User:Robert Loring/"resilient canvass framework"

Resilient Canvass Framework ... The technical name for the approach we advocate is a resilient canvass framework [1]. This can be achieved by a strongly software-independent voting system [2], [3], which provides auditability by generating an audit trail that can be used to find the actual winners, and two kinds of routine postelection audits: a compliance audit and a Risk_limiting_post-election_audit [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9]. The compliance audit checks that the audit trail is sufficiently complete and accurate to tell who won. The risk-limiting audit checks the audit trail statistically to determine whether the vote tabulation system found the correct winners, and, with high probability, corrects the outcome if the vote tabulation system was wrong.

All three components are crucial. The risk-limiting audit relies on the integrity of the audit trail, which was created by the software-independent voting system (the voters themselves, in the case of paper ballots) and checked for integrity by the compliance audit. We now sketch the three ingredients in greater detail.

References

{{ [1] J. Benaloh, D. Jones, E. Lazarus, M. Lindeman, and P. Stark, “SOBA: Secrecy-preserving observable ballot-level audits,” in Proceedings of the 2011 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop / Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE ’11). USENIX, 2011. [Online].Available: http://statistics.berkeley.edu/�stark/Preprints/soba11.pdf

[2] R. Rivest and J. Wack, “On the notion of “software independence” in voting systems (draft version of july 28, 2006),” Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Tech. Rep., 2006, http://vote.nist.gov/SI-in-voting.pdf Retrieved 17 March 2012.

[3] R. Rivest, “On the notion of ‘software independence’ in voting systems,” Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A, vol. 366, no. 1881, pp. 3759–3767, October 2008.

[4] P. Stark, “Conservative statistical post-election audits,” Ann. Appl. Stat., vol. 2, pp. 550–581, 2008. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/ 0807.4005

[5] J. Hall, L. Miratrix, P. Stark, M. Briones, E. Ginnold, F. Oakley, M. Peaden, G. Pellerin, T. Stanionis, and T. Webber, “Implementing risk-limiting post-election audits in California,” in Proc. 2009 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE ’09). Montreal, Canada: USENIX, August 2009. [Online]. Available: http://www.usenix.org/event/evtwote09/tech/ full papers/hall.pdf

[6] P. Stark, “Efficient post-election audits of multiple contests: 2009 California tests,” http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443314, 2009, 2009 Conference on Empirical Legal Studies.

[7] ——, “Super-simple simultaneous single-ballot risk-limiting audits,” in Proceedings of the 2010 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop / Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE ’10). USENIX, 2010. [Online]. Available: http://www.usenix.org/events/evtwote10/tech/ full papers/Stark.pdf

[8] M. Higgins, R. Rivest, and P. Stark, “Sharper p-values for stratified post-election audits,” Statistics, Politics, and Policy, vol. 2, no. 1, 2011. [Online]. Available: http://www.bepress.com/spp/vol2/iss1/7

[9] M. Lindeman and P. B. Stark, “A gentle introduction to risk-limiting audits,” IEEE Security and Privacy, 2012, to appear. [Online]. Available: http://statistics.berkeley.edu/�stark/Preprints/gentle12.pdf }}

External links

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