User:PaxEquilibrium/Poll

The Serbo-Croat peoples have tried to live in a common state. They failed twice. This led to numerous controversies and problems that appear to be unsolvable, the shame of Europa. If you (yes, YOU) have an idea of a solution to this puzzle, please write below. If you don't think that you're a masterful genius or God speaking in the names of millions of people, just simply have your say - heck, I wanna (as a victim of the very same controversies) hear you out. You don't have to e brief, but try to MAKE a point, or at least say something that may at least lead to one. Any posts are welcome and they will be thoroughly read (promise!). Sincerely, --PaxEquilibrium 00:36, 6 November 2006 (UTC)

The Balkan Question

I am not a God and I can tell you all just my own oppinion. I think it is all about power. It is always about some politician's hunger for money and lust of power. All of them wants to be the king, the emperor, the leader of the superior nation. A ruler of a nation which is not realy exist. Is any nation superior? Is there a person from the human race who can govern the whole World? I think the answer for these questions is NO. Unfortunatly the race for false title the Leader Of The Most Superior race exists. It is an existing competition for an non-existing award. Isn't it funny? But it is all about it. Some people thought that there was a South Slav nation who could govern all others. But these people originaly wouldn't have think these if some polititicians hadn't said it to them in hate speeches. There are some people who lives in somekind of an ideal romantic world. A world where they are the superior ones, they are the member of an superior group. The race is steal continouing and unfortunatly it is unstopable. The race which will bring all of us to death. HunTheGoaT 17:42, 6 November 2006 (UTC)

That's nice - but I wanted to hear also if there is a solution to the Balkan Question. --PaxEquilibrium 19:30, 6 November 2006 (UTC)

Solution by NikoSilver

HunTheGoat is right! All politicians (note: I didn't say 'all nations') try to maximize their power and their dominion! Indeed, the best solution would be a world with ONE government, but that's hardly the way to achieve it, and those politicians in particular are hardly fit for the job! So the solution is we break the whole thing down to infinite units. Like the Kingdom of Lovely for instance! But not in way so as to create anarchy; rather, in a way so that we can join those units to that imaginary one government world. Because if you ask all those little pieces, they'll all tell you the same two things: nationalism sucks and we want peace!! •NikoSilver• 21:03, 6 November 2006 (UTC)

Can't disagree. However, that utopia which you defined is impossible - hence I'm seeing in front of my eyes that there is no solution. --PaxEquilibrium 16:22, 7 November 2006 (UTC)

Sorry for not being able to do anything more than to try to amuse you. The question is, had there been a solution in the first place, would they have applied it? •NikoSilver• 22:46, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

Good question... --PaxEquilibrium 19:35, 13 November 2006 (UTC)

It is solved already :))

You want a "solution of the Balkan puzzle"? Well, guess what? You already watch it with your own eyes. :) Check this: http://www.euratlas.com/big/big1800.htm You see a map that show the dark times of the Balkans when most of the peoples of the Balkans were slaves of two foreign empires - "the sickness from Bosphorus" and the "dungeon of nations". And, as you can see, absolutelly all of these peoples of the Balkans are today free and independent: http://www.euratlas.com/big/big2000.htm So the puzzle is solved, at least 90% of it. The rest 10% will be solved in the next 200-300 years too, one way or another (some territories will gain independence and some other will not have any more a population that want independence). PANONIAN (talk) 21:18, 6 November 2006 (UTC)

Are you saying that the relations between Serbs, Croats, Bosniacs and Montenegrins are the sameas those between the Americans and Canadians? Are you saying that there's no Kosovo issue (Albanians and Serbs work perfectly together?), that the three Nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina live in perfect harmony, that there is no problem of Serbs in Croatia, not to mention the bizzare situation of Montenegro. What about smaller problems, like Vojvodina and its Hungarian Question? This lasts for more than a full century... and frankly, I think that 10% is solved and 90% isn't. --PaxEquilibrium 22:24, 6 November 2006 (UTC)

I am saying that you should compare the two maps that I showed to you, so you will see that 90% of puzzle is solved. Rest 10% is not yet solved only because borders are not perfect. But, despite of this, most members of every Balkan nation live in their own independent country. The problems that remained are smaller numbers of members of some nations that do not live in their own countries, but as I said, these problems will be solved in next 200-300 years, and if you want concrete things: Kosovo, Republika Srpska and Illyrida will almost certainly become independent in some point of time. However, I cannot say same thing for Croats of Bosnia, Hungarians of Vojvodina and Transylvania, Turks of Bulgaria or Bosniaks of Sandžak. PANONIAN (talk) 23:00, 6 November 2006 (UTC)

Precisely... 200-300 years. That's what I was aiming at. Sadly, 20-30 years don't seem to pass without a conflict in the Balkans - so I think that it's impossible. Anyway - Germany is the pride of Europe, and only a just a little over half a century had passed since the Nazy Germany - one of the most vile creations of mankind. --PaxEquilibrium 08:25, 7 November 2006 (UTC)

Hi. I happened to notice this page and the discussion attracted my attention. IMHO, the Balkan puzzle has not been solved not even by 10%... What we are experiencing at the moment is Balkanization, a pure re-vitalation of the wellknown ancient Roman saying divide et impera... And the problems, if things won't drastically change, will not be solved not even in 3 centuries' time.... Some of the problems in the Balkans I can think of are the following (comment beneath each one of them, if u wish):

1. Bosnia: does anyone believe that this state can exist for long? those people were killing each other a decade ago, and now the Serbs of the federal rep. are not allowed the right given by the int. community to Montenegro and Kosovo... Maybe 3 states will be created, or else a small muslim one, with the Serb and Croat regions been incorporated to Serbia and Croatia respectively.

Well, problem is simple - the three nations cannot live together simply, but territorial disunity of BH is surely not a possible option. The main problem is that the Serbs want full-scale independence - and the centrists carefully keep Brčko, the territory that spits the Serb Bosnia-Herzegovina in half... so that kind of a country wouldn't function. Essentially, over 90% of the Serbian Republic's population desire independence.. The Serb Republic is constitutionally a part of Bosnia and Herzegovina and it's secession is lawfully, impossible - and considering the unique geographical position of Bosnia, essentially unimaginable. A very high inflammation of nationalism (to the extent of joining Serbia) in this political entity is present as well - this does not make the situation any better. And even aside all this, a great pressure is put on the Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina by imposing centralism and generally nearing it to the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Federation.

In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croats seem to be supporting the general Bosniac view of a centralist state - but the rising opinion (in the wake of slow political motion) announces a third Bosnian entity. The main issue is that, although the Federation is supposed to show equality, the Bosniacs, the most numerous nation, dominate the entity with 80% of its population belonging to this ethnic group, whereas the remainder are only partially Croats (there are Serbs too). The Croats fear of simply vanishing from the face of the earth, as a highly jeopardized nation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and they need the same status as the other two peoples, but they would do nice with an ethnic stabilization by introducing a large number of Serbs (unitarian order). The most rightist of the Herzeg-Bosnian Croats demand closer as possible ties with their nation-motherland, Croatia. The small number of Serbs living in the Bosnian Federation are subject to heaviest discrimination.

The Bosniacs. as they are in relative majority in the country, strictly demand a united infrastructure, in which they would be the number 1 people and to include the greater part of their nation in one state (the good old "Greater" erratic ideology) and under the cloak of equality and national unity hide a very fervent nationalistic feeling towards Croats, and especially Serbs (but weirdly, a very strong state hatred towards two countries: Serbia and Montenegro). It is worth mentioning as well, that BH does not recognize humans that don't belong to either of its three nations as the citizens of their country, and what's more astonishing, a handful of the Bosnian populace declare to be Moslem, by nationality; however the government does not recognize this, and simply puts them under Bosniacs. Finally, the fact that just little over a decade ago a brutal ethnic and religious war was fought in Bosnia. --PaxEquilibrium 16:16, 7 November 2006 (UTC).

2. Serbia: Montenegro left... Kosovo will soon leave... What will be next? Voivodina? Sanjak? or maybe Presevo? What the hell happened in Serbia? Maybe the Hungarians will ask for further autonomy in Voivodina and the Bosniaks in Sanjak. Maybe the Bulgarians will again look forward the Torlakian speakers in SE Serbia. Maybe the Romanians ask a bit of Serbian Banat, the Albanians, after the independance of Kosovo may look forward Presevo as well, and maybe the people of FYROM will ask for these small parts of Kosovo and Serbia that geographically belong to the region of Macedonia.

Montenegro wasn't a part of Serbia, so it shouldn't be mentioned. There are ongoing disputes over Kosovo - it may not be independent after all. The problem is that there is no legal, or from the side of Law, possible way for the territory of Kosovo to secede from Serbia (although the fact that Serbia has no real governing powers helps this issue), however over 80% of its, mostly ethnically Albanian population, will accept nothing but independence and have a strong nationalistic POV of an ethnically pure Kosovo and union with Albania, whereas the 10% Serbs also have an extremely nationalistic view and will never accept truce with the Albanians. The Kosovo Serb enclaves are practically under siege, and North Kosovo is a secessionist part that is in no way a part of the rest of Kosovo... not to mention the non-Albanian refugees... We must not forget the terrible long years of horror that Kosovo endures.

Vojvodina already has an autonomist movement (based on the prospect of a multi-ethnic utopia and very large historical richness) that constantly maintains to increase its political status within Serbia, but a very strong number of Serbs within the Autonomous Province prevents anything of larger scale. There were talks about Sanjak's autonomy for its Islamic populace long before, escalating even with a referendum and balloting with the rise of Bosniac nationalism, but the dissolution of statehood between Serbia and Montenegro had put an end to all those dreams. Nowadays Bosniacs and other Muslims in Sanjak only want to get some form of recognition in the Serbian Sanjak.

Well, the Presevo Valley already fought a covert war not long ago and proclaimed joining Kosovo more than once. It (or better its ethnic Albanian population) currently demands recognition of its Albanian people, and blackmails the Serbian government.

The Hungarians in Vojvodina already request further inner autonomy on national basis: see Hungarian Regional Autonomy. However, the question of the number of Serbs that would live in that autonomous entity returns the loop. The most extremist minority demands closer ties of even full-scale union with Hungary.

The erratic Macedonian opinion on the very south of Kosovo and Serbia proper is an archaic opinion, long ago abandoned (perhaps not yet in some disillusioned minds).

Note, however, that Serbia would gladly expand, and the Serb part of Bosnia offers a great opportunity for that. Whereas Serbia has an eternal competition in you-know-what with Croatia, it also possesses a hard-core opinion on Kosovo. --PaxEquilibrium 16:16, 7 November 2006 (UTC)

3. Montenegro: Weird situation, but in any case friendly to the Serbs, at least at the moment. Many of its people declare to be Serbians. But there are also Bosniaks and Albanians. Is there any quarantee that after Kosovo, the Albanians will not ask for parts of Montenegro? And if Sanjak will be autonomous or independent at some point in the future, Montenegro will not have common borders with Serbia, whatever this may mean that time...

The dream of the Bosniacs and other Muslims of Sanjak is dead in Montenegro's case; however the Albanians have already proclaimed and are forming their very own entity - Frontier and they prefer union with Albania. The weird situation in Montenegro is not really friendly to the Serbs - the age-old struggle of this divided land between the pro-montenegrins and pro-serbians can still be seen - and the whole controversy of the Montenegrin Question (a Montenegrin ethnicity?) that has onle been tapped. The Serb element in Montenegro is very nationalistic (but so are the docleo-montenegrin champions, right?), and there are some demands (since they cannot win over the whole country, they will satisfy with this:) inner autonomy. We can always also remember the Bay of Kotor and the Croatian nationalistic for it, not to mention even to the point of entire Montenegro itself; or perhaps BH's claims to Herzeg-Novi. Anyway - talking of nationalism, Montenegro is just starting that road. --PaxEquilibrium 16:16, 7 November 2006 (UTC)

4. Slovenia: Maybe the most stable and developed ex-Yugoslav country, with just minor Italian, Croat and Hungarian minorities. But i think that if things go wrong in the rest of the Balkans, it will fall a victim as well. Apropos, this is what happened in the Yugoslav wars as well: it was affected the least, but it was indeed affected.

5. Croatia: I have heard that the regions of Croatia seek for greater autonomy. Personally, i think that federations and creations of autonomous entities are good and democratic things. But the Istriots define themselves first as Istriots and then as Croats (maybe a Catalonia-like autonomy is what they may ask). also, either within the EU or not, te Serb refugees may sometime want to go back to Kraina and Eastern Slavonia (it's just 10 years since they left). in addition there is also a Maguar minority in the country... not that they demand anything special (at least i do not know anything about that), but they may ask if the Hungarians in Voivodina achive anything more...

The Croatian constitutional construction and the whole situation itself is very extremely heavily nationalistic. The general feeling against Serbia and Serbs is very strong as the Serb minority is greatly exposed to pressure and discrimination. Also, the return of masses of Frontier and other Croatian Serbs is in great amass, impossible due to various reasons. . There are no other of those kinds of problems in Croatia, because it has a very strong nationally-bound and ethnically pure population - although I guess the Italians are worth to be at least mentioned. --PaxEquilibrium 16:16, 7 November 2006 (UTC)

6. Romania: the same may apply to the Hungarians in Transylvania. They form a large minority there. there are also the Bulgarians of Dobrugea and the Croats and Serbs of the Romanian Banat, not to mention the repeated complaints of the Ukrainians for their minority (which may or may not be significant).

7. Kosovo: if Kosovo will be independent, what will be the future of the 10% Serbs that live there? a new short-lived federation? unification with Serbia? or maybe Kosovo will be the one to unify with Albania?

8. Albania: Montenegro has historic claims in the northern part (Skodra). the people of FYROM demand freedom for their "minority". the Greeks call southern Albania by the name Northern Epirus. The Greek minority may ask in the future a form of autonomy. according to the Protocol of Corfu, the protocol that established the state of Albania, the Greeks of Northern Epirus should be autonomous. the protocol is still active and so the Greeks, de jure, still have this right. on the other hand, there is also the 'Greater Albania' concept, which demands land from all albania's neighbours... (it is not official policy, but it may become, if Kosovo and Albania become one state).

9. FYROM: the territorial claims over its neighbours have been (at least officially) dropped. but there is still the naming issue with Greece and the condition of a "supposed" minority in Bulgaria and Albania. also, the Albanians within the country and their rights. if Illyrida become independent, following Kosovo and, maybe, uniting with Albania, FYROM will be way too short and weak... Maybe it will be absorbed by Bulgaria and/or Greece. Many people there declare Bulgarian ethnicity... According to the Greeks, the large Greek minority of the country does not appear in censuses...

10. Bulgaria: Apart from the issues of minority rights in all its neighbours, the Bulgarians consider the people of FYROM to be also Bulgarians. Turkey accuses Bulgaria for "mistreatment" of the turkish minority. in NATO bombings in 1999, missiles hit Bulgarian soil... If the Bulgarians had not stayed cool, things could have gone really bad...

11. Greece: the naming issue with FYROM, a possible future issue concerning Northern Epirus, the presence or not of Albanian and "Macedonian" minorities. the muslim minority in Thrace, that Turkey prefers to "baptise" "Turkish", despite the fact that 30% of them are Pomaks and another 10% Roma. complaints from Turkey about the "persecution" of that minority (despite the fact that the Greek minority of Turkey has been expelled and exterminated...). the casus belli with Turkey, for the Law of the Sea.

• Not to mention the other Roma, Turkish, Gorani and other minorities, that may be small, but can play their own role. I am not refering to countries partly in the Balkans (Turkey, Hungary) or near and infuencial ones (Italy, Ukraine, Austria), or Great Powers (USA, UK, Russia)... My post is already rather long;-).
• IMO, only within the EU there can be a better and secure future for the Balkan nations, and i consider this another form of Rigas Feraios' plan... If not, guys, there is a long way to go... and, i am sorry to say this, but it doesn't seem to be a peaceful journey... Regards Hectorian 13:39, 7 November 2006 (UTC)

Opinion of a Croatian villager ;D

Realistically, we can categorize the region's problems into two main categories:

• Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Bosnia and Herzegovina problem is complicated because it drags Croatia and Serbia into awkward situations. Whatever ultimately happens, it will be a European solution to the country's problems that results. I'm not saying that BiH won't be split, but it certainly won't if it causes any instability in the region. There have been many solutions put forth. One of those has been the creation of a third entity. There was some talk that the SDA offered us a "Croatian County" which would basically have included those areas that in practicality we already control. Of course, there is the spectre of cutting BiH up, but I don't think anyone really wants that anymore. The war-time borders just don't make enough sense. For example, while Serbs may not realize this, the hard-line Croats probably consider preventing a Serbian state from crossing the Drina, as more important than establishing a Croatian state that reaches the Drina. Again, if regional instability could be avoided, it might be a viable option.

For any real hope of lasting peace and prosperity in BiH, two things have to be fulfilled. One is the recognition that its peoples are diverse (and incorporating this into its institutions), and the other is the understanding that while the Serbs and Croats have their own "nation-states", the Bosniaks do not. A Bosnia and Herzegovina of regions might help with this, in which the country would be divided into several units in which no group would have an absolute majoity.

• Albanian populations

The Albanian problem is just a matter of "waiting things out". A poor Albanian population increasing at a fast pace will eventually become a modern, reasonably well-off population no longer expanding outwards. In the long run, this issue has to be left to stabilize itself. However, in the meantime Kosovo will become independent as a result of the Albanians and Serbia's own politics. This may or may not be good news for the region, but it's certainly better than the status quo. What's important now is that Serbia does not let Kosovo start a Domino-effect. For example, Kosovo independence results in Serbian Radicals getting power, which starts Serb independence movements again, which causes other countries to retaliate... and on and on.

I'll leave off with: As these nations move forward, big questions about borders, flags, and armies will become less important. As people realize that they have been bilked by nationalist ideas that got them very little, they will demand economic improvement, and a higher quality of life. While our peoples will always be proud, and differences will always exist, they simpy won't matter enough anymore. Minority rights will be improved once the majority realizes that this makes good business sense. I think some people are too harsh on the Balkan states: this is the same process that occurred in other parts of Europe, we are just experiencing it rather late due to our unique circumstances. (Sorry for blathering. Hopefully there's something useful in the above mess.)--Thewanderer 21:01, 7 November 2006 (UTC)

Real and false problems

I read the previous discussion where every single small problem in the Balkans was mentioned, so I want to say that there is difference between those problems. Most of these problems (for example problem of Albanians in Montenegro or Bulgarians in Serbia) are small ones - mainly a questions whether two or three small towns will be on one side of the border or on another. Those are really not big or important problems that could cause large conflicts. The real big problems are presence of large minority populations in some areas, and we have two definitions of the word "large" here: 1. a minority group larger than one million people, 2. a minority group larger than 20% of population of the country. So, let see what are real big problems of the Balkans and how they will be solved by my opinion:

• 1. Serbia has Albanian minority in Kosovo numbering almost 2,000,000 and since Albanians have very large birth rate their number will drastically increase in the future. Serbia will be never able to incorporate Kosovar Albanians into its social and political system, thus the problem will be solved by independence of Kosovo.
• 2. Bosnia and Herzegovina has a large ethnic Serb population, numbering about 1,400,000. Bosniak centralists from Sarajevo will be never able to force this population to form centralized Bosnian state, thus this problem will be solved by independence of Republika Srpska.
• 3. Republic of Macedonia has a large Albanian population numbering about 25% of the population of the country. Since, as I already said, the Albanians have very large birth rate, their number as well as percent will increase. When number of Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia reach 1,000,000 (today is about 500,000), the Republic of Macedonia will be almost certainly divided into two states, in the beginning maybe part of the Federation, but in the end, independent Albanian state of Illyrida will be established.
• 4. The last large problem are Hungarians in Romania who number about 1,400,000. However, since quite opposite to the Albanians, the Hungarians have very low birth rate, thus their number will only decrease and after few decades will be less than 1,000,000 (we already know that in 1992 there were 1,600,000 Hungarians in Romania, thus we can say that after 30 years their number in Romania will be only about 800,000). Furthermore, the Hungarians in Romania mostly do not live in compact territory but are scatered throughout the country. Their compact population exist only in Szekely Land area, but only about a third of all Romanian Hungarians live in this area. So, the question whether Szekely Land will gain some form autonomy or not would not solve the entire Hungarian question in Romania. It is low birth rate of Hungarians that will solve it, however. PANONIAN (talk) 21:24, 7 November 2006 (UTC)

There was also a opinion that Republika Srpska cannot be independent if Brčko is not part of it because it would be divided into two parts then. Well, check this: http://wiki.riteme.site/wiki/Image:Azerbaijan_map.gif Azerbaijan is made of two parts and it is independent. So much about Brčko argument. :) PANONIAN (talk) 21:32, 7 November 2006 (UTC)

There are around 1,600,000 Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And about Brcko - well, Azerbeijan would not be totally surrounded by two very unfriendly countries (plus, only a small bit is - while RS's core would be away). --PaxEquilibrium 20:34, 8 November 2006 (UTC)

"while RS's core would be away"

It cannot be away from itself. :)) PANONIAN (talk) 00:58, 9 November 2006 (UTC)

Away from the greater part of its territory. Eastern BH is mostly connected to friendly Serbia and Montenegro, whereas the smaller part with the capital will be locked & under siege. Azerbeijan's outer territory is small and generally unimportant (without the capital in it!) and of course, underdeveloped. --PaxEquilibrium 19:21, 9 November 2006 (UTC)

But why you think that Croatia would not be friendly neighbour to RS? As far as I know Croatia have no territorial claims towards RS, thus I do not think that there is a reason for hostility there. Besides this, present-day Bosniaks are too much frustrated with the war, but new generations of Bosniaks that are born today will grew up with knowledge that RS exist, so even they will not feel so large hostility towards it. Besides this, main problem of Bosniaks in the future would be how to establish their dominance over Bosnian Croats, and until they do this, RS is simply to large snack for them to try to swallow it. PANONIAN (talk) 01:36, 10 November 2006 (UTC)

Because 50% of Croats and Bosniacs believe that RS is something like NDH - a crime-forged entity that must under no circumstance be allowed to continue its irridentist existence - while 100% believe that RS should have been abolished by now, and is in the process of its disappearance (well, they're correct - unlike Montenegro and Serbia, who have been distancing from each other, the Federation and the Serbs are getting closer with each passing moment. Considering the relations of RS with Croatia, I can only expect that a Serb Republic's declaration of independence will result with a direct response of a Croatian invasion and military occupation of RS (of course, I'm overreacting - but I'm not overemphasizing). --PaxEquilibrium 16:22, 10 November 2006 (UTC)

You failed to notice that the same condition of the Hungarians in Romania also applies to the Serbs in Republika Srpska - they don't have a particularly impressive birth rate, either. Granted, the extent of the beef with neighbours is different, but then again the matter of geographic dispersion is similar. In general, though, I wouldn't go so far to say that these issues will sort themselves out by means of demography, so all this is moot. --Joy [shallot] 23:52, 9 November 2006 (UTC)

Yes, Serbs in Bosnia might not have "impressive birth rate", but they also do not have so low birth rate as Hungarians in Romania. While Hungarian population in Romania will certainly further decrease, the Serb population in BIH will not increase, but will also not decrease (Serbs in BIH have better birth rate than Serbs in Serbia). PANONIAN (talk) 01:22, 10 November 2006 (UTC)

Well, the highest birthrate the Kosovar Serbs have (families with at least 4 children). The Bosnian Serbs, unlike their Bosnian-Herzegovinian Christian brothers, have a steady low birthrate - but not negative like Serbians, or dramatically low like Montenegrins, Croatian Serbs and Vojvodinian Serbs. --PaxEquilibrium 16:22, 10 November 2006 (UTC)

"My two lipas worth"

I see the attempt at a common south slav state as the original problem. Such a state was doomed to failure when considering the disparate notions of what the state would look like, with the state only serving as a halfway house for the opposing positions of eventual independence and territorial expansion. Such a state was born by international pressures and logically flawed by not containing Bulgaria, and morally flawed by denying the right of self determination for individual nations. I have to confess astonishment that despite the repression of the 1st Yugoslavia, the resultant antagonism of which gave birth to the extremism of the 1940's, and finally to the repression under the communist regime of the second Yugoslavia, not to mention the brutality of the 1990's wars; it is still viewed with nostalga as some lost ideal by large tracts of the internationalist left, because of the market socialism that looked decent only when compared to the dire state of the command economies to the east.

Have on mind that about 50% of everything (no matter what you see) was built, founded on the soil of former Yugoslavia or simply comes from the ol' Yugoslavia. The contributions of the pre-Yugoslav era aren't of any such seen magnitude, and the post-Yugoslav era has not lasted for long enough to make a change at all.

1st Yugoslavia bought no economic development for Croatia, and was characterised by repression to put in mildly. 2nd Yugoslavia - agree with you on that one - but I think it is a function of the planned economy & compulsory education. As for post-Yugoslavia, it has been about 15 years, and we can see by Slovenia's progress, and Croatia's progress (given that it experienced a devastating war & was isolationist until 2000), that Yugoslavia was really holding these 2 republics back. iruka 03:29, 19 March 2007 (UTC)

Why do you care about Croatia solely? :) Anyway, it's not true that it brought no (development cannot be compared to the successes of the Republic, but the Kingdom also brought some advancement; remember that all the royal finances were in Croatia and in Croatian control and they (famous 1st Yugoslavia Croatian bankers and investers) made huge progress with it).

Can't agree on those. Slovenia and Croatia would've entered far earlier the European Union (as stated by Ren, Xavier and all others). Yugoslavia as a whole, if not for just the turbolent 1980s and 1990s, would've entered EU around 2000 or probably before (much before than any eastern country anyway). --PaxEquilibrium 15:46, 20 March 2007 (UTC)

As far as I see (and I think that's it) the state was not born at all by international pressure, but on the desire of its peoples.

I think the prospect of Croatia sharing the same fate as Macedonia in being split up as spoils of war by neighbouring countries (in Croatia's case b/w Italy & Serbia), forced the hand of the likes of Trumbic. iruka 03:29, 19 March 2007 (UTC)

It wasn't even close to Macedonia. Croatia was entirely included into the new Yugoslavian state (Italy did not possess Croatian territories at all), and mostly willingly - not just by the will of the minority. Things might've changed later in the late 1920s and early 1930s, but that's a world different to the situation that was in 1918. Croatia wasn't "occupied", but "liberated", in normal understanding of the word. --PaxEquilibrium 20:31, 17 April 2007 (UTC)

The promise of the allies of dalmatia to Italy & the rest to Serbia was hanging like a sword of Domecles on the Croat delegation - what would have stopped the Serbian & Italian armies occupying the lands they coveted & annexing. This sort of scenario happened to Macedonia.

Note also that the Croatian Sabor never sanctioned any merger into the 1st Yugoslavia. 220.221.45.107 08:17, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

Why to contain Bulgaria? That's even not logical. It is to my opinion that it was logically flawed because it included Slovenian lands (the remainder is made by practically one people).

Yugoslavia = land of the South Slavs. Thus Bulgaria should have been included. The various peoples are different culturally, liguistically (despite attempts to forge a single standard), historically - I don't how you can conclude they are the same.

Yes, but there were no ideas for Bulgaria - the Bulgarians already bygone had their own nation-state. The plan was dropped even in the 19th century, and was only revived by Tito for a short time. --PaxEquilibrium 20:31, 17 April 2007 (UTC)

Pan slavic feelings was always a forced solution by circumstance - in some Croat circles an out against the Germanisation & Magyarisation policies of the Habsburg empire - for some Serbs, a similar emancipation, for others it was a vehicle for territorial expansion of Serbia. 220.221.45.107 08:17, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

It's pointless to seek mistakes of Yugoslav states as a cause for the horrible things that occurred in the following wars; that would truly mean that that which the Westerners have been telling for years is true (that all Balkaners are indeed primitive).

It's merely s/t that northern Europeans employ to sustain their superiority complex. France was none-too happy being under German domination. The Irish rebelled against being forced into the UK. What the various wars in the 1990's proved for me was:

• Yugoslavia was always viewed as an expansion of Serbia (despite the federalism of 2nd Yug);
• no amount of checks & balances can counter a hegemonic force in a union of different states;
• given a democratic vote, people that are forced into a union, will always opt for an independent path. iruka 03:29, 19 March 2007 (UTC)

• Yes, the first one was - because that's exactly what royal Yugoslavia was. But the second (Communist) Yugoslavia was never viewed as such, besides by the extremist and separatist minority, most notably the Ustasha supporters and many Albanian national circles in Kosovo-Metohija (no one else).
• typically (but erroneously, because being very rough), the first Yugoslavia was defined as a Serbian hegemony/domination, whereas the second Yugoslavia fueled itself on Anti-Serbism. ;)
• In neither of the two Yugoslavian statehood momentums were the peoples forced into union. The First regal Yugoslavia was a democratic country (elections), while the Communist one wasn't (one-party dictatorship) in the governmental view (despite partial dictatorship exposed by King Alexander). --PaxEquilibrium 20:31, 17 April 2007 (UTC)

In the first Yugoslavia, the Serbian army occupied the territory w/o sanction from the sabor & all Croat symbology / culture / reference was subsequently outlawed. Despite the elections, the monarchy proceeded on a Serbianisation program (1918-1939 was the only period in history since Croatia's inception, that Croatia ceased to exist as a legal/territorial entity). Assasination of intellectuals such as Radic & Sufflay was part of the program to break the Croatian spirit & force them to assimilate into the state's Serbian identity. 220.221.45.107 08:17, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

What do you mean by "self-determination for individual nations"? --PaxEquilibrium 23:36, 16 March 2007 (UTC)

Individual nations that constituted Yugoslavia i.e. Croats, Serbs, Slovenes etc This is what we see today & it appears to be the best solution, given the improvement in quality of life of the citizens of Slovenia & Croatia. BiH will follow once they sort out the constitutional issues, and so too will Serbia once that state focuses on socio-economic issues and forgets about Kosovo. Even tiny CrnaGora has seen a larger than expected economic growth due to it's conciliatory stance with Croatia. iruka 03:29, 19 March 2007 (UTC)

But such determination was applied, to regions. Remember all that happened in 1918: 3 of the southern Hungarian regions organized themselves into a political entity, and through a process of self-determination seceded both Hungary and whole of Austro-Hungary and joined Serbia. It was the opinion of the majority of the regions' population self-determined for that, and the national self-determination you mention were present in Serbs, Bunyevs, Shoktzs, Croats, Slovaks and Rusyns that lived in the 3 regions. In a similar manner, Montenegro (and thus the Montenegrin nation back then - although there is controversy whether we could've considered them as a separate constituent from the Serbian nation) had elected, decided and joined the Kingdom of Serbia. In the very same way Syrmia separated from Croatia-Slavonia (e.g. Austro-Hungary) and joined Serbia too. Although it did not join Serbia, most of Bosnia-Herzegovina (within Austro-Hungary) self-determined to join Serbia as well. In the end, all the consent demands were fulfilled, by which the Bosnian (and Herzegovinians), the Croatians (and Slavonians), the Dalmatians and the Slovenians organized into a state and decided to make a new country together with Serbia (the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes). Also remember that, despite the realm had three recognized nationalities (Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, duh), it based itself on national unity, under which it legally considered the 3 just 3 different names for a single people. It was a transitional period in which even they were supposed to disappear - and then it happened in 1929/31, when they all became "Yugoslavs". So national self-determination as an open possibility after the country was created and constructed in 1918-21, would've been completely illogical.

Actually the misuse of the national self-determination rights granted in the Communist Yugoslavia is what brought to the Fall of Yugoslavia. No republic seceded from Yugoslavia except for Macedonia (which seceded fully and completely legal), and I do not think that this fact and the fact that Macedonia seceded peacefully and without bloodshed are mere coincidences. Republics in Yugoslavia never had the rights of self-determination, but only the recognized nations of Yugoslavia (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Muslims, Albanians, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Hungarians). This of course worked for Slovenia indeed, and if you remember I said that the Slovenian lands are much more western-belonging and do not even compose the same "entity" with the rest of (now ex) Yugoslavia. Croatia could've entered the west far earlier if Yugoslavia did not dissolve, and look at what cost - the very economic, demographic and political problems Croatia has draws origins from the war - and the fact that practically a whole nation in Croatia had to be removed (i.e. the Serbs), the same ideologies were present in Serbia, that with the removal of the Albanians, Serbia's problems would've been removed too.

Before 1918 there were none of these complicated issues - Croatia existed as a crownland & was seeking reunification with Dalmatia White Croatia) & greater independence. Drawing a parrallel with Kosovo is erroneous, b/c Kosovo had existed as a standalone entity, whilst in Croatia, Krajina never existed as a Serb autonomous entity until it was militarily created in 1991. Even the military frontier it sought to draw a heritage from was different in size, function and ultimately was characterised as much by it's Croat inhabitants as it's Serb ones. Also the desired Krajina entity had many Croats, whereas in Kosovo it was almost homogenous. Note also the Albanians in Kosovo had no reason to seccede b/c they had autonomy - iot was only when the tanks went in that the process of polarisation began. In Croatia, it was always a battle for heart & minds of the Croatian Serbs b/w being loyal to Zagreb or being seduced by the illusion of Greater Serbia. 220.221.45.107 08:17, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

The Serbs leaving is a sad but nonetheless a self-fullfilling event (similiar to the VolksDeutch) and represents reaping the seeds they sowed. There is no complexity with Croatia BiH & Serbia. The solution is simple - repsect the AVNOJ boundaries (as Djilas pointed out - they are legitimate, basedd on history & ethnic criteria & capture the majority community in each region). 220.221.45.107 08:17, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

What constitutional issues does BH face? I don't think that Serbia will forget Kosovo right now or any time soon (just like it wasn't so far), after all Bosnia will not be prepared to forget the Serbs, Macedonia to forget the Albanians and Croatia was most definitely not prepared to forget about Krajina back then. AFAIK Montenegro now suffers the downstreams of statehood separate from Serbia, as it's entering a severe economic crisis (though Serbia and the EU are helping a lot to prevent this from escalating further), which is drastically leading the lower parts of the population into poverty. The thing that came out with Slovenia's and Croatia's case turned out to be totally different in Montenegro's.

By the way Montenegro's case was not national self-determination, but state self-determination as guaranteed in the Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro from 2003 (drawn in 2002). And btw if a national self-determination was used, there would've been no chance for the Montenegrin secession. --PaxEquilibrium 20:31, 17 April 2007 (UTC)

I also agree with Pannonian in that the solution has been largely resolved - but differ in the analysis of remainling changes with only the independence of Kosovo, a more functional central government for BiH, and integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions being the last jigsaws in the puzzle. Each nation has it's own state in borders that resound with a significant degree of ethnic and historical reality and with regard to economic viability and geography contiguity. I don't believe that after Kosovo's independence their will be border changes. I see the issue raised for each of the republics as follows:

Don't you think that inherits a large POV? From those wording, the thing against the will of Serbs and what is bad for Serbs, or "good anything Serbs say bad" image is received. Different standards for two different situations - and Serbs are on different sides of the two, in both cases would be on the "losing" side - but using same arguments? --PaxEquilibrium 15:12, 25 November 2006 (UTC)

Disagree. The principle of having all Serbs in one state was applied, but not reciprocated to other communities. The wars, prosecuted by Milosevic & his generals, was largely one best characterised as opportunistic redrawing of AVNOJ boundaries along the imperial policies of Serbia's elites, dating back to the 19th century, but also a diversionary mechanism with which Milosevic maintained his grip of power. By creating a state of emergency & a perpetuated sense of flux, people were diverted from the more important social-economic issues.

From what I understand, those AVNOJ boundaries were largely the work of one Montenegran (Serb?) Milovan Djilas. He explained in his last interview (Yutel-Sarajevo I think) that those borders were legitimate & drawn with the objective of capturing the majority nation within eaxh of the respective regions.

Thus, IMO, the AVNOJ boundaries represent legitimate ethnic & historical realities, and are a foundation for peace in the region. This is best demonstrated by the advancements Croatia, Slovenia & now Montenegro & Macedonia are making. BiH exists as a tampon zone between Croatia & Serbia, with cantonal autonomy being the safeguard for national rights. iruka 06:53, 16 March 2007 (UTC)

Heh, but that was not correct in the Serbs' case. The vast majority of Serbs were left outside the (People's/Socialist) democratic Republic of Serbia. ;0)

BTW this has nothing to do with that which I mentioned - on one side, you said that Bosnia should become centralist (totally contrary to the desire of the separatist Serbs that one to secede from BH), while on the other side you said that Kosovo should become independent (contrary to the will of the Serbians who want it to remain in Serbia); I was aiming at these dual standards. --PaxEquilibrium 20:31, 17 April 2007 (UTC)

Kosovo existed as an entity, where as the Bosnian Serb entity was created militarily & lacked the homogeneity that Kosovo had. The situation of Bosnia would best be served by being independent & acting as a tampon zone free of Croat & Serb nationalist aspiration, whilst having various Banovinas that would act like entities. I envisage parts of Posavina, Central Bosnia & Herzegovina as teh Croat Banovina; Cazin, Central/Northern Bosnia, Eastern Bosnia as the Muslim, Western Bosnia, Herzegovina (East), Parts of Posavina & Eastern Bosnia as the Serb entity. 220.221.45.107 08:17, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

1. Croatia - the hope of an autonomous Serb region or Greater Serbia ended with the rejection of the Z-4 plan just before operation Storm, and continues to live today only in the dreams of nationalists like the Serbian Radicals. As president Mesic stated "....there is no plan A-Z, just the constitution of the Republic of Croatia..."

• The situation is far more complicated. The legal portion signed the Z-4 peace treaty, whereas a great part of it refused. Croatia initially didn't want to accept z-4, but in the end accepted it only because the Serb side would evidently not accept it. Then, in the very end, both sides switched their respective opinions several times. It should be noted that the necessity and speed of Operation Storm was plainly because of the emergence of problem that such a peace may have been accepted - Croatia would (and did) gain a lot more with a full-scale martial subjection, both receiving the history as a victorious nation (+concept of victor's justice) evading the situations in BH and getting rid of the hostile Serb minority, achieving ethnic purity. Then again, such stubborn acts from the Serb side might be compared to the Kosovar Albanians, who clearly put for a long time and refused any treaty that doesn't guarantee Kosovo the possibility of independence. --PaxEquilibrium 20:31, 17 April 2007 (UTC)

Misguided analogy for the fact that the Serb entity SAO Krajina, (unlike the Vojna Krajina which has a Croat & Serb heritage) was not an autonomus territory under the 1974 constitution. SAO Krajina tried to draw legitimacy by usurping the heritage of the historical Military Frontier, disregarding the joint Croat heritage that stems from that historical structure. Finally, SAO Krajina was not officially recognised dejure by the international community & drew much of it's negotiating power through it's military capacity - once this was counterbalanced, it crumbled as an entity.

Operation Storm was largely a backup plan that was forced into action quite early because of the Bosnian Serb offensive on Bihac. This offensive had Western support in light of the events @ Srebrenica & the desire to prevent a repetition @ Bihac. Had Bihac fallen, the strategic implications were negative for Republic of Croatia's ability to regain it's internationaly recognised territory. iruka 06:53, 16 March 2007 (UTC)

Bihac was a place in an another war, it wasn't even in Croatia. This was probably misused to justify such a military action. Besides, the takeover of Srebrenica happened after Operation Storm (interestingly enough, with western approval) and not by the Republic of Serbian Krajina. However Operation Storm was not a simple backup plan. The HDZ regime was preparing for such an action ever since the beginning of the war in 1991 (as tested in western Slavonia at the start).

Note that in the early stages of existence of Communist Serbia the question of Serbs in Croatia and Albanians in Serbia was a lot questioned. In the end, the decisive point was that Serbs were widespread across the Republic of Croatia, while Albanians practically lived in a concentrated manner only in South Serbia - Serbian nationalists often claim that this is a good example of mistreatment of Serbs in the Socialist Yugoslavia. The Serbs were proposed (and many Communists, including Croatian fought that they should receive 1, 2 or even more autonomous regions) autonomy, but in the end, the decision was finally maid that Croatia becomes a dual nation-state of Croats and Serbs. However, this was revoked in the new controversial 1990 Constitution of Croatia that defined the Serbs as a national minority, together with the others. IMHO, in a way, the SAOs the Croatian Serbs formed and self-proclaimed seemed like a right response - as the compromise alternative B was abolished, they proceeded to alternative A. SAO Krajina drew its statehood from this.

I have seen both vers of the constitution & for me they are effectively the same - one explicitly states Serbs, in the other they are lumped in others. What is the practical effect of being explictly listed versus categorised in the constitution? 220.221.45.107 08:17, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

By the very nature of being a backup plan, operation storm was always there should negotiations fail. Operation Storm would never had gone ahead w/o western support & that only came after the Srebrenica massacre & the likelihood of a repeat of events in the Bihac pocket. There were also strategic reasons as well for Croatia had Bihac fallen. After the events in Srebrenica, & gaining on Bihac, the Croatian Serbs were never going to compromise. 220.221.45.107 08:17, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

And I shall mention again - the time for Z-4 plan's negotiations was unendingly short and it was completely cut by Croatia's Operation Flash and Storm military offensives. We should remember how negotiations like these last, as the Kosovar Albanians were negotiating with the Serbians practically throughout whole 1998 and 1999 (though first negotiations de facto began in 1996). Remember how hard it was for them and how much fierce international (especially from the US and UK) pressure was needed for them to accept not to secede from Serbia and recognize that they're giving up from they're demands for independence from Serbia. And even up to now, years away, the deal is disobeyed as they ever fiercely demand for independence. --PaxEquilibrium 20:31, 17 April 2007 (UTC)

There were ongoing negotiations for 4 yrs, & not just the Z4 plan. I think it was clear that the project was facilitating Greater Serbia in effect, by creating Serb statelets. If RS is anything to go by, the non-Serb population would never have returned. Operation Storm was the right decision. 220.221.45.107 08:17, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

PaxEquilibrium 15:12, 25 November 2006 (UTC)

• The crimes committed in the establishment of the self-procalimed Serb entity has accorded it a stigma of illegitimacy (b/c as discussed in the ICTY evidence, it could not have been achieved or linked with Serbia w/o forced movement of peoples), & has seen an attribution of collective guilt (think VolksDeutch post WWII) because of the lack of remorse and the absense of significant Serb resistance to the entity (compared with for example the Croat Partisans against the NDH), which translates into no sympathy for and suspicion of any idea of territorial autonomy. And in any practical sense, given that most Serb refugees are experiencing better economic conditions and services in the cities where they have settled than in the rural backwaters they fled, the smaller number of Serbs in Croatia today, the trend towards integration, and an aging population, despite a strong Croatian Serb lobby, there isn't the political critical mass to achieve such territorial ambitions. Serbia is also not in a position economically or militarily to undertake the campaigns of the 1990's.

• I feel the necessity to point out that that which you said is that old ex-Yugoslav propaganda. Just like the mayor of Bijeljina (or some other Bosnian Serb city) said, "we are receiving letters from Bosnian refugees that thank us for population transfers; they owe their great modern lives thanks to our ethnic cleansing" practically. That which you mentioned is nothing but Croatia's propaganda. It's true that Croatian Serbs that have found in the Serbian Republic in B-H have managed somehow (mainly because of the strong national feeling in there), but not much elsewhere (very little in Serbia).

I think you missed my point - the explanation is not a justification, but a description of the facts in the ground - those regions in Croatia that had large Serb communities were economic backwaters before the war, and remain so after the war. The communities there now, because of age are not sustainable in the long run. It is not issue of ethnicity, but something that affects Serb, Croat, Bosnjiak etc communities alike. What I am describing is the rural-urban migration that is inevitable in any modernising economy. You will find the same in many Vojvodinian communities. iruka 06:53, 16 March 2007 (UTC)

We could then question the illegitimacy and stigma of the actual statehood of Croatia itself, as such same ethnic-driven crimes were present on that side. Also the arguments how the exiled are doing fine is just a propaganda invented by those who expelled them (as I came to find out from first eyes). In such way double standards are said in Croatia (or propagated, better) how the hundreds of thousands of Serbs living in exile are actually "doing fine", but that the Croats banished from Republika Srpska or Vojvodina are subjected to torment. Or (in the same manner) in the Serbian Republic we can find (just like I pointed out) that they claim how all the displaced Bosnian Muslims are over-grateful for being ethnically cleansed, while pointing out deeply at the genocide conducted against Serbs in Croatia. --PaxEquilibrium 20:31, 17 April 2007 (UTC)

NDH also lacks remorse, and up to 1943 the "Croat Army" were the Ustasha forces, and not the Partisans. Then again, comparing the two is impossible - this war was solely to protect the interests of the Serb people - not like the Ustashas, whose ideology lied precisely on the extermination of the "non-aryan" peoples (Serbs, Jews, Romas,...). The majority of Croatian Serb refugees don't have a place to live. Why on earth would Serbia want to return to the 1990s??? --PaxEquilibrium 15:12, 25 November 2006 (UTC)

The first Partisan unit was formed in Sisak, Croatia. Many of the prominant Partisans were either ethnically or culturally Croat - Tito, Hebrang, Ribar, Rukavina, Bakaric. Most of the battles were fought on the NDH. 2/3 of the Partisans in NDH were Croats, whilst local Serbs represented above their population percentage. In Serbia, apart from the Partisan revolt in 1941, Serbia slowly came under the influence of the collaborationist Chetniks. The reason for this is because the different countries faced disparate existential issues. Note also the large contribution of Dalmatian Croats to the Partisans, the domobran which with many HSS members, had large Partisan sympathies, often with whole units defecting. The Ustasha military although best armed, was deficient in manpower, with most recruits from either Hercegovina or Eastern Bosnia, with the later group motivated by Chetnik activity in the area (much in the same way Banija Serbs joined Partisans as a result of Ustasha activities).

True that the NDH largely lacks remorse, by they were not in power from 1945 onwards - it was the Partisan that fought them, and they didn't revile away from the truth - even today there are memorial ceremonies for all victims of the NDH. In RS, similar people idealogically are in power, with little remorse and with a policy of equivalence being applied. The prevailing attitude is reflected in Dodik's comments not to recognise the finding of the ICJ. The main fallacy with this approach is that BiH Serb leaders see that recognising the acts of the VRS, it will somehow deligitimise Serb concerns in BiH - but I see war crimes, & Bosnian Serb political questions (which carry there own legitimacy by being citizens of BiH) as separate issues. iruka 06:53, 16 March 2007 (UTC)

BTW the beginning (celebrated as national liberation day) of the Partisan uprising in Croatia was started in 1941 by the Croatian Serbs. ;) In the end, this is all very interesting, but what are you trying to say? Also, the Independent Social Democrats totally stem away from the Serbian Democratic Party that orchestrated the Serbian warmongering campaign. A best example is Serbia - where totally different people from those before 2000 are in charge (the Democrat Bloc). BTW Milorad Dodik recognized and nationally apologized for the Srebrenica massacre. On the other hand, Kosovo is handled by the very same warlords of the 1990s, and the Prime Minister of Kosovo is a war criminal (which brings the controversy of the "just balance" in the negotiations for the final status of Kosovo). The old-style Croatian Democratic Union that shares similar, if not same, ideologies of Franjo Tudjman and his men is in power in Croatia too. --PaxEquilibrium 20:31, 17 April 2007 (UTC)

The question is not one of why would Serbia want a return to the 90's - given the low voter participation, the question is do the elites feel accountable to the international community & the region to not pursue the same policies. As an indication, refer to the difficulty Del Ponte is having with getting the EU to pressurise Serbia to extradite Mladic. iruka 06:53, 16 March 2007 (UTC)

Low voter participation? But it's greatly increasing (it again exceeded four million). --PaxEquilibrium 20:31, 17 April 2007 (UTC)

• Having said that, with increasing economic prosperity in the Republic of Croatia and it's integration into EuroAtlantic institutions, most remaining Serbs realise that their well-being & future lie looking towards Zagreb rather than Belgrade.

One of the key elements in there lies to the traditional Prechani's Anti-Serbian sentiment that had always been there, and is still today there. --PaxEquilibrium 15:12, 25 November 2006 (UTC)

Can you explain more about the Prechani pls. iruka 06:53, 16 March 2007 (UTC)

The Anti-Serbia sentiment is traditionally known and is present today amongst the Precans. This could be seen in their greatest ever leader - Svetozar Pribićević (Prechanis rarely, or more precisely never managed to cooperate with the Serbians and Montenegrins except for the Vojvodinians - but in the end that's precisely why Vojvodina managed to get itself incorporated into Serbia ;). --PaxEquilibrium 20:31, 17 April 2007 (UTC)

• On the issue of regionalisation, this may happen in economic terms, but in terms of political power, the power will still be quite centralised in Zagreb because almost a quarter of the population resides there and accounts for just short of half the country's GDP.
• Republic of Croatia is also a stabilising force in the region, not only acting as a military counterweight to Serbia, but an exporter of investment and growth, particularly to BiH and Serbia, as well as providing a relevant template for implementing civil and economic reforms that are part of the EU acquis.

But it's closed policy to Serbia could change. It invests in Serbia greatly (Frikom, numerous other famous companies etc) and economically (re)makes Serbia dependent, but on the other hand is strictly defensive, isolationist and closed when Serbian investments come in (remember the Hotels and Tourist attractions). BTW what does "as a military counterweight" mean? --PaxEquilibrium 20:31, 17 April 2007 (UTC)

2. Bosnia & Herzegovina - the threat to the states viability ironically stems from the economic stagnation and poltical apathy caused by the very unweildly institutions that are there to accomadate the national differences that tore the country apart during the 1990's. A few observations:

• With a continued NATO presense, the internal security of the country is assured, Serbia is no longer in a position to serve as a threat, and Croatia no longer sees the geopolitical need to sustain a buffer zone in the Croat areas.

• Although Serbia does not support the secession of the Serb Republic, great circles of it do (very large circles). --PaxEquilibrium 15:12, 25 November 2006 (UTC)

Agreed - not good for regional stability. I have seen maps of Greater Serbia that include RS, CG, the now defunct SAO Krajina & parts of the federation (Bihac-sanski most cantonal area as well as the Grahovo, Petrovac area). Is this consistent with the views of these circles, or they more interest in RS only b/c that is more tangible? iruka 06:53, 16 March 2007 (UTC)

Heh, not even close. Just a Serbia without Kosovo and with Republika Srpska (with the Brcko District). --PaxEquilibrium 20:31, 17 April 2007 (UTC)

• All Bosnians, whether they see themselves as Bosnijaks, Croats, Serbs, still share a common regional identity of either being Bosnian or Herzegovinan, and it is this tie that will be leveraged to preserve the country;

• I think you're wrong on this one. Whereas Croats, and especially Serbs identify themselves with the neighboring countries (Croatia and Serbia, respectively), it is amongst the Bosniacs the generaly opinion that they're foreigners, and in common speech "Bosnian" usually denotes "Bosnian Muslim". Serb/Croats are seen as intruders, particularly through the nationalistic ideology of them being "Christian Bosniacs", created as separate peoples in the 19th century. --PaxEquilibrium 15:12, 25 November 2006 (UTC)

Interesting. I have heard of this once before. Sad really. Similar to similar claims made of almost any community in the ex-Yugoslavia. However such views can serve as a benchmark of civil society - when such views diminish or disappear all together, then that is a good sign civil society has cemented itself. iruka 06:53, 16 March 2007 (UTC)

Bosnia is very far away from that Utopia... --PaxEquilibrium 20:31, 17 April 2007 (UTC)

• Institutions will be reformed to provide more efficient service delivery. Republika Srpska will exist in effect, but the entity governments will need to be abolished to create the cost savings for better services, with the functions of the entities delegated largely to the cantons. This would also remove the need for an explicit third entity as Croat autonomy, as with that of the Muslims and Serbs would be facilitated through the cantonal self-management. With greater political empowerment and relevance comes greater engagement with institutions, translating into greater tax receipts and more functional institutions. In such an environment, the renknown Herzegovinan entrepreneurship could be harnessed, the benefits of which would diffuse into adjoining Serb and Muslim areas.

The Serbs will hardly give up hands from their government in Banja Luka, especially in the times when their political leaders are closing upon independence (secession). BTW the central Sarajevo government and Bosniak political leaders are slightly unlikely to accept decentralization and handing over of power to the districts. The current Kosovo topic is especially mixin' it up over with the Serbs. --PaxEquilibrium 20:31, 17 April 2007 (UTC)

• Expect a reform of the presidency with a direct elected president and convention where an ethnic formula applies (similar to Lebanon) where for example a Muslim would be president, a Serb Premier and a Croat Speaker of the parliament.

• But that divides nations. Also, don't you think that more numerous nations will demand lesser rights to the less numerate ones and that the lesser ones will oppose calling upon mistreatment (like Serbs in Croatia?)? The general opinion is that Bosniacs will be going on assuming full rights and powers, while the Croats will practically vanish. --PaxEquilibrium 15:12, 25 November 2006 (UTC)

Citizen rights can be assured @ the national level, while national rights can be assured @ the cantonal level. Entity parliaments are unecessary - you can have entity groupings or national groupings in the national parliament. Think more along committe groupings in the US congress. iruka 06:53, 16 March 2007 (UTC)

• The talk of independence of RS needs to be taken as a tactical move in the context of Kosovo status negotiations, as well as the just passed elections in BiH. It can also be viewed as a preemptive act to any movement to abolishment of the BiH entities.

• You're missing the will over the people. The general self-determination's result is indeed independence. --PaxEquilibrium 15:12, 25 November 2006 (UTC)

3. Montenegro - alot of painful reforms, but good things lie ahead as they follow in Croatia's footsteps. The sizeable Serb minority will soon realise where their bread is buttered.

• In the proper sense of the word, Serbs aren't a minority - and in the late 1990s and in 2004 they were the majority of Montenegro's population. Regardless, if we count all the people with Montenegrin citizenship in the world (this is mainly due to high emigration), the majority of Montenegro's citizens are ever since the fall of Milosevic's regime, Serbs. --PaxEquilibrium 15:12, 25 November 2006 (UTC)

4. Macedonia - With an ongoing NATO presense in Kosovo and Albanian populated parts of Macedonia, I see no security issues of significance. This area of the world will slowly be absorbed by the EU over the next 15years.

• The situation looks somewhat stable for now - but for how long? FYROM's unitarian, and its Albanians don't like it - especially the new government was formed with the help of the minor pro-Macedonian Albanian national parties, practically ignoring the majority of the vote. Also, the Albanians have a rather high birth rate - they're destined to become the majority of the population of the Republic of Macedonia soon enough. --PaxEquilibrium 15:12, 25 November 2006 (UTC)

5. Serbia - once the elites jettison any Greater Serbia visions, are able to let go of Kosovo, and fill their obligations to the ICTY, go through the painful privitisation reforms that the other EU candidates had gone through, they too will eventually accrue the benefits of EuroAtlantic integration. In the short term, I forecast alot of economic pain. But the rub-off of econcomic prosperity of neighbouring republics will help ease that pain. Will have to contend with significant influence of Croatian Corporates like INA, Podravka etc as well as the dominance of the Kuna. iruka 15:33, 24 November 2006 (UTC)

• Well, privatizing is almost done. You don't need to forecast, because that's already happening for a long time :). --PaxEquilibrium 15:12, 25 November 2006 (UTC)

The solution is quite simple really

Build a time machine. —KingIvan 08:34, 14 March 2007 (UTC)

Let me put this as simple as possible, it wouldn't work at all. The only reason Yugoslavia failed for the second time was because of economic problems and ethnic tensions. If Tito was still alive or if politicians had used Tito as their role model or if Tito had had an apprentice, Yugoslavia would still exist and would be as great as Germany, France, Italy, etc. are today. --Crna Gora 18:33, 17 March 2007 (UTC)

Wasn't Tito a dictator? iruka 03:40, 19 March 2007 (UTC)

Depends how you use it. Considering that the word "dictator" today always attracts a negative affect, it should be avoided for the sake of neutrality in Tito's case. --PaxEquilibrium 15:40, 20 March 2007 (UTC)

Even Tito didn't belive in the survival of Yugoslavia. This he said openly (maybe just to frighten people up). See work done by Dušan Bilandžić on this matter. So the merry "dictator" is out of the solution equation. -- Imbris (talk) 01:55, 19 February 2008 (UTC)

European Union

On their way to membership in the European Union, the countries of the Balkan should be able to sort out their squabbles and finally realise that only by working together (within the European Union) they will be able to be a strong constituent part of a Europe that will work to make the world a better place. I seriously believe that a peaceful coexistence of the Balkan within the European Union will be possible, and even expected. —Nightstallion (?) 14:34, 18 March 2007 (UTC)

This differs from the squabbles within the EU, how? :)- I agree Economic union is the way to go, but view political union as containing the same flaws as every other union - CCCP etc. The key issue would be that these countries get to pick & choose their own priorities, rather trying to force them into yet another Balkan Union. iruka 03:48, 19 March 2007 (UTC)