Talk:Battle of Freiburg

New sections added

Hello Fellow Wikipedians,

I am a student in University, doing an assignment which requires me to edit this stub. Hence, I added the following sections. (1)Context, (2)Prelude, (3)Battle, (4)Battle in Hindsight, (5)Aftermath and Significance, (6)Impact on Freiburg. I mostly have followed the Manual of style similar to articles which are very much in the same category. If you disapprove of my work or want me to make some modifications, please do not hesitate to contact me on my talk page, or this article's talk page itself.

Freerange56 (talk) 18:27, 28 May 2020 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 6 March 2021

78.165.27.14 (talk) 22:45, 6 March 2021 (UTC)

Result French victory other languages pages showed this

 Not done: please provide reliable sources that support the change you want to be made. The "inconclusive" result is cited to a source. Please provide a source for your change, not including any other Wikipedia. RudolfRed (talk) 23:56, 6 March 2021 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 8 March 2021

78.165.27.14 (talk) 03:12, 8 March 2021 (UTC)

 Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate. Zupotachyon (talk) 04:17, 8 March 2021 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 15 March 2021

95.12.47.4 (talk) 09:32, 15 March 2021 (UTC)

Result French victory

 Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate. ‑‑ElHef (Meep?) 14:52, 15 March 2021 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 11 May 2021

El Gran Salvador (talk) 23:54, 11 May 2021 (UTC)battle resulted French victory because imperials leave the city

 Not done: please provide reliable sources that support the change you want to be made. ScottishFinnishRadish (talk) 23:59, 11 May 2021 (UTC)

French victory :)

Having updated this article and looking at the various sources, I think this has to be a French victory.

Relative casualties are irrelevant in determining result (see Malplaquet), and the French remained in possession of the battlefield (the key factor at the time).

At the same time, Bavarian losses were such that they convinced Maximilian to negotiate peace, while Mercy's withdrawal allowed the French to capture Phillipsburg, Mainz, Worms etc. I know we have references saying otherwise, but based on the article and other sources I haven't used, it's hard to make a case for a Bavarian tactical victory.

Anyone want to convince me otherwise? Robinvp11 (talk) 18:46, 9 August 2023 (UTC)

I always thought the battle as a draw since both sides left the battlefield on 9 August (staying would probably wrecked both their armies, the Bavarian one because of short supplies and the French because of Mercy's strong defensive positions). At last Condé left (historically still D'Enghien but I see why you changed it) and I don't think he took a detour via the Bavarian entrenchments on the Lorettoberg (the battlefield of the 5 August) to claim them for France. That leaves the battle of 5 August as arguably a draw (or a Bavarian tactical victory if we count battlefield possession on the end of 5 August). Maybe some historians stopped the battle there and assessed the rearguard action on 9 August as an aftermath or "Epilogue" like Guthrie calls it? Or the possession of Freiburg is accounted for to determine the winner? - If this had been a relief battle, France would have lost but the siege had already been successful.

On 10 August, the Weimar cavalry under Reinhold von Rosen attacked the retreating Bavarians and was fought off by the rearguard under Johann von Werth. According to Mercy's report from the 11 August to Maximilian (collected in Johann Heilmann study on Mercy's campaigns from 1851, parts of the French cavalry vanguard had attacked the Bavarian baggage train before Werth's rearguard arrived. Mercy's cavalry refused to countercharge, so Mercy charged the French with his infantry, engaging them until Werth arrived and drove them off. The French didn't ride another attack but the Bavarians had to leave 3 guns and many baggage waggons behind because of their weak horses. So the Bavarians repelled all French attacks until the end. But still they retreated and definitely left this battlefield to the French. Although this action alone wouldn't be called a battle without the connection to the two pitched battles on 3 and 5 August, since it ranged between a small skirmish and a moderate rearguard action.

The aftermath of the battle is clear. Bavaria couldn't afford losses like the French could, so Maximilian didn't allow Mercy any offensive action. Also, Mercy had the longer route to reach Philippsburg via his side of the Black Forest. This is why Wilson and Schott count the battle as a tactical win but strategic loss for Bavaria (a definition that Wikipedia does not know of course). I'm still not sure but I will look up Schaufler's arguments who counts the battle as a draw (in the most detailed study on the battle according to Guthrie), maybe this will help further.

But anyway, thanks for improving the article. It really had been time ;)--Palastwache (talk) 21:11, 9 August 2023 (UTC)

I'd prefer to avoid getting bogged down in the details of how exactly the 17th century determined "holding ground", ie did Conde actually ride over the Lorettoberg, whether Mercy "held his positions" on 5 August; we need to look at the battle as a whole, not day by day.

Based on that, I don't understand how it can be considered a Bavarian tactical win; doesn't matter how many assaults you beat off or how many casualties you inflict if you're forced to retreat. Robinvp11 (talk) 12:45, 10 August 2023 (UTC)

I understand that the result must reflect the battle as a whole but its lenght and complexity makes it apparently interpretive enough for sources to wildly disagree with each other (in terms of calling out a "tactical winner"; in describing the course of the battle they differ mostly in the level of detail). The battlefield changed from day to day; starting when Mercy retreated to better positions after nightfall of the first day. Two days later, he was attacked again and (just) held his ground.

Following Guthrie, Mercy then had superior numbers but deemed his cavalry in too bad shape for an counterattack, so the French waited in vain for it during the 6th August. This gave them enough time to collect about 5000 extra men from all nearby garrisons. Before they could attack him, Mercy already broke camp, leaving one regiment in Freiburg. So he did retreat - while holding on to Freiburg, and several days after the fighting. And due to not only his losses in battle but also his already before dire supply situation and the French reinforcements. This retreat on Mercy's own terms does qualify the battle in my eyes as a draw. Of course, Turenne and Rosen almost caught Mercy but were to late or not strong enough to cut him off.

If you ask me how people like Peter Wilson can interpret the battle as a tactical win for Bavaria - either he uses a modern interpretation of win (casualty rate, control of a fortified place?) or he only counts the closely connected pitched battles on 3 and 5 August as "the battle of Freiburg" (the previous siege until 28/29 July is also rather obviously not counted as part of it). Palastwache (talk) 21:55, 10 August 2023 (UTC)

(a) While Guthrie is usually pretty reliable, I don't think he's correct in suggesting Mercy had superior numbers. I spent time looking at the various Sources; while they tend to agree Mercy had between 15,000 to 16,800 men at the start of the campaign ie before Oberlinden etc, they're much less clear on how many were at Freiburg. Perini (who tends to overstate opponent numbers) suggests the Bavarians lost a third of those engaged on 3 and 5 August, leaving Mercy with only 6,000 effectives, including his rapidly declining cavalry.

(b) Assuming the French lost 50% of the original 17,000, then add the additional troops scraped together by Conde, Mercy was vastly outnumbered and short of supplies. According to Perini, he feared his troops could not resist another assault, while French moves before and after 9 August threatened his exit route to Villingen. You can call it an orderly retreat, you can praise Mercy's pragmatism in doing so, but calling it a draw because "he did it on his own terms" seems highly artificial. It's also inconsistent with what's been argued (by me) when assessing other battles, eg Seneffe in 1674 or St Denis in 1678; retreat is retreat.

(c) No modern historian would argue for a tactical victory purely on the grounds of relative casualties inflicted, or holding onto a fortified place. If they did, the history of the 1944 to 1945 Eastern Front would be very different. Given Wilson then explains that Bavarian losses convinced Maximilian the war could not be won, arguing for a tactical victory just seems weird.

(d) Mercy didn't go to Freiburg to capture it, his objective was to force Turenne away from the Rhine. He failed, had to retreat, and his losses were such he could not prevent French occupation of the Rhine Valley. So how is that not a Bavarian defeat? Robinvp11 (talk) 18:29, 11 August 2023 (UTC)

If it would be consistent with Seneffe and Saint-Denis and if it makes no difference that Mercy initially held his ground after the fighting ended, feel free to change the infobox.

By now, I assume Wilson refers to the overall fighting at Freiburg (siege + battle) as a "Bavarian tactival victory" (figuratively) rather than to the battle itself - since he writes this where he evaluates the entire campaign shortly after narrating the battle. After all, Mercy captured and held Freiburg which was then vastly overshadowed by losing Philippsburg and Mainz. According to Helmut Lahrkamp (biographer of Johann Werth), Freiburg helped to secure the Black forest route into Bavaria (the one Guébriant and Rantzau used prior to Tuttlingen) and allowed to threaten Breisach. Therefore Mercy intended to capture it.

I'm not sure what you mean by "to force Turenne away from the Rhine" - Turenne was on the defensive and had inferior numbers than Mercy until Condé arrived. Also, the strategic success of the French follow-up campaign was only partly due to Mercy's losses and Maximilian's order not to risk another battle (and not to cross the Rhine to potentially link up with the Duke of Lorraine) but perhaps even more due to the neglected defences in the region. Philippsburg and Mainz were fortresses strong enough to resist a siege for several months - but the marshes protecting Philippsburg had dried up and Mainz didn't offer any resistance at all. Mainz even rejected the Bavarian reinforcements that had already arrived.

In terms of the numbers, Guthrie's nominal Bavarian strenght of 18,000 definitely seems excessive. Still, the effective strenght of 14,900 he lists is on par with many sources (Wilson lists 16,800, a battle report at Heilmann states 15,000, Schaufler lists 16,200 of which 1,300 horsemen were dismounted). Schaufler states that Mercy started his campaign with 20,000 men in April, with 15,000 besieging Überlingen, a small force blockading Hohentwiel and a strong cavalry detachment under his brother Kaspar screening the siege against Turenne's forces in the west. Campaign attrition after two sieges (Überlingen & Freiburg, Hohentwiel was just a blockade) is significant, but reducing Mercy to 10,000 men seems unlikely as well. If Périni assumes 10,000 Bavarian effective, he most likely does not include the dismounted cavalry which was present but not very effective in combat. However, 10,000 effective strength and up to 2000 dismounted riders together are not that far away from the often stated 14,000—15,000. Palastwache (talk) 13:10, 14 August 2023 (UTC)