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Mearsheimer critique

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Mearsheimer views on Russian war are widely criticized - you could read it in John Mearsheimer if it would not be removed [1] . Thus Mearsheimer assessments here should be followed with assessments of his assessments. Which would make all of it too much for this article. Better to not to have Mearsheimer at all.

This is regarding latest edits [2] . ManyAreasExpert (talk) 16:28, 11 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I'm perfectly happy with including criticisms of Mearsheimer. That would be balanced. What I don't want is the total exclusion of Mearsheimer altogether, which was the previous consensus position for the article. The man is one of the most well-known, oft-discussed political scientists in the modern era. To dismiss him altogether simply because he doesn't tout the "Russia-bad" narrative editors here seem to endorse is a blatant violation of neutrality.
"Which would make all of it too much for this article" let's be honest, this is just a rationalization to avoid including anything which could give the appearance of criticism of Ukraine/NATO. It wouldn't be "too much" for the article, you could fit in his position and counters to it within one or two sentences. The POV pushing in this topic area is remarkable. JDiala (talk) 18:41, 11 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The sentence referencing Mearsheimer doesn't even require criticism. It's non-controversial. Chino-Catane (talk) 06:22, 12 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
It is simultaneously the case that Mearsheimer is a significantly notable enough commentator that his analysis should be included; and that Mearsheimer's analysis on Ukraine has been widely criticized as being absolutely bunk. So no, it would not be better to not have him at all, unless we cannot do so without giving him undue weight or shielding from criticism; in which case it would actually be better. It's much the same as we should be doing for every other formerly respected academic who subsequently dived face-first into the "crank" pool (e.g. Theodore Postol on Syria) ⇒SWATJester Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat! 19:28, 11 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Either way fits the rules. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 19:40, 11 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Several of your sources are incredibly low-quality. One is some random from the Ayn Rand Institute (lol). One is a journalist without professional scholarly background (Katie Stallard). One is Carl Liles, some random unknown master's student from the University of Tartu (also lol). The others are more respected --- but of course scholarly disagreements between respected scholars are not unusual. While Mearsheimer does have provocative views on many topics, there is no evidence indicating he's regarded as a "crank." JDiala (talk) 20:59, 11 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I disagree with your assessment, but if what you're pushing for is for Mearsheimer's views to be included, then they have to come with appropriately sufficient context for how widely criticized he's been in the context of Ukraine, which may be more than just fitting in his position and counters to it within one or two sentences. To not do so would be giving his position undue weight and be just as blatant of a violation of neutrality as the one you were complaining about above. If we can't do that, then they shouldn't be there at all. ⇒SWATJester Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat! 23:08, 11 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
If you think it's a due weight issue, a full survey of the field might be in order. I personally don't have the time to carry it out, but there are others active on this TP who have the wherewithal. RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 00:04, 12 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Better sources: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Irrespective of controversies over his larger framework, Mearsheimer's specific thesis on the Ukraine invasion (that it was the West's fault because Putin was trying to negotiate in good faith, and it could have been avoided with a pledge to keep Ukraine out of NATO) is shared by very few other scholars.
Actually, I think the page currently leans too far in the Realist direction by exclusively discussing military and diplomatic history in the "background" and "prelude" sections. Liberal researchers like Timothy Snyder argue that the invasion resulted from ideological and political evolutions within Russia itself, not just relations between Russia and other powers. GordonGlottal (talk) 22:55, 11 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
So why not mention this in 1-2 sentences? Chino-Catane (talk) 06:36, 12 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
In other words, this author is telling [3] that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia was fully justified, and that the justification was one provided by Putin. Author does not hide that his view is contrary to the mainstream views on this subject. Moreover, he is saying obvious nonsense, such as Putin was not bent on the occupation of Ukraine. How come when Russia has officially annexed all these territories (and Crimea) and included them to Russian Federation? This is such an obvious WP:FRINGE or propaganda. So, I am saying this page is not a proper place for including WP:FRINGE and debunking it. Only page Disinformation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine is. My very best wishes (talk) 20:39, 11 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
It's not WP:FRINGE. The viewpoint that NATO expansion bears some degree of responsibility for the war is a minority view, but not totally outside the mainstream discourse. JDiala (talk) 21:22, 11 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Speaking on the essence of this (and as described in many sources), Ukraine had absolutely zero chance to be accepted to NATO before the invasion, and Putin knew it. And even now, it has very low chance to be accepted to NATO. My very best wishes (talk) 21:31, 11 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
"Putin knew it": A living political figure's private thoughts and what they "knew" are generally not regarded as productive avenues of academic research. Chino-Catane (talk) 07:22, 12 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Russo-Ukrainian War started in 2014. A new state during a war and with an unresolved territorial dispute could not be accepted to NATO. Everyone knew it, not just Putin. In fact, by starting the low-intensity conflict in 2014, Putin effectively prevented Ukraine from accession to NATO. Putin is also well aware that NATO will not attack Russia. That's why he withdraw nearly all Russian forces from the border with Finland and sent them to Ukraine. My very best wishes (talk) 15:12, 12 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
"out of place and undue on this page": I don't see how it is "out of place and undue" to include a short section presenting motives for invasion in an article titled "Russian invasion of Ukraine". It seems that you have a problem with a particular individual. What is your qualm with the sentence, "Neorealist scholar John Mearsheimer assigned the root cause of the invasion to a U.S.-led effort to develop Ukraine into a liberal democracy and integrate it into the EU and NATO."? Chino-Catane (talk) 07:12, 12 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I am not opposed to including some content on the subject of "Why Putin invaded Ukraine", but it should be focused on mainstream views, for example as summarized by the Institute for the Study of War, i.e. [4]. If this will be just a brief summary, then Mearsheimer simply does not belong there per WP:FRINGE.
According to ISW:
Russian President Vladimir Putin didn’t invade Ukraine in 2022 because he feared NATO. He invaded because he believed that NATO was weak, that his efforts to regain control of Ukraine by other means had failed, and that installing a pro-Russian government in Kyiv would be safe and easy. His aim was not to defend Russia against some non-existent threat but rather to expand Russia’s power, eradicate Ukraine’s statehood, and destroy NATO, goals he still pursues.
This is mainstream view on this subject.My very best wishes (talk) 16:04, 12 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I tried to include it (and was reverted), but it is indeed a question how exactly this should be framed on the page. My very best wishes (talk) 18:17, 12 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
How is the sentence, "Neorealist scholar John Mearsheimer assigned the root cause of the invasion to a U.S.-led effort to develop Ukraine into a liberal democracy and integrate it into the EU and NATO.", even remotely controversial, especially when it is immediately followed by the presentation of a perspective that is probably praised by most of the editors of this article? There does not need to be any critical assessment whatsoever of that first sentence. Your suggestion that the presentation of a single individual's very reasonable view requires an "assessment of the assessment" is utterly ridiculous. Chino-Catane (talk) 06:20, 12 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
If nothing else, even using the label “realist” or “neorealist” without proper context and explanation is kind of POV, since it implies those that disagree with him are “unrealistic” (in practice of course the exactly the opposite turned out to be true) Volunteer Marek 07:32, 12 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I'm sorry, this is ridiculous. These are schools of thought in international relations. A link to the page on realism or neorealism is adequate context for the correct meaning of these words. JDiala (talk) 19:54, 12 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I don't think it's ridiculous. It's not clear to me whether he's a "realist" or "neorealist", or what he's more often referred to in sources as an "offensive realist"; so just applying the label without context, even with a wikilink, doesn't really tell me anything about *why* Mearsheimer is associated with those schools of thought, or why the label is relevant to this article (which is not actually about Mearsheimer anyway). ⇒SWATJester Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat! 21:35, 12 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Agree with providing more descriptive description or omitting those narrow academic terms. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 22:11, 12 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I will remove this and we can discuss the wording here. Slatersteven (talk) 09:55, 12 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I'm looking at the structure and wording of the edit. I think if we want a section about the motivation behind the invasion, we can't start by immediately mentioning Mearsheimer's view, as he is a controversial figure. This would be WP:UNDUE and WP:FRINGE. We would need at least some sort of introduction describing the landscape of such discussions. As mentioned by other editors, a lot of this is discussed in the article Disinformation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which talks about all of the justifications used (often contradictory) by Russia. BeŻet (talk) 09:28, 15 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Spelling mistake in image description

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Could someone please fix the spelling mistake in the caption for the image of the Normandy format meeting, only is misspelt as "onyl". The caption is as follows:

"Negotiations for conflict resolution started in 2014, with the Normandy Format facilitating meetings until just before the fullscale invasion, facilitating in 9, December 2019 a meeting between President Zelensky and President Putin for the first and 'onyl' time"

Thank you :) 1mikeymouse1 (talk) 13:11, 16 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Fixed. Slatersteven (talk) 13:15, 16 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Misrepresentation of WP:ONUS

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@TylerBurden: Your recent revert is in fact having nothing to do with WP:ONUS. It is true that that the onus is on those wanting inclusion to gain consensus for inclusion. This does not mean that the intermediate, temporary version as there is an ongoing discussion must be your version. For that, the norm is to maintain the status quo, see WP:STATUSQUO.

It is important for you to understand that the point of this is to discuss. This is how consensus is built on this encyclopedia. This is how editing disputes are resolved. You are not actually participating in any discussion, and haven't been involved in any discussion here since June 30th. This is not really in the spirit of the collaboration.

In addition, per administrator ScottishFinnishRadish you do in fact need consensus to remove established long-standing material, notwithstanding some contradictory-seeming policies. JDiala (talk) 23:44, 16 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

This paragraph should go (agree with TylerBurden) because it is not about relations between former Soviet republics (the subject of the section), but about their relations with NATO. Hence this should be removed or made a different (sub)section. My very best wishes (talk) 02:00, 17 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
There are two separate issues being raised here: STATUSQUO and NOCON. One of these is a policy, the other an essay. The opening sentence of NOCON is [w]hat happens when a good faith discussion concludes with no agreement to take or not take an action? I can stop here as we have a significant problem. We're dealing with Schrodinger's discussion. That is that the discussion has simultaneously concluded and is on-going depending on which state suits someone's purposes. NOCON only applies to the former state. If the discussion has concluded:
There are four editors – Manyareasexpert, My very best wishes, TylerBurden, and myself – contesting the material. Two identified that sources were used in a manner that constitutes original research; one has partially agreed excepting for material with immediately obvious relevance to the article irrespective of source age. There are two editors – ChinoCatane and yourself – whose position is contingent on the consistency of application of policy. Assuming that this was a compromise position and that the contingent factor has not been met, then we have two editors supporting retention.
All else being equal, the discussion ends with a super-majority (2:1) of editors supporting removal.
STATUSQUO is an essay. It does not represent a widely accepting community norm, per WP:GUIDES. There isn't an issue with citing it, but policy has priority. The policy being sought here is WP:PRESERVE which instructs that editors retain material that has flaws that would otherwise be included anyway without them. However, that policy applies to material that is neutral, verifiable, and free of original research. Given the preceding, the material is not subject to preservation. It can be removed. Mr rnddude (talk) 08:16, 17 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Now what? Compile a selection of sources on the Russian invasion of Ukraine that provide background coverage on NATO-Russia / NATO-Ukraine relations and an analysis on their impact leading up to the invasion. Write a paragraph or dedicated section about it from those sources. Mr rnddude (talk) 08:16, 17 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
@Mr rnddude: It is true that STATUSQUO is an essay, but it is also not the main argument I'm using. The main argument is NOCON. Supplementary to that main argument were two auxiliary arguments, namely (1) STATUSQUO, and (2) a discussion with an administrator, SFR, who appeared to take my side which you can see in the link provided. It is misleading to suggest that STATUSQUO "does not represent a widely accepting community norm." If you read WP:GUIDES carefully, it only indicates that essays may not be supported by widespread consensus. Your assertion may or may not be true. Your discussion on WP:PRESERVE may be an argument for removing the material (which you could utilize in a discussion) but it doesn't justify reverting during an ongoing discussion. Anyways, as I've already told you, your views on OR are quite fringe. We don't really agree that using pre-2022 sources is OR; that is a point of contention, although again I have been cooperative with respect to trying to find compromises.
The prior discussion did not conclude, and a vote count does not imply consensus has been established. There was a legitimate concern I respectfully brought up in the end of the discussion that you did not respond to or engage with. This isn't a "Schrodinger's discussion"; this is a simple case of you not responding, and thus me concluding that a discussion has not concluded. I want to be clear that I do intend to be cooperative and fair, keeping in mind that my position is currently the minority position. I have no doubt that we can have a positive and constructive conclusion to this discussion. If you read my objections carefully, I am not even objecting entirely to the edit, rather merely suggesting a compromise.
We should also be careful to bifurcate the issues at hand here. The first is the actual content dispute. The second is the specific issue of whether TylerBurden's revert was justifiable. On the second point, I do not think TylerBurden's conduct is remotely defensible. In general, if there is an ongoing discussion going on about disputed content, it is not considered appropriate for an uninvolved editor to revert to his or her preferred version without participating at all in the discussion. TylerBurden has not even wrote anything on this talk page in all of July. His revert does not seem to me in the spirit of collaboration, which is what the policies we are debating are anyways intended to facilitate. JDiala (talk) 10:14, 17 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
My views on OR are mainstream, that you are ignorant of it does not change that. You may not use sources that do not discuss an article subject to make claims about the article subject. Present that statement to any admin you like, they will tell you some variant of: no shit. I've been ignoring your casting of the term fringe because they are frankly so off-base that they are not remotely worth debating. Since you are absolutely insistent upon it, fringe has a specific meaning on Wikipedia that relates to the presentation of views in Wikipedia articles that depart significantly from the mainstream. It is inapplicable to editor interpretation of policies and guidelines.
If you haven't noticed, you are consistently finding yourself in disputes with other editors because of problems like this. I have no issue discussing any material within the article with you, but you need to stop lecturing highly experienced editors. Your approach does not appear collaborative to most editors, but combative.
I ignore some of what you write because any uninvolved, experienced editor would realise that it is wrong. For example, I would ignore your 'not a democracy' point as my assessment was more than a vote count as any editor can identify. I presented specifically used arguments and afforded them due weight. I treated the arguments with equal weight – I doubt most editors would – and only then did I assess that there is a clear majority position. You've misrepresented that as a straight vote count. This doesn't appear to me to be a good faith approach. I have skipped over other such errors because if I dissect every line this will be a wall of information. If desired, I can do that and post it to your talk page to read.
Lastly, the reason I haven't responded to your concern is that I am not available every day to edit. The last thing I wrote was: if you have an NPOV concern, I can give it consideration. I have not edited the material further. Recognising the present situation, I have proposed the least conflict ridden path forward. If you want to fight other editors over that paragraph, be my guest. If you want to move the article forward, re-read my 'now what?' comment. Figure out what hills are worth fighting for, and which should just be retreated from. Mr rnddude (talk) 12:09, 17 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
@Mr rnddude: I do not think your OR views are mainstream. As brought up previously by Chino and I, virtually all other articles, including GA articles and homepage-linked articles, on current events allow for sources published pre-event in the background section. You can insist they're all wrong and GA articles are actually all bad (which is the argument you employed previously). Maybe you can make your case, but you cannot pretend it's mainstream. Definitionally, it's not mainstream if other articles (often edited by folks even more experienced than you) do not do this.
"Fringe" is an adjective in the English language, roughly translating to anything not clearly in the mainstream. I'm using the word in a generic English language sense, not in reference to the Wikipedia policy WP:FRINGE. This should be evident from me not capitalizing the word or appending the prefix "WP:" to the word. In general, whenever there is a law or a policy, there could be a range of interpretations to that policy. Some are mainstream interpretations. Others are less mainstream interpretations. I am using the adjective "fringe" in reference to what I consider your less mainstream interpretation.
Bringing up "combative" is funny. Let's compare our comments. You use profanity like "no shit". I use collaborative words like "compromise" and "respectfully." Who's really the combative one? The suggestion I had was simple and reasonable. If you are removing material based on it supposedly being based on an outdated source, it is probably a good idea to check if material you are removing can be substantiated by newer sources first.
Before we discuss moving forward, I will actually take up your offer on discussing the OR interpretation with an administrator. I was evidently too generous conceding compromises before actually even being confident that your position is a legitimate one. I will make a post on SFR's talk page. JDiala (talk) 23:55, 17 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Update on the last point: I was told by SFR to move the discussion to WP:NORN, which I have done. This question of OR really ought to get resolved before we move forward. JDiala (talk) 00:42, 18 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
You can insist they're all wrong and GA articles are actually all bad (which is the argument you employed previously) - This is false. I have never said that all GA articles are wrong or that they are bad. This doesn't qualify even as a strawman as that would require the presence of straw. I said – repeating for the benefit of passers-by – that just because a GA does something that does not mean that it is endorsed by policy. The argument should not rest on other content (essay) alone. The GAs that Chino-Catane cited passed the process fifteen (15) years ago. They are not representative of the process in 2024. I have contributed to both the GAN and the FAC process both as a writer and a reviewer. I used to be actively involved in both, but have turned my attention elsewhere with my limited editing time. I am averse to having that time wasted by – in the politest terms I can muster – such poor quality engagement. This spat will not lead to the article improving. I am aware of the NORN discussion, and have posted there as well. That matter is now in the hands of other editors. Mr rnddude (talk) 06:06, 18 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Absolutely. To replace the first sentence, for example, one can use
Putin's War on Ukraine - Google Books
Russia subsequently prosecuted a military intervention in Crimea and Donbas in order to create a Georgia-style frozen conflict that would preclude NATO membership. This limited military intervention did not change the course of Ukrainian foreign policy, as Ukraine repealed its neutral non-bloc status in December 2014 and constitutionally enshrined EU and NATO membership as a strategic goal in February 2019. The collapse of Russian soft power in Ukraine, which was illustrated by opinion surveys showing less than 20% of Ukrainians with positive views of Russia31 and the inability of the pro-Russian Opposition Bloc—Party for Peace and Development to challenge for power, restricted Moscow’s non-military options. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 09:25, 17 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
... or
Ukraine and Russia - Google Books
The year 2008 saw two pivotal events: the Bucharest NATO sum mit and Russia’s invasion of Georgia. At the Bucharest summit, NATO declined to offer Ukraine and Georgia Membership Action Plans but said that they could eventually join. Depending on one’s view, this com promise was either a concession to Russia’s concerns or an aggressive move to which it felt compelled to respond. Similarly, whether Georgia’s actions justified it being invaded by Russia was highly debatable. While both the United States and European Union were appalled by Russia’s actions, both made concrete efforts to put the episode behind them. In pursuing a “reset,” the new Obama administration was accused of appeasement and naivete, and the strategy brought few results.
The themes highlighted in Chapter 1 were all dramatically on view between 2005 and 2010. The security dilemma in central Europe was exemplified by the Bucharest summit: Ukraine and Georgia, fearing Russia, sought a formal alliance with NATO; NATO, worried about both those states but also about Russia’s reaction, tried to have it both ways – acceding to Russia’s opposition while reassuring Ukraine and Georgia – but even this was insufficient to assuage Russia’s fears of an intolerable loss. Mutually incompatible notions of the status quo exacerbated the security dilemma. For Russia, the perception after 2004 that Ukraine had been lost stoked resentment and determination to redress the problem. ManyAreasExpert (talk) 09:39, 17 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Welcome to include any of this or some parts of the removed text. This content is relevant because not accepting Ukraine to NATO left it vulnerable to attack by Russia (unlike Baltic Republics). This only needs to be well sourced, and the relevance to the subject of the page should be clear, e.g. as appears in this diff [5]. My very best wishes (talk) 15:12, 17 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
not accepting Ukraine to NATO left it vulnerable to attack by Russia. Hell no. Russia would likely attack Ukraine even sooner should it see an increased risk of NATO infrastructure getting closer to its borders. Besides, in 2008, much of the Ukrainian military command was on Russian payroll, and Russia had a 100% visibility into, and much influence over, the flow of security information there. To include these UA structures in NATO information sharing mechanisms would be a suicide, nobody at NATO was ready for such a risk. Add to that the fact that Georgia attacked Russian troops first in Tskhinvali against NATO principles and explicit US advice (that's why nobody at NATO offered support beyond lip service) – and you start seeing that the outcomes of the Bucharest summit were only reasonable. Let's just follow the books and focus on facts and not OR-type what-ifs. — kashmīrī TALK 18:51, 17 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
"not accepting Ukraine to NATO left it vulnerable to attack by Russia". Well, this is actually a well known claim by many, including Zelensky [6]: Zelenskyy didn't just single out the Russians – the murderers who hunted down pedestrians and cyclists. He also mentioned former German Chancellor Angela Merkel and ex-French President Nicolas Sarkozy. "I invite Ms. Merkel and Mr. Sarkozy to visit Bucha to see what the policy of 14 years of concessions to Russia has led to." Zelenskyy was referring to the NATO summit that took place in Bucharest in April 2008. So, why did not Merkel and others accept Ukraine to NATO? There were reasons as outlined in the linked investigation by Spiegel, but summarizing them is not easy. This can be used on the page of course. My very best wishes (talk) 01:20, 18 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

If you have an issue with user conduct, do not discuss it here. Slatersteven (talk) 10:18, 17 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Subarticle on Ukrainian civilians arbitrarily detained in occupied UA + RU?

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Do we have a sub-article on the issue of Ukrainian civilians arbitrarily detained by Russian authorities in the occupied Ukrainian territories and in Russian territory? Please respond at Template talk:Russian invasion of Ukraine#Ukrainian civilians detained in Russia: which article? or here. As stated over there, we have an 86-page Moscow Mechanism report The Moscow Mechanism Expert Report: On the Arbitrary Deprivation of Liberty of Ukrainian Civilians by the Russian Federation (Q127506242) but the topic doesn't seem to quite fit into any existing article. Boud (talk) 18:32, 18 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Undue weight given to Kharkiv Oblast in most recent section

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This is a classic WP:NOTNEWS violation. All serious analytical sources are saying it's just a diversion from the Avdiivka–Pokrovsk, Toretsk, and Svatove–Kupiansk directions. In two of those directions, the Russians have conducted continuous offensive actions over the entire period under consideration (with operationally significant gains in the Pokrovsk direction). There's also insufficient coverage of the strategic-level campaigns, again reflecting "breaking news" weight rather than serious analytical RS.

I would suggest just calling it "current phase" until a better title can be found and agreed on. RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 09:31, 22 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Unfortunately, on current events WP is too often a reflection of the news cycle. That is just how it works (or doesn't) and then we have to come back and bash it into something encyclopedic. I would avoid using phase as it tends to connote it being a terminology accepted in sources. There have been several discussions on this to my recollection. I would suggest Current operations, Operations since November 2023 or some other such permutation. Cinderella157 (talk) 00:05, 23 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Have you ever thought about being WP:BOLD and fixing these problems you bring up? TylerBurden (talk) 15:26, 25 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

War crimes in the Russian invasion of Ukraine has an RfC

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War crimes in the Russian invasion of Ukraine has an RfC for possible consensus. A discussion is taking place. If you would like to participate in the discussion, you are invited to add your comments on the discussion page. Thank you. JDiala (talk) 09:06, 25 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Redundancy in BBC Casualty Figures Sentence

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Under the "Casualty" section there is the sentence "BBC News has reported that Ukrainian reports of Russian casualty figures included the injured."

I believe this is redundant because it's commonly understood that casualty figures include both the dead and the injured. Specifying that the figures "included the injured" provides no informational value. IStalingrad (talk) 08:40, 30 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]

UNsure that is true. Slatersteven (talk) 11:44, 30 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
It is. Casualties refers to deaths and injuries. Here's the OED definition for example: a person killed or injured in a war or accident. I've removed the statement because it is wholly redundant. As an aside, the sources are from the early months of the war (March-April 2022), they're really out-dated with regards casualty and fatality figures anyway. Mr rnddude (talk) 13:28, 30 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Yet the BBC saw the need to point this out, thus implying it was not how they were being presented. However the point about these being outdated is better. Slatersteven (talk) 13:38, 30 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I agree that it is worth considering the context of the BBC articles. The reason the author is underlining the fact that the term casualty includes injuries is that this article is specifically about determining the number of Russian fatalities. It's not that Ukraine is presenting the casualty figure as total deaths, just that the author is trying to estimate total deaths from available figures, and that included Ukraine's casualty estimates as an upper bound of possible deaths. The figures available to the author were: 6,000 claimed by Russia, 25,000 confirmed dead by the BBC, 40-60,000 dead according to the British government, and 200,000 total casualties according to Ukraine. It made sense for the author to clarify directly to the reader that the last figure includes injured given that context, but it was decontextualized here creating the redundancy since we weren't communicating those articles' purpose (to estimate loss of life). Mr rnddude (talk) 14:05, 30 July 2024 (UTC)[reply]
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