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Groupthink is a psychological phenomenon that occurs within a group of people when the desire for harmony overrides the ability of the group to make rational decisions. It can be caused by group cohesiveness, structural faults within teams, and certain situational contexts and can negatively affect group decision making processes when members try to minimize conflict and reach a consensus by suppressing dissenting viewpoints. Most of the initial research on groupthink was conducted by Irving Janis, who claimed that groupthink results in overestimation of group abilities, closed-mindedness, and pressure towards conformity. Following Janis’s work, other researchers have posited alternative causes and questioned his claim regarding group cohesion. More recent studies of groupthink and groupthink antecedents reveal a mixed body of results. For instance, researcher Robert Baron (2005) contended that the connection between certain antecedents Janis believed necessary had not been demonstrated by the collective body of research on groupthink. Instead he proposed his own ubiquity model which included factors such as social identification, salient norms, and low self-efficacy.

The Janis model of groupthink

In 1952, before Janis, American journalist William H. Whyte, Jr. coined the term “groupthink” in an article in Fortune magazine:

Groupthink being a coinage - and, admittedly, a loaded one - a working definition is in order. We are not talking about mere instinctive conformity - it is, after all, a perennial failing of mankind. What we are talking about is a rationalized conformity - an open, articulate philosophy which holds that group values are not only expedient but right and good as well.

Irving Janis did not cite Whyte, but rebranded the term in 1971 by comparing it to "doublethink" and other similar terms that were part of the newspeak vocabulary in the novel "1984" by George Orwell. Janis initially defined groupthink as follows:

I use the term groupthink as a quick and easy way to refer to the mode of thinking that persons engage in when concurrence-seeking becomes so dominant in a cohesive ingroup that it tends to override realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action. Groupthink is a term of the same order as the words in the newspeak vocabulary George Orwell used in his dismaying world of 1984. In that context, groupthink takes on an invidious connotation. Exactly such a connotation is intended, since the term refers to a deterioration in mental efficiency, reality testing and moral judgments as a result of group pressures.

He went on to write:

The main principle of groupthink, which I offer in the spirit of Parkinson's Law, is this: The more amiability and esprit de corps there is among the members of a policy-making ingroup, the greater the danger that independent critical thinking will be replaced by groupthink, which is likely to result in irrational and dehumanizing actions directed against outgroups.

Janis set the foundation for the study of groupthink starting with his research in the American Soldier Project where he studied the effect of extreme stress on group cohesiveness. After this study he remained interested in the ways in which people make decisions under external threats. This interest led Janis to study a number of "disasters" in American foreign policy, such as failure to anticipate the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (1941); the Bay of Pigs Invasion fiasco (1961); and the prosecution of the Vietnam War (1964–67) by President Lyndon Johnson. He concluded that in each of these cases, the decisions occurred largely because of groupthink, which prevented contradictory views from being expressed and subsequently evaluated.

Causes

Janis prescribed three antecedent conditions to groupthink.

1. High group cohesiveness
   • deindividuation: group cohesiveness becomes more important than individual freedom of expression
2. Structural faults:
   • insulation of the group
   • lack of impartial leadership
   • lack of norms requiring methodological procedures
   • homogeneity of members' social backgrounds and ideology
3. Situational context:
   • highly stressful external threats
   • recent failures
   • excessive difficulties on the decision-making task
   • moral dilemmas

It should be stated that although a situation can contain high group cohesiveness, structural faults, and situational context, all three factors are not always present when groupthink is occurring. Janis considered a high degree of cohesiveness to be the most important antecedent to producing groupthink. While he suggested that high cohesiveness would not, itself, always produce groupthink he claimed that it was always present when groupthink was occurring. A very cohesive group adheres to all group norms, but whether or not groupthink arises depends on what the group norms are. If the group encourages individual dissent and alternative strategies to problem solving, it is likely that groupthink will be avoided even in a highly cohesive group. This means that high cohesion will lead to groupthink only if one or both of the other antecedents is present, situational context being slightly more likely than structural faults to produce groupthink.

Symptoms

To make groupthink testable, Janis devised eight indicative symptoms, divided into three types: Overestimation of the group, closed-mindedness, and pressures toward uniformity. Type I: Overestimations of the group — its power and morality

1. Illusions of invulnerability creating excessive optimism and encouraging risk taking.
2. Unquestioned belief in the morality of the group, causing members to ignore the consequences of their actions.

Type II: Closed-mindedness

1. Rationalizing warnings that might challenge the group's assumptions.
2. Stereotyping those who are opposed to the group as weak, evil, biased, spiteful, impotent, or stupid.

Type III: Pressures toward uniformity

1. Self-censorship of ideas that deviate from the apparent group consensus.
2. Illusions of unanimity among group members, silence is viewed as agreement.
3. Direct pressure to conform placed on any member who questions the group, couched in terms of "disloyalty"
4. Mindguards— self-appointed members who shield the group from dissenting information.

Prevention

Janis suggested that decision making groups are not necessarily destined to groupthink and devised several ways of aiding its prevention:

1. Leaders should assign each member the role of "critical evaluator". This allows each member to freely air objections and doubts.
2. Leaders should not express an opinion when assigning a task to a group.
3. Leaders should absent themselves from many of the group meetings to avoid excessively influencing the outcome.
4. The organization should set up several independent groups, working on the same problem.
5. All effective alternatives should be examined.
6. Each member should discuss the group's ideas with trusted people outside of the group.
7. The group should invite outside experts into meetings. Group members should be allowed to discuss with and question the outside experts.
8. At least one group member should be assigned the role of Devil's advocate. This should be a different person for each meeting.

An example of groupthink prevention is outlined in the series of events following the Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961. After the invasion fiasco, President John F. Kennedy sought to prevent groupthink during the Cuban Missile Crisis using "vigilant appraisal." During meetings, he invited outside experts to share their viewpoints, and allowed group members to question them carefully. He also encouraged group members to discuss possible solutions with trusted members within their separate departments, and even divided the group up into various sub-groups, to partially break the group cohesion. Kennedy was deliberately absent from the meetings, so as to avoid pressing his own opinion.

Alternative views and countermodels

Testing groupthink in a laboratory is difficult because synthetic settings remove groups from real social situations, which ultimately changes the variables conducive or inhibitive to groupthink. Because of its subjective nature, researchers have struggled to measure groupthink as a complete phenomenon, instead frequently opting to measure its particular factors. These factors range from causal to effectual and usually focus on group and situational aspects.

Alternative Views

A study by Leana (1985) indicated that the interaction between level of group cohesion and leadership style is completely insignificant in predicting groupthink. This finding refutes Janis' claim that the factors of cohesion and leadership style interact to produce groupthink. Park summarizes a study by McCauley (1989) in which structural conditions of the group were found to predict groupthink while situational conditions did not. This finding refutes Janis' claim that the factors of cohesion and leadership style interact to produce groupthink. McCauley (1989) found that the structural conditions of a group predicted groupthink while situational conditions did not. The structural conditions included group insulation, group homogeneity, and promotional leadership. The situational conditions included group cohesion. These findings refute Janis' claim about group cohesiveness predicting groupthink. McCauley also recast aspects of groupthink's preconditions by arguing that the level of attractiveness of group members is the most prominent factor in causing poor decision-making. According to work by Won-Woo Park(1990), research on the interaction between group cohesiveness and leadership style does not support Janis' claim that cohesion and leadership style interact to produce groupthink symptoms. Despite Janis’ “claim that group cohesiveness is the major necessary antecedent factor, no research has showed a significant main effect of cohesiveness on groupthink". The results of Turner and Pratkanis' (1991) study on social identity maintenance perspective concluded that groupthink could be viewed as a "collective effort directed at warding off potentially negative views of the group." Whyte (1998) suggested that collective efficacy plays a large role in groupthink because it causes groups to become less vigilant and to favor risks, two particular factors that characterize groups affected by groupthink.

Countermodels

In 1993, researchers R.J. Aldag and S.R Fuller (1993) argued that Janis’s groupthink concept was based on a "small and relatively restricted sample", which made it too broadly generalized, rigidly staged, and deterministic. They also claimed that in general, empirical support for groupthink had not, up to that point, been consistent. Aldag and Fuller suggested a new model called the General Group Problem-Solving (GGPS) model, which integrates new findings from groupthink literature. The primary difference between the GGPS model and groupthink is that the former is more value neutral and more political. As observed by Aldag & Fuller (1993), the groupthink phenomenon seems to rest on a set of unstated and generally restrictive assumptions:

1. The purpose of group problem solving is mainly to improve decision quality
2. Group problem solving is considered a rational process.
3. Benefits of group problem solving:
   • variety of perspectives
   • more information about possible alternatives
   • better decision reliability
   • dampening of biases
   • social presence effects
4. Groupthink prevents these benefits due to structural faults and provocative situational context
5. Groupthink prevention methods will produce better decisions
6. An illusion of well-being is presumed to be inherently dysfunctional.
7. Group pressures towards consensus lead to concurrence-seeking tendencies.

Researcher Robert Baron (2005) contended that the connection between certain antecedents Janis believed necessary had not been demonstrated by the collective body of research on groupthink. He believed that Janis' antecedents for groupthink were incorrect and argued that they were "not necessary to provoke the symptoms of groupthink, but that they often will not even amplify such symptoms." As an alternative to Janis' model, Baron proposed a ubiquity model of groupthink. This model provided a revised set of antecedents for groupthink, including social identification, salient norms, and low self-efficacy. A theory generated by Tsoukalas (2007), suggested that many of the basic characteristics of groupthink - e.g., strong cohesion, indulgent atmosphere, and exclusive ethos - are the result of a special kind of mnemonic encoding.[35] He claimed that members of tightly knit groups have a tendency to represent significant aspects of their community as episodic memories and this has a predictable influence on their group behavior and collective ideology.

Related research

Business

Huseman and Drive (1979) indicated that groupthink occurs in both small and large decision making groups within businesses. This results partly from group isolation within the business. Manz and Sims (1982) conducted a study showing that autonomous work groups are susceptible to groupthink symptoms in the same manner as decisions making groups within businesses.

Leadership

Fodor and Smith (1982) produced a study revealing that group leaders with high power motivation create atmospheres more susceptible to groupthink. Leaders with high power motivation possess characteristics similar to leaders with a "closed" leadership style—an unwillingness to respect dissenting opinion. The same study indicates that level of group cohesiveness is insignificant in predicting groupthink occurrence. In a study by Callaway, Marriot, and Esser (1985), groups with highly dominant members "made higher quality decisions, exhibited lowered state of anxiety, took more time to reach a decision, and made more statements of disagreement/agreement." Overall, groups with highly dominant members expressed characteristics inhibitory to groupthink. If highly dominant members are considered equivalent to leaders with high power motivation, the results of Callaway, Marriot, and Esser contradict the results of Fodor and Smith.

Case studies

Pop culture

Outside of research psychology and sociology, wider culture has come to detect groupthink (somewhat fuzzily defined) in observable situations, for example: " [...] critics of Twitter point to the predominance of the hive mind in such social media, the kind of groupthink that submerges independent thinking in favor of conformity to the group, the collective" "[...] leaders often have beliefs which are very far from matching reality and which can become more extreme as they are encouraged by their followers. The predilection of many cult leaders for abstract, ambiguous, and therefore unchallengeable ideas can further reduce the likelihood of reality testing, while the intense milieu control exerted by cults over their members means that most of the reality available for testing is supplied by the group environment. This is seen in the phenomenon of 'groupthink', alleged to have occurred, notoriously, during the Bay of Pigs fiasco." "Groupthink by Compulsion [...] [G]roupthink at least implies voluntarism. When this fails, the organization is not above outright intimidation. [...] In [a nationwide telecommunications company], refusal by the new hires to cheer on command incurred consequences not unlike the indoctrination and brainwashing techniques associated with a Soviet-era gulag."

Politics and military

Groupthink can have a strong hold on political decisions and military operations, which may result in enormous wastage of human and material resources. Highly qualified and experienced politicians and military commanders sometimes make very poor decisions when in a suboptimal group setting. Scholars such as Janis and Raven attribute political and military fiascoes, such as the Bay of Pigs Invasion, Vietnam War, and the Watergate scandal, to the effect of groupthink. More recently, Dina Badie argued that groupthink was largely responsible for the shift in the U.S. administration's view on Saddam Hussein that eventually led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States. After 9/11, "stress, promotional leadership, and intergroup conflict" were all factors that gave rise to the occurrence of groupthink. Political case studies of groupthink serve to illustrate the impact that the occurrence of groupthink can have in today's political scene.

Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis

The United States Bay of Pigs Invasion of April 1961 was the primary case study that Janis used to formulate his theory of groupthink. The invasion plan was initiated by the Eisenhower administration, but when the Kennedy White House took over, it "uncritically accepted" the CIA's plan. When some people, such as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and Senator J. William Fulbright, attempted to present their objections to the plan, the Kennedy team as a whole ignored these objections and kept believing in the morality of their plan. Eventually Schlesinger minimized his own doubts, performing self-censorship. The Kennedy team stereotyped Castro and the Cubans by failing to question the CIA about its many false assumptions, including the ineffectiveness of Castro's air force, the weakness of Castro's army, and the inability of Castro to quell internal uprisings.

Janis claimed the fiasco that ensued could have been prevented if the Kennedy administration had followed the methods to preventing groupthink adopted during the Cuban Missile Crisis, which took place just one year later in October 1962. In the latter crisis, essentially the same political leaders were involved in decision-making, but this time they learned from their previous mistake of seriously under-rating their opponents.

Other scholars attempt to assess the merit of groupthink by reexamining case studies that Janis had originally used to buttress his model. Roderick Kramer (1998) believed that, because scholars today have a more sophisticated set of ideas about the general decision-making process and because new and relevant information about the fiascos have surfaced over the years, a reexamination of the case studies is appropriate and necessary. He argues that new evidence does not support Janis' view that groupthink was largely responsible for President Kennedy's and President Johnson's decisions in the Bay of Pigs Invasion and U.S. escalated military involvement in the Vietnam War, respectively. Both presidents sought the advice of experts outside of their political groups more than Janis suggested. Kramer also argues that the presidents were the final decision-makers of the fiascos; while determining which course of action to take, they relied more heavily on their own construals of the situations than on any group-consenting decision presented to them. Kramer concludes that Janis' explanation of the two military issues is flawed and that groupthink has much less influence on group decision-making than is popularly believed to be.

Pearl Harbor

The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 is a prime example of groupthink. A number of factors such as shared illusions and rationalizations contributed to the lack of precaution taken by Naval officers based in Hawaii. The United States had intercepted Japanese messages and they discovered that Japan was arming itself for an offensive attack somewhere in the Pacific. Washington took action by warning officers stationed at Pearl Harbor, but their warning was not taken seriously. They assumed that Japan was taking measures in the event that their embassies and consulates in enemy territories were usurped.

The Navy and Army in Pearl Harbor also shared rationalizations about why an attack was unlikely. Some of them included:

• "The Japanese would never dare attempt a full-scale surprise assault against Hawaii because they would realize that it would precipitate an all-out war, which the United States would surely win."
• "The Pacific Fleet concentrated at Pearl Harbor was a major deterrent against air or naval attack."
• "Even if the Japanese were foolhardy to send their carriers to attack us [the United States], we could certainly detect and destroy them in plenty of time."
• "No warships anchored in the shallow water of Pearl Harbor could ever be sunk by torpedo bombs launched from enemy aircraft."

Corporate world

In the corporate world, ineffective and suboptimal group decision-making can negatively affect the health of a company and cause a considerable amount of monetary loss.

Swissair

Aaron Hermann and Hussain Rammal illustrate the detrimental role of groupthink in the collapse of Swissair, a Swiss airline company that was thought to be so financially stable that it earned the title the "Flying Bank." The authors argue that, among other factors, Swissair carried two symptoms of groupthink: the belief that the group is invulnerable and the belief in the morality of the group. In addition, before the fiasco, the size of the company board was reduced, subsequently eliminating industrial expertise. This may have further increased the likelihood of groupthink. With the board members lacking expertise in the field and having somewhat similar background, norms, and values, the pressure to conform may have become more prominent. This phenomenon is called group homogeneity, which is an antecedent to groupthink. Together, these conditions may have contributed to the poor decision-making process that eventually led to Swissair's collapse.

Marks & Spencer and British Airways

Another example of groupthink from the corporate world is illustrated in the UK based companies, Marks & Spencer and British Airways. The negative impact of groupthink took place during the 1990s as both companies released globalization expansion strategies. Researcher Jack Eaton's content analysis of media press releases revealed that all eight symptoms of groupthink were present during this period. The most predominant symptom of groupthink was the illusion of invulnerability as both companies underestimated potential failure due to years of profitability and success during challenging markets. Up until the consequence of groupthink erupted they were considered blue chips and darlings of the London Stock Exchange. During 1998 - 1999 the price of Marks & Spencer shares fell from 590 to less than 300 and that of British Airways from 740 to 300. Both companies had already featured prominently in the UK press and media for more positive reasons, to do with national pride in their undoubted sector-wide performance.

Sports

Recent literature of groupthink attempts to study the application of this concept beyond the framework of business and politics. One particularly relevant and popular arena in which groupthink is rarely studied is sports. The lack of literature in this area prompted Charles Koerber and Christopher Neck to begin a case-study investigation that examined the effect of groupthink on the decision of the Major League Umpires Association (MLUA) to stage a mass resignation in 1999. The decision was a failed attempt to gain a stronger negotiating stance against Major League Baseball. Koerber and Neck suggest that three groupthink symptoms can be found in the decision-making process of the MLUA. First, the umpires overestimated the power that they had over the baseball league and the strength of their group's resolve. The union also exhibited some degree of closed-mindedness with the notion that MLB is the enemy. Lastly, there was the presence of self-censorship; some umpires who disagreed with the decision to resign failed to voice their dissent. These factors, along with other decision-making defects, led to a decision that was suboptimal and ineffective.

See also

• Abilene paradox
• Bandwagon effect
• Conformity (psychology)
• Deindividuation
• Emotional contagion
• Group behaviour
• Group flow
• Group narcissism
• Group polarization
• Group-serving bias
• Groupshift
• Herd behaviour
• Homophily
• No soap radio
• Mob rule
• Organizational dissent
• Peer pressure
• Risky shift
• Scapegoating
• Social comparison theory
• System justification
• Team player
• Vendor lock-in
• Woozle effect

Further reading

• Baron, R. S. (2005). "So right it's wrong: groupthink and the ubiquitous nature of polarized group decision making". Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. 37: 219–253. doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(05)37004-3.
• Ferraris, C.; Carveth, R. (2003). "NASA and the Columbia disaster: decision-making by groupthink?" (PDF). Proceedings of the 2003 Association for Business Communication Annual Convention.
• Esser, J. K. (1998). "Alive and well after 25 years: a review of groupthink research" (PDF). Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 73 (2–3): 116–141. doi:10.1006/obhd.1998.2758.
• Hogg, M. A.; Hains, S. C. (1998). "Friendship and group identification: a new look at the role of cohesiveness in groupthink". European Journal of Social Psychology. 28 (3): 323–341. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(199805/06)28:3<323::AID-EJSP854>3.0.CO;2-Y.
• Klein, D. B.; Stern, C. (Spring 2009). "Groupthink in academia: majoritarian departmental politics and the professional pyramid". The Independent Review: A Journal of Political Economy (Independent Institute). 13 (4): 585–600.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: year (link)
• Kowert, P. (2002). Groupthink or Deadlock: When do Leaders Learn from their Advisors?. Albany: State University of New York Press. ISBN 0-7914-5250-6.
• Mullen, B.; Anthony, T.; Salas, E.; Driskell, J. E. (1994). "Group cohesiveness and quality of decision making: an integration of tests of the groupthink hypothesis". Small Group Research. 25 (2): 189–204. doi:10.1177/1046496494252003.
• Moorhead, G.; Ference, R.; Neck, C. P. (1991). "Group decision fiascoes continue: Space Shuttle Challenger and a revised groupthink framework" (PDF). Human Relations. 44 (6): 539–550. doi:10.1177/001872679104400601.
• O'Connor, M. A. (Summer 2003). "The Enron board: the perils of groupthink". University of Cincinnati Law Review. 71 (4): 1233–1320.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: year (link)
• Packer, D. J. (2009). "Avoiding groupthink: whereas weakly identified members remain silent, strongly identified members dissent about collective problems" (PDF). Psychological Science. 20 (5): 546–548. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02333.x. PMID 19389133.
• Rose, J. D. (Spring 2011). "Diverse perspectives on the groupthink theory – a literary review" (PDF). Emerging Leadership Journeys. 4 (1): 37–57.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: year (link)
• Schafer, M.; Crichlow, S. (2010). Groupthink versus High-Quality Decision Making in International Relations. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-14888-7.
• 't Hart, P. (1990). Groupthink in Government: a Study of Small Groups and Policy Failure. Amsterdam; Rockland, MA: Swets & Zeitlinger. ISBN 90-265-1113-2.
• 't Hart, P.; Stern, E. K.; Sundelius, B. (1997). Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-Making. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. ISBN 0-472-09653-2.
• Tetlock, P. E. (1979). "Identifying victims of groupthink from public statements of decision makers" (PDF). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 37 (8): 1314–1324. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.37.8.1314.
• Tetlock, P. E.; Peterson, R. S.; McGuire, C.; Chang, S. J.; Feld, P. (1992). "Assessing political group dynamics: a test of the groupthink model" (PDF). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 63 (3): 403–425. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.63.3.403.
• Turner, M. E.; Pratkanis, A. R.; Probasco, P.; Leve, C. (1992). "Threat, cohesion, and group effectiveness: Testing a social identity maintenance perspective on groupthink" (PDF). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 63 (5): 781–796. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.63.5.781.
• Whyte, G. (1989). "Groupthink reconsidered". Academy of Management Review. 14 (1): 40–56. doi:10.2307/258190.

External links

Category:Conformity Category:Group processes Category:Consensus