Draft:Chester Braddock deGavre

• Comment: Private papers and letters cannot be used to source anything, sources need to have been published. Theroadislong (talk) 21:02, 21 October 2023 (UTC)

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Chester ("Chet") Braddock deGavre (August 17, 1907- May 16,1993) personally tested and evaluated most of the equipment used by the U.S. Army's airborne forces in World War Two, pioneered free fall parachuting in the military, served as a controversial and decorated commander of the 65th Infantry Regiment in Korea, and was a noted waterfowl artist.

Early life

deGavre as 4th Year Cadet at West Point

deGavre grew up in Red Bank New Jersey. His father, Charles J. deGavre of Newark New Jersey, was a parttime limousine driver who served as the organist for the Red Bank Lodge of the BPO Elks and played the piano for the Guardians of the Old Guard of Red Bank. His mother, S. Louise Braddock deGavre of Seville Florida, was the cornerstone of the family, commuting daily to New York City to her job as a seamstress. She was part Native American, most probably Cherokee.

Military Career

In April 1926 deGavre, together with several of his high school classmates who wanted to continue to play organized sports, enlisted as a Private in Troop E of the 102nd (horse) Cavalry, New Jersey National Guard (Essex Troop). In July 1929 Corporal deGavre was accepted by the United States Military Academy through a National Guard appointment in a nationwide competition. He entered West Point at age 22 as one of the oldest members of the Class of 1933. Athletically inclined, he lettered in lacrosse and wrestling and played football. He graduated in the lower 89th percentile of his class. In later years he attributed his successful graduation from West Point to a brilliant classmate (later Lieutenant General) "Abe" Lincoln who helped him study after taps late at night and into the early morning hours.

Upon graduation, he was detailed to the Army Air Corps flight school at Randolph Field and in his own words "washed out". He requested the Cavalry branch, but because his low class ranking at West Point he was assigned to the Infantry.

Airborne

Following several routine infantry assignments, in September 1942 Major deGavre completed parachute training at Fort Benning, one of the first officers to do so and at age 35 one of the oldest trainees. Immediately upon completing parachute training, deGavre joined the staff of the newly formed Airborne Command at Fort Bragg and later at Camp Mackall under the command of Colonel William H. Lee, "The Father of the U.S. Airborne". In the same month Colonel Lee directed that all testing and development of equipment be consolidated under Major deGavre.

deGavre joined the airborne community at a pivotal moment in its history. In May 1940 a small German glider contingent, followed by parachutists, had audaciously captured Fort Eban Emael, the supposedly invincible northern anchor of the Belgian fortifications facing Germany. More important to the evolution of U.S. military thinking was the successful airborne assault by a large force of German parachutists, or Fallschirmjägers, in May 1941 on the island of Crete which was defended by a numerically superior British and allied force. The Crete operation gave both credibility to the early advocates of airborne operations within the U.S. Army and impetus and urgency to developing airborne equipment and doctrine. For the Germans, the high casualties experienced by their Fallschirmjägers and the large losses of transport aircraft foreclosed any future large-scale airborne operations. In Hitler's words, "the days of parachute troops are over".

In March 1942 following Pearl Harbor and the sweeping reorganization of the War Department, the Army accelerated and greatly expanded its plans for Airborne forces. The Provisional Parachute Group at Fort Benning was redesignated the Airborne Command with expanded responsibilities (later re-designated the Airborne Center in February 1944 with reduced responsibilities) and moved to Fort Bragg. The Airborne Command was tasked with activating, training, and preparing for combat all airborne units and with a myriad of other activities relating to airborne forces, including doctrine, organization and equipment. In only three years, by the end of World War II, American airborne units had evolved from specialized light infantry units into formations more resembling a standard army division.

deGavre's responsibilities for all testing and development of airborne equipment was challenging. James Gavin, who had joined the predecessor to the Airborne Command in August 1941 and later served as the CO 82nd Airborne Division, wrote: "[T]he problems were without precedent. Individuals had to be capable of fighting at once against any opposition they met upon landing. ...Equipment had to be lightweight and readily transportable. Weapons had to be hand-carried. This meant larger weapons had to be broken down into individual loads, such as mortars and parachute-dropped artillery." German parachute equipment fell far short of these criteria. Parachutes were attached to the soldiers' waists suspending them facing downwards and thus Fallschirmjägers could not reach their parachute risers to maneuver their parachutes. Their harnesses were tight and early versions did not have quick-release buckles. Aircraft exit procedures required the Fallschirmjäger to have free hands, and these procedures plus the restrictive harnesses prevented the German soldier from carrying rifles or machine guns on their person during descent. Weapons, other than pistols and knives, had to be parachuted separately in containers that upon landing the soldier had to locate and open on the battlefield often under fire.

For the next two years, deGavre served as Chief of the Test and Development Section of the Airborne Command (September 1942-July 1943) and then as Parachute Officer (July 1943-July 1944). In these capacities, Major and then Lieutenant Colonel deGavre, without the aid of any established precedent and at great physical risk, personally evaluated, tested, developed, adapted or standardized most of the equipment used by the rapidly growing airborne forces. He parachuted from dozens of different types of aircraft - transports, bombers, gliders - with experimental parachutes, harnesses and equipment from low altitudes with static lines and free-falling from high altitudes. He personally conducted these jumps as "first tries", thereby inspiring the soldiers in his Section. This role meshed well with deGavre's persona - entreprenurial, unstructured, physical self-confidence, and lack of disabling fear.

In August 1944, deGavre received the Legion of Merit, then a relatively new military medal first awarded in October 1942. The award's citation reads in part: "In the early period of the airborne organization Lieutenant Colonel Degavre directed the expansion of the Test and Development Section [of the Airborne Command] ... He displayed exceptional talent for inventiveness and exercised great mechanical ingenuity in conducting test and development of airborne equipment. He pioneered a majority of the projects pertaining to weapons and equipment proposed for airborne units both parachute and glider."

The sateen jump suit deGavre used while assigned to the Airborne Command - a circa 1941 one-piece balloon cotton jump suit with numerous zippered and other pockets - was in the collection of the 82nd War Memorial Museum. It is now held by the U.S. Airborne and Special Operations Museum at Fort Liberty (Fort Bragg) in North Carolina. When on display, the jump suit is on a mannequin stenciled with the name "C.B. DE GAVRE"

In July 1944 Lieutenant Colonel deGavre together with 35 other officers and men were sent by the War Department from the United States to assist in planning and executing the airborne spearhead of Operation Dragoon, the Allied invasion of Southern France. Apocryphally the invasion was re-named Operation Dragoon (previously Operation Anvil) to reflect Prime Minister Churchill's persistent resistance to the invasion of Southern France.

deGavre was appointed Chief of Staff of the First Airborne Task Force, an ad hoc division-size unit. He and his officers had approximately three weeks to plan a complex operation. The Task Force was a hastily assembled amalgam of 19 mostly American parachute and glider units, including a glider Japanese American antitank company and a British independent parachute brigade, none of whom had previously worked together. This amalgam of units were to be carried by many hundreds of transport aircraft and gliders.

On August 15,1944, 396 troop-transport aircraft carried the parachutists in a pre-dawn assault, followed later in the day by another parachute drop. Two waves of 407 gliders carrying troops and heavy equipment landed in the early morning and early evening.

deGavre parachuted with the first wave of paratroopers into the pre-dawn dark and mist into the Argonne Valley near Le Muis. As was common with many paratroop operations, deGavre landed dispersed from his comrades and was soon besieged for several hours with about twelve other soldiers in a stone farmhouse under fire from German soldiers who had dismounted from a truck convoy. deGavre recalled later "the most welcome sound I ever heard". It was the distinctive noise of a bren gun operated by Scottish paratroopers who had joined a column of soldiers from the 542nd Parachute Infantry Combat Team. After the American and Scottish soldiers had relieved the besieged Americans, their burdens were "... eased somewhat by three captured [German] trucks". Many years later in 1984 deGavre was "adopted" by the 542nd Parachute Infantry Association.

The airborne component of Operation Dragoon is considered by some to have been one of the more successful airborne operations of World War Two and the most accurate night combat drop of the War. Although greatly overshadowed by the success of the Normandy invasion, the historian Anthony Beevor has written that the invasion of Southern France, "... accelerated the German retreat and saved the rest of France from the destruction which occurred during the battle of attrition in Normandy." In addition, the captured ports of Toulon and Marseille provided over 1/3 of the Allied logistical needs in Northern France until Antwerp was opened in December 1944.

Its mission accomplished, the First Airborne Task Force was disbanded in late November 1944. deGavre then very briefly (August 2-November 15) served as the executive officer of the 5th Airborne Training Center near Rome which provided parachute training for replacements for airborne units and was modelled on the parachute school at Fort Benning. It had also served as a training area to bring unit cohesion to the disparate units that composed the First Airborne Task Force. The Center was closed shortly after the invasion of Southern France.

In December 1944 the Army established an Airborne Board to centralize the testing, evaluation and development of airborne equipment. deGavre, soon to be a colonel, returned to Camp Mackall to be its first President. One veteran, writing almost fifty years later, recalled the entrepreneurial and experimental spirit deGavre inculcated among his men. "We never knew from day-to-day whether we'd be drop testing a Cushman Scooter or motorcycle; marching in the field with experimental gas masks; jumping the Hart, Derry, Baseball or Elastic-Line chute; or (horrors) being considered as a subject to descend in the Higgins Parabag. Yep ... them were the days!" The Board, composed of many veterans from the 542nd Parachute Infantry, continued the work of its predecessors - testing and developing containers, parachute packs for crew-served weapons, radios, demolition kits, ammunition, rations and other supplies. New types of parachutes were tested to improve control in the air and to reduce oscillation. A daisy chain was developed for field artillery to hold packs together. Heavier artillery was tested and flown in planes and gliders.

In July 1946, deGavre and his officers and men who served from March 1942 to June 1946 in this unit and its predecessor, The Airborne Command's Service Test Section, were awarded The Meritorious Service Unit Plaque (now The Meritorious Unit Commendation) for "...exercising extreme ingenuity and initiative with complete disregard for personal safety in evaluating, testing and developing material for airborne operations..." The dozens of soldiers receiving the award included airborne icons Harry Kinnard and Jim Bassett, Los Angles Disney artist Joe Witzerman, and Olympic rower and future bank chairman James S. Rockefeller.

The re-organization of the Airborne board and other boards within the Army curtailed "the free hand [deGavre] had enjoyed, and he sought a new assignment. deGavre was re-assigned to Europe (1946-1947) as the American liaison to the British airborne forces at Brize Norton. There he took further parachute training to compare American and British parachute techniques, parachuting from balloon cars and Dakota transport aircraft. Partly as a result of his reports, American equipment and techniques underwent further changes.

After attending the Army Staff College in Norfolk, he was assigned to the Pentagon as Chief of the Airborne Section in Army R&D from 1948-1952. His office was responsible for all airborne equipment and parachutes and he served on an inter-service board which reviewed the acceptability of new aircraft. His tour was for three years, but he was asked to extend for one more year. The position brought a sense of accomplishment, and in retrospect he said the fourth year was "the happiest year of my life".

Korea: the 65th Infantry Regiment - Pusan through Outpost Kelly

On October 11, 1952, deGavre, now in Korea, was appointed Commanding Officer of the 65th Puerto Rican Infantry Regiment, a National Guard regiment.

deGavre lobbied for the position upon being told it was becoming available. He had served with the unit in Puerto Rico as a Captain from 1939 to 1941 as the commander of the 65th's Headquarters company. During his two years in Puerto Rico, he had gained fluency with Spanish. He left with a very good impression of the 65th Infantry. In an interview later with military historian Clay Blair, deGavre recalled: "It was a very elite regiment - elite in the sense that everybody as proud as hell ... it was highly respected and fathers and sons and grandfathers had been in the regiment. ... The old non-coms were terrific people. They were professional all the way and their hearts were in the right place. ... They were eager to have their children and their grandchildren become good soldiers." Some of the soldiers serving with the regiment in Korea in 1952 had served previously with deGavre in Puerto Rico.

deGavre's assessment was not unique among the "continentals " who had served with the 65th. Colonel William W. Harris, who very ably served as its CO from July 1949 to April 1951, as told by the military historian Clay Blair, "came to admire the people and the spirit he found in this offbeat outfit, and he was soon its most ardent booster.

Immediately prior to deploying to Korea the regiment enlisted 2,000 recruits to fill its ranks, out of thousands that applied for duty. The large majority of the recruits were World War Two veterans and spoke both Spanish and English. After disembarking in Pusan in September 1950 and joining the 3d Infantry Division in late October, the 65th Regiment fought from the Pusan perimeter north towards the Chosin Reservoir. In the northward advance towards the Yalu River, "... the Puerto Ricans, experiencing subzero temperatures for the first time in their lives and still dressed in summer clothing, performed with astonishing valor and élan." As told by their CO Col. Harris, his soldiers "... faced hordes of Chinese, eyeball to eyeball, and did not flinch. ... [the Puerto Ricans] ... demonstrated even to the most skeptical of their critics that they were a force to be reckoned with." The 65th together with other units as part of Task Force Dog helped open up the evacuation route for the First Marine Division to the embarkation port of Hungnam. It was among the last combat units defending the Hungnam perimeter. Later back on the offensive, the 65th was the first unit to cross the Han River below Seoul and one of the first to re-enter Seoul in 1951. In late April 1951 it was "instrumental" in breaking an enemy counterattack in the "Iron Triangle" sector. Col Harris records innumerable instances of bravery by individual privates, corporals and sergeants that saved outposts from being overrun or that broke the back of an enemy assault. "The men of the 65th were cool, determined, self-reliant, and effective combat soldiers. They were fearless." "It was well led, well trained, and highly motivated."

The 65th Infantry Regiment - referred to as a Regimental Combat Team when augmented with embedded artillery and tank battalions - did have its detractors. It was an idiosyncratic unit, composed of three Puerto Rican battalions, for a time one Philipine battalion, and in the north a black tank unit and a black artillery battalion. As a geographically based unit, it was institutionally unique within the regular army. As an ethnic and colored unit, it attracted prevailing biases and doubts from some senior commanders. Yet the 65th's unimpeachable combat record through 1951 spoke for itself.

By the end of 1951 and accelerating into 1952 the combat effectiveness of the regiment began to deteriorate significantly. Signs of erosion reached as far back as the Spring of 1951 when there was a rash of fingers and toes being shot off by "inductees" - service fillers or replacements for casualties - who had not absorbed the traditions of the proud 65th. Later in September the regiment experienced its first major tactical setback failing to seize hills in the Chowon Valley despite substantial support from all elements of its parent unit, the 3d Division.

In mid-1951 Colonel Harris was replaced as CO. His two highly regarded veteran battalion commanders - St. Clair and Dammer - were also replaced. Most destructive was the army's rotation policy introduced in September 1951 which led to a massive exodus of combat-experienced soldiers, NCOs and officers. "Inductees", typically without high school degrees and with little or no fluency in English, replaced proud bi-lingual and veteran volunteers. Although all U.S. Army units suffered from this policy, the 65th was uniquely impacted by the loss of its bilingual NCO cadres who provided the essential communication on the battlefield. Following the huge turnover in personnel in the first six months of 1952, the 65th's NCO deficit reached "crisis proportions". At the end of September 1952, out of an authorized strength of 811 NCO's of the upper three grades, the regiment had only 381.

The lack of veteran, bi-lingual NCOs was magnified by leadership weaknesses at the top of the regiment. On February 1, 1952, Col. Juan Caesar Cordero-Davila was appointed CO of the 65th, the only National Guard officer to command a regiment in Korea. He was a popular figure in Puerto Rican politics with little battlefield experience or formal military education. Col. Cordero "... owed his assignment to his close ties with Puerto Rico's political elite." Only his able subordinates held the unit together. Discipline suffered under Colonel Codero. Command of the young soldiers became difficult. As recorded by the historian Gilberto Villahermosa, Colonel Codero pandered to his men rather than emphasizing discipline and combat training. He established a Privates' Council which met once a month, undercutting the military chain of command. In the words of the CO of the 3d Division, "there was much to indicate that Colonel Codero was not a disciplinarian."

The Korean War itself had also changed. For twelve months it had been a war of movement. Now following the peace negotiations which had commenced in July 1951, it became a static war characterized by bloody battles for contested hills lying between each side's main line of defense. The hills themselves were typically barren and rocky offering little natural protection to soldiers. Both sides placed reliance upon heavy artillery - and Chinese artillery competency had markedly improved. The result was battles which produced prodigious casualties. The hills themselves were in the words of the historian Clay Blair "inconsequential". Others saw them as having more political rationale than military - as negotiating leverage at the sometimes-stalled truce negotiations at Panmunjom. The last two months of the war - which ended on 27 July 1953 - were among the most horrific of the war in terms of casualties. Many troop commanders concluded that the war as it was being fought was "verging on the criminal".

The stalemated, no-win war with its prodigious casualties significantly impacted troop morale within all U.S. Eighth Army units. Time magazine wrote "soldiers see no purpose and no good in the kind of war they are fighting." Many months later in July 1953 General Maxwell Taylor decided he could no longer justify risking more lives for hills that were of minimal strategic importance. Chinese commanders continued to operate on a different calculus.

Though low morale was widespread within the Eighth Army, esprit within the 65th Infantry was particularly poor. For example, in the first ten months of 1952, self-inflicted wounds ("SIW's") within the 65th were running about 2.4 times that within the other two 3d Division regiments. The language chasm between the inductee riflemen and continental officers not only made the transmission of urgent orders on the battlefield nearly impossible but also undermined in the eyes of the inductees any sense of purpose for their being in Korea. As deGavre observed upon joining the unit in October 1952, "They didn't do anything, know anything, or care about much."

In the first eight months of 1952, the 65th was on the front line slightly less than half the time. Its performance was judged "satisfactory", but the regiment experienced only relatively light combat action. The unit's fundamental weaknesses in morale, leadership, and veteran, bi-lingual NCOs were not tested to any degree.

The test came in late September 1952 when the Chinese launched a broad offensive against several of the contested hills, one being Outpost Kelly which was occupied by units of the 65th. The regiment fought for the hill over eight days and was ultimately forced off the hill. Soldiers of the 65th were caught literally in their sleeping bags by the attacking Chinese. Almost the entire company "B" was destroyed, it soldiers either killed or taken prisoner. The regiment then failed in two counterattacks to re-occupy the Outpost. In the first, two battalions were deployed against an enemy force estimated to be one reinforced rifle company. In the second counterattack, a fresh battalion supported by tanks and 25,000 rounds of artillery attacked an estimated reinforced enemy company. The intention was to "swat a fly with a sledgehammer". In both attempts, there was "an almost complete failure to get the troops to advance." The disintegration in the second counterattack was not gradual or orderly - "men [were] in full flight .... without helmets, weapons or even shirts". The disorderly withdrawal of almost an entire battalion indicated "a very poor state of discipline and organization."

The eight-day battle for Outpost Kelly produced approximately 350 casualties, or ten percent of the regiment's actual strength. For the whole month of September, the regiment suffered 413 battle casualties, the bulk at Outpost Kelly, the unit's highest monthly casualty rate since arriving in Korea.

Five other outpost hills held by other Eighth Army units had been overrun by Chinese forces as part of their larger offensive, but Outpost Kelly was the only one not recaptured.

The 1st Corps Commander Lieutenant General Paul Kendall, who had personally witnessed the 65th's failure at Outpost Kelly, relieved the commanders of both the 3d Division and the 65th Regiment. Gen. Kendall wrote that the commander of the 65th Infantry, Colonel Juan Cesar Cordero-Davila, was "... incapable of properly commanding a regiment of infantry in combat". Col. Cordero returned to Puerto Rico a national hero and was later promoted to Brigadier General. Compounding leadership weaknesses at the regimental level, the 3d Division commander failed to address the regiment's NCO crisis, exercising hands-off leadership of the 65th, possibly intimidated by Col. Cordero's strong political associations or by a reluctance to discipline a unit which was acknowledged to be "a great source of pride to the people of Puerto Rico".

The debacle on Outpost Kelly resulted in two senior officers bring relieved and no soldiers being court-martialed.

Korea: the 65th Infantry - Jackson Heights and Court-Martials

Upon assuming command of the regiment on October 11, deGavre immediately understood that the 65th was not the unit he remembered. The unit had lost its tight-knit cohesion and its proud sense of family.

deGavre immediately addressed widely recognized deficiencies in training. He embarked upon an intensive three-week training cycle which was hobbled by lack of ammunition and other external factors.

He also immediately addressed deficiencies in military discipline, or in the words of the 3d Division, sought "to restore disciplinary control so necessary to an effective organization". deGavre ordered all soldiers to improve their military appearance and the condition of their equipment. The order encompassed haircuts, shaving beards and mustaches, wearing helmets, lacing boots, correct treatment of firearms and proper clothing. deGavre told the interviewer Clay Blair "We started to shape it up in every way you can imagine - saluting, haircuts, [shining] boots, ... [not] vandalizing or throwing away weapons. ...The first thing I decided to do was to shape this outfit up and bring it back to Jesus, so to speak. This regiment is going to shave clean by Monday morning."

The order to shave mustaches, in particular, provoked a strong response. Mustaches were integral to a Puerto Rican's sense of manhood. Some saw in the order cultural insensitivity; yet deGavre had served in Puerto Rico with the regiment for two years (1939-1940), was fluent in Spanish and was thoroughly familiar with the culture of the regiment. deGavre had taken "the measure of the men and their NCO's".

Colonel Betances-Ramirez, the 2nd Battalion CO and the only Puerto Rican to command a battalion in the 65th during the Korean War, vigorously protested the order to shave mustaches. Major Silvestre "Cy" E. Ortiz, the regimental adjutant, (Ortiz was a friend of deGavre's from deGavre's time in Puerto Rico (1939-1941) and extended his tour in Korea to remain with deGavre) wrote: "Mine had to go also after 22 years with me. All that the mustache means to a Puerto Rican, it is part of his personality, in many cases the product of a religious vow, so much so that the three chaplains went to visit this gentleman and apprised him of its importance..." The regiment's chaplains personally warned deGavre that he was going to be murdered in 24 hours. deGavre told the historian Clay Blair "It got done and I wasn't murdered."

deGavre sought to administer shock therapy to what he and many others perceived to be a failed and demoralized unit. He also sought to convince the CO of the 3d Division that the soldiers could adhere to the same standards of military discipline and courtesy as other regiments in the Division. He understood that his superiors would not tolerate manifestations of a separate identity as long as it failed on the battlefield.

Fourteen days after deGavre assumed command, on October 25, 1952, the Chinese launched another series of attacks including an assault on Jackson Heights held by a unit of the 65th. Jackson Heights was a barren, steep, and rocky knife-edge ridge two thousand yards distant from and perpendicular to the main United Nations' line of defense. Following prodigious Chinese artillery fire over three days, the American soldiers withdrew after suffering numerous battle casualties. On October 28 a unit of the 65th recaptured the hill. Following heavy losses among officers and soldiers, soldiers began deserting the hill and the next day refused to return. On October 29 a unit of the 65th again secured the hill, but shortly thereafter its men began abandoning the hill "without an enemy round being fired or a live enemy being sighted". Officers suffered unusually high casualties as they sought to instill by example an offensive spirit in their soldiers. General James Van Fleet, then CO of the Eighth Army, concluded what he termed the regiment's apathetic soldiers had been driven from Jackson Heights by a "decidedly inferior force".

Five days later, a patrol from the regiment into no man's land was aborted when several deserted to the rear and others refused a direct order issued through an interpreter.

A 3d Division Staff Study used the term "mutiny" to describe the actions of some 65th units and soldiers.

The 3d Division withdrew the 65th Regiment from the front lines. "... [I]n view of the repeated disintegration of companies under fire, the 65th Infantry can no longer be entrusted with a sector of the Unted Nations battlefront until radical improvements are made."

Almost immediately after the battle for Jackson Heights, the 3d Division's staff judge advocate reviewed statements from everyone at Jackson Heights, interviewed some soldiers, and brought charges. The Army's theatre commanders approved harsh measures. In total, one junior officer and 90 enlisted personnel received stiff sentences for desertion, misbehavior before the enemy, and willfully disobeying a lawful order from a superior officer. It was not the first time soldiers had panicked under fire in Korea, including soldiers from a patrol from the 3d Division's 15th Infantry one month later. But it was the first time soldiers had been court-martialed for such action.

Months later when the court-martials became public, a political storm erupted in Washington. In January 1953 The New York Times did an in-depth report. After first acknowledging the regiment had earned international recognition for its bravery, the paper concluded: "Of the 519 men in the three companies and patrols involved, most held their ground and did not flee. The Army had sufficient evidence to bring charges against ninety-seven ...The sentences given range from six months to ten years at hard labor. The severity of the sentence was governed by the circumstances and previous records." Within two years, the Secretary of Army Robert Stevens had given clemency or pardons to all those sentenced. No exonerations were offered.

The debates over the cause of the regiment's disgrace on Jackson Heights and the ensuing court-martials remain bitter.

The historian Clay Blair, a great admirer of the 65th in the early Korean War years, points to the Army's rotation policy: "Stripped of its experienced and spirited volunteers, the 65th sank into a gradual decline that was to result, finally, in a scandalous bugout."

Another military historian, Walter G. Hermes, wrote that two weeks of intensive training under its new commander deGavre prior to be re-committed to combat at Jackson Heights "... could not remedy the basic weakness of the regiment - the lack of experienced noncommissioned officers at the infantry platoon level."

A 3d Division staff study dated 8 November 1952 concluded that " ... during September, October and November [the 65th Infantry Regiment] has disintegrated in discipline and esprit to the point where is is no longer a battleworthy unit. This situation is the result of a language barrier and a complete lack of NCO's."

Villahermosa, who has written extensively on the 65th, offers a more inclusive analysis. In an article published in Army Magazine in 2001 he focused on the Army's practice of assigning English-speaking Puerto Rican NCOs to Eighth Army units other than the 65th. He has been more expansive both in his 2000 report Honor and Fidelity and in his longer 2009 book The 65th Infantry in Korea. At the end of his 2009 book, he summarizes in over six pages his conclusions. He points to numerous issues, most importantly - as judged by the space devoted to the subject - the rotation out of veteran soldiers and officers and the lack of bi-lingual NCOs, the legacy of Col. Cordero as regimental commander, and the inattentive leadership at the division level. At the end of this summary, he briefly questions some of deGavre's decisions, specifically the potential impact on morale of his order to shave all facial hair. He also notes deGavre lacked time to accomplish much before being ordered to defend Jackson Heights.

More recent articles focus almost sole blame upon deGavre, attributing to him personally - a white continental - the failure at Jackson Heights. The oft cited criticism is deGavre's order to shave mustaches "until such time as they gave proof of their manhood" and its damaging effect on morale which then caused or contributed to the Jackson Heights failures. These incendiary words were first surfaced by Villahermosa, the historian of the 65th. He offers conflicting sources for them. In his 2000 report Honor and Fidelity, Villahermosa cites the historian Clay Blair's interview with deGavre as his source. No such words are in Clay Blair's interview. Later in his The 65th Infantry in Korea, he cites two sources:

(i) the 65th's September Command Report. The 65th's September Command Report makes no reference to these words.

(ii) a memo written by Col. Betances-Ramirez twenty-five years later in 1988 which is in Villahermosa's personal files. Col. Betances-Ramirez had been relieved of his battalion command by General Smythe of the 3d Division for "his inability to control or influence the action" on October 28 during the debacle at Jackson Heights. Villahermosa has suggested that Col. Betances-Ramirez was unfairly "made to shoulder the whole blame". Thus, with cause, Col. Betances-Ramirez may be embittered and twenty-five years later arguably not an unbiased observer.

No historian has cited a written order with these incendiary words, and none can be found in the National Archives.

The ten words - "until such time as they gave proof of the manhood" - are central to the critique of deGavre. For example, an article in the Military Officer, the magazine for the Military Officers Association of America, cites these words which, when combined with the language barrier, resulted in insubordination in two of the three battalions. This narrative dominates in other current writings.

An ad hominem narrative ignores the collapse of the regiment as a combat unit well before deGavre assumed command, most notably the 65th's failure on Outpost Kelly. The ten words are also at sharp variance with deGavre's persona as assessed by his commanding officers over his years of military service. For example, as cited in a Bronze Medal (Meritorious) awarded only a few months later, deGavre (then serving as an advisor to a Korean (ROK) division) is seen as possessing tact, persistence and quiet aggressiveness while at the same time promoting mutual respect (see below).

Another book - a 2020 novel - based upon interviews with thirteen Puerto Rican veterans - all Silver Star or Bronze Star veterans - digs deeper into the psychology of the 65th soldiers after Outpost Kelly. The veterans recall the miserable failure of Col. Cordero in his mission, the loss of the old veterans, the suicidal assaults on Outpost Kelly and later Jackson Heights where there was no cover and no place to dig a foxhole both of which were in the end meaningless objectives, the illiterate draftees who could not converse with their continental officers through the language barrier, the order to shave mustaches even though Army regs permitted them, a widespread prejudice against Puerto Ricans, the paucity of Silver Stars awarded to Puerto Rican soldiers. In the end, author concluded that the veterans felt the Army had deserted them, that "the whole organization of the war effort was culpable", that "the refusal to fight ... was more a criticism of the system rather than a reflection on their valor".

Korea: Redemption - 1953

Immediately following the debacle at Jackson Heights, the 65th Infantry was withdrawn from the front line. deGavre launched an intensive program of training that emphasized small unit capabilities and confidence in organic weapons. Some of deGavre's actions indicated an effort to rebuild the unit's esprit de corps by honoring its unique cultural roots. In early December deGavre assured the Division CO and the IX Corps CO that the regiment would be ready for combat in two weeks. Notwithstanding the 3d Division's staff harsh assessment that the 65th could not be "entrusted" as a front-line combat unit, the regiment - still an ethnic Puerto Rican formation - was re-committed to combat in December 1952 and January 1953. Although unit cohesion continued to be bedeviled by the lack of NCOs and critical bilingual NCOs, deGavre reported " ... signs of better spirit and improved efficiency", unit morale excellent, and a dramatic drop in disciplinary problems.

The Army command however had already lost faith in the 65th, seeing "the language barrier between Continental officer and Puerto Rican NCOs as insuperable". deGavre did not endorse this view. As deGavre told Clay Blair, "...we had made such great advances despite the remaining handicaps of language ...I was proud as hell of what we had done and that we were doing a good job. .. We were trusted [by the 3d Division CO] like he would any of the other regiments [in the 3dDivision]... They had proved themselves."

Shortly after Jackson Heights in early November 1952, General James Van Fleet, CO of the Eighth Army, had recommended the Department of Army de-activate the 65th Infantry Regiment. However, unlike other regiments perceived to be unreliable in combat in Korea, the regiment was retained. At the end of February 1953, the Army ordered the regiment be reconfigured into an integrated formation with soldiers from across the Nation. Levies were placed on other units in Korea to supply soldiers and NCOs to the 65th. Over 2,000 Puerto Rican soldiers were transferred to other units in Korea. All Puerto Rican officers in the 65th were retained. General Maxwell Taylor, now the hands-on Commander of Eighth Army, visited deGavre at the 65th on March 28 for a personal update on the quality of the personnel being transferred into the 65th. One month later, the newly integrated regiment began a six-week period of intensive, accelerated training.

June 4, 1953: Gen. Maxwell Taylor arriving to inspect the 65th. deGavre with a nascent mustache (right) and General's aide (left) are helping with flak jacket. In background, fully mustachioed Sgt Matte, deGavre's jeep driver.

In mid-May the regiment was recommitted to the frontline at Outpost Harry. It was almost immediately tested by a Chinese mid-night assault on May 16 which was repulsed with large enemy casualties. The fighting then and later at Outpost Harry was as intense as at Outpost Kelly and Jackson Heights. The regiment did not hesitate on the offensive and stubbornly held its ground on the defensive and then counterattacked. The 65th's performance attracted praise from its senior commanders. In early June 1953, General Maxwell Taylor returned to the regiment to observe personally its combat operations and in a telegram addressed to the CO 3d Division "have noted with pride the staunch defensive and offensive opns [operations] conducted by the three inf div during the period nine dash one June [June 1-9]. The successful raid by the six five inf reg and defense of Outpost Harry by the one five inf reg are outstanding. I extend most sincere congratulations to you and your troops." In the following month, the CO 3d Division congratulated the regiment for a raid and reconnaissance patrol, writing: "The elan and professional skill demonstrated throughout these operations [night of 5-6 July 1953] are indicative of outstanding leadership and dogged devotion to duty."

The unit's combat performance vindicated the Army's decision to retain the 65th. It was also a testament to deGavre's "unusual ability" that in eight intensive weeks he integrated and trained thousands of new personnel into a cohesive and effective fighting force.

Shortly before the July 27,1953 Armistice in Korea, deGavre was replaced as CO of the 65th. He had served as the 65th's CO for nine months, the average tenure for regimental commanders in the 3d Division in Korea being less than 4 months.

deGavre was awarded several citations during his command. In March 1953 he received the Silver Star Medal citing "his calm and fearless manner" while under intense artillery fire. In July 1953 the 3d Division awarded him a Bronze Star (Meritorious) for his leadership in reorganizing the regiment into a national unit, his intensive training program, outstanding professional skill, the success of the regiment's "bold and punishing daylight attacks". deGavre "... performed his duties in an exceptionally superior manner. His reassuring presence with the most forward elements of his command and his resourceful stability in times of stress were all inspiring and vital factors in the success of the 65th Infantry Regiment."

The Bronze Star was immediately superseded by deGavre's second Legion of Merit awarded by Gen. Maxwell Taylor's Eighth Army citing "outstanding service ... displaying astute judgement and professional competence ... reflected in the combat effectiveness and high morale of officers and men." In August 1953 Gen. Maxwell Taylor personally wrote to the Adjutant General, Department of the Army, recommending deGavre's promotion to Brigadier General citing "his outstanding record while under my command."

Remaining in Korea, deGavre served for two months from July 12,1953 to September 24,1953 as senior advisor to the 12th ROK Division. In a citation for a Bronze Star (Meritorious), his superiors wrote: "He personally inspected frontline positions under enemy observation and fire. ...The effectiveness of his interest and professional advice was reflected in a remarkable improvement in health standards, morale and fighting spirit of the individual soldier. ... Demonstrating a tact, persistence and quiet aggressiveness, he promoted an atmosphere of complete cordiality and mutual respect."

Korea to Retirement: 1953-1963

deGavre while serving with 82nd Airborne and General James Gavin, Ret.

Colonel deGavre served (1953-1955) as Chief of Staff for the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg under Maj. Gen. Joseph P. Cleland. In twice recommending him for brigadier general, Gen. Cleland cited deGavre's impressive performance, moral temperance, courage and inspirational leadership. Upon graduation from the Army War College in June 1956, he was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General and returned to the Pentagon in Army R&D as Director of Development under the airborne icon, General James M. Gavin. deGavre greatly admired Gavin, but sensed he and Gavin did not see-eye-to-eye and did not want the assignment. Gavin requested he come and he did. The Pentagon assignment thankfully lasted approximately one year.

In his own words, the "finest assignment I have ever had" was serving as the Assistant Division Commander for Combat Arms of the 82nd Airborne Division from 1957-1959. While serving with the Division then commanded by Maj. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, deGavre did what he loved most and did best - work with troops in the field.

He also renewed his interest in delayed opening parachute jumping. In 1942-44 while at Camp Mackall, deGavre had pioneered free falling with heavy radio equipment, from altitudes of 5,000 to 6,000 feet with delayed openings of up to 17 seconds. These drops were to test the feasibility of deploying pathfinders from high altitudes. Now serving with the 82nd Division, he started the Division's Sky-Dive unit and became the first general officer to become a free fall parachutist, completing 10 such jumps. Prior to leaving the 82nd, he completed his 135th parachute jump.

deGavre in sky-diving suit given to him by sergeants in the 82nd's Sky-Dive Barracks in recognition of his interest and support

Following assignments in Ethiopia as head of the Military Assistance Advisory Group to the government of Haille Selassi and then later at Fort Monroe with the U.S. Continental Army Command, he retired from the Army in 1963 after 30 years of active military service, roughly half of which was in airborne R&D or with airborne troops. Immediately prior to retirement, he was awarded his third Legion of Merit.

Waterfowl Artist and Carver

As a young boy aged 12, Chet deGavre began to spend the winter months hunting waterfowl on the banks of the Shrewsbury River in Rumson, New Jersey. He carved his own full-size decoys both as a necessity and as an expression of his enduring love of waterfowl. None of these decoys remain extant. Later in the Army he shifted to carving full size decorative birds, for example, as lamp-bases. Then in 1935 recognizing the practicality of military life, he turned to carving miniatures on a one-to-six scale, often carrying four or five "blanks" in his pockets while on long flights or while idle on field maneuvers or even in the cold winters in Korea. Carving was a thorough joy for him, a form of metal relaxation offering in his words "therapeutic value". His deep love of waterfowl guided his large hands to create out of a block of wood ducks and geese that were alive.

Each pair of miniatures took five hours to carve using a penknife and sandpaper, plus another twenty-five hours to apply meticulously oil paint under a magnifying glass and then to mount them. He used bass wood for bodies - a straight-grained wood - and mahogany for the heads and later the wings. The birds were typically mounted in pairs on driftwood of red cedar. The noted carver A.J. King (1881-1963) - the preeminent carver of decorative miniature game birds of that era - greatly influenced Chet's work as he developed his own style.

pintails carved and painted by deGavre

While in the military, carving was a hobby and a form of relaxation. Before retiring, he had completed very roughly 500 pairs of waterfowl. Thereafter the numbers of his miniatures increased substantially which he sold at exhibits and to a client list that grew steadily by word of mouth. Though it became a business with such an impossibly long backlog that he stopped taking orders, carving and painting remained for him a pleasure and again in his words was "never tedious".

Chet's work achieved national recognition. As one of thirty artists, he was invited to exhibit his work at the National Audubon Society's 1978 show of contemporary bird carvings and decoys in New York City. He also exhibited his work at many other shows including the annual Atlantic Flyway Waterfowl and Bird Carving Show in Salisbury Maryland sponsored by the Ward Foundation; the well-attended annual Waterfowl Festival in Easton Maryland; the biennial American Bird Carving Exhibit at Washington College in Chesterton Maryland; and the Wetlands Institute in Stone Harbor New Jersey. The Eastern Shore Chapter of Ducks Unlimited recognized him as the Artist of the Year in 1982.

Persona

Upon graduation from West Point in 1933, his classmates wrote in the Howitzer (the class yearbook) their description of Chet. "His nickname [Chet], like his character embodies the sterling characteristics of young America. If ever there was a man with the manliness of a man yet the kindness of a heart of a woman, you see him here. His is a mixed temperament, alternately high spirited and low-spirited ... Athletically inclined, he has no use for the red-comforter man and often denounces vehemently the 'Do-Nothings'."

He was not an intellectual or an academic, as evidenced by his low academic standing at West Point and his distaste for staff and Pentagon assignments. Energy, initiative, ingenuity, courage, common sense, inspiration, were the words commonly used by his superiors to describe Chet, as cited in his decorations referred to above. His leadership abilities were widely recognized by his superiors, but also by "grunts" and junior officers. On Chet's first parachute jump in a plane laden with nervous soldiers, one trainee later wrote that his "leadership became contagious"..

As he matured, he became known within the military and the artist waterfowl community for his outsized persona - his abundant sense of humor, his strong moral character, his exuberant enthusiasm. "His striking personality was always foremost."

He had come to the Army through the enlisted ranks. He was "an Enlisted Man's General", the "Airborne 'Soldiers General' " Sergeants were the core of the Army. One enlisted veteran, a noted Disney artist, wrote to him almost 50 years later: "I am sure you are aware of your popularity with noncoms and grunts".

On the Eastern Shore of Virginia where he lived in retirement, they still tell stories of the "General". A former chair of the local Ducks Unlimited chapter recalled Chet ten years after his death: "What a memory. What a man."

deGavre's last years were difficult for him. He lost his physical prowess, prior cobalt treatment for prostate cancer brought its consequences, and his hands shook depriving him of the relaxation he gained from carving and painting his waterfowl miniatures.

Personal Life

In Chet's own words, "I shall start my story in 1949 because that is when my life really began - with my marriage to a lovely and wonderful English [war] widow whose two sons have been a constant joy to me." This was his second marriage, the first having ended in divorce. For the next forty-three years Chet and Teresa ("Tita") enjoyed an enviable companionship. Tita was a "supportive" Army wife. In Ethiopia they explored, camped, hunted and fished together. Later in retirement she complemented Chet's artistic skills in restoring their recently purchased eighteenth-century home at Deep Creek on the Eastern Shore of Virigina. Chet crafted antique furniture made from the wood of walnut trees on the property, personally disassembled or jacked-up dilapidated old barns or small buildings and moved them to their property, resting only to fish in the Bay or to carve his miniatures. After several years, their home attracted much celebration in the annual Historic Garden Tours and in print. The book Chesapeake: The Eastern Shore Gardens and Houses devotes a chapter to a pictorial and written tour of their home - photographs of Chet's furniture and raised-panel cabinets, a collection of his miniature waterfowl carvings, buildings he moved to the property, Tita's crewel work and gardens, and their menagerie of animals and birds.

Chet died in 1993. He had no children and raised his two stepsons as his own. He is buried alongside Tita at their home. On his tombstone are engraved the words: AIRBORNE PIONEER - WOOD CARVER - LOVING HUSBAND.