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Arguments for the democratic peace

General points

• The theory is now widely studied with more than a hundred researchers having published many more articles.

• Many peer-reviewed studies mention in their introduction that most researchers accept the theory as an empirical fact, including many of those mentioned below.

• Online reviews of the literature supporting the theory: A Lakatosian View of the Democratic Peace Research Program, Does Democracy Cause Peace?, Debate on the 'Democratic Peace', Democratic Peace – Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument

• Some fear that the the theory may used as an argument for wars against nondemocracies in order to spread democracy. However, studies (Weart 1998), (Russett 2005) show that many attempts to spread democracy by force have eventually failed. Greater success in democratization has been achieved through diplomacy and support of internal democratic movements. Thus, the research may actually be an argument against such wars.

Evidence for less systematic violence between democracies

• A review (Ray 1998) lists many studies finding no wars between liberal democracies and that this is statistically significant.
  • Regarding possible exceptions, see User:Salix alba/History of conflict between democracies.

• Militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) are lesser conflicts causing less than 1000 or even no battle deaths but including for example a military display of force. They also include the disputes later becoming wars. There have been more than 2000 MIDs since 1816, allowing more detailed statistical analyses than when looking at wars. A review (Ray 2003) lists many studies that have reported that democratic pairs of states are less likely to be involved in MIDs than other pairs of states.

• Another study (Hensel, Goertz & Diehl 2000) finds that after both states have become democratic, there is a decreasing probability for MIDs within a year and this decreases almost to zero within five years.

• When examining the MIDs in more detail, one study (Wayman 2002) finds that the inter-liberal disputes are less likely to involve third parties, the target of the hostility is less likely reciprocate, if the target reciprocates the response is usually proportional to the provocation, and the disputes are less likely to cause any loss of life. The most common action was "Seizure of Material or Personnel"

• Many earlier papers found that democracies in general are as warlike as nondemocracies and only peaceful against other democracies. However, one paper (Müller & Wolff 2004) notes that several recent papers have found democracies are slightly less involved in wars in general, initiate wars and MIDs less frequently than nondemocracies, and tend more frequently to seek negotiated resolutions. The tendency for this varies greatly between different democracies.

• A review (Ray 2003) lists several studies showing the probability that disputes between states will be resolved peacefully is positively affected by the degree of democracy exhibited by the least democratic state involved in that dispute. Disputes between democratic states are significantly shorter than disputes involving at least one undemocratic state. Democratic states are more likely to be amenable to third party mediation when they are involved in disputes with each other.

• In international crises that include the threat or use of military force, one study finds that if the parties are democracies, then relative military strength has no effect on who wins. This is different from when nondemocracies are involved. These results are the same also if the conflicting parties are formal allies (Gelpi & Griesdorf 2001). Similarly, a study of the behavior of states that joined ongoing militarized disputes reports that power is important only to autocracies: democracies do not seem to base their alignment on the power of the sides in the dispute (Werner & Lemke 1997).

• A review (Ray 2003) lists several studies finding that democracies are more likely to ally with one another than with other states. Such alliances are likely to last longer than alliances involving nondemocracies.

• One study argues that there is also a related but weaker peacefulness between oligarchies (Weart 1998).

Evidence for less systematic violence in democracies

• One study finds that the most democratic and the most authoritarian states have few civil wars, and intermediate regimes the most. The probability for a civil war is also increased by political change, regardless whether toward greater democracy or greater autocracy. Intermediate regimes continue to be the most prone to civil war, regardless of the time since the political change. In the long run, since intermediate regimes are less stable than autocracies, which in turn are less stable than democracies, durable democracy is the most probable end-point of the process of democratization (Hegre et al. 2001).

• One study finds that the most democratic nations have the least terrorism (Abadie 2004).

• One study finds that genocide and politicide are rare in democracies (Harff 2003). Another that democide is rare (Rummel 1997).

• One study (Davenport & Armstrong II 2004) lists several other studies and states: "Repeatedly, democratic political systems have been found to decrease political bans, censorship, torture, disappearances and mass killing, doing so in a linear fashion across diverse measurements, methodologies, time periods, countries, and contexts." It concludes: "Across measures and methodological techniques, it is found that below a certain level, democracy has no impact on human rights violations, but above this level democracy infuences repression in a negative and roughly linear manner."

• One study (Davenport & Armstrong II 2003) states that thirty years worth of statistical research has revealed that only two variables decrease human rights violations: political democracy and economic development. Of this democracy is more important and more easily created.

Evidence for that more participatory democracies have less systematic violence

• One study finds that democracies with proportional representation are in general more peaceful regardless of the nature of the other party involved in a relationship (Leblang & Chan 2003).

• Another study finds that proportional representation system and decentralized territorial autonomy is positively associated with lasting peace in postconflict societies (Binningsbø 2005).

Evidence for that it is democracy that causes the peace between democracies

• Correlation is not causation. However, many studies, as those discussed in (Ray 1998), (Ray 2005), (Oneal & Russett 2004), supporting the theory have controlled for many possible alternative causes of the peace. Examples of factors controlled for are geographic distance, geographic contiguity, power status, alliance ties, militarization, economic wealth and economic growth, power ratio, and political stability.

• Several studies have also controlled for the possibility of reverse causality from peace to democracy (Mousseau & Shi 1999),(Reiter 2001), (Reuveny & Li 2003).

• Several studies and reviews argue that the Realist criticisms, like that the external threat during the Cold War explain the peace, are flawed. This include the critical studies made by Layne, Spiro, Gowa, and Rosato. The critical realist studies are argued to have methodological problems and be contradicted by others which are better made. Also, an intuitive argument against the Cold War explanation is that such external threat did not prevent wars between Communist states (Gelpi & Griesdorf 2001), (Ray 2003), (Kinsella 2005), (Slantchev, Alexandrova & Gartzke 2005).

• One study (Weart 1998) finds and mentions several other studies finding that democracies conduct diplomacy differently and more conciliatory compared do nondemocracies.

• The same study argues that the peacefulness appears and disappears rapidly when democracy appears and disappears. This makes it unlikely that variables that change more slowly are the explanation.

Possible ways in which democracy can cause peace between democracies

• The democratic culture may make the leaders accustomed to negotiation and compromise (Weart 1998).

• A belief in human rights may make people in democracies reluctant to go to war, especially against other democracies. The decline in colonialism, also by democracies, may be related to a change in perception of non-European peoples and their rights (Ravlo & Gleditsch 2000).

• Studies show that democratic states are more likely than autocratic states to win the wars. One explanation is that democracies, for internal political and economic reasons, have greater resources. This might mean that democratic leaders are unlikely to select other democratic states as targets because they perceive them to be particularly formidable opponents. One study finds that interstate wars have important impacts on the fate of political regimes, and that the probability that a political leader will fall from power in the wake of a lost war is particularly high in democratic states (Ray 1998).

• As decribed in (Gelpi & Griesdorf 2001), several studies have argued that liberal leaders face institutionalized constraints that impede their capacity to mobilize the state’s resources for war without the consent of a broad spectrum of interests. Moreover, these constraints are readily apparent to other states and cannot be manipulated by leaders. Thus, democracies send credible signals to other states of an aversion to using force. These signals allow democratic states to avoid conflicts with one another, but they may attract aggression from nondemocratic states. Democracies may be pressured to respond to such aggression—perhaps even preemptively—through the use of force.

• Also as described in (Gelpi & Griesdorf 2001), studies have argued that when democratic leaders do choose to escalate international crises, their threats are taken as highly credible, since there must be a relatively large public opinion for these actions. In disputes between liberal states, the credibility of their bargaining signals allows them to negotiate a peaceful settlement before mobilization.

• A game-theoretic explanation similar to the last two above is that the participation of the public and the open debate send clear and reliable information regarding the intentions of democracies to other states. In contrast, it is difficult to know the intentions of nondemocratic leaders, what effect concessions will have, and if promises will be kept. Thus there will be mistrust and unwillingness to make concessions if at least one of the parties in a dispute is a nondemocracy (Levy & Razin 2004).

• Several studies find that democracy, more trade causing greater economic interdependence, and membership in more intergovernmental organizations reduce the risk of war. This is often called the Kantian peace theory since it is similar to Kant's earlier theory about a perpetual peace. These variables positively affect each other but each has an independent pacifying effect. For example, democracy may empower economic interest groups that may be opposed to disruptive wars (Oneal & Russett 2001), (Lagazio & Russett 2004). However, some recent studies find no effect from trade but only from democracy (Goenner 2004), (Kim & Rousseau 2005).

Progressive research program

• Imre Lakatos suggested that what he called a "progressive research program" is better than a "degenerative" when it is can explain the same phenomena as the "degenerative" one, but is also marked by growth and the discovery of important novel facts. In contrast, the supporters of the "degenerative" program do not make important new empirical discoveries, but instead mostly adjustments to their theory in order to defend it from competitors. On study argues that the democratic peace theory is now the "progressive" program in international relations. The theory can explain the empirical phenomena previously explained by the earlier dominant research program, realism in international relations. In addition, the initial discovery, that democracies do not make war on one another, has created a rapidly growing literature and a constantly growing list of novel empirical regularities, as noted above (Ray 2003), (Chernoff 2004), (Harrison 2005).

Harvard

Abadie, Alberto (2004), "Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism" (PDF), NBER Working Paper Series

Binningsbø, Helga Malmin (2005), "Consociational Democracy and Postconflict Peace. Will Power-Sharing Institutions Increase the Probability of Lasting Peace after Civil War?" (PDF), Paper prepared for presentation at the 13th Annual National Political Science Conference, Hurdalsjøen, Norway, 5–7 January, 2005

Chernoff, Fred (2004), "The Study of Democratic Peace and Progress in International Relations", International Studies Review, 6 (1): 1079–1760, doi:10.1111/j.1079-1760.2004.00372.x

Davenport, Christian; Armstrong II, David A (2003), "Peace by Piece: Towards an Understanding of Exactly How Democracy Reduces State Repression." (PDF), Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association, 61st Annual Meeting, Chicago. April 3-6, 2003

Davenport, Christian; Armstrong II, David A (2004), "Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996" (PDF), American Journal of Political Science, 48 (3): 538–554, doi:10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00086.x

Gelpi, Christopher F.; Griesdorf, Michael (2001), "Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918–94" (PDF), American Political Science Review, 95 (3): 633–647, doi:10.1017/S0003055401003148, S2CID 146346368

Goenner, Cullen F (2004), "Uncertainty of the Liberal Peace" (PDF), Journal of Peace, 41 (5): 589-605, doi:10.1177/0022343304045977, S2CID 5270352 {{citation}}: Unknown parameter |research volume= ignored (help)

Harff, Barabara (2003), "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955" (PDF), American Political Science Review, 97 (1): 57-73, doi:10.1017/S0003055403000522, S2CID 54804182

Harrison, Ewan (2005), "The Democratic Peace Research Program and System Level Analysis" (PDF), Paper Presented at the British International Studies Association Annual Conference

Hensel, Paul R.; Goertz, Gary; Diehl, Paul F. (2000), "The Democratice Peace and Rivalries" (PDF), Journal of Politics, 64 (4): 1173–88, doi:10.1111/0022-3816.00052, S2CID 154641833

Hegre, Håvard; Ellington, Tanja; Gates, Scott; Gleditsch, Nils Petter (2001), "Towards A Democratic Civil Peace? Opportunity, Grievance, and Civil War 1816-1992", American Political Science Review, 95 (1): 33–48, doi:10.1017/S0003055401000119, S2CID 7521813

Kim, Hyung Min; Rousseau, David L. (2005), "The Classical Liberals Were Half Right (or Half Wrong): New Tests of the 'Liberal Peace', 1960–88" (PDF), Journal of Peace Research, 42 (5): 523-543, doi:10.1177/0022343305056225, S2CID 145441516

Kinsella, David (2005), "No Rest for the Demoratic Peace", American Political Science Review, 99 (3): 453–457, doi:10.1017/S0003055405051774, S2CID 19837979

Lagazio, Monica; Russett, Bruce (2004), "A Neural Network Analysis of Militarized Disputes, 1885-1992: Temporal Stability and Causal Complexity" (PDF), in Diehl, Paul (ed.), The Scourge of War: New Extensions on an Old Problem

Leblang, David; Chan, Steve (2003), "Explaining Wars Fought by Established Democracies: Do Institutional Constraints Matter?", Political Research Quarterly, 56 (4): 385–400, doi:10.1177/106591290305600401, S2CID 153829754

Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny (2004), "It Takes Two: An Explanation for the Democratic Peace" (PDF), Journal of the European Economic Association, 2 (1): 1–29, doi:10.1162/154247604323015463, S2CID 12114936

Mousseau, Michael; Shi, Yuhand (1999), "A Test for Reverse Causality in the Democratic Peace Relationship" (PDF), Journal for Peace Research, 36 (6): 639–663, doi:10.1177/0022343399036006003, S2CID 36381997

Müller, Harald; Wolff, Jonas (2004), "Dyadic Democratic Peace Strikes Back" (PDF), Paper Prepared for Presentation at the 5th Pan-European International Relations Conference the Hague, September 9-11, 2004

Oneal, John R.; Russett, Bruce (2001), "Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992" (PDF), Paper Presented at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francsco, CA

Oneal, John R.; Russett, Bruce (2004), "Rule of Three, Let it Be? When More Really Is Better" (PDF), Revised Version of Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Peace Science Society

Ravlo, Hilde; Gleditsch, Nils Peter (2000), "Colonial War and Globalization of Democratic Values" (PDF), Paper Presented to the Workshop on 'Globalization and Armed Conflict' at the Joint Session of Workshops, European Consortium for Political Research Copenhagen, 15–19 April 2000

Ray, James Lee (1998), "Does Democracy Cause Peace?", Annual Review of Political Science, 1: 27–46, doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.27

Ray, James Lee (2003), "A Lakatosian View of the Democratic Peace Research Program" (PDF), in Colin and Miriam Fendius Elman (ed.), Progress in International Relations Theory, MIT Press

Ray, James Lee (2005), "Constructing Multivariate Analyses (of Dangerous Dyads)" (PDF), Conflict Management and Peace Science, 22 (4): 277–292, doi:10.1080/07388940500339175

Reuveny, Rafael; Li, Quan (2003), "The Joint Democracy–Dyadic Conflict Nexus: A Simultaneous Equations Model" (PDF), Journal of Politics, 47: 325–346

Reiter, D. (2001), "Does Peace Nature Democracy?", Journal of Politics, 63 (3): 935–948, doi:10.1111/0022-3816.00095, S2CID 154824443

Rummel, Rudolph J. (1997), Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence, Transaction Publishers

Russett, Bruce (2005), "Bushwhacking the Democratic Peace", International Studies Perspectives, 6 (4): 395, doi:10.1111/j.1528-3577.2005.00217.x

Slantchev, Branislav L.; Alexandrova, Anna; Gartzke, Erik (2005), "Probabilistic Causality, Selection Bias, and the Logic of the Democratic Peace" (PDF), American Political Science Review, 99 (3): 459–462, doi:10.1017/S0003055405051786, S2CID 11320585

Wayman, Frank (2002), "Incidence of Militarized Disputes Between Liberal States, 1816-1992", Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, La., Mar. 23-27, 2002

Weart, Spencer R. (1998), Never at War, Yale University Press

Werner, Suzanne; Lemke, Douglas (1997), "Opposites Do Not Attract: The Impact of Domestic Institutions, Power, and Prior Commitments on Alignment Choicesl", International Studies Quarterly, 41 (3): 529–546, doi:10.1111/0020-8833.00055, hdl:2027.42/146950

Notes

Bruce Russett (October 1995). "The Democratic Peace: And Yet It Moves". International Security. 19 (4): 164–75. doi:10.2307/2539124. JSTOR 2539124.