, these aspirations evolved into discussions that considered binational federalist models that sought to reconcile Jewish national goals with coexistence and shared governance with the Arab population in Palestine. According to historian Walter Laqueur, the bi-national solution was advocated in only a "half-hearted way" by the Zionist movement and relied on the expectation of gaining Arab agreement. However, the Arabs rejected bi-nationalism and parity, feeling no need to compromise on Palestine's Arab identity and were particularly concerned that increased Jewish immigration would threaten their status in Palestine. As the political landscape hardened — marked by total Arab rejection of the Jewish national home idea and the advent of Nazism — a broad consensus favoring the establishment of a fully independent Jewish state eventually emerged within the mainstream Zionist movement.

References
References

DancingOwl (talk) 20:06, 12 February 2025 (UTC)

Personally I think that’s a well written, well sourced positive addition BobFromBrockley (talk) 21:26, 12 February 2025 (UTC)

I think the question here is mostly about the level of detail we want to include and making sure to avoid giving UNDUE weight to certain aspects. As we've mentioned elsewhere, there are already length concerns with the current article.

My understanding is that the purpose of adding this section is to demonstrate the range of views over time and within the movement on the nature of the Jewish national home. Homeland for the Jewish people seems more appropriate for this content.

More relevant for this article is the point that Zionism is about a Jewish national political life, which is already well expressed in this article. The details in the proposed para explain disagreements about how this should be attained--but I think it's too detailed for this article.

We also do discuss in passing the idea of parity: Weizmann was open to the idea of Arabs and Jews jointly running Palestine through an elected council with equal representation, but he did not view the Arabs as equal partners in negotiations about the country's future. In particular, he was steadfast in his view of the "moral superiority" of the Jewish claim to Palestine over the Arab claim and believed these negotiations should be conducted solely between Britain and the Jews.

And we also discuss the hopes of the movement post wwi: In parallel, the Zionist demand for a clear British acknowledgment of the entirety of Palestine as the Jewish national home was rejected. Instead, Britain committed only to establishing a Jewish national home "in Palestine" and promised to facilitate this without prejudicing the rights of existing "non-Jewish communities"—these qualifying statements aroused the concern of Zionist leaders at the time. DMH223344 (talk) 20:11, 14 February 2025 (UTC)

I don't think adding this paragraph would be UNDUE, because it describes a key aspect of movement's view of its goals. DancingOwl (talk) 08:48, 15 February 2025 (UTC)

Early Zionists initially envisioned a limited autonomy within a larger multinational framework. During the British Mandate, these aspirations evolved into discussions that considered binational federalist models that sought to reconcile Jewish national goals with coexistence and shared governance with the Arab population in Palestine

These two sentences do not recognize the influence of practicality and tactical moves on the decisions of the movement. Importantly, the first sentence refers to a period before the movement had the official support of the British. As Gans says in the footnote on the referenced page:

The relationship between entertaining very ambitious goals and withdrawing from such goals, which I discussed there [chapter 2], also applies here.

Looking at that discussion we see:

To deal with this objection, a distinction must be drawn between two sorts of cases, namely, those in which the transition from very ambitious goals to more modest ones is a result of acknowledging the constraints imposed by reality and morality on one’s ambitious goals, and cases in which this transition is the product of calculated political tactics.

I am not arguing what Gans attributes primarily to the "new historians": They claim that the apparent modesty of many of the official decisions and statements made by Zionist leaders should be attributed to mere tactical considerations.

Instead I am saying that we should recognize the influence of practical constraints, and give them DUE weight.

I also question how DUE it is to state that there were "discussions" around such federalist models. The citations are primarily a list of statements from Zionist leaders (this supports the statement well I think), and notably Weizmann's stance is missing, although he is mentioned in passing in one of the citations.

Weizmann (who was of course very influential during this period) proposed the parity compromise at a time where the movement was in a "state of threefold distress caused by Jewish impotence, growing Arab resistance, and negative trends in British policy on Zionism." (Gorny, Ideology) When the outlook was more positive, "[p]arity now appeared to him of scant importance. Its sole significance in his eyes was as a convenient political means of rejecting British proposals for the establishment of a legislative council." (Gorny, Ideology) The content of the parity proposal itself also is interesting to look at (Gorny, Ideology):

The intention was to guarantee the civil status of the Arabs in the light of the future expansion of the Jewish population and to consolidate the national rights of the Jews in the face of the existing Arab majority.

Also note that Gorny himself (referenced here as well, although a text about Zionist ideology as a whole, rather than focusing specifically on the federalist models) says regarding the post wwi period:

Nor did the Zionist movement get all it had hoped for. Its demand for an explicit British acknowledgement of Palestine as the national home of the Jewish people was rejected, and hopes for British commitment to help in building this home were dashed. The commitment was confined to the establishment of a Jewish national home ‘in Palestine’, and assurances of Britain’s ‘best endeavours to facilitate the achieve­ ment of this object’, it being clearly understood ‘that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of exist­ ing non-Jewish communities in Palestine’. These qualifying statements aroused the concern of Zionist leaders at the time...

So Gorny is saying that even at this point the movement wanted one thing, but tactically had to pursue another.

At the moment, our article has some, but limited, discussion about the development of the goals of factions and leaders within the movement. The discussion is primarily limited to the mainstream movement and the representation of the movement's goals in mainstream RS about Zionism and Zionist ideology. I really think that the best place for a more thorough discussion than we already have belongs instead in either History of Zionism or possibly Homeland for the Jewish people. DMH223344 (talk) 21:42, 15 February 2025 (UTC)

Your summary is good. Another thing that influenced Zionist thinking in the post-WW1 period was the lack of Jewish immigration. There were even a few years when more Jews left than arrived (I think it was 1927–1928 or 1928–1929). So at that time the prospect for a massive Jewish majority seemed all but hopeless. Immigration only picked up when oppression in Europe picked up in the 1930s. Zero^talk 04:09, 16 February 2025 (UTC)

There is no doubt that the the proposed draft gives only a broad-strokes overview of this important topic, and you are absolutely right that some aspects, such as the questions of practical/moral constraints that are discussed by Gans in the passage you quoted, can be addressed as well.

I intentionally tried to keep it brief, given the article's length constraints, and if we do decide that there is a need to expand on those aspects, the "History" or the "Homeland" articles would probably be a better place for a more detailed discussion, beyond the brief overview outlined above.

Regarding the question "how DUE it is to state that there were "discussions" around such federalist models" - I think the fact the Gorny's 2006 book is dedicated entirely to this topic is a pretty strong indication that, in his view, those discussions were far from being a marginal matter.

As to second quote from Gorny's "Ideology" book - note that it refers to the question of territory, not the the political form of the national home, which the focus of the proposed paragraph.

Also, your statement that "the movement wanted one thing, but tactically had to pursue another" seems to echo what, as you said it yourself, Gans attributes primarily to the "new historians": They claim that the apparent modesty of many of the official decisions and statements made by Zionist leaders should be attributed to mere tactical considerations. However, as far I can see, Gorny himself doesn't make this claim in the passage you quoted. DancingOwl (talk) 15:59, 16 February 2025 (UTC)

1. "I intentionally tried to keep it brief, given the article's length constraints", that's exactly my point, that if we present this discussion while maintaining BALANCE, we will require much more space.
2. The "discussions" dont have to be "marginal" to be considered UNDUE.
3. The Gorny quote is also about the nature of the national home: it being clearly understood ‘that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of exist­ ing non-Jewish communities in Palestine’. These qualifying statements
4. So what do you think Gorny is saying in that quote, then? He says Nor did the Zionist movement get all it had hoped for, which i think is consistent with the movement wanted one thing, but tactically had to pursue another

DMH223344 (talk) 18:24, 16 February 2025 (UTC)

1. .. if we present this discussion while maintaining BALANCE, we will require much more space
   Not necessarily - we could use some paraphrase of Gans' quote above to acknowledge the existence of a academic debate regarding the question whether "the transition from very ambitious goals to more modest ones is a result of acknowledging the constraints imposed by reality and morality on one’s ambitious goals" or "this transition is the product of calculated political tactics". This would allow us to maintain BALANCE, without sacrificing conciseness.
2. The "discussions" dont have to be "marginal" to be considered UNDUE
   Then, perhaps, I misunderstood what you were trying to say - could you elaborate a bit?
3. The Gorny quote is also about the nature of the national home
   This particular passage doesn't talk about national rights of the Palestinian Arabs, and any form of Jewish national home - including not only limited autonomy (or, "Dominion", promoted at some point by Jabotinsky) or bi-national federation, but also a fully indepedent Jewish nation-state on part of the territory - would be consistent with British "qualifying statements".
4. So what do you think Gorny is saying in that quote, then?
   Like I said, this brings us back to Gans' quote you quoted earlier - Gorny obviously talks about Zionist leadership having to compromise, but he doesn't say whether this was a "result of acknowledging the constraints imposed by reality and morality" or a "product of calculated political tactics".

DancingOwl (talk) 16:05, 17 February 2025 (UTC)

Gans is trying to distinguish between the influence of different types of constraints whereas I'm just emphasizing the role of constraints in general. DMH223344 (talk) 18:01, 19 February 2025 (UTC)

Which part of the discussion above are you referring to here? DancingOwl (talk) 18:21, 19 February 2025 (UTC)

The claim that Jabotinsky "drew inspiration from the Nazi demographic policies"

This claim that appears in the "The Peel Commission transfer proposal" section is based on a heavily truncated quote from Jabotinsky's book "The Jewish War Front", published in 1940, after the outbreak of WWII, and grossly misrepresents Jabotinsky's actual attitude towards the idea of population transfer.

First of all, for most of his life Jabotinsky vehemently opposed this idea, including as late as 1937, after it was proposed by the Peel Commission.

Second, while his opposition to population transfer weakened towards 1940, he still insisted that it would be "undesirable from many perspectives" and only considered the option of voluntary transfer.

Finally, this change of heart was not "inspired by Nazi demographic policies", but was primarily driven by the worsening conditions of European Jewry and the urgent need to find a solution for the large number of Jewish refugees. Additionally, he noted that the idea of population transfer was gaining increased support at the time, including from U.S. President Roosevelt. The cherry-picked quote mentioning Hitler appears in Jabotinsky's book within a broader discussion based on his observation that "the idea of redistributing minorities en masse is becoming more popular among 'the best people' and there is no longer any taboo on the discussion of the subject."

Consequently, I suggest removing this misleading passage.

References
References

DancingOwl (talk) 15:47, 14 February 2025 (UTC)

I dont think the passage contradicts what you're saying here:

1. He drew inspiration from similar policies in the 20th century
2. He sees the world as accommodating to population transfer schemes, with particular reference to hitler who gave it a 'good name'

DMH223344 (talk) 19:20, 14 February 2025 (UTC)

I think your description is much more accurate than how it's currently phrased in the article - the reference to Hitler is just one example he uses to demonstrate that the world is accommodating to population transfer idea, and framing Hitler's "demographic policies" as the reason for Zhabotinsky's change of heart is highly misleading. Not to mention that this phrasing omits the fact that he still considered population transfer 'undesirable from many perspectives,' and that his primary reason for being willing to consider it was the dire condition of European Jews following the outbreak of World War II. DancingOwl (talk) 09:05, 15 February 2025 (UTC)

Just adding a dummy comment to prevent the bot from archiving this topic again DancingOwl (talk) 18:01, 10 March 2025 (UTC)

@DancingOwl, an alternative to removing this passage is contextualising it by adding the sources you've mentioned here. Currently only Finkelstein's viewpoint is represented in the article. To satisfy WP:NPOV we have to provide a balanced coverage, something along the lines of

“ Vladimir Jabotinsky rejected the 1937 Peel Commission's partition plan and condemning it as "ethnic cleansing." However, in his final 1940 book amid World War II, his position evolved to accept the possibility of voluntary Arab emigration—a shift linked to his growing concern about Jewish refugees in Europe and the increasing international acceptance of population transfers. ”

Alaexis_¿question? 20:58, 10 March 2025 (UTC)

Suggested rewrite for the "Zionism and colonialism" section

The section in its present form suffers from WP:EXCESSDETAIL and reads like a disjoint collection of "he said, she said" claims, rather than a clear exposition of the most important points in the "Zionism and colonialism" academic debate.

I suggest replacing it with a more concise exposition of the essential points, and moving the more detailed description of the arguments made by the different authors into the Zionism as settler colonialism article.

Below is a proposed draft of the section, in which I tried to describe the key points of view, while remaining as close to the sources as possible - please, let me know what you think:

---

Zionism and European colonialism

Zionism has been characterized as a form of colonialism or settler colonialism by various scholars. Joseph Massad argues that Zionism was intrinsically linked to European colonial thought from its inception, shaped by antisemitism and European imperial interests. Edward Said similarly described the movement as following the European colonial model, particularly in its patronizing view of the native Palestinian population, which it regarded as backward. On the other hand, Zeev Sternhell disagrees that Jews arriving in Palestine had a colonial mindset, while admitting that Zionism was a movement of "conquest". Similarly, Anita Shapira and Shlomo Ben-Ami frame Zionism as a national liberation movement that was "destined" or "forced" to use colonial methods. Conversely, Nur Masalha argues that Zionism cannot be understood as a national liberation movement because it relied on British colonial support, asserting that "the State of Israel owes its very existence to the British colonial power in Palestine".

Colonialism vs colonization

One key argument made against supporters of the thesis that Zionism is a colonial movement is that they often conflate colonialism and colonization, using the terms interchangeably. Several scholars, including Ran Aaronsohn and Yitzhak Sternberg, argue that it is important to clearly distinguish between those two concepts that refer to two very distinct phenomena.

Post-1967 era

Finally, Gershon Shafir, Jerome Slater and Shlomo Ben-Ami consider the Israeli conquest of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967 to be a turning point in Zionist history, after which the Zionist movement more closely resembled other colonial movements, with Shafir noting that after 1967 the Israeli state became the sponsor of the Zionist movement's colonial efforts, a role which had previously been played by the British. Similarly, according to Sternhell, the conquest of 1967 was the first time the Zionist movement created a "colonial situation." However, this view is disputed by Avi Shlaim, who describes 1967 as a milestone in the development of the "Zionist colonial project" rather than as a qualitative shift in its nature.

Zionism as settler colonialism

Main article: Zionism as settler colonialism

Beyond characterizing it as a colonial movement, Zionism has been more recently described as a form of settler colonialism, with scholarly proponents of this paradigm including Edward Said, Rashid Khalidi, Noam Chomsky and Ilan Pappe.

The settler colonial framework on the conflict emerged in the 1960s during the decolonization of Africa and the Middle East, and re-emerged in Israeli academia in the 1990s led by Israeli and Palestinian scholars, who challenged some of Israel's foundational myths. It built on the work of Patrick Wolfe, an influential theorist of settler colonial studies who has defined settler colonialism as an ongoing "structure, not an event" aimed at replacing a native population rather than exploiting it. DancingOwl (talk) 10:54, 16 February 2025 (UTC)

Thanks for this effort. This is a very difficult topic to write about well since each editor will insist on the inclusion of their view, and I agree with Dowty that this is ultimately an argument over semantics.

1. I agree with your shortening of the first subsection (european colonialism), but think it still very much reads in the he-said-she-said way.
2. I think it's important to have more detail on the colonialism vs colonization debate. Most of the debate over colonialism is about this point.
3. I think its important to include mention of the first aliyah since the ethos of the project changed in a sense at that time.
4. This text doesnt really belong in Zionism and settler colonialism since this is about colonialism in general (it's a shame that so many wiki articles are poorly named. I'd hate to create a Zionism and colonialism article...)

I tried to incorporate some of your suggestions. DMH223344 (talk) 19:02, 16 February 2025 (UTC)

Thanks, it's been indeed quite a challenge to create a more concise summary, while keeping most of the arguments contained in the previous version - hopefully, the editors who contributed to this section earlier will understand the need to find the right trade-off between length and comprehensiveness.

1. I agree with your shortening of the first subsection (european colonialism), but think it still very much reads in the he-said-she-said way.
I tried to make it much more arguments-centered rather than authors-centered, but I agree that it still retained some of the "he-said-she-said" quality - not sure at the moment whether it's possible to get rid of it completely

2. I think it's important to have more detail on the colonialism vs colonization debate. Most of the debate over colonialism is about this point.
I agree that the colonialism vs colonization debate is key here, but as far as I can see, a big part of that subsection is not really concerned with this particular distinction, but with other arguments for/against characterization of Zionism as colonial movement.

3. I think its important to include mention of the first aliyah since the ethos of the project changed in a sense at that time.
I agree - perhaps we can merge this with the discussion about the post-67 period under a more general headline of "Phases" or something of the sort

4. This text doesnt really belong in Zionism and settler colonialism since this is about colonialism in general (it's a shame that so many wiki articles are poorly named. I'd hate to create a Zionism and colonialism article...)
Currently, the Zionism as settler colonialism article already contains a lot of material about the more general "Zionism and colonialism" debate, not just about settler-colonial framework - perhaps we could change the title to something like "Zionism as colonialism/settler-colonialism"? That would both better align with the article's current content and enable us to move the details of the 'Zionism and colonialism' debate there. DancingOwl (talk) 15:29, 17 February 2025 (UTC)

The title stems from the fact that much of the academic discussion is specifically around settler-colonialism, the notion of broader colonialism is only really covered in the background section due to that being the language and terminology some early Zionists used to frame the endeavour. -- Cdjp1 (talk) 22:12, 20 February 2025 (UTC)

Refs

References

Herzl's 12 June 1895 diary entry

The "Early Zionist settlement" section currently contains the following passage:

Herzl publicly opposed this dispossession, but wrote privately in his diary: "We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in our country... Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly." Support for expulsion of the Arab population in Palestine was one of the main currents in Zionist ideology from the movement's inception.[152]

There are two major problems with this passage:

1. It mispresents his public opposition to dispossession of tenant farmers as happening at the same time he wrote the quoted diary entry, whereas in fact the entry was written on June 12, 1895, and predates Herzl's statements against expulsion of Arab farmers by about 8 years.
2. As another diary entry written just a day later shows, at that time Herzl was thinking about Argentina, not Palestine, as the future location for Jewish national home

References

DancingOwl (talk) 15:53, 18 February 2025 (UTC)

This is the characterization presented by Morris. He says something to the effect of "in private, Herzl sung a different tune". DMH223344 (talk) 17:59, 19 February 2025 (UTC)

And this characterization is disputed by Penslar and Karsh - each for different reason.

Also, as far as I can see, the referenced passage from Morris talks specifically about Herzl and doesn't make a general claim that support for expulsion of the Arab population in Palestine was one of the main currents in Zionist ideology from the movement's inception. DancingOwl (talk) 18:18, 19 February 2025 (UTC)

the claim that "Mainstream Zionist groups for the most part differ more in style than substance..."

The lead currently includes the following claim:

Mainstream Zionist groups for the most part differ more in style than substance, having in some cases adopted similar strategies to achieve their goals, such as violence or compulsory transfer to deal with the Palestinians

The claim is not supported by the sources:

• The referenced pages/sections from Penslar 2023, Ben-Ami 2007, Shapira 1992 and Shlaim 2001 don't contain anything about mainstream Zionist groups differing more in style than substance
• Sternhell 1999 does talk about "a difference of form and not an essential difference", but than goes on to elaborate:

Its adherents unanimously viewed Zionism as an enterprise for the rescue of the Jews and their transfer en masse to Palestine and, later, to the state of Israel. They all believed that as far as circumstances permitted, the whole land had to be conquered and settled by all possible means. They all recognized that Zionism's task was to bring about a cultural revolution such as the Jews had not experienced since the conquest of Canaan. And all, finally, held the Bible to be the deed to the land, the entire land of their forefathers.

The only part that can be potentially interpreted as referring to "violence or compulsory transfer" is "the whole land had to be conquered and settled by all possible means", but such interpretation would be a clear WP:SYNTH.

• Similarly, while passage from Gorny 1987 does talk about differences of "style of political action" between Jabotinsky and the other Zionist leaders, neither it nor the subsequent text supports the claim that they all 'adopted similar strategies to achieve their goals, such as violence or compulsory transfer to deal with the Palestinians'
• The passage from Chomsky 1999 talks about contemporary Labor and Likud parties - not the pre-state Zionists groups - and also doesn't say anything about mainstream Zionist groups 'adopting similar strategies to achieve their goals, such as violence or compulsory transfer to deal with the Palestinians'
• Sabbagh-Khoury does claim that "it was the Zionist Left that pioneered the violence of settler colonization.", but again inferring from this a general claim that "mainstream Zionist groups for the most part differ more in style than substance" or the specific claim about compulsory transfer would be a clear WP:SYNTH.

DancingOwl (talk) 09:43, 19 February 2025 (UTC)

I suspect the ref to Penslar may simply have the wrong page; a quick search found this on page 43: The continued application of classic Zionist categories is problematic not only because change over time calls their relevance into question. Those in the past who identified with one Zionist camp or another were unaware of or reluctant to admit commonalities between them and their mutual influence. This was particularly the case for Labor and Revisionist Zionism during the heyday of their internecine struggles during the 1930s and 1940s. The social and economic ideologies of the two movements differed profoundly, but their goals and methods diverged more in style than substance. Given that it overtly uses the "style vs. substance" comparison in as many words. My guess is that the ref was added for that and the page number added only later on, accidentally target to a page that was less central to the main point. --Aquillion (talk) 14:21, 21 February 2025 (UTC)

• For Ben-Ami I found something similar; page 3 has nothing but page 313 has the following: Two schools did exist in Israel, and indeed in the Zionist movement, with regard to the diplomacy of peace and the conditions that justify going to war. In the 1940s, however, and in the history of the peace overtures in the aftermath of the 1948 war, the two-school theory was just that, a theory. It simply did not exist in real life. The differences, if any, between moderates and activists were then microscopic, more a question of style and tactics than of substance. It seems almost certain that that was the page that was intended to be cited. --Aquillion (talk) 14:32, 21 February 2025 (UTC)
• The ref to Shlaim is probably based on this quote from the prologue - Weizmann’s policy toward the Palestine Arabs is usually described as moderate, but it was moderate in style much more than in substance. Not sure if that's an ideal thing to cite for this, since it's not comparing different strands directly that I can see, but it might be usable elsewhere. --Aquillion (talk) 14:54, 21 February 2025 (UTC)
• Shapira is a lot more complex and the cite to it doesn't seem to be based on a single pull-quote but on an overall reading of her conclusion, which (summarizing the parts relevant to this sentence) largely focuses on the inevitability of Zionism reaching a single endpoint. I do think that it supports the statement, perhaps even in more depth than the snappy quotes the others are used for, but it's complicated and probably requires its own section if we're going to discuss it. --Aquillion (talk) 14:54, 21 February 2025 (UTC)

  @Aquillion, judging by the quotes you've cited, it seems like the second part of the sentence (such as violence or compulsory transfer to deal with the Palestinians) isn't supported by sources. Or am I missing something? Alaexis_¿question? 21:56, 21 February 2025 (UTC)

That is the "single endpoint" I mention Shapira discussing, although it's a bit more complex than that because Shapira basically says that there was a degree of self-delusion early on about what the Palestinians would accept, which allowed early Zionist groups to have a degree of plausible deniability with regards to what they were actually pushing for and what the implications of it would be. But you can see more extensive citations regarding that in the body of the article - According to Anita Shapira, beginning in this period, Labor Zionism's use of violence against Palestinians for political means was essentially the same as that of radical conservative Zionist groups cited to Shapira 1992, pp. 247, 249, 251–252, 350, 365. Although the lead version is much more cautiously-worded than that due to the "in some cases." --Aquillion (talk) 02:48, 22 February 2025 (UTC)

I finally had the time to go over the pages from Shapira's book and I find it hard to understand how those passages can bee seen as supporting the claim in the lead that Mainstream Zionist groups for the most part differ more in style than substance, having in some cases adopted similar strategies to achieve their goals, such as violence or compulsory transfer to deal with the Palestinians. (The quote from the last paragraph of "Zionist policies and the 1936–1939 Arab Revolt" subsection that you mentioned is also not consistent with what those passage actually say, but I will address this in a separate topic).

In fact, many of those passages explicitly discuss fundamental differences between Lehi/IZL and Labor.

Here are just two examples:

• p. 247:

Labor movement leaders were quick to realize the dangers immanent in the IZL. They viewed the acts of terror initiated by the organization as sheer insanity: Not only did they fail to stop Arab terror, they even threw oil on the fire, pushing the Arab population to rally around the Arab terrorist gangs... the mass indiscriminate killings of the aged, women, and children by the IZL awakened disgust and grave misgivings.

• p. 249:

Since the IZL’s uniqueness and strength were principally associated with its terrorist activities, discrediting the organization necessitated a fundamental repudiation of its methods. In this way, the IZL’s identity as a fascist organization was mobilized as a weapon in the struggle against the powerful lure that indiscriminate force had for certain youth groups. The phrase “fascist approach” was repeatedly used to describe their actions. Thus, the inclusion of the dispute about the use of force within the boundaries of the overall confrontation between right and left ultimately led to the identification of the unrestrained use of force with one camp and its discrediting with the other.

And, again, nowhere in those pages does Shapira talk about "compulsory transfer". DancingOwl (talk) 16:33, 7 March 2025 (UTC)

Thanks for locating those quotes.

A few comments:

• Penslar quote is much more nuanced that the statement it's used to allegedly support - the "the social and economic ideologies of the two movements differed profoundly" part is not consistent with the over-generalized claim that Mainstream Zionist groups for the most part differ more in style than substance.
• Ben-Ami's quote talks about similarity in a specific context that includes two key parts - 1) with regard to the diplomacy of peace and the conditions that justify going to war 2) In the 1940s...and in the history of the peace overtures in the aftermath of the 1948 war. Over-generalizing it to a simplistic statement about absence of substantial differences between different mainstream Zionist groups throughout movements history violates the requirement take care not to go beyond what the sources express or to use them in ways inconsistent with the intention of the source, such as using material out of context, stated in WP:OR.
• I agree that Shlaim's quote that talks specifically about Weizmann cannot be used as a source for a general statement about different Zionists groups
• Regarding Shapira:

1. The period in question is the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt, so once again we have a critical historical context absent in the lead that makes a much more general claim.
2. There is no mention of compulsory transfer here
3. I didn't have the time to thoroughly examine the whole pp. 247, 249, 251–252, 350, 365 page range yet, but already on p. 247 the following statement can be found:

   Labor movement leaders were quick to realize the dangers immanent in the IZL. They viewed the acts of terror initiated by the organization as sheer insanity: Not only did they fail to stop Arab terror, they even threw oil on the fire, pushing the Arab population to rally around the Arab terrorist gangs.

   This seems to be directly contradicting the claim that Labor Zionism's use of violence against Palestinians for political means was essentially the same as that of radical conservative Zionist groups, but I need to find the time to examine all the referenced passages more carefully.

DancingOwl (talk) 10:14, 23 February 2025 (UTC)

Failed verification of three references to (Gorny, 1987)

Currently a reference to a passage from p. 251 of (Gorny, 1987) is used three times as an alleged source for claims that are not consistent with what the full passage actual says.

1. In the "Claim to a Jewish demographic majority and a Jewish state in Palestine" section, the claim is "Gorny argues that the Zionist movement regarded Arab motives in Palestine as lacking both moral and historical significance"
2. A similar claim appears in the "The Peel Commission transfer proposal" section - According to Gorny, these considerations would drive the Zionist belief in the necessity of the use of force against the Arabs whose motives "were of no moral or historical significance"
3. Just before that, there is an additional claim - The dominant feeling within the movement was that Jewish considerations took precedance over those of the Arabs and the Zionist movement was in a struggle for survival. From this perspective, the leadership believed that the movement could not afford to compromise - that references a wider page range - pp. 250-253 - but seems to be based on the same passage from p. 251.

Now the passage in question discusses Beilinson’s position in context of Arab revolt. For a full context, here is the relevant text, starting from the end of p. 250:

Two months after violence erupted (and shortly before his death), Beilinson asked:

"Till when? Till when is the Zionist movement condemned to fight and to struggle for its existence? Until the might of the Jewish people in their own land will, a priori, spell defeat for any adversary who attacks us; until the . most ardent and most daring within the enemy camp, wherever they may I be, realize that there is no means of breaking the spirit of the Jewish people in their own land, for theirs is a living need and a living truth and there is no alternative but to accept them. This is the meaning of the struggle." (M. Beilinson, ‘The Meaning of the Struggle*, Davar, 23 June 1936)

This was perhaps the ultimate expression of the theory of the necessity of force, accepted by most trends of Zionism. It was accompanied by the assumption that the struggle of the Jewish people , for Palestine was a question of basic survival ‘while for the Arab people, whatever their motives, the fight is not a question of life or I death’.(M. Beilinson, ‘How Shall We Prevail’, Davar, 28 May 1936) Consequently, the Jews could not permit themselves to compromise or to make significant concessions, and thus the motives of the Arabs (whether base or noble) were of no moral or historical significance. These remarks were based on belief in moral relativity in historical development, but their dangerous implications were tempered by Beilinson’s social democratic value system.

In other words, in this passage Gorny doesn't talk about Zionist leadership in general, but specifically about Beilinson, at a very specific point in history - the beginning of Arab revolt. The only statement about Zionist attitudes in general is "...the theory of the necessity of force, accepted by most trends of Zionism".

Consequently, presenting it as a general description of Zionist views is extremely misleading, especially when the historical context is omitted and it's phrased as movement's basic attitude since its inception, as it happens in "Claim to a Jewish demographic majority and a Jewish state in Palestine" section. DancingOwl (talk) 10:46, 20 February 2025 (UTC)

Makes sense. The only statement about the Zionism in general here is that the theory of the necessity of force is accepted by most trends of Zionism. Everything else would be an improper WP:SYNTH. Alaexis_¿question? 22:02, 21 February 2025 (UTC)

While he does quote Beilinson, and further talks about Beilinson, Gorny states that that was the ultimate expression of necessary force which was accepted by most trends in of Zionism. So yes, Gorny does talk about Zionism by way of quoting Beilinson as an expression of it. There is absolutely no WP:SYNTH as suggested by Alaexis. SYNTH (per the policy) states "Do not combine material from multiple sources to state or imply a conclusion not explicitly stated by any of the sources. Similarly, do not combine different parts of one source to state or imply a conclusion not explicitly stated by the source". This is clearly taking material from the same section of the one source. TarnishedPath^talk 10:20, 22 February 2025 (UTC)

Perhaps that's one way of reading this sentence. But it's just as (or perhaps more) likely that "accepted by most trends of Zionism" is dependent on the noun phrase "the theory of the necessity of force." Belinson's words are the ultimate expression of this theory. Alaexis_¿question? 15:21, 22 February 2025 (UTC)

It looks to me that's how the person who edited in the material read it. TarnishedPath^talk 06:45, 23 February 2025 (UTC)

This is a textbook example of do not combine different parts of one source to state or imply a conclusion not explicitly stated by the source - the only claim explicitly stated by the source is "the theory of the necessity of force, accepted by most trends of Zionism".

The interpretation that the "accepted by most trends of Zionism" part also applies to the subsequent statements, including "the Jews could not permit themselves to compromise or to make significant concessions, and thus the motives of the Arabs (whether base or noble) were of no moral or historical significance" part is clearly a conclusion not explicitly stated by the source, especially when Gorny refers specifically to Belinson twice in that part - first time through a reference to his article and second time by explicitly stating his name.

Finally, WP:NOR explicitly states:

Any passages open to multiple interpretations should be precisely cited or avoided.

DancingOwl (talk) 09:27, 23 February 2025 (UTC)

It's from the same section of the source. There's zero WP:SYNTH. TarnishedPath^talk 09:42, 23 February 2025 (UTC)

We could argue whether two consequent passages should be considered different parts of one source or not, but luckily WP:OR spared this from us by clearly stating that

Any passages open to multiple interpretations should be precisely cited or avoided.

So, even if we disagree whether this is WP:SYNTH, at the very least there are two possible interpretations of the passage in question, so it should be precisely cited or avoided. And precisely cited means "cited in context and on topic", the context in this case being Beilinson’s position after the outbreak of Arab Revolt. DancingOwl (talk) 10:28, 23 February 2025 (UTC)

A quote followed by a paragraph which makes reference to the quote is exactly the same section of a source. It's as clear as the sky is blue. TarnishedPath^talk 10:33, 23 February 2025 (UTC)

Ps, see Talk:Libertarian Party (Australia)/Archive 2#Conservatism where I made that exact argument and consensus was that WP:SYNTH was not violated. TarnishedPath^talk 10:36, 23 February 2025 (UTC)

Like I just said, even if we disagree whether this is WP:SYNTH, at the very least there are two possible interpretations of the passage in question, with both me and @Alaexis understanding only the the theory of the necessity of force as a general statement about Zionism, with the rest of the passage being a description of Beilinson's personal position.

Accordingly, WP:OR requires that the passage in question should be precisely cited or avoided. DancingOwl (talk) 10:45, 23 February 2025 (UTC)

The passages are cited, hence you previously adding failed verification to them.

Look we could go back and forth on this for a very long time and in a discussion involving three people where it is 2-1 consensus might never arise for anything. Do you have any specific suggestions for rewriting the three sections of text which would avoid with what you saw as the need to add failed verification tags? TarnishedPath^talk 10:25, 24 February 2025 (UTC)

Having now read this section I see no issue with the conclusions TarnishedPath has come to. -- Cdjp1 (talk) 13:20, 24 February 2025 (UTC)

The requirement in WP:NOR is for the passages to be cited in context and on topic, and since Gorny's quote appears specifically in context of his discussion of Zionist reaction to violence outbreak during the Arab Revolt, the first occurrence in the "Claim to a Jewish demographic majority and a Jewish state in Palestine" section should be removed altogether, because there the quote is over-generalized to a sweeping statement about Zionist position since movement's inception.

Regarding the other two sentences from the "The Peel Commission transfer proposal" section, I suggest to rephrase them as follows:

Amidst the eruption of violence during the Arab Revolt in 1936, most Zionist factions saw the use of force as a necessary means of defense and deterrence. Moreover, some, like Beilinson, viewed the Jewish struggle for Palestine as a matter of survival, whereas for the Arabs, it was not an existential issue. Consequently, they believed that Jews could not afford to make significant concessions and that Arab motives — whether noble or base — were not historically or morally significant.

DancingOwl (talk) 10:14, 26 February 2025 (UTC)

You would propose that wording to replace all of the third last paragraph and the top part of the second last paragraph? TarnishedPath^talk 10:28, 26 February 2025 (UTC)

No, just these three sentences:

The dominant feeling within the movement was that Jewish considerations took precedance over those of the Arabs and the Zionist movement was in a struggle for survival. From this perspective, the leadership believed that the movement could not afford to compromise. According to Gorny, these considerations would drive the Zionist belief in the necessity of the use of force against the Arabs whose motives "were of no moral or historical significance."

DancingOwl (talk) 10:37, 26 February 2025 (UTC)

I suggest you re-read the whole section and reconsider what you're proposing, particularly because the first sentence of the third-last paragraph currently starts By the time of the 1936 Arab revolt ... and the your proposed wording would start below that in that same paragraph with Amidst the eruption of violence during the Arab Revolt in 1936 ....

A} that wouldn't read well and

B) I'm pretty sure it will get reverted because of the usage the 'Amidst the eruption of violence' wording. TarnishedPath^talk 10:45, 26 February 2025 (UTC)

A) We can omit in 1936 to avoid repetition and start the edit with Amidst the eruption of violence during the Arab Revolt... or Amidst the eruption of violence during the revolt...

B) The quoted passage from Gorny starts with "Two months after violence erupted (and shortly before his death), Beilinson asked...", so this wording is directly based on the source. DancingOwl (talk) 11:10, 26 February 2025 (UTC)

@DancingOwl Could you propose a full rewording of the section, it would be clearer? But I agree we should add more context. Michael Boutboul (talk) 18:40, 27 February 2025 (UTC)

I agree that a proposal showing how the full section would read would be more useful. I would suggest any proposed wording not have 'amidst the erruption of violence' bit in it. TarnishedPath^talk 23:54, 27 February 2025 (UTC)

Sure, I will prepare such a proposal later today.

What do you think would be the best phrasing to reflect the fact that the passage from Beilinson's article quoted by Gorny was written in response to the eruption of violence during the Arab Revolt? DancingOwl (talk) 04:10, 28 February 2025 (UTC)

Given the third last paragraph already starts with By the time of the 1936 Arab revolt, I don't think anything further about the Arab revolt needs to be added. TarnishedPath^talk 08:59, 28 February 2025 (UTC)

As I started preparing a suggestion for a rewrite I realized that part of the problem here was that the larger passage mixed two separate discussions - one about the use of force and the other about the partition plan.

Accordingly, I moved a couple of paragraphs to the sections where they are most relevant - hopefully later today will have the time to finish the rewrite of the passage we discussed. DancingOwl (talk) 11:54, 28 February 2025 (UTC)

I don't think I have a problem with reorganisation, however you should be aware that some of those edits that you performed technically violated the active arbitration restriction that "[c]hanges challenged by reversion may not be reinstated without affirmative consensus on the talk page". It would have been safer for you to bring those changes here as proposals prior to implementing. TarnishedPath^talk 01:33, 1 March 2025 (UTC)

Could you elaborate which of the changes involved such violation?

Because, as far as I remember, the only change challenged by reversion was the addition of the "failed verification" template, and I haven't reinstated any of those.

Am I missing something? DancingOwl (talk) 05:04, 1 March 2025 (UTC)

You're correct. My apologies, I've just examined the revert I made to challenge your changes around Gorny, and those parts were me removing the failed verification tags not restoring any structure or content. TarnishedPath^talk 06:22, 1 March 2025 (UTC)

ok, like I said above, I moved the passage we discussed into the "Zionist policies and the 1936–1939 Arab Revolt" where it fits more naturally, based on the the context of the quoted passage from Gorny.

Now, I propose the following change of phrasing:

−

The 1936 Arab Revolt was a turning point in Jewish-Arab relations, unifying previously divided factions within the Zionist movement and reshaping their political outlook. The dominant feeling within the Zionist movement was that Jewish considerations took precedence over those of the Arabs and the movement was in a struggle for survival. From this perspective, the leadership believed that they could not afford to compromise. According to Gorny, these considerations would drive the Zionist belief in the necessity of the use of force against the Arabs whose motives "were of no moral or historical significance".

+

The 1936 Arab Revolt was a turning point in Jewish-Arab relations, unifying previously divided factions within the Zionist movement and reshaping their political outlook. The Arab violence lead most Zionist factions to view the use of force as a necessary means of defense and deterrence. Moreover, some, like Beilinson, viewed the Jewish struggle for Palestine as a matter of survival, whereas for the Arabs it was not an existential issue. Consequently, they believed that Jews could not afford to make significant concessions and that Arab motives — whether noble or base — were not historically or morally significant.

DancingOwl (talk) 16:35, 28 February 2025 (UTC)

I don't see an improvement there. TarnishedPath^talk 01:17, 1 March 2025 (UTC)

What do you not appreciate about this proposal? It has the merit of being closer to the source while recalling the context better than the current text.

@DancingOwlIt is probably clear for everybody here but is this text intend to replace the full subsection "Claim to a Jewish demographic majority and a Jewish state in Palestine" or a part of it only? Michael Boutboul (talk) 16:53, 1 March 2025 (UTC)

Firstly it removes 'these considerations would drive the Zionist belief in the necessity of the use of force against the Arabs whose motives "were of no moral or historical significance"' which I think is significant to the content. Secondly it adds 'The Arab violence', which a) I don't think it particularly neutral and b) the section of text already starts off with 'The 1936 Arab Revolt was a turning point in Jewish-Arab relations' which provides as much context as is required. TarnishedPath^talk 07:44, 2 March 2025 (UTC)

The these considerations would drive the Zionist belief part, or any similar phrasing, does not appear in Gorny's original text, and my proposal does include both the "use of force" and the "no moral or historical significance" themes.

As to "the Arab violence" - this is a key context in Gorny's quoted text that starts with "Two months after violence erupted..." and then continues with Beilinson's quote, asking "Till when is the Zionist movement condemned to fight and to struggle for its existence?" and talking about "adversary who attacks us".

If you are concerned about neutrality, we can add "According to Gorny,..." before "The Arab violence..." to make it clear that both this statement and the subsequent claim about "the use of force" and "no moral or historical significance" - which some people may also consider to be non-neutral - are all Gorny's opinions.

Regarding point (b) - I don't think that the "The 1936 Arab Revolt was a turning point..." opening statement provides as much context as is required, because the Revolt also included non-violent forms of protest (e.g. strikes), and it was not the Revolt in general, but specifically the Arab violence against the Jews that led to the theory of the necessity of force, accepted by most trends of Zionism, as Gorny puts it. DancingOwl (talk) 16:34, 2 March 2025 (UTC)

We simply don't need the 'Arab violence' part as the Arab Revolt is already linked in the article. If people want to read more they can. Starting the section off with "The 1936 Arab Revolt was a turning point ..." is sufficient context.

Beyond that we've already discussed the use of Gorny and there is no SYNTH. There is no need to adjust it's usage for what is significant inforamtion. TarnishedPath^talk 00:20, 3 March 2025 (UTC)

I disagree - the violence is a key part of the context in what Gorny is saying in the quoted passage, and talking about the "use of force" without also stating that it was a reaction to Arab violence would be a grave distortion of Gorny's thesis. If your main concern is repetition, we can move the mention of violence to the beginning of the paragraph:

The eruption of violence during the 1936 Arab Revolt was a turning point in Jewish-Arab relations, unifying previously divided factions within the Zionist movement and leading them to view the use of force as a necessary means of defense and deterrence. Moreover, some, like Beilinson, viewed the Jewish struggle for Palestine as a matter of survival, whereas for the Arabs it was not an existential issue. Consequently, they believed that Jews could not afford to make significant concessions and that Arab motives — whether noble or base — were not historically or morally significant.

DancingOwl (talk) 09:50, 3 March 2025 (UTC)

I wouldn't necessarily object to wording along the lines of 'The outbreak of hostilities in the course of the 1936 Arab Revolt ...', however I still want to maintain the wording '... According to Gorny, these considerations would drive the Zionist belief in the necessity of the use of force against the Arabs whose motives "were of no moral or historical significance"' TarnishedPath^talk 10:11, 3 March 2025 (UTC)

1. Why do you want to use a weaker term "hostilities", if Gorny talks specifically about "violence"?
2. If you read the full passage from Gorny, there are two causal links he makes there:
   1. The eruption of violence and the need to defend themselves against "any adversary who attacks us" leads Beilinson (and other Zionists) to believe in the necessity of force.
   2. The juxtaposition between "question of basic survival" for the Jewish people, and "for the Arab people, whatever their motives, the fight is not a question of life or death" is what leads Beilinson to discard the motives of Arabs as having "no moral or historical significance"

Those causal links are obscured in the current phrasing.

DancingOwl (talk) 10:46, 3 March 2025 (UTC)

I suggested 'hostilities' in place of 'violence' merely to switch up the wording from the source. I'm not particularly wedded to it. TarnishedPath^talk 10:13, 4 March 2025 (UTC)

Excellent.

What about my second point? DancingOwl (talk) 19:49, 5 March 2025 (UTC)

The outbreak of violence in the course of the 1936 Arab Revolt was a turning point in Jewish-Arab relations, unifying previously divided factions within the Zionist movement and leading them to view the use of force as a necessary means of defense and deterrence. Moreover, some, like Beilinson, viewed the Jewish struggle for Palestine as a matter of survival, whereas they argued that for the Arabs it was not an existential issue. Consequently, they believed that Jews could not afford to make significant concessions and that Arab motives — whether noble or base — were not historically or morally significant.

? TarnishedPath^talk 05:37, 6 March 2025 (UTC)

sounds good DancingOwl (talk) 14:52, 7 March 2025 (UTC)

Can you implement it please. I haven't edited much today because I'm a bit under the weather and I have a feeling it's going to get worse. TarnishedPath^talk 14:06, 8 March 2025 (UTC)

Sure.

Take care and get well soon. DancingOwl (talk) 18:47, 8 March 2025 (UTC)

@Boutboul, the text is intended to replace the corresponding paragraph in the "Zionist policies and the 1936–1939 Arab Revolt" section.

Regarding the second reference to this passage from Gorny's book that appears in the "Claim to a Jewish demographic majority and a Jewish state in Palestine" subsection - I think that it should be removed altogether, because in that passage Gorny talks about very specific point in time after the outbreak of the Arab Revolt, but in the "Claim ..." subsection it's misrepresented as a general Zionist position throughout the pre-state period. DancingOwl (talk) 16:03, 2 March 2025 (UTC)

Terminology

Looking at the text again, why is it starting with The term "Zion" was first associated with a mass movement? When clearly the first use of Zion and the first term is and always will be to refer to Mont Zion. Did someone strip the ism from the first sentence? That whole firstly paragraph is bizarrely written. Saying that, the whole article has multitude of floors not addressed. But I strongly suggest people look at the terminology section again and sort it out. At the moment, there is contradiction between the first and second paragraph and the first and second sentence are at odds with each other. Govvy (talk) 10:05, 25 February 2025 (UTC)

My reading of the sentence is that the word's first association with a mass movement came in 1884. Prior to that, the word was not associated at all with a mass movement. Then Zionism was created in 1890, still with the association to a mass movement. --Super Goku V (talk) 10:54, 25 February 2025 (UTC)

Still seems to read wrong to me no matter how many times I read and look at it! Govvy (talk) 13:10, 25 February 2025 (UTC)

It likely needs a rewrite then to better convey the meaning. --Super Goku V (talk) 14:13, 25 February 2025 (UTC)

I've adjusted the sentence a little, hopefully it's better. -- Cdjp1 (talk) 13:28, 27 February 2025 (UTC)

Jewish pre-modern national consciousness

@TarnishedPath That information was sourced to Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi and Leora Batnitzky. Batnitzky is the head of Princeton’s Jewish studies department, and Yerushalmi was an historically prominent scholar of Jewish studies. Per BRD, what is the rationale for reverting this info? Drsmoo (talk) 12:33, 28 February 2025 (UTC)

The section already contains material covering the belief that Jews constituted a nation. TarnishedPath^talk 01:21, 1 March 2025 (UTC)

The current section doesn’t indicate that the perception that Jews are a nation greatly precedes Zionism. It gives the opposite impression. The section also is misleading when referring to a “Judaic sense of being a nation”. Non-Jews considered Jews a nation as well. Drsmoo (talk) 02:22, 1 March 2025 (UTC)

The first sentence currently reads:

Fundamental to Zionism is the belief that Jews constitute a nation, and have a moral and historic right and need for self-determination in Palestine.

Nothing in that gives as you say "the opposite impression". TarnishedPath^talk 02:31, 1 March 2025 (UTC)

That’s the first sentence within the paragraph. The misleading element is from the subsequent sentence. “This belief developed out of the experiences of European Jewry”. Only the conception that Jews require self determination derives from the experiences of European Jewry. The belief that Jews are a nation does not derive from the experiences of European Jews. In fact it’s the opposite. European Jews developed the belief that Judaism is a religion. This is what the reliable sources clarify. Drsmoo (talk) 03:05, 1 March 2025 (UTC)

Without (a) the evolution of the concept "nation", (b) the relationship between "nation" and "race", (c) the lack of ancient distinction between nation and religion, this discussion won't go anywhere useful. On (b), the words "nation" and "race" were frequently used interchangeably in the past (consult dictionaries), so it is necessary to be careful in interpreting statements that Jews are a nation. On (c), most ancient polities were theocracies with their own religion, including the Jewish ones. Zero^talk 04:53, 1 March 2025 (UTC)

“the words "nation" and "race" were frequently used interchangeably in the past (consult dictionaries), so it is necessary to be careful in interpreting statements that Jews are a nation.”

That’s why we rely on reliable sources, to avoid our own interpretations. The Batnitzky source is from 2011, and is using the modern definition of nationality. Another excellent contemporary resource that elaborates on this is “Religion or Ethnicity” edited by Zvi Gitelman which contains the assessments of many scholars of Jewish Studies on the subject.Drsmoo (talk) 08:32, 1 March 2025 (UTC)

I haven't read all of Batnitzy, but what I've read doesn't seem to follow your interpretation. "Prior to modernity, which I will define in the pages that follow as the acquisition of citizenship rights for Jews, Judaism was not a religion, and Jewishness was not a matter of culture or nationality. Rather, Judaism and Jewishness were all these at once: religion, culture, and nationality." (My copy doesn't have page numbers, sorry.) And again "It simply was not possible in a premodern context to conceive of Jewish religion, nationality, and what we now call culture as distinct from one another". And later, in Chapter 8, "The Zionist movement arose in the context of nineteenth-century European nationalism and defined itself in opposition to the idea that Jews could be full members of a modern nation-state, whether French, German, or Russian, while adhering to their Jewish religion in their private lives. Rather, Zionists argued, the Jews themselves constituted a nation of their own." So the transition from nation to religion that you are proposing does not seem to be a good characterisation of Batnitsky's opinion. (And leaving this aside, this is a topic for which every imaginable position can be found in a "reliable source".) Zero^talk 11:36, 1 March 2025 (UTC)

Yerushalmi is a bit closer, but seems to hold the same view of the pre-modern era: "The Jews, however, have represented throughout their history a unique fusion of religion and peoplehood, and they cannot be grasped on either side of such dichotomies" (pp. xv–xcvi). Zero^talk 01:43, 2 March 2025 (UTC)

Sort of, he also writes “But from ancient times until the French Revolution Jews were conscious of themselves as a nation, a nation dispersed in exile, and were viewed as such by the non Jewish world as well. Striking proof of this can be found in the grand debate on Jewish emancipation itself, as it was first voiced in France in the revolutionary National Assembly.” Drsmoo (talk) 16:57, 8 March 2025 (UTC)

Peel Commission partition plan

"In response to the revolt the British appointed in 1937 a commission of inquiry that eventually recommended the partition of the land. The proposal included creating a small Jewish state occupying 17 percent of Mandatory Palestine's territory, while Jerusalem and a corridor to the sea would remain under British control, and the remaining 75 percent of the territory would form a Palestinian state connected to Transjordan under King Abdullah's rule.

Desmartypants replaced "would form a Palestinian state connected to Transjordan" with "would be connected to Transjordan" and TarnishedPath reverted. There are multiple issues. The Khalidi source is the wrong one (it should the Hundred Years' War, not The Iron Cage). The NYT article, which is defective and unreadable at its archive link, mentions the topic only in passing. It says "Palestinian state on the rest of the territory, linked with Transjordan under King Abdullah" matching the previous text, but it is wrong. The review article of Morris is more polemic than I would choose to cite but at least it gets the facts right: "Palestine Arab area be united with the neighboring Emirate of Transjordan, which was then ruled by Prince Abdullah". The point is "united", not "linked", which can be better sourced to Morris' serious works like "Righteous Victims" or specialist works like Galnor's "The Partition of Palestine". The Peel Commission report is perfectly clear: "an Arab State, consisting of Trans-Jordan united with that part of Palestine which lies to the east and south of a frontier such as we suggest" (Chapter XII, Section 1), "it must be remembered that the plan we are submitting involves the inclusion of Trans-Jordan in the Arab State." (ditto, Section 5). There is no mention of linkage, only of union. Also, no mention of "Palestinian State", though perhaps that is a lesser sin given that a large part of the "Arab State" would be in Palestine. Zero^talk 12:36, 2 March 2025 (UTC)

@Zero0000 The NYT archive link worked fine for me when I accessed it yesterday. TarnishedPath^talk 23:39, 2 March 2025 (UTC)

@Tarnishedpath: I have access to the original here. It has footnotes that appear in a side bar but are missing in the archive version. Worse, many entire paragraphs are also missing, something like half of the article, and the indications of which panelist wrote which part are missing. I guess it could be my computer, but I tried both Safari and Firefox with the same result. In any case, what are we doing citing a newspaper article for something covered by multiple scholarly books? Zero^talk 00:59, 3 March 2025 (UTC)

Yeah I can't really argue with that. I just looked up the author Emily Bazelon and while they are a senior research fellow, that's at Yale Law School and they don't appear to be a subject matter expert in international relations or politics. TarnishedPath^talk 03:19, 3 March 2025 (UTC)

References

Zero^talk 12:36, 2 March 2025 (UTC)