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Star Lord - 星王 (talk) 22:44, 2 March 2014 (UTC)
The Origins of Political Order
Reception
[edit]Fukuyama's book was listed in "New York Times Notable Book for 2011",[1] the Globe and Mail "Best Books of the Year 2011 Title",[2] Kirkus Reviews "Best Nonfiction of 2011 title".[3] and on the short list for The Lionel Gelber Prize.[4]
Each reviewer listed here, many of who are notable academics in the field of political economy, discovers a different lesson from the book.
The book received positive reviews, a tour de force as a new description of political history. Many of the following reviewers start out by summing up his most well known book, The End of History and sometimes they connect it to the book being reviewed.
Reviewer Jon Sallet writes that Francis Fukuyama is out to challenge the Anglo-centric perspective of the rise of democracy running from Athens directly to John Locke. "He asks, simply: What happened, why did it happen, and what does it teach us about the future?"[5]
Robert Blackburn thinks that it should be required reading for the education minister and his advisers: "A tour de force, readable, well-informed and provocative. It supplies a coherent, sustained and challenging narrative of the whole of human history."[6]
Michael Lind claims that Fukuyama, in discussing the origins of The Origins, is being modest, follows Weber, Durkheim, Marx, and Hegel and looks forward to the next book in the series. The Origins of Political Order is a rigorous attempt to create a synoptic view of human history by means of a synthesis of research in many disciplines.[7]
David Runciman explain that he phrase "to get to Denmark" means to get to a stable, prosperous, dynamic society, but complains that he does not provide the answer.[8]
The Economist sees insights into China, India and the Arab world today: "its insights are relevant to our understanding of modern states and how they became what they are."[9]
Hewson considers the book a major achievement as an overview of political evolution from prehistory and onwards.[10]
Ian Morris writes. "It is an intellectual triumph—bold in scope, sound in judgment, and rich in provocations; in short, a classic."[11]
Will Hutton uses the book in his review to show why the anti-state instincts of the Tea Party movement are wrong.[12]
Nicholas Wade's review compares the work to classics in the field, like Guns, Germs and Steel and quotes other positive comments, among them Goerg Sorensen, who proclaims "this will be a new classic", Arthur Melzer saying that it is "definitely a magnum opus." and that it is unusual because it addresses many factors like warfare, religion, and human social behaviors.[13]
At a discussion with Fukuyama at Trinity College, he explain the relevance of his ideas to the country's battle over the budget, the debt ceiling and Obamacare.[14]
Frank Furedi comments that Fukuyama is concerned about political stasis in many liberal democracies, and warns about political decay.[15]
Gerard DeGroot congratulates Fukuyama for thinking big."This is a book that will be remembered, like those of Ranke, Trevelyan and Turner. Bring on volume II."[16]
Christopher Caldwell calls Fukuyama's latest book sober but scintillating. Fukuyama’s grimmest message, he feels, is that progress in moral and culture may signal decay in politics and civilisation.[17]
Tim Soutphommasane writes that while philosophers like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau consider humans to be individualistic, Fukuyama cites modern biology research as arguments for humans being programmed for social co-operation.[18]
David Marquand writes that "It is an astonishing achievement."[19]
David Gress advices future leaders to take note, since future legitimacy depends on balancing between strong state action and individual freedoms.[20]
Michael Burleigh is impressed by way he combines anthropology, social biology, history and political science.[21]
Steve Sailer concludes that The Origins of Political Order offers a respectable starting point for those who want to understand how states and nations evolved.[22]
A race between the Criteria
[edit]One theme is a race between the three components, i e which components came first to power in each state. [23]
In China, since a strong modern state came first, the state subjugated any potential agents that might have demanded the other two components. In China, the priestly class did not develop into an organized religion, became little more than official hired shamans in the service of the Emperor. Numerous times, therefore, imperial dynasties collapsed. [23]
In India, the Brahmins became organised into a strong upper caste of India and the warrior/state caste was held to account by a rule of law as interpreted by the Brahmins. Because of the state was weakened by this limitation, attempts at unifying India under one rule did not last very long. [23]
In Europe, there was a long period when the emperors and popes were in conflict, creating a balance of power between them [23] , and ultimately leading to a situation where some small states developed a stable balance between the three components in the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden.[23]
A race between the Criteria
[edit]One theme is a race between the three components, i e which components came first to power in each state. [24]
In China, since a strong modern state came first, the state subjugated any potential agents that might have demanded the other two components. In China, the priestly class did not develop into an organized religion, became little more than official hired shamans in the service of the Emperor. Numerous times, therefore, imperial dynasties collapsed. [25]
In India, the Brahmins became organised into a strong upper caste of India and the warrior/state caste was held to account by a rule of law as interpreted by the Brahmins. Because of the state was weakened by this limitation, attempts at unifying India under one rule did not last very long. [26]
In Europe, there was a long period when the emperors and popes were in conflict, creating a balance of power between them [27] , and ultimately leading to a situation where some small states developed a stable balance between the three components in the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden.[28]
- ^ "New York Times Notable Book for 2011 review". New York TImes. Retrieved March 20, 2014.
- ^ "Best Books of the Year 2011 Title review". Globe and Mail. Retrieved March 20, 2014.
- ^ "Best Nonfiction of 2011 title review". Kirkus Reviews. Retrieved March 20, 2014.
- ^ "The Lionel Gelber Prize review". Award shortlist. Toronto University. Retrieved March 20, 2014.
- ^ Sallet, John. "The Origins of Political Order review". The Washington Independent Review of Books. Retrieved March 20, 2014.
- ^ Blackburn, Robert. "The Origins of Political Order review". The Independent. Retrieved March 20, 2014.
- ^ Lind, Michael. "Francis Fukuyama's Theory of the State review". New York Times. Retrieved March 20, 2014.
- ^ Runciman, David. "The Origins of Political Order review". The Guardian. Retrieved March 20, 2014.
- ^ "The good, the great and the gelded review". The Economist. Retrieved March 20, 2014.
- ^ "Review review". Reviews in History. Retrieved March 20, 2014.
- ^ "How To Get to the End of History or "getting to Denmark" review". Slate. Retrieved March 20, 2014.
- ^ "How To Get to the End of History or "getting to Denmark" review". The Guardian. Retrieved 20 May 2011.
- ^ "From End of History Author, a Look at the Beginning and Middle". New York Times. Retrieved 20 March 2014.
- ^ "Stanford Scholar Francis Fukuyama discusses the origins of political order". Trinity College. Retrieved 20 March 2014.
- ^ "A return to the beginning of history recasts the story of modernization. Frank Furedi is enlightened". Times Higher Education. Retrieved 20 March 2014.
- ^ "Francis Fukuyama's "The Origins of Political Order"". Washington Post. Retrieved 20 March 2014.
- ^ "Review of "The Origins of Political Order"". Financial Times. Retrieved 20 March 2014.
- ^ "Visionary of the Big Picture". The Australian. Retrieved 20 March 2014.
- ^ "Review". New Statesman. Retrieved 20 March 2014.
- ^ "From Dynasty to Democracy - Nations did not find stability, or sustained prosperity, until they became accountable to their citizens". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 20 March 2014.
- ^ "A dense study of global political development". The Telegraph. Retrieved 20 March 2014.
- ^ "Fukuyama's World". The American Conservative. Retrieved 20 March 2014.
- ^ a b c d e Fukuyama, Francis (2012). Origins of political order : from prehuman times to the French revolution (1st paperback ed. ed.). New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. ISBN 0374533229.
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- ^ Fukuyama 2011, Chapter 7
- ^ Fukuyama 2011, Chapter 11
- ^ Fukuyama 2011, Chapter 18
- ^ Fukuyama 2011, Chapter 19
Fukuyama, Francis (2012). Origins of political order : from prehuman times to the French revolution (1st paperback ed. ed.). New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. ISBN ISBN-10: 0374533229 ISBN-13: 978-0374533229. {{cite book}}
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Legality of any declaration of War since 1945
[edit]The United Nations Charter is the foundation of modern international law.[1] The UN Charter is a treaty ratified by members of the UN, which are therefore legally bound by its terms. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter generally bans the use of force by states except when carefully circumscribed conditions are met, stating:
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.[2]
This rule was "enshrined in the United Nations Charter in 1945 for a good reason: to prevent states from using force as they felt so inclined", said Louise Doswald-Beck, Secretary-General International Commission of Jurists.[3]
Therefore, in the absence of an armed attack against a country or its allies, any legal use of force, or any legal threat of the use of force, has to be supported by a United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing member states to use force.
Star Lord - <sup>星王</sup> (talk) 14:28, 14 March 2014 (UTC)
List of wars declared illegal from the point of view of the United Nations, according to the United Nations Charter (1945)
[edit]Start | Finish | Name of War | Person who declared it |
---|---|---|---|
2011 | 2011 | Iraq War | Kofi Annan[4][5][6][7] |
2014 | - | Russian military intervention in Ukraine |
added some text here
- ^ Howard Friel and Richard Falk, “The Record of the Paper: How the New York Times Misreports Foreign Policy,” Chapter I, Without Law of Facts, The United States Invades Iraq,” pages 15-17
- ^ Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/unchart.htm#art2
- ^ International Commission of Jurists, 18 March 2003, Iraq - ICJ Deplores Moves Toward a War of Aggression on Iraq
- ^ http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq
- ^ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3661134.stm
- ^ http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=11953&#.UyHgePl5N8E
- ^ http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/16/international/16CND-NATI.html