User:The Pittsburgher/sandbox2

User:The Pittsburgher/sandbox

User:The Pittsburgher/The Pittsburgher/Sandbox2

General Henry Arnold: bomb tonnage dropped in Pacific Theater by USAAF was to total 1,051,714 in 1945 and 3,167,316 in 1946, excluding the blast yields of atomic weapons.

Date	US	Japanese
X to X+7	12 divisions, 2 RCTs	6 divisions
X+7 to X+14	13 divisions, 2 RCTs	12 divisions
Final	13 divisions, 2 RCTs	17 divisions
Personnel strength	815,548 (includes 40th Division)	990,000 (Army only)

Includes Imperial Guards Division, part of Tokyo Defense Army. SCAP excludes this division because it wasn't part of the field forces.

Date	Allied	Japanese
Y-Day	15 divisions	20 divisions
Y+30	25 divisions	28-33 divisions
Final	50 divisions	28-33 divisions
Personnel strength	2,220,000	1,280,000 (Army only)

Japanese Navy Personnel - August 15 1945

JM-85 p. 24 (unclear if it includes SNLFs)

Location	Battalions	Personnel strength
Miura Peninsula (Coronet Area)	12	20,000
Sasebo Naval Base Area (Olympic Area)	10	16,000
Kure Naval Base Area (Hiroshima)	6	10,000
Southwestern Shikoku	6	10,000
Maizuru Naval Base Area	6	10,000
Shimokita Peninsula (N. Honshu)	6	9,000
Chinkai Naval Guard District (Korea)	3	3,000
Total	49	78,000

Demobilization of Japanese Armed Forces, Navy Section

Kyushu		Kanto Area
Sasebo Naval District Force	96,590	Yokosuka Naval District Force	181,228
5th Air Fleet	73,354	Honshu Air Fleets	87,761
7th Fleet	12,151	6th Fleet	4,553
		Grand Escort Command HQ	23,908
		Central Office & Attached Schools	11,633

Operation Olympic Landing Schedule
Date	Miyazaki Plain	Ariake Bay	Kagoshima	Satsuma Peninsula	General Reserve	Outlying Islands
X-5	--	--	--	--	--	40th Division, 158th RCT
X-Day	25th, 33rd Divisions	43rd Division, 1st Cavalry Division	2nd, 3rd, 5th Marine Divisions	--	--	--
X+1	--	Balance of above divisions	--		--	--
X+2	41st Division	Americal Division, 112th RCT	--	--	--	--
X+3	(From General Reserve)			98th, 81st Divisions	158th RCT	--
X+4	--	Balance of Americal Div.		--	--	--
X+5	--	--	--	77th Division	--	--
X+22	(From General Reserve)				11th Airborne Division	--
	13 Divisions, 2 RCTs					1 Division, 1 RCT
Final	815,548 men

Operation Coronet Landing Schedule
Date	Sagami Bay	Boso Peninsula	General Reserve	Strategic Reserve
				Philippines	US Mainland	Commonwealth Corps
Y-Day	24th, 31st, 37th, 6th, 32nd, 38th Infantry Divisions, 13th, 20th Armored Divisions	7th, 27th, 96th Infantry Divisions, 1st, 4th, 6th Marine Divisions	97th Infantry Division (with Western Force)	--	--	--
Y+30	4th, 87th, 8th Infantry Divisions	86th, 44th, 5th Infantry Divisions	--
Y+35	(From General Reserve)		2nd, 28th, 35th Infantry Divisions, 11th Airborne Division
Y+60	(Rear Echelon)
After Y+60	(From Strategic Reserve)			95th, 104th, 91st Infantry Divisions	10th Mountain Division, 5 unnamed Armored Divisions, 11 unnamed Infantry Divisions	3rd UK Division, 6th Canadian Division, 10th Australian Division, 2nd New Zealand Division, 1 unnamed Australian Division
	25 Divisions			25 Divisions
	1,171,646 men (Incl. 11th AB Div. (8,556) and 81,002 others from Kyushu)			120,000 men	735,000 men	200,000 men

Location	Japanese Estimate	US Plan
Ariake (Shibushi) Bay	5-6 divisions	3 divisions, 1 RCT
Miyazaki Plain	3-4 divisions	3 divisions
Satsuma Peninsula	2 divisions	3 divisions
Airborne attacks	1-2 divisions	--
Makurazaki-Kaimon-dake	--	3 divisions
Tanega-shima	1 brigade (RCT)	1 RCT (contingent)
Koshiki-retto, Uji-gunto, Kusagaki-shima, Kuro-shima, Kuchino-erabu-shima	--	1 division
Shikoku	2 divisions	--
Reserve	2 divisions	1 airborne division
Total	15-18 divisions, 1 RCT	14 divisions, 2 RCTs

Location	Japanese Estimate	US Plan
Kujukuri	15 divisions	9 divisions
Sagami Bay	5 divisions	12 divisions (2 armored)
Airborne attacks	1-2 divisions	--
Izu Islands	1 division	--
Mishima Beach	1 division	--
Omaezaki	1 division	--
Reserve	3-5 divisions	4 divisions (1 airborne)
Total	27-30 divisions	25 divisions

Initial Forces	Primary Reserve (1 week)	Secondary Reserve (10 days-2 weeks)	Tertiary Reserve (Honshu)	Shikoku	Kanto Plain
6 divisions (303rd, 206th, 146th, 86th, 156th, 154th)	4 divisions (216th, 25th, 77th, 212th)	2 division (57th, 145th)	3 divisions (231st, 230th, 225th)	2 divisions (205th, 11th)	3-5 divisions

	Allied	Soviet	Ratio
Infantry divisions	80	228	1 : 2.85
Armored divisions	23	36	1 : 1.57
Tactical aircraft	6,048	11,802	1 : 1.95
Strategic aircraft	2,750	960	2.86 : 1

	Western Europe	Mediterranean	Total
Infantry divisions	69	17	86
Armored divisions	25	3	28
Armored brigades	9	5	14
Sep. Tank Battalions	37	6	43

	Soviet (E. Europe)	Stavka Reserve	Total
Rifle/Cavalry Corps	157	9	166
Tank/Mech Corps	32	5	37
Ind. Tank/Mech Brig.	29	--	29
Ind. Tank Regiment	52	--	52

Khalkhin Gol

Hata 表 3: Soviet casualties July 3-12, 2,103 dead, 328 missing

IJA Ground Force casualties by Period

Period	Personnel strength	Battle casualties	Casualties as % of strength
3-4 July	10,000	800	8
7-14 July	15,000	2500	16
23-25 July	22,000	1700	8
1-20 August	22,000	1800	8
21-31 August	25,000	8500	34
Total	--	15,300	--

Hata:

The 75mm gun, which was officially adopted in the 2590th year of the Imperial Era (Showa 5), ​​was not a cutting-edge weapon, but it had a high muzzle velocity, good accuracy, and a range of 14,000 meters, surpassing the 15-mm gun. The improved mobile 90 field gun, introduced after the Second Sino-Japanese War, was towed with puncture-proof rubber tires and could move at a high speed of 18 km per hour. Therefore, it made good use of its mobility in grasslands such as Nomonhan, moving around the important front on the east bank of the Khalkha River. Only two companies' worth of eight guns could be deployed due to position changes. Since it was easy to change the direction of fire, they only lost two guns and did not leave the battle line until the end, but some regret that if the 90 field gun, one company of which had been dispatched to North China, had been used as the main force of field guns, the situation would have been different, but since there are no detailed battle reports from the 1st Independent Field Artillery Regiment that recorded numerical data, it is difficult to judge. In anti-tank attacks, the 90 field gun, 38 field gun, and infantry gun (41 mountain gun) were also effective, but the trump card, the 37mm rapid-firing gun, was praised by Kolomyets as "the best gun. Its armor-piercing shells penetrated the armor of our tanks at medium distances (1,000m). It was light and hard to find." (3) However, Captain Kawakami said that in the latter half of the battle, the Soviet tanks turned off their engines and switched to stationary firing when they were outside the effective range of our rapid-firing guns. If there is not much difference in the performance of the guns, the outcome of the battle will be decided by the number of guns and the amount of ammunition. Comparing heavy guns with a caliber of 10 cm or more (Tables 6 and 8), the number of guns was 50 (Japan) vs. 156 (Soviet), about 1:3, and adding light guns of 10 cm or less, the ratio was 277 (Japan) vs. 546 (Soviet), 1:2. The difference was surprisingly small. So, we looked at the amount of ammunition in terms of the number of shots lost, but no official statistics from the Japanese military have been found, so we have to guess from fragmentary records (Table 7). The clue is the artillery battle record for July 23-25, which shows that the regiments of 3 Field Heavy Regiments, 13 Field Artillery Regiments, and 90 Field Artillery Regiments prepared 29,300 rounds (5 units), but the actual number of shots lost was 20,488. The remaining 9,000 rounds of artillery ammunition were used in the subsequent battles. This can be seen from the Komatsubara Diary, which states, “From July 28th onwards, the number of 1515mm guns was 0.0.05 per day, 0.06 for other guns, and 15 for 90mm field guns.” There is also a record of one 0.15 round per day being fired. The Soviet offensive in August made it extremely difficult to supply shells, and the 13th Field Gun Regiment limited its ammunition use to 15 rounds per day for light field guns and nine for heavy guns (see Table 7) on August 5th, 12th, and 18th. Even so, the 12th Company aimed its remaining ammunition directly at the Soviet tanks, but on the 26th, when it had only 22 rounds left, two of its guns were destroyed, and it lost its fighting power. For these reasons, it is difficult to calculate the number of rounds lost by the Japanese army over the entire period. However, based on Captain Kawakami's report, which lists 400 rounds per heavy field gun and 1,200 rounds per 90 field gun, which may be approximate figures, we estimate the total to be about 20,000 rounds, and adding the 46,000 rounds lost by the 13 field guns (Table 7I, j), we arrive at a total of 66,000 rounds. Compared to the Soviet army's equivalent loss of 430,000 rounds (Table 9, A, B, C), the ratio is 1 (Japan) to 6.5 (Soviet). If we focus on the peak period in late August, the disparity may have exceeded 1:10. The Kawakami Report was interested in the Soviet artillery because of operational innovations, such as "frequent position changes, and as soon as they fired, they immediately retreated, as if their heavy artillery had limited range." As if to back this up, the Zhukov Report pointed out that the Soviets were positioned on the west bank of Khalkhin Gol (14-18 km away), firing from the west bank, and placing importance on mobility, whereas the Japanese artillery "did not like to change their firing positions, and were completely lacking in mobility." (5) As for the other main weapon, tanks and armored vehicles, the Type 89 medium tanks, main battle tanks that participated in the battle of the Yasuoka Tank Brigade in early July, were defeated in a tank-on-tank battle, which was the Army's first experience of such a battle, but there is no denying the fact that they were defeated. The Kwantung Army hurriedly retreated to the rear. He points out that the carelessness of the Soviet Union led to its overwhelming power against the Chinese army, which did not have tanks, during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Without direct support from infantry, the Japanese army lost about 30 tanks, including light tanks, in a counterattack by a team of Soviet tanks, armored vehicles, and anti-tank guns, which was close to half of the Japanese army's total. After that, the Kwantung Army lost confidence and hesitated to deploy tank corps, and the Japanese army had no choice but to struggle without tanks even at the critical stage of the August offensive. The soldiers suffered the same misery as the Chinese army. General Zhukov harshly criticized the Japanese tanks as "old, poorly equipped, and with a small range of action" and "technically immature", but the Soviet tanks were not without technical and operational problems. In the Battle of Baintsagan on July 3, the Japanese army's rapid-fire guns and Molotov cocktail attacks set the BT tanks and BA armored vehicles ablaze one after another, partly due to the lack of infantry support. Four months later, Zhukov submitted a report to the central government detailing the number of troops participating in the war (182 tanks and 154 armored cars) and tales of individual heroism, but did not mention the number of losses, likely at Moscow's request. (7) This suggests that the damage to tanks and armored cars was a serious shock, and that it was something the military wanted to keep secret even within the military. The BT7MV2 type, which had been equipped with fireproof diesel engines, was deployed. In the August Offensive, although the number was small, the tanks were equipped with fireproof diesel engines. Since a high-speed advance under the scorching sun could lead to overheating and ignition due to being hit, the tanks were slowed down, baskets were installed to cover the engines, and the tanks were made faster. Zhukov's responsibility could have been called into question, but he also took emergency measures to ensure that the same mistake would not be repeated. On the other hand, he also made an effort to reduce total losses by preparing special tanks and tractors to tow and recover damaged tanks. According to Kolomyets, during the ten days of the August offensive, of the 317 tanks of the 6th and 11th Tank Brigades, 44 were burned down, and of the 159 tanks destroyed, 86 were salvaged and repaired. (8) Even so, the losses of Soviet tanks were by no means small. As shown in Table 8, the losses throughout the entire period amounted to more than 253 tanks, nearly 70% of the total. This is more than three times the losses in the Battle of Baintsagan (77 tanks), and shows that the Soviet army considered tanks to be expendable items that they were willing to wear down in order to win.

In addition, let's compare the numbers of vehicles (trucks, containers, fuel tankers, etc.) mobilized for supply missions. The Soviet army’s main supply line was an unpaved road with a total length of about 700 km that ran from Borgia, the terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railway (and Solovyovsk, the terminus of a branch line), to Bayntumen (250 km), Tamsk (260 km), and the front line on the Khalkhin Gate (130 km). Compared to the 160 km that could be traveled from Hailar, the terminus of the Japanese army’s railway, to the Nomonhan front line, which took two days for a round trip, this was more than three times as far and took five days for a round trip, so it was no surprise that Soviet General Stern emphasized that it was “immeasurably difficult.”(9) However, with the aim of the September offensive in sight, the general boasted that he “worked hard to have all the food on the table for the festivities.”10) With the exception of meat, no supplies could be procured locally, and firewood for cooking had to be transported 700 km, but in August 1950 the general managed to get all the supplies he needed. Zhukov’s Corps and the Transbaikal Military District did not have enough trucks, so they scraped together 5,854, including 1,625 as reinforcements from the center. By August 1, they had secured a daily supply of 1,950 tons, including 600 tons of artillery ammunition, 220 tons of aviation ammunition, 220 tons of fuel, 132 tons of food, and 240 tons of firewood, but some ground troops were forced to march on foot.11 Meanwhile, the Japanese military had a preconceived notion that the Operational Mission Order stipulated that trucks' daily travel distance was 100 km, and Captain Ito Noboru, rear staff officer of the 23rd Division, expressed an optimistic outlook to Motor Corps Commander Tasaki (commander of the 4th Motor Regiment) on July 1st, just before the battle of Khalkha River, saying, "(Our army) can win in the rear. The enemy has a range of 600 km, and we have 160 km." Perhaps because of this, the Kwantung Army repeatedly failed to deploy motorized personnel one after another. At the beginning of July, the number was about 600 vehicles, and by the end of the month, it had finally reached 1,000 vehicles. However, compared to imported cars such as Chevrolet and Ford, Isuzu and Nissan trucks had many breakdowns, and their operation rate was below 75% (.

Captain Iwatsubo Hirohide, company commander of the 1st Motor Vehicle Regiment, recalls that when the Soviet offensive began in August, the Kwantung Army's motorized corps had reached about 2,000 vehicles, including requisitioned vehicles from the South Manchuria Railway and those repurposed from the Chinese battlefield, and was transporting 1,500 tons to the front lines per day (.14), not much different from the Soviet army's 1950 tons. In September, the 6th Army prepared for a counterattack, and gathered 3,000 vehicles, and by the 12th, 10 loads of ammunition and 10 days' worth of food had been accumulated, but this was not deployed, and the ceasefire came on the 15th (.15). Finally, the table shows the statistics by type of creation. I would like to observe the characteristics of the Battle of Nomonhan from the "statistics by wound type" shown in 10, which were the causes of death and injury of participating soldiers. This type of statistics has been collected since the Russo-Japanese War and World War I, and data remains for both the Japanese and Soviet armies from the Battle of Nomonhan. Japan The number of wounds is only about 20%, but there is not much difference in content. In the case of the military, the subjects of the survey are two types: hospitalized patients and battle dead. The former numbered over 11,000 people, while the latter was about 1,800, and if the ranking of all battle dead is also added up, the first place is artillery wounds, and the second place is bullet wounds, both of which account for nearly 90%. The third place is grenade wounds for battle wounds and blast wounds (explosives from airplane bombs, land mines, etc.) for deaths, but since the total number of artillery and blast wounds is almost the same, it is difficult to distinguish between artillery and blast wounds when it comes to deaths, but it is thought that they have an influence. Hand-to-hand combat wounds, mainly from guns and swords (0.4-0.5%, the actual number of battle wounds was 100%. The number of Japanese soldiers killed in battle (45, including 9 killed in action) is significantly lower than the 4.5% recorded during the Russo-Japanese War. Even if you search through war histories, you won't find any episodes in which people fought with guns and swords.

Operation Downfall medical plan

Tenth Army AAR Vol. 2 part 18, 11-XV-14-15:

Hospital beds: Army and Marine combat: 4219, convalescent 500, 2188 garrison (should be 3150), total ~7900 for Okinawa campaign

Kyushu: Staff Study Operations Olympic (28 May 1945) Annex 4 Appendix A "Kyushu Base Development": 13,250 fixed beds at Kagoshima (including 4750 Marine), Shibushi 15,500 fixed beds, and 4500 at Miyazaki. 33,250.

Page 8: "The Commanding General, Army Forces in WESTERN PACIFIC is responsible for establishing 36,750 beds in the objective area."

p. 19 "Control of United States Marine Ground units forming parts of landing forces is exercised by the Commanding General, Sixth United States Army."

p. 20 "Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, is responsible for the logistic support of all Army forces engaged in these operations (except the Twentieth Air Force),"

p. 3 (later) CINCPAC - 6800 hospital beds in objective area.

GHQ AFPAC OI No. 1 20 June 1945:

Army is responsible for Marine hospitalization:

• Kagoshima, 13,250 fixed beds (Stage II) by X+135, along with housing for 40,000 POWs and civilian internees. Housing for 155,000 garrison force and 50,000 rehabilitation camp.
• Shibushi (Base B), 15,500 fixed beds (Stage II) by X+135, along with housing for 30,000 POWs and civilian internees. Facilities for 125,000 garrison troops.
• Miyazaki (Base C), 4,500 fixed beds (Stage II) by X+135. Temporary POW accommodations only. Facilities for 30,000 garrison troops.

Bed credits for initial evacuation phase:

• X-Day, Marines 5,000, Army 12,000
• X+10: additional 12,000 Army
• X+20: additional 7,000 Army

Hospital Construction Timetable (Stage II beds)

Time/Location	Kagoshima	Shibushi	Miyazaki	Total
X+30	-	500	500	-
X+45	750	2,000	1,000	3,750
X+60	1,750	3,500	1,500	6,750
X+75	3,250	-	-	-
X+90	4,750	6,500	2,500	13,750
X+120	6,250	11,000	3,500	20,750
X+135	13,250	15,500	4,500	33,250

Per Staff Study Operations Olympic (slightly different info RE: Bed Credits), 30,000 bed credits will be available in the Pacific to X+90, after which evacuation should go directly to the US if treatment not possible in Kyushu.

Coronet (Staff Study: Operations Coronet)

Bed credits to Y+90

• Y-Day: 24,000 (10,000 Kyushu)
• Y+7: 7,000 additional
• Y+10: 15,000 additional

Hospital Construction Timetable (Stage II and III beds, exclusive of temporary hospitals)

Time/Location	Sagami area			Kujukuri area			Total
Hospital Stage II/III	Stage II	Stage III	Total	Stage II	Stage III	Total	Stage II	Stage III	Total
Y+45	1,500	-	1,500	1,250	-	1,250	2,750	-	2,750
Y+60	3,000	-	3,000	2,500	-	2,500	5,500	-	5,500
Y+75	5,000	-	5,000	4,250	-	4,250	9,250	-	9,250
Y+90	7,000	-	7,000	7,500	-	7,500	14,500	-	14,500
Y+105	9,000	-	9,000	11,250	-	11,250	20,250	-	20,250
Y+120	14,000	-	14,000	15,000	500	15,500	29,000	500	29,500
Y+150	24,500	4,000	28,500	18,250	6,500	24,750	42,750	10,500	53,250
Y+180	24,500	18,000	42,500	18,250	14,250	32,500	42,750	32,250	75,000
Y+195	24,500	24,500	49,000	18,250	18,250	36,500	42,750	42,750	85,500