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Armenia–CSTO relations

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Armenia–CSTO relations

Armenia
Collective Security Treaty Organization

Bilateral relations between Armenia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) were formalized when Armenia became a full member of the CSTO in 1994.[1][2] In February 2024, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced Armenia's freeze on CSTO membership.[3]

History

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After the start of renewed fighting between Armenia and former member Azerbaijan on 13 September 2022, Armenia triggered Article 4 of the treaty, and a CSTO mission including CSTO Secretary General Stanislav Zas and Anatoly Sidorov was sent to monitor the situation along the border.[4][5] After the CSTO mission took a rather uncommitted position in the conflict, criticism towards CSTO membership inside Armenian political circles increased, with the secretary of the Security Council of Armenia, Armen Grigoryan, even stating that he saw no more hope for the CSTO.[6] The lack of Russian support during the conflict prompted a national debate in Armenia, as an increasing percentage of the population indicated doubt as to whether it is beneficial to continue CSTO membership, calling for realignment of the state with NATO instead.[7] This coincided with a visit from Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi to Yerevan on 17 September 2022, largely seen as an effort to reorient the security alliance structure of Armenia.[8] To discuss the results of the CSTO mission sent on 15 September 2022, an extraordinary session of the CSTO was held via videoconference on 28 October 2022. With the leaders of all member states and CSTO Secretary General Stanislav Zas in attendance, the meeting was chaired by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who concurred with the report presented by the Secretary General while also reiterating the importance for a clear political assessment of Azerbaijani aggression and a roadmap for the restoration of Armenian territorial integrity.[9][10]

A regular Collective Security Council meeting took place on 23 November 2022 with the leaders of all CSTO members present to discuss matters of international and regional security.[11] After Pashinyan refused to sign the joint declaration because it did not "reach a decision on a CSTO response to Azerbaijan's aggression against Armenia", speculation arose regarding the continuation of the CSTO.[12][13] Secretary General Stanislas Zas indicated that, though numerous measures in the diplomatic as well as military spheres were generally agreed upon, no consensus regarding the situation on the border could be reached.[14] The diplomatic friction continued into January 2023, after Pashinyan refused to hold common military drills, because the organisation did not unequivocally condemn Azerbaijan over its perceived aggression.[15] In response, Dmitry Peskov, the Press Secretary of the President of Russia, stated that Armenia remains a very close ally and promised to continue the dialogue.[16] To mend their ties, Sergey Lavrov offered the deployment of a CSTO mission along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border on 2 February 2023 within one or two days, "if our Armenian allies, friends are still interested in it like before".[17]

In May 2023, after the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan escalated, the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said that Armenia could consider withdrawing from the treaty due to the lack of support from Russia in the conflict.[18] In an interview with CNN broadcast on 1 June 2023, Pashinyan stated that "Armenia is not an ally of Russia in the war in Ukraine".[19] On 3 September 2023, during an interview, Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that it was a strategic mistake for Armenia to solely rely on Russia to guarantee its security. Pashinyan stated, "Moscow has been unable to deliver and is in the process of winding down its role in the wider South Caucasus region" and "the Russian Federation cannot meet Armenia's security needs. This example should demonstrate to us that dependence on just one partner in security matters is a strategic mistake." Pashinyan accused Russian peacekeepers deployed to uphold the ceasefire deal of failing to do their job. Pashinyan confirmed that Armenia is trying to diversify its security arrangements, most notably with the European Union and the United States.[20]

During the 2023 Armenian protests that began following the 2023 Azerbaijani offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh, demonstrators surrounded the Russian embassy in Yerevan criticizing Russia's refusal to intervene in the offensive. Some protesters called for the rejection of the Alma-Ata Protocol, and Armenia's withdrawal from the CSTO.[21] Armenia declined participating in military exercises and the CIS summit in Kyrgyzstan in October 2023 and asked for Russian peacekeeping forces to return to Russia.[22] The Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, went further in late October saying he saw "no advantage" in the presence of Russian troops in Armenia. Currently around 10,000 Russian troops are in stationed in Gyumri.[23]

Freezing of membership

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On 23 February 2024, Armenian Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, confirmed that Armenia has frozen its participation in the CSTO. Pashinyan stated, "We have now in practical terms frozen our participation in this treaty" and "membership of the CSTO was under review" during a live broadcast interview.[3] On 28 February 2024, during a speech made in the National Assembly, Pashinyan further stated that the CSTO is "a threat to the national security of Armenia". Responding to Pashinyan's remarks, Dmitri Peskov stated that the CSTO charter does not include provisions for a "frozen membership" status.[24] On 12 March, Pashinyan said that the CSTO needed to clarify "what constitutes Armenia's sovereign territory", as the organization had not come to Armenia's defence when requested following Azerbaijani troops crossing the border into Armenia's internationally recognized territory. Pashinyan said that if the CSTO's response did not align with Armenia's expectations, the country would officially withdraw from the organization.[25] On 8 May 2024, Armenia announced it had stopped making financial contributions to the CSTO,[26] leading Russia to state that it was still obligated to pay its membership dues.[27] On 12 June 2024, Armenia announced that it would formally withdraw from the alliance at an unspecified later date,[27] with Pashinyan stating, "We will leave. We will decide when to exit...Don't worry, we won't return".[28]

On 14 November 2024, Armenian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Ani Badalyan announced that there has been no change in Armenia's stance on freezing its participation in the CSTO.[29]

Public opinion

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Several political parties in Armenia actively campaign for the withdrawal of Armenia from the CSTO, most notably the European Party of Armenia, For The Republic Party, Conservative Party, Hanrapetutyun Party, Sasna Tsrer Pan-Armenian Party, Sovereign Armenia Party, Meritocratic Party of Armenia, National Democratic Pole, and the United Platform of Democratic Forces.[30]

A July 2024 Gallup opinion poll noted a 7% increase in support for Armenia's membership in NATO, with 29% of respondents believing Armenia should strive for NATO membership. Meanwhile, support for Armenia's membership in the CSTO decreased by 10%, with only 16.9% believing Armenia should maintain its membership in the CSTO.[31]

Bilateral visits

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Former CSTO Secretary General Stanislav Zas visited Yerevan on 21–23 December 2021 to meet with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan and Armenian Security Council Secretary General Armen Grigoryan.[32]

CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov met with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan in Yerevan on 21 December 2023.[33]

Representation

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Main article: Permanent Mission of Armenia to the CSTO

Armenia maintains a Permanent Mission to the CSTO in Moscow, Russia.[34] As of November 2018, Ambassador Viktor Biyagov is the current Head of the Permanent Mission of Armenia to the CSTO.[35][36] Meanwhile, Mher Shirinyan has been appointed Representative of the Armed Forces of Armenia at the Mission of Armenia to the CSTO.[37][38]

See also

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References

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  1. ^ "CSTO – Relations with Armenia". CSTO.
  2. ^ "COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION". www.mfa.am.
  3. ^ a b "Armenia freezes participation in Russia-led security bloc - Prime Minister". Reuters. 23 February 2024.
  4. ^ "CSTO mission not arrived in Armenia yet, Kremlin says". Panorama News. 14 September 2022. Archived from the original on 14 September 2022. Retrieved 14 September 2022.
  5. ^ "Armenia asked CSTO for military support to restore territorial integrity amid Azeri attack – PM". Armenpress. Armenian Telegraph Agency. 14 September 2022. Archived from the original on 14 September 2022. Retrieved 14 September 2022.
  6. ^ Mghdesyan, Arshaluis (26 September 2022). "Armenians Decry CSTO Inaction". Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Archived from the original on 12 October 2022. Retrieved 12 October 2022.
  7. ^ "Opposition Groups Call For Armenia's Withdrawal From CSTO On Eve Of Yerevan Summit". Radio FreeEurope/Radio Liberty. 23 November 2022.
  8. ^ Gavin, Gabriel (19 September 2022). "Pelosi's visit fires debate in Armenia over alliance with Russia". Politico. Archived from the original on 7 October 2022. Retrieved 12 October 2022.
  9. ^ "Extraordinary session of the CSTO Collective Security Council took place". Aravot.am. Hayknews. 29 October 2022. Archived from the original on 8 November 2022. Retrieved 8 November 2022.
  10. ^ Roscoe, Matthew (27 October 2022). "BREAKING: Extraordinary session of CSTO Collective Security Council announced for this week". EuroWeekly. Archived from the original on 8 November 2022. Retrieved 8 November 2022.
  11. ^ "Lukashenko to attend CSTO Collective Security Council meeting in Yerevan". Artsakh Press. 22 November 2022. Archived from the original on 30 November 2022. Retrieved 30 November 2022.
  12. ^ Baker, Sinéad (24 November 2022). "Putin was repeatedly snubbed at an international summit of countries meant to be Russia's friends". Business Insider. Archived from the original on 29 November 2022. Retrieved 30 November 2022.
  13. ^ "Pashinyan refuses to sign CSTO document on Armenia". Panorama News. 24 November 2022. Archived from the original on 30 November 2022. Retrieved 30 November 2022.
  14. ^ "CSTO chief: Situation on Armenian-Azeri border complicated". Panorama News. 28 November 2022. Archived from the original on 30 November 2022. Retrieved 30 November 2022.
  15. ^ "Armenia says won't host CSTO military drills this year". Mehr News. 11 January 2023. Archived from the original on 14 January 2023. Retrieved 15 January 2023.
  16. ^ "Kremlin vows to continue dialogue with Armenia after abandoning CSTO drills". Artsakh Press. 10 January 2023. Archived from the original on 16 January 2023. Retrieved 15 January 2023.
  17. ^ "Russia says CSTO mission can be deployed to Armenia-Azerbaijan border in "one or two days" if greenlighted by Yerevan". Artsakh Press. 2 February 2023. Retrieved 3 February 2023.
  18. ^ "Armenia's Pashinyan gives up Karabakh, abandons Russia-led CSTO". www.euractiv.com. 2023-05-23. Retrieved 2023-06-23.
  19. ^ "Pashinian Says Armenia Is Not Russia's Ally In Moscow's War With Ukraine". Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. 2 June 2023. Retrieved 4 June 2023.
  20. ^ "Armenian PM says depending solely on Russia for security was 'strategic mistake'". reuters.com. Retrieved 2023-09-01.
  21. ^ "Pashinyan: Calls to abandon the Declaration of Alma-Ata are calls to abandon Armenia's independence". News.am. 21 September 2023. Archived from the original on 21 September 2023. Retrieved 21 September 2023.
  22. ^ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 11, 2023" (PDF). 11 October 2023.
  23. ^ "Armenian PM sees "no advantage" in Russian troop presence as ties with Moscow deteriorate further". 31 October 2023.
  24. ^ "Pashinyan warns of potential de jure freeze of Armenia's activities in CSTO if the current process continues". Armenpress. 28 February 2024. Archived from the original on 2024-02-28. Retrieved 2024-03-04.
  25. ^ "Armenia will withdraw from Russia's answer to NATO if land lost to Azerbaijan is recognized by CSTO". The New Voice of Ukraine. 2024-03-12. Retrieved 2024-03-16.
  26. ^ "Armenia Stops Financial Contributions To Russian-Led Military Alliance". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 2024-05-08. Retrieved 2024-05-08.
  27. ^ a b Gavin, Gabriel (June 12, 2024). "Armenia to quit Russia's military alliance amid split with Putin". Politico. Retrieved June 12, 2024.
  28. ^ "Armenia to leave Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation". Euronews. June 12, 2024. Retrieved June 13, 2024.
  29. ^ "Armenia's position regarding freezing CSTO participation remains unchanged, says foreign ministry". Armenpress.am. 14 November 2024.
  30. ^ "Three parties issued a statement". August 3, 2021.
  31. ^ New Poll Reveals 56.7% Of Armenians Support EU Membership, 80.3% Oppose Constitutional Changes
  32. ^ "CSTO Secretary General Stanislav Zas to visit Armenia on December 21-23". 1lurer.am. 20 December 2021.
  33. ^ "CSTO Secretary General Meets with Armenian Foreign Minister". CSTO. 21 December 2023.
  34. ^ "In International Organizations". Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia. Retrieved 30 January 2022.
  35. ^ "Permanent Representative".
  36. ^ "Armenia assumes CSTO rotating chairmanship". arka.am.
  37. ^ "Structure".
  38. ^ "Mher Shirinyan appointed Armenia Armed Forces Armament Department head". news.am.
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