Anti-Bolshevism, antisemitism, and racism are often cited as the main reasons behind the mass death of prisoners, along with the regime's conflicting demands for security, food, and labor. Little planning was done for housing and feeding the millions of soldiers expected to be captured in the first months of the war. Although more than three million Soviet soldiers were captured by the end of 1941, the actual number was fewer than expected due to military setbacks. There is still disagreement between historians to what extent the mass deaths of prisoners in 1941 can be attributed to ideological reasons as part of the planned racial restructuring of Germany's empire versus a logistical failure that interrupted German planners' intent to use the prisoners as a labor reserve. During the invasion of France in 1940, 1.9 million prisoners of war were housed and fed; historian Alex J. Kay cites this as evidence that supply and logistics cannot explain the mass death of Soviet prisoners of war.
Anti-Bolshevism, antisemitism, and racism are often cited as the main reasons behind the mass death of prisoners, along with the regime's conflicting demands for security, food, and labor. There is still disagreement between historians to what extent the mass deaths of prisoners in 1941 can be attributed to ideological reasons as part of the planned racial restructuring of Germany's empire versus a logistical failure that interrupted German planners' intent to use the prisoners as a labor reserve. More than three million Soviet soldiers were captured by the end of 1941. Though this was fewer than expected by the German military, little planning had been done for housing and feeding the millions of prisoners anticipated. During the invasion of France in 1940, 1.9 million prisoners of war were housed and fed; historian Alex J. Kay cites this as evidence that supply and logistics cannot explain the mass death of Soviet prisoners of war.
In 1941, three or four Soviet soldiers were captured for each one killed. The ratio of prisoners to killed was lower later in the war, but remained higher than for the German side. By mid-December 1941, 79 percent of prisoners captured to date (more than two million) had been apprehended during thirteen major battles where large Soviet forces were surrounded. The number of Soviet soldiers captured fell dramatically after the Battle of Moscow in late 1941.
By mid-December 1941, 79 percent of prisoners captured to date (more than two million) had been apprehended during thirteen major battles where large Soviet forces were surrounded; three or four Soviet soldiers were captured for each one killed. The number of Soviet soldiers captured fell dramatically after the Battle of Moscow. The ratio of prisoners to killed also fell, but remained higher than the German side throughout the war.
Note: Deleted two mentions of 1941, which had appeared three times.
Front-line troops took prisoners during encirclement battles, but were typically in charge for only a short time before bringing them to a collection point. From there, the prisoners were sent to transit camps. Many transit camps were shut down beginning in 1942, with prisoners instead sent directly from the collection point to a permanent camp. Some front-line units would strip prisoners of their winter clothing for their own use as temperatures dropped late in 1941. Although wounded and sick Red Army soldiers sometimes received medical care, most often they did not.
Soviet soldiers were often captured in encirclements by Axis front-line troops, who took them to a collection point. From there, the prisoners were sent to transit camps. When many of the transit camps were shut down beginning in 1942, prisoners were sent directly from the collection point to a permanent camp. Sometimes the prisoners were stripped of their winter clothing by their captors for their own use as temperatures dropped late in 1941. Wounded and sick Red Army soldiers usually received no medical care.
Red Army soldiers overtaken by the German advance without being captured were ordered by the Supreme Command of Ground Forces (OKH) to present themselves to the German authorities under the threat of summary execution; such orders were intended to prevent the growth of a partisan movement. Despite the order, prisoners were more often than not taken under such circumstances. Nevertheless, thousands or tens of thousands of Red Army soldiers were executed on the spot as partisans, while others evaded capture and returned to their families.
Thousands or tens of thousands of Red Army soldiers were executed on the spot as partisans. To prevent the growth of a partisan movement, Red Army soldiers overtaken by the German advance without being captured were ordered by the Supreme Command of Ground Forces (OKH) to present themselves to the German authorities under the threat of summary execution. Despite the order, few soldiers turned themselves in; some evaded capture and returned to their families.
The use of railcars for transport was often forbidden to prevent the spread of disease. In such cases, prisoners were forced to march hundreds of kilometers on foot with no or inadequate food or water. Guards frequently shot anyone who fell behind and the quantity of corpses left behind created a health hazard. Sometimes Soviet prisoners were able to escape due to inadequate supervision. After October 1941, transport in open cattle wagons in winter weather killed some 20 percent of passengers. Additional death marches were ordered as camps were evacuated when the Red Army regained territory, typically on foot except in western areas. A figure of 200,000 to 250,000 deaths in transit is provided in Russian estimates.
Prisoners were often forced to march hundreds of kilometers on foot with no or inadequate food or water. Guards frequently shot anyone who fell behind , though inadequate supervision allowed some prisoners to escape. The quantity of corpses left behind created a health hazard. The use of railcars for transport was often forbidden to prevent the spread of disease, though open cattle wagons were used after October 1941, which resulted in the death of some 20 percent of passengers due to cold weather. A figure of 200,000 to 250,000 deaths in transit is provided in Russian estimates.
Note: Deleted mention of later death marches as this is discussed in first paragraph inEnd of war.
Prisoners were herded into open, fenced-off areas with no buildings or latrines; some camps did not have running water. Kitchen facilities were rudimentary, and many prisoners got nothing to eat. In September 1941, preparations for winter housing began; in November, the building of barracks was rolled out systematically. Some prisoners had to live in the open for the entire winter, or in unheated rooms, or in burrows they dug themselves which often collapsed. Poor housing and the cold were major factors in the mass deaths beginning in October 1941. After 1941, the situation improved; because of the mass deaths, the camps became less overcrowded. The death toll at many prisoner-of-war camps was comparable to that at the largest Nazi concentration camps. One of the largest camps was Dulag 131 in Bobruisk, where an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 Red Army soldiers died.
Poor housing and the cold were major factors in the mass deaths. Prisoners were herded into open, fenced-off areas with no buildings or latrines; some camps did not have running water. Kitchen facilities were rudimentary, and many prisoners got nothing to eat. Some prisoners had to live in the open for the entire winter, or in unheated rooms, or in burrows they dug themselves which often collapsed. In September 1941, the Germans started preparations for winter housing began; the building of barracks was rolled out systematically in November. These preparations were inadequate. The situation improved because the mass deaths made the camps less overcrowded. The death toll at many prisoner-of-war camps was comparable the largest Nazi concentration camps. One of the largest camps was Dulag 131 in Bobruisk, where an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 Red Army soldiers died.
Beginning in August 1941, additional screening by the Security Police and the SD in the occupied Soviet Union led to the killing of another 38,000 prisoners. With the army's cooperation, Einsatzgruppen units visited the prisoner-of-war camps to carry out mass executions. About 50,000 Jewish Red Army soldiers were killed, but 5 to 25 percent escaped detection. Soviet Muslims mistaken for Jews were sometimes killed. From 1942, systematic killing increasingly targeted wounded and sick prisoners. Those unable to work were often shot in mass executions or left to die, and sometimes mass executions were conducted without a clear rationale. Disabled soldiers were in particular danger when the front approached.
Beginning in August 1941, additional screening by the Security Police and the SD in the occupied Soviet Union led to the killing of another 38,000 prisoners. With the army's cooperation, Einsatzgruppen units visited the prisoner-of-war camps to carry out mass executions. About 50,000 Jewish Red Army soldiers were killed, but 5 to 25 percent escaped detection. Soviet Muslims mistaken for Jews were sometimes killed. From 1942, systematic killing increasingly targeted wounded and sick prisoners. Those unable to work were often shot in mass executions or left to die, disabled soldiers were in particular danger when the front approached. Sometimes mass executions were conducted without a clear rationale.
(sentence swaps near end, rewrite of escape, minor edits.)
Current structure
Suggested alternative
For the prisoner-of-war camps in Germany, screening was carried out by the Gestapo. Those highlighted for scrutiny were interrogated for about 20 minutes, often with torture. If their responses were unsatisfactory, they were stripped of prisoner-of-war status and bought to a concentration camp for execution, to conceal their fate from the German public. At least 33,000 prisoners were transferred to Nazi concentration camps—Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Dachau, Flossenbürg, Gross-Rosen, Mauthausen, Gusen, Neuengamme, Sachsenhausen, and Hinzert—and nearly all were executed. These killings dwarfed previous killings in the camp system. As the war progressed, increasing manpower shortages motivated the curtailment of executions. After March 1944, around 5,000 escaped Soviet officers and non-commissioned officers were killed at Mauthausen, despite an attempted mass escape. Including the shooting of wounded soldiers, the death toll from direct executions was probably hundreds of thousands.
For the prisoner-of-war camps in Germany, screening was carried out by the Gestapo. Those highlighted for scrutiny were interrogated for about 20 minutes, often with torture. If their responses were unsatisfactory, they were stripped of prisoner-of-war status and bought to a concentration camp for execution, to conceal their fate from the German public. At least 33,000 prisoners were transferred to Nazi concentration camps—Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Dachau, Flossenbürg, Gross-Rosen, Mauthausen, Gusen, Neuengamme, Sachsenhausen, and Hinzert. Nearly all were executed, including 5,000 Soviet officers and non-commissioned officers implicated in a mass escape attempt from Mauthausen after March 1944. These killings dwarfed previous killings in the camp system. Though increasing manpower shortages motivated the curtailment of executions as the war progressed, the death toll, including the shooting of wounded soldiers, was probably hundreds of thousands.
Thank you - most of this looks like an improvement, although the last paragraph results in inaccuracy so I will have to rewrite to clarify. (t · c) buidhe23:37, 28 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I'm glad you found them useful,buidhe. I mainly did it because my comments in the review may have been hard to make clear and thought just providing examples would help. I'm not surprised the last one is inaccurate. My guess is it is related to the mass escape? It was the one sentence I had trouble figuring out. I guessed at two meanings. With my luck, there's probably a third. I guess I'll find out when it is rewritten. Wtfiv (talk) 00:21, 29 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The Nazi leadership believed that war with its ideological enemy was inevitable[1] due to the Nazi dogma that conquering territory to the east—called living space (Lebensraum)—was essential to Germany's long-term survival,[2][3] and the reality that the Soviet Union's natural resources were necessary to continue the German war effort.[4][3] Due to supply shortages and inadequate transport infrastructure, the German invaders planned to feed their army by looting (although in practice they remained dependent on shipments from Germany)[5][6] and to terrorize the local inhabitants with preventative killings.[6]
The Nazis drew two lessons from World War I: suspicion of Jews based on the belief that they had caused the German defeat, and the importance of securing food supplies to avoid a repeat of the blockade-induced famine in Germany.[1]Planners considered cordoning off the Soviet Union's "deficit areas" (particularly in the north) that required food imports from its "surplus areas", especially in Ukraine. If the surplus food was redirected to the German army or Germany, an estimated 30 million people—mostly Russians—were expected to die.[15] The German Army lacked the resources to cordon off these large areas.[16] More than a million[17] Soviet civilians died from smaller-scale blockades of Soviet urban areas (especially besieged Leningrad and Jewish ghettos) that were less effective than expected because of flight and black market activity.[16][18][19] As prisoners of war were held under tighter control than urban or Jewish civilians, they had a higher death rate from starvation.
The Nazi leadership believed that war with its ideological enemy was inevitable[1] due to the Nazi dogma that conquering territory to the east—called living space (Lebensraum)—was essential to Germany's long-term survival,[2][3] and the reality that the Soviet Union's natural resources were necessary to continue the German war effort.[4][3] The vast majority of German military manpower and materiel was devoted to the invasion. Due to supply shortages and inadequate transport infrastructure, the German invaders planned to feed their army by looting (although in practice they remained dependent on shipments from Germany)[5][6] and terrorizing the local inhabitants with preventative killings.[6]
The Nazis drew the lesson from World War I that it was important to secure food supplies to avoid a repeat of the blockade-induced famine in Germany.[1]Planners considered cordoning off the Soviet Union's "deficit areas" (particularly in the north) that required food imports from its "surplus areas", especially in Ukraine. If the surplus food was redirected to the German army or Germany, an estimated 30 million people—mostly Russians—were expected to die.[15] The German Army lacked the resources to cordon off these large areas.[16] More than a million[17] Soviet civilians died from smaller-scale blockades of Soviet urban areas (especially besieged Leningrad and Jewish ghettos) that were less effective than expected because of flight and black market activity.[16][18][19] As prisoners of war were held under tighter control than urban or Jewish civilians, they had a higher death rate from starvation.
