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Die Hoffnungslosigkeit aller Psychologie (translated: Hopelessness of all psychology) is a book written by Paul Julius Möbius published in 1907. In the book, Möbius challenges psychology's ability to establish itself as a legitimate science, questioning its reliance on empirical methods and raising concerns about its future as a scientific discipline.[1]
Context
[edit]The writing of Die Hoffnungslosigkeit aller Psychologie is an extension of Möbius's critical perspective on the field of psychology. His work reflects scepticism about the empirical foundations of psychology during his time, as he observed the field's struggle to establish itself as a rigorous scientific discipline.[2]
This scepticism did not exist in isolation and was part of a larger intellectual debate in late 19th-century Germany. These debates revolved around the nature of mental illness and the role of psychology in medicine and science.[3] While discussions about the mind date back way earlier, the specific critique of psychology as a scientific discipline, as Möbius addressed, became more pronounced with the arrival of empirical psychology during this period. This rise of empirical psychology was led by figures like Wilhelm Wundt or Hermann Ebbinghaus, who sought to establish psychology as a scientific discipline through experimental methods and self-observation.[3] However, these approaches were questioned by other schools of thought, such as psychoanalysis led by Sigmund Freud. [3]
Möbius initially studied philosophy and theology before pursuing a career in medicine.[2] By the time he wrote the book, Möbius was already an established figure in the field of neurophysiology and psychiatry.[4] Möbius Prior to the publication, Möbius's work had focused on nervous disorders and neurology. He became known for differentiating between exogenous and endogenous nerve conditions. This classification had a significant and lasting influence on the development of neurological and psychiatric theories.[4]
During the course of his academic career, he circled back to his roots in philosophy. Möbius increasingly added psychological topics to the focus of his work, as seen in his highly debated work Über den physiologischen Schwachsinn des Weibes (translated: The Idiocy of Women). This and other works created the background for his critique of psychology from a scientific and medical point of view. [4]
Contents
[edit]In Die Hoffnungslosigkeit aller Psychologie, Möbius offers a detailed critique of psychology as a scientific discipline, arguing that it is fundamentally flawed and cannot evolve into a true science.[1]
The book is structured as an extended essay rather than being divided into formal chapters. It begins with a preliminary remark where Möbius introduces the topic and suggests that psychology might need to incorporate metaphysics into its methods. The first part of the book defines key concepts such as physicality and psyche, highlighting their distinctiveness. The main body of the work uses various topics, including animal psychology, unconsciousness, instinct, feelings, and legal psychology, to illustrate the limitations of empirical psychology. Möbius concludes with a closing statement that critiques the prevailing methods of empirical psychology.[1]
Looking at the book as a whole, Möbius asserts that psychology relies heavily on self-observation and subjective reports, limiting its scope and accuracy. He argues that any psychology claiming universal validity must cross into the realm of metaphysics, as it deals with phenomena that cannot be fully captured by empirical methods alone. Möbius criticises contemporary psychologists for failing to acknowledge this limitation.[1]
He also challenges the discipline's ability to adequately study the full range of mental life, particularly the unconscious. He observes that there are significant gaps in our understanding of mental processes that empirical psychology is unable to fill. These gaps, he argues, expose the limitations of psychology as a science and call into question its ability to fully explain the complexities of the mind.[1]
Another key point in Möbius's critique is the neglect of physiological explanations within psychology. He emphasizes the interconnectedness of mental processes and the physical aspects of the brain, asserting that any serious study of the mind must account for its physiological underpinnings. Without this integration, he argues, psychology remains incomplete, failing to offer a comprehensive account of human thought and behaviour.[1]
Reception
[edit]The book elicited a range of responses from his contemporaries and later scholars. Kurt Goldstein, a prominent neurologist and psychiatrist, agreed with some of Möbius’s views on the limitations of introspection as a methodological tool in psychology. However, Goldstein regarded Möbius's scepticism as overly radical, suggesting that while introspection had clear limitations, the discipline of psychology could not be dismissed as fundamentally flawed or without scientific value.[5] Other scholars also critiqued Möbius’s conclusions, arguing that his dismissal of psychology placed unrealistic expectations on the field. These critics contended that Möbius’s assertions regarding the "hopelessness" of psychology were overstated, as they held the discipline to standards beyond its scope, failing to acknowledge the evolving methodologies and potential for future scientific development.[6] In more recent years, Wolfgang Prinz, a cognitive psychologist, referred to Möbius as a harsh critic of introspection but he also acknowledges that Möbius's arguments were not entirely novel.[7]
Over time, the specific topic of psychology’s scientific validity continued to evolve, with the field gradually moving away from introspection as a primary method. While Möbius’s arguments about the limitations of introspection were acknowledged, the field of psychology continued to advance without incorporating the metaphysical elements he recommended, instead pursuing a path focused on empirical methodologies. The rise of cognitive psychology, and eventually neuropsychology reflects a shift towards more empirically grounded approaches.[3]
The book was published in 1907, the same year Möbius passed away, leaving limited insight into his further opinions on the topic or potential responses to his critics.[4]
References
[edit]- ^ a b c d e f Möbius, P.J. (1907). Die Hoffnungslosigkeit aller Psychologie [The hopelessness of all psychology] (in German). Halle a.d.S. : Marhold,.
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: CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link) - ^ a b Cadogan, Mike (2018-09-03). "Paul Julius Moebius". Life in the Fast Lane • LITFL. Retrieved 2024-08-12.
- ^ a b c d Brysbaert & Rastle (2013). Historical and conceptual issues in psychology (2nd ed.). Pearson, Harlow, England, 2013.
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: CS1 maint: date and year (link) - ^ a b c d Steinberg, H. (2005-05-01). "Paul Julius Möbius (1853–1907)". Journal of Neurology. 252 (5): 624–625. doi:10.1007/s00415-005-0872-2. ISSN 1432-1459.
- ^ Goldstein, Kurt (1908-07-01). "Zur Theorie der Hallucinationen". Archiv für Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten (in German). 44 (2): 584–655. doi:10.1007/BF01821565. ISSN 1433-8491.
- ^ Giehm, Gerhardt (1933-12-01). "Experimentell-psychologische Untersuchungen der Assoziationsgeschwindigkeit bei Geisteskranken". Archiv für Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten (in German). 100 (1): 432–438. doi:10.1007/BF01814750. ISSN 1433-8491.
- ^ Prinz, Wolfgang (2004-10). "Kritik des freien Willens:". Psychologische Rundschau (in German). 55 (4): 198–206. doi:10.1026/0033-3042.55.4.198. ISSN 0033-3042.
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