User:Gog the Mild/Siege of Utica
Roman invasion of Africa (205–201 BC) | |||||||
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Part of the Second Punic War | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Carthage | Rome | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Hasdrubal Gisco Syphax Hannibal | Scipio Africanus |
Lead goes here.
Background
[edit]First Punic War
[edit]The First Punic War was fought between the two main powers of the western Mediterranean in the 3rd century BC: Carthage and Rome.[1] The war lasted for 23 years, from 264 to 241 BC, and was fought primarily on the Mediterranean island of Sicily, its surrounding waters and in North Africa.[1] The Carthaginians were defeated[2][3] and by the terms of the Treaty of Lutatius evacuated Sicily and paid Rome an indemnity of 3,200 silver talents[note 1] over ten years.[6] Four years later, Rome seized Sardinia and Corsica on a cynical pretence and imposed a further 1,200 talent indemnity,[note 2][7][8] actions which fuelled Carthaginian resentment.[9][10] The near-contemporary historian Polybius considered this act of bad faith by the Romans to be the single greatest cause of war with Carthage breaking out again nineteen years later.[11]
From 236 BC Carthage expanded its territory in Iberia, (modern Spain and Portugal).[12] In 226 BC the Ebro Treaty with Rome established the Ebro River as the northern boundary of the Carthaginian sphere of influence.[13] A little later Rome made a separate treaty of association with the city of Saguntum, well south of the Ebro.[14] In 219 BC Hannibal, the de facto ruler of Carthaginian Iberia, led an army to Saguntum and besieged, captured, and sacked it[15][16] In early 218 BC Rome declared war on Carthage, starting the Second Punic War.[17]
Second Punic War
[edit]![a map of the western Mediterranean region showing the territory controlled by Rome and Carthage in 218 BC](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/62/Map_of_Rome_and_Carthage_at_the_start_of_the_Second_Punic_War_Modified.svg/310px-Map_of_Rome_and_Carthage_at_the_start_of_the_Second_Punic_War_Modified.svg.png)
Hannibal led a large Carthaginian army from Iberia, through Gaul, over the Alps and invaded mainland Italy in 218 BC. During the next three years Hannibal inflicted heavy defeats on the Romans at the battles of the Trebia, Lake Trasimene and Cannae.[18] At the last of these alone, at least 67,500 Romans were killed or captured.[19] The historian Toni Ñaco del Hoyo describes these as "great military calamities",[18] and Brian Carey writes that they brought Rome to the brink of collapse.[20] Hannibal's army campaigned in Italy for 14 years before the survivors withdrew.[21]
There was also extensive fighting in Iberia, Sicily, Sardinia and North Africa. In 211 BC the Romans suffered a severe reverse at the battle of the Upper Baetis and were penned back by the Carthaginians to the north-east corner of Iberia. In 210 BC Roman reinforcements stabilised the situation;[21] later that year Publius Cornelius Scipio,[note 3] arrived with further Roman reinforcements to take command in Iberia.[23] In a carefully planned assault in 209 BC he captured the centre of Carthaginian power in Iberia, New Carthage.[23][24] During the following four years Scipio repeatedly defeated the Carthaginians and drove them out of Iberia in 295 BC.[25]
Prelude
[edit]In 206 BC Scipio left Iberia and returned to Italy.[26] He was denied the triumph he would normally have expected on the grounds that he had not occupied any of the magistracies of the cursus honorum, the sequential mixture of military and political administrative positions held by aspiring Roman politicians.[27] He was elected to the senior position of consul in early 205, despite not meeting the age requirement.[28] Scipio was already anticipating an invasion of North Africa and while still in Spain had been negotiating with the Numidian leaders Masinissa and Syphax. He failed to win over the latter, but made an ally of the former.[29]
Opinion was divided in Roman political circles as to whether an invasion of North Africa was excessively risky. Hannibal was still on Italian soil; there was the possibility of further Carthaginian invasions,[30] shortly to be realised when Mago Barca landed in Liguria;[31] the practical difficulties of an amphibious invasion and its logistical follow up were considerable; and when the Romans had invaded North Africa in 256 BC during the First Punic War they had been driven out with heavy losses, which had re-energised the Carthaginians.[32] Eventually a compromise was agreed: Scipio was given Sicily as his consular province,[33] which was the best location for the Romans to launch an invasion of the Carthaginian homeland from and then logistically support it, and permission to cross to Africa on his own judgement.[30] But Roman commitment was less than wholehearted, Scipio could not conscript troops for his consular army, as was usual, only call for volunteers.[31][34]
In 216 the survivors of the Roman defeat at Cannae were formed into two legions and sent to Sicily.[35] They still formed the main part of the garrison of Sicily, and Scipio used the many men who volunteered to increase the strength of each of these to an unprecedented 6,500.[36] The total number of men available to Scipio and how many of them travelled to Africa is unclear; Livy gives totals for the invasion force of either 12,200, 17,600 or 35,000. Modern historians estimate a combat strength of 25,000–30,000, of whom more than 90% were infantry.[36][37] With up to half of the complement of his legions being fresh volunteers, and with no fighting having taken place on Sicily for the past five years, Scipio instigated a rigorous training regime. This extended from drills by individual centuries - the basic Roman army manoeuvre unit of 80 men - to exercises by the full army. This lasted for approximately a year. At the same time Scipio assembled a vast quantity of food and materiel, merchant ships to transport it and his troops, and warships to escort the transports.[38]
Also during 205 BC, 30 Roman ships under Scipio's second-in-command, the legate Gaius Laelius, raided North Africa around Hippo Regius, gathering large quantities of loot and many captives.[37][39] The Carthaginians initially believed this was the anticipated invasion by Scipio and his full invasion force; they hastily strengthened fortifications and raised troops – including some units made up of Carthaginian citizens. Reinforcements were sent to Mago in Liguria an attempt to distract the Romans in Italy.[40] Meanwhile a succession war had broken out in Numidia between the Roman-supporting Masinissa and the Carthaginian-inclined Syphax. Laelius re-established contact with Masinissa during his raid. Masinissa expressed dismay regarding how long it was taking the Romans to complete their preparations and land in Africa.[41]
Invasion
[edit]In 204 BC, probably June or July, the Roman army left Sicily in 400 transport ships, escorted by 40 galleys.[42] Three days later[43] they disembarked at Cape Farina 20 kilometres (12 mi) north of the large Carthaginian port of Utica.[42] The locals fled and Carthage's immediate response, a scouting party of 500 cavalry, was defeated with the loss of its commander and the general in overall charge of responding to the invasion. The area was pillaged and 8,000 captives were sent back to Sicily as slaves. Masinissa joined the Romans with either 200 or 2,000 men, the sources differ. A large fortified camp was established at Ghar el-Melh[44] which was known as Castra Cornelia. Masinissa had been recently defeated by his Numidian rival Syphax, wounded and had his army scattered. Syphax had been persuaded to take firm action by the Carthaginian general Hasdrubal Gisco and by his new assertive new wife: Hasdrubal's daughter Sophonisba.[45]
Carthage sent a larger party to probe the Roman position, about 4,000 soldiers under a general called Hanno. His command of mixed Numidians and Carthaginian citizens based itself at Salaeca, 24 kilometres (15 mi) from the Romans, and did little scouting. Following a strategem agreed with Scipio, Masinissa's cavalry raided Hanno's force who chased them off and then pursued them into a Roman ambush. Hanno and 1,000 of his men were killed or taken prisoner. The survivors were in turn pursued for 50 kilometres (30 mi), only 1,000 escaped. The Romans pillaged an ever-wider area, sending their loot and prisoners to Sicily in the ships bringing their supplies.[46]
Siege
[edit]Wanting a more permanent base, and a port more resilient to the bad weather to be expected when winter came, Scipio besieged Utica. The siege dragged on into the winter and a Carthaginian army under Hasdrubal set up a fortified camp 11 kilometres (6.8 mi) from the Romans with a reported 33,000 men. Syphax joined him, establishing his own camp a mile (2 km) away with a reported 60,000 troops. The size of both of these armies as reported by ancient historians have been questioned by their modern counterparts as being infeasibly large. Nevertheless, it is accepted that the Romans were considerably outnumbered, in particular in terms of cavalry.[47] The Carthaginians were besieging Utica, but were themselves now bllockaded on the landward side.[48] The Carthaginian camp was solidly constructed, with timber-built barracks; the Numidian one less so, with the accommodation for the soldiers being largely constructed of, and roofed with, reeds. Scipio sent emissaries to Syphax to attempt to persuade him to defect. Syphax in turn offered to broker peace terms. A series of exchanges of negotiating parties followed. With his delegations Scipio sent junior officers disguised as slaves to report back on the layout and construction of the Numidian camp.[47]
Battle of Utica
[edit]Scipio drew out the negotiations with Syphax, stating that he was in broad agreement with the proposition, but that his senior officers were not yet convinced. As the better weather of spring approached, Scipio made an announcement to his troops that he would shortly shortly attempt to storm the defences of Utica and began preparations to do so. Simultaneously he was planning a night attack on both camps. Local knowledge and careful scouting identified the routes least likely to cause problems at night, and Scipio briefed his senior officers carefully. On the night of the attack two columns set out: one was commanded by Gaius Laelius, a legate and the Roman army's second in command, who had years of experience of operating under Scipio. This force consisted of about half the Romans and was accompanied by the Numidians. Its target was Syphax's camp. Scipio led the balance of the Roman force against the Carthaginian camp.[49]
Thanks to the careful prior reconnoitring both forces reached the positions from which they were to start their attacks without issue, while Masinissa's Numidian cavalry positioned themselves in small groups so as to cover every route out of the two enemy camps. Laelius's column attacked first, storming the camp of Syphax's Numidians and concentrating on setting fire to as many of the reed huts as possible. The camp dissolved into chaos, with many of its Numidian occupants oblivious of the Roman attack and thinking that the barracks had caught fire accidentally. The Carthaginians heard the commotion and saw the blaze, and some of them set off to help extinguish the fire. With pre-planned coordination Scipio's contingent then attacked. They cut down the Carthaginians heading for their ally's camp, stormed Hasdrubal's camp and attempted to set fire to the wooden housing. The fire spread between the close-spaced barracks. Carthaginians rushed out into the dark and confusion, without armour or weapons, either trying to escape the flames or to fight the fire. The organised and prepared Romaans cut them down. Polybius writes that Hasdrubal escaped from his burning camp with only 2,500 men. Numidian losses are not recorded.[50]
By the diplomatic standards of the time, Scipio launching a surprise attack while in the midst of peace negotiations was ethically dubious.[48]
Between battles
[edit]With no Carthaginian field army to threaten them, the Romans pressed their siege of Utica and pillaged an extensive area of North Africa with large and far-ranging raids. As well as gold and slaves the Romans accumulated large amounts of foodstuffs. This was added to the large stocks already built up by shipping grain from Sicily.[51]
Battle of the Great Plains
[edit]When word of the defeat reached Carthage there was panic, with some wanting to renew the peace negotiations. The Carthaginian Senate also heard demands for Hannibal's army to be recalled. A decision was reach to fight on with locally available resources.[48] A force of 4,000 Iberian warriors finally arrived in Carthage, although their strength was exaggerated to 10,000 to maintain morale. Hasdrubal raised further local troops with whom to reinforce the survivors of Utica.[52] Syphax remained loyal and joined Hasdrubal with what was left of his army.[53] The combined force is estimated at 30,000 and they established a strong camp on a flat plain of the Bagradas River known as the Great Plains. This was near modern Souk el Kremis[51] and about 120 kilometres (75 mi) from Utica.[54] Hasdrubal assembled this substantial force within 30–50 days of the defeat at Utica.[52]
Hearing of this, Scipio immediately marched most of his army to the scene. The size of his army is not known, but it was outnumbered by the Carthaginians.[55] After several days of skirmishing both armies committed to a pitched battle.[51] Upon being charged by the Romans all of those Carthaginians who had been involved in the debacle at Utica turned and fled; morale had not recovered.[56][51][57] Only the Iberians stood and fought. They were enveloped by the well-drilled Roman legions and wiped out.[58][59]
Battle of Cirta
[edit]Hasdrubal fled to Carthage, where he was demoted and exiled.[60] Syphax and his Numidians were pursued, brought to battle outside his capital, Cirta, and again defeated, with Syphax being captured.[60] Cirta surrendered to Masinissa, who took over Syphax's kingdom.[note 4][61] Scipio moved his main army to Tunis, within sight of the city of Carthage.[62] Scipio and Carthage entered into peace negotiations, while Carthage recalled both Hannibal and Mago from Italy.[63] The Roman Senate ratified a draft treaty, but because of mistrust and a surge in confidence when Hannibal arrived from Italy, Carthage repudiated it.[64]
Hannibal was placed in command of another army, formed of his and Mago's veterans from Italy and newly raised troops from Africa, with 80 war elephants but few cavalry.[65] The decisive battle of Zama followed in October 202 BC.[66] After a prolonged fight the Carthaginian army collapsed; Hannibal was one of the few to escape the field.[66][67]
Armistice
[edit]Battle of Zama
[edit]![a black and white photograph of a bronze head depicting Hannibal](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/0a/Hannibal_Slodtz_Louvre_MR2093_%28cropped2%29.png/140px-Hannibal_Slodtz_Louvre_MR2093_%28cropped2%29.png)
Aftermath
[edit]Rome's African ally, King Masinissa of Numidia, exploited the prohibition on Carthage waging war to repeatedly raid and seize Carthaginian territory with impunity.[68] In 149 BC, fifty years after the end of the Second Punic War, Carthage sent an army, under Hasdrubal, against Masinissa, the treaty notwithstanding. The campaign ended in disaster at the battle of Oroscopa and anti-Carthaginian factions in Rome used the illicit military action as a pretext to prepare a punitive expedition.[69] The Third Punic War began later in 149 BC when a large Roman army landed in North Africa[70] and besieged Carthage.[71] In the spring of 146 BC the Romans launched their final assault, systematically destroying the city and killing its inhabitants;[72] 50,000 survivors were sold into slavery.[73] The formerly Carthaginian territories became the Roman province of Africa.[74][75] It was a century before the site of Carthage was rebuilt as a Roman city.[76][77]
Notes, citations and sources
[edit]Notes
[edit]- ^ Several different "talents" are known from antiquity. The ones referred to in this article are all Euboic (or Euboeic) talents, of approximately 26 kilograms (57 lb).[4][5] 3,200 talents was approximately 82,000 kg (81 long tons) of silver.[4]
- ^ 1,200 talents was approximately 30,000 kg (30 long tons) of silver.[4]
- ^ Publius Scipio was the bereaved son of the previous Roman co-commander in Iberia, also named Publius Scipio, and the nephew of the other co-commander, Gnaeus Scipio.[22]
- ^ Masinissa also married Syphax's wife, Sophonisba, Hasdrubal's daughter.[61]
Citations
[edit]- ^ a b Goldsworthy 2006, p. 82.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 157.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 97.
- ^ a b c Lazenby 1996, p. 158.
- ^ Scullard 2006, p. 565.
- ^ Miles 2011, p. 196.
- ^ Scullard 2006, p. 569.
- ^ Miles 2011, pp. 209, 212–213.
- ^ Hoyos 2015, p. 211.
- ^ Miles 2011, p. 213.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 175.
- ^ Miles 2011, p. 220.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 143–144.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 144.
- ^ Collins 1998, p. 13.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 144–145.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 145.
- ^ a b Ñaco del Hoyo 2015, p. 377.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 192–194.
- ^ Carey 2007, p. 2.
- ^ a b Edwell 2015, p. 322.
- ^ Miles 2011, pp. 268, 298–299.
- ^ a b Edwell 2015, p. 323.
- ^ Zimmermann 2015, p. 292.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 277–285.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 285.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 268.
- ^ Carey 2007, p. 99.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 285–286.
- ^ a b Goldsworthy 2006, p. 286.
- ^ a b Miles 2011, p. 306.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 286–287.
- ^ Lazenby 1998, p. 194.
- ^ Lazenby 1998, p. 195.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 218.
- ^ a b Goldsworthy 2006, p. 287.
- ^ a b Carey 2007, p. 100.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 287–288.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 288.
- ^ Lazenby 1998, pp. 194–195.
- ^ Lazenby 1998, pp. 198–199.
- ^ a b Carey 2007, p. 103.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 291.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 275.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 290–292.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 292.
- ^ a b Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 292–293.
- ^ a b c Goldsworthy 2006, p. 294.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 293.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 293–294.
- ^ a b c d Goldsworthy 2006, p. 295.
- ^ a b Hoyos 2003, p. 162.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 294–295.
- ^ Briscoe 2006, p. 63.
- ^ Carey 2007, p. 106.
- ^ Edwell 2015, p. 333.
- ^ Carey 2007, p. 108.
- ^ Rawlings 1996, p. 90.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 295–296.
- ^ a b Hoyos 2015b, p. 205.
- ^ a b Lazenby 1998, p. 212.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 282, 284.
- ^ Carey 2007, p. 111.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 287–291.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 302.
- ^ a b Miles 2011, p. 315.
- ^ Carey 2007, p. 118.
- ^ Kunze 2015, pp. 398, 407.
- ^ Kunze 2015, pp. 399, 407.
- ^ Purcell 1995, p. 134.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 341.
- ^ Le Bohec 2015, p. 441.
- ^ Scullard 2002, p. 316.
- ^ Scullard 1955, p. 103.
- ^ Scullard 2002, pp. 310, 316.
- ^ Richardson 2015, pp. 480–481.
- ^ Miles 2011, pp. 363–364.
Sources
[edit]- Bagnall, Nigel (1999). The Punic Wars: Rome, Carthage and the Struggle for the Mediterranean. London: Pimlico. ISBN 978-0-7126-6608-4.
- Briscoe, John (2006). "The Second Punic War". In Astin, A. E.; Walbank, F. W.; Frederiksen, M. W.; Ogilvie, R. M. (eds.). The Cambridge Ancient History: Rome and the Mediterranean to 133 B.C. Vol. VIII (2 ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 44–80. ISBN 978-0-521-23448-1.
- Carey, Brian Todd (2007). Hannibal's Last Battle: Zama & the Fall of Carthage. Barnslet, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword. ISBN 978-1-84415-635-1.
- Coarelli, Filippo (2002). "I ritratti di 'Mario' e 'Silla' a Monaco e il sepolcro degli Scipioni". Eutopia Nuova Serie (in Italian). II (1): 47–75. ISSN 1121-1628.
- Collins, Roger (1998). Spain: An Oxford Archaeological Guide. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-285300-4.
- Edwell, Peter (2015) [2011]. "War Abroad: Spain, Sicily, Macedon, Africa". In Hoyos, Dexter (ed.). A Companion to the Punic Wars. Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley. pp. 320–338. ISBN 978-1-119-02550-4.
- Etcheto, Henri (2012). Les Scipions. Famille et pouvoir à Rome à l'époque républicaine (in French). Bordeaux: Ausonius Éditions. ISBN 978-2-35613-073-0.
- Goldsworthy, Adrian (2006). The Fall of Carthage: The Punic Wars 265–146 BC. London: Phoenix. ISBN 978-0-304-36642-2.
- Hoyos, Dexter (2015) [2011]. A Companion to the Punic Wars. Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley. ISBN 978-1-1190-2550-4.
- Hoyos, Dexter (2015b). Mastering the West: Rome and Carthage at War. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-986010-4.
- Jones, Archer (1987). The Art of War in the Western World. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. ISBN 978-0-252-01380-5.
- Koon, Sam (2015) [2011]. "Phalanx and Legion: the "Face" of Punic War Battle". In Hoyos, Dexter (ed.). A Companion to the Punic Wars. Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley. pp. 77–94. ISBN 978-1-1190-2550-4.
- Lazenby, John (1996). The First Punic War: A Military History. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-2673-3.
- Lazenby, John (1998). Hannibal's War: A Military History of the Second Punic War. Warminster: Aris & Phillips. ISBN 978-0-85668-080-9.
- Miles, Richard (2011). Carthage Must be Destroyed. London: Penguin. ISBN 978-0-14-101809-6.
- Ñaco del Hoyo, Toni (2015) [2011]. "Roman Economy, Finance, and Politics in the Second Punic War". In Hoyos, Dexter (ed.). A Companion to the Punic Wars. Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley. pp. 376–392. ISBN 978-1-1190-2550-4.
- Rawlings, Louis (2015) [2011]. "The War in Italy, 218–203". In Hoyos, Dexter (ed.). A Companion to the Punic Wars. Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley. pp. 299–319. ISBN 978-1-1190-2550-4.
- Scullard, Howard H. (2006) [1989]. "Carthage and Rome". In Walbank, F. W.; Astin, A. E.; Frederiksen, M. W. & Ogilvie, R. M. (eds.). Cambridge Ancient History. Vol. VII, part 2 (2 ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 486–569. ISBN 978-0-521-23446-7.
- Zimmermann, Klaus (2015) [2011]. "Roman Strategy and Aims in the Second Punic War". In Hoyos, Dexter (ed.). A Companion to the Punic Wars. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 280–298. ISBN 978-1-405-17600-2.