User:Akm2173/sandbox

By inviting warlords capable enough to disrupt the state building process, a"big tent" strategy was enacted in order to incorporate, rather than alienate, these non-state actors in Afghan state centralization

Ethnic Conflict in Soviet Union

In particular, the Post Soviet Union territories are especially vulnerable to "triadic" hostilities. The newly independent states– nationalizing states– are in tension with the "homeland" state of Russia who will attempt to protect Russian ethnic minorities within the new states. Each of the incipient fifteen states except for Armenia had in 1989 substantive Russian minorities, a cause for conflict between Russia and its former autonomous republics.

Outline for Ethnic conflict or Ethnic Violence

Central Question: Is ethnic violence a top-down or bottom-up phenomenon? If either under what circumstances? Currently, there is no mention of bottom-up or top-down in a social science sense. How important is this beyond just this page?

I did not post this to any talk pages because I do not know if this belongs in ethnic violence or ethnic conflict . If anyone has some feedback that would be greatly appreciated.

I.    Top-down- Ethnic Violence and Conflict are caused by elites and incite violence and make ethnicities politically salient.

a.   Is it inherent in a society?

i.     No- Rwanda

1.  Scott Strauss argues that “Most Rwandans chose to commit violence in the context of an intense civil war and only when genocide became the order of the day decreed from above. Rwandans are easy to mobilize, then and now, but committing violence against Tutsis is not ingrained in Rwandan culture” (Order of Genocide : Race, Power, and War in Rwanda)

2. He argues that repression is not needed to temper “ethnic hatreds” and divisions amongst society. Instead, ethnic violence is only possible when elite coercion makes it so.

ii.  No- India (Hindu-Muslim)

1. Steven Wilkinson theorizes that politicians have incentives to either constrain or incite ethnic violence, especially in a democracy in order to benefit politically.  (Votes and Violence: electoral competition and ethnic riots in India)

a. State- capacity- argues that it is not state capacity that determines the outbreak of ethnic violence because one sees variance across the same states in federal India

b. Consociational theory- Arend Lijphart argues that India is state with a political “grand coalition” with wide ethnic representation and minority vote; ethnic violence has increased in India due to the loss of the dominant multiethnic Congress Party

i.  Wilkinson argues against this statistically and demonstrates the most ethnic violence occurred during moments of Congress Party rule

b.     Does ethnic violence across states happen during moments of democratization?

i.     Jack Snyder argues that 75% of democratizing states go to warà the elites must win over the votes of a mass electorate

1.      Appeal to the basic instinct and make ethnicity politically salient

II. Bottom-down

a.      Primordialist ancient hatreds    

i.     Robert Kaplan on the Balkans

ii.     Stuart Kauffman says that the myth of ethnic hatred must be renewed each generation

b.     Why is this not a dominant theory amongst political scientists but very common in journalistic covering of ethnic violence?

Questions:

a)  Where should I put this article ? ethnic violence or ethnic conflict

b)  How long should I make each section?

c)  Which case studies should I use? Follow up question: How important are case studies in a Wikipedia article? Should they go under ethnic violence/conflict page or under a whole separate page?  

Current Possible Case Studies

• The Balkans
• USSR
• Rwanda
• Guatemala
• India

III. Possible Directions

• Interstate violence/conflict vs intrastate
• What is the role of international institutions/organizations as a policing/regulating form
• Are there any state institutions which might prevent/mitigate ethnic conflict?

Transfer to Both Ethnic Violence and Ethnic Conflict Talk Pages

Hello, I am looking to combine the ethnic violence and ethnic conflict pages into one more cohesive page. Moreover, I would like to further expand the section on the causes of ethnic violence. What do you think of this idea? Below is an expanded version of my basic proposed outline:

Causes of Ethnic Violence

I would be further explaining, using the research of prominent scholars in the field of course, the following questions:

Top-down or Bottom Up?

There is currently no mention of top-down vs bottom-up on the ethnic violence/conflict page (or any mention of these concepts in the social science sphere of wikipedia). Thus, I would like to summarize several of the prevalent and authoritative arguments for each side of the question as well as explain the concept. Since this is a driving question for many of political scientists of today, I think it's important to have this summary of the current discussion. I would be illustrating their points with the case studies the political scientists use to make it clearer. I was planning to add 3-4 paragraphs each for top-down and bottom-up.

I would also add a subsection within this to explain ethnic entrepreneurs and any prevailing political science jargon which might occur.

Interstate vs Intrastate Violence

I am not sure if this belongs under its own section or a subsection of the TD vs BU debate, but the driving force for two states going to war with a framework of ethnic violence is an important subject.

Moments of Ethnic Violence

In this section, I would like to discuss today's theories on when ethnic violence actually breaks out. Several theorists suggest that it's during democratization or a certain critical mass of a population that ethnic violence occurs. Therefore, I would summarize the main arguments:

• democratization
• demography
• wealth
• primordial
• anarchy

If anyone feels that a major event or exogenous shock is missing, please do not hesitate to respond to this.

Mitigation of Ethnic Violence/Conflict

Here, I would like to discuss the institutions, on an international and state level, that might lower tension and actually prevent ethnic violence. This is currently being further researched, so if anyone has any suggestions for places to look, I would be very grateful.

So what do you think?

Timeline for Moving Article

March 28- move the definition section to the mainspace; post in the ethnic violence talk page about the merging of the two articles

April 4- Bottom Up and Top down additions as well as the institutional mitigation of ethnic conflict; develop drafts for the case studies

April 11- Create a moments/causes of violence part; link to other wikipedia pages

April 18-Develop 2 case studies on their page

March 28- Definition

An ethnic conflict or ethnic war is a conflict between ethnic groups. It contrasts with civil war on one hand (where a single nation or ethnic group is fighting among itself) and conventional warfare on the other, where two or more sovereign states (which may or may not be nation states) are in conflict. An ethnic conflict involves two contending groups who fulfill the ascriptive criteria for ethnicity, namely a "myth of common of descent". While the source of the conflict may be political, social, economic, etc., the combatants must be expressly fighting for an ethnic issue or for the ethnic group's position within society. This is the final criterion that differentiates an ethnic conflict from other forms of armed struggle.

Ethnic conflict does not necessarily need be violent. For example, ethnic conflict might be a non-violent struggle for resources divided among ethnic groups. Only the subject confrontation must be either directly or symbolically linked with an ethnic group.

Examples of ethnic wars since the 1990s that were mostly caused by secessionist movements leading to the breakup of multi-ethnic states along ethnic lines are: the Yugoslav Wars, the First Chechen War, the Nagorno-Karabakh War, the Rwandan Civil War, the War in Darfur, and the Internal conflict in Myanmar, among others.

Academic explanations of ethnic conflict generally fall into one of three schools of thought: primordialist, instrumentalist or constructivist. Recently, several political scientists have argued for either top-down or bottom-up explanations for ethnic conflict. Intellectual debate has also focused on the issue of whether ethnic conflict has become more prevalent since the end of the Cold War, and on devising ways of managing conflicts, through instruments and institutions such as consociationalism and federalisation.

April 18

Primordialism

Clifford Geertz, a founding scholar of this school of thought, asserts that each person has an "natural" connection to one's perceived kinsmen. In time and through repeated conflict, essential ties to one's ethnie will coalesce and will interfere with ties to civil society. Therefore, in a primordialist account, ethnic groups will always threaten the survival of civil governments but not the existence of a nation formed by one ethnic group.

Institutional Resolutions to Ethnic Conflict

Consociationalism

Consociationalism is a power sharing agreement which coopts the leaders of ethnic groups into the government. Each nation or ethnic group is represented in the government through a supposed spokesman for the group. In the power sharing agreement, each group has veto powers to varying degrees, dependent on the particular state. Moreover, the norm of proportionality is dominant: each group is represented in the government in a percentage that reflects the ethnicity's demographic presence in the state. (Hechter).

In theory, this leads to self governance and protection for the ethnic group. Since many scholars maintain that ethnic tension erupts into ethnic violence when the ethnic group is threatened by a state, then veto powers should allow the ethnic group to avoid legislative threats (Brubaker). Switzerland is often characterized as a successful consociationalist state. (Hechter) This theory of ethnic conflict resolution was advocated by Arend Lijphart.

A recent example of a consociational government is post-conflict Bosnia that was agreed upon in the Dayton Accords. A tripartite presidency is chosen and must have a Croat, a Serb, and a Bosniak. The presidents take turns acting as the forefront executive in terms of 8 months for 4 years. (Schrostein) Many have credited this compromise of a consociational government in Bosnia for the end of the violence.

In contrast to Lijphart, several political scientists and policy analysts have condemned consociationalism. One of the many critiques is that consociationalism locks in ethnic tensions and identities. This assumes a primordial stance that ethnic identities are permanent and not subject to change. Furthermore, this does not allow for any "others" that might want to partake in the political process. Currently a Jewish Bosnian is suing the Bosnian government from precluding him from running for presidential office since only a Croat, Serb, or Bosniak can run under the consociational government.

Another critique points to the privileging of ethnic identity over personal political choice. Howard has deemed consociationalism as a form of ethnocracy and not a path to true pluralistic democracy. Consociationalism assumes that a politician will best represent the will of his co-ethnics above other political parties. This might lead to the polarization of ethnicity and the loss of non-ethnic ideological parties.

Federalism

The theory of implementing federalism in order to curtail ethnic conflict assumes that self-governance reduces "demands for sovereignty". Hechter argues that some goods such as language of education and bureaucracy must be provided as a local good, instead of state-wide, in order to satisfy more people. Some political scientists such as Stroschein state that ethno-federalism, or federalism determined along ethnic lines, is "asymmetric" as opposed to the equal devolution of power found in non-ethnic federal states, such as the United States. In this sense, special privileges are granted to specific minority groups as concessions and incentives to end violence or mute conflict.

During the Soviet Era, the USSR divided its structure into ethno-federal sub-states termed Union Republics. The sub-state was named after a titular minority who inhabited the area as a way to Sovietize nationalist sentiments during the 1920s. Brubaker asserts that these titular republics were formed in order to coopt any potential elite led nationalist movements against the Soviet center by incentivizing elite loyalty through advancement in the Soviet political structure.

Thus, federalism provides some self-governance for local matters in order to satisfy some of the grievances which might cause ethnic conflict among the masses. Moreover, federalism brings in the elites and ethnic entrepreneurs into the central power structure; this prevents a resurgence of top-down ethnic conflict.

Nevertheless, after the fall of the USSR many critiques of federalism as way to resolve ethnic conflict emerged. The devolution of power away from the central state can weaken ties to the central state. Moreover, the parallel institutions created to serve a particular nation or ethnic group might provide significant resources for secession from the central state. As most states are unwilling to give up an integral portion of their territory, this might lead to violence again.

Furthermore, among elite political players, some are competing elites and not in power, thus are not coopted into the central system. These competing elites can gain access through federal structures and their resources to solidify their political power in the structure. According to V.P. Gagnon this was the case in the former Yugoslavia. Ethnic entrepreneurs were able to take control of the institutionally allocated resources to wage war on other ethnic groups.  

Non-territorial autonomy

A recent theory of ethnic tension resolution is non-territorial autonomy or NTA. NTA has emerged in recent years as an alternative solution to ethnic tensions and grievances in places that are likely to breed conflict (Osipov). For this reason, NTA has been promoted as a more practical and state building solution than consociationalism (Osipov). NTA, alternatively known as non-cultural autonomy (NCA), is based on the difference of jus solis and jus sanguinis, the principles of territory versus of that of personhood (Coakley). It gives rights to ethnic groups to self-rule and govern matters potentially concerning but limited to: education, language, culture, internal affairs, religion, and the internally established institutions needed to promote and reproduce these facets (Coakley, Wolff, Ossipov). In contrast to federalism, the ethnic groups are not assigned a titular sub-state, but rather the ethnic groups are dispersed throughout the state unit. Their group rights and autonomy are not constrained to a particular territory within the state. This is done in order not to weaken the center state such as in the case of ethnofederalism (Hechter, Brubaker).

The origin of NTA can bee traded back to the Marxists works of Otto Bauer and Karl Renner (Smith, Wolff). NTA was employed during the interwar period, and the League of Nations sought to add protection clauses for national minorities in new states (Coakley). In the 1920s, Estonia granted some cultural autonomy to the German and Jewish populations in order to ease conflicts between the groups and the newly independent state (Smith).

In Europe, most notably in Belgium, NTA laws have been enacted and created parallel institutions and political parties in the same country (Dalle Mulle). In Belgium, NTA has been integrated within the federal consociational system (Wolff). Some scholars of ethnic conflict resolution claim that the practice of NTA will be employed dependent on the concentration and size of the ethnie group asking for group rights (Wolff, Coakley).

Other scholars, such as Clarke, argue that the successful implementation of NTA rests on the acknowledgement in a state of "universal" principles: true Rule of Law, established human rights, stated guarantees to minorities and their members to use their own quotidien language, religion, and food practices, and a framework of anti-discrimination legislation in order to enforce these rights (Clarke). Moreover, no individual can be forced to adhere, identify, or emphasize a particular identity (such as race, gender, sexuality, etc) without their consent in order for NTA to function for its purpose (Sens).

Nonetheless, Clarke critiques the weaknesses of NTA in areas such as education, a balance between society wide norms and intracommunity values; policing, for criminal matters and public safety; and political representation, which limits the political choices of an individual if based solely on ethnicity. Furthermore, the challenge in evaluating the efficacy of NTA lies in the relatively few legal implementations of NTA.

Secession and independence

In some cases, international actors will advocate for secession and independence as a method for solving ethnic conflict.

Working Bibliography

Kaufman, Stuart J. Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. New York: Cornell UP, 2001. Print.

Kaufman, Stuart J. "Spiraling to Ethnic War." International Security 21.2 (1996): 108-38. JSTOR [JSTOR]. Web.

Olzak, Susan. The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1992. Print.

Snyder, Jack L. From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. New York: Norton, 2000. Print.

Straus, Scott. The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda. 1st ed. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2008. Print.

Varshney, Ashutosh. Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2002. Print.

Wilkinson, Steven I. Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge UP, 2004. Print.