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Russia supplies a significant volume of fossil fuels to other European countries. In 2021 it was the largest exporter of oil and natural gas to the European Union,[1] and 40% of gas consumed in the EU came from Russia.[2]
The Russian state-owned company Gazprom exports natural gas to Europe. It also controls many subsidiaries, including various infrastructure assets.[citation needed] According to a study published by the Research Centre for East European Studies, the liberalization of the EU gas market drove Gazprom's expansion in Europe by increasing its share in the European downstream market. It established sale subsidiaries in many of its export markets, and also invested in access to industrial and power generation sectors in Western and Central Europe. In addition, Gazprom established joint ventures to build natural gas pipelines and storage depots in a number of European countries.[3]
The dependency on Russian fossil fuels poses energy security risks for Europe.[4] In a number of disputes Russia used pipeline shutdowns, which motivated the European Union to diversify its energy sources.[5] The rapid expansion of renewables in the European energy market would allow for less imports. As a reaction, Russia is expanding its export abilities towards China, as it has only one pipeline.[6][4] In response to the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the European Commission presented a plan to reduce gas imports from Russia by two thirds within a year, and completely by 2030.[7]
History
[edit]In the early 1980s there were American efforts, led by the Reagan administration, to convince European countries, through which a proposed Soviet gas pipeline was to be built, to deny firms responsible for construction the ability to purchase supplies and parts for the pipeline and associated facilities. Ronald Reagan feared that a Kremlin-controlled European natural gas pipeline infrastructure would increase the USSR's influence not only in Eastern Europe, but also in Western Europe. For this reason, during his first term in office, he attempted – unsuccessfully – to stop the first natural gas pipeline from being built between the USSR and Germany. The pipeline was built despite these protests and the rise of large Russian gas firms such as Gazprom as well as increased Russian fossil fuel production has facilitated a large expansion in the quantity of gas supplied to the European market since the 1990s.[8]
Since the 2000s, natural gas pricing in Europe has gradually shifted from fairly stable long-term contract pricing largely linked to the oil price, which supported the large-scale investments in developing gas fields and pipelines, to competitive market based pricing. This change was driven by EU regulation, moving from a 30% market price share in 2010 to 80% in 2020, saving EU countries an estimated $70 billion over the 2010s largely driven by the development of cheap U.S. shale gas. However, due to the 2021 global energy crisis, the International Energy Agency estimated the total cost of EU gas imports in 2021 will be about $30 billion higher that year than it would have been under the previous pricing regime.[9][10]
In September 2012, the European Commission opened formal proceedings to investigate whether Gazprom was hindering competition in Central and Eastern European gas markets, in breach of EU competition law. In particular, the Commission looked into Gazprom's usage of 'no resale' clauses in supply contracts, alleged prevention of diversification of gas supplies, and imposition of unfair pricing by linking oil and gas prices in long-term contracts.[11] The Russian Federation responded by issuing blocking legislation, which introduced a default rule prohibiting Russian strategic firms, including Gazprom, to comply with any foreign measures or requests.[12] Compliance is subject to prior permission granted by the Russian government.
Gas for northern Europe largely came from the Nadym Pur Taz (NPT) region in Western Siberia, but these large fields are now in decline due to depletion. Since the early 2010s Gazprom has been developing replacement gas fields in the Yamal Peninsula area of the Russian Arctic. As of 2020, Yamal produces over 20% of Russia's gas, which is expected to increase to 40% by 2030. The shortest pipeline routes from Yamal to the northern EU countries are the Yamal–Europe pipeline through Poland and Nord Stream to Germany. During the winter peak Gazprom does not have the capacity to redirect flows to the central pipeline corridor through Ukraine, built for the NPT gas flow. Gazprom intends to decommission some pipelines, over forty years old with high maintenance costs, in the central corridor as NPT production declines.[13]
In 2017, energy products accounted for around 60% of the EU's total imports from Russia.[14] 30% of the EU's petroleum oil imports and 39% of total gas imports came from Russia in 2017. For Estonia, Poland, Slovakia and Finland, more than 75% of their imports of petroleum oils originated in Russia.[14]
Natural gas deliveries
[edit]![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/d7/Major_russian_gas_pipelines_to_europe.png/220px-Major_russian_gas_pipelines_to_europe.png)
In 2021, 45% of the European Union's natural gas total imports originated in Russia.[2] As of 2009, Russian natural gas was delivered to Europe through 12 pipelines, of which three were direct pipelines (to Finland, Estonia and Latvia), four through Belarus (to Lithuania and Poland) and five through Ukraine (to Slovakia, Romania, Hungary and Poland).[15] In 2011, an additional pipeline, Nord Stream (directly to Germany through the Baltic Sea), opened.[16]
The largest importers of Russian gas in the European Union are Germany and Italy, accounting together for almost half of the EU's gas imports from Russia. Other larger Russian gas importers in the European Union are France, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Austria and Slovakia.[17][18] The largest non-EU importers of Russian natural gas are Turkey and Belarus.[17]
In 2017 Russia became one of the main liquefied natural gas (LNG) suppliers to Europe, mostly from Yamal LNG which started operations in 2017, in addition to pipeline supplies. In 2018 about 6% of Russian gas supply to Europe was as LNG.[13]
In response to Russian military buildup and recognition of Ukrainian separatists, Germany cancelled opening of the Nord Stream 2 in February 2022. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine prompted Western sanctions, leading to a currency crisis in Russia. The 2022 Russia–European Union gas dispute broke out in April, with Russia demanding to be paid in Russian rubles and cutting off natural gas deliveries to Poland and Bulgaria when those countries refused to allow alteration of gas contracts.
2021-22 supply instability
[edit]![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/2e/Share_of_Russia_in_EU_and_UK_gas_demand_2001_2021_updated.png/330px-Share_of_Russia_in_EU_and_UK_gas_demand_2001_2021_updated.png)
The reliance of the European Union and, indirectly, the United Kingdom on Russian gas supplies has increased over the last decade. Natural gas consumption in the EU and UK overall remained broadly flat in over this period, but production fell by a third and the gap has been filled by increased imports. Consequently, the share of Russian gas supplies increased from 25% of the region’s total gas demand in 2009 to 32% in 2021.[19]
Russia also has a wide-reaching gas export pipeline network, both via transit routes through Belarus and Ukraine, and via pipelines sending gas directly into Europe (including Nord Stream, Blue Stream, and TurkStream pipelines) all. Russia completed work on the Nord Stream II pipeline in 2021, but the German government decided not to approve certification in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[20] Meanwhile, the importance of Ukraine as a transit country has lessened due to the build-up of additional transit corridors bringing Russian piped gas to the EU and UK (e.g. Nord Stream). Transit flows via Ukraine accounted for over 25% of Russia’s pipeline deliveries to the EU and UK in 2021, significantly down from more than 60% in 2009. Nevertheless, Ukraine remains an important conduit for Russian gas to Europe. About 8% of the EU and UK combined gas demand transits through Ukraine, and the country also relies heavily on imported gas for its own domestic use.[19]
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/d9/Year-on-year_change_in_the_EU_and_UK_natural_gas_imports_by_source%2C_October_2021-Jan_2022.png/330px-Year-on-year_change_in_the_EU_and_UK_natural_gas_imports_by_source%2C_October_2021-Jan_2022.png)
Over the course of 2021 and the beginning of 2022, Russia created an ‘artificial tightness’ in European gas markets. The Russian state-owned Gazprom reduced its piped gas supplies to the EU market by 25% in the fourth quarter of 2021 compared to the same period in 2020.[21][19] This decrease in Russian pipeline supply to the EU became more pronounced in the first seven weeks of 2022, falling by 37% compared to the previous year. The last pipeline deliveries to Germany via the Yamal pipeline which goes through Belarus, occurred on 20 December 2021. Gas flows via Ukraine to Slovakia fell from an average of over 80 mcm/d in December 2021 to just 36 mcm/d in the first seven weeks of 2022. Altogether, Russian gas flows via Ukraine averaged only half of the contractually available capacity.[19]
Other pipeline suppliers, including Algeria, Azerbaijan and Norway, increased their deliveries during the heating season to the European market compared with last year, using commercially available supply routes. Lower Russian pipeline flows were compensated in part by higher liquefied natural gas (LNG) inflows to the EU and the UK, which reached an all-time high of 13 bcm in January – almost three times their last year’s levels and about 70% higher compared to Russian pipeline flows that month. Strong supply and milder-than-expected temperatures in Northeast Asia helped to facilitate the redirection of cargoes towards Europe and limit the implications of strong European demand for LNG markets. The United States supplied over half of the additional LNG imported by the EU and UK since the beginning of the heating season. This highlights the importance of the US LNG export industry to European energy security.[19] In 2021, the Russian government released a long-term LNG development plan, with the goal of expanding its LNG capacity in order to compete with growing LNG exports from the United States, Australia, and Qatar.[20]
Russia has also been reducing its piped gas supplies to the EU market, while choosing not fill its storage sites in the EU to adequate levels, even in the middle of the heating season in the fourth quarter of 2021 and in early 2022.[22][19] As a consequence of low inventory levels at the beginning of the heating season, and the sharp decline of Russian piped flows to the EU, European gas storage levels fell to 30% below their working storage capacity (and standing 28% below their 5-year average levels for this period of the year). Storage sites owned or controlled by Gazprom, the Russian state-owned energy corporation, had particularly low storage levels at the start of the heating season, filled to just 25% of their working storage capacity. While Gazprom storages account for just 10% of the EU total working storage capacity, they accounted for half of the EU’s 5-year storage deficit. Without the strong increase in LNG imports since October 2021, European storage levels would have been less than 15% full by February 2022 (vs 31% in reality), leaving Europe in a much more vulnerable position vis-à-vis late cold spells or supply disruptions.[19] For context, expert analysis suggests that fill levels of at least 90% of working storage capacity by 1 October are necessary to provide an adequate buffer for the European gas market through the winter heating season.[23]
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/2a/Inventory_Levels_in_EU_underground_storage_sites%2C_2016-2022.png/330px-Inventory_Levels_in_EU_underground_storage_sites%2C_2016-2022.png)
In late 2021, European natural gas prices rose to all-time highs and remained extremely volatile into 2022. These reduced Russian pipeline flows, together with low storage levels and adverse weather conditions, contributed to strong upward pressure on prices in Europe, which averaged more than $30 USD per million BTUs (MMBtu) in the fourth quarter of 2021. Natural gas prices moderated down to an average of $27/MMBtu in the first seven weeks of 2022. Unseasonably mild weather conditions led to a slight decrease in demand (declining by 14% year-on-year according to preliminary estimates), and a 20% increase in wind energy output in the first quarter of 2022 reduced gas burn in the power sector.
Nonetheless, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, European gas prices surged by 50% day-on-day, reaching to $44/MMBtu, following the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. On 26 April, Russia announced it would cut off natural gas exports to Poland and Bulgaria, as a part of a series of disputes over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Natural gas prices are expected to remain extremely volatile in the current context of market uncertainty.[19][24]
Disputes and diversification efforts
[edit]NO CHANGES
Poland
[edit]As part of Poland's plans to become fully energy independent from Russia within the next years, Piotr Wozniak, president of state-controlled oil and gas company PGNiG, stated in February 2019: "The strategy of the company is just to forget about Eastern suppliers and especially about Gazprom."[25] In 2020, the Stockholm Arbitral Tribunal ruled that PGNiG's long-term contract gas price with Gazprom linked to oil prices should be changed to approximate the Western European gas market price, backdated to 1 November 2014 when PGNiG requested a price review under the contract.[26][27]
Gazprom had to refund about $1.5 billion to PGNiG. The 1996 Yamal pipeline related contract is for up to 10.2 billion cubic metres of gas per year until it expires in 2022, with a minimum annual amount of 8.7 billion cubic metres.[28][29] Following the 2021 global energy crisis, PGNiG made a further price review request on 28 October 2021. PGNiG stated the recent extraordinary increases in natural gas prices "provides a basis for renegotiating the price terms on which we purchase gas under the Yamal Contract."[30][31]
On 17 November 2021 Belarus has stopped oil supplies over the Druzhba pipeline to Western Europe for "unscheduled maintenance"[32][33] which happened amidst the Belarus border crisis[34] and one day after Germany suspended certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.[35]
The Baltic Pipe between Norway and Poland will have the capacity to replace the roughly 60% of Polish gas imports coming from Russia via the Yamal pipeline, and is expected to be operational by the end of 2022.[36][needs update]
On 26 April, Russia announced it would cut off natural gas exports to Poland and Bulgaria, as a part of a series of disputes over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[24]
Electricity markets before the invasion of Ukraine
[edit]The turmoil in natural gas markets in 2021 and 2022 spilled over into European electricity markets, which typically rely on gas as a marginal fuel and are therefore affected when it experiences high prices and volatility. This has been exacerbated by lower than average hydropower output and lower nuclear output highlighting the need for adequate investment in sources of baseload supply and flexibility. While higher carbon prices have also played a role in pushing up electricity prices, it has not been the most significant factor. The International Energy Agency estimates that the effect on European electricity prices of the sharp spike in natural gas prices is nearly eight times bigger than the effect of the increase in carbon prices. Although wind power was unusually below average during the European summer, wind and solar PV provided valuable contributions to meeting European electricity demand in the fourth quarter of 2021. Wind power generation increased by 3% and solar by 20% compared with the same period a year earlier.[21]
Nuclear fuel supplies
[edit]NO CHANGES
Sources
[edit] This article incorporates text from a free content work. Licensed under CC BY 4.0 (license statement/permission). Text taken from Gas Market and Russian Supply, International Energy Agency, IEA.
This article incorporates text from a free content work. Licensed under CC BY 4.0 (license statement/permission). Text taken from Europe and the world needs to draw the right lessons from today's natural gas crisis, Fatih Birol, International Energy Agency.
This article incorporates text from a free content work. Licensed under CC BY 4.0 (license statement/permission). Text taken from A 10-Point Plan to Reduce the European Union's Reliance on Russian Natural Gas, International Energy Agency, IEA.
References
[edit]- ^ "EU imports of energy products - recent developments". ec.europa.eu. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
- ^ a b International Energy Agency (3 March 2022). "How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia significantly within a year". IEA. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
- ^ Koszalin, Andreas Heinrich (5 February 2008). "Gazprom's Expansion Strategy in Europe and the Liberalization of EU Energy Markets" (PDF). Russian Analytical Digest (34 Russian Business Expansion). Research Centre for East European Studies. Archived from the original (PDF) on 6 July 2011. Retrieved 23 February 2008.
- ^ a b Chandrasekhar, Aruna (25 February 2022). "Q&A: What does Russia's invasion of Ukraine mean for energy and climate change?". Carbon Brief. Retrieved 26 February 2022.
- ^ Cite error: The named reference
:1
was invoked but never defined (see the help page). - ^ Birnbaum, Michael; Mufson, Steven (24 February 2022). "E.U. will unveil a strategy to break free from Russian gas, after decades of dependence". Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 26 February 2022.
- ^ Weise, Zia (8 March 2022). "Commission plans to get EU off Russian gas before 2030". POLITICO.
- ^ Iftimie, Ion (22 January 2015). Natural Gas as an Instrument of Russian State Power (Second edition, fully revised and updated ed.). Washington, D.C.: Westphalia Press. p. 74. ISBN 9781633911390. OCLC 908407323.
- ^ Marson, James; Wallace, Joe (27 October 2021). "Europe's Push to Loosen Russian Influence on Gas Prices Bites Back". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 1 November 2021.
- ^ Zeniewski, Peter (22 October 2021). "Despite short-term pain, the EU's liberalised gas markets have brought long-term financial gains". International Energy Agency. Retrieved 1 November 2021.
- ^ European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Opens Proceedings Against Gazprom, IP/12/937
- ^ Marek Martyniszyn, Legislation Blocking Antitrust Investigations and the September 2012 Russian Executive Order, 37(1) World Competition 103 (2014)
- ^ a b Cite error: The named reference
oxfordenergy-202109
was invoked but never defined (see the help page). - ^ a b "EU imports of energy products - recent developments" (PDF). Eurostat. 4 July 2018. pp. 3–4. Retrieved 11 August 2018.
- ^
"Commission staff working document–Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply and repealing Directive 2004/67/EC. Assessment report of directive 2004/67/EC on security of gas supply {COM(2009) 363}". European Commission. 16 July 2009: 33, 56, 63–76. Retrieved 30 January 2010.
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(help) - ^ Juergen Baetz (8 November 2011). "Merkel, Medvedev inaugurate new gas pipeline". Associated Press. Retrieved 15 November 2011.
- ^ a b
"Country analysis briefs: Russia" (PDF). Energy Information Administration. May 2008: 11. Archived from the original (PDF) on 7 June 2010. Retrieved 30 January 2010.
{{cite journal}}
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(help) - ^
Noël, Pierre (May 2009). "A Market Between Us: Reducing the Political Cost of Europe's Dependence on Russian Gas" (PDF). EPRG Working Paper Series. University of Cambridge Electricity Policy Research Group: 2; 38. EPRG0916. Retrieved 30 January 2010.
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(help) - ^ a b c d e f g h International Energy Agency (26 February 2022). "Gas Market and Russian Supply". IEA.
- ^ a b International Energy Agency (21 March 2022). "Energy Fact Sheet: Why does Russian oil and gas matter?". IEA. Retrieved 27 April 2022.
- ^ a b Birol, Fatih (13 January 2022). "Europe and the world need to draw the right lessons from today's natural gas crisis". International Energy Agency. Retrieved 27 April 2022.
- ^ International Energy Agency (21 September 2021). "Statement on recent developments in natural gas and electricity markets". IEA. Retrieved 27 April 2022.
- ^ International Energy Agency (March 2022). "A 10-Point Plan to Reduce the European Union's Reliance on Russian Natural Gas". IEA. Retrieved 27 April 2022.
- ^ a b "Ukraine war: Russia halts gas exports to Poland and Bulgaria". BBC News. 27 April 2022. Retrieved 2 May 2022.
- ^ Reed, Stanley (26 February 2019). "Burned by Russia, Poland Turns to U.S. for Natural Gas and Energy Security". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331.
- ^ Barteczko, Agnieszka (31 March 2020). "Poland's PGNiG to take immediate steps to receive $1.5 billion from Gazprom". Reuters.
- ^ "Victory for PGNiG: the Arbitral Tribunal in Stockholm rules to lower the price of the gas sold by Gazprom to PGNiG". PGNiG (Press release). 20 March 2020.
- ^ Barteczko, Agnieszka (31 March 2020). "Poland's PGNiG to take immediate steps to receive $1.5 billion from Gazprom". Reuters.
- ^ "Victory for PGNiG: the Arbitral Tribunal in Stockholm rules to lower the price of the gas sold by Gazprom to PGNiG". PGNiG (Press release). 20 March 2020.
- ^ "Polish PGNiG asks Gazprom to reduce gas prices under Yamal contract". TASS. Moscow. 28 October 2021.
- ^ "PGNiG files request for price reduction under Yamal Contract". PGNiG (Press release). 28 October 2021.
- ^ "Belarus restricts oil supplies to Poland due to unscheduled maintenance". Reuters. 17 November 2021. Retrieved 17 November 2021.
- ^ "Belarus Stopped Supplying Oil Via "Druzhba" To Poland". charter97.org. Retrieved 17 November 2021.
- ^ Anonym. "Belarus blocks oil transit to Poland | txtreport.com". www.txtreport.com. Retrieved 17 November 2021.
- ^ "Nord Stream 2: Gas prices soar after setback for Russian pipeline". BBC News. 16 November 2021. Retrieved 17 November 2021.
- ^ Easton, Adam (26 April 2022). "Russia halts gas supplies to Poland, reports say". BBC News. Warsaw. Retrieved 26 April 2022.