User:Geo Swan/Userified 2011-01/Abdul Razzak Hekmati

Geo Swan/Userified 2011-01/Abdul Razzak Hekmati
Detained at	Guantanamo
ISN	942
Charge(s)	No charge (held in extrajudicial detention)
Status	Died in custody

Abdul Razzak Hekmati (c. 1929 – (2007-12-30)December 30, 2007) was a citizen of Afghanistan. He was recognized as war hero, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. In 1999 he and his son lead a daring rescue of Northern Alliance leaders from a Taliban prison. In response the Taliban placed a $1,000,000 reward for his capture, and the Northern Alliance paid him a stipend to support him while he was in exile in Iran. Nevertheless, he was apprehended in 2003, based on allegations he was Taliban leader, and was transferred to the United States Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba. He died there, from colon cancer, on December 30, 2007.

His ID while in US custody was 942. Joint Task Force Guantanamo analysts estimate he was born in 1929, in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

Following Hekmati's death Carlotta Gall, a long-time New York Times correspondent in Afghanistan, and historian Andy Worthington, author of The Guantanamo Files, found they were able to confirm Hekmati's alibi. They concluded that American analysts never understood who Hekmati was, never understood his role in opposing the Taliban, and failed to make a meaningful attempt to contact the senior Northern Alliance leaders who tried to vouch for him.

Hekmati's medical care

JTF-GTMO Commandant Mark Buzby discusses the death of Abdul Razzaq Hekmati with chief doctor Captain Bruce Meneley.

In April 2008 the Adam M. Robinson, the United States Navy's Surgeon General, wrote that every captive over fifty years old had been offered a colonoscopy to detect colon cancer. Robinson reported camp medical staff had performed 20 colonoscopies.

Hekmati's death from a cancer that is one of the easiest to detect and treat was offered as a reason to question whether the Guantanamo captives receive good medical care. According to John Chandler, an Atlanta, Georgia lawyer who has volunteered to help Guantanamo captives, and who volunteered at Emory University's International Humanitarian Law Clinic, "A colonoscopy in 2003 might have detected the cancer and saved Hekmati's life; indeed, colon cancer is entirely preventable if doctors detect and remove precancerous growths." Chandler noted that not only wasn't Hekmati able to give informed consent to whatever treatment he was provided with, the identity and credentials of his doctors were withheld from him.

Name issues

Abdul Razzaq Hekmati was one of half a dozen captives in US custody American intelligence analysts called some variation of "Abdul Razzak".

On all the official documents released as of February 2008 Abdul Razzaq Hekmati's name was spelled "Abdul Razzak". However Gall and Worthington found that during his entire stay in US custody American officials had been identifying him solely by his personal names. They found he was well-known, in Afghanistan, under his full name, "Abdul Razzaq Hekmati". Gall and Worthington wrote that he was widely known by the nickname "Baraso".

Combatant Status Review

The Bush administration asserted that:

the protections of the Geneva Conventions did not extend to captured prisoners who are not members of the regular Afghan armed force nor meet the criteria for prisoner of war for voluntary forces.

Critics argued the Conventions obliged the U.S. to conduct competent tribunals to determine the status of prisoners. Subsequently, the U.S. Department of Defense instituted Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), to determine whether detainees met the new definition of an "enemy combatant".

"Enemy combatant" was defined by the U.S. Department of Defense as:

an individual who was part of, or supporting, the Taliban, or al-Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who commits a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.

The CSRTs are not bound by the rules of evidence that would normally apply in civilian court, and the government’s evidence is presumed to be “genuine and accurate.” From July 2004 through March 2005, CSRTs were convened to determine whether each prisoner had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant".

Geo Swan/Userified 2011-01/Abdul Razzak Hekmati was among the 60% of prisoners who chose to participate in tribunal hearings. A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for the tribunal of each detainee, listing the allegations that supported their detention as an "enemy combatant".

Geo Swan/Userified 2011-01/Abdul Razzak Hekmati's memo accused him of the following:

a. The detainee is associated with al Qaida and the Taliban:

1. Detainee served as a Taliban driver beginning in 1992.
2. Detainee is an al Qaida facilitator and smuggler.
3. Detainee was a commander of a Taliban terrorist cell in Afghanistan.
4. Detainee conducted an escort mission for Usama bin Laden in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
5. Detainee provided goods and funding for Taliban terrorist cells in Afghanistan.
6. Detainee provided guidance in the terrorist training camp near Kandahar.

b. The detainee participated in military operations against the coalition.

1. Detainee fought against United States forces in Kabul.
2. Detainee provided weapons and explosives to a Taliban terrorist cell in Afghanistan.
3. Detainee was involved in assassination attempts against Afghani government officials.

The Department of Defense released a six page summarized transcript on March 3, 2006.

Witnesses

Razak requested three witnesses; Abdul Wahled, Haji Abdul Zaher and Ismael Kahn. The Tribunal's President ruled that they were not reasonably available because they thought that they were all in Afghanistan, and the State Department's requests to the Afghan government had gone unanswered.

Administrative Review Board

Detainees whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal labeled them "enemy combatants" were scheduled for annual Administrative Review Board hearings. These hearings were designed to assess the threat a detainee might pose if released or transferred, and whether there were other factors that warranted his continued detention.

First annual Administrative Review Board hearing

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for his Administrative Review Board.

The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment

1. The detainee said he was forced to serve the Taliban three months out of every year since they came to power in 1992 [sic].
2. The detainee stated he fought with Abdul Wahed in the Russian jihad for approximately five years. He was a driver for Abdul Wahed, a commander of approsimately 800-1000 soldiers. After the jihad, Wahed became the military commander of the Helmand Province.
3. As of January 2005, Taliban fighters were regrouping at Abdul Wahid Rais Baghrani's compound in Helmand Province. The fighters received money, supplies and orders at the compound.
4. The detainee was the number two commander of a 40-man unit of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The unit was formed in approximately November 2001 and was supported by al Qaida. The group continually plans to kill Americans. The Supreme Commander of the unit was Hajji Raes Abdul Wahed [sic].
5. The detainee was high in the al Qaida hierarchy and acted as a smuggler and facilitator. Al Qaida's operational leader provided him with weapons.
6. The detainee received weapons shipments, plastic explosives, night-vision equipment, missiles, small arms and ammunition from Syria. The weapons come from Syria to Zahedan, Iran. From there they were smuggled into Afghanistan.
7. The detainee aided in weapons distribution to the terrorist team. He also had a night vision and telescoping optical device to use during mission preparation. The terrorist group used it for surveillance on United States forces.

b. Training

1. The detainee reportedly attended the training camp near Khotal-e-Morcha mountain pass outside of Kandahar, Afghanistan.
2. The detainee provided guidance at the terrorist training camp near Kandahar, Afghanistan and was directly involved in assassination attempts. He also attempted to have other personnel participate in suicide missions and he provided training on how to use explosive vests.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was originally a freedom fighter against the Soviets, a member of Hezb-E-Islami, Taliban, and then al Qaida. He is currently instructing other detainees on how to resist interrogation tactics.
2. The Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) has long established ties with Usama Bin Laden. HIG has stages small attacks in its attempt to force US troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration and establish a fundamentalist state.
3. In January 2005, Taliban and HIG elements in Afghanistan were beginning to regroup and plan actions against the government of Afghanistan and coalition forces deployed in the country. Abdul Wahid Rais Baghrani, also a major narcotics trafficker, was one of the key commanders involved.
4. The detainee was part of the main security escort for Usama Bin Laden.
5. The detainee provided information on a number of Taliban personalities in the Helmand Province being protected by Governor Sher Mohammed.
6. The detainee was paid to smuggle 50 Arab family members out of Afghanistan and into Zabul, Iran, through Afghanistan's Nimroz Province. He was associated with Taliban commanders.
7. The detainee admitted to having knowledge of weapons shipments and weapons smuggling routes as well as knowledge of the Jamiat Islami.
8. The Jamiat Ulema E Islami or "Assembly o the Scholars of Islam" is a radical Sunni religio-political party best known for its anti-United States threats, vocal support of Usama Bin Ladin [sic], and sponsorship of some 3,000 religious schools (madrassahs).

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was knowledgeable of an assassination plot against President Karzai the day before it occurred and knew the specific route Karzai was to take.
2. The detainee attempted to have another individual kill Governor Gul Agha Sherzai and told him he would go directly to heave if he completed the attack.
3. In 2002, the detainee told another individual that there were still suicide pilots in the United States who could carry out their missions.
4. The detainee planned and executed the escape of Ismail Khan from a Taliban prison.
5. Ismail Khan is an exiled Afghan commander.
6. The detainee was arrested as a suspected member of Abdul Wahed's Taliban organization on 21 January 2003.

The following primary factors favor release or transfer

a. The detainee says that the Taliban is a stupid organization.

b. The detainee vehemently denies that he is currently associated with the Taliban.

c. The detainee claims he is not a Taliban member.

Transcript

Hekmati chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.

Second annual Administrative Review Board hearing

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for his second annual Administrative Review Board on August 5, 2006.

The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment

1. The detianee said he was forced to serve the Taliban three months out of every year since they came to power in 1992.
2. The detainee was a driver and fought in the Russian jihad for a commander of approximately 800 to 1000 soldiers. The commander became a military commander in Afghanistan after the jihad.
3. A source stated that Taliban fighters go to the military commander's compound in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. The fighters receive money, supplies and orders at the compound.

b. Training

1. A source stated that the detainee was involved in a terrorist training camp near Khotal-e-Morcha mountain pass outside of Kandahar, Afghanistan.
2. A source stated that the detainee was directly involved in assassination attempts. The source stated that the detainee also attempted to have other personnel participated in suicide missions. The detainee provided training on how to use explosive vests.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A source stated that the detainee was originally a freedom fighter against the Soviets, a member of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its attempts to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration and establish a fundamentalist state. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden.
2. The Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration and establish a fundamentalist state. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has long established ties with Usama bin Laden.
3. A source stated that the detainee was part of the main security escort for Usama bin Laden]].
4. A source stated that the detainee was paid to smuggle 50 Arab family members out of Afghanist and into Zabul, Iran through Afghanistan's Nimroz Province.
5. A source stated that the detainee was high in the al Qaida hierarchy and acted as a smuggler and facilitator. The detainee received money and weapons from Syria. The source stated that al Qaida's operational leader provided weapons to the detainee.
6. The detainee provided details of weapons shipments and weapons smuggling routes of Jamiat Islami.
7. The Jamiat Ulema e Islami is a radical Sunni religious-political party best known for its anti-United States threats, vocal support of Usama bin Ladin and sponsorship of some 3,000 religious schools.
8. The detainee was identified as a senior leader of a 40-man unit for the Taliban in Afghanistan. A source stated that the unit receives money, weapons and support from al Qaida and continually plans to kill Americans.
9. A source stated that the detainee was the number two commander of the unit and also the Taliban Supreme Commander in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.
10. The detainee stated that the 40-man unit's commander gave the detainee his satellite phone number so President Karzai could contact the 40-man unit's commander and order him to turn in the rest of his weapons if President Karzai desired it.
11. A source stated that the 40 man units' leaders stayed in a contact through satellite telephones.
12. The detainee was detained as a suspected member of a Taliban organization.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee helped an individual escapt from a Ministry of Intelligence Prison in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
2. The individual is an exiled Afghan commander.
3. In early 2004, the exiled Afghan commander was known to have distributed approximately 40,000 small arms of unknown origin to former mujahedin fighters and personal associates located in Herat Province, Afghanistan.
4. A source stated that the detainee received weapons shipments, plastic explosives, night-vision equipment, missiles, small arms and ammunition from Syria. The weapons come form Sytia to Zahedan, Iran and were smuggled into Afghanistan.
5. A source stated that military weapons were delivered to the detainee who aided in its distribution to a terrorist team. The source stated that the detainee also had a night vision and telescoping optical device to use during mission preparation and for surveillance on United States Forces.
6. A source stated that the detaioee was knowledgeable of an assassiation plot against President Karzai the day before it occurred.
7. On 2 November 2001, source indicated that senior Taliban officials were extremely concerned about stopping opposition leader Hamid Karzai. During conversation between the detainee and a senior Taliban leader, they discussed the fact that Karzai had escapted a Taliban attack.
8. A source stated that the detainee attempted to have two other individuals kill the Kandahar, Afghanistan Governor.
9. A source stated that in 2002, the detainee claimed that there were still suicide pilots in the United States who could carry out their missions.

The following primary factors favor release or transfer

a. The detainee claims he is not a Taliban member.

b. The detainee vehemently denies that he is currently associated with the Taliban.

c. The detainee states that the Taliban is a stupid organization.

d. An individual that was part of a 40-man team was under the command of Abdul Razaq [sic].

e. The individual described Abdbul Razaq [sic] as having dark eyes, a full beard, and taller than himself. The individual claims this Abdul Razaq [sic] is not the same person as the detainee.

New York Times' profile

On February 5, 2008 New York Times writer Carlotta Gall and historian Andy Worthington, author of The Guantanamo Files, published a profile of Hekmati. Gall and Worthington noted:

"... the Americans on his tribunal and review boards seemed unaware of how significant the prison break was, or how important were the men he had helped escape and whom he had asked to be called as witnesses."

Gall and Worthington described the prison break as such a "deep humiliation" for the Taliban; that they had offered a bounty of one million dollars.

Gall and Worthington had no trouble contacting the three Northern Alliance leaders he helped rescue. They pointed out that although Hekmati had requested the leaders as witnesses, he was told they were not reasonably available.

When Gall and Worthington contacted the leaders, they found that none of them had been invited to offer testimony on Hekmati's behalf. Furthermore, the leaders said they had been aware that Hekmati had been sent to Guantanamo, and had made efforts to get him released. Ismail Khan, Minister of Energy, asked Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and American Ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, for help getting Hekmati released. They quoted Zahir:

“We did try but it was not working. When they are sending someone to Guantánamo, they have their own rules.”

See also

• Guantanamo Bay detention camp

References

Category:1929 births Category:2007 deaths Category:Deaths from colorectal cancer Category:Afghan extrajudicial prisoners of the United States Category:Guantanamo Bay detention deaths Category:Afghan people who died in prison custody Category:Prisoners who died in United States military detention Category:Cancer deaths in Cuba