User:Yerevantsi/KarabakhForeign

Foreign involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict since the early 1990s has been in the form of foreign fighters (volunteers and mercenaries), foreign weapons supply, and non-combat support for Armenia and Azerbaijan.

User:Yerevantsi/KarabakhPositions

Ongoing

mercenaries from Afghanistan

• NSS

• Vahram Poghosyan

• 1993 mercenaries

• volunteers from Abkhazia

• Russia (arms supply to Armenia alleged by Azerbaijan and Turkey); reports of support; within Armenia

• Diaspora (arms supply to Armenia alleged by Azerbaijan)
  • Diaspora volunteers

• France (arms supply to Armenia claimed by Turkey)

• US (arms supply to Armenia claimed by Turkey)

• Pakistan (special forces on Az side alleged by Armenia)
• We have seen the transcript of Armenian Prime Minister’s interview on 15 October with a Russian TV referring to some unsubstantiated reports alleging involvement of Pakistani special forces alongside Azerbaijani army in the ongoing conflict.

• Belarus (arms supply to either side denied by Belarus)[1]

• Israel (arms supply to Azerbaijan) [2][3][4]

• Turkey involvement

• Serbia

https://balkaninsight.com/2020/10/02/in-nagorno-karabakh-fight-serbian-made-rockets-and-links-to-blacklisted-dealer https://web.archive.org/web/20220313043813/https://balkaninsight.com/2020/10/02/in-nagorno-karabakh-fight-serbian-made-rockets-and-links-to-blacklisted-dealer/

File:UN Resolution regarding the territorial integrity of Ukraine.svg United Nations General Assembly Resolution 68/262

Overall

on foreign involvement

The Geopolitics of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict https://search.proquest.com/openview/6b71a24587a077ad846beb4d8b5ace87/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=55193 Some Muslim countries, such as Syria and Lebanon, have also devel- oped strong ties with Armenia

[PDF] rcaap.pt Regional security and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict T Cierco, MR Freire - Nação e Defesa, 2005 - comum.rcaap.pt … While Turkey has been pro-Azerbaijani, supporting Baku militarily, economically and diplomatically, the Iranian pro-Armenian positioning prefers a weak Azerbaijani … Turkey has been linking the lifting of the blockade to Armenia to the settlement of the Karabakh conflict despite

https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/two-positions-on-the-nagorno-karabakh-war-russian-and-turkish-1990-1994

Two Position on the Nagorno Karabakh war

Russian and Turkish (1990-1994)

E Souleimanov, L Evoyan - Central Asia and the Caucasus: Journal of …, 2012 - ca-c.org … speaking states) on the foreign scene. Therefore, Turkey's policy during the Karabakh war was exclusively pro-Azerbaijani

Iran:“The Permanent Alternative” A Mirzoyan - Armenia, the Regional Powers, and the West, 2010 - Springer … Mamikonian, Vartananz, who led the armed struggle against the Sasanid Persia, has been frequently invoked throughout the Karabakh movement … Informally, Iranian intellectual circles as well the upper echelons of the Iranian regime have favored Armenia in part because

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep09668.pdf https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09668?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents [B] Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy and the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict E Fuller - 2013 - peacepalacelibrary.nl

p. 8

Since the early 1990s, Turkey has provided significant military aid, advice, support and training to the Azerbaijani armed forces. Under two agreements signed in 2011, the two countries have begun joint production in Turkey of rifles and grenade launchers.13

Given that its own problems with the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia mirror Azerbaijan’s own problem with Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia has consistently supported Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity in international organizations, including the OSCE, the UN and GUAM (see below). It has not, however, offered to mediate independently.

[PDF] uclouvain.be UN and CSCE Policies in Transcaucasia O Paye, E Remacle - Coppieters, B.(ed.), 1996 - dial.uclouvain.be … The Azeri proposal for a demilitarization of Nagorno- Karabakh itself was not included. The new Armenian offensive in the region of Kelbajar at the end of March threatened to wreck the whole peace process once again. Seventeen countries supported Azerbaijan's request to …

TML] tandfonline.com Skating on Thin Ice: Israel's Strategic Partnership with Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus M Grebennikov - Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 2015 - Taylor & Francis … It fears that opening an embassy in Israel would contribute to Muslim hostility on decisions relating to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 25 In fact, only the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) supports the Azerbaijani position in this conflict …

[PDF] peacepalacelibrary.nl [B] Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy and the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict E Fuller - 2013 - peacepalacelibrary.nl … More than any other international organization, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which Azerbaijan joined in 1991, has consistently and unequivocally sided with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. It has adopted

Sovereignty After Empire: Self-determination Movements in the ... https://books.google.am › books

Turkey also supplied weapons to the Azeri side and dispatched a small number of military instructors to train Azeri draftees. The Azeri army

Arms suppliers

SIPRI: Arms transfers to conflict zones: The case of Nagorno-Karabakh, 30 April 2021

Russia

https://www.aravot.am/2021/06/13/1198004/ Ռոխլինը բացահայտում է. ինչպե՞ս էր 90-ականներին զենք գալիս Հայաստան

https://www.azatutyun.am/a/31477748.html Հայաստանին ռուսական սպառազինության մատակարարման շուրջ 1997-ի սկանդալը

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_FAmtDRbdN4 Ինչպես էր Հայաստանը ձեռք բերում ռուսական զենքը 1990-ականներին | Նորագույն պատմություն Apr 2, 2022 https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/_FAmtDRbdN4

http://www.aniarc.am/2021/11/21/putin-russia-arm-sale-armenia-1997/

http://www.aniarc.am/2021/11/21/kommersant-1997-russia-armenia-arm-sale/

By country

The following countries have supplied arms to Armenia and/or Azerbaijan:

Russia has supplied arms to both parties. During the war, Russia provided Armenia weaponry starting from 1992.

The Russian army's prosecution department started its investigation after a report last week by Gen Lev Rokhlin, head of parliament's defence committee, which said that, between 1992 and 1996, Russia secretly supplied Armenia with more than £650 million of weapons, including Scud missiles and advanced T-72 tanks.

But according to Gen Rokhlin, supplies to Armenia did not stop there. His report detailed the delivery of 84 T-72 battle tanks, 50 BMP armoured troop carriers, 72 howitzers, 24 Scud missiles with eight launchers, and millions of rounds of ammunition.

Between 1992 and early 1994, when the conflict was at its height, Russian heavy transport aircraft were said to have ferried 1,300 tonnes of ammunition to the Armenian capital, Yerevan.

Armenia has hit back with claims that Azerbaijan bought hundreds of tanks and dozens of warplanes from Russia or Ukraine between 1993 and 1995.

In the post-war period, Russia remains, by far, Armenia's largest arms supplier. According to SIPRI, Russia provided 96% of Armenia's arms imports in 2007–11 and 94% in 2015–19.

During the war, Russia provided Azerbaijan "some [military] assistance," according to Thomas de Waal. In 2009–11 Russia and Azerbaijan signed a series of contracts and Russia became a major supplier since then. In 2013 Ilham Aliyev said that Azerbaijan has purchased $4 billion of weaponry from Russia. According to SIPRI, Russia supplied 80% of Azerbaijan's arms imports in 2009–13 and 31% in 2015–19.

Two months earlier, the Moscow business daily Vedomosti quoted defence ministry sources in saying that Russia had sold Azerbaijan armoured vehicles, conventional artillery and multiple rocket systems plus 24 Mi-35 attack helicopters and 60 other helicopters, in sales worth up to one billion dollars.

In an interview with the Itar-Tass news agency published on May 23 this year, Konstantin Biryulin, head of the Russian agency for defence technology cooperation, said 100 T-90C tanks had been delivered to Azerbaijan under a deal signed in 2011. He said a further 100 of these late-model tanks would be sold soon.

According to the United Nations register of conventional arms which tracks officially-recorded arms transactions, Azerbaijan received 438 heavy artillery systems and 25 attack helicopters from Russia last year, while Armenia got 35 tanks, 110 other armoured vehicles, 200 missiles and 50 launchers.

Ukraine has supplied arms to both parties. During the war, Ukraine reportedly supplied Azerbaijan with some 59 tanks and MiG-21 fighter jets. According to SIPRI, Ukraine was a notable arms supplier to Azerbaijan in 2009–13. In 2010 Ukraine reported that it had sold Azerbaijan some 71 BTR-70 armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery systems, an attack helicopter, and submachine guns.

In 2010, Ukraine reported that it had sold Armenia training aircraft, revolvers and pistols, rifles and carbines, submachine and light machine guns.

Israel has supplied weapons to Azerbaijan. During the war, Israel supplied Azerbaijan with Stinger missiles. In 2012 Azerbaijan agreed to acquire Israel drones, anti-aircraft and missile-defense systems from Israel worth $1.6 billion. Israel supplied around 30% of Azerbaijan's arms imports in 2013–17, and 60% in 2015–19. Israel's supplies to Azerbaijan have included, among other things, Barak 8 surface-to-air missiles (2016), Elbit Hermes 450 unmanned aerial vehicles (2012), and LORA missiles (2018). Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated in 2016 that Azerbaijan has purchased $4.85 billion-worth of defense equipment from Israel.

Turkey provided Azerbaijan a "limited amount of military supplies through clandestine channels" during the war. According to SIPRI, Turkey was a notable arms supplier to Azerbaijan in 2009–13. Azerbaijan acquired 30 heavy multiple rocket-launchers from Turkey in 2011–12. Pro-government Daily Sabah stated in 2020 that Azerbaijan has imported the following from Turkey: Altay tanks, T129 ATAK helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles.

Belarus was a notable arms supplier to Azerbaijan in 2009–13, according to SIPRI. In June 2018 Azerbaijan displayed the Polonez multiple-launch rocket system it had purchased from Belarus.

China has sold Armenia WM-80 MRL rocket launchers in 1999 and AR-1A multiple rocket launchers in 2013.

India sold four Swathi Weapon Locating Radars to Armenia in 2020.

Serbia confirmed in July 2020 that a Serbian company has supplied Armenia rifles and pistols with combined market value less than €1 million euros, but did not confirm the supply of mortars, as claimed by Azerbaijani sources. They were supplied in May and June 2020.

In August 2020 Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić stated that "In recent years, we have sold ten times more weapons to Azerbaijan [than to Armenia]."

In the latest outbreak of fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian forces have fired rockets made in Serbia of a type previously bought by a firm linked to US-blacklisted arms merchant Slobodan Tesic. Greece reportedly delivered "military assistance" to Armenia during the war. In 2015 Armenia bought Western European-made MILAN anti-tank missiles from Greece.

South Africa sold Azerbaijan 60 armoured personnel carriers in 2011–12.

Moldova sold Armenia "large quantities of weapons and ammunition" in 2011 worth $3.3 million. It reportedly included Soviet-made antitank and other rocket systems, including BM-27 Uragan, along with ammunition.

Jordan was reported by Jane's Defence Weekly, citing sources from the Armenian military, to have supplied Armenia 35 Soviet-made Osa-AKM missile systems in 2020. It was modernized in Armenia. Jordanian authorities said that the sale "might have been made by private companies that bought weapons from Jordanian defense industries."

Austria supplied Azerbaijan ten drones in 2011–12.

Czech Republic and Slovakia Czech

denied by the Czech authorities

Yossi Melman wrote about shady deals by another Israeli company – Elbit – that reportedly issued fraudulent end-user certificates to Czech and Slovak suppliers of artillery systems to Azerbaijan, in order to avoid the European Union’s restrictions on weapons exports to Azerbaijan. https://web.archive.org/web/20200603032234/https://www.jpost.com/Jerusalem-Report/Bad-arms-deals-558728

Syria and Lebanon were accused in March 1992 by Yagub Mammadov, chairman of the Azerbaijani parliament, of supplying weapons to Armenia.

Russia was an important supplier to both.

2012: Mi-24 combat helicopters from Russia, Matador and Marauder armoured vehicles from South Africa built under licence in Azerbaijan.

Russia is the main supplier of arms to both states: in 2007–11 it provided 55 per cent of Azerbaijan’s arms imports and 96 per cent of Armenia’s arms imports.

Russia Armenia

Tor missile system

9K38 Igla

TOS-1

https://armenian.usc.edu/armenia-stays-mum-on-new-missile-deliveries-to-azerbaijan/

https://jamestown.org/program/azerbaijan-shows-off-polonez-lora-missiles-from-belarus-israel/

RM-70 multiple rocket launcher

152mm SpGH DANA

S-300 missile system

https://www.azatutyun.am/a/25043620.html Azerbaijan Protests Against ‘Missile Supplies’ To Armenia

https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-blames-greece-and-cyprus-for-selling-frenchgerman-missiles-to-armenia Azerbaijan Blames Greece And Cyprus For Selling French/German Missiles To Armenia

https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-objects-to-armenian-acquisition-of-european-missiles Azerbaijan Objects to Armenian Acquisition of European Missiles

Arms embargoes

In 1992 the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) "requested its participating states to impose an embargo on arms deliveries to forces engaged in combat in the Nagorno-Karabakh area." However, it is a "voluntary multilateral arms embargo and a number of OSCE participating states have supplied arms to Armenia and Azerbaijan since 1992." The UN Security Council Resolution 853, passed in July 1993, called on states to "refrain from the supply of any weapons and munitions which might lead to an intensification of the conflict or the continued occupation of territory." According to SIPRI, "since 2002 the UN Security Council has no longer listed that it is 'actively seized of the matter'. As such, since 2002 it is assumed that the non-mandatory UN embargo is no longer active."

Foreign fighters

Several groups of foreign fighters participated in the first war. Human Rights Watch (HRW) noted in 1994 that "Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian mercenaries or rogue units of the Soviet/Russian Army have fought on both sides." According to U.S. State Department officials (1996), both parties "enlisted mercenaries from Russia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union."^{p. 85}

On the Azerbaijani side

First war (1992–94)

Several foreign groups fought on the Azerbaijani side, including Chechen volunteers, Afghan mujahidin, Turkish volunteers, including members of the ultranationalist Grey Wolves, and members of the Ukrainian nationalist UNA-UNSO.

Armenia claimed in 1994 that Azerbaijan made a "systematic use of mercenaries" since 1991. Vartan Oskanian, Armenia's Deputy Foreign Minister, wrote in a letter to the UN special rapporteur that around 70 Russian mercenaries arrived in Azerbaijan in 1992 and another 150 in 1993. Azerbaijan made an extensive use of ex-Soviet mercenary pilots. According to HRW, "Most informed observers believe that mercenaries pilot most of Azerbaijan's air force." According to de Waal, in August 1992, Azerbaijan used "mostly Russian or Ukrainian pilots" to attack Stepanakert.

The Chechen fighters in Karabakh, who are estimated to have numbered between 100 and 300, were led by Shamil Basayev, who later became Prime Minister of Ichkeria (Chechnya), and Salman Raduyev. Basayev famously participated in the battle of Shusha in 1992. Saudi-born Ibn al-Khattab may have also joined them.

The Afghan mujahidin were mostly affiliated with the Hezb-e Islami, led by Afghan Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. According to HRW, they were "clearly not motivated by religious or ideological reasons" and were, thus, mercenaries. The recruitment of Afghan mujaheddin, reportedly handled by paramilitary police chief Rovshan Javadov, was denied by Azerbaijani authorities. They first arrived to Azerbaijan in fall 1993 and numbered anywhere between 1,500 to 2,500 or 1,000 and 3,000. Armenia alleged that they were paid for by Saudi Arabia. Afghan mujaheddin constituted the most considerable influx of foreign fighters during the war. Some of the mujaheddin arrived in Azerbaijan through Iran. Vartan Oskanian, Armenia's Deputy Foreign Minister, claimed in a letter to the UN special rapporteur that Azerbaijan had recruited mercenaries from Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan. Oskanian wrote that the Afghan mujaheddin "carry out special tasks including punitive operations against Azerbaijani combatants who have deserted the front lines."

Volunteers from Turkey joined the Azerbaijani forces during the war and may have numbered up to several thousand. Some 200 Turkish Grey Wolves were still present in the conflict zone as of September 1994 and were engaged in training Azerbaijani units.

Gerard Libaridian’s secret visit to Afghanistan in 1994 In June 1994, after the ceasefire agreement, Gerard Libaridian visited Afghanistan to meet PM Hekmatyar and talk about their agreement with Azerbaijan. Afghans were committed to sending more troops to fight against Armenia in case of another war. https://mediamax.am/en/news/special-file/13374/ https://web.archive.org/web/20220814152502/https://mediamax.am/en/news/special-file/13374/

Second war (2020)

In July 2020 the Kurdish news agency Firat claimed that the Turkish occupation forces in northern Syria have began recruiting members of the Syrian National Army in Afrin to deploy them in Azerbaijan against Armenia. Both Turkish and Azerbaijani officials denied the claims. According to Hawar News Agency the Turkish army began recruiting Syrian mercenaries in Idlib in late July. Hawar claimed in late August that secret offices have been set up in Azaz and Afrin to recruit mercenaries and that they "are being transported to Azerbaijan via Turkish airports after preparations made by Turkey during the past two months." In early September the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta claimed that around 500 Syrian militants, mostly Turkmens, were deployed in Azerbaijan. They reportedly came from Sultan Murad Division, Hamza Division, and the Free Syrian Army. Azerbaijan's Defense Ministry denied the report. Armenia's Foreign Ministry spokesperson said they did not rule it out, "taking into account especially Azerbaijan's experience of involving religious extremists, as well as Turkey's experience of supplying terrorists to other regions." Armenia's Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan stated in September 2020: "We are hearing about the use of the foreign terrorist fighters to be transferred to Azerbaijan or maybe they are already transferred." In late September, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that more than 300 Turkish-backed Syrian mercenaries from Afrin were transported to Azerbaijan.

https://www.investigative.am/news/view/argishti-qyaramyani-eluyty-qk-8-rd-taredarcin-nvirvac-nistin.html ՀՀ քննչական կոմիտեի նախագահ Ա.Քյարամյանի խոսքը Քննչական կոմիտեի ծառայողի օրվա կապակցությամբ տեղի ունեցած հանդիսավոր նիստի ընթացքում (տեսանյութ)

Նախաքննությամբ պարզվել են ագրեսիայի ակտի իրականացմանն այլազգի վարձկանների և միջազգային ահաբեկչական խմբավորումների ներկայացուցիչների ներգրավման, միջազգային ահաբեկչության ֆինանսավորման դեպքեր։ Քննությամբ հաջողվել է անհատականացնել 44-օրյա պատերազմի ընթացքում Ադրբեջանի կողմից ռազմական գործողություններին մասնակցած շուրջ 300 վարձկանների ինքնություններ։ Քննությամբ ձեռք բերված փաստական տվյալները ներկայացվել են միջազգային ահաբեկչության կանխարգելման հարցերով զբաղվող տարբեր կառույցների։ https://web.archive.org/web/20221010072039/https://www.investigative.am/news/view/argishti-qyaramyani-eluyty-qk-8-rd-taredarcin-nvirvac-nistin.html

https://twitter.com/joshuakucera/status/1567026745689231362?t=43NojbBMGYfdDKQvwXe_7g&s=19 Interesting details from interviews with Syrian mercenaries who fought in Karabakh in 2020: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/inside-bloody-business-turkey%E2%80%99s-syrian-mercenaries-204589

On the Armenian side

According to Mayis Mirzoyan, chief ataman of the Armenian Cossacks, around 85 Russian Cossacks participated in the war. In May 2011 a khachkar was inaugurated in the village of Vank dedicated to the memory of 14 Kuban Cossacks who died in the war. According to Hay Zinvor, the official newspaper of the Ministry of Defense of Armenia, a group of 70 Cossacks arrived in Karabakh in September 1992 from Transnistria and four died in the battle for Vaghuhas. According to Major General Astvatsatur Petrosyan, who led the unit of Armenian volunteers in September 1992, the Cossacks came from Transnistria and seven of them died that month.

Cossacks in first war http://nv.am/kazachij-don-stanet-blizhe-k-armenii-i-artsahu/

https://eadaily.com/ru/ampnews/2016/09/02/abhaziya-i-yuzhnaya-osetiya-pozdravili-karabah-s-25-letiem

Volunteers from South Ossetia fought on the Armenian side, according to Leonid Tibilov, President of South Ossetia. According to one Armenian analytical center, some 30 Ossetian volunteers fought on the Armenian side.

An unknown number of ethnic Armenian citizens of other countries participated in the war, among them Monte Melkonian, Garo Kahkejian, and Jirair Sefilian. U.S. State Department officials stated in 1996 that "citizens of the U.S. and France have fought for the NK Armenians. There is no clear evidence that any of these foreigners had the backing of their governments."^{p. 85} David Rieff wrote in 1997 that members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaks), "including a substantial number of volunteers from the diaspora, did a great deal of the fighting and dying." Former members of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) also participated in the war. According to analyst Emil Sanamyan, no less than 12 diaspora Armenian volunteers fought and four diaspora fighters died in the war. Tatul Hakobyan also reports four killed diaspora fighters. In 2013 Armenpress named nine diaspora fighters who are buried at Yerablur military pantheon in Yerevan.

Allegations

Kurdish fighters in Armenia

Since at least the late 1990s Azerbaijani and Turkish sources alleged that the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) had established a presence in Karabakh. In 1999 Azerbaijan's Minister of Defense Safar Abiyev alleged that "up to 200 Kurdish terrorists were being trained in the Lachin region." In 2007 Turkish and Azerbaijani sources alleged that the PKK had decided to move its bases and camps from northern Iraq to Karabakh. Araz Azimov, Azerbaijan's Deputy Foreign Minister, referred to alleged PKK units positioned in Karabakh. The allegations were revived in September 2020. The Turkish pro-government newspapers Yeni Şafak and Daily Sabah claimed that Kurdish fighters from the PKK and the YPG were transfered by Armenia to Karabakh to train Armenian militias.

Involved states

Russia

Thomas de Waal has argued that there is an Azerbaijani narrative that Russia has "consistently supported the Armenian side." According to him, Russia "has more supported the Armenian side," but there have been various "different Russian actors at different times supporting both sides in this conflict." He argues that President Boris Yeltsin did not "want to see the Armenian side be defeated, but he also didn't want to supply them with too many weapons." De Waal argued in 2012 that "Russia [is] playing both sides", but "ultimately more in the Armenian side." Other commentators have also argued that Russia plays both sides in the conflict. Svante Cornell argued in 2018 that Russia "had been playing both sides of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict to gain maximum control over both, a policy that continues to this day."

During the war, "Russia was widely viewed as supporting the Armenian position. Much of this perception stemmed from the fact that Russia transferred military support to Armenia." According to Razmik Panossian, Russian forces indirectly supported the Armenian side by "supplying arms, fuel and logistical support." Russia supplied around $1 billion worth of weapons and, thus, "made a vital contribution to the Armenian victory." According to de Waal, "greater Russian support for the Armenians" was one of the main factors behind the Armenian victory. De Waal notes that "Yet it is not entirely clear how this support for the Armenians was translated on to the battlefield; to complicate things further, the Russians also gave some assistance to Azerbaijan."

In the post-war period, Russia is Armenia's main arms supplier and the two countries are military allies. Russia is sometimes described as Armenia's supporter in the conflict, however, this view is widely challenged as Russia extensively sells arms to Azerbaijan. At the same time, Armenia buys Russian weaponry at a discount, while Azerbaijan pays the full price.

https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/OXAN-DB257116/full/html Russia reviews Karabakh priorities to remain relevant

http://web-old.archive.org/web/20201031000227/https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/russia-provides-94-of-armenia-s-weapons-in-5-years/2023969# Russia provides 94% of Armenia's weapons in 5 years 1 day ago — Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev voiced suspicions about Russia, asking: “Why would someone who wants cease-fire send weapons

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/russia-provides-94-of-armenia-s-weapons-in-5-years/2023969&ved=2ahUKEwixxPziwd3sAhXCHXcKHZI5AKoQFjACegQICxAB&usg=AOvVaw0qi7P19Yonv-jXwsAfXBdY

Turkey

https://eurasianet.org/turkey-takes-assertive-role-in-caucasus-conflict Turkey takes assertive role in Caucasus conflict

https://www.azatutyun.am/a/30744020.html Russia Urges Turkish Restraint On Karabakh Conflict

Russia Slams Turkey’s ‘Destructive’ Stance On Karabakh https://www.azatutyun.am/a/27427243.html

https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/FIW2021_World_02252021_FINAL-web-upload.pdf New fighting erupted in September when the Azerbaijani regime, with decisive support from Turkey, launched an offensive to settle a territorial dispute that years of diplomacy with Armenia had failed to resolve.

Sept 2022 Mher Grigoryan: Մենք պարբերաբար տեղեկություններ ենք ստացել և շարունակում ենք ստանալ Թուրքիայից Ադրբեջան ռազմական նշանակության օդային փոխադրումների վերաբերյալ։ Սեպտեմբերի 5-9-ը Թուրքիայի և Ադրբեջանի ռազմաօդային ուժերը համատեղ վարժանքներ են անցկացրել, որոնց հայտարարված խնդիրն էր ոչնչացնել պայմանական հակառակորդի օդային և ցամաքային թիրախները։

Turgut Ozal’s initial attempts to “frighten” the Armenians with unambiguous warnings or with an unexpected concentration of Turkish troops near the Armenian border failed to achieve their purpose because of the growing cooperation between Russia and Armenia.

Turkey did not back down from its activism in the Nagorno-Karabakh affair, though it reduced it to the realm of diplomacy and indirect relief.

Throughout the period of the conflict, Ankara’s support of Baku, as aforementioned, tended to remain at the diplomatic level.18

Itir Bagdadi wrote that "while Turkey did not officially provide military assistance to Azerbaijan, Turkish volunteers and informal aid from various Turkish sources did flow to Baku."

Turkey’s strong support for Azerbaijan makes it a party to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar said on Thursday. “Turkey is also a party to the conflict, standing with a brotherly state and defending its rights,” Akar told the Turkish Anatolia news agency.

Turkey is widely considered Azerbaijan's main supporter in the conflict. Svante Cornell wrote in 1998 that Turkey is the "only country that constantly expressed its support for Azerbaijan." It provided Azerbaijan "active military help" during the war. Turkey also supports Azerbaijan diplomatically. Turkish and Azerbaijani armed forces cooperate extensively and regularly hold military exercises. Azerbaijan has also bought weapons from Turkey.

Turkey closed its border with Armenia in April 1993 after Armenian forces captured Kalbajar. Prior to that, the border was only open "on demand and only for transferring the humanitarian aid (mainly wheat delivery) to Armenia and for the operation of the weekly Kars-Gyumri train, which had been crossing the Turkish-Armenian border since the days of the Soviet Union." Turkey has repeatedly refused to normalize and establish diplomatic relations with Armenia in solidarity with Azerbaijan over Karabakh.

"Turkey has actively helped Azerbaijan in training its military, provided it with diplomatic support and played an important role in maintaining a de facto blockade of Armenia."

The stance of Turkey regarding the Karabakh conflict has consistently been pro-Azerbaijani. Turkey has provided a wide range of military, economic, and diplomatic assistance to Baku and has joined Azerbaijan's blockade of Armenia. In addition, Turkey lobbied internationally for the Azerbaijani cause... https://www.jstor.org/stable/4030929

in general, Ankara has chosen to stay out of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and refrained from providing troops and large-scale military support to Azerbaijan.

The growing domestic pressures on the Turkish government to intervene militarily led to strong official protests to Armenia that were accompanied by troop movements in eastern Turkey close to Armenia's border.

Turkey sent a number of retired officers to Azerbaijan to train the Azeri troops, provided a limited amount of military supplies through clandestine channels, and offered humanitarian aid to Azeri refugees following the occupation of nearly one-fifth of Azerbaijan by Armenians.

Ankara also imposed an embargo on Armenia in 1993 and became the major supporter of the Azeri view of the conflict in international diplomatic and political circles. But Turkey chose not to become militarily involved

Despite the increasingly pro-Azerbaijani stance of Turkish politicians and the open demands for intervention, Turkey did not supply Azerbaijan with anything that could have helped it turn the tide of the war.

Some Turkish retired army officers were encouraged to train the Azerbaijani army, and did so;

Armenians claim that Turkey provided weapons, but in case such shipments took place, these weapons were insignificant considering what Turkey could have provided had it wanted to or been able to.

Turkey's policy in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict shows clear restraint on the part of the policy-makers in supporting Azerbaijan to the degree most of them certainly wished to do. In fact, it is possible to discern at least five factors that constrained Ankara in the formulation and implementation of its policy towards Armenia and Azerbaijan

Officers

Turkey: 350 officers

http://armenianhouse.org/demoyan/turkey/summary.html

...it appeared that there were around 100 retired Turkish officers acting as “advisers” to the Azeri army, but no regular supplies of arms or ammunition.

https://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/04/world/turkey-moves-troops-to-armenian-border.html Turkey Moves Troops to Armenian Border

https://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/10/world/turkey-holds-talks-on-caucasus-war.html Turkey Holds Talks on Caucasus War

United States

Thomas Ambrosio suggested in 2000 that the US "supported Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, but enacted policies that effectively supported Armenia's irrendentist policies." Sergo Mikoyan argued in 1998 that the US response to the conflict has been "inconsistent, pulled in different directions by the legislative and executive branches of power." Congress was under the influence of the Armenian lobby, while the executive branch (the White House and the State Department) pursued a pro-Azerbaijani policy, which "reflects Turkish influence and the interests of oil companies." Richard C. Longworth and Argam DerHartunian expressed similar views.

Congress's pro-Armenian position was expressed in passing the Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act in 1992, which banned any assistance to Azerbaijan. It was effectively amended by the Senate in 2001 and waived by President George W. Bush starting from 2002. The US provides military aid to both countries. Between 2005 and 2016 Azerbaijan received $8.5 million for counternarcotics assistance and $11.5 million for counterterrorism aid. In the same period, Armenia received only $41,000 for counternarcotics assistance and none for counterterrorism aid. According to EurasiaNet, "Much of the money for Azerbaijan has been targeted toward naval forces, to reduce the risk that it could be used against Armenia." The Trump administration greatly increased the US military aid to Azerbaijan to around $100 million in fiscal years 2018-19, compared to less than $3 million in a year in FY 2016-17. The US aid is primarily "offered in the context of U.S. policy to increase pressure on Iran and focuses on Azerbaijan’s Iranian border, but it also has implications for Armenia," according to Emil Sanamyan. In FY 2018 Armenia received $4.2 million in U.S. security assistance.

The US has also provided humanitarian aid to Artsakh (some $36 million between 1998 and 2010), including for demining. The humanitarian aid has been criticized by Azerbaijan for legitimizing the "illegal regime in the occupied lands and damages the reputation of the US as a neutral mediator."

Iran

User:Yerevantsi/IranKarabakh

Iran is officially neutral and has sought to play the role of a mediator, most notably in 1992. In its official statements, Iran calls for a peaceful settlement and restraint during skirmishes. At the same time, Iranian officials have repeatedly reaffirmed their support for Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated in 2020 that "While respecting the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan Republic, Iran is fundamentally opposed to any move that would fuel conflict between the two neighbouring countries of the Azerbaijan Republic and Armenia."

During the war, "Iran was domestically torn in devising a policy", but de facto "pursued a policy that combined official neutrality with growing support for Armenia," according to Svante Cornell. Cornell argues that Iran has "pursued policies in the conflict inclined towards Armenia." However, Iran's tacit support for the Armenian side was limited to economic cooperation. Terhi Hakala noted in 1998 that "as a geopolitical counter-weight to Turkey, Iran has strongly supported Armenia, especially by alleviating the effects of the Turkish blockade." Cornell notes that during the war, Iran served as Armenia's "main purveyor of electricity and goods, and once the Armenian conquest of Karabakh had been completed, Iranian trucks began to supply most of the secessionist enclave's needs." According to Bahruz Balayev, "Iran supported the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and gave some humanitarian aid to the [Azerbaijani] refugees, but in the meantime widely cooperates with Armenia and even Karabakh Armenian authorities." Brenda Shaffer wrote that "Iran's cooperation with Armenia and its tacit support in the conflict with Azerbaijan over Karabagh strengthened Yerevan's actual and perceived power and consequently may have lessened its sense of urgency to resolve the conflict."

In 2013 Mohsen Rezaee, who was commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) during the war, claimed that he "personally issued an order [...] for the Republic of Azerbaijan army to be equipped appropriately and for it to receive the necessary training." Rezaee added that "Many Iranians died in the Karabakh War. In addition to the wounded, who were transported to [Iran], many of the Iranian martyrs of the Karabakh War are buried in Baku." In 2011, Hassan Ameli, a leading Iranian cleric, claimed that Iran provided Azerbaijan arms and helped Afghan mujaheddin move to Azerbaijan. The Iranian embassy in Armenia stated that they would not like unreliable information affect the friendly Armenian-Iranian relations: "We do not exclude the possibility that there are forces, which aim to create hindrances for our friendly relations."

David Nissman, an adjunct professor of Caucasian and Central Asian history at Georgetown University, claimed in a 1996 US House Committee on International Relations hearing that "Armenia has been buying weapons from Iran."^{p. 26} At the same hearing, U.S. State Department officials said that they "have no evidence that Armenia is engaging in any sanctionable activity in its trade with Iran."^{p. 79}

Iran was apparently supplying raw materials and goods to Armenia, which was being subjected to a blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey.36

Iran could be reached only by a difficult mountain road and crossed into— even as late as mid1995— by a temporary bridge. While Iran supported Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, it remained neutral in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Iran also supplied Armenia with raw materials and food following Turkey’s blockade

The Islamic Republic of Iran's Policy Toward the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict B Shaffer - The International Politics of the Armenian-Azerbaijani …, 2017 - Springer … control over the South Caucasus, and the significant rise in violence between Azerbaijanis and Armenians related to control over Nagorno-Karabakh … of Azerbaijan, the lack of Iranian criticism and the adoption of a “balanced” approach to the sides in actuality favored Armenia https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/978-1-137-60006-6_6

Iran's foreign policy since the Gulf war A Tarock - Australian Journal of International Affairs, 1994 - Taylor & Francis … However, in August 1993, Iran appeared to have ended its neutrality in the Nagorno-Karabakh and sided with Azerbaijan amid mounting concern over the human and political cost of the Armenian offensive near its border

https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/05/20/iran-turkey-denounce-armenian-aggression/60599a94-c2a3-4678-996e-b11ecff5dd51/ In Iran, state-run radio quoted a senior diplomatic official as saying that Armenian attacks in Nakhichevan and other key sites in the area constituted "flagrant aggression" against Azerbaijan and that Iran "will not accept any change in the borders of these republics." 1992

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uiug.30112001416897&view=1up&seq=408 Gerard Libaridian

Iranians Participate in Karabakh War / Many Iranian Martyrs of Karabakh War Buried in Azerbaijan - Islam Times

2020

analysis

Mohammad Pakpour, Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Forces "In this regard, he added: "The liberation of the occupied areas of Nagorno-Karabakh has been our desire from the beginning and we are happy that this has happened."

Mohammad Javad Zarif: Zarif cited respect for Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and resolving the conflict through peaceful and irrevocable international borders as the principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran's active diplomacy. He said that the presence of Takfiri terrorists and possibly other terrorists in the region is a concern which he has said with transparency that this is intolerable for the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Ali Khamenei: "The war between our neighbors, Azerbaijan & Armenia, is a bitter event & must end ASAP. Of course, Azerbaijani land seized by Armenia should be freed & the safety of its Armenian residents must be secured. If terrorists approach the Iranian border, they'll be dealt with severely." war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, by saying, “This war is a bitter incident and it threatens the security of the region. Of course, all Azerbaijani territories occupied by Armenia should be freed. All these lands should be given back to Azerbaijan. One of the main conditions is that these lands should be returned to Azerbaijan. The Republic of Azerbaijan is entitled to be in control of these lands, and therefore, all of them should be freed. Of course, the safety of all Armenians living in those lands should be ensured. International borders should be respected and the two sides should not transgress against the borders of other countries. The integrity of international borders should be protected and terrorists should not be allowed to deploy their forces near the borders. According to the reports that we have received, although some people deny them while there are reliable reports confirming this, a number of terrorists from here and there have become involved in this war.”

Hassan Rouhani warned that his country will not tolerate the presence of foreign fighters — “terrorists that Iran has fought for years” — near its northern border, where a conflict is raging between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Mahmoud Vaezi: Vaezi then denied rumours spread by some media and social networks suggesting Iran is offering assistance to Armenia in its conflict with the Azerbaijan Republic. “These rumours are completely baseless and are aimed at straining good relations between Iran and the Azerbaijan Republic,” he said.

military reinforcement in the north

https://brill.com/view/journals/ic/25/3/article-p284_5.xml (Iran’s Security Interests and Policies in the South Caucasus, 2021)

https://twitter.com/khamenei_ir/status/1325506918014652422 Khamenei Despite the denials of some people, we have information from credible sources that a number of terrorists from different places were involved in this case. If they approach our borders and pose a threat to our country, decisive measures will be taken. https://archive.ph/Tj4lP

Tehran Times: During 44-day Karabakh war, Iran explicitly supported Azerbaijan’s bid to restore its territorial integrity. https://twitter.com/TehranTimes79/status/1441496068982665218 https://archive.ph/D7l3p

Iran MFA spox Said Khatibzadeh said that Tehran had all the information about the presence of terrorists in Flag of Azerbaijan from the very beginning, but Baku assured that they did not pose a threat to Iran. "We have these reports since the beginning of the war. We informed our friends in Baku. During the meetings, our friends said that there is no danger for Iran. We continue to receive reports," Khatibzade said. https://www.irna.ir/news/84493399/%D8%AE%D8%B7%DB%8C%D8%A8-%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B7-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A8%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%A7%DA%A9%D9%88-%D9%88-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%85

Azeri MP, 2023 Nigar Arpadarai

1. Armenia piles up army at #Azerbaijani border while Iranian IRGC related media threatens Azerbaijan. Alliance? Obviously, yes. These two colluded and looted occupied #Karabakh together for decades.

https://archive.ph/Ep47L

France

Gamaghelyan, Phil. "Rethinking the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: Identity, politics, scholarship." International Negotiation 15, no. 1 (2010): 33-56. https://brill.com/view/journals/iner/15/1/article-p33_3.xml p. 46 France, so far, has chosen a passive stance toward the conflict and is hardly contributing to progress in negotiations. France’s oil giant, Total, owns 5% of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. The Azerbaijani side regards it suspiciously as a mediator because it has historically come across as a pro-Armenian actor with an influential Armenian diaspora. But pro-Armenian or not, France’s approach indicates that it is comfortable with the status quo and has little incentive to promote development, since it might require either Armenian or Azerbaijani concessions that would dissatisfy French-Armenians or its own oil lobby. France, therefore, has little incentive to actively broker any compromise.

Azerbaijan has repeatedly accused the Minsk Group (Russia, US, France) of being pro-Armenian. Svante Cornell argued in 1997 that France, the US and Russia are "more or less biased towards Armenia in the conflict." Askerov and Matyok argued in 2015 that the Minsk Group's policy of preserving the "no war-no peace situation has tremendously supported Armenia’s position."

https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/karabakh-is-war-inevitable/ In different ways, Washington, Paris and Moscow all tilt in their domestic politics toward Armenia. Their economic interests tilt toward Azerbaijan. To oversimplify, Armenia has an effective diaspora, while Azerbaijan has oil and gas. In Washington, the Congress loves Armenia but the Pentagon loves Azerbaijan.

Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan reportedly told the Greek ambassador in 1993 that France and Russia were Armenia's only allies at the time. According to a US State Department cable, released in 2020, the French ambassador to the UN, Jean-Bernard Mérimée, succeed in changing the wording of the UNSC Resolution 822 to state that it was the "local Armenian forces", not "Armenian forces" that occupied Kalbajar. He also suggested treating the Armenian capture of Kalbajar not under the chapter VII of the UN Charter (an act of aggression), but chapter VI (a dispute that should be settled peacefully). In 1996, when France was chosen by the OSCE to co-chair the Minsk Group, Azerbaijan asked the OSCE to reconsider the decision because France was perceived by Azerbaijan as pro-Armenian.

In 2018 Azerbaijan accused the US and France in bias for allowing Bako Sahakyan, president of Artsakh, to visit their countries.

Israel

92 Flights From Israeli Base Reveal Arms Exports to Azerbaijan: Haaretz investigation reveals dozens of cargo flights from Baku to Israeli airstrip used for export of explosives ■ Israel sells Azerbaijan weaponry worth billions – and, per sources, receives oil and access to Iran ■ Tensions between Azerbaijan and both Iran and Armenia have ratcheted up recently https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/security-aviation/2023-03-06/ty-article-magazine/92-flights-from-israeli-base-reveal-arms-exports-to-azerbaijan/00000185-fd3d-d96e-adef-ff3dc38e0000

Israel’s Role in the Second Armenia-Azerbaijan War and Its Implications for the Future Brenda Shaffer https://web.archive.org/web/20221007191009/https://www.cacianalyst.org/resources/pdf/220912Shaffer.pdf

Cornell, Svante E. (August 1999). "Geopolitics and Strategic Alignments in the Caucasus and Central Asia" (PDF). Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs. IV (2). Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey: 9. ISSN 1300-8641. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2020-08-25. ...Israel from the start took on an overtly pro-Azerbaijani stance in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Khalifa-zadeh, Mahir (2012). "Israel and Azerbaijan: To Counteract Iran" (PDF). Central Asia and the Caucasus. 13 (3). Institute for Central Asian and Caucasian Studies: 76. Israel has repeatedly declared that Tel Aviv supports Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.

During the period of the Nagorno-Karabakh war (1991-1993) [...] Israel proffered its military know-how and diplomatic support to Azerbaijan. But Israeli diplomacy maintained a low profile during this period.

former official Avigdor Lieberman https://web.archive.org/web/20161004230759/https://sputniknews.com/military/20160417/1038168379/karabakh-israel-role-analysis.html

https://www.ca-c.org/c-g/2008/journal_eng/c-g-2/15.shtml#nazad45 In 1990 only two countries, Israel and Turkey diplomatically supported the Azerbaijani position in its struggle against the Armenian secessionist forces in Nagorno-Karabakh.

https://archive.vn/elNdA

See also

Foreign involvement in the Syrian Civil War

Foreign involvement in the Spanish Civil War

International reactions to the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation

International recognition of Kosovo

References

Notes

Citations

Bibliography

• Taarnby, Michael (2008). "The Mujahedin in Nagorno-Karabakh: A Case Study in the Evolution of Global Jihad" (PDF). Working Paper. Madrid: Elcano Royal Institute: 1–12. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2020-08-19.
• de Waal, Thomas (2003). Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War. New York: New York University Press. ISBN 978-0-8147-1945-9.
• Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh (PDF). Human Rights Watch. 1994. ISBN 1-56432-142-8. Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 June 2020.
• Cornell, Svante E. (1998). "Turkey and the Conflict in Nagorno Karabakh: A Delicate Balance". Middle Eastern Studies. 34 (1): 51–72. doi:10.1080/00263209808701209. JSTOR 4283917.
• Charalampidis, Ioannis (2013). Sponsored To Kill: Mercenaries and Terrorist Networks in Azerbaijan (PDF). Moscow: "MIA" Publishers. ISBN 978-5-9986-0115-6. Archived (PDF) from the original on 29 November 2014. Retrieved 18 July 2013.
• Souleimanov, Emil (2011). "Dealing with Azerbaijan: The Policies of Turkey and Iran Toward the Karabakh War (1991-1994)". Middle East Review of International Affairs. 15 (3).