User:Veritas Aeterna/Draft United States intervention in Chile

The United States intervention in Chilean politics started during the War of Chilean Independence. The influence of the United States of America in both the economic and the political arenas of Chile has gradually increased over the almost two centuries since, and continues to be significant.

Chilean independence

The arrival of Joel Roberts Poinsett, in 1811, marked the beginning of U.S. involvement in Chilean politics. He had been sent by President James Madison in 1809 as a "special agent" to the South American Spanish colonies (a position he filled from 1810 to 1814) to investigate the prospects of the revolutionaries, in their struggle for independence from Spain.

War of the Pacific

Main article: War of the Pacific

The United States tried to bring an early end to the War of the Pacific, mainly because of US business interests in Peru, but also because its leaders worried that the United Kingdom would take economic control of the region through Chile. Peace negotiations failed when a stipulation required Chile to return the conquered lands. Chileans suspected the new US initiative was tainted with a pro-Peruvian bias. As a result, relations between Chile and the United States took a turn for the worse. Chile instead asked that the United States remain neutral, and the United States, unable to match Chilean naval power, backed down.

War scare of 1891

During the Chilean Civil War, the U.S. backed President José Manuel Balmaceda, as a way to increase their influence in Chile, while the UK backed the Congressional forces. As such, after the defeat of Balmaceda, they were determined to assert their influence in Chilean domestic affairs (then dominated by the victorious Congress) by any means, including war, pushing out British interests in the region.

Itata incident

Main article: Itata Incident

The incident concerned an attempted arms shipment by the ship Itata from the U.S. to Chile in 1891, destined to assist Congressional forces. The Itata Incident was the direct cause of the Baltimore Crisis and is one of the reasons that Benjamin Harrison was not reelected to a second term as the President of the United States.

Baltimore crisis

Main article: Baltimore Crisis

After the Itata left Iquique to return to the U.S., the crew of the Baltimore took shore leave at Valparaiso. During the US sailors' shore leave on October 16, 1891, a mob of enraged Chileans angry about the Itata's capture (among other possible motives), attacked the sailors from the Baltimore. Two sailors were killed and several were wounded seriously. That Valparaiso riot prompted saber-rattling from enraged US officials, threatening war against Chile, which by now was controlled by victorious Congressional forces. War between the U.S. and Chile was ultimately averted when the Chilean government bowed, and while maintaining that the seamen were to blame for the riot offered to pay an indemnity of $75,000 to the victims' families.

First half of the 20th century

See also: Law of Permanent Defense of the Democracy

United States involvement in Chilean affairs intensified in the early decades of the 20th century. After World War I, the United States replaced Britain as the main superpower controlling most of Chile’s resources, as most economic activity in the country lay in US hands. Such a change prevented Chile profiting from the result of the war and gaining its economic independence. The dependence on the United States formally began in the early years of the 1920s as two major US industries Anaconda and Kennecott took control of the profitable resources. Up until the 1970s, “both industries controlled between 7% to 20% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product”. The conclusion of World War II brought more of the same as Chile could not even exploit the “excess of copper they produced as almost all the copper was marketed through subsidiaries of United States copper firms established in Chile for whom the allied government fixed a ceiling price upon copper products during the course of the war.” As the working class demanded an improvement in their standard of living, higher wages and improved working conditions, the notion that a leftist government could be the solution for the people began to take form.

1950s and 1960s

During the 1950s and 1960s, the United States put forward a variety of programs and strategies ranging from funding political campaigns to funding propaganda aimed at impeding the presidential aspirations of leftist candidate Salvador Allende. Throughout this time, the United States successfully impeded the left-wing parties from gaining power. In the 1958 presidential election, Jorge Alessandri - a nominal independent with support from the Liberal and Conservative parties - defeated Allende by nearly 33,500 votes to claim the presidency. His laissez-faire policies, endorsed by the United States, were regarded as the solution to the country’s inflation problems. Under recommendations from the United States, Alessandri steadily reduced tariffs from 1959, a policy that caused the Chilean market to be overwhelmed by American products. The government’s policies angered the working class, who asked for higher wages, and the repercussions of this massive discontent were felt in the 1961 congressional elections. The president suffered terrible blows, sending the message that laissez-faire policies were not desired. As the “grand total of $130 million from the U.S. banking Industry, the U.S. Treasury Department, the IMF and the ICA” accepted by Alessandri illustrates, laissez-faire policies only made Chile more dependent on the United States.

Presidential candidate Salvador Allende was a top contender in the 1964 election. The US, through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), covertly spent three million dollars campaigning against him, before and after the election, mostly through radio and print advertising. The Americans viewed electing Christian Democratic contender Eduardo Frei Montalva as vital, fearing that Alessandri’s failures would lead the people to support Allende. Allende was feared by the Americans because of his warm relations with Cuba and his open criticism of the Bay of Pigs Invasion. Furthermore, clandestine aid to Frei was put forward through John F. Kennedy`s Latin American Alliance for Progress, which promised "$20 billion in public and private assistance in the country for the next decade." In direct terms, the United States contributed US$20 million to the campaign, but they also sent in about 100 people with assigned tasks to prevent Allende`s victory. In order to influence the public opinion, the CIA also embarked on a massive propaganda campaign through radio, television, posters, wall paintings, and pamphlets, with a goal of connecting communist atrocities to Allende. In the end, the mobilization of the American business sector in Chile, together with aid from the CIA and the American government, enabled Frei to defeat Allende with a significant majority.

1970 election

According to the 1975 Church Commission Report, covert United States involvement in Chile in the decade between 1963 and 1973 was extensive and continuous. The Central Intelligence Agency spent $8 million in the three years between 1970 and the military coup in September 1973, with over $3 million in 1972 alone. Covert American activity was present in almost every major election in Chile in the decade between 1963 and 1973, but its actual effect on electoral outcomes is not altogether clear. Chile, more than any of its South American neighbours, had an extensive democratic tradition dating back to the early 1930s, and even before. Because of this, it is difficult to gauge how successful CIA tactics were in swaying voters.

Allende Presidency

Salvador Allende ran again in the 1970 presidential election, winning a narrow plurality (near 37%). U.S. president Richard Nixon stated his fear that Chile could become "another Cuba", and the U.S. cut off most of its foreign aid to Chile and supported Allende's opponents in Chile during his presidency, intending to encourage Allende's resignation, his overthrow, or his defeat in the impending election of 1976. To this end, the Nixon administration clandestinely funded independent and non-state media and labor unions.

The U.S. government had two approaches to fighting Marxism as represented by Allende. "Track I" was a State Department initiative designed to thwart Allende by subverting Chilean elected officials within the bounds of the Chilean constitution and excluded the CIA. Track I expanded to encompass a number of policies whose ultimate goal was to create the conditions that would encourage a coup. "Track II" was a CIA operation overseen by Kissinger and CIA’s director of covert operations, Thomas Karamessine. "Track II" excluded the State Department and Department of Defense. The goal of Track II was to find and support Chilean military officers that would support a coup.

Immediately after the Allende government came into office, the U.S. sought to place pressure on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to U.S. and hemispheric interests, such as Allende's total nationalization of several U.S. corporations and the copper industry. Nixon directed that no new bilateral economic aid commitments be undertaken with the government of Chile.

The U.S. provided humanitarian aid to Chile in addition to forgiving old loans valued at $200 million from 1971-2. The U.S. did not invoke the Hickenlooper Amendment which would have required an immediate cut-off of U.S. aid due to Allende's nationalizations. Allende also received new sources of credit that was valued between $600 million and $950 million in 1972 and $547 million by June 1973. The International Monetary Fund also loaned $100 million to Chile during the Allende years.

Track I

Track I was a State Department plan designed to persuade the Chilean Congress, through outgoing Christian Democratic President Eduardo Frei Montalva, to confirm conservative runner-up Jorge Alessandri as president. Alessandri would resign shortly after, rendering Frei eligible to run against Allende in new elections. However, Track I was dropped, because Alessandri, despite being firmly anti-Allende, was also adamantly opposed to going against Chile's longstanding democratic traditions.

Track II

Main article: Project FUBELT

The CIA had also drawn up a second plan, Track II. The agency would find military officers willing to support a coup and provide them with support. They could then call new elections in which Allende could be defeated.

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In September 1970, President Nixon found that an Allende regime in Chile would not be acceptable and authorized $10 million to stop Allende from coming to power or unseat him. As part of the Track II initiative, the CIA used false flag operatives to approach Chilean military officers, to encourage them to carry out a coup. A first step to overthrowing Allende required removing General René Schneider, the army chief commander. Scheider was a constitutionalist and would oppose a coup d'etat. To assist in the planned kidnapping of Schneider, the CIA provided "$50,000 cash, three submachine guns, and a satchel of tear gas, all approved at headquarters..." The submachine guns were delivered by diplomatic pouch.

The attempted kidnapping and resultant death of General René Schneider shocked the public and increased support of the Chilean Constitution. Schneider was killed by a group led by a retired general, General Roberto Viaux, who had been forced into retirement after the Tacnazo insurrection. Viaux was considered unstable by the U.S. and was discouraged from attempting a coup by himself. Instead, the CIA encouraged him to join forces with an active duty general, General Camilo Valenzuela, who had also been approached by CIA false flag operatives. Kissinger's orders, relayed by the CIA clearly stated that...

IT IS FIRM AND CONTINUING POLICY THAT ALLENDE BE OVERTHROWN BY A COUP....IT WAS DETERMINED THAT A VIAUX COUP ATTEMPT CARRIED OUT BY HIM ALONE WITH THE FORCES NOW AT HIS DISPOSAL WOULD FAIL....ENCOURAGE HIM TO JOIN FORCES WITH OTHER COUP PLANNERS....GREAT AND CONTINUING INTEREST IN THE ACTIVITIES OF...VALENZUELA ET AL AND WE WISH THEM OPTIMUM GOOD FORTUNE.

Kissinger later would portray his attempt to stop Viaux from acting unilaterally as a more general attempt to stop a coup against Allende (see discussion of court suit against Kissinger below). Nixon and Kissinger always firmly supported an overthrow of Allende, and Nixon referred to Allende as "That son of a bitch, that son of a bitch..."

Viaux joined forces with Valenzuela. On October 22, Viaux went ahead with his plan to kidnap Scheider, which was badly botched. Gen. Schneider drew a handgun to protect himself from his attackers, who shot him in four vital areas; he died in Santiago's military hospital three days later. The event provoked national outrage. Schneider's assassination caused the citizens and the military to rally behind the just-elected Allende and ended the U.S. hopes of a coup for the time being.

A CIA and White House cover-up obscured American involvement, despite Congressional investigative efforts. The Church Committee, which investigated U.S. involvement in Chile during this period, determined that the weapons used in the debacle "were, in all probability, not those supplied by the CIA to the conspirators." The weapons, had in fact, been supplied to Valunzuela's men, while Viaux's group had carried out the kidnap attempt, so the CIA was still culpable, as they aided and encouraged both groups, even if their weapons had not been the exact ones used in Schneider's murder.

On September 10, 2001, a suit was filed by the family of Schneider, accusing former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger of arranging Schneider's 1970 murder because he would have opposed a military coup. CIA documents indicate that while the CIA had sought his kidnapping, his killing was never intended, although the CIA had been warned that, "Thru Viaux solution we provide you with formula for chaos which is unlikely to be bloodless." Kissinger said he had declared the coup "hopeless" and had "turned it off".. The full context of the declassified documents show that Kissinger intended for Allende to be overthrown, and was only instructing Viaux not to act at that time before he had joined forces with active duty military officers. As mentioned, the CIA had backed the attempt to kidnap Schneider and on October 22, weapons (submachine guns and tear gas) were given to the group led by General Camilo Valenzuela However, Viaux's group carried out the actual killing before Valenzuela's group could do so, so the weapons were not used.

The CIA attempted to muddy the water by claiming the two groups were autonomous, and that it wanted only to stop Viaux's group:

In a secret October 1974 briefing paper, titled "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," the CIA attempted to rewrite FUBELT history, forcefully asserted that that "the Viaux group, acting independently" had killed Schneider. "To sum up, the tragic death of General Schneider resulted from a unilateral kidnap attempt taken on the initiative of the Viaux group despite and against the advice of an Agency representative." This argument ignored the fact, well-documented in the CIA's own records, that Viaux was not acting independently or unilaterally, but clearly as a co-conspirator with Valenzuela who had the unreserved support of the CIA--support that included $50,000 to pay the kidnap team Viaux had hired. CIA documents written at the time of the shooting repeatedly referred to the assault as part of the "Valenzuela's group coup plan."

After Schneider's death, the CIA recovered the submachine guns and money it had provided. Both Valenzuela and Viaux were arrested and convicted of conspiracy after Schneider's assassination. One member of the coup plotters that escaped arrest requested assistance from the CIA, and was paid $35,000, so "The CIA did, in fact, pay "hush" money to those directly responsible for the Schneider assassination--and then covered up that secret payment for thirty years."

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ITT Corporation

In 1970, U.S. conglomerate ITT owned of 70% of Chitelco, the Chilean Telephone Company, and funded El Mercurio, a Chilean right-wing newspaper. Declassified documents released by the CIA in 2000 suggest that ITT financially helped opponents of Salvador Allende's government prepare a military coup. On September 28, 1973, ITT's headquarters in New York City, New York, was bombed by protesters for alleged involvement in the September 11th overthrow of the democratically elected and emerging socialist government in Chile.

In 1972 newspaper columnist Jack Anderson disclosed a memo of ITT's Washington lobbyist, Dita Beard, which revealed a relationship between ITT's providing funds for the Republican National Convention and a Justice Department settlement of an antitrust suit favorable to ITT.

1973 coup

Main article: Chilean coup of 1973

In the Chilean coup of 1973, Augusto Pinochet rose to power. While declassified documents related to the military coup have shown that the CIA "probably appeared to condone" the 1973 coup, and even helped coup plotters gather intelligence, there is no evidence that the US actually participated in the 1973 coup [3].

Operating guidance issued to CIA operatives in Chile on 16 October 1970 explicitly stated US aims:

It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It would be much preferable to have this transpire prior to 24 October but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date.

However, after the failure of Project FUBELT and the inauguration of Allende on 3 November 1970, it appears that there were no more discussions of coup attempts. On November 9, 1970 the US National Security Council, in Decision Memorandum 93, noted that President Nixon had decided:

(1) The public posture of the United States will be correct but cool to avoid giving the Allende government a basis on which to rally domestic and international support for consolidation of the regime; but that (2) the United States will seek to maximize pressure on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to US and hemisphere interests.

Specifically, the US would seek to reassure other Latin American countries that the US opposed a fully communist Chilean state and would consider implementing economic sanctions.

During the period leading up to the coup, the CIA received information about potential coup plots. The 1975 Church report noted:

The intelligence network continued to report throughout 1972 and 1973 on coup plotting activities. During 1972 the Station continued to monitor the group which might mount a successful coup, and it spent a significantly greater amount of time and effort penetrating this group than it had on previous groups. This group had originally come to the Station's attention in October 1971. By January 1972 the Station had successfully penetrated it and was in contact through an intermediary with its leader.

Intelligence reporting on coup plotting reached two peak periods, one in the last week of June 1973 and the other during the end of August and the first two weeks in September. It is clear the CIA received intelligence reports on the coup planning of the group which carried out the successful September 11 coup throughout the months of July, August, and September 1973.

One such coup plot was the Tanquetazo which Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon made reference to in the course of an informal telephone call on 4 July 1973:

Nixon: I want you to take the Fourth off now so ... I just looked over the news thing, nothing new here. It's relatively quiet. The Latin American guys are having there [sic] usual - you know I think that Chilean guy may have some problems.

Kissinger: Oh, he has massive problems. He has definitely massive problems.

Nixon: If only the Army could get a few people behind them.

Kissinger: And that coup last week - we had nothing to do with it but it still came off apparently prematurely.

Nixon: That's right and the fact that he just set up a cabinet without any military in it is, I think, very significant.

Kissinger: It's very significant.

Nixon: Very significant because those military guys are very proud down there and they may just - right?

Kissinger: Yes, I definitely think he's in difficulties.

According to the CIA document "CIA Activities in Chile", during the late summer of 1973, the local CIA station suggested that the US commit itself to support for a military coup. In response, CIA Headquarters reaffirmed to the station that "there was to be no involvement with the military in any covert action initiative; there was no support for instigating a military coup."

On the issue of CIA involvement in the 1973 coup, the CIA document is equally unequivocal:

On 10 September 1973 -- the day before the coup that ended the Allende government -- a chilean military officer reported to a CIA officer that a coup was being planned and asked for US government assistance. He was told that the US Government would not provide any assistance because this was strictly an internal chilean matter. The Station Officer also told him his request would be forwarded to Washington. CIA learned of the exact date of the coup shortly before it took place. During the attack on the Presidential Palace and its immediate aftermath, the Station's activities were limited to providing intelligence and situation reports.

The Church report also answered the allegation that the US government involved itself in the 1973 coup:

Was the United States DIRECTLY involved, covertly, in the 1973 coup in Chile? The Committee has found no evidence that it was.

There is no hard evidence of direct U.S. assistance to the coup, despite frequent allegations of such aid. Rather the United States - by its previous actions during Track II, its existing general posture of opposition to Allende, and the nature of its contacts with the Chilean military- probably gave the impression that it would not look with disfavor on a military coup. And U.S. officials in the years before 1973 may not always have succeeded in walking the thin line between monitoring indigenous coup plotting and actually stimulating it.

In all probability, the exact timing of the 1973 coup perhaps came as a surprise to the US. However, it was without doubt a major vindication for the Republican administration. Conrad Black, in his work "Richard M. Nixon: A Life in Full", notes:

After more than thirty years, no evidence has come to light in either country that the United States played a direct role in the overthrow of the Allende government, but it was certainly a geopolitical bonanza for the United States, as Allende was cavorting with Castro with a particularly irritating relish.

On September 16, 1973, approximately one week after Pinochet had assumed power, the following exchange about the coup took place between U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon:

Nixon: Nothing new of any importance or is there?

Kissinger: Nothing of very great consequence. The Chilean thing is getting consolidated and of course the newspapers are bleeding because a pro-Communist government has been overthrown.

Nixon: Isn't that something. Isn't that something.

Kissinger: I mean instead of celebrating – in the Eisenhower period we would be heroes.

Nixon: Well we didn't – as you know – our hand doesn't show on this one though.

Kissinger: We didn't do it. I mean we helped them. [garbled] created the conditions as great as possible.

Nixon: That is right. And that is the way it is going to be played.

Kissinger's last remark is most likely a recognition that the actions of the CIA - by not attempting to discourage the 1973 coup and having conducted a previous coup attempt in 1970 - had given the appearance of implicit support for the coup, therefore helping the coup succeed. In "CIA Activities in Chile", the CIA concluded "Because CIA did not discourage the takeover and had sought to instigate a coup in 1970 -- [the CIA] probably appeared to condone it".

There is no evidence that the U.S. instigated or provided material support to Pinochet's successful coup in 1973, but the Nixon administration was undoubtedly pleased with the outcome; Nixon had spoken with disappointment about the failed coup earlier that year.

The U.S. did provide material support to the military regime after the coup up until 1974, although it criticized them in public. "CIA Activities in Chile" notes that "US military assistance grew significantly during the years of greatest human rights abuses". It also revealed that the CIA actively supported the military junta after the overthrow of Allende and that it made many of Pinochet's officers into paid contacts of the CIA or U.S. military, even though some were known to be involved in human rights abuses. The CIA's publicly announced policies on paid informants have since been modified to exclude those involved in such abuses, but at the time they were evaluated on a case-by-case basis and measured with the value of the information they provided.

Therefore, while the CIA did consider it, ultimately the U.S. did not participate in any tangible way in the 1973 coup. There has not been any evidence to the contrary in the last 30 years. However, many of the documents pertaining to this period of history remain secret, and until they are released into the public domain, it is impossible to be truly certain of this conclusion.

Pinochet regime

See also: Operation Condor

The U.S. provided material support to the military regime after the coup, although criticizing it in public. A document released by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 2000, titled "CIA Activities in Chile", revealed that the CIA actively supported the military junta after the overthrow of Allende and that it made many of Pinochet's officers into paid contacts of the CIA or U.S. military, even though some were known to be involved in human rights abuses.

CIA documents show that the CIA had close contact with members of the Chilean secret police, DINA, and its chief Manuel Contreras (paid asset from 1975 to 1977 according to the CIA in 2000). Some have alleged that the CIA's one-time payment to Contreras is proof that the U.S. approved of Operation Condor and military repression within Chile. The CIA's official documents state that at one time, some members of the intelligence community recommended making Contreras into a paid contact because of his closeness to Pinochet; the plan was rejected based on Contreras' poor human rights track record, but the single payment was made due to miscommunication.[4]

On March 6, 2001, the New York Times reported the existence of a recently declassified State Department document revealing that the United States facilitated communications for Operation Condor. The document, a 1978 cable from Robert E. White, the U.S. ambassador to Paraguay, was discovered by Professor J. Patrice McSherry of Long Island University, who had published several articles on Operation Condor. She called the cable "another piece of increasingly weighty evidence suggesting that U.S. military and intelligence officials supported and collaborated with Condor as a secret partner or sponsor."

In the cable, Ambassador White relates a conversation with General Alejandro Fretes Davalos, chief of staff of Paraguay's armed forces, who told him that the South American intelligence chiefs involved in Condor "keep in touch with one another through a U.S. communications installation in the Panama Canal Zone which covers all of Latin America". This installation is "employed to co-ordinate intelligence information among the southern cone countries". White, whose message was sent to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, was concerned that the U.S. connection to Condor might be revealed during the then ongoing investigation into the deaths of Orlando Letelier and his American colleague Ronni Moffitt. "It would seem advisable," he suggests, "to review this arrangement to insure that its continuation is in U.S. interest."

The document was found among 16,000 State, CIA, White House, Defense and Justice Department records released in November 2000 on the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile, and Washington's role in the violent coup that brought his military regime to power. The release was the fourth and final batch of records released under the Clinton Administration's special Chile Declassification Project.

Later comments and actions by U.S. officials

In her evaluation of United States foreign policy around the time of the coup in Chile, Jeane Kirkpatrick, later U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, highlighted her country's lack of overt aggressiveness in the developing world while events were transpiring in Chile. "In the last decade especially we have practiced remarkable forbearance everywhere." [Kirkpatrick, 1979] While this is the case for overt U.S. policy, severely constrained by the movement that had grown up in opposition to the Vietnam War, nonetheless, as discussed above, United States policy regarding aid (at the very least) helped lead to Allende's downfall, and the U.S. actively supported coup planning on some occasions, although possibly not that of the coup that actually took place. U.S. President Gerald Ford publicly admitted in 1974 that the CIA had covertly operated in Chile

U.S. President Bill Clinton ordered the release of numerous documents relating to U.S. policy and actions toward Chile. [5] The documents produced by various U.S. agencies were opened to the public by the U.S. State Department in October 1999. The collection of 1,100 documents dealt with the years leading up to the military coup. One of these documents establishes that U.S. military aid to the Chilean armed forces was raised dramatically between the coming to power of Allende in 1970, when it amounted to US$800,000 annually, to US$10.9 million in 1972.

Regarding Pinochet's rise to power, the CIA concluded in a report issued in 2000 that:"The CIA actively supported the military junta after the overthrow of Allende but did not assist Pinochet to assume the Presidency." However, the 2000 report also stated that: "The major CIA effort against Allende came earlier in 1970 in the failed attempt to block his election and accession to the Presidency. Nonetheless, the U.S. Administration's long-standing hostility to Allende and its past encouragement of a military coup against him were well known among Chilean coup plotters who eventually took activities of their own to oust him.

A White House press release in November 2000 acknowledged that "actions approved by the U.S. government during this period aggravated political polarization and affected Chile's long tradition of democratic elections..."

In a 2003 town hall with students, high school student James Doubek asked Secretary of State Colin Powell about the United States support for the coup, to which Powell replied that "it is not a part of American history that we're proud of.

2004 investigation

The lower house of the Chilean Congress announced on October 6, 2004 that an investigation would begin of alleged CIA activities in Chile over a period of several decades. Of particular interest are the CIA's efforts to prevent Allende's election in 1970.

In the Chilean coup of 1973, Augusto Pinochet rose to power and Allende committed suicide. Several separate investigations (including the Church Commission Report) have concluded that the U.S. had no direct role in the coup.

Bush-Aznar memo

Main article: Bush-Aznar memo

The Bush-Aznar memo is reportedly a transcription of a February 22, 2003 conversation in Crawford, Texas between George W. Bush, then-Prime Minister of Spain José María Aznar, then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Daniel Fried, Alberto Carnero, and Javier Rupérez, the Spanish ambassador to the U.S. British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi participated by telephone. Rupérez transcribed the meeting's details which El País, a Madrid daily newspaper, published on September 26, 2007. The conversation focuses on the efforts of the US, UK, and Spain to get a second resolution passed by the United Nations Security Council. This "second resolution" would have followed Resolution 1441. Supporters of the resolution also referred to it as the "eighteenth resolution" in reference to the 17 UN resolutions that Iraq had failed to comply with.

According to the account in El País, the memo also gives details on how Bush tried to coerce members of the United Nations Security Council into supporting U.S. policy: He tells Aznar how he can cut Angola's foreign aid from the Millennium Challenge Account and how he can torpedo the free trade agreement with Chile (awaiting ratification in the United States Senate at the time) if the two countries did not back U.S. policy.

Additional information

See also

• History of Chile
• Itata Incident
• Baltimore Crisis
• 1970 Chilean presidential election
• Salvador Allende - deposed by 1973 coup
• Chile under Allende
• Declaration of the Breakdown of Chile’s Democracy (Wikisource)
• David H. Popper, US ambassador to Chile (1974-77)

• United States and South and Central America
• CIA activities in Chile
• Project FUBELT - secret CIA operations to unseat Allende
• Chilean coup of 1973
• Augusto Pinochet - took power in 1973 coup
• Chile under Pinochet - aftermath of the coup
• Project Camelot

Notes

• Thomas Karamessines (1970). Operating guidance cable on coup plotting in Chile, Washington: National Security Council.

• Jeane Kirkpatrick (1979). "Dictatorships and Double Standards", Commentary, November, pp34–45.

• Henry Kissinger (1970). National Security Decision 93: Policy Towards Chile, Washington: National Security Council.

• James F. Petras & Morris H. Morley (1974). How Allende fell: A study in U.S.–Chilean relations, Nottingham: Spokesman Books.

External links

• Church Report. Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973 (FOIA)
• National Security Archive's Chile Documentation Project which provides documents obtained from FOIA requests regarding U.S. involvement in Chile, beginning with attempts to promote a coup in 1970 and continuing through U.S. support for Pinochet
• "Make the Economy Scream" famous instruction of Nixon to the CIA about Chile
• CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970 (report on CIA.gov)
• CIA activities in Chile (detailed report by the CIA itself)
• Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents relating to the Military Coup, 1970-1976

Category:Central Intelligence Agency operations Category:History of the foreign relations of Chile Category:History of the foreign relations of the United States Category:Chile under Salvador Allende Category:CIA activities in the Americas Category:Chile–United States relations