Tribes of Yemen
This article may require copy editing for grammar. (February 2024) |
Total population | |
---|---|
200–400 tribes | |
Languages | |
Arabic (Yemeni), minority Mehri and Socotri | |
Religion | |
Islam (Shafi'i, Zaydi) |
The Tribes of Yemen are those residing within the borders of the Republic of Yemen. While there are no official statistics, some studies suggest that tribes make up about 85% of the population, which was 25,408,288 as of February 2013.[1][2] Estimates vary, with approximately 200 tribes in Yemen, although some reports list more than 400.[3][4] Yemen is notable as the most tribal nation in the Arab world, largely due to the significant influence of tribal leaders and their deep integration into various aspects of the state.[5]
Many tribes in Yemen have long histories, with some tracing their roots back to the era of the Kingdom of Sheba. Throughout history, these tribes have often formed alliances, either to establish or dismantle states. Despite their diverse origins, they frequently share common ancestry. In Yemen, the lineage of the tribe is less important than the alliances it forms.[6] Tribes are far from homogeneous societal structures. While several clans may share a common history and "lineage," the tribe in Yemen is not a cohesive political entity. Clans belonging to a common "lineage" may shift their affiliations and loyalties as dictated by needs and circumstances,[7] with the allied tribe also finding a shared "lineage."[8]
Over long periods of time, Yemen remained a unified nation despite the lack of a central government that imposed authority over the entire territory, except for brief periods in Yemen's history. The nation was made up of numerous tribes, and the tribal divisions in Yemen stabilized with the advent of Islam into four federations: Himyar, Madhhaj, Kinda, and Hamdan.[9] The Madhhaj tribe group consists of three tribes—Ans, Murad, and Al-Hadda—and they inhabit the eastern regions of Yemen. The Himyar tribes lived in the southern mountainous regions and central plateaus, while the Hamdan federation includes the Hashid and Bakil tribes.[10] The political and economic conditions in Yemen during the Middle Ages and the early modern era led to the redrawing of the tribal map. The Madhhaj tribes joined the Bakil tribal confederation, and some Himyar tribes joined the Hashid confederation.[11]
Origins
[edit]Classes of Arabs
[edit]Most genealogists and historians classify the Arab peoples into two categories: defunct Arabs and those remaining.[12] Defunct Arabs refer to ancient Arab tribes that once lived on the Arabian Peninsula but disappeared before the advent of Islam. No descendants of these tribes remain today due to changes in the natural environment and volcanic eruptions.[13] These tribes include ‘Ād, Thamud, Amliq, Tasm, Jadis, Umim, and Jassim, with Abeel, the first urn, and Dabbar occasionally included.
The remaining Arabs are the descendants of Yarub bin Qahtan and the sons of Ma`ad bin Adnan bin Ad, who adopted the Arabic language from the defunct Arabs. Qahtan and his group became Arabized when they settled in Yemen and mixed with the local people. According to one narration, Qahtan originally spoke Syriac, but his language gradually changed to Arabic as he became Arabized.[14][15]
There is another classification that divides the Arabs into three categories: defunct Arabs, Arabized Arabs, and Mozarabized Arabs. The latter two categories are collectively known as "remaining Arabs." The Arabs are those descended from Qahtan (or Joktan), as mentioned in the Old Testament.[16] He was the first to speak Arabic, and his descendants are considered the authentic and ancient Arabs. These include the Al-Qahtaniyah from the Himyar, the people of Yemen and its branches, representing the people of southern Arabia, as opposed to the Musta'arabi Jews of the Levant. Additionally, there are the Maadis, who descend from Ma`ad ibn Adnan ibn Ad. They inhabited Najd, Hijaz, and the northern regions and are descended from Ismail ibn Ibrahim. This group became Arabized following the Muslim conquest of the Iberian Peninsula, and they were known as Mozarabs. When Ismail came to Mecca, he spoke Hebrew or Aramaic, but upon assimilating with the Yemenites, he learned their Arabic language.[17]
Ibn Khaldun divides the Arabs into four successive classes over a chronological range: first, the defunct Arabs; second, the Qahtaniyah Arabs; third, the Arabs belonging to them, including those from Adnan, Aws, Khazraj, Ghasasna, and Manathira; and fourth, the Arabs of Al-Mustajimah, who were influenced by the Islamic State.[17][18]
In fact, the division between the Arabs and the Arabized Arabs originates from what is written in the Old Testament and is derived from accounts of the beginning of creation. Subsequently, genealogists and historians agreed to divide the Arabs, in terms of lineage, into two groups: the Qahtaniyah, whose original homeland was Yemen, and the Adnaniyah, whose original homeland was Hijaz.[19][20]
History
[edit]Ancient tribal history
[edit]In ancient times, the tribal structure was organized around tribal unions, including the Kingdom of Sheba, Qataban, Ma'in, and Hadhramaut. These four kingdoms gave rise to various tribes. After the advent of Islam, historians knew little about Qataban and Ma'in. As a result, tribes previously affiliated with these kingdoms were often classified under Saba or Himyar, as they were mentioned in the Qur'an or associated with Himyar, the last of the ancient Yemeni kingdoms before Islam.[21][22] The strongest of these unions was the Sabaean, which established a system similar to federalism, encompassing the four kingdoms and their tribes.
Kingship in Sheba was held by specific tribes or "covens," as indicated by the Sabaean terms "Fishan," "Dhu Khalil," "Dhu Sahar," and "Dhu Ma'ahir." Currently, little is known about these groups, and they are not mentioned in existing writings.[23] Their rule marked the kingdom's most prosperous period, believed to have lasted from the 12th century BCE to the 4th century BCE.[24]
These kings established a "federal" system of governance, granting each tribe or province a degree of autonomy while maintaining military and economic subordination to the kingdom, primarily through tax payments.[25] The unique geography of Yemen played a significant role in the emergence of tribes. The mountains and narrow valleys isolated communities from one another, leading to the formation of tribal groups that allied with each other for mutual protection while remaining wary of nearby groups.
Urban Arabs built forts and castles to defend themselves and their resources against both neighboring tribes and external threats. Similarly, the Ahlaf, or tribal alliances, served as protection for Bedouins in the desert. The scarcity of resources in the Arabian Peninsula historically drove people to form isolated tribal groups scattered across the region. Even urban dwellers maintained strong tribal ties and sometimes fabricated lineages to reinforce their alliances, reflecting a deep-seated fear of an uncertain future.[citation needed]
The civilization of the Kingdom of Sheba began to decline after the collapse of the Ma’rib Dam.[26] This catastrophic event caused widespread flooding of the surrounding villages, cities, and farms, forcing the population to migrate both internally and externally to nearby and distant regions.[27] After the event known as Sil al-Aram, the people of Ma'rib dispersed across the land. However, the tribes of Himyar, Madhhaj, and Kinda remained in Yemen, along with Ash'ari and Anmar (Khath'am and Bajila).[28]
Yemen then entered a new era characterized by religious conflicts during the period of the Himyarite State. It became a battleground for competing external powers, particularly the Sassanians and the Roman Empire. This rivalry between foreign powers, driven by greed, brought about significant instability in Yemen.[29]
The Romans sought to introduce Christianity to Yemen to establish political and economic influence in the region. Their trade routes passed through Yemen, connecting the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea. Meanwhile, the Jewish presence in Yemen grew as Jews fleeing Roman persecution, especially after the destruction of the Second Temple in Jerusalem in 70 CE, sought asylum there.
As the influence of the Jewish community in Yemen increased, tensions arose with Roman Christians. Fueled by a spirit of revenge, the Jewish king Dhu Nuwas al-Himyari of the Al-Diyaniyya dynasty persecuted Christians who refused to convert to Judaism. He famously dug trenches for them and set them on fire, a brutal act that marked a dark period in Yemen's history.[30]
The Abyssinians invaded Yemen in 533 CE with the goal of eliminating their Persian rivals and reclaiming control of the trade routes. Their leader, Aryat, assumed power after overthrowing the Himyarite King Dhu Nuwas. In 535 CE, Abraha al-Habashi declared himself king of Yemen after breaking away from the Axumite state in Abyssinia.
Abraha ruled independently and sought to spread Christianity throughout the Arabian Peninsula. He aimed to redirect Arab pilgrimage from Mecca to a grand cathedral he built in Sanaa, known as Al-Qalis. In 570 CE, he famously attempted to invade Mecca, an event remembered as the "Year of the Elephant." Abraha was later succeeded by his son, Axum.[citation needed]
Saif bin Dhi Yazan Al-Himyari, a prominent noble of Himyar, sought assistance from the Persians to expel the Abyssinians from Yemen. With Persian support, Saif bin Dhi Yazan successfully ended the 72-year Abyssinian rule over Yemen. However, this victory brought Yemen under Persian control, marking the beginning of a new colonial era.[31]
During this period, Yemen experienced political, tribal, religious, and intellectual fragmentation. Sana'a and its surrounding regions were directly subjected to Persian rule, with the Persians forming a distinct class known as the "Sons." Meanwhile, Yemeni regions beyond Persian control remained mired in conflicts and tribal disputes, a state of unrest that persisted until the emergence of Islam.[32]
Muhammad's era
[edit]Several researchers believe that the rapid conversion of the Himyarites, Hamdan, and Hadhramaut tribes to Islam can be attributed to their longstanding adherence to a monotheistic religion prior to Islam. However, neither Mu'adh ibn Jabal, Ali ibn Abi Talib, nor Abu Musa Al-Ash’ari stayed long in these regions before the tribes embraced Islam.[33]
The Bedouin tribes, such as Kinda and Madhhaj, took a different stance during this period. A battle erupted between the Hamdan tribe and the Murad branch of Madhhaj, during which Madhhaj suffered defeat at the hands of Hamdan. Despite their historical ties, Kinda and Madhhaj faced internal tensions. Farwa bin Al-Musayk Al-Muradi, a leader of the Madhhaj tribe, reportedly severed ties with the kings of the Kingdom of Kinda after they betrayed him during the battle.
Following this, Farwa went to meet Muhammad, converted to Islam, and was appointed by Muhammad to oversee the collection of alms. Meanwhile, the tribes of Khawlan, Nahd, and Nakha` from Madhhaj, along with the Ash'ari people under Abu Musa Al-Ash'ari, eagerly anticipated their meeting with Muhammad, saying, “Tomorrow we will meet our beloved Muhammad and his companions.” Muhammad, in response, warmly welcomed them and praised their arrival.[34]
"The people of Yemen have come to you. They are weaker in heart and softer in understanding, faith is Yemeni and wisdom is Yemeni."
The remaining members of Madhhaj maintained their allegiance to Kinda and resented the appointment of Farwa bin Al-Musayk Al-Muradi as head of charity. Consequently, Amr ibn Maadikarb Al-Zubaidi and several members of Madhhaj defected and joined al-Aswad Al-Ansi. However, Farwa successfully defeated Amr ibn Maadikarb, and his son Qays later joined Fayrouz Al-Dailami, the slayer of al-Aswad Al-Ansi.[35]
During this time, Muhammad dispatched Mu'adh ibn Jabal to Yemen and established the Al-Jund Mosque in Taiz, located on the lands of Al-Sukun and Al-Sakasik, which were part of the Kingdom of Kinda. This mosque is the second-oldest in Yemen.[36] After Muhammad's death, tribal divisions reemerged. Narratives mention that Al-Ash’ath ibn Qays, the leader of Banu Al-Harith ibn Jabla from Kinda, refused to pay zakat.[37] Sharhabeel ibn Al-Samat Al-Kindi, hostile to Al-Ash'ath, ultimately killed him. Kinda, divided during this period, continued to experience internal hostilities into the Umayyad era.[38]
Sharhabeel became the governor of Homs under Muawiyah and was instrumental in dividing tribal settlements there.[39] He opposed Ali ibn Abi Talib and played a significant role in the Battle of Siffin. Conversely, Al-Ash'ath fought in Ali's army.[40] Some members of Kinda were reportedly Christians, including the Christian prince of Najran who visited Muhammad.[41]
Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq sent a force to besiege Al-Ash'ath, who had fortified himself in a stronghold called Al-Najir. Meanwhile, the tribes of Banu Tajib and Al-Sakasik Al-Kindi, led by Al-Husayn bin Al-Numair Al-Sakuni, fought against Al-Ash'ath. After four months, Al-Ash'ath surrendered, converted to Islam again, and joined Muslim forces in campaigns in the Levant and Iraq. He participated in the Battle of Al-Qadisiyah, leading 3,000 fighters under Saad bin Abi Waqqas and was among those sent to negotiate with Yazdgerd III.[42]
Later, Al-Ash'ath suppressed a second rebellion in Azerbaijan and became its governor during the caliphate of Uthman ibn Affan, though some sources attribute his governance to Ali ibn Abi Talib's era.[43] He died in Kufa during the caliphate of Hasan bin Ali.[44]
Al-Ash'ath married Farwa bint Abi Quhafa after being freed by Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq, which upset Uyaynah ibn Muhsin, as his similar plight did not result in such an alliance. In response, Salem bin Dara Al-Ghatfani, a poet from Uyaynah’s tribe, composed verses expressing his frustration.
Uyaynah bin Hisn Al Adi, you are one of your people, to the core and core I am not like the shaggy, crowned boy who has mastered and is weaned His grandfather the bitter eater and Qais/his speeches about the kings were great speeches If you two have come to an engagement/excuse other than you, it will be eternal He has the prestige of kings and of Al-Ash'ath if an old incident comes Al-Ash`ath ibn Qays ibn Maadi has anguish and pride, and you are an animal.
Hadhramaut embraced Islam following the conversion of its prominent leader, Wael bin Hajar, after receiving a letter from the Prophet Muhammad. Wael traveled to Medina, where Muhammad ordered the call to prayer in his honor upon his arrival. While the exact duration of Wael's stay in Medina is unknown, it is reported that Muhammad instructed Muawiyah bin Abi Sufyan to accompany him when he departed.
Wael and his people remained steadfast in Islam. He later passed away in Kufa during the reign of Muawiyah. Wael led the banner of Hadhramaut during the Battle of Siffin as part of Ali ibn Abi Talib's army.[45] Additionally, the people of Hadhramaut participated in the Muslim conquests of Egypt. It is said that Muawiyah bin Abi Sufyan recommended them for roles as judges and record-keepers in Egypt, favoring them over other tribes alongside the Azd.[46]
The Rashidun Caliphate
[edit]Yemen enjoyed stability during the period of the Rightly Guided Caliphate. The Rashidun Caliphate divided Yemen into four provinces: Sana'a (along with Najran),[47] Mikhlaf al-Jand (central Yemen), Mikhlaf Tihama, and Mikhlaf Hadhramaut. Their rule was stable, and not much is known about this period until the late ninth century AD. However, historical sources, particularly those from Yemen, provide details of Yemeni involvement in Islamic conquests.
Abu Bakr al-Siddiq sent Anas bin Malik to Yemen to encourage participation in the Levantine campaigns.[48] Anas bin Malik sent a letter to Abu Bakr, reporting the response from the people of Yemen. Dhu al-Kala` al-Himyari arrived with a few thousand of his people to join the effort.[49] Additionally, Al-Ala bin Al-Hadrami conquered Bahrain, fighting those who had apostatized from Islam, and both Abu Bakr and Omar appointed him to govern Bahrain, as the Prophet had previously done.[50]
Al-Samat bin Al-Asut Al-Kindi, Muawiyah bin Khadij al-Tujaybi, Dhu al-Kala` al-Himyari, and Hawshab Dhu Dhalim al-Himyari each led forces in the Battle of Yarmouk, commanding units known as Kardus. Sharhabeel bin Al-Samat Al-Kindi, who is said to have governed Homs with Al-Miqdad bin Al-Aswad, ruled for twenty years and was responsible for dividing the land among the people.[51] Later, Malik bin Hubayra al-Kindi took charge, serving as the commander of Muawiyah's armies against the Romans.[52]
The Kingdom of Kinda played a vital role in the military forces of the Jund of Homs and the Jund of Palestine.[53][54] Bin Khadij al-Tujaybi was involved in the campaigns at Jalawla and confronted the Roman forces.[55]
When Saad bin Abi Waqqas left Medina heading to Iraq at the head of four thousand fighters, three thousand of whom were from Yemen,[56] the number of fighters from Mazhaj in the Battle of Al-Qadisiyah was two thousand and three hundred out of ten thousand.[57][58] Their leader was Malik bin Al-Harith Al-Ashtar Al-Nakha'i, and Al-Nakha' is from Abyan, where they still reside. Hadhramaut contributed seven hundred fighters.[59] Amr bin Maadikarb Al-Zubaidi fought on the right flank of Saad bin Abi Waqqas in that battle.[57][58]
Omar Ibn Al-Khattab swore allegiance to Mazhaj, which was divided between Iraq and the Levant. They preferred to move toward the Levant and disliked the idea of going to Iraq, unlike other people from Yemen. There were four chiefs over Mazhaj: Amr bin Maadikarb Al-Zubaidi, Abu Sabra bin Dhu’ayb Al-Jaafi, Yazid bin Al-Harith Al-Sada'i, and Malik Al-Ashtar Al-Nakha'i.[60] Al-Ash'ath Ibn Qays led one thousand seven hundred fighters and participated with Sharhabeel Ibn Al-Samat in the battle as well.[61]
Duraid bin Ka'b Al-Nakha'i carried the banner of Al-Nakha' during the "Night of the Harrier," when the Kinda Kingdom was defeated by the Persians. Similarly,[62] Qais bin Makshuh Al-Muradi commanded the force that attacked Rustam.[63] Mazhaj was one of the most prominent groups in that battle, with one boy from their tribe leading sixty or eighty prisoners of the Persian Empire.[64] Even the women of Mazhaj participated in the battle, with seven hundred women taking part.[65] Additionally, people from Bani Nahd participated in the conquest of Tabaristan.[66]
In the twentieth year of the Hijra, Abdullah bin Qais al-Taraghmi al-Kindi invaded the Romans at "the sea" at the urging of Muawiyah bin Abi Sufyan, despite Omar's hesitation on the matter.[67] Muawiyah bin Khadij al-Tujaybi al-Kindi was part of a delegation to Omar ibn al-Khattab during the conquest of Alexandria, and the Yemenis formed the majority of the army of Amr ibn al-Aas. They were responsible for planning Fustat and distributing housing on a tribal basis.[68]
The planning of Fustat was supervised by four people: Muawiyah bin Khadij al-Tujaybi, Shareek bin Sami al-Ghataifi from Murad Mazhaj, Amr bin Qazam Al-Khawlani, and Haywal bin Nashirah Al-Maafiri. Most of the tribes residing in Fustat were Yemeni,[69] including Al-Maafir, Khawlan, Ak, Ash'ari, and Tajib. Hamdan also participated in the conquests of Egypt, North Africa, and Andalusia, with Hamdan and the Kingdom involved in Giza.[70]
Abdullah bin Aamer al-Hadrami assumed the governorship of Mecca during the time of Othman bin Affan.[71] Al-Ash'ath bin Qays was appointed governor of Azerbaijan. Yemen was divided between Ali ibn Abi Talib and Muawiyah bin Abi Sufyan, with the majority of Hamdan siding with Ali. Their leader, Saeed bin Qais Al-Hamdani, carried the Hamdan banner in both the Battle of the Camel and the Battle of Siffin.[72] Yazid bin Qais Al-Arhabi Al-Hamdani served as one of the messengers of Ali ibn Abi Talib to Muawiyah bin Abi Sufyan, urging him to obey Ali.[73]
A large portion of Hamdan remains Shiite to this day, with factions including Zaidi and Ismaili followers. The rest of the tribes were divided between the two factions.[74][75] Malik al-Ashtar al-Nakha’i led three thousand horsemen in the army of Ali ibn Abi Talib during the Battle of Siffin, accompanied by Shurayh bin Hani al-Harithi, Ziyad bin al-Nadr al-Harithi, and Ammar bin Yasser al-Ansi, all of whom were from Mazhaj.[76] The heart of Ali's army in the Battle of Siffin was composed of Yemenis,[77] and many loyalists from Hamdan were killed in that battle. Whenever one of them fell, the banner would be passed to another.[78] Malik al-Ashtar would rally his people from Mazhaj, saying:[78]
"You are the sons of wars, the raiders, the youth of the morning, the dead of the peers, and Madhhaj al-Ta'an"
While Sharhabeel bin Al-Samat Al-Kindi and Malik bin Hubayra Al-Kindi were in the army of the Levant, Hajr bin Adi Al-Kindi and Al-Ash'ath bin Qays were also part of the army of the Levant. Abd al-Rahman bin Mahrez al-Kindi and others fought alongside Ali.[79] Dhu al-Kila' al-Himyari supported Muawiyah, and with him were four thousand of his people. He attacked those loyal to Ali, wounding some of them. They were known for their great character.[80]
Muawiyah bin Khadij al-Tajibi al-Kindi pursued Muhammad bin Abi Bakr al-Siddiq in Egypt and killed him by inserting him into the belly of a donkey and burning him.[81] Muawiyah bin Abi Sufyan directed Abdullah bin Amer al-Hadrami to Iraq to rally support for his side.[82] One of the people from Mazhaj, Abdul-Rahman bin Muljam al-Muradi, a Khariji, was the one who killed Ali ibn Abi Talib.[83]
After the killing of Ali, Muawiyah bin Abi Sufyan ordered the execution of Hajar bin Adi al-Kindi. However, Malik bin Hubayra al-Kindi, one of the commanders of the Levant army in the Battle of Siffin, interceded on the grounds that Hajar was the leader of those who opposed and criticized Muawiyah.[84] Muawiyah accepted his intercession through Abdullah bin Al-Arqam Al-Kindi.[85]
The killing of Hajar bin Adi stirred strong reactions, including from the Yemeni tribes, even Muawiyah bin Khadij Al-Tujaybi.[86] In response, Muawiyah sent one hundred thousand dirhams to Malik bin Hubayra al-Kindi to silence him.[87] Things eventually returned to normal, and the conquests resumed.
Rabi’ bin Ziyad al-Harithi al-Madhaji went to Khorasan and conquered it, while Yazid bin Shajara al-Rahawi al-Madhaji and Abdullah bin Qais al-Taragmi al-Kindi invaded the sea and Sicily, with Abdullah being the first Arab to do so.[88][89] Bin Hudayj al-Tujaybi invaded Africa (Tunisia) three times, including an invasion of Nubia, where he lost an eye and became one-eyed.[90] He later assumed the emirate of Egypt and Crenasia.[91]
Muawiyah died, and Hamdan remained loyal to the sons of Ali ibn Abi Talib, with Abu Thumama al-Sayidi al-Hashidi as their leader. This loyalty extended to parts of the Kinda Kingdom and Mazhaj. Muhammad bin Al-Ash'ath and Muslim bin Aqeel were killed, while Amr bin Aziz al-Kindi and his son Ubayd Allah were in control of a quarter of the Kinda Kingdom. Rabi'ah pledged allegiance to Al-Hussein bin Ali.[92]
However, Muhammad bin Al-Ash'ath al-Kindi feared for the life of Hani’ bin Urwa al-Muradi al-Madhaji, an ally of Muslim bin Aqeel in Iraq, as he was at risk of being killed.[93] Hani’ was ultimately slain by a servant of Ubaid Allah bin Ziyad, named Rashid. In response, Abdul Rahman bin Al-Husayn al-Muradi proceeded to avenge his master by killing Ibrahim bin Al-Ashtar al-Nakha’i al-Mazhaji, who had been a key figure in opposing Ubayd Allah ibn Ziyad.[94][95]
Umayyads
[edit]Historical sources are very scarce regarding the situation of Yemen during that period. As with previous crises, the Yemenis were divided between Hussein bin Ali and Yazid bin Muawiyah, with the exception of Hamdan, which continued to mourn Hussein until the caliphate of Marwan ibn al-Hakam.[96] Kinda acquired thirteen members of the family of Hussein ibn Ali, while Mazhaj acquired seven.[97] Sinan bin Anas al-Nakha'i al-Mazhaji was the one who cut off the head of Hussein.[98]
As for Hamdan, many of them were killed in the Battle of Karbala, with the most prominent among them being Abu Thumama al-Saidi, Habashi bin Qais al-Nahmi, Hanzalah bin Asaad al-Shabami (a relative of Shibam Kawkaban), Saif bin al-Harith bin Saree al-Jabri, Ziyad bin Urayb al-Saidi, Siwar bin Munim Habis al-Hamdani, Abas bin Abu Shabib al-Shakri, and Barir bin Khudair al-Hamdani.[99]
There were also individuals from Hadhramaut who participated in the battle alongside the Umayyads, including Hani bin Thabit al-Hadrami, Usayd bin Malik al-Hadrami, and Sulaiman bin Awf al-Hadrami.[100] Hakim bin Munqidh al-Kindi rode out to Kufa on horseback, mobilizing people to avenge Hussein in the year 65 AH.[101] He was among those killed, alongside Sulaiman bin Sard al-Khuza'i, during the Revolution of the Tawabin.[citation needed]
Some sources suggest that Yemen pledged allegiance to Abdullah bin Al-Zubayr in addition to the Hijaz,[102] although details regarding this are scarce. However, Al-Husayn bin Al-Numair Al-Sakuni Al-Kindi played a major role in gathering the people of Yemen in the Levant alongside Marwan bin Al-Hakam.[103] Before that, he was part of the army of Muslim bin Uqba, who invaded Medina during the Battle of al-Harra in the caliphate of Yazid bin Muawiyah. Al-Numair then left the army and went to Mecca at Yazid's command, where he besieged Abdullah bin Al-Zubayr.[104]
Al-Numair pledged allegiance to Marwan ibn al-Hakam, and a number of people from the Kinda Kingdom insisted that Al-Husayn bin Al-Numair present Khalid ibn Yazid ibn Muawiyah to them, as they were his maternal uncles.[105] However, they pledged allegiance to Marwan ibn al-Hakam on the condition that they be given Balqa in Jordan, which Marwan agreed to.[106]
Two tribes of Kinda (Al-Sukun and Al-Sakasik) fought alongside Marwan bin Al-Hakam in the Battle of Marj Rahit, which solidified Marwan's rule and marked the beginning of the second phase of the Umayyad state. This battle was also one of the key events that contributed to the development of tribal divisions among the Arabs.[107]
Many from Hamdan, Nakha, Mazhaj, and Bani Nahd joined Al-Mukhtar al-Thaqafi in his revolution to investigate the killers of Hussein. Asim bin Qais bin Habib Al-Hamdani led a faction from Hamdan and Bani Tamim,[108] while Malik bin Amr al-Nahdi and Abdullah bin Sharik al-Nahdi led the Bani Nahd.[109] Sharhabil bin Wars al-Hamdani led three thousand fighters, mostly mawali (non-Arabs), with only seven hundred Arabs among them. They headed towards Medina and then to Mecca to besiege Abdullah bin Al-Zubayr. However, he was killed by a plot orchestrated by bin Al-Zubayr, and the rest of Sharhabil's army returned to Basra.[110]
Al-Husayn bin Numair Al-Sakuni was killed during Al-Mukhtar al-Thaqafi's revolution. Al-Mukhtar was eventually killed during Mus'ab bin Al-Zubayr's campaign against him. To the right of Al-Mukhtar was Salim bin Yazid Al-Kindi, and to his left was Saeed bin Munqidh Al-Hamdani. Muhammad bin Al-Ash’ath Al-Kindi fought alongside Mus'ab bin Al-Zubayr.[111]
When Abd al-Malik bin Marwan entered Kufa, he was surprised to see Bani Nahd, despite their small number. They claimed, "We are stronger and more powerful." When he asked, "By whom?", they replied, "By you, Commander of the Faithful." Kinda also joined Abd al-Malik, with Ishaq bin Muhammad al-Kindi leading them.[112] Abd al-Rahman bin Muhammad al-Kindi, also known as "Ibn al-Ash’ath," later led a famous revolution at the head of five thousand fighters against the Kharijites.[113] Uday bin Uday al-Kindi and Amira bin al-Harith al-Hamdani were sent to fight against Saleh Ibn Masrah al-Tamimi, a Khariji, who was eventually killed.[114]
In the year 80 AH, Abdul-Rahman bin Muhammad bin Al-Ash’ath Al-Kindi headed to Sistan, after the destruction of the army of Ubayd Allah bin Abi Bakra by the Turks. The relationship between Al-Hajjaj bin Yusuf and Abdul-Rahman was very strained, to the point that Abdul-Rahman’s uncle urged Al-Hajjaj not to send him. Abdul-Rahman, who used to call Al-Hajjaj "Ibn Abi Raghal," was known for his arrogance. Whenever Al-Hajjaj saw Abdul-Rahman, he would say, “How arrogant he is! Look at his walk! By God, I was about to behead him.” Abdul-Rahman took pride in his lineage, tracing it back to the kings of the Kingdom of Kindah.[115] He would sit among his Hamdan uncles and say, “As Ibn Abi Raghal says, if I do not try to remove him from his authority, I will exert myself until we both stay.”[116]
Abdul-Rahman set out at the head of forty thousand fighters, and people began to call his army the “peacock army.”[117] He invaded the Turkish lands, and when their leader offered to pay tribute to the Muslims, Abdul-Rahman refused to respond until he had annexed a large part of their country. He stopped only due to the onset of winter. Al-Hajjaj sent a letter to Abdul-Rahman, forbidding him to stop and threatening to depose him and appoint his brother Ishaq bin Muhammad al-Kindi as commander.[118] Abdul-Rahman consulted his soldiers and, supported by Amer bin Wathilah Al-Kinani, called for the removal of Al-Hajjaj, whom he considered "the enemy of God."[119] This marked the beginning of one of the most intense revolts against the Umayyad state.
Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan sent supplies to Al-Hajjaj, who killed Abdul-Rahman bin Al-Ash'ath, Mutahhar bin Al-Harr al-Judhami, and Abdullah bin Rumaitha al-Tai. Al-Hajjaj then stormed Basra, which pledged allegiance to him, along with all of Hamdan, Abdul-Rahman’s maternal uncles, the reciters, and followers such as Saeed bin Jubair and Muhammad bin Saad bin Abi Al-Waqqas. Abdul-Rahman’s rising status greatly alarmed Abd al-Malik bin Marwan, who proposed to the people of Iraq to remove Al-Hajjaj. Abdul-Rahman's leadership over them caused great concern for Al-Hajjaj.[120]
Ibn al-Ash’ath's campaign lasted nearly four years, with Abdul-Rahman winning eighty battles against Al-Hajjaj’s armies. However, he was ultimately defeated in the Battle of Dayr al-Jamajim. Abdul-Rahman fled to the Turkish lands with Ubaid bin Abi Suba` al-Tamimi, but Al-Hajjaj sent Amara bin Tamim al-Lakhmi to capture him. Realizing he would be handed over to Al-Lakhmi, Abdul-Rahman chose to commit suicide rather than be delivered to the enemy in 85 AH.[121]
Talha bin Daoud al-Hadrami assumed the governorship of Mecca during the reign of the seventh Umayyad Caliph, Suleiman bin Abdul Malik. Bashir bin Hassan al-Nahdi held the governorship of Kufa and Basra, while Sufyan bin Abdullah Al-Kindi governed as well.[122] Ubadah bin Nasi Al-Kindi took over the governorship of Jordan during the reign of Omar bin Abdul Aziz, and Raja bin Haywa Al-Kindi was his advisor and the master of the people of Palestine.[123] During this time, Al-Samh bin Malik Al-Khawlani governed Andalusia, opening several forts. He was killed in the Battle of Toulouse in France and was succeeded by Abdul-Rahman Al-Ghafiqi, who was killed in the Battle of Balat al-Shuhada.[124]
Tribal disputes broke out throughout the country, particularly between the Yamaniyya and Qays Aylan, along with the Ta'i, Ghassan, Banu Amila, Lakhm, and other tribes of Rabi'ah. Marwan bin Muhammad, the last Umayyad caliph, was nicknamed "Donkey" due to his numerous wars. Homs, a major stronghold of the Yemeni tribes, revolted against him during this period of conflict. Abdullah bin Yahya al-Kindi also ruled in the year 128 AH, but he was not motivated by tribal loyalties. He was regarded as one of the major imams of the Ibadi and the judge of Ibrahim bin Jabla al-Kindi, the Umayyad governor in the later years of the dynasty. Abdullah dominated Hadhramaut and Sanaa, opened the treasury, and distributed the funds to the poor without taking anything for himself.[125] Abdullah's army, led by Al-Mukhtar bin Awf Al-Azdi, was able to storm Mecca, but they were defeated at a site called Jerash, and his forces returned to Yemen.[126]
Yemeni mini-states
[edit]Some Yemeni tribes supported the Abbasid call at its beginning.[127] The country became independent from the Caliphate in 815, and several states were established throughout Yemen for sectarian and tribal reasons. The State of Bani Ziyad, founded by Muhammad bin Abdullah bin Ziyad Al-Umawi, was established in 818. It was nominally subordinate to the caliphate in Baghdad, and its influence extended from Hilli bin Yaqoub south of Mecca, passing through Michalaf Jerash (Asir), and even to Aden. Zubaid in Al-Hudaydah was made their capital.[128] Meanwhile, the State of Banu Yaafar, founded by Yafar bin Abd al-Rahman al-Hawali (a Himyari),[129] was established in 847 in Sanaa, covering the surrounding countryside, Al-Jawf, and the mountainous region between Saada and Taiz.[130] Saada fell into the hands of Imam Yahya bin Al-Hussein in 898.[131]
Mawla Hussein bin Salama was able to preserve the state of his masters, Bani Ziyad, and confront Abdullah bin Qahtan Al-Himyari. However, Al-Himyari managed to burn Zubaid.[132] Ibrahim bin Abdullah bin Ziyad, the last prince of the Ziyad family, was killed by his loyalists, Nafis and Najah, who went on to establish the State of Bani Najah on the ruins of the Ziyad state in Tihama. They enjoyed support from the Caliphate center in Baghdad.[133]
The Ibadis established several states for themselves in Yemen, and large parts of Hamdan and Khawlan pledged allegiance to Imam Yahya bin Al-Hussein. Ali bin Muhammad al-Sulayhi, the founder of the Sulayhid state, opposed the Zaidi Imams and the Najjahis in Tihama, as well as various tribal forces in Saada. He fought many battles and was able to bring most of Yemen under the rule of a single state, a first since the advent of Islam. He made Sanaa the capital of the country.[134]
In 1064, Ali bin Muhammad al-Sulayhi annexed Mecca.[135] However, they did not attempt to impose their religious doctrine.[136] In 1138, Sultan Suleiman bin Amir al-Zarahi, the last Sulayhid sultan, died, and the regions became independent, including Sanaa, which was controlled by three families from Hamdan. Aden also became independent, with Banu Zurayi, from the Yam tribe of Hamdan, assuming control. Al-Mukarram Al-Sulayhi had appointed them over it.[137]
The Najjahs returned briefly to Tihama, but Ali bin Mahdi Al-Himyari eliminated them, imposed a specific lifestyle on them, and isolated them from society in 1154. This marked the beginning of the emergence of a group of modern-day Yemeni citizens known as the Akhdam.[138][139] Grudges between tribal leaders prevented them from unifying their stance against the Ayyubids[140] until the Zaidi tribes (Hashid, Bakeel, Sanhan, Khawlan etc.) defeated the Ayyubids in 1226.[141]
Omar bin Rasool established a state known as the Apostolic State, one of the strongest kingdoms Yemen had seen since the advent of Islam.[142] It was also one of the longest-lived Yemeni states in the country's history after Islam. The state built the Cairo Citadel in Taiz, along with a mosque and the Al-Muzaffar School.
The division between the Arab Arabs and the Arabized Arabs is rooted in what is mentioned in the Old Testament and is derived from the accounts of the beginning of creation. Later, genealogists and historians agreed to classify the Arabs into two main groups based on lineage: the Qahtaniyah, whose origins are in Yemen, and the Adnaniyah, whose origins are in Hijaz.[19][20]
The Mazhaj established a strong state, the Tahirid state, with their city of Radaa, but they did not submit to the Zaidi Imamate. The Tahirid army was defeated by Imam Al-Mutahhar ibn Muhammad in 1458.[143] Despite this, the Tahirids successfully repelled the Portuguese from Aden. By the late 15th century, Hadramaut had fallen to the Kathiriyya Sultanate. Imam Al-Mutawakkil Sharaf al-Din, with the commander of the Mamluk army, was able to defeat the Tahirids and drive them out of Taiz, Radaa, Lahj, and Abyan.[144] The fall of the Tahirid state was complete, although they retained control of Aden until 1539, when the Ottomans took control of Aden, then Taiz, Al-Hudaydah, and the rest of Tihama.[145]
The Ottomans' rule over Aden was one of the worst periods in the city's history. However, the Zaidi tribes, led by Imam Al-Mansur Al-Qasim, were able to defeat the Ottomans after several revolts were suppressed. Their success was due to their ability to effectively use firearms.[146] In 1644, they liberated Aden from Ottoman control, and Yemen became the first region to separate from the Ottoman Caliphate.[147] By 1654, the tribes of Hashid, Bakeel, Sanhan, and Khawlan extended their control over all of Yemen in favor of the Zaidi Imamate.[148]
An overview of the tribes
[edit]The Kingdom of Sheba included many tribes mentioned in texts written in the Musnad script, though little is known about them. These include tribes such as "Fishan," "Dhu Ma’ahir," "Dhu Khalil," "Dhu Lahad," "Dhu Yazan," and many others. These tribes were not referenced in the writings of genealogists and historians. However, some tribes mentioned in historical sources that still exist today are Hamdan, Kinda, and Mazhaj, with the latter two historically identified as Bedouin tribes.
Hamdan
[edit]Hamdan refers to an ancient Sabaean land mentioned as early as the seventh century BCE.[149] According to historical sources, Hamdan is considered the ancestor of the Hashid and Bakeel tribes. Genealogists trace his lineage as Hamdan bin Malik bin Zaid bin Usala bin Rabi’ah bin Al-Khayar bin Malik bin Zaid bin Kahlan bin Saba.[150]
The primary deity of the Hamdan people was Talab Riyam, believed to be their divine ancestor and the son of the supreme Sabaean god, El-Maqh.[151] Ancient Musnad texts refer to Hamdan as "Ardam Hamdan," which translates to "the land of Hamdan."[152] The term "ardam" in this context likely refers to barren or dry land that does not support vegetation.[153]
Hamdan is divided into two main branches: Hashid and Bakil, both of which are large and prominent tribes. The earliest mention of Hashid, referred to as "Hashdum" in ancient Sabaean texts, dates back to the 4th century BCE.[154] In contrast, Bakil's earliest reference appears in the 6th century BCE.[155]
Since the 4th century BCE, the kings of the Kingdom of Sheba began to belong to one of the branches of Hamdan for reasons that remain unclear but may be uncovered through future archaeological discoveries.[156] The leader of Hashid, Yarim Ayman, successfully monopolized the kingdom around the second half of the 2nd century BCE.[157] Subsequently, kingship shifted to Bakil in the latter half of the 1st century BCE.
Bakil's control over the kingdom ended after the Himyarites, under the leadership of Dhamar Ali Yahbar I, triumphed in 100 CE.[158]
The Hamdan tribe primarily resides in Sanaa and its surrounding areas, with extensions in the Amran Governorate. Additionally, there are independent sheikhdom tribes, such as the Yam Tribe, located outside the borders of the Republic of Yemen. According to Western sources, Hashid and Bakil are described as alliances of several tribes or a "tribal union" comprising various clans. This practice reflects an ancient custom in the the Arabian Peninsula, where larger tribes incorporate smaller ones under specific circumstances.
The term "Bakeel" is theorized to derive from the word "Yabakal," which signifies mixing or bringing together. Another interpretation suggests that Bakeel means "a beautiful man."[159] However, since the name appears in ancient Sabaean texts, it likely holds a distinct meaning tied to its Sabaean origins. There is no doubt that the name Bakeel is of Sabaean origin, and both Hashid and Bakeel are as ancient as the Kingdom of Sheba itself.[160]
Historically, the Hashid and Bakil tribes were referred to as the "wings of the Zaidi Imams."[161][162] However, this does not imply that all Hamdan members are Zaidi or that the Zaidi sect is exclusive to them. This connection is primarily from a historical perspective and does not represent the full diversity of beliefs within the tribes.
Although the 26 September Revolution originated in Taiz, a region where tribal influence is less pronounced compared to other Yemeni areas,[163] the Hamdan tribes played a significant role in supporting the revolution. This involvement granted them influence and power, enabling them to participate in shaping political decisions in the newly formed Yemen Arab Republic. Their influence extended beyond politics, providing opportunities for broader economic and commercial activities, which in turn impacted traditional cultural and social structures.
Some sources indicate that many families from the Hashid and Bakil tribes shifted their allegiances periodically, driven by political interests.[164] These tribes have remained among the most politically influential in the Republic of Yemen since the fall of the monarchy in 1962 and after Yemeni unification.[165]
Bakil is divided into four main sections: Arhab, Marhaba, Nihm, and Shaker. They are considered the most numerous of the Yemeni tribes, and many other tribes have joined their ranks, making them the largest tribal union in Yemen.[165]
However, Bakil is not under the influence of the Hashid tribe. This independence is attributed to the existence of multiple sheikhdoms within Bakil and the lack of centralized leadership under a single family.[165]
Kinda
[edit]Kinda (Musnad: 𐩫𐩬𐩵𐩩) is an ancient Arab tribe first mentioned in texts dating back to the second century BCE.[166] This tribe is referred to in heritage books as the "Kings of Kinda."[167]
The Kingdom of Kindah was established in Najd,[168] though the history of this pre-Islamic kingdom is shrouded in ambiguity. Historical accounts from news writers provide some information, but much of what is known comes from writings discovered in Qaryat Al-Faw, recorded in the ancient Musnad script. These inscriptions serve as a more reliable source for understanding Kinda's history, avoiding the biases of lineage-related fanaticism and the subjective accounts of early historians.
Kindah is historically divided into three main sections: the Sons of Muawiyah, often referred to as "The Noble Ones" due to their status as the kings of Kindah,[169][170] along with Sukun and Sakasik. Over fifty tribes branch out from these divisions, with members of these tribes located in Yemen, the Sultanate of Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. Additionally, there are clans in Iraq and Jordan that continue to uphold and cherish their ancient lineage.
The oldest Sabaean texts referencing "Kinda" date back to the second century BC and place them in Najd.[171] The Musnad script texts describe Kinda and Madhhij as "the parsing of Sheba."[172]
Mazhaj
[edit]The oldest mention of the Mazhij tribe dates back to the second century BC.[173] They were part of the Kingdom of Kindah and were mentioned in the Al-Namara Inscription of the king of the The Kingdom of Al-Hirah. The texts of the Musnad script described them as "the Bedouins of Sheba."[174] Madhhij is one of the sections to which many tribes in Yemen and the rest of the Arabian Peninsula trace their origins, as well as several other countries that maintained their tribal connections. The tribe was known in Arab heritage books by the title "Mazhaj al-Ta'an."
Mazhaj is historically divided into three sections: the Saad clan, Ans, and Murad. They are found in most areas of Yemen and consist of many tribes. These include Nak' in Al-Bayda Governorate, Abyan, and Banu Al-Harith bin Ka'b in Shabwa, Ma'rib, and Sada’. Ubaida is found in Ma’rib and Al-Habbab from Qahtan, as well as Al-Minhali in the north of Hadramaut and Sanhan, around Sana’a. This includes the tribe of Ali Abdullah Saleh and Hakam in Tihama, the tribe Al-Had'a from Murad, and Al-Qaraada'ah in Ma'rib, also from Murad. Among them is Sheikh Ali bin Nasser Al-Qardai Al-Muradi, the killer of Imam Yahya Hamid Al-Din.
The Anas tribe is found in Dhamar, and one of its branches is Al-Ansi, which originally comes from Mazhaj but later entered Bakil, like many other tribes. There is also the Al-Riyashi tribe, with members in Al-Bayda Governorate and Al-Dhale’, also from Mazhaj. Some sources mention that they are from Kinda. Additionally, there are many tribes in Madhhaj, including the Al-Dulaim clans in the deserts of Iraq and Syria, who trace their origins back to Zubaid.
Himyar
[edit]He is the eldest son of Saba and the brother of Kahlan, according to reports.[175][176] Although the Himyarites were the ones who overthrew Saba and Hadhramaut and unified them into one state, there is no indication that the Himyarites were descendants of Saba. Ancient Sabaean texts refer to them as "the sons of a paternal uncle," and this uncle was the greatest god of the ancient Qataban kingdom, not Sheba.[177][178] They seized "Dahsum," which was the land of the Yafa and Al-Ma’afer tribes, and fought with Saba for a long time until they completely overthrew it around 275 AD.
There are many tribes attributed to Himyar in various parts of Yemen and beyond, and discussions about their divisions rely on the writings of the informants rather than the Musnad inscriptions. The Musnad texts do not mention that Himyar, or "Himyar," was a man with children, or that his real name was "Al-Arnaj." Instead, he was called Himyar because he wore a red robe.[179] Like Sheba, the Himyarites were an ancient ruling family. The tribes joined them in opposition to Sheba, and the informants considered them "Himyar tribes."[180]
The oldest text discovered about Himyar is a Hadhrami inscription referring to the construction of a wall around Wadi Labna in Hadhramaut. Its purpose was to prevent the Himyarites from attacking the caravans of the Kingdom of Hadhramaut, located between Shabwa and the port of Qena, and to block their encroachment on the Kingdom of Hadhramaut's territory toward the coast. The text dates back to the fifth century BC (around 400 BC).[181] The Himyarites established their government at the end of the second century BC, during a time when the Kingdom of Sheba was greatly weakened. As a result, the Himyarites swept through the central and southern regions of Yemen (present-day Yemen) and took control of Dhofar Yarim as their capital.[182]
The first mention of the Himyarites was Shammar Dhu Raydan, who fought many battles against Ili Sharh Yahudhab and allied with every enemy of the Sabaeans. However, he did not win and was eventually forced to reconcile with the King of Sheba. He then joined the Sheban army as a commander.[183] During this time, Himyar was divided, with some factions allied with Sheba, while others remained independent and did not recognize the authority of the weakening Sheban government. This led to the rise of four royal dynasties in Yemen: Hashid, Bakil, and two Himyarite dynasties. Each of these factions claimed the title "King of Sheba and Dhu Raydan."[184]
The turmoil continued for a century and a half, with some estimates suggesting that twelve Himyarite leaders arose during this period. Eventually, in 275 AD, the Himyarites were able to establish their kingship under the leadership of Shammar Yaharash.[185]
Hadhramaut
[edit]Hadhramaut is the name of an ancient tribal union. Genealogists and informants sometimes referred to it as "the belly of donkeys," with some claiming that a man named "Amer bin Qahtan" would kill many enemies, leading them to exclaim "Hadhramaut" upon seeing him.[186] However, these narratives lack archaeological support or evidence. As such, Hadhramaut is not considered Himyarite; it predates the Himyarites.[187]
The Hadhrami tribes, including Siban, Noah, Al-Sadaf, and Al-Sa'ir, are among the ancient tribes of the region. Although no Musnad inscriptions have been discovered linking these tribes to Himyar, it is important to note that Siban and Noah are ancient tribes. Siban, for instance, is mentioned alongside Al-Mahra in a text written by Samifa Ashua Al-Himyari, though no chain of transmission is provided in the text. The description of these tribes as coming from Hadhramaut seems more accurate.[188][189]
Tribes such as Siban, Nuh, and al-Humum share closer features and clothing with the Mahra and the inhabitants of Socotra, indicating no direct relation to the Himyarites.
In general, Hadhramaut is considered somewhat less tribal than other regions in Yemen, despite the presence of tribes. In a study conducted by American researcher Sarah Phillips in cooperation with Sana'a University, 70% of the population in Hadhramaut declared that their loyalty should be to the state rather than to the tribe. This percentage was higher than that of the population in the Amran Governorate's Al-Ahmar Center.[190]
Quda'ah
[edit]The name "Qada'ah" or "Adnan" was not mentioned in ancient texts that predate Islam, and only a little about "Qahtan" was mentioned in the Musnad texts, but as a land name rather than in the form portrayed by the informants in the Umayyad and Abbasid eras.[191] Qada'ah includes many tribes, some of which are located in the south of Arabia, and some in the north. During the era of the Banu Umayyads, boasting among the Arab tribes began, with each tribe attributing others to its section, composing legends and satirical poems against other sections. This led to an escalation, with clients taking pride in the origins of their masters while mocking others.[192] The Battle of Marj Rahit was one of the most significant wars that fueled these grudges. The Yemenis sided with Marwan bin Al-Hakam, while the Qaysiyyah supported Abdullah bin Al-Zubayr.[193][194] The disagreement among informants and genealogists about "Quda'ah" stems from this boasting. The tribes considered "Quda’ah" are mentioned in Musnad texts without specific ancestors, but rather as peoples. Among these tribes, the most prominent is Khawlan, which was mentioned as "Khulan" and "Dhi Khawlun," along with other "Qada'i" tribes such as "Kalb" (Banu Kalb), "Nahd," and "Adhrat" (Adhrah), but there is no mention of a single tribal bloc called "Quda'ah."[195]
Yafa'a
[edit]Yafi' is a tribe belonging to Himyar bin Saba',[196][197][198] and their land was known in the texts of Al-Musnad as "Dahs" or "Dahsam," later named after them during the era of the Upper Yafa Sultanate.[199][200][201][202] The Yafi' tribe in the Yafa region is divided into two main sections: Banu Qasid and Banu Malik.[203][204] They established several sultanates throughout history in Yemen and abroad, such as the Tahirid State,[205] the Emirate of Al-Kasad,[206] the Qu'aiti Sultanate,[207] the Emirate of Al-Buraik,[208] and others.[209]
Outside the Yafa' area, the tribe is usually divided into three major clans: Al-Mousta, Al-Dhabi, and Banu Qasid. Collectively, they are referred to as Ayal Malik or Banu Malik, in reference to Yafa' Na'ta's grandfather, who was nicknamed Malik. They are spread across almost all governorates of Yemen, especially in Hadramaut.[210][211][212] The Yafa' tribe was also notable for being among the first to embrace the Najdi Salafi call in Yemen during the era of Imam Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab.[213][214]
Yafa' played a role alongside other tribes in the October 14 Revolution against the British colonizer. However, unlike the northern regions of the country, the revolution and the expulsion of the colonizer did not strengthen the influence of the tribes; instead, it increased their weakness and disintegration, with minor differences from one southern governorate to another. This was due to the policies of the Yemeni Socialist Party, which seized power after the expulsion of the British colonialists from Aden. The Socialist Party made weakening tribal influence one of its priorities.[215] However, tribal (or more precisely, regional) affiliations resurfaced during the 1986 civil war, with divisions between supporters of Abdul Fattah Ismail and Ali Nasser Muhammad.[216]
al-Aulaqi
[edit]The Aulaqi is one of the largest and most influential tribal blocs in the south of Yemen.[217] They are a tribal confederation from Shabwah Governorate in the eastern desert of Yemen. Most of the families in the confederation trace their origins to Himyar, Kinda, and Mazhaj. The Aulaqi appeared under this name in the late eighteenth century. They established several sultanates in the modern history of Yemen, including the Upper Aulaqi Sultanate, the Lower Aulaqi Sultanate, the Al-Daghar Sultanate, and their sheikhdom in Al Farid. Compared to other tribes in the south of Yemen, the Aulaqi is a more cohesive tribe, and they are primarily located in Shabwa.
Traditional tribal structure
[edit]The tribal structure in Yemen can be classified into several organizational levels: the tribal union, the tribe, the clan, and the house. While this is an academic classification, in daily usage, the term "tribe" is often used interchangeably to refer to the tribal union, the tribe, and the clan.
When comparing the tribal division with Yemen’s administrative division, the "tribal union" typically spans across several governorates. The "tribe" generally aligns with a district, although it sometimes encompasses multiple districts or shares a district with other tribes. The "clan" corresponds to a subdistrict or community level, while the "house" aligns with a village.
Many Yemeni villages include the term "house" (e.g., Beit Al-Ahmar in Sanhan), reflecting both a spatial or administrative connection and a shared kinship bond.[218]
Although genealogical studies often assert that lineage is the fundamental bond within society at various levels, this generalization is inaccurate. Numerous political and economic factors have influenced the formation and restructuring of tribal unions, often through systems of allegiance rather than strict kinship.[219]
For instance, some tribes have separated from the Mazhaj tribal union to join the Hashid or Bakil tribal unions.[220] As a result, the bond at the level of the "tribal union" is primarily based on loyalty rather than lineage. At the tribal level, the connection is often driven by shared interests, as the tribe functions as an organization for managing natural resources.
However, at the levels of the clan or house, kinship remains the primary bond, typically encompassing individuals related through kinship up to the fifth, sixth, or even seventh generation.[221]
Social structure
[edit]Historically, the Yemeni tribe functioned as an independent political and economic unit. It served as an organization for managing collectively owned natural resources, a military unit responsible for defending its members and affiliated individuals or groups, and a social system that regulated relationships within the community.
The social status of individuals within the tribe, as well as the relationships governing their daily interactions and social behaviors, was determined by their roles in producing and protecting the tribe’s economic needs. According to Khaldun al-Naqib, the tribal economy in the Arabian Peninsula was primarily an economy of conquest. Consequently, individuals tasked with protecting the tribe held a prestigious position within its structure.
The tribe was not exclusively composed of individuals sharing a common lineage. Others could join either voluntarily, through the system of fraternization (as seen in the relationships among early Islamic Companions), or forcibly, through the annexation of war prisoners. Those who joined voluntarily through fraternization were granted equal status with the tribe’s original members, provided they contributed to its defense and paid the required "fine" (a form of tribute or obligation).[222]
The Yemeni people have inherited ancient social traditions and customs that date back to pre-Christian times, reflecting deeply rooted social patterns and roles.[223] In ancient Yemen, the Makariba or soothsayers were held in great veneration and respect, as they represented the religious authority of the community.
In tribal society, the fundamental unit of interaction was the family rather than the individual. The Sayyidah and Hashemites enjoyed a high social status among the tribes with which they were associated. Their primary role was to mediate conflicts between tribes. Additionally, a well-established tribal custom obligated tribes to protect their neighbors. The Sayyidah, being non-combatants, did not fight or carry weapons and lived under the protection of the tribes.[224]
The next social class is composed of sheikhs or judges, who are of tribal origin but often do not carry weapons.[225] Below them is "the tribe," which typically consists of individuals who bear arms and may engage in agricultural work, although they generally avoid manual or craft labor. In reality, "the tribe" is considered the highest social class, and the status of the sheikhs and judges depends on the approval and support of the tribes.[226]
Lower social classes included craftsmen and artisans, such as the Muzayna (circumcisers, barbers, and cuppers), the Qashamen (vegetable sellers and owners of stalls and carts), and the Dawasheen (those who recited welcome poems and sang Al-Zamil). Despite their lower status, these groups were afforded protection by the tribes due to the essential nature of their services.[227]
Distribution of power
[edit]The distribution of power in traditional Yemeni tribal society followed a hierarchical structure aligned with the tribal organization. In the Hashid tribes, the "Sheikh of the Sheikhs" stood at the top of tribal authority, followed by the "Sheikh of Al-Daman," then the sheikhs, headmasters, and secretaries.
In the Bakil tribal confederation, leadership similarly began with the "Sheikh of Sheikhs," followed by tribal heads known as "Captains,"[note 1] then the sheikhs, elders, and trustees.
In the tribes of Hadhramaut, each group was led by a tailah, while each tribe was headed by a colonel.[note 2] Leadership within subgroups, or "thighs," was managed by an "intruder." The term sheikh in Hadhramaut was reserved exclusively for religious leaders and scholars.
Those holding the ranks of "Sheikh of Sheikhs" and "Sheikhs of Al-Daman" in the Hashid tribes, along with their counterparts in other tribes, constitute the elite and the political authority within the tribe.[228]
In Islamic historical writings, they are often referred to as the “People of Solution and Contract.”[229] These leaders are authorized by their tribes to negotiate and conclude treaties, agreements, and alliances with the state and other tribes or to dissolve them. They also serve as representatives of the tribe in dealings with the state and other tribal entities.
Those holding the third rank in the tribal power hierarchy, referred to as "sheikhs" or their equivalents, form the military elite of the tribe. They are responsible for mobilizing tribal fighters and leading them during conflicts and wars.
Next in rank are the "aqal" (elders) and secretaries, or their counterparts. They constitute the executive authority within the tribe. Their duties include collecting zakat, implementing directives issued by higher-ranking leaders, summoning individuals for tribal obligations, documenting agreements, and supervising tasks such as the distribution of irrigation water, among other responsibilities.[230]
Despite variations in tribal authority structures among different tribal unions, a common feature across all of them is that positions of tribal authority were chosen by members of the tribe, either directly or indirectly. In the Al-Fadhli region, for example, sheikhs were selected by members of their tribes.[231] The same applied to the Al-Wahidi Sultanate and the Al-Fadhli tribes in Abyan. In some tribes, such as the "Ibn Abd al-Mani" tribe, the position of sheikh rotated among its three divisions.
In the Hashid and Bakil tribes, sheikhs were historically chosen through the endorsement of village sheikhs and headmen. However, in modern times, the position has become hereditary, with the title passing to the eldest son after the father's death.[232][233] In Hadhramaut, leaders known as "presenters" were chosen through consultation and consensus among the "intruders" of the tribes, with their installation taking place at a meeting called the "Intruders’ Meeting."
In traditional tribal society, the sheikh was subject to accountability by the tribe and could be replaced if found to be arrogant or tyrannical.[234]
The selection of those holding the first rank, the "Sheikh of Sheikhs," has traditionally been conducted through a mechanism resembling the system of allegiance.[235] For instance, Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar was pledged allegiance in 2008 as the successor to his father, Abdullah al-Ahmar. Similarly, Sheikh Sinan Abu Lahoum was installed as the Sheikh of Sheikhs of the Bakil tribal confederation in 1977, with his son succeeding him in the same manner during a tribal conference in 1982.
The politicization of the social authority of tribal sheikhs had negative effects on both the state and the tribes. At the tribal level, it led to a transformation from an egalitarian structure to a hierarchical one, shifting social authority from being based on acceptance to becoming compulsory. This also weakened social relations within tribes, as tribal sheikhs no longer represented their tribes before the state but became representatives of the state in their regions. As a result, they were no longer accountable to their tribes, which contributed to the erosion of the intermediary space between the state and society.[236]
At the state level, the politicization of tribal sheikhs' social authority helped give the state the characteristics of a sultanate, undermined its ability to enforce the law, and contributed to the sharing of state power between the tribe and the government. This weakened the government's capacity to monopolize political power.[237]
Social relations
[edit]Social relations in Yemeni tribal society were characterized by a collective nature. The unit of dealing was the family, not the individual, and ownership of pastures and natural resources was considered collective property. Individual disputes often escalated into collective conflicts.[238] The Yemeni tribes developed a customary justice system for arbitration, focusing on settlement and reconciliation rather than punishment.[239] In the tribe, no authority was authorized to impose punishment on offenders.[240] Tribal sheikhs acted as arbitrators between tribes, not as judges over them. As a result, the phenomenon of revenge spread among the Yemeni tribes. Revenge was not taken directly from the killer, but from any member of the clan to which the killer belonged.
Each Yemeni tribe has a "diwan," which serves as a middle space between the tribe and the state, as well as a public space for deliberating on general tribal issues. It is where decisions related to resource management are made and disputes between families and clans[241] are settled through a consensual process among tribe members.
Recently, the tribe's decision-making process is no longer carried out through consensus. Instead, the sheikh makes most of the decisions without referring to the tribe's members. This shift has stripped the tribe of its traditional civil character, strengthened its sectarian nature, and hindered the development of a modern civil society.
Marginalized groups
[edit]In the past, society looked down on singers, but this has changed recently. Many of the Yemeni singers who have emerged belong to different societal groups, including the lowest strata, known as the Marginalized.[242][243] These customs no longer have their previous effect or remain only symbolic. However, discrimination, marginalization, and contempt for the so-called Akhdam or marginalized people persist, even leading to physical attacks and neglect by the authorities. The tribal structure in Yemen continues to exist.[244][245]
The situation of the Akhdams in Yemen is similar to that of the Pariha in India.[246] Al-Akhdam are often confused with slaves, but they are not slaves or mamluks, nor have they ever been. These social divisions existed in both North and South Yemen under different names. The equivalent of "judges" in North Yemen (such as the late Ibrahim al-Hamdi) are referred to as "Sheikhs" in the south and Hadramaut. These divisions have ancient roots dating back to the history of Ancient Yemen.
In Aden, things were different. Aden has long been a commercial city,[247] visited by merchants, and it was unclear who its original inhabitants were. In 1872, the city's population was 19,289, of whom 4,812 were Arabs, 965 were original inhabitants,[248] and 8,168 were Indians, including 2,557 Muslims, with the rest being Africans from East Africa.[248]
On the religious level, intermarriage between Zaydis and Shafi'is is common in Yemen.[249] Ismailis tend to intermarry among themselves, while there is a very small Twelver minority, whose existence is not officially recognized by the Yemeni government, and they suffer from societal isolation.[250] Intermarriage between Yemeni Jews is socially rejected, primarily for religious reasons. Yemeni Jews even refuse to marry their daughters to Muslims, but they are too socially and legally weak to prevent such marriages.
Before Islam, intermarriage with Jews was common in Yemen. Yemeni Jews are a mix of Hebrews and local tribes,[251] and their presence in Yemen is ancient. They are the indigenous people of Yemen and do not differ from the tribes ethnically or racially, except for their religious beliefs and culture. However, Yemeni Jews face societal and political discrimination and marginalization, as noted by Orientalists who visited Yemen in the 20th century.
The Jews of Yemen have a long and rich history that traces back to ancient times. Historically, they were known for their craftsmanship, particularly as skilled goldsmiths and exceptional makers of daggers. Their expertise in these crafts was highly regarded, and they played an important role in the local economy and culture. Their presence was particularly strong in Aden, which was a major commercial port, attracting traders and travelers from all over the world, including the British during their colonial rule.[246] However, with the establishment of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent political and social changes, the majority of Yemeni Jews emigrated, primarily to Israel and the United States. A smaller number of Jews remained in Yemen, but their influence—both socially and politically—diminished significantly over time.
Yemeni Jews, despite their deep historical roots in the country, faced societal discrimination due to their religious beliefs and cultural practices. This marginalized them, but they continued to contribute to the cultural and intellectual landscape of Yemen. Many Yemeni Jewish scholars were involved in various fields such as medicine, industry, and language, producing works that enriched local knowledge. Yet, despite their intellectual contributions, their social status was often low, and they were subjected to the discriminatory practices that were prevalent in Yemeni society.
In contrast to the marginalized status of Jews and other minority groups, Yemeni society also includes individuals of Turkish and Persian origins, who have generally been better integrated into the social fabric. Yemen’s history of imperial influence, particularly from the Ottoman Empire, led to the presence of many Turkish individuals who became part of Yemen's elite, assimilating into various aspects of Yemeni life. The same cannot be said for those of African origin, including the Muhamasheen (also known as Al-Akhdam), who continue to face systemic discrimination.[252]
The discrimination against the Muhamasheen is particularly severe. They make up a significant portion of Yemen's population, estimated between 500,000 to 1 million people, and are often treated with contempt by other groups. Their social and political exclusion remains a persistent issue, despite efforts to address it. One notable attempt to include the Muhamasheen in the political process was during the Yemeni National Dialogue Conference, where a representative, Noman Al-Hudhaifi,[253] was appointed to speak on their behalf. However, their representation and influence within the national dialogue were minimal, reflecting the continued marginalization of this community.
The difficult economic conditions in Yemen have contributed to some degree of melting social differences, but this has not been uniform across all tribal groups. Tribes surrounding the capital, Sanaa, including Amran and Sanhan, often saw themselves as key participants in the political processes, especially during the rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh. However, the country remains deeply divided along tribal, ethnic, and social lines, with the Muhamasheen continuing to struggle for recognition and equal rights in Yemen's social and political systems. The persistence of such divisions highlights the challenges Yemen faces in building a more inclusive and egalitarian society.[254][255]
Political role
[edit]Throughout the history of the modern state and before it, the Yemeni tribe is considered politically important in building the state, and it forms part of its authority, and plays a major role in political decision-making, although it does not It has a vision for social transformation, but it has an influence in opposing or stopping every decision that conflicts with its interests. The expansion and effectiveness of the tribal role in Yemen has worked to strengthen tribal structures and adherence to the culture of privacy and unequal citizenship relations, which has remained one of the most important issues around which conflict between Modernization forces and traditional forces. This situation weakens the role of civil society and makes it unable to contribute to the process of democratic transformation because the traditional forces are considered conservative social forces resistant to change.
The tribe represents an essential component of social capital, and a living economic force whose influence extends to the relationship between the state and the tribe, and thus determines the level of institutionalization of the state, its ability to direct and make decisions, and the extent of implementing the rule of law.
The tribe in Yemen is viewed as a national entity from the point of view of those defending its existence in its current form. It is a major and ancient part of the components of the Yemeni people. Observers believe that Ali Abdullah Saleh used the tribe and directed it against civil values, until the civilization of civil society became mortgaged. In the hands of tribal sheikhs, Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime did not work for 33 years to establish the foundations of a civil society,[256] To improve the image of the regime, Ali Abdullah Saleh exaggerated in portraying the nature of the Yemeni tribes And to give it legitimacy before the international community,[257] Researcher Sarah Phillips believes that it may be believed that democracy in Yemen is more likely to succeed than in other Arab countries due to the egalitarian nature of the tribes, and their prevention of any authoritarian authority from tyranny in the country, but Ali Abdullah Saleh used the tribes in favor of consolidating the foundations of minority rule in the country.[258]
In the south and Hadramaut
[edit]After Captain Stafford Haines occupied Aden on 19 January 1839 he pursued a policy based on provoking tribes to fight among themselves, thus reducing his need for large British forces.[259] The occupation government agreed to this policy,[260] Haines and those who came after him succeeded in dividing The south and east of Yemen were divided into sheikhdoms, sultanates, emirates and states, the number of which reached 25 tribal states, all of which were linked to protection agreements with the colonial administration in Aden.[261]
When the South gained its independence in November 1967, the new state worked to eliminate the authority of the tribal sheikhs, and merged the tribal states into one national state. There was no prominent political tribal role, so the policies of The Yemeni Socialist Party is one of the reasons for state control and the absence of tribal authority in the south of the country before Yemeni unity in 1990. The ruling party succeeded in building a strong state controlling sources of income, but it was a closed totalitarian state, with Bad relations with most countries in the region as well as economic failure. As for the regions of Hadhramaut, the tribe's authority was at its lowest in the south because of the socialist policies, and because of the Hadrami diaspora in Southeast Asia, East Africa, and the Gulf. The Hadramis outside Hadramaut were more than those inside it. And the symbolism remained weak, but the tribe remains strong in areas in the south like Abyan and Shabwa. Al-Dhalea increased in strength after Yemeni unity and Summer War of 1994 to some extent, but it is not as strong and influential as the northern tribes.[262]
As for the state that was formed in the north after the 26 September Revolution it sought to include the tribal sheikhs in the political body of the state, and the Yemeni state in the north before unification witnessed a struggle between two military forces and the tribal sheikhs, until it created Ali Abdullah Saleh, who does not belong to a strong tribe and does not have long military experience, created a kind of balance and reconciliation between the tribal forces and the army at the beginning of his rule, but he began to change his positions in later periods and transformed the army into what could be called the "family sector."[263]
Yemen Arab Republic
[edit]Judge Abdul Rahman al-Eryani assumed the presidency after the dismissal of Abdullah Al-Sallal. They do not have the influence of the tribes around Sanaa, but the elites who belong to this governorate, such as Beit Al-Iryani, realize that it is in their interest to maintain good relations with the tribal elites because they lack a tribal base to support them.[264]
During the presidency of Judge Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani the military entered a party in political battles, starting with the conflict over the establishment of the National Council,[265] where the forces presented What were known as the correction decisions of the armed forces, the correction officers demanded that the funds provided by the state to the tribal sheikhs be stopped. In August 1971 the government resigned and Prime Minister Ahmed Mohamed Noman justified the government's resignation due to its inability to fulfill its obligations due to... Tribal sheikhs’ depletion of the state budget,[266][267][268] In December 1972 the resignation of the government of Mohsen Al-Aini due to... His demands, which were not met, were the dissolution of the Shura Council, which is dominated by sheikhs, the dissolution of the Tribal Affairs Authority, and the cessation of the sheikhs’ budget.[269]
The June 13 Corrective Movement was led by Lieutenant Colonel Ibrahim al-Hamdi, and President Ibrahim al-Hamdi overthrew Judge Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani by persuading Tribal leaders, and using them as a temporary bait to realize that they are the ones with the real power on the ground. So he wooed Sinan Abu Lahoum by appointing his relative Mohsen Al-Aini as head of the government and kept Abu Lahoum's relatives in the army, but he quickly got rid of them, and Al-Hamdi worked to reduce the role of tribal sheikhs in the army and the state and abolished Ministry of Tribal Affairs He froze the work of the constitution and dissolved the Shura Council, and on 27 July 1975 which he called "Army Day," he issued decisions to remove many tribal sheikhs from the leadership of the military establishment. Al-Hamdi moved Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar even though he was a rival of Abu Lahoum, but he realized al-Hamdi's intentions to get rid of the mostly negative influence of tribal forces, angered[270] Al-Ahmar tried to rally his supporters in the countryside of Sanaa to overthrow President Al-Hamdi, but Saudi Arabia, the guardian of the tribal forces in Yemen, through the money it pays through the so-called "Special Committee"[271] I refused to support Al-Ahmar because Al-Hamdi succeeded in making them believe that he was their ally by getting rid of the Abu Lahoum family,[270] The era of Ibrahim al-Hamdi witnessed major political and economic reforms,[272] He bet on his popularity in Yemeni circles to remove his country from the Saudi mantle, by clipping the nails of powerful tribal players,[273] So he held a summit Quartet of [[Red Sea] Basin countries], and began communicating with the President of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen Salem Rabie Ali regarding Yemeni unity, and concluded arms deals with France[274] Ibrahim al-Hamdi was assassinated in 1977 one day before he headed to Aden to discuss unity with President Salem Rabie Ali.[275]
After the assassination of Al-Hamdi, Ahmed Hussein Al-Ghashmi assumed the presidency, and the tribal sheikhs, Lieutenant General Hassan Al-Omari demanded their positions in the armed forces, including Mujahid Abu Shawarib and Abdullah Al-Ahmar and Sinan Abu Lahoum, which is what happened to them[276] They detailed the military units on tribal and regional basis.[276]
The period of Ali Abdullah Saleh
[edit]To strengthen the place of tribal sheikhs in power, in the eighties Ali Abdullah Saleh established the Tribal Affairs Authority to play the same role as the Ministry of Tribal Affairs, which was abolished by the assassinated President Ibrahim al-Hamdi, in organizing the distribution of funds.[277]
During the 1990s, Ali Abdullah Saleh chose the patronage system as a way to quickly bypass the difficult process of state-building. In the absence of strong state institutions, the political elite in the Saleh era formed a model of cooperative governance where competing interests agreed to discipline through implicit acceptance of the resulting balance, and this balance was not disturbed except after the efforts of Ali Abdullah Saleh to strengthen the position of his son Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh.[278] Saleh appointed his relatives to various military positions to ensure the loyalty of the institution, and in return he rewarded them in ways that included allowing them access to the government's foreign exchange reserves and showing them to deal in contraband on the black market, other relatives held ministerial positions related to planning, real estate and insurance and others took over public projects such as the National Oil Company and airlines, and rewarded others by granting them a monopoly on the tobacco trade and the construction of hotels.[279] His son Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh was the commander of the Yemeni Republican Guard, with approximately thirty thousand militants loyal to him.[280] According to the WikiLeaks document 05SANAA1352_a, General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and Yahya Muhammad Abdullah Saleh were involved in using military tankers to smuggle diesel to the Yemeni and Saudi markets,[281] Although the security services nominally report to the Ministries of Defense and Interior, senior leaders from Sanhan such as Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yahya Muhammad Abdullah Saleh and Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar were largely independent in their actions, and there was virtually no civilian supervision of the army, so it became an important hotbed for patronage and the distribution of benefits, through fake soldiers and smuggling of weapons, fuel and people.[278]
Post-unity republic
[edit]The sheikhs and tribal leaders enjoyed broad powers in the state. The head of the Islah Party and the sheikh of the Hashid sheikhs Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar was the speaker of Parliament,[282] And his deputy, Sheikh Yahya Al-Ra’i from the Congress Party,[283] They do not have academic or scientific qualifications, but their tribal influence enabled them to hold their positions. Ali Abdullah Saleh built a wide patronage network with the tribal leaders, which turned them into an extension of the weak state to obstruct any independent political movement of the tribes and prevent the formation of tribal entities compliant with the institutions of a modern state.[284] The desire for independence from the government stems from within the tribal community in Yemen because of their conviction that the patronage system is better compared to submission to state institutions and the amount of influence that They enjoy it in their regions, but it is not something they would like to sacrifice easily.[284] Tribes from different regions prefer to solve their problems on their own without state intervention, through tribal customs that they consider better for resolving conflicts, despite their demands from time to time. The state extends its influence.
There are two parties that dominate the Yemeni political scene, namely the General People's Congress Party and the Yemeni Islah Party, which are competing to attract tribal sheikhs, due to their tribal and political influence, and their relations with neighboring countries.[285] Both parties have their own media outlets. The Islah Party has newspapers and channels that speak in its name and represent it, and the Party also controls The General People's Congress, on the official media for several decades, and when the Congress lost its authority over it, Ali Abdullah Saleh created Yemen Today Channel, and the Yemen Today newspaper, In addition to dozens of websites for both parties.
The tribes were not accustomed to submitting to a strong central authority. The majority of states that were established in Yemen did not control the tribal areas, especially the northern highlands. The sheikhs were the decision makers in their regions. During the Middle Ages, Yemeni society was divided into isolated and self-sufficient villages, and the tribal people were in Yemen are "supporters and allies" of the state and not subjects[286] As well as the residents of cities and agricultural areas in which the tribal structure was weak, the Yemeni states were controlling On major ports and cities, where tribal ties are weakened to collect taxes from farmers and merchants.[286]
Ali Abdullah Saleh worked to weaken and disperse the influential middle class and strengthened the position of the patriarchal pastoral forces represented by the tribal sheikhs in the countryside. The fragmentation of society has weakened the public sphere, making it unable to play its role in the field of democratic transformation, due to the separation between political and social authority and the continuation of traditional local loyalties, which generates political lethargy among the population,[287] Joining parties, especially in the countryside, is done collectively due to the appeal of the two main parties in Yemen, namely the General People's Congress and the Yemeni Islah Party, to tribal sheikhs, and it is not based on conviction, knowledge, or understanding of the party's programmes. The majority of the population of the Yemeni countryside (where most of the population lives) are illiterate and cannot read and write.[288] Ali Abdullah Saleh hindered the state's penetration into society, as he did not establish state agencies in many rural or even urban areas, and he did not work to establish the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force. By forming networks of personal loyalty and subordination with traditional elite symbols of tribal sheikhs and local leaders, they can, through their social powers, control their followers and thus curb any attempt to demand their political, civil, social, economic, and cultural rights.
The sheikh of the Hashid sheikhs Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar died in 2007, and his sons had enjoyed influence in the state before, and they exploited that to secure multiple commercial privileges. Humaid al-Ahmar is one of the most prominent businessmen in Yemen, and he owns many companies and is an agent for a number of international companies inside Yemen, and the influence of the sons of Abdullah bin Hussein Al-Ahmar conflicts with the influence of the sons of Ali Abd God is Saleh, in 2009 a committee was formed to sell Yemeni oil at auction to various competitors, and Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh was behind this decision, to break the monopoly of Hamid Al-Ahmar in this matter. Disagreements of this kind increased between the sons of Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar and the relatives of Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the support of Hamid al-Ahmar, who is the leader of the Islah party. The emergence of the Yemeni Youth Revolution, against Ali Abdullah Saleh, as well as his brother Sadiq al-Ahmar, and he joined the revolution after General Ali Mohsen Saleh, and their joining of the revolution was not for the sake of The revolution or to stand with its youth only, but this came as a result of previous disputes between them and Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the parties took advantage of the revolution to achieve their demands in partnership and to obtain political positions that were monopolized by the For the People's Congress year, and the political parties signed the Agreement with the ruling party, sponsored by the Gulf states, which led to an end to the Political Crisis that accompanied the Yemeni Youth Revolution, whose demands were met Against administrative and financial corruption and nepotism.[289]
The loyalties and relationships woven by the political system, and the subjugation of the tribe to its benefit, prevented attempts to build a civil society by disbursing financial allocations and "acceptance" to the armed forces, all of which were factors that contributed to the exacerbation of the role of the tribes and the culture of corruption. And patronage, and he was able to create a balance of sorts between the state and the tribe through the policy of "dancing on the heads of snakes]]" and involving tribal leaders and elites in governance by linking them personally to him in a wide patronage network,[290] Those tribal elites depend on central rents, financial, real estate and administrative, government financial transfers to tribal sheikhs via the Department of Tribal Affairs, and real estate that Ali Abdullah Saleh orders that it be disbursed to them, and the senior political, diplomatic and administrative jobs that he grants to them. As for ordinary tribal members, they obtain rent-seeking jobs in the army and security, and in the education and health sectors. USAID estimated the number of completely fake employees in 2006 at about 30,000 employees, out of the total employees in the state administrative apparatus, which numbered about 473,000 employees at the time, and estimated the fake soldiers at approximately one-third of the forces’ soldiers.[291]
Tribes and the army
[edit]Historically, the Yemeni army was in constant need of the support of tribal militias, or what became known as Popular Committees in its internal and external wars. It is a weak and disjointed army, and lacks military doctrine despite the numbers of its members, and the majority of its members are loyal to the tribe. My party accepted it as a military allegiance, and when the 26 September Revolution broke out in the north, the national state did not inherit from Imamate Kingdom a strong national army. Rather, some members of the army fled and sided with The deposed Imam was trying to regain power, and the revolution needed protection, so the state issued in 1963 the "Conscription Law", according to which conscription did not take place.[292]
Recruitment methods differed according to the differences in tribal structures. Citizens from the "central regions" where tribal ties were weak, in Taiz and Ibb in particular, volunteered individually, and what was established was It was called the "National Guard" to accommodate them, and its formations were regular formations, subject to a military "rank series" (rank series), and its members received monthly salaries, wore military clothing, and underwent military training.[293] As for citizens from the northern regions, which are characterized by strong adherence to tribal ties, they used to apply for conscription en masse, under the leadership of their sheikhs, and what was called the "People's Army" was established to accommodate them. Although it was given a regular name, it was called "The Liberation Brigade".[294] However, he remained outside the structure of the regular army, led by a group of tribal sheikhs, including sheikhs who occupy official positions in the military and civil state agencies, and some sources indicate that the late Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar alone leads a force of 20,000 armed tribesmen in the war between the republic and the monarchy.[295]
Tribesmen and sheikhs realize that the continuation of their political roles is determined in light of the measures taken by state in the field of building a strong, professional and institutionalized army,[296] Therefore, they contributed to hindering the army institution, and keeping it in a state of weakness, which made state a constant need to seek help from the tribal people's army, and a strong army capable of successfully waging conflicts and wars was not built, so The army did not dispense with it in all the battles it fought after the cessation of the Yemeni 26 September Revolution in 1970, so the tribal militias "irregular forces" had an important role in supporting the army of the north against the army of the Republic of Yemen Popular Democracy, during the two wars that broke out between the authorities of the two parts of Yemen in 1972 and 1979.[297] Before the outbreak of the March 1979 War between the two sides, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh sent a letter to Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar. On 22 February 1979, he was asked to mobilize tribal forces and prepare to confront the turbulent situation on the border.[298] The tribal sheikhs were the ones who pushed the authority. North to go to war in 1972, and the tribal militias started the war before the army started.[299]
During the Summer War of 1994 the popular committees played an important role in supporting the military units loyal to the unity and to Ali Abdullah Saleh, in their battles against the military units loyal to his deputy Ali Salem Al-Bayd After the war, the Tribal Affairs Authority was distributed to the southern governorates, and the cities and neighborhoods were appointed with sheikhs and neighborhood chiefs, something that these cities and governorates had never known before.
The army used the tribal militia in the six Saada wars against the rebel militias "Houthi group" in the governorates of Saada and Amran. During the years 2004 – 2009 the government used it again in fighting Al-Qaeda and tribal teams were formed to support the army in confronting Al-Qaeda in 2010 in Shabwa Governorate and again in Abyan Governorate in the period 2011 – 2012,[300][301] Where The popular committees in the regions of southern Yemen, especially in Abyan Governorate play a major role in supporting the army to fight Al-Qaeda, and sometimes they fight battles as an alternative to it.[302][303]
The army's need to support tribal militias was and still is not only due to its weakness, but also to the army's desire to contain the tribes during the wars and battles it fights, and to ensure that they do not side with the other party. The Yemeni tribes have always been ready to enter wars with anyone against them. Whatever,[304] throughout Yemeni history the tribal sheikhs viewed war as a means of production,[305] some of the tribes that were monarchies during the 1960s, cooperated in the late 1970s in what was known as the “Front War" with the National Democratic Front, which constitutes an extension of the forces that were fighting it in sixties[306] The regime then imposed forced conscription on many of the youth of the central regions, which were witnessing a widespread rebellion., to ensure that they or those not recruited from their families do not participate in the rebellion against the army.
In exchange for the militias’ support for the regime in its wars during the last decades of the twentieth century, the regime granted tribal sheikhs money, lands, cars, and real estate, and granted some tribal sheikhs military ranks and job ranks in the state's administrative apparatus.[307] During those wars, the tribes obtained a large amount of weapons, and the participation of tribal militias in the 1994 Civil War gained importance. Especially in this area, it obtained large quantities of weapons from the military units loyal to President Ali Abdullah Saleh at the time, and seized other quantities of weapons from the military units loyal to his deputy Ali Salem Al-Baid after their defeat, to the point that their stock of light weapons exceeds the government's stockpile. The government's stockpile of light weapons was estimated at 1,500,000 weapons, while the tribes' possessions were estimated at more than 5 million weapons[308] Most of these weapons are in the hands of the Hashid and Bakil tribes and their sheikhs. The boom in weapons among the tribes was and still is one of the most important factors for the weakness of the army, eliminating the presence of the state and marginalizing its role. The availability of weapons among the tribes has hindered the government from fulfilling the functions of the state, such as extracting natural resources, punishing outlaws, and regulating the use of water.[309][310] Tribal leaders attribute their influence in less favored areas in the areas of Sanaa such as Radaa or Ma'rib to the absence of infrastructure, the deliberate marginalization of the government, and the state's inability to establish security and stability there.[311]
Saudi Arabia and the sheikhs
[edit]Since the 1960s, Hashid sheikhs close to the Saudi ruling family have been receiving huge monthly sums totaling $60–80 million annually, as pointed out by Dr. Gregory Goss, a professor of international relations at the University of Vermont, USA.,[313] The funds were disbursed through the so-called “Special Committee," a Saudi intelligence committee It was created to obstruct the Republic and save the Kingdom of Yemen but it was soon able to gain the loyalty of the tribal leaders participating in the 26 September Revolution, especially Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar Sheikh of the Sheikhs of Hashed, who had great influence and influence on the reality of political, social and economic life in Yemen.
The Irish researcher Fred Halliday mentioned that the imprint of President Ibrahim al-Hamdi was his rejection of foreign interference in Yemen's internal affairs,[314] Indeed, as soon as Al-Hamdi was assassinated, Ahmed Al-Ghashmi who was from Hashed requested the return of monthly salaries,[315] Al-Hamdi's intention was not hostile to Saudi Arabia. He wanted to adopt a foreign policy compatible with Riyadh, but he adopted an internal policy hostile to the interests of the tribal sheikhs and the Hashid. Specifically, through which the Saudi regime exerted its influence on Yemen,[316] “Aid” was not limited to tribal sheikhs, but rather to members of political parties, as the Saudi patronage network increased in Yemen. Since the beginning of the eighties, the amount of this "aid" has reached three and a half billion dollars annually, and the number of people directly linked to Saudi Arabia is estimated at thousands within the country.[317] As tribal elites play the largest role in Saudi-Yemeni relations to weaken the centrality of the state,[318] It was stated in the memoirs of Sinan Abu Lahoum, Sheikh Sheikhs Bakil about how Saudi employees in Yemen communicated with tribal leaders and allocated monthly salaries, including Sinan himself, and about the Saudi advisors’ indication to King Faisal to stop supporting the House of Hamid al-Din because they were able to "buy" the Republican sheikhs.[319]
In South Yemen, the circumstances were different. Relations between Saudi Arabia and The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) were tense, and Saudi Arabia did not have the same influence within that country as the North. The Socialist Party has succeeded in limiting the role of the tribal and religious leaders in the south of the country, but this does not negate Saudi Arabia's relations with “southern Yemeni" parties that were hostile to the Socialist Party, most notably the sultans and sheikhdoms that existed before the October 14 Revolution, but that did not prevent them. "Tense relations" due to support for the separatist forces led by Ali Salem al-Bayd in 1994,[320] Where Saudi Arabia wanted a longer war and more money and weapons for the separatists.[320] The white supporters lost quickly, but Saudi Arabia wanted to arm and support the tribes in the south, and they say to the Americans, "You don't know the tribes."[320] Saudi Arabia was the only one that recognized the Democratic Republic of Yemen, which was declared by the Whites in 1994.
See also
[edit]Main sources
[edit]- The 1994 Yemen War: Causes and Consequences prepared by Jamal Sanad Al-Suwaidi, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research.
- Palace and Diwan, The Political Role of the Tribe in Yemen a group of researchers headed by Dr. Adel Mujahid Al-Shargbi, Sanaa, 2009 PDF
- Sinan Abu Lahoum, Yemen: Facts and Documents I Lived Part Two, Al-Afif Cultural Foundation, Sana’a, second edition, 2006
- Yemen.. Revolution and War until 1970 AD Edgar Aublance, Madbouly Library – Cairo – 1990AD.
- Zaid bin Ali Al-Wazir, An Attempt to Understand the Yemeni Problem, Al-Resala Foundation, D.B., 1971
- Abdul Wali Al-Shammiri, One Thousand Hours of War, Al-Yusr Library, Sana’a, second edition, 1995
- Muhammad Anam Ghalib, Yemen, Land and People: The Economics of Yemen Beirut, second edition, 1966
References
[edit]- ^ "Tribal Resistance and al-Qaeda: Suspected U.S. Airstrike Ignites Tribes in Yemen's Ma'rib Governorate. the James town foundation last retrieved DEC 72012". Archived from the original on 16 March 2020.
- ^ CIA World Factbook, Yemen Archived 2018-01-29 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ "Zaydi Islam". www.globalsecurity.org. Retrieved 19 February 2024.
- ^ الجزيرة نت Archived 19 March 2014 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ J. E. Peterson, Tribes and Politics in Yemen p.1
- ^ J. E. Peterson, Tribes and Politics in Yemen p.2
- ^ "Tribal Resistance and al-Qaeda: Suspected U.S. Airstrike Ignites Tribes in Yemen's Ma'rib Governorate. the James town foundation last retrieved DEC 72012". Archived from the original on 16 March 2020.
- ^ جواد علي المفصل ج 4 ص 420
- ^ حمزة علي لقمان، تاريخ القبائل اليمنية، دار الكلمة، صنعاء، 1985
- ^ محمد محسن الظاهري، القبيلة والتعددية السياسية في اليمن، رسالة دكتوراة
- ^ عبد الله عبد الكريم الجرافي، المقتطف من تاريخ اليمن، منشورات العصر الحديث، بيرون، طبعة2، 1987
- ^ الطبري, أبو جعفر محمد بن جرير (1960). تاريخ الرسل والملوك، الجزء الأول [History of the Apostles and Kings, Part One] (in Arabic). القاهرة – مصر: دار المعارف. pp. 618–626. Archived from the original on 8 April 2022.
- ^ Farroukh, Omar (1964). History of Ignorance. Beirut – Lebanon. p. 45.
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) - ^ Farroukh, Omar (1964). Pre-Islamic History. Beirut – Lebanon. p. 44.
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) - ^ Taqquush, Muhammad Suhail (2009). The History of the Arabs Before Islam. Beirut – Lebanon: Dar Al-Nafais. p. 30. ISBN 978-9953-18-465-4.
- ^ "الإصحاح العاشر من سفر التكوين" [The tenth chapter of Genesis]. St-Takla.org (in Arabic). Retrieved 19 February 2024.
- ^ a b Al-Masoudi, Abu Al-Hasan Ali Bin Al-Hasan (1965). Meadows of Gold and Substantial Minerals, Part One. Beirut – Lebanon: Dar Al-Andalus. p. 262.
- ^ Ibn Khaldun, Abdul Rahman bin Muhammad (1979). Lessons and the Diwan of Al-Mubtada wal-Khabar|The History of Ibn Khaldun, The Book of Lessons and the Diwan of Al-Mubtada wal-Khabar, part two. Beirut – Lebanon: Jammal Printing and Publishing Establishment. pp. 46–47.
- ^ a b Ibn Khaldun, Abdul Rahman bin Muhammad (1979). Lessons and the Diwan of Al-Mubtada' and Al-Khabar|History of Ibn Khaldun, The Book of Lessons and the Diwan of Al-Mubtada' and Al-Khabar, Part Two. Beirut – Lebanon: Jamal Printing and Publishing Establishment. pp. 15–16.
- ^ a b The Political History of the Arabs.
- ^ Hommel. Geography and Geschichte of the Alten Orients, I S., 142 – Fritzl Hommel's Geography and History of the Ancient Near East, p. 142
- ^ Klaus Skipmann's History of the Ancient South Arabian Kingdoms, p. 98
- ^ David Heinrich Müller,Süd-arabische Studien (1877) p.34
- ^ John Philby,Background of Islam p.142
- ^ The Asian Journal, first issue 1874, p. 584
- ^ Ahmed bin Muharib Al-Dhafiri, Happy Yemen in Distant History, Kuwaiti Al-Siyasa newspaper dated 15 July 2010 AD
- ^ The Beginning and the End/Part Two/The Story of Sheba
- ^ The Beginning and the End – Part Two – Chapter on the Residence of Six Tribes from Sheba in Yemen.
- ^ Dr. Adnan Tarsis, The Land of Sheba and the First Arab Civilization, Yemen (Arabia Felix), Lebanon, Beirut, Dar Al-Fikr Al-Mu’asim, 2nd edition, 1990, p. 46
- ^ The Beginning and the End, Part Two, The Story of the People of the Groove
- ^ Majmal al-Tarikh, p. 171
- ^ ".php?lng=Arabic&sid=37254 D. Muhammad Ahmad Al-Kamil, The Historical Path of Yemeni Unity from the beginning of Islam until the state of Bani Rasul, September 26 newspaper, issue (1371), issued on October 13, 2010, p. 24". Archived from the original on 5 March 2016. Retrieved 20 January 2024.
- ^ Israel Abu Dhu’ayb, Ka'b Al-Ahbar Review Mahmoud Abbasi Al-Sharq Cooperative Press, Jerusalem, p. 25
- ^ Al-Tirmidhi, Jami` at-Tirmidhi Vol. 1, Book 46, Hadith 3935
- ^ Al-Mufassal fi Tarikh Al-Arab Before Islam, Jawad Ali (1/2292)
- ^ The Beginning and the End – Ibn Kathir – Part 5 – Page 117
- ^ Futuh Al-Buldan, p. 106
- ^ Al-Baladhuri, Futouh al-Buldan, p. 110
- ^ Ibn Makula, Ikmal al-Kamal, vol. 4, p. 347
- ^ The Lion of the Jungle in the Knowledge of the Companions, Part Two, p. 621
- ^ Abdul Rahman bin Khaldun, the initiator and expert in the history of the Arabs and Berbers Those who lived with them were of the greatest importance. Part 2, p. 477
- ^ Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun, the initiator and expert in the history of the Arabs and Berbers and those who contemporized them of the greatest importance. Part 2, pp. 526 – 527
- ^ Al-Baladhuri, Futuh al-Buldan, vol. 2, p. 400
- ^ History of al-Tabari, Part Three, p. 332
- ^ Tabaqat bin Saad, Part One, p. 287
- ^ Conquests of Egypt and its news – Al-Qurashi Al-Masry – Page 226
- ^ The Sword and Politics – Saleh Al-Wardani p. 132
- ^ Abdul Rahman bin Khaldun The beginning and the news in the history of the Arabs and Berbers and their contemporaries are of the greatest importance. Part 2, p. 514
- ^ Al-Waqidi, Muhammad (1997). Conquests of the Levant (1 ed.). Scientific Books House. p. 6. Archived from the original on 19 August 2017. Retrieved 17 September 2021.
- ^ Asad Al-Ghabah, vol. 1, p. 783
- ^ Ibn Makula, Ikmal al-Kamal, vol. 4, p. 347
- ^ Al-Isaba fi Ma’rifat al-Sahaba – (vol. 3 / p. 48
- ^ Lee Strange (1890), Palestine Under the Moslems: A Description of Syria and the Holy Land from A.D. 650 to 1500, Committee of the Palestine Exploration Fund, London p.25
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 1309
- ^ History of Ibn Khaldun, vol. 4 – p. 236
- ^ History of Al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 751
- ^ a b Al-Musannaf Ibn Abi Shaybah Al-Kufi, vol. 8, p. 15
- ^ a b Book of Al-Futuh – Ahmad bin Athham Al-Kufi – Part 1 – Page 159
- ^ The People of Yemen in the Early Modern Islam, Abd al-Latif p. 110
- ^ "History of Al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 751"
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 1, pp. 752 – 753
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 786
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 792
- ^ History of Al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 793
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 795
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 1 p. 935
- ^ History of al-Tabari Volume 1, p. 930
- ^ Petersen, Andrew (1999).Dictionary of Islamic Architecture. London; New York: Routledge. p.91 ISBN 0-415-21332-0
- ^ Lapidus, Ira M. (1988). A History of Islamic Societies. Cambridge University Press p.52
- ^ Butler, Alfred J. The Arab Conquest Of Egypt (1902) p.431
- ^ Healing love with the news of the Sacred City, vol. 2, p. 165
- ^ Al-Tarikh Al-Kabir, by Al-Bukhari / Part 3
- ^ History of Al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 1081
- ^ The Battle of Siffin: 245
- ^ History of al-Tabari 5/23
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 1076
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 1087
- ^ a b History of al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 1088
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 1092
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 1093
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 1127
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 1 p. 1129
- ^ History Al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 1145
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 1202. Muawiyah said: “Your cousin Hujr is the head of the people, and I fear that if I release him, he will ruin Egypt for me.”
- ^ History of Al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 1203
- ^ Ibn Asakir: 16 / 330 He said while he was in Tunisia: O my brothers, my companions, and my best friend, should I fight for the Quraysh for the kingdom so that if it is upright for them, they will kill us? By God, if I catch it again with those who obey me from Yamaniyah, I will tell them: Quraysh separate from us and let them kill each other.
- ^ History of Al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 1204. He sent a messenger to him and told him The Commander of the Faithful did not prevent the Commander of the Faithful from interceding for you on behalf of your cousin except out of compassion for you and your people due to the calamity of another war. If Hijr remained, you feared that he would force you and your people to rush to him, and that would be a calamity for the Muslims greater than killing him.
- ^ I. Akram, The Muslim conquest of Egypt and North Africa. Ferozsons, 1977. Page 201
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 1207
- ^ "History of Ibn Khaldun, vol. 4 – p. 2362"
- ^ For the beginning and the end, vol. 8 – p. 61
- ^ History of Al-Tabari, vol. 1, c. 1245
- ^ History of Al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 1249. You have known the status of Hani bin Urwa in Egypt and his house in the clan, for I hate enmity with his people. They are the people of Egypt and the number of the people of Yemen.
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 1250
- ^ It was stated in Al-Iqd al-Farid 5/152, that when Ubayd Allah ibn Ziyad and Ibrahim ibn Malik al-Ashtar met Balzab said: Who is this who is fighting me? It was said to him: Ibrahim bin Al-Ashtar He said: I left him yesterday as a boy playing in the bathroom
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 1319
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 1292
- ^ "History of al-Tabari Volume 1, p. 1292"
- ^ Issar Al-Ain fi Ansar Al-Hussein, peace be upon him, p. 153
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 1293
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 2, p. 1347
- ^ Siyar A`lam al-Nubala’, vol. 3, p. 346
- ^ History of Al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 1322
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 1306
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 1324
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 1, p. 1328
- ^ (Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics p.326
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 2, p. 1383
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 2, p. 1388
- ^ History Al-Tabari, vol. 2, p. 1399
- ^ History of Al-Tabari, vol. 2, p. 1412
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 2, p. 1443
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 2, p. 1447
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 2, p. 1469
- ^ Ibn Qutaybah al-Dinouri, Imamate and Politics, vol. 2, p. 29
- ^ "History of al-Tabari, vol. 2, p. 1520"
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 2, p. 1521
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 2, p. 1523
- ^ History of Al-Tabari, vol. 2, p. 1524
- ^ History of al-Tabari, vol. 2, p. 1529
- ^ >History of Al-Tabari, vol. 2, p. 1550
- ^ History of Al-Tabari, vol. 2, p. 1618
- ^ http://islamweb.net/newlibrary/showalam.php?ids=16294 Translated by Ubadah bin Nasi
- ^ Ben Adhari, Abu Al-Abbas Ahmed bin Muhammad (1980). Al-Bayan Al-Maghrib fi Brief News of the Kings of Andalusia and Morocco, p. 26
- ^ 'An Ibadi lecture on the authority of Imam "Seeker of Truth" Abdullah bin Yahya Al-Kindi, may God be pleased with him Archived 28 December 2015 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Jaafar Al-Subhani, Research on Mills and Bees – Vol. 5, p. 321
- ^ Ira Lapidus. A History of Islamic Societies. Cambridge University Press. 2002 ISBN 0-521-77056-4 p. 54
- ^ Ziyadids, G.R. Smith, The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. XI, ed. P.J. Bearman, T. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs, (Brill, 2002), p. 523
- ^ H.C. Kay, Yaman: Its early medieval history, London 1892, p. 223-4
- ^ R.B. Serjeant & R. Lewcock, San'a'; An Arabian Islamic City, London 1983, p. 55
- ^ Stanley Lane Poole, The Mohammadan Dynasties, (Elibron Classics, 2006), p. 90
- ^ H.C. Kay, Yaman: Its early medieval history, London 1892, pp. 225–7
- ^ G. Rex Smith, "Islamic Revolutionary Invasion", p. 138.
- ^ Ibn al-Dubai’, the apple of the eyes, in the auspicious news of Yemen, p. 246
- ^ Salibi, Kamal Suleiman (1980).
- ^ L’Arshi Bulugh al-Maram, p. 26
- ^ Ibn Al-Dubai’ Qarat Al-Uyoun bi Akhbar Al-Yaman Al-Ma’imun, p. 304
- ^ This is Yemen, Abdullah Al-Thawr, p. 294
- ^ Robert W. Stookey, Yemen; The politics of the Yemen Arab Republic. Boulder 1978, p. 98; H.C. Kay, Yaman: Its early medieval history, London 1892, pp. 128–9, 317
- ^ Bin Hatim, "The Expensive Scourge in the News of the Kings from the Conquest of Yemen," p. 25
- ^ Ibn Hatim Al-Samat The precious in the news of the kings from the invasion in Yemen p. 176
- ^ G. Rex Smith (1988). The Rasulids in Dhofar in the VIIth–VIIIth/XIII–XIVth centuries. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (New Series), 120, pp 26–44
- ^ Encyklopädie des Islam, III, Leiden 1936, p. 1217
- ^ R.B. Serjeant & R. Lewcock, San'a'; An Arabian Islamic City. London 1983, p. 69
- ^ R.B. Serjeant & R. Lewcock, Sana'a'; An Arabian Islamic City. London 1983, p. 70.
- ^ Gabor Agoston; Bruce Alan Masters (2009). Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire. Infobase Publishing. p. 603
- ^ R.J. Gavin, Aden under British Rule, 1839–1967. London 1975, p. 19
- ^ Amin al-Rihani Kings of the Arabs vol. 1 p. 145
- ^ Conti Rossini, Carlo, Chrestomathia Arabica meridionalis epigraphica edita et glossario instructa (1931) Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto per l'Oriente p. 55 (4th line)
- ^ Ibn Khaldun, His History, vol. 2, p. 252
- ^ Jamme, South-Arabian Inscriptions, Princeton, 1955, p. 508
- ^ Conti Rossini, Carlo, Chrestomathia Arabica meridionalis epigraphica edita et glossario instructa' ' (1931) Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto per l'Oriente p. 55 (4th line
- ^ AF/ He swayed the earth: it dried up and did not produce growth. Simple Dictionary Archived 17 January 2015 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ David Heinrich Müller and J Mordtmann,Sab?ische Denkm?ler p.116
- ^ Eduard Glaser and the South Arabian antiquities collection in Vienna " In. Wilfried Seipel (ed.), The Discovery of the World. The world of discovery. Austrian researcher, collector, adventure p.194
- ^ Fischer, Wolfdietrich & Otto Jastrow, Handbuch der arabischen Dialekte. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz p.90
- ^ Al-Mufassal, vol. 2, p. 350
- ^ Nikolaus Rhodokanakis,Altsab?ische Texte II. Nikolaus Altsab?ische Texte II p.64
- ^ Lisan Al-Arab – Ibn Manzur – Part 11 – Page 63
- ^ Le Muséon: Revue d'Etudes Orientales, 1964, 3–4, P.476
- ^ "The Tribes of Yemen: An Asset or Impediment to Stability? Part One". Archived from the original on 16 March 2020.
- ^ Yemen's Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective: Patronage and... By Sarah Phillips Archived 21 October 2014 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Yemen News Archived 2016-03-10 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Encycle. Ethnography Of Middle-East And Central Asia (3 Vols. Set) By R. Khanam p.269
- ^ a b c F. Gregory Gause.Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence p.19
- ^ Albert Jamme, inscription from Mahram Bilqis P.137
- ^ R. Khanam,Encyclopaedic Ethnography of Middle-East and Central Asia: A-I, Volume 1 p.442
- ^ W. Caskel, Entdeckungen in Arabien, Koln, 1954, S. 9
- ^ Laklil 1/90
- ^ Ibn Khaldun 2/257.
- ^ Albert Jamme. inscription from Mahram Bilqis p.137
- ^ Albert Jamme,Inscriptions from Mahram Bilqis p.164
- ^ Sabaean Insciptions from Mahram Bilqis (Marib). Professor Albert Rev Jamme p.318
- ^ Albert Jamme,Inscription from Mahram Bilqis p.169
- ^ The will of Himyar bin Saba
- ^ Blink The Companions, p. 43.
- ^ Le Museon, 1964, 3–4, Pp.457, 498
- ^ Le Museon Lxxvii, 3–4, 1964, P.429, 450, Ryckmans 535, Jamme 577, 578, 589.
- ^ The Crown of the Bride by Mortada Al-Zubaidi (2/ 73)
- ^ Kenneth Anderson Kitchen : Documentation for Ancient Arabia . Part I:. Chronological Framework and Historical Sources Liverpool University Press, Liverpool 1994, ISBN 0-85323-359-4 (The World of Ancient Arabia Series).
- ^ Jawad Ali, Al-Mufassal fi Tarikh al-Arab before Islam Part 2 p. 519
- ^ Jawad Ali Al-Mufassal, vol. 2, p. 519
- ^ Le Muséon: Revue d'Études Orientales 1964 3–4 p.477
- ^ Le Muséon: Revue d’Études Orientales 1964 3–4 p.451
- ^ Le Muséon: Revue d'Études Orientales 1964 3–4 p.465
- ^ a description of the Arabian Peninsula. – Al-Hamdani Verified by: Muhammad bin Ali Al-Akwa’ Al-Hawali Publisher: Al-Irshad Library – Sana’a
- ^ Joseph Halévy, Sur Une Mission Archéologique Dans Le Yémen (1872) p.205
- ^ Nihayat al-Arb by al-Qalqashandi, Manuscript Q29 – 1
- ^ Ibn Khaldun "2/257"
- ^ Sarah Phillips. Yemen's democracy experiment in regional perspective: patronage and pluralized authoritarianism p.97
- ^ De Lacy O'Leary,Arabia before Muhammad p.18
- ^ Muruj Gold (1/300).
- ^ enc. Vol. 2, p. 655, Werner Caskel, die bedouinen in der geschichite der araber, s. 13
- ^ The book "Al-Kamil fi Al-Tarikh" by Ibn Al-Atheer, Volume Four, pp. 145 to 153 ("Mention of the Pledge of Allegiance to Marwan Ibn Al-Hakam" and "Mention of the Battle of Marj Rahit and the Killing of Al-Dahhak Ibn Qays"), Dar Sader – Beirut – 1979.
- ^ PHILBY, H. ST. John B. – THE LAND OF SHEBA London: Royal Geographical Society, 1938 p.451
- ^ Ayoub Sabri Pasha (1999). Mirror of the Arabian Peninsula (in Arabic) (fourteenth ed.). Dar Al-Afaq Al-Arabiyya. p. 233.
- ^ Salah Al-Bakri (2001). Political History of Hadhramaut (in Arabic) (first ed.). Egypt: Cairo: Dar Al-Afaq Al-Arabiya. p. 111.
- ^ On the authority of Abdullah bin Al-Abbas – may God be pleased with him – that a man asked the Prophet about Sheba: “Whether it is legs, a woman, or land?” He said, “Rather, he is a man who had ten children. Six of them lived in Yemen, and four of them lived in the Levant. As for the Yemenis: Madhhij, Kinda, Azd, Ash’ariyyun, Anmar, and Himyar, and as for the Levantine people: Lakhm, Judham, Amila, and Ghassan.” Al-Hakim said: This is a hadith with an authentic chain of narration, but they did not narrate it. It was narrated by Imam Ahmad in Al-Musnad (1/316), and Al-Hakim in Al-Mustadrak (2/459), and it was witnessed by the hadith of Farwah bin Masik Al-Muradi.
- ^ Omar Reda Kahla (1966). Geography of the Arabian Peninsula. p. 328.
- ^ Muhammad Abdel Qader Bafaqih (2007). Unification of ancient Yemen (in Arabic) (first ed.). Yemen: French Institute of Archeology and Social Sciences. p. 130.
- ^ Abu Muhammad al-Hasan al-Hamdani (1987). Al-Akleel from Yemen News and Himyar Genealogy (in Arabic) (first ed.). Beirut: Dar Al-Manahil. p. 298.
- ^ Abu Al-Mundhir Hisham bin Al-Sa’ib Al-Kalbi (1988). Lineage of Ma'ad and the Great Yemen (in Arabic) (first ed.). Beirut: Dar Alam Al-Kutub. p. 298.
- ^ Abdullah Al-Nakhibi (1999). The shining planet in what was neglected in young history (in Arabic) (first ed.). Dar Al-Andalus Al-Khadraa. p. 20.
- ^ Abdul-Ilah Salem Al-Dubai (2010). Social life and aspects of civilization in Saru Himyar, Yafa' (in Arabic) (first ed.). University of California. p. 47.
- ^ Muhammad Ahmed Muqbil Al-Faisaly (2005). History of the Tahirid State, 858 AH-945 AH (in Arabic) (first ed.). Indiana University, USA: General Book Authority, Dar Al-Kutub. p. 185.
- ^ Hamed Abi Bakr Al-Mihdhar (1983). The leader, Mr. Al-Habib Hussein bin Hamid Al-Mihdhar and the Qaiti Sultanate (in Arabic) (first ed.). University of California, USA: World of Knowledge. p. 36.
- ^ Muhammad Issa Salehia (2007). Westernization of Arab Heritage (in Arabic) (first ed.). Dar Al-Hadithah. p. 77.
- ^ Karama Mubarak Suleiman Bammen (2000). Thought and Society in Hadramaut, Republic of Yemen (in Arabic) (first ed.). Indiana University, USA: Karama Mubarak Suleiman Bammen. p. 201.
- ^ Ibrahim Al-Muqahfi (1985). Dictionary of Yemeni Countries and Tribes, Part Two (in Arabic) (first ed.). Dar Al-Kalima for Publishing and Distribution. p. 1343.
- ^ Mr. Abdul Rahman bin Ubaid Allah Al-Saqqaf. Sustenance in knowing the history of the Hadhramaut tribes (in Arabic) (first ed.). p. 50.
- ^ Abdul Rahman Al-Debaa. Thanks for more on the beneficiary's intention in the news of the city of Zabid (in Arabic) (first ed.). Center for Political and Strategic Studies – Research Center. p. 114.
- ^ Abdul Hakim Saleh Abdullah Al Amiri (2006). The book of Sultan Badr bin Abdullah bin Jaafar Al-Kathiri, known as Abu Tuwayriq (in Arabic) (first ed.). Tarim Studies and Publishing. p. 101.
- ^ Ibn Hussein, Muhammad bin Saad, edition (1984). The impact of the call of Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab on literature and thought in the southern Arabian Peninsula (in Arabic). Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University, Saudi Arabia. p. 107.
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) - ^ Abi Abd al-Rahman al-Madhaji (2019). Ithaf al-Rutut in Abbreviation and Indexing of Coffin Goods (in Arabic) (First ed.). p. 115.
- ^ Sarah Phillips, Yemen's democracy experiment in regional perspective: patronage and pluralized authoritarianism p.92
- ^ By Fred Halliday.Revolution and Foreign Policy: The Case of South Yemen, 1967–1987 p.215
- ^ Chart: The Awlaki Tribes Archived 10 February 2017 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ The Palace and the Diwan, p. 16
- ^ Daniel M. Corstange¬ (10) Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Lebanon and Yemen¬ A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Political Science)¬ The University of Michigan¬2008¬ P. 131. note No. 9.
- ^ Fadl Abu Ghanem, The Tribal Structure in Yemen between Continuity and Change, Damascus, 1985, pp. 47–76
- ^ "The Palace and the Court, p. 16"
- ^ Informal actors in Yemen, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, April 2010, The tribe is an informal actor, p. 39. -42
- ^ Social, cultural, economic and political conditions in Hadhramaut 1918–1945 AD" Abdullah Al-Jaidi, (p. 25)
- ^ The tribal structure in Yemen between continuity and change" by Fadl Abu Ghanem, (pp. 213–214)
- ^ Customs and Traditions in Al-Ahqaf" by Abdul Qadir Al-Sabban (p. 40)
- ^ Social segments" by Al-Sharabi (p. 61 )
- ^ Al-Qasr and Al-Diwan, p. 21
- ^ D. Sayyed Salem, the book "Yemeni Documents: A Historical Documentary Study”, Al-Fanni Press, Cairo, 2nd Edition, 1985
- ^ Sinan Abu Lahoum, Facts and Documents I Lived, Part Three, Al-Afif Cultural Foundation, Sana’a, 2006, pp. 164 – 165
- ^ Informal actors in Yemen, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, April 2010, The Tribe is an Unofficial Actor
- ^ R. B. Serjeant, Dawlah, Tribal Shaykhs, the Mansab of the Waliyyah Saidah, qasamah, in the Fadli Sultanate, South Arabian Federation, in Mooawiyah Ibrahim (ed), Arabian Ltritur in Honor of Mahmoud Ghul, Wiesbaden: Harassowitz, 2001, p. 135.
- ^ Fadl Abu Ghanem, structure Tribalism in Yemen between Continuity and Change, Damascus, 1985, p. 206
- ^ Muhammad Mohsen Al-Dhaheri, Tribe and Political Pluralism in Yemen, PhD thesis, pp. 297–298
- ^ The Palace and the Diwan, p. 20
- ^ Abdul Rahman bin Muhammad bin Khaldun, Introduction to Ibn Khaldun, Dar Al-Qalam, Beirut, 1981, p. 209
- ^ "The 1994 Yemen War: Causes and Consequences,” prepared by Jamal Sanad Al-Suwaidi, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Chapter Two: The Tribal Factor in the Yemeni Crisis, pp. 39–44
- ^ Book: “Determinants Internal and external affairs for political stability in Yemen (1990–2010 AD)” Master's thesis, Saleh Nasser Jashan 2012 AD.
- ^ Abdul-Wasa’i bin Yahya al-Wasa’i, History of Yemen, Yemeni House for Publishing and Distribution., Sana’a, pp. 322–323
- ^ Varisco and Adra¬ op. cit¬ p 139.
- ^ Paul Dresch¬ The Rules of Barat: Tribal Documents from Yemen, Center Francais d Archeologie et de Scienees Cociales, Deutsches Archaologisches Institute, Sanaa, 2006. p. 5.
- ^ Shelagh Weir¬ Tribe¬ Hejrah and Madinah in North -West Yemen¬ in Kenneth Brown¬ Michele Jole¬ Peter Sluglettand Sami Zubaida (eds)¬ Middle Eastern Cities in Comparative Perspective¬ London¬ Ithaca Press¬ 1986
- ^ The Social Segments of Al-Sharjabi (p. 230)
- ^ Social segments" by Al-Sharjabi (p. 259)
- ^ "And Change" by Fadel Abu Ghanem (p. 193)
- ^ Black is not thought beautiful The Economist Archived July 15, 2017, at the Wayback Machine
- ^ a b Dr Z H Kour, Z.H. Kou,The History of Aden p.51
- ^ History of Ibn Khaldun, vol. 4, p. 218
- ^ a b The History of Aden p.49
- ^ Here Amsterdam Accessed July 14, 2014 Archived 19 June 2013 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Book: “Internal and External Determinants of Political Stability in Yemen (1990–2010 AD)” Master's Thesis, Saleh Nasser Jashan 2012 AD. The second section: Social determinants, p. 66
- ^ The Invention of the Jewish People By Shlomo Sand p.193
- ^ Turkey's Influence Divides Yemenis Farea Al-Muslami al-Monitor Archived 2017-02-18 at the Wayback Machine
- '^ The marginalized' look forward to justice in the Yemen dialogue Al Jazeera Net, accessed February 26, 2013 Archived 2013-11-09 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Robert W. Stookey, Yemen: The politics of the Yemen Arab Republic, 1978, p. 116
- ^ El-Khazraji, The pearl-strings: A history of the Resuliyy Dynasty of Yemen, Vols. I-V, Leiden & London 1906–1918.
- ^ Symposium on the Political Role of Tribes in Yemen, Abdul Bari Taher
- ^ Bin Aboud: The tribe in Yemen is like a reserve army Mareb Press History Accessed November 27, 2012 Archived 6 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Yemen's Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective: Patronage and By Sarah Phillips p.89
- ^ Thomas Jerholm, Formation of Traditional Society, Internal and External Factors
- ^ Harold F. Yacoub, Aden and South Yemen in the Kings of the Arabs, translated by Ahmed Al-Madhawi, Damascus, first edition, 1967, p. 45
- ^ The Palace and the Diwan "The Political Role For the tribe in Yemen," a group of researchers, Sana’a, 2009, p. 6
- ^ Tribal Governance Nadwa Al-Dosari Accessed August 15, 2013 Archived 6 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Hotspot Has Spring Passed By? Al Jazeera Channel Accessed August 10, 2013 Archived 11 October 2016 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Stephen W. Day,Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union p.151
- ^ Ali Muhammad al-Ulafi, Yemeni Texts, pp. 172 – 175
- ^ Adel Mujahid Al-Sharjabi, Urbanization and Tribal Structure in Yemen, previous reference, pp. 206–219
- ^ Ali Muhammad Al-Ulafi, Yemeni Texts, previous reference, pp. 215–222
- ^ Abdullah bin Hussein Al-Ahmar, A Program for National Action and Governance Reform, Yemeni Printing and Publishing Company, Sana’a, 1937 AD, pp. 3–23
- ^ Sana'a, second edition, 2006, pp. 380–382
- ^ a b About a Yemeni citizen with the powers of a president: Ibrahim Al-Hamdi and the power of example Farea Al-Muslimi to the Lebanese As-Safir newspaper Archived 6 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ F. Gregory Gause. Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence p.112
- ^ Peter J. Chelkowski,Ideology and Power in the Middle East: Studies in Honor of George Lenczowski p.234
- ^ Stephen W. Day,Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union p.126
- ^ W. Andrew Terrill,The Conflicts in Yemen and U.S. National Securityp.17
- ^ Noel Brehony, Yemen Divided: The Story of a Failed State in South Arabia p.77
- ^ a b Ahmed Saleh ALafqih, “Restructuring the Army and Security Forces, the Solution to the Mubarakah,” Mareb Press, accessed February 28, 2013 .php?id=19460&lng=arabic Archived 6 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Sinan Abu Lahoum, "Yemen is Facts and Documents I Lived", Part Two, Al-Afif Cultural Foundation, Sana’a, second edition, 2006, pp. 380–382
- ^ a b Yemen Corruption, Capital Flight and Global Drivers of Conflict Chatham House's report last retrieved Dec 8 2013 /files/public/Research/Middle%20East/0913r_yemen.pdf Archived 8 October 2013 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ James L. Gelvin The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know p.69
- ^ Muriel Mirak-Weissbach Madmen at the Helm p.2
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- ^ a b Sarah Phillips Yemen's Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective P.96 Palgrave Macmillan, 2008 ISBN 0-230-61648-8
- ^ http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10276 Archived 19 October 2017 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ a b The palace and the court: the political role of the tribe in Yemen p. 32
- ^ "The Socialist Net – Text of Dr. Adel Al-Sharjabi's paper presented to the National Conference, "Yemen, Where to?". Archived from the original on 15 February 2015. Retrieved 15 February 2015.
- ^ Education in Yemen: An Undeclared Emergency Field Farea Al-Muslimi to Al-Safir Al-Arabi Archived 5 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Tribes Still Rule in Yemen By: Farea al-Muslimi for Al-Monitor Posted on October 10 /2013/10/yemen-tribes-revolution-politics-saleh.html Archived 21 October 2016 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Sarah Phillips,Yemen's Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective: Patronage and Pluralized Authoritarianism p.89
- ^ Transformations in the Map of the Distribution of Political Power of the Yemeni Tribes Lebanese Al-Safir Al-Arabi Newspaper Accessed August 30, 2013 Archived 10 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ "Yemen...The Revolution and the War until 1970 AD," Edgar Oplance, Madbouly Library – Cairo – 1990AD, p. 186
- ^ The Palace and the Diwan, "The Political Role of the Tribe in Yemen," a group of researchers headed by Dr. Adel Mujahid Al-Sharjabi, Sana’a, 2009, The Military Character of the Tribes, p. 84
- ^ "The Military History of Yemen 1839–1967 AD)," Sultan Naji, p. 256
- ^ Sharif Ismail, op. sit, p. 33.
- ^ Zaid bin Ali Al-Wazir, An Attempt to Understand the Yemeni Problem, Al-Resala Foundation, Dr. B, 1971, p. 152
- ^ Abdul Wali Al-Shamiri, One Thousand Hours of War, Al-Yusr Library, Sana’a, second edition., 1995, p. 72
- ^ Memoirs of Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein Al-Ahmar, p. 461
- ^ "Witness to the Age Program, "From the Imami to the Republic as Seen by Mohsen Al-Aini," Episode Six, Thursday 11/24/1425 AH". Archived from the original on 6 March 2016. Retrieved 20 January 2024.
- ^ "Toll hits 200 in battle with Qaeda for Yemen town". CNN. 12 April 2012. Archived from the original on 30 January 2016. Retrieved 13 April 2012.
- ^ 31 dead in Yemen fighting with Qaeda
- ^ Five people killed in a clash between al-Qaeda fighters and a militia in Yemen Archived 21 June 2017 at the Wayback Machine
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- ^ Edgar Oblans, previous reference, p. 192
- ^ See Muhammad An'am Ghalib, "Yemen, Land and People: The Economics of Yemen", Beirut, second edition, 1966, p. 60
- ^ See the intervention of Sultan Naji in the Symposium on Contemporary Yemen, Arab Future Magazine, Beirut, Issue 62, April 1984, p. 182
- ^ The Palace and the Diwan "The Role" “Politics of the Tribe in Yemen," a group of researchers headed by Dr. Adel Mujahid Al-Sharjabi, Sanaa, 2009, The Military Character of the Tribes, p. 85
- ^ Derek B. Miller, Demand, Stockpiles, and Social Controls: Small Weapons in Yemen, the Graduate Institute of International Studies, A publication of the Small Arms Survey, Occasional Paper, No. (9), Geneva, May 2003, p. 28.
- ^ Mohamed Mohsen Al Dhaheri, pp. 127–137
- ^ Adel Mujahid Al-Sharjabi, Urbanization and Tribal Structure in Yemen, pp. 196–221
- ^ Video, the American bombing of the Radaa region, in video The American bombing of the Radaa area, Marib Press, accessed 7 February 2013 on YouTube
- ^ Sarah Philips Yemen's Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective p.100
- ^ "Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Internal Structures and Foreign Influence” (1990) Gregory Goss, [[Columbia University] Press] page 26
- ^ Fred Halliday,Revolution and Foreign Policy: The Case of South Yemen, 1967–1987 p.278
- ^ F. Gregory Gause. Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence p.121
- ^ F. Gregory Gause. Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence p.112
- ^ Ginny Hill and Gerd Nonneman, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States: Elite Politics, Street Protests and Regional Diplomacy p.9
- ^ Bernard Haykel,Saudi Arabia's Yemen Dilemma Foreign Policy magazine last retrieved DEC 12 2012 Archived 30 March 2015 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Sinan Abu Lahm "Yemen: Facts and Documents I Lived Through,” Part Two, p. 146
- ^ a b c A Saudi Disaster Story: Yemen's Unity by Force Washington Post last retrieved 30 aug 2013 Archived 2 August 2017 at the Wayback Machine