Talk:The Establishment (Pakistan)

Related to recent deletions

Herculespk99, please discuss matter to be deleted here before making such large deletions. Thanks. DiplomatTesterMan (talk) 06:20, 4 November 2019 (UTC)

I am not convinced this is a topic

DTM, I find this article to be poorly sourced and full of WP:OR. "The Establishment" is often a term used for the established power structure in a country. Frankly, every country has an "establishment" in that sense. But some people also use it to refer to a mysterious hidden oligarchy that somehow makes things happen, in the manner of Hollywood movies. You are often slipping from one to the other in your usage.

Sourcing is not carefully done. For example, the very first citation is to an entire book, with no page numbers or quotations. Then there are references to "declassified intelligence" with absolutely no details, except links to a web site that is black-listed (at least by my ISP, but propbably plenty of other networks). Intelligence reports are always WP:PRIMARY sources, and need solid backing from SECONDARY sources to be included. They should not be used especially in the LEAD.

Then the body of the article falls back into the "street wisdom" of blaming everything wrong with Pakistan on this mysterious "establishment". I think this is basically an attack page on the Pakistani state, but terming it the "establishment". I don't think it stands up to scrutiny. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:42, 4 November 2019 (UTC)

Kautilya3, this does need a lot of cleaning up and time required to convert it into policy-compliant content. It is a page that covers a vast topic, making it really vauge. I agree with the points you have noted about the discrepancies. It does seem like an attack page as of now, for one some of the links are called one thing and link to something else, which clearly give away the intention like Existential crisis or Sarva Dharma Sama Bhava and then not filling it with content.

The cleaning up is going to take time. No matter who does it. How about shifting it to draftspace for now and then maybe AFC check? I don't think even requesting the original authors to carry on trying to improve the page would help, 99% if the content is by IPs. Any other suggestions? Maybe just keep cleaning up it up slowly ourselves? DiplomatTesterMan (talk) 11:50, 4 November 2019 (UTC)

As per your heading "I am not convinced this is a topic" it could go through an AFD check even before the cleanup? DiplomatTesterMan (talk) 12:07, 4 November 2019 (UTC)

Exactly. We need to first make sure that it can survive an AfD before spending any effort on it. So, if you have an interest, please find 3-4 quotations from solid sources that demonstrate that this is even a topic. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:10, 4 November 2019 (UTC)

Sources

Long list

This is a legitimate topic for an article. Here is an article which provides information on The Establishment of Pakistan, and lists many books and essays on The Establishment. A simple google search ""The Establishment" in Pakistan" provides 84,600 results. A 2017 article in Pakistan Today, explains "The Establishment" of Pakistan, and how it does political engineering/manipulation. The Establishment may be opaque in some ways due to the nature of this type of clique, it is definitely not some vague term, even the Hong Kong based Asia Times asserts the real power lies with The Establishment and not with the elected governments of Pakistan. Reuters even wrote about how The Establishment tried to kidnap a journalist who wrote against it. Pakistani media particularly refers to the deep state actors of its military as "The Establishment" such as this article in The Nation (Pakistan), more examples here1 (the very first link in the google search mentioned earlier), here2 (second link in the google search results) and here3. Basically, it is all there to easily find that "The Establishment" exists, has been topic of many books, is much written about with this "specific name/terminology". Pakistani media clearly differentiates "The Establishment" from the "legitimate government". Even the Indian media, such as The Quint, uses this terminology. All these are very recent media articles, which just demonstrates how frequently this term is deployed. About the subjective notion of attack page etc, what are the editors going to write when writing about "an illegitimate entity" which is controlling the legitimate entities/governments/businesses of the nation? It will have a tone comparable to Taliban (an organisation created by "The Establishment" of Pakistan) and Al-Qaeda articles. Unbiased does not mean "neutralising" the content. If reality of "an above the law" entity like The Establishment, which does lots of dubious things to its neighbours and own citizens, is unpalatable then the article will carry the same tone. It surely will not have the same tone as the articles on Mother Teresa or Gautama Buddha. India and Afghanistan are victims of The Establishment, but its bigger victims are the people of Pakistan, and according to Daily Times (Pakistan)'s April 2018 article The Establishment's policies are pushing Pakistanis into another 1971 style civil war. 58.182.172.95 (talk) 15:33, 4 November 2019 (UTC)

Note that I have asked for quotations, not links. We need quotations that firmly establish that this is a topic. Newspaper op-eds aren't really helpful because they are WP:PRIMARY sources that can only be attributed. Moreover, the articles are again vaguely hinting at "the establishment" without stating what they are talking about. Ayesha Siddiqa's article is probably helpful, but I can only see a few isolated pages of it. Moreover, one source is not enough to write an entire Wikipedia article. So, we are back at square-A. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:11, 4 November 2019 (UTC)

Books mentioned in the The Establishment (Pakistan)#In_popular_media could provide the definition/quotation you are looking for. Several books talk about various aspects of The Establishment.

1. Abubakar Siddique provides a definition of The Establishment in his book "The Pashtun Question: The Unresolved Key to the Future of Pakistan and Afghanistan" (last para at he bottom of the page) which says "The military forms the core of what Pakistanis call the 'establishment' - an elite group composed of pro-military politicians, bureaucrats, judges and generals. The establishment adopted the strategy of supporting Islamist extremists proxies during the 1971 war that resulted in Pakistan's eastern wing becoming Bangladesh. The apparent success of the Afghan muzahedeen in the 1980s encouraged the establishment to test the model against arch rival India in the disputed Kashmir region in the 1990s."

2. Collection of essays in the book "Pakistan's Democratic Transition: Change and Persistence" edited by Ishtiaq Ahmad and Adnan Rafiq, Check Ayesha Siddiqa essay titled "Mapping "the establishment"".

3. In the above book, also check Ishtiaq Ahmed (political scientist)'s article page number 31 (Beyond the civil-military divide) and 23-24 (Pakistan's third democratic transition).

4. Christophe Jaffrelot's book "Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience" has interesting read on this page and he uses the term "Civil-Military Establishment" and explains 3 tensions which have determined the course/history/policies of Pakistan (Imposition of Urdu leading to various secessionist movements, power in the hands of very small clique of Civil-Military Establishment, Islamization leading to Jihadist troubles).

5. Shabir Choudhry's "Kashmir Dispute, Pakistan and the Un Resolutions"

6. "The Struggle for Pakistan" book by Ayesha Jalal, 3rd chapter, page 61 onwards. "Ayesha Jalal provides a unique insider’s assessment of how the nuclear-armed Muslim nation of Pakistan evolved into a country besieged by military domination and militant religious extremism."

7. Craig Baxter's Pakistan on the Brink: Politics, Economics, and Society.

8. Kalim Bahadur's "Democracy in Pakistan: Crises and Conflicts" writes "Pakistani Establishment which had greatly limited her [Benazir Bhutto] autonomy in decision making her foreign policy."

9. Imtiaz Gul's "The Al Qaeda Connection" talks of how The Establishment created and sustained various terror groups as a strategic state policy, "The ISI went on to support smaller emerging groups and even helped various Pakistani based groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Harkatul Ansar (later Harkatul Mujahideen), to operate in Kashmir. The ISI-led military establishment pursued a path that turned out to be fraught with danger and the current situation in Pakistan is perhaps the blowback that many had feared would ensue from the support extended to the Afghan Mujahideen, Kashmiri militants and the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. Public opinion on the consequences of the establishment's policies on these struggles had been sharply divided, but by January 2009 divisions had narrowed because of sharp deterioration in security situation. By early 2009 a consensus had emerged within Pakistan that the establishment's attempt to extend its influence deep into Afghanistan had backfired, but the establishment remained wedded to 'the doctrine of strategic depth'."

10. Sikander Ahmed Shah from LUMS in his book "International Law and Drone Strikes in Pakistan: The Legal" explains role of The Estabishment, US war on terror and US drone strikes on Pakistani terror groups, and its unintended consequences for Pakistan.

11. Barnett Rubin in Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror talks about how The Establishment sees armed militants as controllable strategic asset.

12. Shabir Choudhry writes in "Kashmir Dispute: A Kashmiri Perspective" how The Establishment considers keeping the Kashmir conflict alive as a justification for its dominance over Pakistan's politics.

13. Erich Reiter and ‎Peter Hazdra in "The Impact of Asian Powers on Global Developments" explain how The Establishment rewrote history to search/create/invent an identity (identity crisis).

14. Maneesha Tikekar writes in "Across the Wagah: An Indian's Sojourn in Pakistan" explains how The Establishment tried Arabisation of Pakistan to give it a distinct/different identity from the Indian Muslim Culture (see wikipedia article on the syncretic "Ganga Jamuni Tehzeeb" as opposed to the fundamentalist wahabi arabic culture).

15. Sanjay Dutt (Journalist) in "Inside Pakistan: 52 Years Outlook" writes about the destabalizing role of The Establishment during Nawaz Sharif regime.

16. Mordechai Nisan Does NOT mention The Establishment but provides good explanation of "Punjabi dominance" and how various nationalities (such as Baloch, Bengalis, Punjabi, Pathans, etc) were repressed and forced into one Pakistan under the garb of islam.

17. Rafiq Zakaria's book "The Man who Divided India: An Insight Into Jinnah's" writes about Bihari Muslims in East Pakistan/Bangladesh "For twenty-five years the establishment, dominated by persons from West Pakistan, looked upon them with favour; they were more liked than the native Bengalis who differ in many respects, especially socially and culturally from the Urdu speaking muslims." (page 213 onward).

18. Gautam Murthy International Economic Relations writes about The Establishment and Kashmir.

19. Nafisa Hoodbhoy writes in Aboard the Democracy Train: A Journey through Pakistan's how The Establishment has manipulated ethnic and islamist groups to further its agenda which has led to wasteful bloodshed.

20. Husain Haqqani's "Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military" not sure if it uses the term The Establishment but his book analyzes the origins of the relationships between Islamist groups and Pakistan's military, and explores Pakistan's quest for identity and security.

21. C. Christine Fair in his book Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War writes how "The military establishment has locked the country in an enduring rivalry with India, with the primary aim of wresting Kashmir from India".

22. C. Christine Fair and Sarah J. Watson write in Pakistan's Enduring Challenges also write about concerns regarding security of Pakistan's nuclear stockpile.

23. Muhammad Moj's The Deoband Madrassah Movement: Countercultural Trends and and Tendencies explains "Otherwise, the military establishment, which actually helped the Deobandis to grow strong in the first place, will never allow the crfeation to threaten the creator. Militant Doebandi forces like TTP, despite their links with Al-Qaeda, are de minimis in relation to the state power and military strength of Pakistan... the rise of Doebandi counterculture in Pakistan was mainly spawned by the support of the all-powerful military establishment of Pakistan... Despite distancing itself from these militant organizations, the 'deep state' still tacitly supports Doebandi-dominated religious organizations like the Defence of Pakistan Council and All-Pakistan Ulema Council. In short, the military establishment's role is more vital vis-a-vis the DMM's (Deoband Madarsa Movement) future in Pakistan."

24. Peter Bergen and ‎Katherine Tiedemann write in Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders Between Terror, Politics and Religion how The Establishment selectively targets bad terrorists (opposed to Pakistan) and still enables good terrorists (waging violent jihad against other nations).

25. Anthony Hyman, ‎Muhammed Ghayur, ‎Naresh Kaushik in Pakistan, Zia and After write about the role of The Military Establishment in interfering in the politics to retain power.

26. Syed Jamaluddin in Formation of Republic of Jinnahpur: An Inevitable Solution how The Establishment relies on the bogus Two-nation theory to justify its hold on decision making and resources, and that it has a political culture which resembles a modern-day monarchy controlled by the military establishment combined with the domination of Punjab which has 99% share in Pakistani Army.

27. Barnett Rubin in Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror writes "The Pakistani security establishment believes that it faces both a U.S.IndianAfghan alliance and a separate Iranian-Russian alliance, each aimed at undermining Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan and even dismembering the Pakistani state. Some (but not all) in the establishment see the armed militants within Pakistan as a threat; but they largely consider it one that is ultimately controllable, and in any case secondary to the threat posed by their nuclear-armed enemies."

28. Ashutosh Misra and ‎Michael E. Clarke in Pakistan's Stability Paradox: Domestic, Regional and International Dimensions write about how LeT maintains its links with the Pakistani establishment.

29. Navnita Chadha Behera in Demystifying Kashmir writes how the establishment behaves that it is operating without political limits.

30. Samir Puri in Pakistan's War on Terrorism: Strategies for Combating jihadist armed groups since 9/11 outlines how the Pakistani security establishment's policy of endorsing armed groups became an indelible component of Pakistan's strategic culture,

31. Matt McAllester in Eating Mud Crabs in Kandahar: Stories of Food During Wartime explains the anti-west anti-nonmuslims conspiracy theorist mindset of dominant people in The Establishment.

32. Erich Reiter and ‎Peter Hazdra in The Impact of Asian Powers on Global Developments the Establishment saw rewritign history as a matter of principle for defining Pakistani identity.

58.182.172.95 (talk) 22:09, 4 November 2019 (UTC)

Great. I will go through the sources and scratch out the ones that aren't considered WP:RS.

Meanwhile, please construct from the sources a paragraph that describe the Establishment. You can make it as large as you wish it. But it should "describe" it in the sense that it should state what it is, how it arose, how it runs itself etc. Whatever information you can find and think worthwhile can be included. But it should say nothing about what the Establishment did. We already know what it did. And it is not the point of this exercise. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 09:39, 5 November 2019 (UTC)

(edit conflict) There is no one book (or two..) called "Pakistan's Establishment" or "The Establishment in Pakistan"; that would have been ideal.

Since I had started this yesterday and one of the main IP authors posted the quotations first, (I was also going to post 12, 23, 24, 25) I just wanted to mention that apart from these there are mentions of Pakistan's Establishment in various newspaper-like (as the IP user and K3 mentioned op-eds but neverthless sources) articles such as "Why the Pakistani Establishment Is Rooting for the BJP (The Diplomat)" and 'Mambo jumbo about Pakistan’s`Establishment’?:

Establishment’s Composition: What is composition of the invisible, yet ubiquitous and decisive Establishment? Ayesha Sideeqa Agha tried to map its contours in her essay `Mapping the “Establishment” (Ishtiaq Ahmad and Adnan Rafiq, Pakistan’s Democratic Transition: Change and Persistence, pp.53-71). Besides, following books try to peek into the “Establishment”: (a) Maleeha Lodhi’s Pakistan: Beyond ‘The Crisis State’ (2011), (b) Anatol Lieven’s Pakistan: A Hard Country (2011), (c) Javed Jabbar’s Pakistan: Unique Origins; Unique Destiny? (2011), and (d) Aqil Shah’s The Army and Democracy. (Amjed Jaaved in Modern Diplomacy October 31, 2019)

I quickly went through each of the 32 sources listed. There are all reliable so to speak, some more than others, (green ticks more than blue ticks, dashes unsure). Yes some of them may just have parapgraphs or sentences directly related to the term, but as far as relaiblility goes and a basic WP:GNG, i would say the article is boderline safe as far as the basic criteria go.

Basic assessment of the above 32 references
(RS - reliable source Y, US - unreliable source N)

Ref No.	RS/US	No.	RS/US	No.	RS/US	No.	RS/US	No.	RS/US	No.	RS/US
1	Y	7		13	Y	19	Y	25	Y	31
2	Y	8	Y	14		20	-	26		32	Y
3	Y	9	Y	15	Y	21		27	Y
4	Y	10	Y	16	-	22	-	28
5		11	Y	17	Y	23	Y	29	Y
6		12	Y	18	Y	24	Y	30

Also I just want to point out, i know i am stating the obvious, nevertheless... not all mentions of the establishment in the books directly relate to the topic. Some seem like more general usages and some are used in the normal defn of the word - "the action of establishing something or being established". DiplomatTesterMan (talk) 09:44, 5 November 2019 (UTC)

Wow DiplomatTesterMan (talk · contribs), this looks like a nice table, you got some great tool. About the WP:GNP, article amply meets those those requirements. A standalone book is ideal but not mandatory, there have been dedicated chapters and dedicated discussion on this topic in several books, which put together could constitute equivalent of several books, this addresses the ample reliable sources with vast information so that no OR is needed to extract the information. To add further to the notability, standalone solitary media new reports and OP ED sources may not meet GNP, but when thousands of those (English google search throws up 86000+, plus add more from Urdu and Google scholar journals, etc) are added to the books, due weight of the combined evidence makes a compelling case for the notability. Bhai, what is the difference between green and blue ticks? 58.182.172.95 (talk) 15:31, 5 November 2019 (UTC)

33. A. Stephen F. Cohen's Stephen P. Cohen book "The Idea Of Pakistan" page 68 onward: Kautilya3 (talk · contribs), the archived version of Stephen F. Cohen's Stephen P. Cohen book "The Idea Of Pakistan" page 68-onward provides
- definition of who/what is The Establishment,
- size/number of The Establishment (fluid clique of 500, Cohen secondarily reports these numbers based on data/work of politician-journalist Mushahid Hussain who is an expert on "The Establishment"),
- people who subscribe to certain set of characteristics/core values,
- goes on to enlist 14 core principles/values (policy of treating as India as archrival and existential threat, Kashmir obsession, Islamisation of Pakistan, Punjab as the heartland/core of Pakistan, strategic use of nonstate militants),
- describes that the clique/terminology evolved from the time of dictator Ayub Khan (general)s (he grabbed power through 1958 coup), etc.
All of these match/fit directly into the existing TOC of the article. I checked on Amazon, it is a legitimate book. Hopefully DiplomatTesterMan (talk · contribs) can kindly help out by using his magic tool to further verify/establish reliability of source. The archived version is located here, click here, go to page 68 second-last para to section titled "Pakistan's ruling elite" or just search on "establishment" and 3rd search result will take you there.

B. Pervez Hoodbhoy takes the information from this book and re-reports it in the Dawn newspaper here with his own analysis.

C. Ayesha Siddiqa's essay titled "Mapping "the establishment"" would be useful too, I can see the excerpts of the first chapter by Ahmad in the book but I can not access Siddiqa chapter on google books (hidden from the free view). If someone else has access to the whole book, or at least her chapter, it would be a great help.

D. For the clarity, this "The Establishment" is not the same as Establishment Division (ED) which is just the the HR arm of civilian administration of Pakistan, though some top civilian officers from this may be part of the military led "The Establishment" clique. Establishment Division's Indian equivalent is the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions (MPPGP) which is responsible for HR related matters of IAS, ICS, IRS, etc. Pakistani ED and and Indian MPPGP are powerful babudom in their own way, but standalone they do not have the same immense power and control as Pakistan's "The Establishment" which is more like "Gabbar type Babudom ka baap ka bhi baap".
58.182.172.95 (talk) 15:31, 5 November 2019 (UTC)

Ok, we are home. The coverage by Stephen Cohen, an internationally recognized scholar on South Asia, settles the issue. We have a topic.

Give me a few days to study the material, and we can start rewriting the article. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:10, 5 November 2019 (UTC)

No worries, even I needed a break from this article for few days. Once ready we can have a go at it. Already spent too much time on it. But I understand what two of you are trying to do, which is basically helping make this article challenge/revert proof for future. Thank you doing that. Meanwhile I will try to find bits and pieces of Siddiqa's article. BTW, is it acceptable to put the link to "archive" of a book? Is it considered indirect WP:COPYVIO, even though the wikipedia article itself complies with the wikiguidelines but the citation has a link to a source, accessing which might not be considered legit? 58.182.172.95 (talk) 16:40, 5 November 2019 (UTC)

You can only put links to legitimate copies that themselves respect the copyright laws. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 19:20, 5 November 2019 (UTC)

We still can use that source as a valid citation with appropriate page number and quote etc without the link in the citation in the article. Please clarify, 1. If such a links is placed in the article will it trigger some filter? 2. Per wikiguidelines, can the link be posted on talkpages for the discussion? Thanks. 58.182.172.95 (talk) 19:00, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

Piecing together online access to Sidiqa's book, standalone chapter and journals

A. "Mapping 'The Establishment'" Chapter

A1. Seems Sidiqa started out in 2010 by writing this short "Mapping 'The Establishment'" article in Dawn newspaper.

A2. Progressed to writing a lengthier chapter in Mapping the Establishment. In Ishtiaq Ahmed and Adnan Rafiq, Pakistan’s Democratic Transition: Change and Persistence (Routledge Studies in South Asian Politics, 2016), only a page is available in free view.

B. Military Inc. book

B1. book review1, book describes "how the military has gradually gained control of Pakistan's political, social, and economic resources. This power has transformed Pakistani society, where the armed forces have become an independent class" - as per google book review.

C. Other peer reviewed journal articles by her

C1. Her downloadable pdf free on researchgate journal article "Pakistan's modernity between the military and militancy" describes how recently The Establishment is evolving and reinventing by stepping out of its older elite core to widen its mass appeal among the newer middle classes bulk of whom are ridden with the latent radical tendencies. Rest of the article describes who Establishment in Pakistan is replacing more tolerant Indian style Islam of sufism with the radical Deobandi Wahabism [though Deoband itself lies in UP/India and is not a militant/radical organisation, separate Pakistani splinter group of Deoband is increasingly radicalised]. She published it in "The Economic and Political Weekly" which is a weekly peer-reviewed academic journal covering all social sciences, not sure if it is considered predatory journal or not. Perhaps DiplomatTesterMan (talk · contribs) can help find out by running his tool.

This list is work in progress, to be updated. 58.182.172.95 (talk) 17:46, 5 November 2019 (UTC)

Other names for "The Establishment"

"The Establishment" or "the establishment" (term deployed by 1. Stephen F. Cohen and 2. Ayesha Siddiqui), is also called the
"Civil-military establishment" (3. Jeffrlot, 4. Mathew Joseph C. and 5. Asad Durrani)

or

"Garrison state" (6. Ayesha Siddiqui,
7. K. L. Kamal (1982, Pakistan: The Garrison State, Page 68),
8. Husain Haqqani (in Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding), and
9. Ishtiaq Ahmed, (2013, The Pakistan Garrison State: Origins, Evolution, Consequences (1947-2011), review: A conceptual and theoretical framework combining the notion of a post-colonial state and Harald Lasswell's concept of a garrison state is propounded to analyse the evolution of Pakistan as a fortress of Islam).

58.182.172.95 (talk) 17:46, 5 November 2019 (UTC)

Sorry, you are going off on tangents again. We are only interested in the "Establishment" with capital E, which is described concretely in Steve Cohen's book. You can't make random connections with everything else mentioned elsewhere. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 19:14, 5 November 2019 (UTC)

Wrong, capital or lower case "E" is irrelevant. Read the sources please. If the sources are talking about the same thing (The Establishment), even while using the entirely different names, the sources and content are still valid as per wikipedia guidelines. e.g. Jaggery and Gur, Delhi and NCR India, Banglore and Bengaluru, Dacca and Dhaka. Even wikipedia allows redirects of same names from both lower and upper case spellings and their numerous variations and alternative names. I have not even started to add the Urdu names for the Establishment e.g. Chamak/Bijli (by Benazir Bhutto), Farishtey or Asmani Farishtey (by Nawaz Sharif and his party), and many more. It is important to include those "instantaneously recognizable names" among the ordinary Pakistanis. All these names and variations will be useful to support/substantiate the creation of redirects later. Intellectual depth. Please stop lame stonewalling. Thanks. 58.182.172.95 (talk) 18:54, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

Links that need a look over

These links don't fit, i guess...

• veto power over the civilian rule...... LINKS TO Extrajudicial punishment
• global center...... LINKS TO Number of terrorist incidents by country
• Selected PM...... LINKS TO Electoral fraud
• rest of the time the army..... LINKS TO Non-state actor

DiplomatTesterMan (talk) 10:01, 5 November 2019 (UTC)

Please rephrase as you deem fit. While saving large amount of edit, I also had an error message that showed a the sources is not acceptable quality source but I could not figure out exactly which one. Do you have any tool to run on the article to filter out exactly which source is questionable/banned so that it can be removed? Thanks. 58.182.172.95 (talk) 14:07, 5 November 2019 (UTC)

I guess I will have to start making the changes to the article soon. As for the magic tool kautilya talked about it is just a manual effort just like the templates {{Source assess table}} and the {{Source assess}}. Some users have made wonderful use of these. As for the magic tool as kautilya asked with regard to sources above, this also has to be done, manually as far as I know. DTM (talk) 10:23, 27 November 2019 (UTC)

Breakdown of the exact composition of The Establishment

58.182.172.95 Please help add a citation to support this line of thought which you have added - "The Establishment is dominated by the people of its largest ethnic group, Sunni Punjabi Muslims of Punjab province of Pakistan" DTM (talk) 11:52, 8 December 2019 (UTC)

Great and exciting question, because we now know the exact definition and ideology of "The Establishment", but then what is the "clearer composition and breakdown" of that "core of 500". I will go further, we also need to document well known past and present members of "The Establishment", perhaps in a separate article as we the list grows over next few years. Those short on time, read I and II and skip the rest. 58.182.172.95 (talk) 19:56, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

Breakdown

I. The dominant Punjabi character of The Establishment

From Stephen P. Cohen's book "The Idea Of Pakistan"). See quotes below on page 223, 224, 225 (clearly states that the Establishment is Punjabi dominated). Then see quote on page 98, followed by quotes on pages 32, 33, 200, 201, 203, 206 (Mojahir-Punjabi Establishment), 207, 208, 211, 212, 214, 226, 227, 292, 293, etc. 58.182.172.95 (talk) 19:56, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

II. The Ethnic and tribal composition of the Core of The Establishment

The core of The Establishment is largely comprised of a. Punjabis,

b. Converted Muslim Rajputs, such as Ranghars and Khanzada Rajputs.

c. Ashrafs, e.g. Mughals, Pathans, Arabs, Persians, Turks, Uzbeks, etc.

The overall Pakistan Military officer ranks are "In terms of their ethnic and linguistic background ... about 70 percent Punjabi; the Northwest Frontier contributed 14 percent, Sindh 9 percent, Baluchistan 3 percent, and Azad Kashmir 1.3 percent." (page 98, Stephen P. Cohen's book "The Idea Of Pakistan"). Punjab Regiments are all Punjabis. Even the Frontier Corps and Baloch Regiment other ranks are 50% Punjabis and the rest are comprised of Baloch and Pathans. 58.182.172.95 (talk) 19:56, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

III. The Hierarchical composition of the core of The Establishment

Further breakdown of "Establishment core of 500 people" on another dimension:

A. Inner core - military-based core of the core: A1. Think Tank and ideologically/policy defining leaders of The Establishment are the retired Generals who are usually appointed in Military owned businesses (army owns 70%+ GDP) and as Ambassadors to other nations (yes military has fixed quota, I think it is 18, will recheck sources and update). Total few dozen, but among them only few (say 4 to 10 or so seniors under whom A2 below directly served and groomed by).

A2. Functional leadership is usually the serving top generals in military, ISI, NSA, etc who are basically Punjabi dominated, augmented by Ashrafs, with rare Muhazirs like Musharraf. Among the most powerful would be again less than dozen or so).

B. Middle core - Political-military core: Those who are at same/similar ranks are A1 and A2 but not the favorites of the serving top General of the Military, but still loyal and useful. Plus hand picked politicians of the day/month/year e.g. due to defeat in 1971 war dictator Yahya Khan (Punjabi) handed over the power to "select PM" Bhutto (Jat of Sindhi-Baloch origin, see Zardari family), Ayub "selected PM" Bhutto (qualified as Rajput, though from Sindh), Zia's (Punjabi Arain) "selected PM" was Nawaz Sharief (Ashraf from Kashmir with last several generations in Punjab), Bajwa (Punjabi Jat) "selected PM" is kaptan "Imran Khan" (Pathan/Ashraf with last several generations in Punjab).

C. Outer core: Leftovers from A and B, combined with few more favorite-of-the-day politicians at cabinet and provincial level, owners of the media houses and top business people who fund some of the politicians favored by The Establishment in lieu of winning large govt licenses and contracts. For the Media and Industrialist nexus with politicians and The Establishment, read Imran Khan's ex-wife journalist Reham Khan's controversial memoir, full text here. DiplomatTesterMan, please check the quality of Reham's memoir as source.

D. Camp followers - not part of the core: Rest of military and babus, who are largely supportive/loyal, are out of the loop lower rung followers just carrying out the orders. Some are well and others are vaguely aware of The Establishment.

Piecing this together needs more time and reading of multiple sources. Leave it as an open item. I have not yet been able to get access to full copies to some of the sources, specially Ayesha Siddiqa and journals, she breaks the composition down. 58.182.172.95 (talk) 19:56, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

IV. Best sources on The Establishment are the Pakistanis

a. Who have been studying The Establishment for long time, e.g. many Pakistanis living overseas as journalists and professors in elite globally highly ranked universities have written books, see sources list in the sections above.

b. Have been part of The Establishment: read their books and boasts from the loyalists e.g. Mushrraf's and other ex-generals such as ISI-chief Asad Durrani who co-wrote the book The Spy Chronicles, Brigadier Feroz Hassan khan's (former director of Pakistani nuclear command) papers to Think Tanks such as this as to why nukes are not credible deterrence for a weak state.

c. Renegades from The Establishment: Those who were part of The Establishment, fell out of favor or quit because they started to see how bad establishment policies are for the Pakistan and spilling the beans now, e.g. Husain Haqqani's multiple books, General Jehangir Karamat who resigned in protest of The Establishment's interference in democracy and state sponsorship of terrorism.

d. Who later became part of The Establishment. Many unbiased journalists who studied The Establishment later became MP/Ministers handpicked by The Establishment e.g. the secondary source Stephen P. Cohen cites the earlier work of the journalist Syed Mushahid Hussain to provide "definition and bullet point key characteristics of The Establishment". That young idealist journalist Syed Mushahid Hussain of 80s, who studied The Establishment is now part of The Establishment, he was a Minister in govt in 90s, fell out of favor with The Establishment, and found favors again, now a MP again in the senate. Note, Zia Ul Haq brought Naaz Sharif into politics as his handpicked puppet, and Syed Mushahid Hussain became minister in Nawaz's cabinet.

e. Think tanks: Brookings Institute, US Think Tanks which has hired ex-Brigadiers from Pakistan Army and employees/researchers of this Thinks Tank have gone to serve the Pakistani govt.

Barring some examples, whoever starts to speak against The Establishment, such as Husain Haqqani, are run out and all of these people now live overseas. Even the once leader of The Establishment Mr. Musharraf now lives in exile. 58.182.172.95 (talk) 20:01, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

IV. Useful quotes from Stephen P. Cohen's book "The Idea Of Pakistan"

The Establishment article has many interlinked articles, these quotes are useful to enhance those piped articles in a "correct context". Creation of this article covering vast topics, also also means we need to enhance all other piped articles. I am putting a lot of effort, so that the rest of the readers do not have to individually spend days to read the whole book. I have picked those quotes that help "define Punjabi dominance", composition breakdown of the establishment, how establishment evolved through stages of each dictator, how it got hold over economy, how its policies of supporting separatism in Kashmir fuels same sentiment at home, how its policy of sponsoring terrorism in India and Afghanistan resulted in those terrorists turning on the innocent ordinary, how "wrong policies by small elite" of Pakistani Establishment are causing bigger problems for the ordinary Pakistanis including to the larger Punjabis population. Please add more, if I missed something important. More sources I read, more I see "Establishment's wrong policies are harming Pakistanis more than the harm being caused to India or Afghanistan", a cycle of self-and-mutual destruction. No wonder biggest authors/sources on and the opponents of The Establishment's polices are Pakistanis who are now forced to live overseas.

From Stephen P. Cohen's book "The Idea Of Pakistan". This whole book is about The Establishment, its definition, core, evolution through various regimes and coups, how it got hold of economy, how its core ideology developed out of Two Nation theory and obsession with kashmir and nukes as well as Islamisation during Zia Ul Haq's days and so on. It goes on to explain how the core of military establishment has single path of entry, ingraining of those The Establishment core values mentioned on page 68, etc.

page 32 "Pakistan has ... enabled its predominately Punjabi army to dominate Pakistani politics.

page 33 "the British relied on the Muslim League to help them recruit soldiers to the Indian army — Punjabi Muslims were the single largest recruitment class in the army"

page 46 - the genesis of The Establishment, i.e. how The Establishment started to form in the early days: 'The refugees thus gained control of the government, bureaucracy, and business in the West Wing, while the traditional Punjabi and Pathan leadership — the descendants of the Unionists who had controlled the politics of pre-independence Punjab — were frozen out. Also taking shape was the “triad” consisting of the army, the bureaucracy, and the feudal landlords that came to dominate the politics and social life of the Indus basin, and that today “continues to exercise inordinate influence over public and economic affairs."

page 50 - How govt backed Punjabis came to dominate the business/GDP of Pakistan, instead of traditionally rich Gujrati and Bengalis trader muslims: "Most emigre business families belonging to the traditional trading communities of Gujarat resettled in Karachi, turning the sleepy port city into the business capital of the country and eventually a huge metropolis. They quickly filled the gap left by Hindu traders. A smaller number of Punjabi-owned businesses resettled in the Lahore-Lyallpur (now Faisalabad) belt, making the first major investments in industry. The contribution of these families should not be underestimated. Both the Bengalis in East Pakistan and the Urdu-speaking Mohajirs (together with the Punjabi working class and the Islamists) in West Pakistan protested the concentration of wealth in their hands"

page 50 - Kashmir policy of bleeding India: "The army leadership would not risk the future of Pakistan over Kashmir, and until the 1989 Kashmir uprising, few thought that Kashmir’s status would ever change (there is also a degree of cultural disdain, especially by Punjabis, for the nonmartial Kashmiris). Army officers speak of aid to the Kashmiri liberation movement but basically see it as a guerrilla struggle, which must therefore be waged by the Kashmiris, not outsiders. This has not prevented Pakistan from supporting Kashmiri militants and facilitating the movement into Kashmir (and India) of Punjabis and others who would like to join the fight against India, but the motive is as much to bleed India as to hope that Kashmir can be wrested from India."

page 55 - Democratic Bengalis vs insecurity of Punjabis/west Pakistan: "There were deep differences between the populations of the East and West Wings: the former was almost entirely Bengali, while the latter was divided among several linguistic groups, with almost half being Punjabi. East Pakistanis (mainly Bengalis) were an overall majority and believed in the logic of majority rule, which put the less populous West at risk of permanent subordination to its Bengali fraction, which was poorer and in some quarters culturally denigrated."

page 66 - How during Ayub's regime military (retired army, select feudal lords and civil servents) and Punjabis gained more control over Pakistan's business/GDP "Ayub’s economic policy allowed the military to forge an alliance with the business community. His purpose in doing so was to reduce the power of the political classes, both popular politicians and the feudal landowners. Ayub’s regime established the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC), which would finance the industrial growth of the 1960s. Between 1962 and 1969, the PIDC financed twenty-five large industrial projects in the private sector. 43 The PIDC was also used by the regime to discriminate against those who did not support military rule. Further, the government supported the formation of business associations in order to direct their growth and to maintain their political reliability."

page 73-74 - Pakistan's Punjabi centric policies, Puanjabi and Afghan/Ashraf dominated military, and discrimination against Bengalis and East Pakistan: "The 1965 war was devastating for Pakistani unity because it revealed to the East Wing that Pakistan was a Punjab-centric state whose army defined both the idea of Pakistan and the security parameters of the state of Pakistan in a manner that was incompatible with Bengali interests. When Ayub stated that the defense of Pakistan lay in the West, he effectively wrote off East Pakistan. Further, the army’s overwhelming Punjabi-Pathan officer corps had never accepted the idea that Bengalis were militarily equal to them in terms of their “martial” qualities, so by assuming that half of Pakistan’s citizens were militarily inferior, they also implied over half the country comprised lesser Pakistanis. In short, in the dominant West Wing the “idea” of Pakistan pertained to a martial people defending its Punjabi stronghold. Bengal and Bengalis only figured as an investment opportunity or source of foreign exchange."

page 73-74 - Military, Punjabis and Pathans were against giving representative share in power to Bengalis: "the notion of a Bengali majority was anathema both to the Punjabi-Pathan-dominated army and to the most prominent West Pakistani politician, Bhutto, who wanted the prime ministerial position for himself."

page 81 - Economic policies of Ayub concentrated wealth in the hands of Punjabis, alienated Muhazirs, Sindhis, etc: "The pro-business policies of the Ayub government created a working- class movement that contested the concentration of wealth in Pakistan. Rapid economic growth had not improved the living conditions of a population that was fast urbanizing, laying the foundations of shantytowns around Karachi, Lahore, and other cities. Moreover, the urbanizing working class comprised primarily Punjabis and some Urdu-speaking Mohajirs. Sindhis felt left out, especially from the Karachi boom inside their own state. After serving as the backbone of the new government, even the Mohajirs felt denied the breakthrough opportunities for their new generation."

page 98 - "about 70 percent Punjabi; the Northwest Frontier contributed 14 percent, Sindh 9 percent, Baluchistan 3 percent, and Azad Kashmir 1.3 percent."

page 138 - Bhutto was product of The Establishment: "Bhutto was born into Pakistan’s Establishment and knew it better than any of his successors. The son of a prominent Sindhi landowner, he was for many years Ayub Khan’s favorite, eventually serving as his foreign minister. Bhutto had remarkable personal qualities: he was intelligent, a fine speaker, and politically shrewd and charismatic. He could be manipulative too, and while he praised democracy and criticized the army government he served for many years, he was himself highly autocratic. Though not a Punjabi, he built a political organization that was strong in southern Punjab — thus he had a powerful base in two provinces, Sindh and Punjab."

page 152 - Sometimes compliant Baloch, etc get to be the part of The Establishment's middle/outer core: "Jamali appeared to be another early Junejo — a politically inconsequential and highly deferential Baluch politician from a landed aristocratic family. In his first months in office, Jamali was even more cautious than Junejo, in part because he was dependent upon the army’s manipulation of the coalition-building process. 28 As a condition of coming to office, Jamali was required to accept Musharraf’s choice of interior, finance, and education ministers. His foreign minister, Mian Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri, a genial Punjabi politician, dared not challenge the army’s foreign policy even if he wanted to — he was not even invited to accompany Musharraf on the latter’s swing through Western capitals, and neither Jamali nor he were invited to attend the Camp David Summit in mid-2003. There were reports of divergence on Kashmir policy between the army and Kasuri’s ministry, but Jamali and his ministers knew that they could not roam far from orthodoxy."

page 50 - State sponsorship of terror, Pakistani Establishment trained and funded islamists and taliban, those terrorists sometimes turned on the Pakistani people (ordinary Pakistanis pay for the bad policies of the small elite core of The Establishment's policies), "Pakistan’s Islamists, including many with ties to the Establishment, make no distinction between “foreign” and “domestic” matters where Afghanistan and Kashmir are concerned. Pakistan’s relations with Afghan-based radical Islamists are complex. At one level there was a strong ethnic affinity between the Afghan Pashtun tribes and their Pakistani counterparts, as well as a long history of Pakistani intelligence and party engagement with them. The JUI, the Jama’at, and other Islamist parties worked with Afghan counterparts, and the Taliban was born out of JUI-run madaris on the Afghan border. The ultraviolent Lashkar-e-Jhangvi based in the Punjab had ties to the Taliban and operated in Afghanistan and Indian-administered Kashmir. 55 The government of Pakistan used these Pakistani groups to train, fund, and in some cases assist the Afghan mujahiddin... The Taliban grew out of a generation of leaders who had received their education in Pakistan’s border madaris in NWFP and Baluchistan. It was a Pashtun movement that sought to gain power in Afghanistan and then purify it of contaminating elements. Their success was due in part to support from Pakistan intelligence, and from various Pakistan militant groups, especially the JUI. Perhaps guided by their radical Pakistani supporters, the Taliban saw Pakistan itself as a ripe target, and before Pakistan reversed its support for the Taliban, there was growing concern about Taliban influence in the Sindh, NWFP, Baluchistan, and Karachi. Later when Afghanistan came under attack in 2002, thousands of Pakistanis were recruited to the cause, and hundreds may have perished in the subsequent fighting."

page 200 - Punjabis and Pathans (ashrafs) are found all across Pakistan, also see next. "Each of its [Pakistan's] provinces is associated with a single ethnolinguistic group: Punjab with Punjabis, Sindh with Sindhis, Baluchistan with Baluch, and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) with Pashtuns. Some also have significant minority representation, and Pashtuns and Punjabis are found throughout the country (see table 6-1)."

page 201 - Sindh has 13.6% Punjabis. In Baluchistan, Quetta has 18.85% Punjabis.

page 203 - Two Nation theory's failure, Indians Muslims (except leaders and rich/royals) who supported creation of Pakistan stayed in India, Non-Punjabi Muslims who became part of Pakistan were not big supporters of creation of Pakistan: "support for the Pakistan movement was tepid among Sindhis, Pashtuns, and Baluch. North Indian Muslims had strongly supported the Pakistan movement, but it was mostly the leadership and the professional classes who had undertaken the harrowing migration after partition."

page 205-206 - Regional separatism and Establishment's dilemma: policy of denial of more local self-rule to non-punjabis even after loss of Bangladesh led to sepratism in non-Punjabi provinces of Pakistan: "The loss of more than half of Pakistan’s population in 1971 did not alert the leadership to the dangers of ignoring local “nationalist” sentiment. After the loss of East Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ah Bhutto pursued a tough state-centric policy, moving forcefully against the Baluch and triggering a rebellion among a powerful linguistic group, the Mohajirs. Zia agreed: when asked in 1978 about the possibility of introducing a multinational Pakistan in which the Baluch, Pashtun, Sindhis, and Punjabis would be entitled to local self-rule, he expressed his dismay at “this type of thinking. We want to build a strong country, a unified country. Why should we talk in these small-minded terms? We should talk in terms of Pakistan, one united Pakistan.” On paper, Pakistan has a tolerant view toward its ethnolinguistic groups. However, every Pakistani leader, whether from the Punjab or a less populous province, has vehemently opposed “nationalist” or ethnolinguistic sentiments, which they consider a threat to the state. For the leadership, an important challenge to Pakistan comes from ties between India or Afghanistan and disloyal Pakistani ethnolinguistic communities...This poses the classic federal dilemma for Pakistan’s Establishment. Are calls for national self-determination or autonomy by ethnolinguistic minorities really calls for separate statehood, and the breakup of Pakistan? Or are they part of a bargaining game, in which such groups profess such goals in order to satisfy their own maximalists but would really be willing to settle for greater autonomy or some special privileges? This is the same situation faced by India in Kashmir and Nagaland, where “separatists” privately suggest that their demands are set forth for purposes of bargaining with the central government."

page 207- table of separatist movements e.g. Sindhis had movement against settlement of Punjabis in Sindh 1940s-90s, Muhajirs had movement against Punjabiasation of central govt's bureaucracy/establishment 1985-2003. Also see page 212.

page 208 - "Although Pakistan’s subnational and ethnolinguistic groups have some common features, they also differ in significant ways. — All have different connections to the land; some have histories that can be traced back one or two millennia, and others, such as the Mohajirs, are newcomers to Pakistan. In several cases, notably Karachi, internal migration has changed ethnic and cultural balances, destabilizing local political and administrative patterns.

— Their narratives regarding their ties to the idea of Pakistan vary widely. The Mohajirs were in the forefront of the Pakistan movement; others were disinterested or marginal to it.

— All of these groups have a different relationship with the dominant Punjab. Some are fairly close, such as the Pashtuns; others, such as the Baluch, were alienated to the point of open warfare, with the Sindhis and Mohajirs having a mixed history.

— Some of these groups are entangled in mutual enmity, usually involving Punjabis as the third side of the triangle. Sindhis, like the Bengalis, resent the Mohajir- Punjabi nexus but are also pressed upon by the Baluch; the Baluch have been subjected to in-migration from Pashtuns; and the Mohajirs have come to regard Sindhis and Punjabis as threats to their identity and prosperity."

page 211 - "Seventy-three percent of the migrants to the new state of Pakistan in 1947 were Punjabis, and most of these settled in Pakistan’s Punjab."

page 212 - Sindhi champion of Two Nation Theory turned against it and non-Punjabi nationalist movements of Pakistan joined hands: "For the legendary G. M. Sayed, a politician who once supported the Pakistan movement, Pakistan and the two-nation theory became a trap for Sindhis — instead of liberating Sindh, it fell under Punjabi-Mohajir domination, and until his death in 1995 he called for a separate Sindhi “nation,” implying a separate Sindhi country. Sayed had not been a Muslim nationalist, but a Sindhi one. In 1948 the fledgling Sindhi nationalist movement joined with Bengalis, Pashtuns, and Baluch to form the People’s Organization. It was succeeded by the Pakistan Oppressed National Movement (PONAM), but both stopped short of openly calling for the dissolution of Pakistan."

page 212 - Also see page 207: "today as much as 40 percent of Sindh’s prime agricultural land is held by non-Sindhis, mostly Punjabis and Mohajirs."

page 214 - Sindhi's resentment of Punjabis for implanting Mujahirs: "Sindhis are persuaded that Punjabis and Mohajirs are trying to further divide their state because they are the only real opposition to Punjabi domination of Pakistan. Thus, Punjabis have settled in Sindh, they have tried to implant Biharis (non-Bengali Pakistanis trapped in Bangladesh) in Sindh, and they have encouraged the migrant Mohajir population to attack Sindhis and Sindh culture in a strategy of divide and rule."

page 215 - Bihari muhajirs unwanted by both Pakistan and Bangladesh (Many even came to India as illegals, this also ties into National Register of Citizens of India, Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019, Illegal immigration to India, Refugees in India and current strife in Northeast India) "This changed markedly after Pakistan’s first free election, held in 1970, which unleashed potent ethnolinguistic forces throughout the country. The Bengali separatist movement did not directly affect the Mohajir community in the west, but it was devastating for the non-Bengalis who lived in the east. The so-called Biharis were loyal to the west but trapped in the east and constitute one of the great tragedies of contemporary Pakistan. Following the loss of the East Wing the government of Pakistan refused to take most of them back, and those who did not flee or make it to Pakistan in the first few months after the war found themselves stateless and trapped in Bangladesh internment centers. Over a quarter million of them still live in Bangladesh, mostly in camps around Dhaka, yet Pakistan has only allowed a token number to repatriate to the country where they have no economic or social links."

page 222 and 223 - separatist feeings of Baltis, Gilgit, Balawaristanis, etc

page 223 - Establishment is Punjabi dominated: "Conversations with leading Sindhi and Baluch intellectuals and politicians quickly reveal their conviction that regional conflict is largely the fault of militaristic Punjabi leaders, who will not normalize relations with India because they want to maintain a large army. In the view of regional autonomists and separatists, the Punjab-dominated Establishment, in league with a few Mohajirs and the Pashtuns, use foreign and defense policy as a club to beat the lesser provinces, notably Sindh and Baluchistan. A few years after submitting his report on the loss of East Pakistan, Chief Justice Rahman raised the issue of Punjabi dominance in Pakistan in a lead article in the army’s professional journal. Justice Rahman reminded his readers that the main culprits in the corruption that led to the disintegration of the old Pakistan were invariably Punjabis, and that “this gave rise to a feeling of Punjabi domination which in its turn propelled into prominence regionalistic and parochial aspirations. Nevertheless, most Sindhis and Baluch recognize that independence is not practical. With their feudal aristocracy, poor peasantry, and small middle class, these provinces lack the social and economic infrastructure for a success- ful nationalist, separatist movement; they particularly lack military skills, as is evident from the small number of Sindhis and Baluch in the army."

page 224 - Punjabi dominance of military and Establishment. "Punjab is clearly Pakistan’s wealthiest and most populous province, with a commanding position in Pakistan’s core political and military institutions. Punjab’s centrality was enhanced by Pakistan’s acceptance of military rule for half of the years since 1971. Indeed, the nation’s army remains by and large a Punjabi army with regard to both the officer corps and other ranks. Political style and culture merely reinforce a Punjab-centric system... For Punjabis, only the Pashtuns can compare in martial qualities and valor; attitudes toward Baluch are dismissive, and toward Sindhis, contemptuous. The focal point of Punjabi domination was and remains the army. Seventy-five percent of the army is drawn from three Punjab districts (Rawalpindi, Jhelum, and Campbellpur) and two adjacent districts in the NWFP (Kohat and Mardan). These districts contain only 9 percent of Pakistan’s male population. The officer corps is drawn from a wider, more urban base but is still predominately Punjabi, often the sons of junior commissioned officers. Pakistan’s air force and navy are drawn from a much wider base.""

page 225 - Punjab and Punjabis all the way: "Once they have a relative in the military, especially the army, a certain aura surrounds the family or clan — other state institutions are likely to be more accommodating, be they the local police, civil servants, or petty officials. Retired officers, in particular, benefit enormously from the military association, through appointments to government posts, assistance in starting up new businesses (with government contracts), and assignments to the police and paramilitary forces. Hence Punjab has an enormous vested interest in keeping the army connection open, and this will not change until the Pakistani economy begins to expand rapidly, with new opportunities for retired jawans and officers. Another reason offered for Punjab’s dominance is its strategic value. The Staff College teaches that every country has a heart or core area, which in Pakistan’s case is the Punjab, whereas the other three provinces constitute invasion routes. This logic is analogous to that of Ayub Khan’s declaration that East Pakistan could be defended by maintaining strong forces in West Pakistan."

page 226 - Failure of Two Nation theory and Punjabi domination leading to separatism and even Pakistan's supports for Kashmiri separatism in India fuels separatism among non-Punjabis in Pakistanis: "Pakistan’s historic identity as a homeland for oppressed Indian Muslims is, ironically, one factor that will continue to reinforce separatism. The notion of Pakistan as a homeland worked its way through the new state in a devastating fashion. If Muslims needed and deserved a separate space in which they could achieve personal and community fulfillment denied to them by Indian Hindus, what about those Pakistani Muslims who found themselves dominated politically, militarily, and culturally by other Pakistanis? When it became clear that equality was not possible between East and West Pakistan or between Punjabis and non-Punjabis, the concomitant idea that Pakistan itself might be composed of two, three, or even four nations spread first to East Bengal and then to Sindh, Baluchistan, the Northwest Frontier Province, and even the Punjab and Kashmir. It was accelerated by Pakistan’s vehement support for the idea of national self-determination in the case of the Kashmiris."

page 227 - How Establishment does token balancing act with other provinces: "Pakistan’s federal system works well when non-Punjabis are regularly inducted into the Establishment, through a form of ticket-balancing that ensures some senior posts will go to non-Punjabis. Baluch served as prime ministers under Zia and Musharraf, and Sindhis find a place in ministries and senior appointments. Although such appointments do not automatically confer power on a given province, they do help to co-opt regional elites."

page 292 - Scenario in which Punjabis might willingly break Pakistan up: "Soviet history suggests a third route to a reorganized Pakistan. The Soviet Union broke up largely because its dominant republic (Russia) calculated that it would do better without some of the non-European republics, and that Russia’s future lay in becoming a modern European state. Could Pakistan evolve into a Punjabistan — a nuclear-armed, smaller, more efficient and generally secure state? This seems doubtful, but Punjab, like Russia, is the educationally and economically most advanced part of the country, and Punjabis regard themselves as culturally and civilizationally distinct, if not superior, to Sindhis, Baluch, and the tribals of NWFP."

page 293 - scenario for decline of The Establishment, will come from the secularist Punjabis military officers in the Establishment. "A fresh challenge to the army’s integrity could come from several directions. Pakistan’s society may deteriorate to the point where violence, sectarianism, and economic stagnation began to affect the army (especially the officer corps) more directly. Second, the army’s professional achievements might come under scrutiny. If, for example, there were full accountability for Kargil and other military misadventures or a fresh military humiliation, then the credibility of the senior leadership would be cast into doubt. Third, a division among the officer corps along ideological lines would hasten the fragmentation process. Such a split might stem from sectarianism (Sunni versus Shi’ia) but would more likely be due to Islamic versus secular differences among the dominant Punjabi element. These divisions would probably find expression in different army factions led by powerful personalities, who themselves would have strong links to politicians, bureaucrats, and business elites, each faction claiming to represent Pakistan’s true national interest."

page 312 - How to deradicalise pakistanis madarsas: "As one Pakistani official who has studied the madaris noted, “If you give them access to the Internet, they’ll only surf the radical websites.” The strategy should be to support the kind of education that will contribute to a broader view of the world and prepare graduates for real-world employment. As for the mullahs, again the strategy (in the words of a Punjabi Nazim concerned about their growth) should be to strengthen the moderates and the state system of education, not to “go after [the Islamists] hard, which would only make them martyrs.”

page 355 - Baloch resentment "One of these grievances [of Baloch people] is that the federal government intends to create a new province or directly administered zone along the Makran coast and populate it with Mohajirs and Punjabis."

Working discussion and additional read

Unsourced addition: Most of this too is easily citable by reading the piped articles and the source list above. We would need to validate and find citations. Useful background for editing other related articles piped from this article.

Based on my understanding obtained from "on the go" recollection of the piped articles and past discussions with the Pakistani friends here is this thought dump (I have lived in 6+ nations, over 1 year in each, where I have numerous Pakistani friends and colleagues):

Pakistani Punjabi Mumslims in the The Establisment: Punjabis are Punjabi speaking muslims of all castes. Punjab is a muslim jat dominated area, they are called Jat Muslim. Other influential land owning tribes are Arain, Khokhars, Rajputs. Arains are similar to Sainis and maintain separate caste identity both in India and Pakistan. Khokkhars of India/Haryana/WesternUP self-identify and widely accepted as Jats and in Karnal as Rors. As the piped article says, the Ashrafs are the foreign Islamic invaders/conquerors who settled in India/Pakistan e.g. Mughals, Arabs, Pathans, Persians, Uzbeks, etc. Largest among them are Pathans, followed by some Mughals.

A. Are Ranghars/Rajput Muslims Ashrafs? Sometimes Rajputs are also categorised (self identification) as Ashraf in South Asia. They are not accepted as the real Ashrafs outside South Asia, specially in Arab nations. E.g. Tarek Fatah is a Pakistani Punjabi Rajput Muslim and he has a lot to add on this topic, just check youtube.

B. Tiwana and Noons - are they Jat or Rajput? Among Rajput Muslims in Pakistan, the biggest feudal lords/jagirdars are mostly of Tiwana and Noon gotras. In India, Hindu-Sikhs Tiwanas and Noons self-identify as Jats. Muslim converts in Pakistan have started to self-identify as Rajputs.

C. Muley Jats: Within "Jat Muslims" is the subcategory of Muley Jats. They are Haryanvi-speaking converted Jats of "Western UP and Haryana", who now live in Pakistan in Punjab. Anyone, both Jats and non-Jats, who speaks Haryanvi in Pakistan is more commonly called "Rohtakiya". Rohtakiya implies the "deswali" dialect of "deswal region" of Haryana (Rohtak, Sonepat, Panipat, Jhajjar and Jat/Gurjar villages in Delhi proper). In reality in Pakistan, all dialects of Haryanvi are labelled as Rohtakiya including Deswali, Bagri, Bangru, Ahirwali and other dialects of Haryanvi.

D. Mirpuri Kahsmirs are mostly Punjabis too: Mirpur is technically a part of Azad Kashmir/PoK, largely flat or tarai area of otherwise mountainous PoK. After 1947, Mirpur's Kahsmiri dominated demography has been systematically changed to Punjabi dominated by creating townships and allocating housing and farm lands to Army and Ex Army people. Among the Pakistani Mumslims in UK, the Mirpuris are the largest groups (actually Punjabis, among them mostly Jats). They are the ones championing the Kashmir cause masquerading as Kashmiris. For more nuanced details, listen to the exiled Pakistani Kashmiris Mirpuri activists on youtube, such as "Barrister Hamid Bashani" and Tahir Aslam Gora. Also worth checking muhajir "Arif Ajakia". All 3 Canadian Human Rights Activist have own youtube channels, and The Establishment will arrest them if they enter Pakistan, see Forced disappearance in Pakistan.

Readers, please add your understanding, sources, questions, etc. 58.182.172.95 (talk) 19:57, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

Working list of known members of The Establishment

Convert to a table here, with columns for name, role in Establishment (think tank, functional leader), level in The Establishment (core of core, middle core, outer core), duration served, authorship/books/journals, ethnicity {Punjabi, Baloch, Sindhi, Kashmiri, etc), Stratification (Ashraf, Rajput, Jat, etc.)? Please suggest changes to this.

Divide the table by eras of each dictator, whenever there was no dictator then attribute the era to the most influential General e.g. Bajwa now who even managed to extend his tenure by 3 years after ordering kaptan Imran Khan to skip the due process and retrospectively obtain approvals as required by the Supreme Court.

Within each dictator subdivide the table by "inner core / Core of core", "middle core", "outer core", etc.

As it grows we can decide later if we insert this table on this article or make it a separate article and pipe link within this article.

Stephen Cohen, page 69, says membership is not role based but based on the conformance to "14 core values and loyalty to the group".

1. All dictators,
2. All heads of ISI
3. All Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC)
4. All Chief of Army Staff
5. Select chiefs of staff of the Navy and Airforce

Outer core

1. All "selected PM"
2. Syed Mushahid Hussain

To be updated. DTM and Kautilya, please feel free to overwrite this without leaving overwrite marks. 58.182.172.95 (talk) 22:32, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

58.182.172.95 Are there references for the above? As far as I can tell there are no references that explicitly say that all Cheifs of Army Staff were part of the Establishment or is it just a logical derivative? But for it to stay in the article it needs (a) solid source/s. Same goes for all five listed above. And you've stopped editing the main article yourself?! DTM (talk) 06:33, 30 December 2019 (UTC)

Not straight off the bat, but I will keep an eye out for role based citations. I do not have access to the full text of the most of the sources collected above. It is going to be a slow and tedious task to build this list up. There are three parts to it (a) which roles are mostly always part of the core - this could be built up once we get access to the sources listed above and if we keep it at the back of mind, (b) individuals - ongoing process, perhaps a separate article/list as it grows, (c) subset of item B those members who fell out of favor. For now, this is a work space for us to start listing the known positions and members with citations. 58.182.172.95 (talk) 13:04, 4 January 2020 (UTC)

Well known renegades/quitters

Similar table as above, additional column, such as cause of quitting, current residency, think tank if any, etc.

1. Husain Haqqani, Ambassador to USA, multiple books,
2. Jehangir Karamat, General, Chief of Army Staff, Chairman of Joint Chiefs former Ambassador to the United States, who resigned in protest of The Establishment's interference in democracy and state sponsorship of terrorism.

To be updated. DTM and Kautilya, please feel free to overwrite this without leaving overwrite marks. 58.182.172.95 (talk) 22:32, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

Working list of Think Tanks on The Establishment

In table format with columns for name of Think Tank (TT), Funding source, Linkage with The Establishment (separate row for each individual e.g. Establishment's ex Brigadier hired by the TT, or a TT employee/researcher becomes part of Establishment such as Pakistan's NSA/minister)

1. Brookings Institution
2. Spearhead Research General founded by General Jehangir Karamat

To be updated. DTM and Kautilya, please feel free to overwrite this without leaving overwrite marks. 58.182.172.95 (talk) 22:32, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

Future scenarios

Expand based on "future scenario" planning by USA govt, Brookings Institute, Stephen P. Cohen's book (last chapter), other think tanks, articles by defence expert journalist Abhijit Iyer-Mitra (writes for ThePrint and his twitter wall has his articles), Pakistan based journalist Naila Inayat who writes for The Print and DailyO (her twitter). Insert list of scenarios, describe each, Deradicalization strategics. One of the Brookings Institute's scenario in Stephen P. Cohen's book covers secularist elements of Pakistan Military rising against The Establishment's core to disintegrate and de-radicalize The Establishment, another scenario talks about The Establishment might think of other provinces as burden just as Russia thought in case of USSR and willingly break Pakistan up on its own terms with bilateral ties with Sindh and Pakhtunwa, etc. Cohen's scenarios have been subsequently updated by the Brookings and USA govt and others (I recall an article by Abhijit Iyer-Mitra couple of months ago).

To be updated.

58.182.172.95 (talk) 23:04, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

Original research

Most of this draft consists of original research. For example, the section on economy is sourced to this one article, which doesn't even use the term "The Establishment". The basic gist of that article is that Pakistan's military has big business interests. We can cover that in a small section in Pakistan Armed Forces, and it has no relevance to this article. And pretty much same thing for most other sections of this article.VR _talk 02:01, 23 December 2019 (UTC)

VR, please go ahead and make the changes as needed. I have only tried to edit the ""Characteristics" section as yet. There is a loooot of editing left here. DTM (talk) 07:06, 23 December 2019 (UTC)

Thanks for the input. I have been reading many sources, One source is not a valid objection, move on. Not being sourced is a valid objection. This article is going to exist. The Establishment will want to obliterate and "forcibly disappear the article or the editors". Sorry, the Wikipedia is not Pakistan, can not disappear me, you or other editors. Go to the list of sources. Please do ahead and add a section up front by multiple names The Establishment in Pakistan is known by. Thank you. 58.182.176.169 (talk) 03:07, 1 February 2020 (UTC)

Move to main space

I respect editor's raising questions, it preeempts future objections against the article. Thank you. This is already better sourced than 90% articles on wikipedia. Please move it now from to the main namespace. PS: MY IP has been randomly moved by ISP every few months. 58.182.176.169 (talk) 03:03, 1 February 2020 (UTC)

Kautilya3 (talk · contribs), please undo your move, you have been enlightened, please amend now. Thank you. 58.182.176.169 (talk) 03:20, 1 February 2020 (UTC)

CAUTION: The Establishment of Pakistan wants this article and us dead

The Establishment in Pakistan has an IT cell with ops to trap, hound, disappear and kill people and manipulate media discourse. There obviously will be attempts against this article. Identify those editors. Being an IP is not anonymous, so be it. This article will keep getting better, more sourced by well respected and well published Pakistani sources sourced forced to live in exile in the modern western world. It will be more comprehensive too.

Watch the sympathiser editors here, some might be evenly directly hired by The Establishment in Pakistan. 58.182.176.169 (talk) 03:20, 1 February 2020 (UTC)

Call for discussion

The lead paragraph currently says:

The Establishment in Pakistan is the terminology used to describe the deep state cooperative federation of the Pakistan Armed Forces, the Pakistani intelligence community and other pro-military government officials and civilians. Responsible for various military coups, the military dominated Establishment has directly ruled for nearly half of its nation's existence since Pakistan's creation in 1947.[1][2] The Establishment in Pakistan includes the key decision makers in country's military and intelligence services, national security, foreign and domestic policies including the state policy of sponsoring terrorism, Sharization and Islamisation of Pakistan and turning Pakistan into global center for political Islam.[3]

It is phrased awkwardly, in my opinion. Only The Establishment should be in bold. Perhaps the first sentence should read:

"In Pakistan The Establishment is the term critics use to describe covert deep cooperation between senior element of Pakistan's Armed Forces, its intelligence community, and other pro-military government officials and civilians."

If there were covert cooperation it seems unlikely the conspirators would ever openly refer to their group as "The Establishment" in documents that could serve as reliable sources.

If the conspirators don't use this term then the article, and the lead paragraph, in particular, needs to cite respected authoritative sources that use the specific phrase "The Establishment".

If critics refer to the phenomenon of unofficial covert deep cooperation, as described in the article, but never use the term "The Establishment", then it would be a mistake for the article to use it, or to be named after it.

Forty years or so ago there was a Mafia leader, in the USA, who founded, and backed, what he intended to look like a genuine grass-roots organization, with a name like "The Italian-American anti-defamation league". They started suing journalists who wrote about the Mafia, claiming there was no such thing as the Mafia, and that everyone who claimed it existed was engaged in hate speech. As above, when there are no documents from those in an organization, they can try to deny its existence. When those in the organization deny its existence, then its existence has to be attributed to someone else, "critics", Interpol, someone. Geo Swan (talk) 15:38, 1 February 2020 (UTC)

Hi Geo Swan, I fully agree. The chief problem with the current write-up is that good sources and the bad have been thrown together. ("bad" in the sense of not being convincing about this particular topic.) The two authoritative sources seem to be these:

• Cohen, Stephen P. (2004), The Idea of Pakistan, Brookings Institution Press, pp. 68–73, ISBN 978-0-8157-9761-6
• Siddiqa, Ayesha (2016), "Mapping the 'Establishment'", in Ishtiaq Ahmad; Adnan Rafiq (eds.), Pakistan's Democratic Transition: Change and Persistence, Taylor & Francis, pp. 53–, ISBN 978-1-317-23594-1

Husain Haqqani writes about the Establishment too, but sort of in an implicit way. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:02, 1 February 2020 (UTC)

Well, the article is back in the mainspace

This article is back in the mainspace with a lot of content having moved to Criticism of Pakistan Armed Forces. DTM (talk) 07:26, 7 February 2020 (UTC)

There is a lot of confusion/overlap between the two articles (which I guess is bound to happen). And what was written for The Establishment (Pakistan) has been shifted word to word. So a little sorting out needed there too. But of course, academically, "Criticism of Pakistan Armed Forces" is an easier topic to address; for any country. DTM (talk) 07:32, 7 February 2020 (UTC)

Great. Thanks for the considerable clean-up that is apparent. We are in business, and can start improving the article. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:46, 7 February 2020 (UTC)

Also see Template:Did you know nominations/The Establishment (Pakistan). Aman Kumar Goel^(Talk) 05:10, 9 February 2020 (UTC)

Failed verification

The first two sources do not support the claim that "The Establishment" is used as a proper name. It seems to be the case for other reliable sources. This should be addressed to proof that the article is not original research. --MarioGom (talk) 16:34, 22 April 2020 (UTC)

Proposed merge of Criticism of the Pakistan Armed Forces into The Establishment (Pakistan)

Same articles with different titles? The article Criticism of the Pakistan Armed Forces essentially duplicates the scope of The Establishment (Pakistan). Also, the main focus of both articles is the armed forces, i.e., The Establishment. TheBirdsShedTears (talk) 18:13, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

I agree with the proposed merge. This article is more of a WP:REDUNDANTFORK. Wikibear47 (talk) 14:27, 14 November 2024 (UTC)

Support for merger.--Ameen Akbar (talk) 21:45, 21 November 2024 (UTC)

• Oppose I agree both the articles are underdeveloped but this has already been discussed (Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Criticism of Pakistan Armed Forces) and the consensus was to keep the article as it passes WP:GNG criteria on its own. Per WP:NTEMP: Notability is not temporary; once a topic has been the subject of "significant coverage" in accordance with the general notability guideline, it does not need to have ongoing coverage. The Establishment: In sociology and in political science, the term The Establishment describes the dominant social group, the elite who control a polity, an organization, or an institution, so The Establishment (Pakistan) article is mainly about who has controlled power in Pakistan since 1947 and this can include bureaucrats who controlled power in the early years of Pakistan and judiciary in some years. The criticism part is separate and is directly related to the Pakistan Armed Forces and is more notable in my opinion. It was rightly splitted into the Criticism of the Pakistan Armed Forces per WP:ARTICLESIZE requirement as well. I'm pinging active AfD participants so they can share their opinion on this here as well: @NavjotSR: and @Bharatiya29:. Thank you. 109.204.231.244 (talk) 11:23, 28 November 2024 (UTC)

Support merge without any problem, and indeed that seems as WP:REDUNDANTFORK, so it will be fine in The Establishment (Pakistan). 178.223.4.189 (talk) 10:57, 2 December 2024 (UTC)