User:Lucky102/sandbox/Kriegsschuldfrage

The Kriegsschuldfrage (English: Question of responsibility in war) refers to the public debate that took place in Germany in order to establish the German share of responsibility in the First World War. The debate took place for the most part during the Weimar Republic and was articulated in several phases determined largely by the impact of the Treaty of Versailles (1919) and the attitude of the victors. This debate also took place in other countries involved in the conflict, such as France and the United Kingdom.

The debate surrounding the Kriegsschuldfrage not only mobilized historians such as Hans Delbrück, Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Gerhard Hirschfeld or Fritz Fischer, but also a rather large circle comprising various intellectuals such as Kurt Tucholsky and Siegfried Jacobsohn, as well as public opinion. The history of the Weimar Republic was partly shaped by the Kriegsschuldfrage: founded shortly before the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, the republic embodied until its demise this debate which will be taken up again as a campaign argument by the Nazi Party.

While the Kriegsschuldfrage made it possible to investigate the deep-rooted origins of the First World War, not without provoking a great deal of controversy, it also made it possible to identify other aspects of the conflict, such as the role of the masses and the question of the Sonderweg. This debate, which blocked German political progress for many years, also showed that politicians such as Gustav Stresemann were able to confront the problem of responsibility by advancing general thinking, without compromising German interests.

Since 1945, many similar debates have taken place, with the concept particularly relevant to the First World War.

Foundations

War Propaganda

In terms of international law at the time, the war of aggression was a legal but morally condemned process. During the war, the governments involved embarked on the publication of carefully selected diplomatic documents to prove that they themselves had tried to defuse the conflict but the enemies had triggered it. For the Triple Entente, the invasion of Belgium was a sign that Germany was the aggressor, but for the German government, the Russian mobilization was the prelude to an invasion. The declaration of war would have prevented encirclement. The Oberste Heeresleitung thus justified the application of the Schlieffen Plan and its desire to achieve a victorious peace quickly.

On 4 August 1914, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg justified the violation of Belgian neutrality before the Reichstag:

We now find ourselves in self-defense, and necessity is the law. Our troops have occupied Luxembourg, perhaps already trampled on Belgian territory. Gentlemen, this is against the laws of international law. The harm - I speak frankly - the harm that we are doing by this action, we will repair it as soon as our military goal has been achieved.

Only a few politicians acknowledged some fault in the war. Hungarian Prime Minister István Tisza had refused the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia because of the risk of war. In the autumn of 1914, he blamed the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Leopold Berchtold and the German government for the escalation of the conflict.

The proof that he himself had been attacked was necessary above all for domestic political reasons. Social Democratic supporters in France and Germany had still been demonstrating en-masse for peace at the end of July 1914. The readiness for war was low, especially in Great Britain; in Germany, war-enthusiastic masses in the large cities were confronted by a predominantly skeptical and apathetic rural population. It was clear to all those responsible that one had to portray one's own country as innocent of the outbreak of war in order to win the population over to the war. In fact, the color books promoted readiness for war in all belligerent states..

War support in Germany

Almost all historians of the German Reich, such as Georg von Below, Otto Hintze, Erich Marcks, Friedrich Meinecke, Hermann Oncken, considered it their patriotic duty to support the government during the war through nationalistic portrayals of their own history. Many artists and writers such as Ludwig Fulda supported propaganda, aimed at proving innocence in the war. The Manifesto of the Ninety-Three, signed by internationally renowned Nobel Prize winners, philosophers, artists, doctors and teachers, had a strong impact abroad.

Due to the Sacred Union and the vote of the war loans on 4 August 1914, which allowed the full mobilization of the Reich Army, the question of responsibility was only tackled within the Social Democrats by a few revolutionary socialists. Like most people in Germany, it was believed that Russia started the war and thus forced the Germans to wage a defensive war. It was on this basis that the Majority Social Democratic Party of Germany, the German Progress Party and the Centre Party passed a peace resolution on 19 July 1917 in the Reichstag to get the OHL (German: Oberste Heeresleitung) to renounce the unrestricted submarine war but also to get the Allies to end the maritime blockade and to obtain guarantees under international law for German integrity. In the resolution, MPs called for reconciliation and envisage, among other things, the creation of international legal organisations. However, they also stated that Germany would continue the fight as long as it and its allies are invaded and violated. Without the guarantees of international law, the war had to continue.