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George Herbert Mead

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Not to be confused with General George Meade. George H. Mead

Born February 27, 1863 South Hadley, Massachusetts Died April 26, 1931 (aged 68) George Herbert Mead (1863–1931) was an American philosopher, sociologist and psychologist, primarily affiliated with the University of Chicago, where he was one of several distinguished pragmatists. He is regarded as one of the founders of social psychology and the American sociological tradition in general. Contents [hide] 1 Biography 2 Writings 3 Pragmatism and symbolic interaction 4 Social philosophy (behaviorism) 5 Nature of the self 6 Philosophy of science 7 Play and game and the generalized other 8 See also 9 Notes 10 Bibliography 11 Further reading 12 External links [edit]Biography

Mead was born February 27, 1863 in South Hadley, Massachusetts. He was raised in a Protestant, middle class family comprising his father, Hiram Mead, his mother, Elizabeth (Billings) Mead, and his sister Alice. His father was a former Congregationalist pastor from a lineage of farmers and clergymen and who later held a special chair at Oberlin College’s theological seminary. Elizabeth Storrs Billings Mead taught for two years at Oberlin College and subsequently, from 1890 to 1900, served as president of Mount Holyoke College in South Hadley, Massachusetts.[1] In 1879, George Mead enrolled at Oberlin College, graduating in 1883 with an BA degree. After graduation, Mead taught grade school for about four months. For the following three years, he worked as a surveyor for the Wisconsin Central Rail Road Company. In autumn 1887, Mead enrolled at Harvard University where his main interests were philosophy and psychology. At Harvard, Mead studied with Josiah Royce, a major influence upon his thought, and William James, whose children he tutored. In 1888, Mead left Harvard after receiving only a B.A. and moved to Leipzig, Germany to study with psychologist Wilhelm Wundt, from whom he learned the concept of "the gesture," a concept central to his later work. In 1891 he married Helen Kingsbury Castle (1860–1929) , the sister of Henry Northrup Castle (1862–1895), a friend he met at Oberlin.[2] Despite never finishing his dissertation, Mead was able to obtain a post at the University of Michigan in 1891. At the University of Michigan, Mead met Charles H. Cooley and John Dewey, both of whom would influence him greatly.[3] In 1894 Mead moved, along with Dewey, to the University of Chicago, where he taught until his death. Dewey's influence led Mead into educational theory, but his thinking soon diverged from that of Dewey, and developed into his famous psychological theories of mind, self and society.[4]:352–353 No detached philosopher, he was active in Chicago's social and political affairs; among his many activities include his work for the City Club of Chicago. He believed that science could be used to deal with social problems and played a key role in conducting research at the settlement house in Chicago.[4]:353[5] Mead died of heart failure on April 26, 1931. [edit]Writings

In a career spanning more than 40 years, Mead wrote almost constantly and published numerous articles and book reviews in both philosophy and psychology. However, he did not publish any books. Following his death, several of his students put together and edited four volumes from records of Mead's social psychology course at the University of Chicago, his lecture notes, and his numerous unpublished papers. The four volumes are: The Philosophy of the Present (1932), edited by Arthur E. Murphy; Mind, Self, and Society (1934), edited by Charles W. Morris; Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century (1936), edited by Merritt H. Moore; and The Philosophy of the Act (1938), Mead's 1930 Carus Lectures, edited by Charles W. Morris. Most notable among Mead's published papers are “Suggestions Towards a Theory of the Philosophical Disciplines” (1900);[6] “Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning” (1910);[7] “What Social Objects Must Psychology Presuppose” (1910);[8] “The Mechanism of Social Consciousness” (1912);[9] “The Social Self” (1913);[10] “Scientific Method and the Individual Thinker”(1917);[11] “A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol” (1922);[12] “The Genesis of Self and Social Control” [8] (1925); “The Objective Reality of Perspectives” [9] (1926);”The Nature of the Past” [10] (1929); and “The Philosophies of Royce, James, and Dewey in Their American Setting” [11] (1929). Twenty-five of Mead’s most notable published articles have been collected in Andrew J. Reck, ed (1964). Selected Writings: George Herbert Mead. Bobbs-Merrill, The Liberal Arts Press.[13] In his lifetime, Mead published about 100 scholarly articles, reviews, and incidental pieces. The Mead Project[14] at Brock University in Ontario intends to publish all of Mead's 80-odd remaining unpublished manuscripts. [edit]Pragmatism and symbolic interaction

Philosophers whose inspiration is more ontological, e.g. Heidegger, emphasize the uncovering of Being from the perspective of the experiencing human being, and how the world is revealed to this experiencing entity within a realm of things. Pragmatic philosophers like Mead focus on the development of the self and the objectivity of the world within the social realm: that "the individual mind can exist only in relation to other minds with shared meanings" (Mead 1982: 5). The two most important roots of Mead's work, and of symbolic interactionism in general are the philosophy of pragmatism and social (as opposed to psychological) behaviorism (i.e.: Mead was concerned with the stimuli of gestures and social objects with rich meanings rather than bare physical objects which psychological behaviourists considered stimuli). Pragmatism is a wide ranging philosophical position from which several aspects of Mead's influences can be identified. There are four main tenets of pragmatism: see Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy First, to pragmatists true reality does not exist "out there" in the real world, it "is actively created as we act in and toward the world. Second, people remember and base their knowledge of the world on what has been useful to them and are likely to alter what no longer "works." Third, people define the social and physical "objects" they encounter in the world according to their use for them. Lastly, if we want to understand actors, we must base that understanding on what people actually do. Three of these ideas are critical to symbolic interactionism: the focus on the interaction between the actor and the world a view of both the actor and the world as dynamic processes and not static structures and the actor's ability to interpret the social world. Thus, to Mead and symbolic interactionists, consciousness is not separated from action and interaction, but is an integral part of both. Mead's theories in part, based on pragmatism and behaviorism, were transmitted to many graduate students at the University of Chicago who then went on to establish symbolic interactionism.[4]:347–350 [edit]Social philosophy (behaviorism)

Mead was a very important figure in 20th century social philosophy. One of his most influential ideas was the emergence of mind and self from the communication process between organisms, discussed in Mind, Self and Society, also known as social behaviorism.[15] This concept of the how mind and self emerge from the social process of communication by signs founded the symbolic interactionist school of sociology. Rooted intellectually in Hegelian dialectics and process philosophy, Mead, like Dewey, developed a more materialist process philosophy that was based upon human action and specifically communicative action. Human activity is, in a pragmatic sense, the criterion of truth, and through human activity meaning is made. Joint activity, including communicative activity, is the means through which our sense of self is constituted. The essence of Mead's social behaviorism is that mind is not a substance located in some transcendent realm, nor is it merely a series of events that takes place within the human physiological structure. This approach opposed the traditional view of the mind as separate from the body. The emergence of mind is contingent upon interaction between the human organism and its social environment; it is through participation in the social act of communication that individuals realize their potential for significantly symbolic behavior, that is, thought. Mind, in Mead’s terms, is the individualized focus of the communicational process. It is linguistic behavior on the part of the individual. There is, then, no “mind or thought without language;” and language (the content of mind) “is only a development and product of social interaction” (Mind, Self and Society 191-192). Thus, mind is not reducible to the neurophysiology of the organic individual, but is emergent in “the dynamic, ongoing social process” that constitutes human experience (Mind, Self and Society 7).[13] For Mead, mind arises out of the social act of communication. Mead’s concept of the social act is relevant, not only to his theory of mind, but to all facets of his social philosophy. His theory of “mind, self, and society” is, in effect, a philosophy of the act from the standpoint of a social process involving the interaction of many individuals, just as his theory of knowledge and value is a philosophy of the act from the standpoint of the experiencing individual in interaction with an environment.[13] Action is very important to his social theory and, according to Mead, actions also occur within a communicative process. The initial phase of an act constitutes a gesture. A gesture is a preparatory movement that enables other individuals to become aware of the intentions of the given organism. The rudimentary situation is a conversation of gestures, in which a gesture on the part of the first individual evokes a preparatory movement on the part of the second, and the gesture of the second organism in turn calls out a response in the first person. On this level no communication occurs. Neither organism is aware of the effect of its own gestures upon the other; the gestures are nonsignificant. For communication to take place, each organism must have knowledge of how the other individual will respond to his own ongoing act. Here the gestures are significant symbols.[15] A significant symbol is a kind of gesture that only humans can make. Gestures become significant symbols when they arouse in the individual who is making them the same kind of response they are supposed to elicit from those to whom the gestures are addressed. Only when we have significant symbols can we truly have communication.[4]:356–357 Mead grounded human perception in an "action-nexus" (Joas 1985: 148). We perceive the world in terms of the “means of living” (Mead 1982: 120). To perceive food, is to perceive eating. To perceive a house, is to perceive shelter. That is to say, perception is in terms of action. Mead's theory of perception is similar to that of J. J. Gibson. Mead the social psychologist argued the antipositivistic view that the individual is a product of society, or more specifically, social interaction. The self arises when the individual becomes an object to themselves. Mead argued that we are objects first to other people, and secondarily we become objects to ourselves by taking the perspective of other people. Language enables us to talk about ourselves in the same way as we talk about other people, and thus through language we become other to ourselves.[16] In joint activity, which Mead called 'social acts', humans learn to see themselves from the standpoint of their co-actors. A central mechanism within the social act, which enables perspective taking, is position exchange. People within a social act often alternate social positions (e.g., giving/receiving, asking/helping, winning/losing, hiding/seeking, talking/listening). In children's games there is repeated position exchange, for example in hide-and-seek, and Mead argued that this is one of the main ways that perspective taking develops. However, for Mead, unlike John Dewey and J. J. Gibson, the key is not simply human action, but rather social action. In humans the "manipulatory phase of the act" is socially mediated, that is to say, in acting towards objects humans simultaneously take the perspectives of others towards that object. This is what Mead means by "the social act" as opposed to simply "the act" (the latter being a Deweyan concept). Non-human animals also manipulate objects, but that is a non-social manipulation, they do not take the perspective of other organisms toward the object. Humans on the other hand, take the perspective of other actors towards objects, and this is what enables complex human society and subtle social coordination. In the social act of economic exchange, for example, both buyer and seller must take each other's perspectives towards the object being exchanged. The seller must recognize the value for the buyer, while the buyer must recognize the desirability of money for the seller. Only with this mutual perspective taking can the economic exchange occur (Mead was influenced on this point by Adam Smith). [edit]Nature of the self

A final piece of Mead's social theory is the mind as the individual importation of the social process. As previously discussed, Mead presented the self and the mind in terms of a social process. As gestures are taken in by the individual organism, the individual organism also takes in the collective attitudes of others, in the form of gestures, and reacts accordingly with other organized attitudes. This process is characterized by Mead as the "I" and the "Me". The "Me" is the social self and the "I" is the response to the "Me." In other words, the "I" is the response of an individual to the attitudes of others, while the "me" is the organized set of attitudes of others which an individual assumes.[17] Mead develops William James' distinction between the "I" and the "me." The "me" is the accumulated understanding of "the generalized other" i.e. how one thinks one's group perceives oneself etc. The "I" is the individual's impulses. The "I" is self as subject; the "me" is self as object. The "I" is the knower, the "me" is the known. The mind, or stream of thought, is the self-reflective movements of the interaction between the "I" and the "me." These dynamics go beyond selfhood in a narrow sense, and form the basis of a theory of human cognition. For Mead the thinking process is the internalized dialogue between the "I" and the "me." Mead rooted the self’s “perception and meaning” deeply and sociologically in "a common praxis of subjects" (Joas 1985: 166) found specifically in social encounters. Understood as a combination of the 'I' and the 'me', Mead’s self proves to be noticeably entwined within a sociological existence. For Mead, existence in community comes before individual consciousness. First one must participate in the different social positions within society and only subsequently can one use that experience to take the perspective of others and thus become self-conscious. [edit]Philosophy of science

Mead is a major American philosopher by virtue of being, along with John Dewey, Charles Peirce and William James, one of the founders of pragmatism. He also made significant contributions to the philosophies of nature, science, and history, to philosophical anthropology, and to process philosophy. Dewey and Alfred North Whitehead considered Mead a thinker of the first rank. He is a classic example of a social theorist whose work does not fit easily within conventional disciplinary boundaries. As far as his work on the philosophy of science, Mead sought to find the psychological origin of science in the efforts of individuals to attain power over their environment. The notion of a physical object arises out of manipulatory experience. There is a social relation to inanimate objects, for the organism takes the role of things that it manipulates directly, or that it manipulates indirectly in perception. For example, in taking (introjecting or imitating) the resistant role of a solid object, an individual obtains cognition of what is "inside" nonliving things. Historically, the concept of the physical object arose from an animistic conception of the universe. Contact experience includes experiences of position, balance, and support, and these are used by the organism when it creates its conceptions of the physical world. Our scientific concepts of space, time, and mass are abstracted from manipulatory experience. Such concepts as that of the electron are also derived from manipulation. In developing a science we construct hypothetical objects in order to assist ourselves in controlling nature. The conception of the present as a distinct unit of experience, rather than as a process of becoming and disappearing, is a scientific fiction devised to facilitate exact measurement. In the scientific worldview immediate experience is replaced by theoretical constructs. The ultimate in experience, however, is the manipulation and contact at the completion of an act.[15] [edit]Play and game and the generalized other

Mead theorized that human beings begin their understanding of the social world through "play" and "game". "Play" comes first in the child's development. The child takes different roles he/she observes in "adult" society, and plays them out to gain an understanding of the different social roles. For instance, he first plays the role of policeman and then the role of thief while playing "Cops and Robbers," and plays the role of doctor and patient when playing "Doctor." As a result of such play, the child learns to become both subject and object and begins to become able to build a self. However, it is a limited self because the child can only take the role of distinct and separate others, they still lack a more general and organized sense of themselves.[4]:360 In the next stage, the game stage, it is required that a person develop a self in the full sense of the term. Whereas in the pla

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--Most of Meads biographies do not include a deeper background of Mead’s life, for example, who were Mead’s parents? Mead’s father was a Sacred Rhetoric and Pastoral Theology at Oberlin College beginning in 1869. Mead’s mother also taught at Oberlin, and she was to ensuring that young George was guided trough a daily routine of prayer, study, and good works. Although Oberlin College was well known for its religious orthodoxy, it also emphasized the social obligations of living as a Christian, and this included a rather “radical” commitment to the emancipation of blacks and women (Joas 1985:15).

--Reflexivity was especially important to Mead in developing the concepts of mind and self. Mead argues that the essential condition for the appearance of mind is that the individual, in acting toward and adjusting to objects in the social environment, also takes into account himself as an object in relation to the other objects present. It is by means of “reflexiveness”-the turning back of the experience of the individual upon himself or herself-that persons are able to take the attitude of the other toward them.”Reflexivenes”, is the essential condition, within the social process, for the development of mind.” (1934:134)

--For Mead the thinking process is the internalized dialogue between the internalized dialogue between the “I” and the “Me.” The “Me” is the accumulated understanding of “the Generalized Other” i.e. how one thinks one’s group perceives oneself. The “I” is the knower, and the “Me” is the known. The mind, or stream of thought, is the self-reflective movement of the interaction between the “I” and the “Me.” These dynamics go beyond selfhood in a narrow sense, and form the basis of a theory of human cognition. (Joas 1985: 166)

--According to Mead, the notion of “rights” makes sense only to the extent that self-consciousness arises as we take on the attitude of others, that is, as we assume the attitude of assent of all members of the community (the “generalized other”). Mead’s stated, “The World Court and the League of Nations are other such social objects that sketch out common plans of action if there are national selves that can realize themselves in the collaborating attitudes of others.” (1959: 195)

References

- - Joas, Hans. 1985. G. H. Mead: A Contemporary Re-examination of His Thoughts, Translated by R. Meyer. Cambridge, MA: MT Press.

- - 1934. Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist, edited by C. W. Morris. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

- - 1959. The Philosophy of the Present, edited by A. E. Murphy. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.