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1966 New York City smog

Date	November 23–26, 1966
Location	Acute smog in New York City; lesser smog throughout the New York metropolitan area
Coordinates	40.7127°N 74.0059°W / 40.7127; -74.0059
Cause	Heat inversion over East Coast
Casualties
There are several estimates for the number of casualties caused by the smog: 168 (estimate from 1967 medical study) 366 (estimate from 1978 medical study) 80 (unreliable; used in a 1967 message to Congress from President Lyndon B. Johnson without a scientific source)

The 1966 New York City smog was a historic air-pollution event in New York City that occurred from November 23–26, that year's Thanksgiving holiday weekend. It was the third major smog in New York City, following events of similar scale in 1953 and 1963.

On November 23, a large mass of stagnant air over the East Coast trapped pollutants in the city's air. For three full days, New York City experienced severe smog with high levels of carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, smoke, and haze. Smaller pockets of air pollution pervaded the New York metropolitan area throughout other parts of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. On November 25, regional leaders initiated a "first-stage alert" in the city, state, and neighboring states. During the alert, leaders of local and state governments asked residents and industry to take voluntary steps to minimize emissions. People with respiratory or heart conditions were advised by health officials to stay indoors. The city's garbage incinerators were shut off, requiring massive hauling of garbage to landfills. A cold front dispersed the smog on November 26 and the alert ended.

A medical research group conducted a study estimating that 10 percent of the city's population suffered some negative health effects from the smog, such as stinging eyes, coughing, and respiratory distress. City health officials initially maintained that the smog had not caused any deaths. However, a statistical analysis indicated that 168 people likely died because of the smog, and another study found 366 people likely had their lives shortened.

The smog served as a catalyst for greater national awareness of air pollution as a serious health problem and political issue. New York City updated its local laws on air pollution control, and a similar weather event passed in 1969 without major smog. Prompted by the smog, President Lyndon B. Johnson and members of Congress worked to pass federal legislation regulating air pollution in the United States, culminating in the 1967 Air Quality Act and the 1970 Clean Air Act. The 1966 smog is a milestone that has been used for comparison with other recent pollution events, including the health effects of pollution from the September 11 attacks and pollution in China.

Background

Smog before 1966

A view of the Chrysler Building from the Empire State Building on November 20, 1953. The six-day smog of 1953 caused an estimated 220–240 deaths.

Smog is the name of a type of air pollution commonly found in urban and industrialized areas. A combination of several distinct chemical pollutants, smog arrived in modern cities in the 1940s and 1950s with the popularization of motor vehicles and development of new power plants. Although smog is a chronic condition, unfavorable weather conditions and excessive pollutants can cause intense concentrations of smog that can cause acute illness and death; because of their unusual visibility and lethality, these intense smog events are often publicized in the media and are typically described as disasters.

Even before the 1966 smog episode in New York City, it was known by scientists, city officials, and the public that the city—and most major American cities—had a serious air-pollution problem. According to scientific studies from the period, more than 60 metropolitan areas had "extremely serious air pollution problems" and "probably no American city of more than [50,000] inhabitants enjoys clean air the year round." The air "over much of the eastern half of the country [was] chronically polluted," and the cities with the most intense air pollution were New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles, St. Louis, and Philadelphia.

New York City's air pollution was reportedly the worst of any American city. Although the "persistently glaring" photochemical smog of Los Angeles was more visible, more "infamous," and received a greater degree of public attention, New York City had more total emissions and many more emissions proportional to its area. Despite its higher emissions, New York City's landscape and weather normally prevented smog from concentrating at high levels, meaning the smog was mostly invisible most of the time. Unlike Los Angeles, which is surrounded by mountains that tend to trap airborne pollutants, New York City's open topography and favorable wind conditions usually dispersed pollutants before they could form concentrated smogs. If 1960s New York City had surroundings and a climate like those of Los Angeles, pollutants would not have escaped as easily and smog would have made the city uninhabitable.

The smog event of 1966 was preceded by two other major smog episodes in New York City: one in November 1953, and one in January–February 1963. Using statistical analysis that compares the number of deaths during periods of smog with the number of deaths during the same time in other years, medical scientists led by Leonard Greenburg were able to determine that excess deaths occurred during those smogs, from which it can be inferred that the smog caused or contributed to those deaths. An estimated 220–240 deaths were caused by the six-day 1953 smog, and an estimated 300–405 deaths were caused by the two-week 1963 smog. Other episodes of smog had occurred in the city prior to 1966, but were not accompanied by significant excess deaths.

City air monitoring

In 1953, the city opened a laboratory to monitor pollution that would become its Department of Air Pollution Control. The department quantified pollution with an air quality index, a single number based on combined measurements of sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, and haze or smoke levels in the air. The index average was 12, with an "emergency" level if the index was higher than 50 for a 24-hour period. Using the index, the city developed an air-pollution alert system with three stages of alert, matching increasingly severe levels of pollution with corresponding counteractions.

When the 1966 smog event occurred, the city had only a single station to measure air quality: the Harlem Courthouse building (pictured in 2009).

At the time of the 1966 smog, air quality measurements were recorded from only a single station, the Harlem Courthouse building on East 121st Street, run by department co-founder Moe Mordecai Braverman and his staff of 15. Taking measurements from a single station meant that the index reflected conditions in that small area, but served as a poor gauge of overall air quality across the entire city. The Interstate Sanitation Commission, a regional agency run by New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut and headquartered at Columbus Circle, also relied on the Harlem Courthouse laboratory. Formed in 1936, the advisory agency was authorized in 1962 by New York and New Jersey to oversee air pollution issues.

Warnings

Dr. Helmut F. Landsberg, a climate scientist with the federal Weather Bureau, predicted in 1963 that the Northeastern and Great Lakes regions could anticipate a major smog event every three years due to the confluence of weather events and trends like growing population, industrialization, and increased emissions from cars and central heating. In early 1966, Dr. Walter Orr Roberts—director of the National Center for Atmospheric Research—warned of the imminent threat of a smog event with the potential to kill as many as 10,000 people. Roberts identified Los Angeles or New York City as the cities most vulnerable to a large-scale lethal smog in the United States, and London, Hamburg, or Santiago as other the most vulnerable internationally. Asked if "many" American cities were vulnerable to a disaster smog event, Roberts replied, "Yes. I have been worried that we would wake up some morning to an unusual meteorological situation that prevented the air from circulating and that we might find thousands of people dead as the result of the air they were forced to breathe in that smog situation."

The mayor's office established a 10-member task force headed by Norman Cousins (known as the editor of the weekly magazine Saturday Review) to study the problem of air pollution. The task force published a 102-page report in May 1966, finding that the city had the most polluted air of any major city in the United States, with a wider range and greater total tonnage of pollutants than Los Angeles. The task force criticized the city for lax enforcement of pollution laws, even naming the city itself the biggest violator, with municipal garbage incinerators "operat[ing] in almost constant violation" of its own laws. The report warned "all the ingredients now exist for an air-pollution disaster of major proportions" and that the city "could become a gas chamber" in the wrong weather conditions.

Timeline of smog event

November 20–23: stagnant air traps pollutants

In November 1966, New York City was experiencing unseasonably warm "Indian summer" weather. An anticyclonic thermal inversion — in other words, a stationary, warm mass of air — formed over the East Coast on November 20. Inversions can act like a lid, preventing the usual process of lower, warm air rising. Such weather events are common, and they are usually followed by a cold front that blows them away; in this case, the cold front approaching west through southern Canada was delayed.

The inversion prevented air pollutants from rising and trapped them within the city. The smog itself started on Wednesday November 23, coinciding with the beginning of Thanksgiving weekend. The material sources of the smog were particulates and chemicals from factories, chimneys, and vehicles. Sulfur dioxide levels rose. Smoke shade, a measure of visibility interference in the atmosphere, was two to three times higher than usual.

Surface weather analysis maps showing wind at a height of 18,000 feet from November 21–26, 1966, prepared by employees of the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1968. The maps show a mass of warm air spreading east and south above the East Coast: the inversion that trapped pollutants in the air below.

November 24: Thanksgiving Day

     We were flying at about two thousand feet, through a curiously greasy-looking and pervasive haze. The ground could just be made out below—cars, roads, houses, all dim but visible.

     Then we began to climb. In less than a minute the ground had vanished. Cars, roads, houses, the very earth itself had been blotted out. We were circling in bright sunlight, above an apparently limitless bank of opaque, polluted air. The smog extended to the horizon in every direction. At a distance, the slanting rays of the sun gave it a coppery, rather handsome appearance. Nearer at hand it merely looked yellow and ugly, like nothing so much as a vast and unappetizing sea of chicken soup.

William Wise, describing his view of the smog from an airplane approaching John F. Kennedy International Airport. Delayed in landing for a half hour, Wise was on a return flight from London, where he had been researching a book about the Great Smog of London.

The city chose not to declare a smog alert on Thanksgiving Day, but The New York Times later reported that city officials had been "on the verge" of calling an alert. Austin Heller, the city's commissioner of air pollution control, said he nearly declared a first-stage alert between 6 a.m. and 10 a.m. on November 24. Heller said the index had reached a high of 60.6—10 points higher than the "emergency" mark—between 8 and 9 p.m., and the 60.6 reading was possibly the highest in the city's history. After a nighttime lull, Heller cautioned, the smog would likely spike again in the morning.

The unusually heavy smog was evident to the crowd of one million onlookers at the Macy's Thanksgiving Day Parade. Tabloids and newspapers that ordinarily ran front-page stories about the parade instead carried stories about the smog. Health officials cautioned those with chronic lung diseases to stay indoors and advised patients that symptoms of pollution-related illness usually lagged 24 hours after exposure.

That day, the city closed all 11 of its municipal garbage incinerators. Energy companies Consolidated Edison and Long Island Lighting Company were asked to burn natural gas rather than fuel oil to minimize the release of sulfur dioxide; both companies voluntarily cut back emissions, with Consolidated Edison reducing its emissions by 50 percent. The city told 18 inspectors "to forget their turkey dinners and start looking for dirty air," and they issued an "unusually high" number of citations for emissions violations, including two for Consolidated Edison plants. Representative William Fitts Ryan of Manhattan sent a telegram to Secretary of Health and Human Services John W. Gardner to request an emergency meeting with New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, New Jersey Governor Richard J. Hughes, and other regional leaders.

November 25: first-stage alert declared

By Friday November 25, a first-stage alert for the New York metropolitan area, including parts of New Jersey and Connecticut, was declared through newspaper, radio, and television announcements. Governors Rockefeller and Heller attended a press conference with Deputy Mayor Robert Price standing in for Mayor Lindsay, who was on vacation in Bermuda. The announcement "was believed to be the first appeal ever made to New York's citizens in connection with a smog problem." Conrad Simon, who acted as a liaison between the scientific and political communities during the crisis, later said "We came close to closing the city down."

The alert was declared upon the advice of the Interstate Sanitation Commission. Members of the commission had been monitoring the smog situation in shifts for three days, nonstop. Thomas R. Glenn Jr., the commission's director and chief engineer, recommended the alert at 11:25 a.m. after seeing instruments in New York and New Jersey that showed carbon monoxide greater than 10 ppm (parts-per-million) and smoke greater than 7.5 ppm, both for more than four consecutive hours.

In New York, the city asked commuters to avoid driving unless necessary, and apartment buildings to stop incinerating their residents' garbage and turn heating down to 60 °F (15 °C). New Jersey and Connecticut asked their residents not to travel, and to use less power and heat. Although it was a workday, traffic was light in New York City. A check on 303 buildings of the New York City Housing Authority later found near-total cooperation with the city's requests. Private residences were believed to have a high rate of voluntary cooperation with the city's plea to cut energy consumption.

The weather forecast called for the heat inversion to end that day, followed by a cold wind that would disperse the smog. Nevertheless, Heller said that if the wind did not come, a first-stage alert would likely remain in effect and it might become necessary to declare a second-stage alert if conditions worsened.

November 26: cold front arrives

New Yorkers went to work yesterday morning in acrid, sour-tasting air that was almost dead calm.

Many had headaches that were not the product, they thought, of holiday over-eating. Their throats scratched. But no deaths were attributed to the smog.

Homer Bigart, "Smog Emergency Called for City," front-page article for the November 26, 1966 edition of The New York Times

Rain came in the night. The cold front that would blow away the smog was forecasted to arrive between 5 a.m. and 9 a.m. Shortly after 9 a.m. the wind arrived, moving mostly from the northeast between 5–6 miles per hour and bringing cooler temperatures in the 50s °F (10–15 °C). Glenn at the Interstate Sanitation Commission sent a message advising the alert to end at 9:40 a.m., based on weather and air readings. Shortly after noon, Governor Rockefeller declared the end of the alert; New Jersey and Connecticut also ended their alerts that day.

Health effects from the smog were downplayed in most early reports. Some hospitals reported increased admissions of patients with asthma. However, an official at the city Department of Health noted that some hospitals were receiving fewer asthma patients, and attributed the reported increases to ordinary random fluctuations. The official told The New York Times that "[i]n not one [hospital] is a pattern emerging which would suggest we are dealing with an important health hazard as of this moment." By this time, the inability to incinerate garbage had generated a large amount of excess waste. Hundreds of sanitation workers worked overtime to transport garbage to landfills in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Staten Island, with the bulk going to Fresh Kills in Staten Island.

Impact

Initial estimates of health effects and casualties

The atmosphere of New York was bombarded with more man-made contaminants than any other big city in the country—almost two pounds of soot and noxious gases for every man, woman, and child. So great is the burden of pollution that were it not for the prevailing wind, New York City might have gone the way of Sodom and Gomorrah.

John C. Esposito, Vanishing Air (1970)

It was not initially clear how many casualties and illnesses had been caused by the smog — or indeed, whether the smog had caused any casualties at all. The population of the area affected by the smog has been estimated at 16 million. After studying admissions to municipal hospitals for cardiac and respiratory complications, the city commissioner of hospitals, Joseph V. Terenzio, told the press "I can report almost with certainty that there was no detectable immediate effect on morbidity and mortality because of the smog. ... It now seems unlikely that final statistical analysis will reveal any significant impact on the health of New York City's population."

A study on the smog's nonfatal health effects was published in December 1966. The study, conducted by a nonprofit health research group, found that 10 percent of the city's population suffered some negative health effects from the smog, including symptoms like stinging eyes, coughing, wheezing, the coughing-up of phlegm, or difficulty breathing. The director of the research group said anything serious enough to adversely affect as much as 10 percent of the population, like the smog had, indicated the existence of a serious public health problem.

Subsequent estimates of casualties

The earliest report of casualties came in a special message by President Lyndon B. Johnson sent to Congress on January 30, 1967. In the message, the president said 80 people had died in the smog. Johnson did not cite a source of that claim, and there is no known source concluding that 80 people died, other than those citing Johnson.

Two major medical studies have analyzed the extent of casualties from the smog. Leonard Greenburg — the same medical researcher who had previously published findings on the death count of the 1953 and 1963 smogs — published a paper in October 1967 showing that the previous year's smog had likely killed 168 people. Greenburg showed that there were 24 deaths in excess of how many would normally be expected at that time of year every day, over a period of seven days — using a period four days longer than the smog itself had lasted because of the delay between smog exposure and resultant health effects. Greenburg said that his analysis could not account for damage during the smog that would remain latent and continue to cause disease and death for years. The results of Greenburg's paper were reported by the New York Times. A 1978 medical paper published in the Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine estimated that the smog shortened the lives of 366 people.

The smog was compared to the 1948 smog in Donora, Pennsylvania and the Great Smog of London of 1952, both of which lasted five days. The London smog's death toll of 4,000 was far higher than Donora, but the smog in Donora was far more severe; at the time of its smog, Donora was a small industrial town with a population of only 13,000, and its population was proportionally hit much harder with 20 deaths and smog-related illnesses among 43 percent of the population. Pollution experts estimated that if a smog as strong as the Donora smog had occurred in the much more populous New York City, the death toll could have been as high as 11,000 with four million ill.

Urban life and smog

See also: urban decay, white flight, environmental justice, and environmental racism

Circumstantial factors helped to offset the smog's potential strength and health damage. The event began over the long Thanksgiving weekend, not the workweek, meaning that many factories were closed and far fewer people were in traffic than normally would be. The warm weather meant the demand for central heating was also lower than usual. On November 25, the high of 64 °F (18 °C) broke the previous record high for that date, leading the reporter Homer Bigart to describe the apartment-heating restrictions as "no problem." Because of these factors, pollution — and the death toll — were likely lower than they could have been otherwise.

The incinerator plant at Gravesend Bay in Brooklyn, pictured in 1973. The 1966 smog event demonstrated the ways that disparate problems of urban life, such as waste management and air pollution, are interconnected.

The smog brought into focus the complexity and interdependency of environmental problems and other issues of urban life. Attempts by city government to react to the smog had unintended negative side effects of their own; as Mayor Lindsay reflected in his 1969 book The City, "[e]very time you shut down an incinerator, you increase the amount of garbage on city streets." Efforts to address a given environmental problem can cause undesired side effects, sometimes unforeseeable, which are often related to a city's limited resources.

Environmental harms in general are linked to urban decay and social inequality. After the 1966 smog, the task of eliminating or reducing air pollution became an essential part of the goal to make "the city attractive again to the middle class and acceptable to all its residents." Such harms — but especially those that create obvious and unpleasant effects, as smog does — were among the factors that, historically, motivated and exacerbated white flight from American cities, including New York City, in the mid-20th century. The mass migration of affluent residents, whether individually motivated by unpleasant environmental factors like smog in whole or in part, drained the city's tax base and resulted in a loss of human resources for the city's economy. Residents who remained in the city often had no choice whether to stay or to leave because they lacked the resources that would enable them to move. Those residents then saw the burdens of pollution — including the direct effects of pollution itself, indirect effects of city reactions to pollution (for example, uncollected garbage in the streets), and other problems stemming from lack of municipal resources after white flight — as "emblems of larger governmental neglect and social inequality."

Political reaction

National attention

The smog is commonly cited as one of the most-visible and most-discussed environmental disasters of the 1960s in the United States, alongside the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill and the 1969 Cuyahoga River fire. National public awareness of the smog and its health effects spurred the nascent environmental movement in the United States and galvanized support for legislation to regulate air pollution. Vernon McKenzie, chief of the air pollution division of the federal Public Health Service, called the smog "a warning of what can happen — and will happen — with increasing frequency and in wider areas unless something is done to prevent it." In the 1968 book Killer Smog, William Wise warned that the 1966 smog and the 1952 London smog represented a vulnerability to air pollution disasters among American cities:

Perhaps, as in Great Britain, change will begin to come only after a large-scale tragedy. The conditions are favorable for one in any of a dozen of the nation's most populous cities. A mass of still air drifting slowly eastward, an intense thermal inversion, and then five, six, seven days of increasingly poisonous smog. The air will look bronze, almost copper-colored, as it did during New York's 1966 Thanksgiving smog. ... From every appearance, a similar tragedy is now being prepared in America—and there is very little time left in which to prevent it.

At the time of the smog event, only half of the urban population of the United States lived with local protections on air quality; the smog event catalyzed the call for federal regulation on the issue. Spencer R. Weart of the American Institute of Physics said the American public "did not take the problem [of air pollution] seriously" until the 1966 smog. According to Weart, an important factor driving awareness of the smog was its location, as events in New York "always had a disproportionate influence on the media headquartered there."

Municipal response

John Lindsay (pictured in April 1966) was the mayor of New York City during the 1966 smog.

Smog in May 1973. By 1972 New York City had cut levels of sulfur dioxide and particulates by half from their peak.

Before the 1966 smog, the city government had been slow to act to regulate air pollution. Despite general awareness of the health and environmental impacts of smog, other problems took priority: as The New York Times reported, issues like "housing, crime, education and keeping the city 'cool'" were at the forefront of city government concerns. But the 1966 smog impelled a swift response by the city government, who now felt pressure to respond "in the aftermath of disaster." Lindsay, then a liberal Rockefeller Republican, had run as a supporter of stronger air pollution control in his 1965 mayoral campaign, and the 1966 smog reinforced Lindsay's position on the issue.

City Council member Robert A. Low, a Manhattan Democrat and chairman of the city subcomittee on air pollution, criticized Lindsay for failing to enforce an air-pollution bill that had been passed in May. The bill, authored by Low, would update city incinerators and require apartment buildings to replace their incinerators with other garbage disposal methods. Low accused Lindsay's administration of "dragging its feet" on the problem of air pollution, which Lindsay called a "political attack."

The mayor's office prepared a report in the aftermath of the smog, singling out the coal-burning Consolidated Edison company, city buses, and apartment building incinerators as significant contributors to air pollution. The report noted that the change in weather that dispersed the smog "spared the city an unspeakable tragedy," and that if New York City had stagnant smog at the high levels commonly found in Los Angeles, "everyone in the city would have long since perished from the poisons in the air." Consolidated Edison began using a fuel with lower sulfur content, and by June 1969 the city had reduced the level of sulfur dioxide in the air by 28 percent.

In December 1966, the New York City Administrative Code section on pollutant levels in the air was strengthened by a bill that was later described as the "toughest air pollution control bill in the country" at that time. Lindsay announced a plan to install 36 new stations for the Department of Air Pollution Control to measure air pollution levels throughout the city — an upgrade from the sole station in the Harlem Courthouse building. The stations would send data to a central computer using telemetry to create a profile of the city atmosphere. Five of those stations would also send data to the Interstate Sanitation Commission. The city purchased a computer system and equipment from the Packard Bell Company for $181,000 (adjusted for inflation, approximately $1,653,928 in 2024 dollars).

In November 1968, the city opened 38 monitoring stations, 10 outfitted with computer equipment. The 10 computerized stations were designed to send data every hour to the central computer, while the other 28 operated manually as backup. The old index system used during the 1966 smog, which produced a single number from multiple measurements, was abandoned as simplistic and unhelpful. The new index system was similar in that it used weather forecasts and measurements of pollutants in the air and had three progressive stages of severity ("alert," "warning," and "emergency") requiring stronger actions by city, industry, and citizens.

The city's actions mitigated air pollution and reduced the likelihood of a major smog event on the same scale. In contrast to dire warnings from the mayor's air-pollution task force in its May 1966 report, a city official said in 1969 "[w]e probably have the possibility of a health catastrophe under control now." The city declared minor smog alerts in 1967 and 1970; conversely, a four-day inversion similar to the Thanksgiving weather of 1966 occurred in September 1969, but it passed without incident — neither smog nor deaths resulted. Norman Cousins, chairman of the mayor's task force, credited the regulations enacted since the 1966 smog for the prevention of a comparable September 1969 event. Cousins wrote in a message to Lindsay:

New York City's air is cleaner and more breathable today than it was in 1966. ... It is important to ask what would have happened on those days [in September 1969] if the pollution levels had continued to worsen at the same rate of deterioration that occurred from 1964 to 1966. The answer is that there could have been a substantial number of casualties. The fact that an episode did not occur attests to the capability of the City's programs to protect its air resources.

After the passage of strict new state and federal air regulations, the city passed its updated Air Pollution Control Code in 1971, designed in part to address concerns that nitrogen oxides and unburned hydrocarbons had been left insufficiently controlled by the previous changes. By 1972, New York City had cut levels of sulfur dioxide and particulates by half from their peak. According to an article published by the EPA Journal in 1986, those improvements at the city level were "the legacy of concern that emerged after the 1966 Thanksgiving Day smog disaster."

States' responses

Nelson Rockefeller (left), the Republican Governor of New York, and Democratic President Lyndon B. Johnson (right) at the White House in June 1968. Following the 1966 smog, air-pollution control became a major policy objective of both Rockefeller and Johnson.

Prior to 1966, air-pollution control had largely been the responsibility of states and political subdivisions of states like counties and municipalities (cities and towns). The federal government played little role in air-pollution control, and to the extent that it did, its actions supported the efforts of states and local governments. For example, federal law provided resources like research, training, grants to improve state and local programs, and a conference procedure to convene agencies and polluters under the guidance of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Direct regulations—such as, for example, setting emissions standards—were left to states.

The governors of New York (Rockefeller), New Jersey (Hughes), Delaware (Charles L. Terry Jr.), and Pennsylvania (Raymond P. Shafer) met in December 1966 to address air pollution in their region. Each governor pledged to enforce their state's pollution abatement laws and to prevent their own state from becoming a "pollution haven" with lax regulations to attract industry.

At the same meeting, the governors also discussed the possibility of new tax incentives to motivate industry to reduce pollution and the creation of a new interstate compact to set industry standards, which would require adoption by all member states and approval by Congress. Those four states were already members of the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC), an interstate agency that controls water pollution in the Delaware River. The proposed air-pollution compact was modeled after the DRBC and would function similarly, setting minimum air standards across states and enabling enforcement actions against polluters. New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut adopted the proposed Mid-Atlantic States Air Pollution Control Compact with the possibility for Delaware and Pennsylvania to join in the future. Its approval by Congress became a policy goal of Rockefeller's failed primary bid for the 1968 Republican presidential nomination. The compact was never approved by Congress and thus never took effect.

After the 1966 smog, "the consequences of state inaction were apparent to the naked eye," public outcry intensified, and the demand for federal intervention increased. New Jersey passed several new air-pollution laws in 1967. Nevertheless, traffic and drifting polluted air from New Jersey remained a major contributor to New York City's pollution problem. Edward Teller — the physicist known for his role in developing the hydrogen bomb and an advisor to Mayor Lindsay on pollution and energy issues—advocated for New York state to adopt stricter sulfur fuel standards than the city. A leader of the advocacy group Citizens for Cleaner Air criticized the local and state governments at a state public hearing, calling the city's enforcement "in a state of collapse" and, saying the city acting alone "cannot or will not enforce any standard or rule," demanded that the state government increase its role.

Perhaps the most notable critic of New York's inaction was Robert F. Kennedy. On a 1967 tour of pollution sources, Kennedy—then a New York Senator and soon to embark on his 1968 presidential campaign—criticized the city, the states of New York and New Jersey, industry, and the federal government for their failures to adequately address the problem. Kennedy warned, "[w]e are just as close to an air-pollution disaster as we were last Thanksgiving." In Kennedy's view, the solution would have to come from the federal government, as state and local agencies lacked the ability or oversight for the task.

Federal response

Air pollution control, already a priority of President Lyndon B. Johnson's administration, became a greater concern after the smog. By early 1967, his statements on air pollution became more rhetorically urgent. In January 1967, Johnson sent a message to Congress entitled "Protecting Our National Heritage," the first section of which was entitled "The Pollution of Our Air" and focused on the problems posed by air pollution. The message was prompted by wide public discussion of the problem following the 1966 smog. Johnson cited the experiences of specific American cities and towns in the message, and highlighted the 1966 smog at length:

Two months ago, a mass of heavily polluted air — filled with poisons from incinerators, industrial furnaces, power plants, car, bus and truck engines — settled down upon the sixteen million people of Greater New York.

For four days, anyone going out on the streets inhaled chemical compounds that threatened his health. Those who remained inside had little protection from the noxious gases that passed freely through cooling and heating systems.

An estimated 80 persons died. Thousands of men and women already suffering from respiratory diseases lived out the four days in fear and pain.

Finally, the winds came, freeing the mass of air from the weather-trap that had held it so dangerously. The immediate crisis was ended. New Yorkers began to breathe "ordinary" air again.

"Ordinary" air in New York, as in most large cities, is filled with tons of pollutants: carbon monoxide from gasoline, diesel and jet engines, sulfur oxides from factories, apartment houses, and power plants; nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons and a broad variety of other compounds. These poisons are not so dramatically dangerous most days of the year, as they were last Thanksgiving in New York. But steadily, insidiously, they damage virtually everything that exists.

President Johnson (seated at right), pictured signing the Air Quality Act of 1967. The law, a series of amendments to the 1963 Clean Air Act, was enacted in response to the 1966 smog.

Johnson called for a bill regulating toxins in the air and increasing funding for pollution programs. Edmund Muskie, a Senator from Maine and political environmentalist, praised Johnson's words, pledged to hold hearings on the proposals, and would soon sponsor the Johnson administration's bill, which became the Air Quality Act. Muskie also co-sponsored bills in 1967 for research on non-polluting automobiles using either electric or fuel cell technology. While discussing the research bills on the Senate floor, Muskie said "the serious air pollution situation in New York City [in November of 1966] dramatically illustrated what our cities may be facing in the future if an alternative to the [internal] combustion engine is not developed."

Congressional interest and public pressure for greater air pollution regulation had existed since the signing of the 1963 Clean Air Act, the first federal legislation on the issue, but further action had been opposed by members of Congress who believed responsibility for air regulation properly lay with the states, not the federal government. Partly in response to the added public pressure spurred by the smog event, Congress passed and Johnson signed the 1967 Air Quality Act, which amended the 1963 Clean Air Act to provide for study of air quality and control methods. The Air Quality Act was not without criticism for its ineffectiveness: a 2011 encyclopedia of environmental law judged that the act "was a failure but it was the first step in federal air pollution control." Among contemporaneous critics, Ralph Nader affiliate and environmentalist John C. Esposito wrote the book Vanishing Air to accuse Muskie of watering down the bill and adding needless complications in order to satisfy industry. Calls for greater air pollution regulation in this era culminated with the passage under President Richard Nixon of the 1970 Clean Air Act, which supplanted the Air Quality Act and has been described as the most significant environmental legislation in American history.

Legacy

A plume of smoke rising from lower Manhattan after the September 11 attacks. Cumulative air pollution events like the 1966 smog contrast with the sudden pollution that resulted from the September 11 attacks.

The most widely recognized legacy of the 1966 smog was the political reaction to it, which galvanized the nascent environmental movement in the United States and prompted demand for sweeping air-pollution control laws. The smog has been remembered for various purposes by scientists, historians, journalists, writers, artists, activists, and political commentators.

The full range of negative health effects arising from the September 11 attacks came to light in the years following the attacks. The 1966 smog serves, along with the earlier major New York City smog events in 1953 and 1963, as a precedent used for comparison with the air effects caused by the collapse of the World Trade Center. However, the 1966 smog and other historical smog events differ from the September 11 pollution in significant ways that limit their usefulness as a point of comparison. Unlike the air impact of the September 11 attacks, the New York City smog events were chronic and cumulative rather than acute, sudden, and short-lasting, and prior smog events had thousands of small sources rather than a single culpable source. The absence of prior events similar to the September 11 attacks left "a hole in the medical library," and presented medical experts with a challenge in the absence of "hard knowledge about the health consequences of intense brief pollution."

Other major air pollution, particularly in China, has been compared to the 1966 smog. Elizabeth M. Lynch, a New York City legal scholar, said that images of visible air pollution in Beijing from 2012 were "gross" but not "that much different from pictures of New York City in the 1950s and 1960s," specifically referring to the 1952, 1962, and 1966 smog events. Lynch wrote that the Chinese government's increased transparency on the issue was an encouraging sign that pollution in China could be regulated and abated just as it had in the United States. Similar comparisons between the 1966 smog and Chinese pollution in late 2012 appeared in Business Insider and Slate. USA Today cited the 1966 smog after China issued its first "red alert" air quality warning in December 2015; the same month, an article in The Huffington Post used the 1966 smog to argue that China could follow the United State's model to regulate pollution.

The smog event has been referenced in pop culture. Smog figures into the plot of the 2012 Mad Men episode "Dark Shadows", which is set in New York City during the same Thanksgiving weekend in 1966. A reviewer in The A.V. Club interpreted the writers' use of the smog as a symbolic representation of the character Betty, who spends the episode "longing to enter [Don Draper's] apartment and tear some shit up," "hover[ing]" and "waiting to poison it from within." The New York City-based indie pop band Vampire Weekend used a photograph of the smog over the city skyline, taken by Neal Boenzi and originally published in The New York Times, for the cover of their 2013 album Modern Vampires of the City.

Following the 2016 election of Donald Trump to the presidency, his administration's environmental proposals—including steep budget cuts to the EPA and deregulation—prompted several reflections on the environmental condition of the United States prior to the creation of the EPA. The New York Times, Vice Media's tech-news site Motherboard, public radio station WNYC, real estate news site 6sqft, and environmental advocacy group Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) connected Trump's declared policies to the risk of returning to a more polluted environment, with each publication evoking the 1966 smog as an example of the potential dangers of defunding and deregulation. David Hawkins, an attorney for NRDC, recalled, "I was a student at Columbia Law School during the 1966 episode. It was frightening, but while that is the best-known event, heavy pollution was an everyday fact of life those days."

See also

• Air pollution

• Air pollution in the United States

• Other smog events

• 1948 Donora smog
• Great Smog of London
• Pollution in China
• Pollution in California

• Air quality law

• Clean Air Act (United States)

References

Sources

Bibliography

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Journal articles

• Blomquist, Robert F. (2004). "In Search of Themis: Toward the Meaning of the Ideal Legislator — Senator Edmund S. Muskie and the Early Development of Modern American Environmental Law, 1965–1968". William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review. 28. 539.
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• Podhora, Erik (2015). "Lessons For Climate Change Reform From Environmental History: 19th Century Wildlife Protection and the 20th Century Environmental Movement" (PDF). Journal of Environmental Law & Litigation. 30. 1. Archived (PDF) from the original on September 27, 2016. Retrieved September 24, 2016.
• Popkin, Roy (1986). "Two 'Killer Smogs' the Headlines Missed". EPA Journal. 12 (10). EPA: 27–29. Archived from the original on September 12, 2016.
• Reitze, Arnold W., Jr. (1999). "The Legislative History of U.S. Air Pollution Control". Houston Law Review. 36. 679.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
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