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Prelude

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Preparation for genocide

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Historians do not agree on the precise date on which the idea of a "final solution" to kill every Tutsi in Rwanda was first mooted. Gerard Prunier dates it to 1992, when Habyarimana began negotiating with the RPF,[1] while journalist Linda Melvern dates it to 1990, following the initial RPF invasion.[2] The army began arming civilians with weapons such as machetes from 1990, and training the Hutu youth in combat, officially as a programme of "civil defence" to the RPF threat,[3] but these weapons were later used in carrying out the genocide.[4] Rwanda also purchased large numbers of grenades and munitions from late 1990; in one deal, future UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his role as Egyptian foreign minister, facilitated a large sale of arms from Egypt.[5] The Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) expanded rapidly at this time, growing from less than 10,000 troops to almost 30,000 in one year.[3] The new recruits were often poorly disciplined;[3] a divide grew between the elite Presidential Guard and Gendarmerie units, who were well trained and battle ready, and the ordinary rank and file.[6]

In March 1993, the Hutu Power began compiling lists of "traitors" whom they planned to kill, and it is possible that Habyarimana's name was on these lists;[7] the CDR were publicly accusing the president of treason.[7] The Power groups also believed that the national radio station, Radio Rwanda, had become too liberal and supportive of the opposition; they founded a new radio station, Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLMC), which broadcast racist propaganda, obscene jokes and music, becoming very popular throughout the country.[8] One study finds that approximately 10% of the overall violence during the Rwandan genocide can be attributed to this new radio station.[9] During 1993, the hardliners imported machetes on a scale far larger than that required for agriculture, as well as other tools which could be used as weapons, such as razor blades, saws and scissors.[10] These tools were distributed around the country, ostensibly as part of the civil defence network.[10]

In October 1993, the President of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, who had been elected in June as the country's first ever Hutu president, was assassinated by extremist Tutsi army officers.[11] The assassination caused shockwaves, reinforcing the notion among Hutus that the Tutsi were their enemy and could not be trusted.[12] The CDR and the Power wings of the other parties realised they could use this situation to their advantage.[12] The idea of a "final solution," which had first been suggested in 1992 but had remained a fringe viewpoint, was now top of their agenda, and they began actively planning it.[12] They were confident of persuading the Hutu population to carry out killings, given the public anger at Ndadaye's murder, as well as RTLM propaganda and the traditional obedience of Rwandans to authority.[12] The Power leaders began arming the interahamwe and other militia groups with AK-47s and other weapons; previously, they had possessed only machetes and traditional hand weapons.[13]

On January 11, 1994, General Romeo Dallaire, commander of UNAMIR, sent his "Genocide Fax" to UN Headquarters.[14] The fax stated that Dallaire was in contact with a high level informant who told him of plans to distribute weapons to Hutu militias to kill Belgian members of UNAMIR in order to guarantee Belgian withdrawal. The informant, a local politician, had been ordered to register all Tutsis in Kigali with an example that they could kill up to 1,000 Tutsis in 20 minutes, leading to the extermination of the Tutsis.[15] Dallaire requested permission for the protection of the informant and his family. Kofi Annan repeatedly forbade the operation until guidance was received from headquarters. He did so even as the genocide had started, despite having the authority for approval. His reason for not doing so was Article 2(4) of the Charter, although the intervention would have been by the UN itself, not a member state.[16] The UNAMIR force was established by Resolution 872 on October 5, 1993 with the consent of both parties to the civil war.[17] Thomas Pogge argues that UNAMIR could not have been charged with intervening because both sides requested and consented to it and it was authorized by the UN Security Council.[16]

Assassination of Habyarimana

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Main article: Assassination of Juvénal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira
Juvénal Habyarimana in 1980

On April 6, 1994, the airplane carrying Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira, the Hutu president of Burundi, was shot down as it prepared to land in Kigali, killing everyone on board. Responsibility for the attack was disputed, with both the RPF and Hutu extremists being blamed. A later investigation by the Rwandan government blamed Hutu extremists in the Rwandan army.[18] In January 2012, a French investigation confirmed that the missile fire which brought down the plane "could not have come from a military base occupied by Kagame's [Tutsi] supporters."[19] Despite disagreements about the perpetrators, many observers believe the attack and deaths of the two Hutu presidents served as the catalyst for the genocide.

Following Habyarimana's death, on the evening of 6 April, a crisis committee was formed; it consisted of Major General Augustin Ndindiliyimana, Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, and a number of other senior army staff officers.[20] The committee was headed by Bagosora, despite the presence of the more senior Ndindiliyimana.[21] Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana was legally next in the line of political succession,[22] but the committee refused to recognise her authority.[22] Dallaire met with the committee that night and insisted that Uwilingiyimana be placed in charge, but Bagosora refused, saying Uwilingiyimana did not "enjoy the confidence of the Rwandan people" and was "incapable of governing the nation."[22] The committee also justified its existence as being essential to avoid uncertainty following the president's death.[22] Bagosora sought to convince UNAMIR and the RPF[23] that the committee was acting to contain the Presidential Guard, which he described as "out of control",[24] and that it would abide by the Arusha agreement.[22]

Killing of moderate leaders

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UNAMIR sent an escort of ten Belgian soldiers to Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana, with the intention of transporting her to the Radio Rwanda offices to address the nation.[25] This plan was cancelled because the Presidential Guard took over the radio station shortly afterwards and would not permit Uwilingiyimana to speak on air.[25] Later in the morning, a number of soldiers and a crowd of civilians overwhelmed the Belgians guarding Uwilingiyimana, forcing them to surrender their weapons.[26] Uwilingiyimana and her husband were killed, although their children survived by hiding behind furniture and were rescued by Senegalese UNAMIR officer Mbaye Diagne.[27] The ten Belgians were taken to the Camp Kigali military base, where they were tortured and killed.[28] Major Bernard Ntuyahaga, the commanding officer of the Presidential Guard unit which carried out the murders, was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment by a court in Belgium in 2007.[29]

In addition to assassinating Uwilingiyimana, the extremists spent the night of 6–7 April moving around the houses of Kigali with lists of prominent moderate politicians and journalists, on a mission to kill them.[30][26] Fatalities that evening included President of the Constitutional Court Joseph Kavaruganda, Minister of Agriculture Frederic Nzamurambaho, Parti Liberal leader Landwald Ndasingwa and his Canadian wife, and chief Arusha negotiator Boniface Ngulinzira.[25] A few moderates survived, including prime minister-delegate Faustin Twagiramungu,[31] but the plot was largely successful. According to Dallaire, "by noon on April 7 the moderate political leadership of Rwanda was dead or in hiding, the potential for a future moderate government utterly lost."[32] The only exception to this was the new army chief of staff, Marcel Gatsinzi; Bagosora's preferred candidate Augustin Bizimungu was rejected by the crisis committee, forcing Bagosora to agree to Gatsinzi's appointment.[33] Gatsinzi attempted to keep the army out of the genocide,[34] and to negotiate a ceasefire with the RPF,[35] but he had only limited control over his troops and was replaced by the hardline Augustin Bizimungu after just ten days.[34]

  1. ^ Prunier 1999, p. 169.
  2. ^ Melvern 2004, p. 19.
  3. ^ a b c Melvern 2004, p. 20.
  4. ^ Prunier 1999, p. 243.
  5. ^ Melvern 2000, pp. 31 32.
  6. ^ Dallaire 2005, p. 69.
  7. ^ a b Prunier 1999, p. 182.
  8. ^ Prunier 1999, p. 189.
  9. ^ Yanagizawa-Drott, David (2014-11-01). "Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide". The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 129 (4): 1947–1994. doi:10.1093/qje/qju020. ISSN 0033-5533.
  10. ^ a b Melvern 2004, p. 56.
  11. ^ Prunier 1999, p. 199.
  12. ^ a b c d Prunier 1999, p. 200.
  13. ^ Dallaire 2005, p. 143.
  14. ^ Adams, Smin. "The UN, Rwanda and the 'Genocide Fax' -- 20 Years Later". Huffington Post. Retrieved 14 April 2015.
  15. ^ Patrick, Stewart. "Lessons of the Rwandan Genocide". The Internationalist.
  16. ^ a b Pogge, Thomas (2010). Politics as Usual (1 ed.). Polity. p. 170. ISBN 978-0-7456-3892-8.
  17. ^ "Resolution 872 Rwanda (5 Oct)". UNSCR. Retrieved 14 April 2015.
  18. ^ "TIME". Retrieved May 30, 2011.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)[dead link]
  19. ^ Reuters: French probe exonerates Rwanda leader in genocide, January 10, 2012
  20. ^ Dallaire 2005, pp. 222–223.
  21. ^ Melvern 2004, p. 137.
  22. ^ a b c d e Dallaire 2005, p. 224.
  23. ^ Dallaire 2005, p. 225.
  24. ^ Dallaire 2005, p. 223.
  25. ^ a b c Dallaire 2005, p. 230.
  26. ^ a b Prunier 1999, p. 230.
  27. ^ Dallaire 2005, p. 245.
  28. ^ Gourevitch 2000, p. 114.
  29. ^ "Rwandan convicted of killing Belgian peacekeepers". Reuters. July 4, 2007. Retrieved September 30, 2012.
  30. ^ Dallaire 2005, p. 231.
  31. ^ Prunier 1999, p. 231.
  32. ^ Dallaire 2005, p. 232.
  33. ^ Melvern 2004, p. 139.
  34. ^ a b Prunier 1999, p. 229.
  35. ^ Dallaire 2005, p. 292.
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