User:R AlvarezUCSD/sandbox
P3's at the local level
[edit]According to Weimer and Vining, "A P3 typically involves a private entity financing, constructing, or managing a project in return for a promised steam of payments directly from government or indirectly from users over the projected life of the project or some other specified period of time" [1]. Because P3's are directly responsible for a variety of activities, as indicated by Weimer and Vining, P3's can evolve into monopolies motivated by rent-seeking behavior(s).
Clarence N. Stone frames the public private partnership as 'governing coalitions'. In Regime Politics Governing Atlanta 1946-1988, he specifically analyzes the 'crosscurrents in coalition mobilization'. Government coalitions are revealed as susceptible to a number of problems primarily corruption and conflicts of interests. This slippery slope is generally created by a lack of sufficient oversight[2]. Corruption and conflicts of interests, in this case, leads to costs of opportunism; other costs related to P3's are production and bargaining costs[3]
In New York, during the Robert Moses era, public private partnership ran rampant. P3's during this period were best described and known as public authorities; for example, the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, Henry Hudson Parkway Authority, and the Port Authority. Moses manipulated various public authorities, either seeking their success of failure, in order to gain political power[4].
San Diego has entered into numerous P3 agreements. In fact, "San Diego has used P3s more extensively and, with Petco Park, on a larger scale than is typical of cities elsewhere"[5] . One explanation for San Diego's propensity towards P3 agreements is "...local residents refuse to tax themselves to pay for public benefits and prefer private-sector actors to take the lead...[6] . "...tax shares are usually linear functions of property values..., jurisdictions have an incentive to try to exclude those who would have below-average property values. The incentive leads to such local policies as minimum lot sizes, restrictions on multiple-unit dwellings, and restrictive building codes...One social cost if these policies is a reduction in housing opportunities for low- and middle-income families"[7]
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- ^ Policy Analysis Edition No.05. Pearson Education, Inc. 2011. p. 309. ISBN 978-0-205-78130-0.
- ^ Stone, Clarence N (1989). Regime Politics Governing Atlanta 146-1988. University Press of Kansas. pp. 148–149. ISBN 0-7006-0415-4.
- ^ Policy Analysis Edition No.05. Peason. 2011. pp. 311–315. ISBN 978-0-205-78130-0.
- ^ Caro, Robert A. (1974). The Power Broker Robert Moses and the Fall of New York. Random House, Inc. ISBN 0-394-72024-5.
- ^ Paradise Plundered Fiscal Crisis and Governance Failures in San Diego. Stanford University Press. 2011. p. 177. ISBN 978-0-8047-5602-0.
- ^ Paradise Plundered Fiscal Crisis and Governance Failures in San Diego. Stanford University Press. 2011. p. 177. ISBN 978-0-8047-5602-0.
- ^ Policy Analysis Edition No.05. Peason. 2011. p. 188. ISBN 978-0-205-78130-0.