User:John Z/drafts/First Intifada
OLD
[edit]The first Intifada was the intifada that took place from 1987 to 1991 (end of massive violence) or 1993 (Oslo accords). The first Intifada was sometimes also called "the war of stones", -because of the massive stone-throwing by Palestinian crowds during it.- +Palestinians, committed to civil disobedience, refused to use arms even against Israeli tanks curIt was sometimes also called "the war of stones", because the Palestinians generally used stones and other makeshift weapons.cur
The intifada was a partially spontaneous phenomenon; after it began, the PLO attempted to claim that it had organized it, but historians view this as an after-the-fact attempt to assert more control than it really had. edp+(This is the reverse of the situation with regard to the Second Intifada, which was billed as "spontaneous" although the PLO had apparently long planned it.)edp+
In the months leading up to the first intifada numerous events occurred that increased the hostility between Palestinians and Israelis. On October 1, 1987 Israeli military ambushed and killed seven men from Gaza believed to be members of the Jihad. Several days later an Israeli settler shot a Palestinian schoolgirl in the back.++2/4/05On the other hand, the Palestinians attacked and killed many innocent Israeli citizens as well as Israeli soldiers++ Daily, the riots escalated throughout the occupated territories and where particularly severe in the Gaza Strip.
Under these already heated circumstances, incorrect rumors easily spread. -In the Gaza Strip, stories were told a recent truck accident (in which several Palestinians were killed by a rushing Israeli army truck) was really a deliberate attack as retaliation for the Jewish salesman that had been stabbed to death two days ago in Gaza. Further, it was said that Israeli hospitals were murdering Palestinians; other stories stated that "the Jews" had poisoned the water so as to kill all the Palestinians in the Gaza strip, A UN investigation found that none of these charges had any basis in fact, but the mere presence of these stories, reinforced by the real incidents above, caused wild panic and street fights against Israeli policemen and soldiers.- + It is well documented that the combined effect of these events constituted the proximal spark of the first intifada.-- Howver, the general underlying cause of the intifada can be seen in the many years of military control that the Palestinians suffered under the Israelis. + -- ++The Intifada was the climax of growing tension and violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians.++
It is well documented that the combined effect of these events constituted the proximal spark of the first intifada. Howver, the general underlying cause of the intifada can be seen in the many years of military control that the Palestinians suffered under the Israelis.
Arabs maintain that the Intifada was a protest of Israel's brutal repression which included extra-judicial killings, mass detentions, house demolitions, indiscriminate torture, deportations, and so on. There is very little doubt that these did take place. Even so, the period preceding the Intifada was a generally calm one - for example, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, leader of the Hamas was arrested by Israel for preaching for violence but released when he promised to refrain from it.
In addition to the political and national sentiment, further causes to the Intifada can be seen in the Egyptian withdrawal from their claims to the Gaza Strip (as well as the Jordanian monarchy growing weary of supporting Jordanian claims to the West Bank), the increasing density of population (caused by both the traditional rapid rates of birth in poor areas and the limited allocation of land to new building or agriculture under the Israeli rule) and the growing unemployment (in particular, the income from jobs in Israel allowed Palestinians to provide university education for their children - but there were few available jobs for the graduates afterwards).
Others point out that Palestinians felt abandoned by their Arab allies, the PLO had failed to destroy Israel and establish a Palestinian state in its stead as promised. However, it did manage to block the Israeli attempts to call for an election inside the territories (beginning with 1974), and as it seemed to many of them, they would spend the rest of their lives as second class citizens, without full political rights.
Considering all of the above and the mass scale of the uprising, it is of little doubt that it was not initiated by any single man or organization. However, the PLO was very quick to take matters into its hands, sponsoring riot provocateurs and enhancing their presence in the territories (called the "tandhim", or "organization") that was to guarantee the continuation of riots. The PLO was not uncontested, however, competing in its activities for the first time with radical Islamic organizations - Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which also had a share in inducing further violence.
Much of the intifada was low-tech; dozens of Palestinian teenagers would ambush small patrols of Israeli soldiers, showering them with large rocks, attempting to kill with brute force and vastly superior numbers. However, this tactic soon gave way to using thousands of Molotov cocktail attacks, over 100 hand grenade attacks and more than 500 attacks with guns or explosives.++Many Israli citizens, civilians or in the military were killed this way.++
In 1988, middle-class Christian merchants initiated a nonviolent movement (or as some analysts hold it, were forced by the PLO) to withhold taxes - the legality of which under international law is disputed - collected and used by Israel to pay for the administration of territories. When time in prison didn't stop the activists, Israel crushed the boycott by imposing heavy fines while seizing and disposing of the equipment, furnishings, and goods from local stores, factories, and even homes.
Ultimately, Israel was successful in containing the Intifada. As the Palestinians were inferior in relation to the well equipped and trained Israel Defense Forces, and were generally unarmed. However, the Intifada pinpointed numerous problems with the IDF's conduct in the operative and tactical fields, as well as the general problem of Israel's prolonged control of the Palestinian territories. These problems were noticed and widely criticized, both in international forums (in particular, when humanitarian questions were at stake), but also in Israel's own public, in which the Intifada had caused a split. --Eventually, it was the Intifada that caused the repeated rise of the Israeli peace movement (see Peace Now), and Yitzhak Rabin's eventual re-election in 1992. The Intifada definitely stopped only with the 1993 Oslo accords.--
+++ 30/5/05
Outcome
[edit]By the time the Oslo Accords were signed, 1,124 Palestinians and 90 Israelis had died source. Significantly, in the first eighteen months of the intifada, 326 Palestinians had been killed, as opposed to only 10 Israeli casualties in the same period. This initially high fatality rate on the Palestinian side was due largely to the IDF's lack of resources and inexperience in pacification and crowd control. Often when facing demonstrators IDF soldiers had no riot control munitions and would feel compelled to shoot unarmed demonstrators with live fire.
As the intifada progressed, Israel progressively introduced various riot control methods (some, including a machine that broke up rocks and spat them at crowds, being rather exotic) that had the effect of reducing Palestinian casualties, although they still remained fairly high. Another possible contributor to the high initial casualties was Yitzhak Rabin's aggressive stance towards the Palestinians (notably including an exhortation to the IDF to "break the bones" of the demonstrators). His successor Moshe Arens subsequently proved to have a better understanding of pacification, which perhaps reflects in the lower casualty rates for the following years.
The Intifada was never a military endeavour in either a conventional or guerilla sense. The Palestinian leadership (who had limited control of the situation in any event) never expected the uprising to make any direct gains against the Israeli state. However, the Intifada did produce a number of positive results for the Palestinians:-
1. By engaging the Israelis directly, rather than relying on the authority or the assistance of neighbouring Arab states, the Palestinians were able to globally cement their identity as a separate nation worthy of self-determination. The era marked the end of the Israelis referring to Palestinians as "South Syrians" and largely ended Israeli discussion of a "Jordanian solution".
2. The harsh Israeli countermeasures (particularly during the earlier years of the Intifada) resulted in adverse media publicity for Israel. The fact that 159 Palestinian children below the age of 16 (mostly stone throwers) had died was especially concerning for international observers. Significantly, numerous American media outlets openly criticised Israel in a way that had not been experienced previously. Furthermore, the conflict succeeded in putting the Palestinian question back on the internation agenda, particularly in the UN, but also for Europe and the United States as well as the Arab states. Europe became an important economic contributor towards the nascent Palestinian authority, and American aid and support of Israel became more conditional that it was previously.
3. The intifada also dealt a heavy economic blow to Israel. The Bank of Israel estimated it cost the country $650 million in lost exports. The impact on the services sector, including the important Israeli tourist industry was notably bad.
4. The uprising lead directly to the Oslo accords, and thereby to the return of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation from their Tunisian exile. Although the negotiations failed to fulfil their potential, it is notable that prior to the first Infifada, it was doubtful whether there would ever be a Palestinian state. After the Oslo accords, an independent Palestine of some sort, at some time in the future seemed relatively certain.
Ultimately, Israel was successful in containing the Intifada. As the Palestinians' force was inferior in relation to the well equipped and trained Israel Defense Forces, and were generally unarmed. However, the Intifada pinpointed numerous problems with the IDF's conduct in the operative and tactical fields, as well as the general problem of Israel's prolonged control of the Palestinian territories. These problems were noticed and widely criticized, both in international forums (in particular, when humanitarian questions were at stake), but also in Israel's own public, in which the Intifada had caused a split. +++
NEW
[edit]The first Intifada (literally "shaking off") was an uprising that took place from 1987 to 1991 (end of massive violence) or 1993 (Oslo accords). It was sometimes also called "the war of stones", because the Palestinians generally used stones and other makeshift weapons. The intifada was a spontaneous phenomenon. After it began, the PLO claimed that it had organized it, but historians view this as an after-the-fact attempt to assert more control than it really had. The PLO shared its leadership with a new body, the Unified National Command.
In the months leading up to the first intifada numerous events occurred that increased the hostility between Palestinians and Israelis. On October 1, 1987 Israeli military ambushed and killed seven men from Gaza believed to be members of the Jihad. Several days later an Israeli settler shot a Palestinian schoolgirl in the back. Daily, the riots escalated throughout the occupated territories and where particularly severe in the Gaza Strip.
Under these already heated circumstances, false rumors easily spread. In the Gaza Strip, stories were told a recent truck accident (in which several Palestinians were killed by a rushing Israeli army truck) was really a deliberate attack as retaliation for the Jewish salesman that had been stabbed to death two days ago in Gaza. Further, it was said that Israeli hospitals were murdering Palestinians; other stories stated that "the Jews" had poisoned the water so as to kill all the Palestinians in the Gaza strip, A UN investigation found that none of these charges had any basis in fact, but the mere presence of these stories, reinforced by the real incidents above, caused wild panic and street fights against Israeli policemen and soldiers. It is well documented that the combined effect of these events constituted the proximal spark of the first intifada. However, the underlying cause of the intifada was the many years of Israeli military control of the Palestinians. This control included extra-judicial killings, mass detentions, house demolitions, torture, deportations and so on. Even so, the period preceding the Intifada was a generally calm one - for example, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, leader of the Hamas was arrested by Israel for preaching for violence but released when he promised to refrain from it.
In addition to nationalist sentiment, increasing density of population (caused by both the traditional rapid rates of birth in poor areas and limited allocation of land to new building or agriculture under the Israeli rule) and growing unemployment (in particular, the income from jobs in Israel allowed Palestinians to provide university education for their children - but there were few available jobs for the graduates afterwards).
Others point out that Palestinians felt abandoned by their Arab allies, the PLO had failed to destroy Israel and establish a Palestinian state in its stead as promised. However, it did manage to block the Israeli attempts to call for an election inside the territories (beginning with 1974), and as it seemed to many of them, they would spend the rest of their lives as second class citizens, without full political rights.
Considering all of the above and the mass scale of the uprising, it is of little doubt that it was not initiated by any single man or organization. However, the PLO was very quick to take matters into its hands, sponsoring riot provocateurs and enhancing their presence in the territories (called the "tandhim", or "organization") that was to guarantee the continuation of riots. The PLO was not uncontested, however, competing in its activities for the first time with radical Islamic organizations - Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which also had a share in inducing further violence.
Much of the intifada was low-tech; dozens of Palestinian teenagers would ambush small patrols of Israeli soldiers, showering them with large rocks, attempting to kill with brute force and vastly superior numbers. However, this tactic soon gave way to using thousands of Molotov cocktail attacks, over 100 hand grenade attacks and more than 500 attacks with guns or explosives.
In 1988, middle-class Christian merchants initiated a nonviolent movement (or as some analysts hold it, were forced by the PLO) to withhold taxes - the legality of which under international law is disputed - collected and used by Israel to pay for the administration of territories. When time in prison didn't stop the activists, Israel crushed the boycott by imposing heavy fines while seizing and disposing of the equipment, furnishings, and goods from local stores, factories, and even homes.
Outcome
[edit]By the time the Oslo Accords were signed, 1,124 Palestinians and 90 Israelis had died source. Significantly, in the first eighteen months of the intifada, 326 Palestinians had been killed, as opposed to only 10 Israeli casualties in the same period. This initially high fatality rate on the Palestinian side was due largely to the IDF's lack of resources and inexperience in pacification and crowd control. Often when facing demonstrators IDF soldiers had no riot control munitions and would feel compelled to shoot unarmed demonstrators with live fire.
As the intifada progressed, Israel progressively introduced various riot control methods (some, including a machine that broke up rocks and spat them at crowds, being rather exotic) that had the effect of reducing Palestinian casualties, although they still remained fairly high. Another possible contributor to the high initial casualties was Yitzhak Rabin's aggressive stance towards the Palestinians (notably including an exhortation to the IDF to "break the bones" of the demonstrators). His successor Moshe Arens subsequently proved to have a better understanding of pacification, which perhaps reflects in the lower casualty rates for the following years.
The Intifada was never a military endeavour in either a conventional or guerilla sense. The Palestinian leadership (who had limited control of the situation in any event) never expected the uprising to make any direct gains against the Israeli state. However, the Intifada did produce a number of positive results for the Palestinians:-
1. By engaging the Israelis directly, rather than relying on the authority or the assistance of neighbouring Arab states, the Palestinians were able to globally cement their identity as a separate nation worthy of self-determination. The era marked the end of the Israelis referring to Palestinians as "South Syrians" and largely ended Israeli discussion of a "Jordanian solution".
2. The harsh Israeli countermeasures (particularly during the earlier years of the Intifada) resulted in adverse publicity for Israel. That 159 Palestinian children below the age of 16 (mostly stone throwers) had died especially concerned international observers. Significantly, many American media outlets openly criticised Israel in a way that had not been experienced previously. Furthermore, the conflict succeeded in putting the Palestinian question back on the international agenda, particularly in the UN, but also for Europe and the United States as well as the Arab states. Europe became an important economic contributor towards the nascent Palestinian authority, and American aid and support of Israel became more conditional that it was previously.
3. The intifada also dealt a heavy economic blow to Israel. The Bank of Israel estimated it cost the country $650 million in lost exports. The impact on the services sector, including the important Israeli tourist industry was severe.
4. The uprising led directly to the 1988 events in Algiers, the 1991 Madrid Conference and the 1993 Oslo accords, and thereby the return of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation from its Tunisian exile. Prior to the first Intifada, it seemed doubtful whether there would ever be a Palestinian state. After the Oslo accords, and in spite of their disappointing outcome, an independent Palestine of some sort, at some time in the future seemed relatively certain.
Ultimately, Israel was successful in containing the Intifada. The generally unarmed Palestinians' force was inferior to the well equipped and trained Israel Defense Forces. But the Intifada pinpointed numerous problems with the IDF's operations and tactics, as well as the general problem of Israel's prolonged control of the Palestinian territories. These problems were noticed and widely criticized, both in international forums (in particular, when humanitarian questions were at stake), but also in Israel's own public, in which the Intifada had caused a split. Eventually, it was the Intifada that caused the repeated rise of the Israeli peace movement (see Peace Now), and Yitzhak Rabin's eventual re-election in 1992. The Intifada definitely stopped only with the 1993 Oslo accords.
French
[edit]The first intifada, also called the war of the stones, was a spontaneous and general uprising of the Palestinian people against the Israeli occupation which began on December 9, 1987. It reached a peak in February when an Israeli photographer published pictures round the world showing Israeli soldiers violently molesting Palestinians outraging of public opinion.[1] It ended in 1993 with the signing of the Oslo accords. La première Intifada, appelée guerre des pierres, est un soulèvement général et spontané, qui a débuté le 9 décembre 1987, de la population palestinienne contre l'occupation israélienne. Elle a atteint son paroxysme en février lorsqu'un photographe israélien publie des images qui font le tour du monde montrant des soldats israéliens « molestant violemment » des Palestiniens suscitant ainsi l'indignation de l'opinion publique[2]; elle a pris fin en 1993 lors de la signature des accords dits d'Oslo.
Casus belli
[edit]On 8 December 1987, an Israeli truck crushed a Palestinian car killing four Palestinians. Radio broadcasted the news without any special emphasis, saying it was an accident like many others.[3]. A rumor surfaced that it was an act of vengeance committed by a relative of an Israeli stabbed two days earlier. [4]. Les Palestiniens y voient un accident provoqué intentionnellement et un meurtre prémédité[5]. and many Palestinians saw it as intentionally premeditated murder
Le 8 décembre 1987, un camion israélien écrase une voiture palestinienne tuant quatre Palestiniens. La radio diffuse la nouvelle sans insister car il s'agit d'un accident comme tant d'autres[6]. Une rumeur fait surface selon laquelle il s'agissait d'un acte de vengeance commis par un parent de l'israélien poignardé deux jours plus tôt [7]. Les Palestiniens y voient un accident provoqué intentionnellement et un meurtre prémédité[8].
Le lendemain, pendant les funérailles des victimes, la foule s'en prend à une position militaire de Tsahal à Jabaliya en lançant des pierres. Des coups de feu furent tirés par les soldats mais cela n'aura aucun effet sur la foule. Des renforts furent appelés, mais ceux-ci se trouvèrent sous un déluge de pierres et de cocktails Molotov [9]. Cet évènement est considéré comme le début de la première Intifada. Cependant cet accident ne constitue que la goutte d’eau qui fait déborder le vase car l'Intifada est le résultat de l'accumulation de plusieurs facteurs.
Sous-estimation
[edit]Plusieurs officiers de la compagnie de Jabaliya se réunirent à l'avant-poste attaqué. Les réservistes, impressionnés par l'intensité de l'émeute, demandèrent du renfort mais le commandement du secteur répondit {{citation}}
: Empty citation (help) et ajouta {{citation}}
: Empty citation (help)[10]. Aucun renfort n'est alors demandé et aucun couvre-feu n'est instauré.
Mais le lendemain les troubles recommencent. La majorité des résidents ne se rendent pas au travail et les étudiants de l'université islamique de Gaza parcourent le rues pour appeler la population à la révolte. Pour disperser la foule, les soldats sortent pour faire étalage de leur force mais ils se trouvent sous une pluie de pierres accompagnées par des huées de la foule. Quelques jeunes Palestiniens grimpent sur les camions militaires. Les chauffeurs effrayés accélèrent pour tenter de se débarrasser d'eux[11]. Le gaz lacrymogène est utilisé à plusieurs reprises sans effets pour disperser la foule. Trois cocktails Molotov sont jetés par les Palestiniens, deux atteignent leur cible et incendient un véhicule militaire. Ofer, le lieutenant de la compagnie de Jabaliya ordonne alors de tirer dans les jambes de tous ceux qui s'approchent puisque les rafales en l'air ne réussit pas à disperser la foule[12]. Deux heures plus tard Itzak Mordechai , commandant de la région Sud arriva à l'avant-poste de Jebalaya et suspendit le lieutenant Ofer sur le champ car il était convaincu que cet affrontement dans la rue était à l'origine des troubles dans la bande de Gaza .[13]
Réaction politique israélienne
[edit]Au troisième jour de l’Intifada, le 10 décembre, Yitzhak Rabin ministre israélien de la défense à l'époque s'envola pour New York. Celui-ci ne prend aucune mesure pour calmer l'Intifada et ce fut Yitzhak Shamir qui occupa les fonctions de ministre de la Défense pendant l'absence de Rabin alors qu'il n'avait jamais occupé ce poste et le chef d'état-major, relativement nouveau dans son poste, n'a jamais eu à s'occuper de troubles palestiniens ce qui permit à l'Intifada de s'étendre en Cisjordanie[14]. Arrivé à New York, le secrétaire américain de la Défense n'aborde le sujet que brièvement, ce qui constitue une preuve pour la délégation israélienne que ce qui se passe dans les territoires n'a pas d'importance[15] et à cela s'ajoute le fait que l'équipe chargée de communiquer à Rabin tous les développements significatifs était inexpérimentée. Alors Rabin ne prêta pas attention à ce qui se passe dans les territoires occupés et était plutôt occupé par des négociations portant sur l'achat d'équipements militaires [16] . De plus aucun responsable de la sécurité n'imaginait un soulèvement palestinien d'une grande ampleur. Dès son retour, Rabin qui est mal informé commet ce qui passe pour une erreur flagrante aux yeux des observateurs : il organise une conférence de presse dans l'aéroport et affirme que l'Iran et la Syrie, les deux plus grands ennemis d'Israël, se trouvent derrière l'Intifada. Ces propos sont non seulement éloignés de la vérité, mais ils vont aussi à l'encontre de ceux de Yitzhak Shamir qui accuse l'OLP d'en être responsable. Les experts des services de renseignement étaient également d'accord pour dire que le soulèvement était un mouvement spontané né sur place et que, ni la Syrie, ni l'Iran, ni l'OLP n'étaient à l'origine de cette révolte[17] .
Raisons antérieures
[edit]L'Intifada n'est pas l'unique résultat de la mort des quatre Palestiniens mais elle naît suite à l'accumulation de plusieurs facteurs :
Sur le plan personnel, la population vivait mal l'occupation israélienne. Après la guerre de six jours, le marché de travail israélien s'ouvre aux Palestiniens ce qui a permis à l'économie locale de se développer et d'élever le niveau de vie [18] mais cette situation ne dura pas longtemps. Les Palestiniens commencent à subir des humiliations quotidiennes. Les conditions de travail commencent à se dégrader, pour le même travail ils sont payés 2 fois moins que leurs collègues Israéliens, les Palestiniens ont besoin d'autorisations pour se déplacer et travailler mais elles sont difficiles à obtenir, des fouilles quotidiennes sont effectuées même dans leur domicile [19]
Sur le plan territorial, Jérusalem est réunifié par Israël et elle est déclarée sa capitale « éternelle et indivisible ». L'accès à l'esplanade des Mosquées et aux lieux saints musulmans est réglementé. Des terres sont annexées pour assurer le statut de Jérusalem comme capitale indivisible et pour créer des colonies qui ont pour but de garantir des frontières sûres [20] et les sources d'eau de la bande de Gaza et de la Cisjordanie sont détournées au profit des colonies israéliennes et au détriment des Palestiniens. [21]
Sur le plan directionnel, la direction palestinienne en exil ne connaissait pas leur situation, elle n'était pas consciente de leur souffrance, ne tenait pas compte de leur besoin et ne proposait pas des solutions [22] . La politique de l'OLP à Tunis reposait sur la création d'une axe Le Caire-Amman pour assurer la sécurité d'Arafat et ne réglait pas les problèmes des Palestiniens ou même des réfugiés[23]
Sur le plan arabe, le désintéressement progressif des chefs d'État arabes pour leur cause. Les Palestiniens sont en effet déçus par les sommets de la ligue arabe où la question palestinienne est classé en bas de la liste des priorités. Même quand les dirigeants arabes s'intéressent à la question palestinienne, ils n'ont aucune solution à proposer [24]
Développement
[edit]L'Intifada se caractérise par une campagne de désobéissance civile et par des manifestations contre la domination israélienne, avant de s'étendre rapidement à l'ensemble des territoires occupés, avec une diminution de la violence en 1991. Après Jebaliya le vent de l'Intifada touche Khan Younès, al Bourej, Nuseirat et toute la Bande de Gaza est emportée par l'Intifada qui touche ensuite la Cisjordanie. Elle est surtout menée par des enfants et des adolescents qui s'attaquent aux forces israéliennes en jetant des pierres et qui bloquent les routes avec des barricades de pneus incendiés. Des centaines de personnes se rassemblent autour des mosquées et défient l'armée de les disperser . Les haut-parleurs sont utilisés pour appeler les habitants à manifester, des tracts sont distribués et des slogans sont placardés sur les façades, incitant à se retourner contre l'armée [25] . Les tracts sont généralement distribués à la mosquée pendant les heures de prière par des enfants de six ou sept ans ou sont affichés à l'entrée. Une autre méthode consistait à les jeter par paquets des fenêtres des voitures avant la levée du jour ou à les glisser sous les portes, les placarder sur les poteaux de téléphone... [26]. Israël répond d'abord par la répression policière et militaire, des tortures physiques, des déportations, des arrestations sans procès [27] la fermeture des universités, des sanctions économiques et le développement des implantations israéliennes dans les territoires occupés. L'armée israélienne qui a sous-estimé l’Intifada, fut surprise par la révolte car elle était le plus grand défi jamais adressé par les Palestiniens à Israël[28] et l'armée n'était pas prête à affronter des grandes démonstrations. Les soldats se trouvaient encerclés par des enfants, des hommes et des femmes armés de pierres [29]. L'armée adopta, dans un premier temps, une politique militaire répressive et reçut l'ordre de frapper les manifestants. {{citation}}
: Empty citation (help) [30].Les images, amplement diffusées par les médias nationaux et étrangers, d'enfants Palestiniens battus, voire tués, par les forces de l'ordre israéliennes pour avoir jeté des pierres alimentent un courant de sympathie à l'égard des Palestiniens que Yasser Arafat sait utiliser pour faire progresser sa cause. Elle entraîne un cycle infernal de représailles de la part de « Tsahal » que suivent de nouvelles émeutes. Des grèves sont également organisées, ainsi que des mouvements de boycott. En Israël, la poursuite de l'Intifada renforce l'opposition entre les partisans d'un règlement pacifique de la question palestinienne et les opposants à toute concession faite aux Palestiniens.
Rôle des femmes
[edit]Contrairement aux autres soulèvements, les femmes ont joué un rôle important dans la Première Intifada. Les femmes n'hésitent pas à affronter l'armée israélienne et à s'engager en faveur de la cause palestinienne. Leur participation dans les villes est plus forte que dans les villages. Ce phénomène est dû en effet à la structure patriarcale, très importante dans les milieux ruraux, qui maintenait les femmes à la maison . Leur engagement progressif était palpable sur le terrain : les femmes représentent un tiers de la totalité des victimes [31]. Grâce à l'Intifada, les femmes ont pu affirmer leur existence sur les scènes sociale et politique ce qui constitue une rupture avec le passé. Dans le passé, seules les épouses des plus éminents activistes participaient à la politique nationale. L'entrée de la femme en politique date des années 1970 avec la création d'associations étudiantes mais leur rôle n'était pas important. Par exemple, le rôle de l'Union générale des femmes Palestiniennes se restreignaient aux aides sociales et à la santé. Cette tendance peut être vue avec l'augmentation du nombre de femmes arrêtées ou incarcérées sans procès qui passa de quelques centaines aux années 1970 à quelques milliers aux années 1980 [32]. La politique israélienne a aidé les femmes à faire entendre leur voix en annulant une disposition jordanienne de 1955 qui refusait le droit de vote aux femmes. Les femmes ont pu alors participer aux élections municipales de 1976 et certaines furent élues dans certains conseils municipaux [33] . Avec le durcissement des conditions de vie et la répression au fur et à mesure de l'Intifada, le taux de participation des femmes a connu une augmentation. Elles sont présentes dans tous les aspects du soulèvement : jets de pierre, organisation de grèves et élaboration d'une politique diplomatique afin de tirer parti politiquement de l'Intifada. Avec les sanctions israéliennes, les femmes ont joué un rôle important afin de parvenir à une autosuffisance locale. Elles fondèrent des coopératives, parfois dans leurs foyers, afin de fournir tout ce qu'il faut et compenser les sanctions israéliennes [34]
Répression militaire israélienne
[edit]Pressé d'agir, Ytshak Rabin déclare à la Knesset : « Nous imposerons la loi et l'ordre dans les territoires occupés, même si cela doit se faire dans la douleur» . Il ajoute « S'il le faut, brisez-leur les bras et les jambes » [35]. Il demande de concevoir des armes non létales permettant de lutter contre les manifestants d'une manière plus efficace [36]. Israël développe une politique de communication dans le but de marginaliser l'OLP et alimenter les tensions entre le Hamas et les autres factions[37].
Suite à l'échec des forces régulières, les garde-frontières sont appelés par le gouvernement israélien pour mettre un terme à la révolte populaire . Les garde-frontières, ou les bérets verts sont en effet connus pour leur aptitude à contrôler les foules et également pour leur brutalité [38]. Avec un âge moyen de 35/40 ans, ils sont plus expérimentés que les autres soldats du Tsahal. Dans le but de calmer l'Intifada ils reçoivent des vestes pare-éclats en Kevlar et armes non létales qui permettent de neutraliser l’adversaire. Ce sont les 20e et 21e compagnies, connues pour avoir surveillé les frontières entre le Liban et Israël lors de l'invasion de 1982, qui sont les premiers à être déployés. Mais l'engagement des bérets verts ne change pas la situation sur le terrain. L'armée est alors autorisée à ouvrir le feu en cas d'attaque par une personne de plus de 12 ans qui est considérée comme un adulte. Le tir doit d'abord s'effectuer en l'air à 60 degré au-dessus de la foule, puis dans les jambes en cas de danger. Le thorax ne peut être visé qu'en cas de légitime défense. Néanmoins ces règles sont fréquemment violées [39] . En octobre 1988, le gouvernement israélien révèle l'existence de deux nouvelles unités qui opèrent en Cisjordanie et à Gaza. Ses membres sont tous des arabisants qui agissent en civil et leur tâche principale est d'infiltrer la résistance palestinienne [40] .
Le cas de Jérusalem
[edit]Jérusalem-Est vivait dans le calme alors que le reste des territoires occupés furent emportés par l'Intifada. Les habitants des quartiers aisés n'étaient pas du genre à descendre dans la rue[41]. Israël ne prend non plus aucune précaution supplémentaire dans cette partie orientale de la ville. Muhammad Labadi, un militant du front démocratique, décida d'importer l'Intifada à la ville. Des jeunes furent recrutés à Gaza et Hébron dans ce but. Les préparatifs s'accomplirent dans le secret le plus total et le Shin Beth ne se douta de rien. Il fut décidé que les émeutes éclateraient le 19 décembre. Les émeutes éclatent alors d'une manière brutale et inattendue dans divers endroits à 9h20 malgré les renforcements des mesures de sécurité ce jour à l'occasion de la visite du président italien Francesco Cossiga. Des barricades de pneus incendiés sont élevées, les banques israéliennes sont attaquées, les véhicules de la municipalité sont brûlés. Certaines institutions arabes ne sont pas épargnées par les attaques. L'hôpital Muqased, des clubs de jeunes sont visés et des usines où des Palestiniens représentent une part importante de la main d'œuvre.[42]. La ligne verte a été rétablie et des renforts sont appelés par la police israélienne. La police procéda à des méthodes strictes vis-à-vis des habitants arabes de Jérusalem : contrôle des véhicules, fouilles corporelles, confiscation de 4000 cartes d’identité. Une nouvelle loi interdit aux Musulmans non résidents dans la ville d'aller à la mosquée al-Aqsa et ceux qui y entrent doivent montrer leurs papiers. Un contingent de la brigade anti-terroriste est placé à l'enceinte de la mosquée pour empêcher que des manifestations éclatent le vendredi mais cette mesure provoque des affrontements entre la police et des manifestants que les forces de l'ordre capturent et rouent de coups. La police plaça alors ses hommes à une certaine distance de la mosquée. Parallèlement à ces mesures, la police reçut l'ordre formel de ne pas ouvrir le feu et les troupes sont averties de devoir passer par un juge pour prouver qu'ils étaient en état de légitime défense pour justifier l'usage de leur arme. Pendant des mois, Jérusalem ne connaît aucun mort côté Palestinien [43].
Désobéissance civile
[edit]L'Intifada se caractérise par une campagne de désobéissance civile et par des manifestations contre la domination israélienne. Cette idée d'utiliser la désobéissance civile existait bien longtemps avant l'Intifada mais les dirigeants de l'OLP l'ont tournée en dérision et ont considéré les personnes qui soutenaient ces idées comme des individus naïfs ignorant la réalité palestinienne. Côté israélien, on était conscient de son potentiel mais on la tenait pour négligeable [44]. Le principal partisan de la désobéissance civile était Moubarak Awad un psychologue palestinien vivant aux États-Unis. Ce dernier rentre à Jérusalem, où il ouvrit un centre de la non-violence en 1983, après 15 ans aux États-Unis . Ses tentatives d'appliquer sa philosophie sur le terrain échouèrent à plusieurs reprises. Awad était "snobé" par les représentants de l'OLP qui l'accusaient de collaborer avec la CIA et proféraient des menaces à son encontre [45] . Son isolement idéologique et le manque de soutien rendaient son travail difficile. On ne montra plus d'intérêt à ses idées qu'à partir de novembre 1986 lorsque les Palestiniens ont perdu leur foi dans les représentants Palestiniens de l'extérieur. Pour Awad, seul le peuple empêcherait l'annexion des territoires par Israël [46]. Il n'inventa pas moins de cent vingt méthodes d'action. Parmi ses partisans ,on trouve Hanna Siniora et Sari Nusseibeh. Hanna Siniora lance un appel à une désobéissance civile qui commencerait par le boycott des cigarettes et des boissons gazeuses, se poursuivrait par celui des taxes pour atteindre, en plusieurs étapes, la rupture totale avec le système israélien mais son appel tomba dans l'indifférence et le mépris et Hanna fut soupçonné de vouloir démobiliser la jeunesse en prise avec l'armée dans les rues[47]. Awad proposait de remplacer les émeutes par des marches silencieuses, des campagnes de nettoyage. Il appela par exemple à la création d'institutions alternatives à l'administration civile israélienne. Il proposait une infrastructure autonome qui servirait de noyau à un futur État Palestinien, une infrastructure indépendante d'Israël et également de l'extérieur pour le financement et la gestion des affaires. Il appelait à faire des provisions de nourriture, de fuel, et de créer des systèmes de financement locaux au lieu d'attendre l'aide extérieure [48]. À la fin de janvier 1988, le Commandement unifié de l'Intifada a estimé que la rébellion ne pouvait durer que six mois de plus. Aucun membre du Commandement ne croyait à l'idée d'une lutte prolongée car ils étaient convaincus, par leurs expériences, que l'endurance de la population était en général de courte durée. Pour Louai Abdo, la population ne supporterait plus le chômage et une économie sans cesse interrompue [49]. Le Commandement conclut que la désobéissance civile est la seule méthode de lutte possible et commença à étudier les textes d'Awad et adopta plusieurs points de son programme comme objectifs de l'Intifada. L'Intifada adopta une nouvelle stratégie à long terme. Louai Abdo parla de « réduire l'occupation, son réseau inextricable des lois, ses manœuvres et sa bureaucratie omniprésente à des groupes de soldats éparpillés dans les rues ». Dès lors, Awad fut très sollicité des les mois qui suivirent et ses anciens adversaires se disputaient aujourd'hui de défendre ses idées. Awad est également sollicité par les dirigeants locaux du Fatah, il est appelé pour régler les litiges qui opposaient des fractions rivales et la presse le traitait comme le porte-parole de l'Intifada. Sa montée et le triomphe de ses idées irrita l'État hébreu et Awad se trouva sous menace d'expulsion malgré les appels de plusieurs personnalités américaines. Le ministre israélien de l'intérieur a annoncé qu'il ne renouvellerait pas son visa touristique ce qui lui donna plus de crédit. Il fait appel de la décision devant la Haute Cour de justice et fit savoir qu'il était prêt à se convertir au judaïsme s'il le fallait [50] .
Pour rétablir le contrôle de l'Administration civile sur la population et empêcher les progrès de la désobéissance civile, Israël appliqua des mesures punitives et dissuasives. Persuadé qu'il ne peut pas inverser la rébellion, le gouvernement a décidé de s'en prendre aux acquis de l'Intifada et contrôler ses ambitions. Le code de procédure pénale fut révisé pour permettre des arrestations massives. De nouveaux centres de détention sont créés pour permettre l'incarcération de plusieurs milliers de personnes pendant de longues périodes. L'armée a choisi aussi d'allonger la durée des couver-feu. Pendant la première année du soulèvement on compta pas moins de 1600 couvre-feux dont 118 sur une période au moins égale à 5 jours. La totalité de la population de la Bande de Gaza a vécu sous couvre-feu et au moins 80% des 450 villages et villes arabes de la Cisjordanie. Les écoles et les universités de Cisjordanie ont été fermées, 140 dirigeants du soulèvement ont été expulsés et plusieurs maisons démolies [51]. Les associations qui ont exprimé une quelconque manifestation d'indépendance ou de contestation, comme par exemple l'Association pour la protection de l'environnement à Qalqilya, furent contraintes de fermer leurs portes. Afin d'empêcher l'arrivée de l'aide extérieure, les voyageurs en provenance de la Jordanie ne furent plus autorisés à porter que deux cents dinars jordaniens contre deux mille dinars précédemment. Des campagnes sont organisées par l'armée afin de forcer la populations à payer les impôts israéliens. Les licences d'exportation ne furent renouvelées seulement aux personnes qui avaient acquitté leurs impôts [52]. Un blocus est imposé sur certaines zones uniquement peuplées d'Arabes. Ils ne peuvent plus se déplacer, d'expédier ce qu'ils produisaient. On va jusqu'à interrompre l'alimentation en électricité et en eau. Il y a également coupure des lignes téléphoniques. La Jordanie a aggravé la situation en interdisant l'importation de certains produits majeurs de la Cisjordanie [53]. Cette politique a modifié l'équilibre des forces et a entraîné la chute du niveau de vie des Palestiniens de 30 à 40 % .
Action armée
[edit]La première Intifada est connu par son caractère pacifique mais l'action armée y était présente à hauteur de 15% . Les cibles de ses actions armées étaient les soldats israéliens, les colons et les collaborateurs : {{citation}}
: Empty citation (help) (Hamas) tandis que les appels du CNU désignent indistinctement soldats et colons comme cibles des pierres et des molotov mais rien n'est dit des civils israéliens qui ne vivent pas dans les territoires occupés [54]. Des listes nominatives de collaborateurs ainsi que tracts sont publiés . Ces collaborateurs sont présentés par le Hamas comme des "hommes à l'esprit malade" , des "psychologiquement défaitistes" (HMS13), des "sous-hommes" ou des "lâches" . Les collaborateurs sont définis par le Commandement unifié de l'Intifada comme "tous ceux qui s'écartent du rang national" . {{citation}}
: Empty citation (help)[54] . Des "groupes de choc", "brigades de choc" et autres "forces de choc" sont apparus après à la création du Commandement unifié, et ce sont les proches du Fatah qui, dans un premier temps, feront appel à leurs services . Ces groupes ont pour mission d'organiser les heurts avec l'armée et les colons, d'imposer les consignes du Commandement; ils sont également investis du pouvoir de châtier tous ceux qui tentent de "s'éloigner de l'appel de la patrie" . Cette militarisation croissante des groupes de choc ne sera, cependant, pas acceptée de tous, le débat se manifestant dans les réécritures de chaque groupe [54].
Naissance du Hamas
[edit]Lorsque l'Intifada éclate dans la bande de Gaza, où habitait Ahmed Yassine, ses disciples lui demandent de prendre part au mouvement en adoptant une ligne militante à la place de sa politique de prédilection. Ahemd Yassine ne voulait pas participer à des actions armées contre Israël et a interdit ce genre d'actions à ses disciples car il était convaincu qu'une confrontation avec Israël serait coûteuse. Quelques semaines après le début du soulèvement, il change sa vision et fait circuler un tract qui appelle à se joindre au mouvement. Ce tract est signé par une faction inconnue jusqu'à maintenant qui est le Mouvement de Résistance Islamique. Avec la création du Commandement unifié de l'Intifada, Yassine voit une manœuvre de l'OLP pour s'assurer le contrôle du soulèvement [55] et prend la décision de créer le Hamas et fait des efforts énormes pour protéger le Congrès islamique qu'il a créé en essayant de faire croire qu'il existe une distinction entre le deux. Le Majed, un réseau de renseignement, est créé pour traquer les personnes qui collaboraient avec le Shin Beth et les exécuter. Les membres des Frères musulmans rejoignent le Hamas et l'organisation se fait absorber par le Hamas qui se développe d'une manière considérable devenant un acteur important dans la bande de Gaza à partir du deuxième mois de l'Intifada et commence à s'attaquer aux soldats israéliens isolés, incendier des champs et des boutiques appartenant à des individus israéliens. L'été suivant le Hamas devient présent en Cisjordanie[56]. Les milieux de la Défense israélienne décident d'une intervention radicale qui s'étend entre juillet et septembre 1988. Environ 120 sont arrêtés dont des hauts responsables comme Jamil al-Tamimi qui était en charge de la liaison avec la Cisjordanie. Ahmed Yassin n'est pas arrêté à cause de son état physique mais il est prévenu d'une manière sévère contre tout soutien aux activités terroristes. Une idée envisage de lui interdire l'accès de Gaza mais elle fut écartée car on craignait que cette idée rehausse son prestige [57] . Suite à cette opération un rapport annonça la fin du mouvement mais celui-ci réussit à se reconstruire quelques semaines plus tard. Les services de sécurité israéliens mènent une seconde intervention en mai 1989 et cette fois Yassine est arrêté avec 260 militants du Hamas. Israël est cette fois conscient que le Hamas est capable de se reconstruire avec la montée en puissance du soulèvement[58] .
Arabes israéliens
[edit]La réaction des Palestiniens d'Israel était inattendue . Ils réagirent au soulèvement plus vite que l'OLP de Tunis [59]. Les Arabes israéliens déclarent {{citation}}
: Empty citation (help) [60]. Les Arabes d'Israël sont touchés par ce qui arrivent aux Palestiniens des territoires occupés. Il organisent des manifestations et des grèves. Ils considèrent les actions des insurgés palestiniens justifiées et se sentent même fiers de leur audace qui permet de défier et mettre en échec l'armée israélienne. Pour les aider, ils envoient de la nourriture, des médicaments, organisent des protestations, collectent du fond peux eux et leur donnent leur sang[61]. Les députés arabes à la Knesset interviennent en faveur des détenus palestiniens. D'autres apportent une aide au soulèvement, pour la première fois, les actions politiques des Palestiniens d'Israël et des territoires occupés sont coordonnées. Les Arabes Israéliens seront même soutenus plus tard par certaines factions de la gauche israélienne[62]. Lorsque le Commandement unifié de l'Intifada a trouvé des difficultés pour imprimer les tracts et les manifestes dans les territoires palestiniens occupés, ils utilisèrent d'abord les imprimeries de Nazareth, plus grande ville arabe du pays, puis celles qui se trouvent des les villages arabes. Certains mettent leur compte bancaire à la disposition de l'OLP qui a pu effectuer des virements importants vers les territoires. D'autres offrent leur téléphone lorsque le Shin Beth décida de couper les lignes internationales pour empêcher les Palestiniens de recevoir des directives venant de l'étranger[63] .
Le soulèvement a permis d'accélérer le processus de la « palestinisation » des arabes israéliens. Il les amène aussi à changer leur stratégie politique qui consistait à influencer la politique israélienne de l'intérieur en pénétrants les institutions sionistes. Deux membres de la Knesset appartenant à deux partis sionistes démissionnent de leur poste. Abdel Wahab Darawshe quitte le parti travailliste pour créer le Parti arabe démocratique et Mohammed Watad quitte le Mapam pour rejoindre le Front démocratique pour la paix. La stratégie de vote de cette communauté change aussi. Les électeurs arabes votaient d'habitude pour les partis sionistes au pouvoir mais au début des années 1980 la donne change et ils commencent à voter au profit des partis non sionistes avec une légère orientation nationaliste palestinienne comme le Rakah et la liste progressiste pour la paix. En 1981 deux tiers des Arabes votent pour les partis sionistes alors qu'en 1988, les électeurs arabes votent massivement avec un taux de participation avoisinant 73% et deux tiers d’entre eux se prononcent en faveur des partis non sionistes [64] . L'Intifada joua un rôle décisif dans cette orientation politique avec aussi l'émergence d'une nouvelle classe de jeunes diplômés plus cultivés qui a une forte conscience politique éprouvant une profonde sympathie à l'égard de l'Intifada [65].
La crainte jordanienne
[edit]Le roi Hussein de Jordanie et ses conseillers étaient persuadés que les Israéliens refusaient délibérément de prendre les mesures nécessaires afin d'écraser l'Intifada. Ils refusaient de croire qu'Israël éprouvait des difficultés et craignaient qu'Israël ne laissa l'Intifada prendre de grandes proportions afin de recourir à une politique de déportation massive [66]. Les Jordaniens craignaient également que la rébellion s'étende au million de Palestiniens qui vivaient sur la rive est du Jourdain. Ainsi, la Jordanie craignait la déstabilisation du pouvoir surtout après la déclaration d'Ariel Sharon qui disait que seulement la Jordanie était le foyer national des Palestiniens. Hussein se tourna vers l'Irak pour demander son aide militaire. L'Iraq proposa de faire stationner des troupes en Jordanie. Hussein exprimait également sa solidarité avec le mouvement mais de l'autre coté les services de sécurité interdisaient les manifestations, confisquaient les tracts en provenance de Cisjordanie et incarcéraient certains Palestiniens à titre préventif [67].
Conséquences
[edit]L’Intifada eut des conséquences différentes pour les Palestiniens et les Israéliens. Le mouvement fit subir des pertes économiques importantes à Israël [68]. L'Intifada permit l'union de toutes les couches sociales et consolida l'entité nationale palestinienne. La direction de l'OLP exploita le succès de l'Intifada et publia la déclaration d'indépendance de l'État palestinien en novembre 1988 . Le document est une tentative pour préciser les objectifs de l'Intifada, certains d'entre eux n'étaient pas forcément au centre des actions politiques de l'Intifada. Le texte fut suivi de déclarations publiques de l'OLP sur la fin de la lutte armée et la reconnaissance d'Israël [69]. L'Intifada permit la réapparition du problème palestinien et sa mise à l'ordre du jour aux Nations Unies en tant que problème devant être résolu ce qui a conduit les Israéliens et les Palestiniens aux Accords d'Oslo signés en 1993 qui ont mis fin à la première Intifada . 1 162 Palestiniens (dont 241 enfants) et 160 Israéliens (dont 5 enfants) ont connu la mort[70].
{{Intifada}}
Documentation
[edit]- Histoire de l'autre, Collectif, Liana Levi, 2004, ISBN 2-86746-358-0
- Zeev Schiff, Yaari Ehud, Intifada, Simon & Schuster , ISBN 978-0671710538
- Pierre Razoux, Tsahal, nouvelle histoire de l'armée israélienne, Perrin, 2006, ISBN 226202328X
- Ilan Pappé,Une terre pour deux peuples : Histoire de la Palestine moderne ,Fayard,2004 ,ISBN 978-2213618685
Sources
[edit]- ^ Tsahal de Pierre Razoux p.407
- ^ Tsahal de Pierre Razoux p.407
- ^ Intifada p .14
- ^ Intifada p .14
- ^ Histoire de l'autre, p.69
- ^ Intifada p .14
- ^ Intifada p .14
- ^ Histoire de l'autre, p.69
- ^ Intifada p .15
- ^ Intifada p. 15
- ^ Intifada p. 16
- ^ Intifada p. 18
- ^ Intifada p. 18
- ^ Intifada p. 21
- ^ Intifada p. 21
- ^ Intifada p. 21
- ^ Intifada p. 26
- ^ Histoire de l'autre, p.63
- ^ Histoire de l'autre, p.72
- ^ Histoire de l'autre, p.66
- ^ Histoire de l'autre, p.73
- ^ Histoire de l'autre, p.72
- ^ Une terre pour deux peuples p 251
- ^ Une terre pour deux peuples p 251
- ^ Intifada p 125
- ^ Intifada p 130
- ^ Histoire de l'autre, p.66
- ^ La Première Intifada Medea (consulté le 17 janvier 2007)
- ^ Histoire de l'autre, p.70
- ^ Intifada
- ^ Une terre pour deux peuples p 257
- ^ Une terre pour deux peuples p 258
- ^ Une terre pour deux peuples p 258
- ^ Une terre pour deux peuples p 259
- ^ Tsahal de Pierre Razoux p.407
- ^ Tsahal de Pierre Razoux p.407
- ^ Tsahal de Pierre Razoux p.407
- ^ Tsahal de Pierre Razoux p.407
- ^ Tsahal de Pierre Razoux p.410
- ^ Tsahal de Pierre Razoux p.410
- ^ Intifada p 133
- ^ Intifada p 134
- ^ Intifada p 138
- ^ Intifada p 309
- ^ Intifada p 313
- ^ Intifada p 311
- ^ Le Commandement National Unifié : les partisans de l'OLP reprennent l'initiative (consulté le 31 mai 2007)
- ^ Intifada p 312
- ^ Intifada p 327
- ^ Intifada p 315
- ^ Intifada p 338
- ^ Intifada p 339
- ^ Intifada p 340
- ^ a b c Le soulèvement comme violence : armes, cibles et structures. (consulté le 25 mai 2007)
- ^ Intifada p 286
- ^ Intifada p 286
- ^ Intifada p 307
- ^ Intifada p 308
- ^ Une terre pour deux peuples p 251
- ^ Intifada p 215
- ^ Intifada p 216
- ^ Une terre pour deux peuples p 256
- ^ Intifada p 216
- ^ Intifada p 225
- ^ Intifada p 223
- ^ Intifada p. 346
- ^ Intifada p. 346
- ^ L'INTIFADA Centre de ressources sur la non-violence (consulté le 17 décembre 2006)
- ^ Une terre pour deux peuples p 261
- ^ Fatalities in the first Intifada B'tselem (consulté le 16 janvier 2007)
google trans of french
[edit]First Intifada
Arab-Israeli conflict
Wars and conflicts Palestine War of 1948
Protagonists of the war in Palestine in 1948 Civil War of 1947-1948 Arab-Israeli War of 1948-1949 War borders of Israel (1949-1956) Suez War (1956) Six-Day War (1967) Yom Kippur War (1973) Arab-1982 First Intifada (1987-1993) Second Intifada (2000 -..) Arab-2006 Conferences and Summits Madrid Conference of 1991 Camp David Summit II Summit Taba Geneva Initiative Agreements and peace treaties Agreements 1949 armistice The Camp David Accords (1978) Peace Treaty Israeli-Egyptian (1979) Lebanese-Israeli agreement of 17 May 1983 Oslo Accords Treaty Israeli-Jordanian peace (1994) Interim Agreement "Oslo II" Wye Accords
The first intifada, called war of the stones, is a spontaneous and general uprising, which began on December 9, 1987, of the Palestinian people against the Israeli occupation. It reached a peak in February when an Israeli photographer who publishes pictures have gone round the world showing Israeli soldiers violently molesting "Palestinians" thus the outrage of public opinion it ended in 1993 at the signing of the Oslo accords themselves.
Summary
1 Casus Belli
1.1 Understatement 1.2 Reaction Israeli policy 1.3 Reasons earlier
2 Development
2.1 Women's Role Israeli military crackdown 2.2 2.3 The case of Jerusalem 2.4 Civil Disobedience
3 Action army 4 Birth of Hamas 5 Israeli Arabs 6 Fear Jordanian 7 Consequences 8 Documentation 9 Sources
Casus Belli [Edit]
On 8 December 1987, an Israeli truck crushes a Palestinian car killing four Palestinians. The station broadcasts without the new emphasis because it is an accident like many others A rumor surfaced that it was an act of vengeance committed by a relative of the Israeli stabbed two days earlier The Palestinians see it as an accident caused intentionally and premeditated murder
The next day, during the funeral of the victims, the crowd grows on a military position in the IDF in Jabaliya throwing stones. Shots were fired by the soldiers, but this will have no effect on the crowd. Reinforcements were called, but they found themselves under a deluge of stones and molotov cocktails This event is regarded as the beginning of the first intifada. But this accident is just the drop of water that breaks the camel's back because the intifada is the result of the accumulation of several factors.
Understatement [Edit]
Several officers of the company Jabaliya met in the outpost attack. Reservists, impressed by the intensity of the riot, but asked for reinforcements from the command of the sector "He said nothing will happen!" And added "They go to bed and then start work tomorrow morning at dawn, as usual No reinforcements is then asked, and no curfew was introduced.
But the day after the unrest again. The majority of residents do not go to work and students from the Islamic University in Gaza roam the streets to call on the population to revolt. To disperse the crowd, the soldiers go out to display their strength, but they are under a hail of stones huées accompanied by the crowd. Some Palestinian youths climbed onto military trucks. Drivers accelerate frightened to try to get rid of them The tear gas was used several times without effect to disperse the crowd. Three Molotov cocktails were thrown by Palestinians, two reach their target and burned a military vehicle. Ofer, the lieutenant of the company Jabaliya ordered to draw in the legs of all those who approach because the gusts in the air fails to disperse the crowd Two hours later Itzhak Mordechai, commander of the Southern Region arrived at the outpost of Jebalaya and suspended Lt. Ofer on the field because he was convinced that this confrontation in the street was the cause of unrest in the band Gaza
Reaction Israeli policy [Edit]
On the third day of the intifada, December 10, Israeli Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Defense at the time flew to New York. This does nothing to calm the intifada and it was Yitzhak Shamir who occupied the position of Minister of Defense during the absence of Rabin as he had never held the post and the Chief of major, relatively new to his post, has never had to deal with Palestinian unrest which enabled the intifada to spread in the West Bank Arriving in New York, the American Secretary of Defense does the subject only briefly, which is a proof for the Israeli delegation that what is happening in the territories does not matter and it s 'Furthermore, the team Rabin communicate to all significant developments was inexperienced. So lent Rabin did not pay attention to what's happening in the occupied territories and was instead occupied by negotiations on the purchase of military equipment Moreover, no security officer imagined a Palestinian uprising in a big way. Upon his return, Rabin is misinformed commits what passes for an obvious error in the eyes of observers: he organized a press conference at the airport and argues that Iran and Syria, the two greatest enemies of Israel , are behind the intifada. These remarks are not only far from the truth, but they also go to those of Yitzhak Shamir who accuses the PLO of being responsible. The experts of the intelligence services were also agree that the uprising was a spontaneous movement born on the spot and that neither Syria nor Iran, nor the PLO was at the root of this revolt
earlier Reasons [Edit]
The Intifada is not the only result of the deaths of four Palestinians, but it arises as a result of the accumulation of several factors:
On a personal level, the population lived poorly Israeli occupation. After the six-day war, the Israeli labor market opens to the Palestinians which allowed the local economy to develop and raise the living standards but this did not last long. The Palestinians are beginning to suffer daily humiliations. Working conditions are beginning to deteriorate, for the same work they are paid 2 times less than their colleagues Israelis, Palestinians need permits to travel to and work but they are difficult to obtain, searches are conducted daily in the same their homes
On a national level, Jerusalem was reunified by Israel and its capital is declared "eternal and indivisible". Access to the Esplanade of the Mosques and Muslim holy sites is regulated. The lands are annexed to ensure the status of Jerusalem as its undivided capital and create colonies that are designed to ensure secure borders and water sources in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are being diverted for the benefit of Israeli settlements at the expense of Palestinians.
On the way, the Palestinian leadership in exile was unaware of their situation, she was not aware of their pain, did not take into account their need and did not propose solutions The policy of the PLO in Tunis was based on the creation of an axis Cairo-Amman to ensure the safety of Arafat and did not resolve the problems of Palestinian refugees or even
On the Arabic, unselfishness progressive Arab heads of state for their cause. The Palestinians are indeed disappointed by the summit of the Arab League in which the Palestinian issue is ranked at the bottom of the priority list. Even when the Arab leaders concerned with the Palestinian issue, they have no solution to offer
Development [Edit]
The Intifada is characterized by a campaign of civil disobedience and protests against Israeli domination, then spread quickly throughout the occupied territories, with a reduction of violence in 1991. After Jebaliya wind of the intifada key Khan Yunis, al Bourej, Nuseirat and Gaza is washed away by the intifada, which then affects the West Bank. It is mostly carried out by children and adolescents who attack Israeli forces by throwing stones and blocking roads with barricades of burning tires. Hundreds of people gather around mosques and defy the army to disperse them. The loudspeakers were used to call the people to demonstrate, leaflets were distributed and slogans are placardés on facades, encouraging them to turn against the military The flyers are usually distributed at the mosque during prayer times by children of six or seven years or are posted at the entrance. Another method was to throw the packet windows of the cars before the lifting of the day or to slide under doors, placarder on telephone poles ... Israel responded initially by the police and military repression, physical torture, deportations, arrests without trial the closure of universities, economic sanctions and the development of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. The Israeli army has underestimated the intifada, was surprised by the revolt because it was the biggest challenge ever sent by the Palestinians to Israel and the army was not ready to face major demonstrations. The soldiers were surrounded by children, men and women armed with stones The army adopted, as a first step, a military policy of repression and was ordered to strike the demonstrators. "In many cases, non-commissioned officers with their soldiers participated in beatings unjustified. It was not easy to know when it could strike [...] knocked on the same people at home, without reasons, and entire families were beaten Images, widely broadcast by the national media and foreign children Palestinians beaten, or even killed by the security forces Israel for throwing stones feeding a stream of sympathy for the Palestinians that Yasser Arafat knows how to use to advance its cause. It leads to a vicious circle of retaliation by the IDF "that" after further riots. Strikes are also held, as well as movements of boycott. In Israel, the continuation of the intifada strengthens the opposition between supporters of a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian issue and those opposed to any concession to Palestinians.
Women's Role [Edit]
A woman and an Israeli soldier in Jerusalem
Unlike other uprisings, women have played an important role in the First Intifada. Women did not hesitate to confront the Israeli army and to commit themselves to the Palestinian cause. Their participation in the cities is higher than in the villages. This is due in fact to the patriarchal structure, which is very important in rural areas, which kept women at home. Their progressive engagement was palpable on the ground: women make up one third of all victims Thanks to the intifada, women were able to assert their existence on the social and political scene which is a break with the past. In the past, only the wives of the most prominent activists involved in national politics. The entry of women in politics date the 1970 with the creation of student associations, but their role was not important. For example, the role of the General Union of Palestinian Women are restricted to welfare and health. This trend can be seen with the increase in the number of women arrested or imprisoned without trial, which grew from a few hundred in 1970 to a few thousand years to 1980 The Israeli policy has helped women to make their voices heard by cancelling a 1955 Jordanian who refused the right to vote for women. The women were able to then participate in the municipal elections of 1976 and some were elected in some municipal councils With the hardening of living conditions and repression as of the intifada, the participation rate for women has increased. They are present in every aspect of the uprising: stone, organizing strikes and development of a diplomatic policy to take advantage politically of the intifada. With Israeli sanctions, women have played an important role in order to achieve self-sufficiency locally. They founded cooperatives, sometimes in their homes, to provide everything necessary sanctions and compensate Israeli
Israeli military crackdown [Edit]
Under pressure to act, Ytshak Rabin said in the Knesset: "We will impose law and order in the occupied territories, even though it must be done in pain." He added "If necessary, break-their arms and legs" He seeks to develop non-lethal weapons to fight against demonstrators in a more efficient Israel is developing a communications policy with the aim of marginalizing the PLO and fuelling tensions between Hamas and the other factions
Following the failure of the regular forces, border guards are called by the Israeli government to put an end to the popular revolt. Border guards, or Green Berets are, in fact, known for their ability to control the crowds and also for their brutality With an average age of 35/40 years, they are more experienced than other IDF soldiers. In an effort to calm the intifada they receive fragmentation jackets and Kevlar non-lethal weapons that can neutralize the opponent. These are the 20 th and 21 th companies known to have guarded the borders between Lebanon and Israel during the 1982 invasion, which are the first to be deployed. But the commitment of green berets does not change the situation on the ground. The army is then authorized to open fire if attacked by a person over 12 years of age which is considered an adult. The fire must first be in the air at 60 degrees above the crowd, and then in the legs in case of danger. The chest can be set only in self-defence. But these rules are frequently violated In October 1988, the Israeli government revealed the existence of two new units that operate in the West Bank and Gaza. Its members are all Arabists who act civilian and their main task is to infiltrate the Palestinian resistance
The case of Jerusalem [Edit]
East Jerusalem was living in a calm while the rest of the occupied territories were washed away by the intifada. Residents of affluent neighbourhoods were not the type to take to the streets Israel does not any extra precaution in the eastern part of the city. Muhammad Labadi, an activist of the Democratic Front, decided to import the intifada in the city. Young people were recruited in Gaza and Hebron for this purpose. Preparations s'accomplirent in full secrecy and the Shin Beth douta do anything. It was decided that the riots éclateraient Dec. 19. The riots broke out when a sudden and unexpected way in various locations in 9:20 despite enhanced security measures today on the occasion of the visit of Italian President Francesco Cossiga. The barricades of burning tires are high, the Israeli banks are attacked, vehicles of the municipality are burned. Some Arab institutions are not spared the attacks. The hospital Muqased, youth clubs are covered and factories where Palestinians form a significant part of the workforce. The Green Line was restored and reinforcements are called by the Israeli police. The police proceeded to stringent methods vis-à-vis the Arab inhabitants of Jerusalem: vehicle control, body searches, confiscation of identity cards 4000. A new law prohibits non-Muslim residents in the city to go to the Al-Aqsa Mosque and those who enter must show their papers. A contingent of the anti- terrorist squad is placed at the mosque to prevent demonstrations broke out on Friday but this measure creates clashes between police and demonstrators that the security forces catch and beat. The police then put his men at a distance of the mosque. Alongside these measures, the police received a formal order not to open fire and troops are aware of having to go through a judge to prove that they were in self-defence to justify the use of their firearms. For months, Jerusalem has no known side Palestinian death
Civil Disobedience [Edit]
The Intifada is characterized by a campaign of civil disobedience and protests against Israeli domination. The idea of using civil disobedience existed long before the intifada but the leadership of the PLO have toured derision and considered those who supported these ideas as individuals naive ignoring the Palestinian reality. Israeli side, it was aware of its potential, but it is considered to be significant The main proponent of civil disobedience was a psychologist Mubarak Awad Palestinian living in the United States. The latter returned to Jerusalem, where he opened a center for non-violence in 1983, after 15 years in the United States. His attempts to apply his philosophy on the ground failed several times. Awad was "snobé" by the representatives of the PLO who accused him of collaborating with the CIA and proféraient threats against him His ideological isolation and the lack of support made his work difficult. It showed no further interest in his ideas that from November 1986 when the Palestinians have lost their faith in the Palestinian representatives from the outside. For Awad, only the people would prevent the annexation of territories by Israel It n'inventa no less than one hundred twenty approaches. Among its supporters are Hanna Siniora, and Sari Nusseibeh. Hanna Siniora appealed to a civil disobedience that begins with the boycott cigarettes and soft drinks, would continue through the taxes to achieve, in several stages, a total rupture with the system of Israel but his call fell into indifference and Hanna contempt and was suspected of wanting to demobilize youth in touch with the army in the streets Awad proposed replacing the riots by silent marches, clean-up campaigns. He called for instance for the creation of alternative institutions for the Israeli Civil Administration. He proposed an infrastructure that would serve as autonomous nucleus of a future Palestinian state, an infrastructure independent of Israel and also from abroad to finance and business management. He urged to make provisions for food, fuel, and create local financing systems instead of waiting for external aid In late January 1988, the Unified Command of the intifada believed that the rebellion could last only six months. No member of the Command skepticism to the idea of a prolonged struggle because they were convinced by their experiences, that the endurance of the population was generally short-lived. For Louai Abdo, the people will no longer support unemployment and an economy continuously interrupted Command concluded that civil disobedience is the only possible method of struggle and began to study the texts of Awad and passed several items on its program objectives of the intifada. The Intifada adopted a new long-term strategy. Louai Abdo spoke of "reducing the occupation, its intricate network of laws, its maneuvers and its pervasive bureaucracy to groups of soldiers scattered in the streets." Therefore, Awad was highly sought the months that followed and its former adversaries disputed today to defend his ideas. Awad is also sought by local leaders of Fatah, he is called to settle disputes which opposed fractions rivals and the press treated him as the spokesman of the intifada. Her ascent and the triumph of his ideas irritated the Hebrew state and Awad found himself under threat of deportation despite calls from several American personalities. The Israeli Minister of the Interior announced that he would not renew his tourist visa which gave him more credit. He appealed the decision before the High Court of Justice and informed that he was ready to convert to Judaism if necessary
To restore control of the civil administration on the population and preventing the progress of civil disobedience, Israel applied punitive measures and dissuasive. Convinced that it can not reverse the rebellion, the government decided to attack the achievements of the intifada and control its ambitions. The Criminal Procedure Code was revised to allow mass arrests. New detention centres are being created to allow the imprisonment of several thousand people for long periods. The army has also decided to extend the duration of simmering fire. During the first year of the uprising counted on no less than 1600 curfews including 118 over a period of at least 5 days. The entire population of the Gaza Strip lived under curfew and at least 80% of the 450 Arab villages and cities of the West Bank. Schools and universities in the West Bank were closed, 140 leaders of the uprising were expelled and several demolished houses The associations which have expressed any manifestation of independence or challenge, such as the Association for the Protection of the environment in Qalqilya, were forced to close their doors. In order to prevent the arrival of foreign aid, travellers from Jordan were not allowed to carry more than two hundred Jordanian dinars against two earlier. Campaigns are organized by the army to force the people to pay the taxes Israel. Export permits were not renewed only for people who had paid their taxes A blockade was imposed only on certain areas populated by Arabs. They can no longer move, to send what they were producing. We are going to interrupt the supply of electricity and water. There are also cutting telephone lines. Jordan has worsened the situation by prohibiting the importation of certain major products of the West Bank This policy has changed the balance of power and led to the fall in the living standards of Palestinians from 30 to 40%.
Action army [Edit]
The first intifada is known by its peaceful nature, but the army was present to the tune of 15%. The targets of its actions were armed Israeli soldiers, settlers and collaborators: "We do not differentiate between the settler and soldier: both are Jewish settler today is the soldier of tomorrow" ( Hamas), while the calls of CNU designate indiscriminately soldiers and settlers as targets stones and molotov but nothing was said on Israeli civilians who do not live in the occupied territories The lists of names of collaborators and pamphlets are published. These employees are presented by Hamas as "men in the sick mind", "psychologically defeatist" (HMS13), "sub- human" or "cowardly". Employees are defined by the Unified Command of the Intifada as "all those who deviate from the national forefront." Within Calls, employees are designated traders who do not call a strike or disseminate Israeli products affected by the boycott, the members of municipal councils, village or designated camps or in general all non-resigned services tax, police, customs and so on. And those who spread false rumours or communicated to the goals of the enemy. Proponents of Jordan and the Arab reaction will be, on several occasions, also included in the list of categories accused of collaboration as well as supporters of Hamas The "shock groups", "shock brigade" and other "shock forces" have emerged after the establishment of the Joint Command, and it is close to Fatah, as a first step, will use their services. These groups are responsible for organizing the clashes with the army and the settlers, to impose instructions Command, and they are also the power to punish all those who try to "get away from the call of the motherland ". This increasing militarization groups clash will, however, not accepted by all, the debate manifested in the rewriting of each group
Birth of Hamas [Edit]
Emblem of Hamas
When the intifada broke out in the Gaza Strip, where Ahmed Yassin lived, his disciples asked him to take part in the movement by adopting a militant line in place of its policy of choice. Ahemd Yassin did not want to participate in armed actions against Israel and forbids such actions to his disciples because he was convinced that a confrontation with Israel would be costly. A few weeks after the beginning of the uprising, he changes his vision and circulated a leaflet calling to join the movement. This tract is signed by a hitherto unknown faction which is the Islamic Resistance Movement. With the establishment of the Unified Command of the intifada, Yassin is a maneuver of the PLO to take control of the uprising and the decision to establish Hamas and made tremendous efforts to protect the Islamic Congress that he created by trying to make us believe that there is a distinction between the two. The Majed, a network of intelligence, was created to hunt down those who collaborated with the Shin Beth and execute them. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas joining the organization is absorbed by Hamas that develops significantly becoming an important player in the Gaza Strip from the second month of the Intifada and beginning to address Isolated at Israeli soldiers, burning fields and shops belonging to individuals Israelis. The following summer this becomes Hamas in the West Bank The circles of the Israeli Defense decide a radical intervention that stretches between July and September 1988. About 120 were arrested including senior officials as Jamil al-Tamimi who was in charge of liaison with the West Bank. Ahmed Yassin was not arrested because of his physical condition but he is accused of a severe manner against any support to terrorist activities. One idea he is considering prohibiting access to Gaza, but it was rejected because it was feared that this idea enhances its prestige Following this transaction a report announced the end of the movement but it managed to rebuild a few weeks later. The Israeli security services are conducting a second statement in May 1989 and this time Yassin was arrested with 260 Hamas activists. Israel is aware this time that Hamas is able to rebuild itself with the rise to power of the uprising
Israeli Arabs [Edit]
The reaction of the Palestinians to Israel was unexpected. They reacted to the uprising faster than the PLO in Tunis Israeli Arabs say 'We are part of the Intifada, but rather than resorting to violence, we exercise our rights within the Israeli democratic system The Arabs of Israel are affected by what came to the Palestinians in the occupied territories. It organize demonstrations and strikes. They consider the actions of Palestinian insurgents justified and feel very proud of their courage to defy that allows and to defeat the Israeli army. To help them, they send food, medicine, organize protests, the substance can collect them and give their blood The Arab MPs in the Knesset intervene on behalf of Palestinian prisoners. Others provide support to the uprising, for the first time, the policy actions of the Palestinians to Israel and the occupied territories are coordinated. Arab Israelis are even supported later by some factions of the Israeli left When the Unified Command of the Intifada has found it hard to print leaflets and manifests in the occupied Palestinian territories, they used first printing works of Nazareth, the largest Arab city in the country, then those located in the villages Arab. Some put their bank account at the disposal of the PLO who has been able to make significant transfers to the territories. Others offer their phone when the Shin Beth decided to cut international routes to prevent the Palestinians to receive instructions from abroad The uprising has helped to accelerate the process of "palestinisation" Israeli Arabs. It also led them to change their political strategy, which was to influence the Israeli policy of the Interior in penetrating Zionist institutions. Two members of the Knesset belonging to two parties Zionists resign from their posts. Abdel Wahab Darawshe left the Labour Party to form the Democratic Party Arabic and Mohammed Watad Mapam departed to join the Democratic Front for Peace. The strategy for the vote of this community does, too. Voters Arab usual voted for Zionist parties in power but in the early 1980's began to change and they start to vote in favour of non-Zionist parties with a slight Palestinian nationalist orientation as Rakah and progressive list for peace. In 1981 two thirds of the Arabs voted for Zionist parties, while in 1988, voters overwhelmingly Arab vote with a participation rate of around 73% and two-thirds of them are in favour of non-Zionist parties The Intifada played a decisive role in this policy also with the emergence of a new class of graduates more educated with a strong political consciousness experiencing a profound sympathy for the intifada
Fears Jordanian [Edit]
Jimmy Carter and King Hussein II of Jordan, on April 25, 1977 at the White House
King Hussein of Jordan and his advisers were convinced that the Israelis deliberately refused to take the necessary measures to crush the intifada. They refused to believe that Israel is experiencing difficulties and feared that Israel would not let the intifada take large proportions to resort to a policy of mass deportation Jordanians also feared that the rebellion spreading through the million Palestinians who lived on the east bank of the Jordan. Thus, the Jordan feared the destabilization of power especially after the declaration of Ariel Sharon who said that only Jordan was the homeland of the Palestinians. Hussein turned to Iraq to ask its military aid. The proposed Iraq to station troops in Jordan. Hussein also expressed its solidarity with the movement but on the other side the security services forbade demonstrations, leaflets confiscated from the West Bank and incarcéraient some Palestinians as a preventive measure
Consequences [Edit]
The Intifada had different consequences for Palestinians and Israelis. The movement did suffer substantial economic losses to Israel The Intifada permit the union of all segments of society and consolidating the Palestinian national entity. The leadership of the PLO exploit the success of the Intifada and published the declaration of independence of the Palestinian State in November 1988. The document is an attempt to clarify the objectives of the intifada, some of them were not necessarily at the centre of policy actions of the intifada. The text was followed by public statements of the PLO on the end of the armed struggle and the recognition of Israel The Intifada permit the resurgence of the Palestinian problem and put on the agenda at the United Nations as a problem that must be solved which led the Israelis and Palestinians to the Oslo Accords signed in 1993 that ended the first intifada. 1162 Palestinians (including 241 children) and 160 Israelis (including 5 children) have experienced death
Documentation [Edit]
History of the other authors, Liana Levi, 2004, ISBN 2-86746-358-0 Zeev Schiff, Ehud Yaari, intifada, Simon & Schuster, ISBN 978-0671710538 Pierre Razoux, IDF, new history of the Israeli army, Perrin, 2006, ISBN 226202328X Ilan Pappé, a land for two peoples: The History of Modern Palestine, Fayard, 2004, ISBN 978-2213618685
Sources [Edit]
↑ IDF Pierre Razoux p.407 ↑ intifada p .14 ↑ intifada p .14 ↑ History on the other hand, p.69 ↑ intifada p .15 ↑ intifada p. 15 ↑ intifada p. 16 ↑ intifada p. 18 ↑ intifada p. 18 ↑ intifada p. 21 ↑ intifada p. 21 ↑ intifada p. 21 ↑ intifada p. 26 ↑ History on the other hand, p.63 ↑ History on the other hand, p.72 ↑ History on the other hand, p.66 ↑ History of the other, p.73 ↑ History on the other hand, p.72 ↑ Land for two peoples p 251 ↑ Land for two peoples p 251 ↑ intifada p 125 ↑ intifada p 130 ↑ History on the other hand, p.66 ↑ The First Intifada Medea (accessed January 17, 2007) ↑ History on the other hand, p.70 ↑ Intifada ↑ Land for two peoples p 257 ↑ Land for two peoples p 258 ↑ Land for two peoples p 258 ↑ Land for two peoples p 259 ↑ IDF Pierre Razoux p.407 ↑ IDF Pierre Razoux p.407 ↑ IDF Pierre Razoux p.407 ↑ IDF Pierre Razoux p.407 ↑ IDF Pierre Razoux p.410 ↑ IDF Pierre Razoux p.410 ↑ intifada p 133 ↑ intifada p 134 ↑ intifada p 138 ↑ intifada p 309 ↑ intifada p 313 ↑ intifada p 311 ↑ The Unified National Command: supporters of the PLO to resume the initiative (accessed on May 31, 2007) ↑ intifada p 312 ↑ intifada p 327 ↑ intifada p 315 ↑ intifada p 338 ↑ intifada p 339 ↑ intifada p 340 ↑ a b c The uprising as violence: weapons, targets and structures. (Accessed on May 25, 2007) ↑ intifada p 286 ↑ intifada p 286 ↑ intifada p 307 ↑ intifada p 308 ↑ Land for two peoples p 251 ↑ intifada p 215 ↑ intifada p 216 ↑ Land for two peoples p 256 ↑ intifada p 216 ↑ intifada p 225 ↑ intifada p 223 ↑ intifada p. 346 ↑ intifada p. 346 ↑ THE INTIFADA Resource Centre on non-violence (accessed December 17, 2006) ↑ Land for two peoples p 261 ↑ Fatalities in the first intifada B'tselem (accessed January 16, 2007)
References
[edit]- Ze'ev Schiff, Ehud Ya'ari (1990). Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising-Israel's Third Front. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0671675303.
- Zachary Lockman, Joel Benin (1989). Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israel Occupation. South End Press. ISBN 0896083632.
- Roane Carey (Editor), Noam Chomsky, Gila Svirsky, Alison Weir (2001). The New Intifada: Resisting Israel's Apartheid. Verso. ISBN 1859843778.
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- Gloria Emerson (1991). Gaza: A Year in the Intifada : A Personal Account from an Occupied Land. Atlantic Monthly Pr. ISBN 0871134667.
- Don Peretz (1990). Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising. Westview Press. ISBN 0813308607.
- Norman G. Finkelstein (1996). The Rise and Fall of Palestine: A Personal Account of the Intifada Years. University of Minnesota Press. ISBN 0816628599.