Talk:World War II/Archive 31

This is an archive of past discussions about World War II. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page.

Archive 25

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Archive 29

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Neutral

I see in the casualties diagram the Baltic States are listed as Allies. They should be listed as neutral. —PētersV (talk) 22:29, 8 June 2008 (UTC)

Greece and Yugoslavia both signed the Declaration by United Nations, they are officially Allies. Oberiko (talk) 01:22, 9 June 2008 (UTC)

He said Baltic, not Balkan :) Given that their participation in WWII was as constituent republics of the Soviet Union, it is probably correct to include them with the Allies. Really, they shouldn't be listed as separate entities; Ukraine and Belarus aren't. And yes, this will likely ruffle the feathers of Baltic nationalists, but Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were annexed (illegally or not) into the Soviet Union, and no one can dispute that simple fact. Parsecboy (talk) 03:12, 9 June 2008 (UTC)

Remember, Belarus and Ukraine were co-founders of USSR, along with RSFSR (Russia). Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were occupied by USSR. --Paul Siebert (talk) 21:59, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

See, this is why I shouldn't edit while on jet lag. Apologies for that, and agreed with Parsecboy. Oberiko (talk) 10:30, 9 June 2008 (UTC)

The Baltic States were countries and neutral at the start of the war and should be represented as such. What we wish to represent about who swallowed up whom later is a different matter. They did not "participate" as "constituent republics". In fact, the Nazi occupation lasted considerably longer than the the Soviet occupations leading to the end of the war; Courland, Latvia, was never re-occupied by the Soviets prior to the end of the war.

I'm sorry, but I do hope Parsecboy isn't using "nationalist" as a a dirty word implying biased POV pusher as opposed to simply being motivated to be fully informed based on reputably establish facts. Apologies, the New York heat wave has made me cranky. —PētersV (talk) 01:47, 10 June 2008 (UTC)

Hmm, we probably need to rethink out the entire graph. Perhaps only including nations which had a significant role in the war (Germany, Italy, Japan, USSR, China, UK + Crown Colonies, US, France) and an "other" category. We could re-do the tallies with summarized causalities for "Allies", "Axis" and "Neutral" (taking into account shifting alliances), breaking the first two down by civilian and military. Thoughts? Oberiko (talk) 02:28, 10 June 2008 (UTC)

That doesn't change the fact that they were de facto part of the Soviet Union at the time of Barbarossa, whether they liked it or not. They had no participation in the events of 1939-1940, when they were still sovereign countries.

I wasn't implying anything about you of the sort. However, on similar issues, I've seen editors from the Baltics and Russia arguing over inane things like calling them "Baltic republics" (which apparently has a pro-USSR connotation), and "Baltic states" (which is supposedly anti-Soviet). Let's not pretend like there's not some serious bad blood between the two parties. That's all I was referring to. Parsecboy (talk) 02:25, 10 June 2008 (UTC)

Sure, but this is serious. Baltic States were de facto part of Soviet Union 1940-1941, part of Nazi Germany 1941-1944, and part of Soviet Union again from 1944 on. They were de jure neutral during the whole course of the war. On 18 September 1944, the Estonian government led by Otto Tief, declared its neutrality in the war over the radio, in English. And, speaking of it, why the hell is Estonia missing from the graph? Erikupoeg (talk) 17:29, 4 August 2008 (UTC)

No, the Baltics were never part of Nazi Germany. Großdeutschland never incorporated the Baltics; they were from 1940 onwards de jure constituent republics of the Soviet Union (whether the original incorporation was through Soviet manipulation of the independent states' governments or not is irrelevant). One wouldn't say that the Ukraine or Belarus were part of Nazi Germany either; they were simply occupied Soviet territory. As for the graph, you'll have to ask the creator of the original version (can be found here: Image:World War II Casualties.svg). Parsecboy (talk) 19:11, 4 August 2008 (UTC)

How about we get back to this after reading Occupation of the Baltic states#Recognition and non-recognition of annexation and occupation, Baltic States Investigation by the US House of Representatives and European Court of Human Rights cases on Occupation of Baltic States? Erikupoeg (talk) 19:28, 4 August 2008 (UTC)

If we take seriously that Soviet counter offensive was halted at the Estonian border for 8 months by the German Armed Forces, aided by a large number of Estonian conscripts and volunteers , then Estonian neutrality sounds wierd. Like if Finns, for instance, claimed neutrality in 1943. Poland was conquered in 1939 and ceased to exist, nevertheless about 200,000 Poles fought in 1944-1945 the East and comparable amoint in Italy from 1943, so Poland had the forth lagrest army (greater than French army) in the European theater. The Poles are definitely among major belligerents, despite Poland didn't exist that time, and despite Poles fough under Soviet and Western command. If the cited sentence is valid - Estonians should not be considered neutral. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 129.49.51.49 (talk) 19:22, 19 August 2008 (UTC)

Listing Estonia among the Axis countries would count as original research, before anybody comes across some sources that claim that.Erikupoeg (talk) 07:59, 20 August 2008 (UTC)

Slave action?

Can somebody clarify the difference between "slavery" (as describing Japanese & German actions) & "forced labor" (as describing British & American)? It sounds alike to me... Trekphiler (talk) 23:33, 10 June 2008 (UTC)

History is written by the victors. I believe that was the British POV at the time. 98.208.95.209 (talk) 00:03, 4 July 2008 (UTC)

Something a bit more substantive, perhaps, than a hoary old cliche? TREKphiler 03:55, 4 July 2008 (UTC)

interestingly that is not what the section says. The concentration camps and slavery sections uses both in these contexts:

About 12 million forced laborers, most of whom were Eastern Europeans, were employed in the German war economy inside the Nazi Germany.(Germany- Forced labour)
more than 10 million Chinese were mobilized by the Japanese army and enslaved by the Kōa-in for slave labor in Manchukuo and north China.[197] The U.S. Library of Congress estimates that in Java, between 4 and 10 million romusha (Japanese: "manual laborer"), were forced to work by the Japanese military. About 270,000 of these Javanese laborers were sent to other Japanese-held areas in South East Asia. Only 52,000 were repatriated to Java, meaning that there was a death rate of 80%. (Japan - Mix of Slave and forced labour)
Allied use of slave labor occurred mainly in the east, such as in Poland, but more than a million was also put to work in the west. By December 1945 it was estimated by French authorities that 2,000 German prisoners were being killed or maimed each month in mine-clearing accidents. (Allies - slave labour)

So in brief, no use of slave labour for Germany, for Japan mixed, and for Allies only use of slave labout.

For what it is worth, I would not use slave labour. If I would use slave labour I would only use it in the context of "forced labour for non-prisoners" (ie POW's, criminals, or even political prisoners put to forced labour may not necessarily be slaves, but people raised and interned for the sole reason/purpose of conducting forced labour could (in my view) qualify for slavery (as far as I know this fits the German action in the occupied territories, and Japanese actions). Arnoutf (talk) 14:47, 4 July 2008 (UTC)

ARMY SIZES

There should be a extra article that shows nations that fought in war and percentage of soldiers compared to total population. Would help in comparing casualties & mobilized troops.

and someone archive this discussion page it's getting too big. Cheers

Kuhlfürst (talk) 09:29, 11 June 2008 (UTC)

Would you like to start that article and achive this discussion page? Nick Dowling (talk) 10:00, 11 June 2008 (UTC)

Re: Kuhlfürst. No doubt, that'd probably be a very informative article if we could have a comparative analysis of statistics like mobilization, oil, iron ore, manufacturing tonnage and GDP between the major powers. However, I haven't seen that many books on the logistics of World War II, as crucial as the area is. If you know of a good source, let us, or the editors at production of World War II know. So far as achieving, I believe we have a bot that does that for us; the current amount of discussion focused on starting dates is something of an exceptional case. Oberiko (talk) 11:15, 11 June 2008 (UTC)

"Atrocities"

Can this word ever be used in a NPOV manner? Does it ever need to be used? It looks to me like it could consistently be replaced here with either "war crimes" or "acts considered to be atrocities". There is no such thing as an objective atrocity. This is probably demonstrated by the deletion of World War II atrocities which has continued to be cited until today as a main article for the "Casualties and atrocities" section. The problem is: there is no defining line past which an act becomes an atrocity except its status as a war crime. Some might consider, for example, conscription as an atrocity, but it is not a war crime. BigBlueFish (talk) 16:30, 11 June 2008 (UTC)

In the absence of any objection, I'm going to weed out the use of this word in the article. On further reflection, the word "atrocity" doesn't have very much encyclopedic value at all. Its use here is mostly based on the POV (a common and perhaps reasonable one nonetheless) that the conflict within international rules of engagement ("war") is socially acceptable, but outside these rules (war crimes) such acts offend the human psyche so much more as to become atrocious. If we do not have an objective criterion for such events (i.e. being war crimes or claimed to be so) then we have a category that could conceivably span the whole subject matter. BigBlueFish (talk) 01:23, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

No objection to removing, myself, but I'd disagree atrocity & war crime are necessarily synonymous. The strafing of Japanese troops at the Bismarck Sea was an atrocity. So was the strafing of Laconia survivors. Doubtless there were numerous Soviet Army examples. None were charged as war crimes, because they were committed by the victors. Trekphiler (talk) 06:27, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

Yes, however these events have all been described as war crimes or characterised as such at some point. In removing the use of "atrocity", I've avoided replacing with "war crime" with reference to specific events unless they have been upheld as such, but most dictionary definitions don't require a court decision, merely a "violation of international rules of war". If the act has no notable accusations of breaking these rules, though, it probably shouldn't be mentioned, at least with regard to atrocities. BigBlueFish (talk) 00:18, 1 July 2008 (UTC)

There is no such thing as an 'OBJECTIVE ATROCITY', it all depends on your point of view of the the act commited. 86.21.143.246 (talk) 16:27, 7 August 2008 (UTC)The White Rider

Yugoslavia

The sentence " The Soviets attacked through Hungary, while the Germans abandoned Greece and Yugoslavia. " is not correct. See Yugoslav_Front_(WWII). Yugoslav Army, emerged from partisan movement continued the battle against Germans and their colaborators until May 15th 1945, even after the official capitulation of Germany. At the end of the war, Yugoslav Army counted 800,000 men [[1]]. Please correct it, I can not, the page is semi-protected. Megaribi (talk) 13:10, 13 June 2008 (UTC)

Can you give us an alternate statement to use instead? Oberiko (talk) 14:03, 13 June 2008 (UTC)

" The Soviets attacked through Hungary, while the Germans were redrawing from Greece and Yugoslavia, constantly attacked by Yugoslavian Army."Megaribi (talk) 15:11, 13 June 2008 (UTC)

You don't provide any sources for that, and it implies a larger role for the Yugoslavians then that of the Soviets and other partisans (such as the Greeks). Can you rephrase to it prevent WP:UNDUE and provide references demonstrating the signficance of Yugoslavia vs. that of other partisan groups and their impact at this point in the war? Oberiko (talk) 17:00, 13 June 2008 (UTC)

If you do not insist in English language sources, finding reliable sources is pretty easy for me, I have book "Stvaranje Titove Jugoslavije" (Creation of Tito's Yugoslavia) whose authors are nine doctors of science, three colonels, one general and one professor, as common project of Yugoslavian TV stations. The book has 589 pages, ISBN 86-385-0091-2. This book in detail describes war in Yugoslavia From this book I cite that in April 1945 in Yugoslavia there were as many Axis forces as in Italy or in Hungary, totally 600.000 (400.000 Germans and 200.000 quislings) (page 529), while NOVJ who in march 1945 changed name to Yugoslavian Army had 800.000 fighters in 63 divisions. Or that in 21. september 1941 (!) Fieldmarshal von Weichs, German Balkan commander, told that "Size, weapons, organization and operations of partisans units justifies German opinion to be considered as enemy at the same level as regular forces of the other peoples " (page 504). After liberation of Belgrade, Soviet front ended at river Drava (page 503), which is small percent of Yugoslavian theritory. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Megaribi (talk • contribs) 20:41, 13 June 2008 (UTC)

Could you try to find some in English? For FA's and the like, espeically on a topic as conentious as this, I wouldn't be surprised if sources will need to be verified. Plus, we'll need more then just the size, we'll need pretty solid evidence that they had a major impact in the time frame you specify. If it was significant, documentation shouldn't be difficult to come by. Oberiko (talk) 22:18, 13 June 2008 (UTC)

OK, let's turn to the most cited book in this article (I just downloaded it) GERHARD L. WEINBERG A WORLD AT ARMS A GLOBAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II: First about notability of Yugoslavian resistance Page 430: "On a continent where,with the exception of Poland and Yugoslavia, most of the conquered peoples were quietly cooperating with the conqueror, those living in the occupied Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were reminded that big brother was watching, not from Moscow or some government in exile, but from a camp just outside the village." Then about abandoning Yugoslavia where it was clear that the Germans did not abandon whole Yugoslavia Page 758: "In Hungary, in the face of the offensive of the Red Army, supported by two Romanian armies, the Germans and some Hungarian units had built up a front after Romania switched sides, Bulgaria had been occupied by the Soviets, and the Germans had been forced to evacuate Greece, Albania and southern Yugoslavia." About continuation of battles in Yugoslavia and their role in Allies victory, page 820: "While beyond Bratislava (Pressburg) the Red Army headed for Vienna, at the southern end of the front they took the hungarian oil fields on April 2 even as Tito's army was pushing back the Germans in Yugoslavia, where they faced the possibility of being taken in the rear by the British advancing in Italy., ". Finally about Who liberated Yugoslavia: Page 906 " The liberation of the country was, however, largely the result of its own resistance forces so that the Soviet Union could not control Yugoslavia as it did its northern and eastern neighbors. ". So I have enough elements to change the sentence. Megaribi (talk) 22:32, 14 June 2008 (UTC)

Yugoslav partisan army had a pretty substantial role. Perhaps something like "The Soviets attacked through Hungary, while the Germans were redrawing from Greece and Yugoslavia, while being attacked by partisan army\ies." Arnoutf (talk) 17:05, 13 June 2008 (UTC)

Army, I should think, and we can even name it; Mihailovich was not attacking the Germans. Septentrionalis PMAnderson 18:40, 13 June 2008 (UTC)

Even Yugoslavian sources confirm that the final partisan offensive only begun in coordination with the offensive by two Soviet Fronts (including a Bulgarian Army) that steam-rolled into eastern Yugoslavia from Bulgaria. Their strategic goal was however limited to swinging north into Hungary, so much of former Yugoslavia was left to partisans by prior agreement between Stalin and Tito. Germans for their part tried to get troops out of Greece and Yugoslavia into Hungary and Austria via the 1-2 available rail lines, so did not offer much resistance elsewhere in Yugoslavia for fear of being cut off at Budapest, which made it possible for a rapid advance by the 3/4 of partisan forces to the Italian border, and consequently coming into conflict with the Italian troops serving with the Allies and the British troops in the area --mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 23:10, 13 June 2008 (UTC)

How's this: "The Soviets attacked through Hungary, while the German withdrawal from Greece and Yugoslavia was significantly hindered by the Yugoslav Partisan control over much of the country's territory."? --DIREKTOR ^(TALK) 09:33, 20 June 2008 (UTC)

I believe that Yugoslavia were neutral in World War Two. Would somebody please verify this statement. 203.59.192.209 (talk) 09:04, 31 July 2008 (UTC)

No, Yugoslavia was an active participant; Germany invaded Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941, and from that point on, a strong resistance movement actively fought the Germans, until the end of the war, at which point they numbered some 800,000 soldiers. Parsecboy (talk) 12:16, 31 July 2008 (UTC)

Reasons behind Axis defeat

Moved to (talk)

Info Box

In the Infor box, wouldn't it be much easier to list Britain, America, the Soviet Union, and China along with German, Japan and Italy instead of having people click on a link? It seems to me, it would be much easier for the reader to just look at something instead of having to click on a link and see a whole drawn out explanation. Doing it this way would show the main powers of the war, without going overboard. Red4tribe (talk) 01:31, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

Can you please read (and by read I mean skim, it'll take to long to read it all) through the literally hundreds of KBs worth of discussion, both here and on the infobox talk page regarding this issue? (The template talk can be found here) There are a couple of subject archives on this talk page, but they're fairly old discussions; newer iterations have apparently been archived all willy-nilly into the individual date-based archives by the bot.

However, the tl;dr answer is this: there are dozens of conflicting sources justifying the inclusion and exclusion of just about every country (save probably the Big 3 and Germany and Japan, although I'm sure there are those who would argue that the US and USSR only played from 1941 onwards, so they're not as major as the UK. Or whatever.) Therefore, because there is seemingly no consensus amongst historians on the issue, we have decided it's best to simply link to the separate articles about the Axis, Allies, and their commanders. This avoids endless conflicts over whether France, Poland, and Canada (the usual suspects in this case) constitute "major powers" (these debates have historically been the result of hit-and-run edits/posts here by nationalistic newbie/anon editors. Please, I beg of you, don't re-open this can of worms; this article has enough stupid disputes (and I mean that in the best possible sense) at the moment, with the hullabaloo over the start date. Parsecboy (talk) 01:59, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

I second that. The arguments over who should be included has got incredibly long and complicated with everyone basically making a case that their country was a "major participant" in the war; or at least as much of a participant as anyone listed. If you include France should you include Poland? If you include Poland should you include Belgium? Or Norway? Or Czechoslovakia? Or India? Should all the Commonwealth countries be named individually? The solution we have is an appropriate compromise. DJ Clayworth (talk) 15:17, 4 July 2008 (UTC)

Battle of Britain

I know that this subject has been discussed before —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.142.238.128 (talk) 16:24, 6 July 2008 (UTC)

So what is the relevance of this remark? Arnoutf (talk) 17:46, 6 July 2008 (UTC)

Sorry, editing error. My point was that this influential battle is hardly mentioned.Martin Hogbin (talk) 18:09, 6 July 2008 (UTC)

I'm not following what you're trying to say. Can you be more specific? Caden S (talk) 18:31, 6 July 2008 (UTC)

Firstly the name of the battle is not mentioned anywhere (except in the caption of a picture). Secondly no mention is made of its effect on the planned operation sealion, which, if successful, would have vastly changed the course of the war.Martin Hogbin (talk) 18:41, 7 July 2008 (UTC)

Yes, I think the Battle of Britain deserves another sentence or two. Operation Sealion does not: it was a badly-conceived afterthought and couldn't possibly succeed if Germany's main force was concentrated in the East. Binksternet (talk) 19:30, 7 July 2008 (UTC)

I do not think the result of Sealion was a certainty if the Germans had obtained air superiority. Historians seen divided on this. Have a look at the WP article. What is certain is that without air superiority it would fail.Martin Hogbin (talk) 21:13, 7 July 2008 (UTC)

There are no certainties only that the operation was never executed. All other outcomes may have probabilities but no certainties. Arnoutf (talk) 21:16, 7 July 2008 (UTC)

Of course, you are technically correct, but the chances of Sealion succeeding without air superiority were minute. I do not know of any authority that believes that it could have succeeded without air superiorityMartin Hogbin (talk) 08:18, 8 July 2008 (UTC).

I've added another sentence. However if we use the name explicitly other editors will want to add the name of every battle referred to and the article will grow. The link goes to the Battle of Britain article. DJ Clayworth (talk) 21:24, 7 July 2008 (UTC)

I take your point about adding the name of every battle but there are other battles named; the BoB is already named but only in a picture caption, which is confusing; and it was one of the most important battles of the war. Regardless of the possible effect on Sealion, it had a great effect on morale for both the axis and the allies.Martin Hogbin (talk) 08:18, 8 July 2008 (UTC)

The operation was never executed because Germany never gained air superiority. If they had, then there is no doubt they would have had a better than fair chance of gaining a beachhead and from there it does'nt take a great deal of imagination to figure out what would have happened from there. The Battle of Britain changed the tactics of the war, think of the D day landings, so I do think it deserves another sentence or two. Stan 888 (talk) 01:34, 8 July 2008 (UTC)

As this article aims to provide a very high-level summary of the war (and this is essential to keep it readable), it's not appropriate to go into depth on any single campaign. The current coverage of both the BoB and Sealion seem perfectly adequte to me. Note that Japan's offensive in Asia in late 1941 and 1942, which completly re-drew the map of Asia and had long-lasting consequences only gets two sentances (again, perfectly adequete IMO). Nick Dowling (talk) 01:43, 9 July 2008 (UTC)

There are currently three sentences on the BoB, two in para 4 and one in para 9. Perhaps these could be consolidated in to one section that mentions the battle by name, otherwise the picture caption is orphaned. Maybe I will propose something.Martin Hogbin (talk) 21:59, 9 July 2008 (UTC)

Style here is not to mention battles by name in the text. Battle of France, Operation Barbarossa, Battle of Midway and Battle of Iwo Jima are just some of the battles that are not named, and have at least as great a claim to significance as the BoB. Instead we describe what happened so Germany invaded France, Japanese failed to capture Midway island etc. Getting mentioned in a caption already gives the BoB extra significance. And it is linked to from the blue text. DJ Clayworth (talk) 20:16, 10 July 2008 (UTC)

Fair enough, it seems curious not to mention battle names in the text but to do so in picture captions, however that is clearly the style of the article and I will adhere to it.Martin Hogbin (talk) 21:13, 10 July 2008 (UTC)

The point is that adding battle names would add a significant amount of text to an already long article. From the point of view of the summary the important thing is what happened, not what the happening was called. So it's important that Germany tried and failed to establish air superiority over Britain. It becomes important to know the name when you want to find out more about it, but at Wikipedia we have links for that. DJ Clayworth (talk) 13:37, 14 July 2008 (UTC)

Campaigns of World War II

Above article is languishing in the articles to be wikified since June 2007. If you could take it in hand in some way, merge it if necessary, develop it as a subarticle or whatever, I'm sure you can only improve it. Thanks. Itsmejudith (talk) 22:11, 7 July 2008 (UTC)

Overview

I, being a deeply studying WWII interestee, believe the war began in, indeed, September 1939, when Germany declared its war-mongering upon Poland, then, on December of 1941, Japan began its war against America. BUT, on the side, they were assaulting China beforehand for supplies, commerce, and productivity, with the U.S. attacking them back and forth to chase them off, thus giving Japan a reason to hate America, and, want a war with them, NOT the Axis. —Preceding unsigned comment added by JederCoulious (talk • contribs)

The war started after Hitler invaded Poland on September 1, 1939. Hitler tried to make it look like the Poles attacked him but they were attacking tanks on horseback. Also, Japan needed resorces to supply the Japanese so the Japanese invaded China. At this time, the US stopped all shipping to Japan. Pres. Roosevelt told Japan to get out of China or else. He knew that Britian and France declared war on Japan because of the Axis pact. He also knew that Japan doesn't declare war before an attack. So when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, we wanted to fight the Japanese so we declare war on Japan. However, since the Japanese were part of the Axis, we declared war on Italy and Germany as well. We were already sending supplies to Britian so we sent men with the supplies. Sfd1905 (talk) 02:12, 3 August 2008 (UTC)

In 1939 Poland has been invaded and occupied by Germany and by the Soviet Union. Why didn't Britain and France declare war on both invaders, but only on Germany?

It is a little bit more complex issue.
First, the pre-war Soviet-Polish border was a result of the Polish-Soviet war initiated by Poland in 1919, after which Poland obtained a major part of disputed territories of Western Ukraine and Western Belourssia, populated mostly by Jews, Ukrainians and Belarussians. Although this land belonged to medieval time Poland (so called Rzeczpospolita) the latter was a multi-ethnic commonwealth (an analog of the Soviet Union), whereas XX-century Poland claimed to be primarily the state of the Poles. Therefore, two national states, Ukrainian SSR and Belarussian SSR had more rights to those lands than the Poles did. (The arguments about "Communist Empire" doesn't work, because the USSR was founded by joint decision of Belarussian, Ukrainian and Russian republics, and, by the way, ceased to exist according their joint decision also.) Therefore, a legal bases supporting eastern border of Poland are questionable (although I don't state they had absolutely no rights on that land, of course).
Second, occupation or annexation of a neighbour's land wasn't unusual during pre-war time, for instance, Poland herself annexed Zaolzie during partition of Czechoslovakia, and, before that, a part of Lithuanian territory, although no country declared a war on her after that.
Of course, both France and the UK were not happy after the Soviets moved west, but they recognized some legal ground for such a move. --Paul Siebert (talk) 01:53, 17 September 2008 (UTC)

I thought it had more to do with the fact that the British and French treaties with Poland guaranteed mutual defense only under the condition that Germany attacked Poland. The UK and France had no obligation to declare war on the USSR under the terms of their treaty. Parsecboy (talk) 02:10, 17 September 2008 (UTC)

I think the latter was, at least partially, a result of the former. Remember, western power didn't oppose to Hitler's intentions to annex Sudetes, mostly because that was a territory populated by ethnic Germans predominately. --Paul Siebert (talk) 04:27, 17 September 2008 (UTC)

The purpose of the British and French treaties with Poland was to protect the territorial integrity of Poland. But this integrity has been violated at the same time by Germany and by the Soviet Union. Later on the UK even became an ally of the Soviet Union, and it accepted the Soviet expansion and the movement of the western Polish border far into German territory.

The purpose was to stop Hitler. I would remind you that both French and the UK approved partition of Czechoslovakia, so they didn't care much about territorial integrity, human rights etc. Today's UK and France differ dramatically from what they were before WWII. And, once again, violation of Polish territorial integrity was, at the same time, a restoration of territorial integrity of Ukraine and Belarussia. Post WWI borders were very disputable in Europe. --Paul Siebert (talk) 12:52, 17 September 2008 (UTC)

The trouble is that no one thought about stopping Stalin. However the greatest errors in reasoning have been made by Adolf Hitler, Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman.

This was not the major problem during pre war time. Other states like Germany and Italy were much more expansionist. By the way, one of the major reason for not signing a military treaty between France and the USSR was that the former considered military capabilities of the latter to be too limited to expect any considerable assistance from the Soviets if the the war with Hitler would start. And, once again, in contrast to the Soviet occupation of Baltic states, the border change in Eastern Poland was more or less consistent with a linguistic map. Moreover, I personally knew peoples who survived exclusively due to the Soviet invasion of Eastern Poland. (They were Polish Jews, former soldiers of Polish army. Soviet authorities drafted them and sent to Ural. In contrast, their family, that remained in Western Belarussia, perished during Hitler occupation). --Paul Siebert (talk) 00:46, 18 September 2008 (UTC)

You cannot take into consideration only the pre-war time. After the Soviet invasion of Poland and of the Baltic States it has become obvios that the dictators Hitler and Stalin have the same intentions of expansion. In spite of this the United Kingdom formed a military alliance with the Soviet Union against Germany. Later on, the Western Allies accepted the expulsion of 15 million people from the eastern parts of Germany. This was an expulsion out of the own country, and it represents the biggest "ethnic cleansing" of history. This aspects should also be revealed in the main article.

Please remember that this is not a forum for discussing WWII and the decisions made by those in power at the time. Discussions here should be limited to focusing on the content of the article. If you want to continue this conversation, please take it to Paul's talk page, thanks. Parsecboy (talk) 22:20, 18 September 2008 (UTC)

The problem is that the anti-German watchdogs and their permanent censorship of this site won't allow to create a neutral article.

What is anti-German and what is neutral to your opinion? For instance, I proposed to include a notion that Sudetes was the territory populated mostly by ethnic Germans, so this concrete Hitler's demand did have some legal ground. What else?
By the way, could you please have a look at the new version of the "War Becomes Global" at the end of the talk page and tell me if you see anything anti-German there? As regards to the UK's alliance with the USSR, one has to remember that the UK was simply not in position to oppose to both these powers. And, once again, expansionist intentions were generally more normal during that time than a peacefull behaviour. --Paul Siebert (talk) 15:40, 21 September 2008 (UTC)

In spite of all your considerations it is not understandable why the Western Democraties UK and US have accepted the border conditions imposed by dictator Stalin. Because these concessions, which have been disastrous and even deadly for further millions of civilians, have only encouraged the dictator in his expansionism. The consequence was The Cold War.

Please take this discussion to a user talk page; it has no relation to the content of the article and shouldn't be continuing here. Wikipedia is not a forum. Parsecboy (talk) 22:24, 24 September 2008 (UTC)

I wouldn't say that accusation in anti-German bias has no relation to the content of the article, therefore, the anonymous person who threw such an accusation should explain it in more details, and we have to discuss his/her arguments here, on that very page. If the arguments are reasonable, we should think about elimination of anti-German bias. If not, I am not intended to continue this discussion anywhere. --Paul Siebert (talk) 16:06, 25 September 2008 (UTC)

The problem is, the anonymous editor doesn't seem to want to discuss the alleged anti-German bias in the article, only the issues. Wikipedia is not a soapbox for anti-Soviet (or anti-anyone, for that matter) rhetoric. Parsecboy (talk) 16:20, 25 September 2008 (UTC)

holocaust picture

that one picture of dead people scared the shit out of me and my little brother... put some drawer tab that can hide/show it or replace it with some black/white photograph 70.129.57.74 (talk) 10:00, 10 July 2008 (UTC)

No. WP isn't designed to cater to 12 year olds. TREKphiler 10:20, 10 July 2008 (UTC)

Also, Wikipedia is not censored. Parsecboy (talk) 12:38, 10 July 2008 (UTC)

Also it is not a bad thing that it scared you. It would be good if it scared other people and stopped them from doing bad things.Martin Hogbin (talk) 19:31, 10 July 2008 (UTC)

uh, it's somewhat disconcerting looking at a pile of starved corpses, and it's a bit redundant, seeing that such a shocking image is not really necessary to prove or illustrate what happened. 71.129.154.21 (talk) 06:28, 12 July 2008 (UTC)

We are NOT censoring the photo. If you think it is disconcerting, then so be it. Binksternet (talk) 06:37, 12 July 2008 (UTC)

a black/white picture can suit the purpose of that color one easily... —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.130.58.44 (talk) 07:34, 13 July 2008 (UTC)

Be sickened by the fact it ever happened. Censoring it is effectively removing the memory. We need to remember this so we never allow it to happen again. Evidently, we've not learned the lesson yet, or Rwanda & Dafur, to name just 2, would never have happened. Censoring it is a bit like banning "nigger", rather than eliminating the mindset that makes saying "nigger" OK. The first won't work. The second is essential, & if it works, it'll make the first approach redundant. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 09:19, 13 July 2008 (UTC) (BTW, if you're offended by my saying "nigger", you've proven my point. Not so long ago, you could hear it said on a national newscast with the speaker not even batting an eye.)

being sickened should be allowed to only a certain extent, not something like the ludovico. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.231.24.164 (talk) 23:29, 20 July 2008 (UTC)

No offence, but I've seen worse pictures in a GCSE text book. I studied the world wars in school and we watched videos depicting worse. Photo's like this should make you sick, feel violated at least it gets the message across and makes people THINK about what one human being will, can and have done to other human beings. 86.21.143.246 (talk) 16:35, 7 August 2008 (UTC)The White Rider

Background section

I don't want to start something here, so I'm asking for some help in resolving a huge error in the first sentence of the Background section. It states "the defeated German Empire signed the Treaty of Versailles." Now the German Empire never signed the Treaty, having been abolished on November 9, 1918. I tried to replace it with just saying Germany, with a link to the Weimar Republic, but that was removed, with the explanation that they didn't lose the war, the Empire did. I just want to find a compromise that doesn't include the misinformation of the Empire signing the Treaty, seeing how it had been abolished seven months before. Kaiser matias (talk) 17:58, 10 July 2008 (UTC)

As the wiki article says, the term Weimar Republic was never used in its lifetime. When the treaty was signed Germany had given up any pretentions of empire, yet it was still known as the Deutsches Reich (German Empire). Stan 888 (talk) 18:47, 10 July 2008 (UTC)

While that is true, the term was also used for the Nazi regime, only being abandoned in 1945. The biggest issue I have with the phrasing now is that it says the German Empire signed the Treaty, when that was not at all the case. Even if it simply said Germany, and linked to whatever article, it would be much better. Kaiser matias (talk) 20:56, 10 July 2008 (UTC)

I think Germany is more neutral as that is both not false, and fairly neutral. The Reich no longer existed, the republic did not lose the war; but the country was Germany all along. Arnoutf (talk) 21:02, 10 July 2008 (UTC)

Having taken a quick browse of the treaty I don't see any reference to German Empire, unless I missed it of course. So on reflection, I agree that Germany would be the correct term. Stan 888 (talk) 22:11, 10 July 2008 (UTC)

This was mentioned on critical websites as early as March 16, 2008.[2] [3] Good catch, Kaiser. Duck of Luke (talk) 13:17, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

The German Empire didn't really have a choice unless they wanted to get demolished by the Allies. They signed it so they could attempt to get back up on their feet. Sfd1905 (talk) 02:15, 3 August 2008 (UTC)

Possible change of the article name?

After having read this article I got impression that major events of the WWII took place in Pacific region and Mediterranean, and in Western Europe (by the end of the war). I decided to briefly estimate relative importance of the WWII battles and their contribution into the final victory of the Allies.
I took the chapter “The tide turns” as an example because by that time all major powers had been already involved into the conflict and every event could tip the scale. I compared the amount of military forces involved in the battles mentioned there (from both sides) and losses both sides suffered.These data are given in the order the battles are mentioned in the chapter.
Please, note, that all the data below were taken exclusively from English Wikipedia, according to the references given in the chapter.
'Al' stands for the Allies, 'Ax' - for the Axis powers. All losses include killed wounded and captured.
The tide turns.

1. Defence of Port Moresby: no data;

2. Battle in the Coral Sea: Al: 543 killed; Ax: 1074 killed.

3. Battle of Midway:- it is hard to compare with other battles, because the major result is a loss of most Japanese carriers (4 carriers), so negligible human losses (Al: 307, Ax: 3,500) tell nothing in this concrete case.

4. Occupation of Aleutian Islands. For the whole campaign: Al: 144,000. losses 1,481; Ax 8,500, losses 4,350.

5. Another attack on Port Moresby: no data.

6. Battle for Guadalkanal. Al: 60,000, losses 2,200; Ax: 32,200, losses 25,600

7. Burma campaign: (For total campaign, 1924-45: Al; 100,000, losses 15,000; Ax: 185,000, losses 144,000)

8. Battles at Kerch peninsula, Kharkov and Stalingrad, Kerch: no data. For Sebastopol (nearly at the same time and in the same place:Al: 100,000, losses 95,000. Ax: 350,000+, losses 100,000. Kharkov: Al: 640,000, losses 135,531, Ax: 300,000 losses 60,000 Stalingrad: Al: 1,103,000; losses: 130,000, Ax: 1,011,000 men, losses 241,000;

9. Rzhev salient: losses only, Al: 200,000, Ax: 40,000

10. Another German attack on Kharkov: Al 300,000, losses 180,000. Ax 160,000, losses moderate.

11. Madagascar invasion. no data

12. Offensive in Libya: (Battle of Gazala) Al: 175,000. losses 98,000; Ax: 80,000, losses 32,000

13. El Alamein. Al: 150,000 troops, losses: 13,250; Ax: 96,000 troops,losses: 10,000

14. Dieppe Al: 6,086 losses 3,320, Ax: 1,500 troops, losses ~500

15. Second battle for El Alamein Al.: 4 divisions (1750 killed) Ax: 6 divisions (2900 killed)

It is easy to see that the majority of forces involved and losses suffered fall to the Eastern Front.
Eastern Front: Al: 2,143,000, losses 741,000; Ax: 1,821,000, losses 441,000.
Others theatres: Al: 629,000 (+4 divisions), losses 135,308 (+2 carriers). Ax: 498,299 (+6 divisions), losses: 219,924 (+5 carriers).
However, assuming that major Japanese losses during a campaign in Burma (144,000) took place by the end of the war, the total axis losses during 1942 were about 120,000. The same might be valid for the Aleutian campaign.

Therefore, according to Wikipedia during 1942 - beginning ot 1943,

75% of the allied forces were fighting at the Eastern Front (i.e. they were Soviet peoples).

84% of the allied losses took place at the Eastern Front.

78% of Axis manpower was fighting at the Eastern Front

66% of Axis losses took place at the Eastern Front (assuming that all Japanese losses in Burma happened in that period. Otherwise (see above) the percent of Axis losses at the Eastern Front is, accordingly, greater).

Of course, these calculation are incomplete and incorrect, but I think they give a reasonable overall picture, namely, the major and decisive battles of the WWII took place at the Eastern Front. This conclusion is consistent with the data from another Wiki article, 'Eastern Front (World War II)': 5,100,000 Axis (military) losses at the Eastern Front versus ~8,000,000 total, and 10,650,000 Soviet military losses versus 14,000,000 total.

What does reader sees in this chapter, however? The chapter The tide turns starts with the Port Moresby and ends with Tunisia. Only one paragraph in the middle (~%25 of the chapter) is devoted to the Eastern Front. Dieppe took the same space as Stalingrad. Situation is similar with other chapters. Attack on Pearl Harbor (after which US entered WWII) is mentioned among key events, along with Marco Polo bridge incident, or Mukden incident, however German invasion of USSR, according to the authors, was not as important. Definitely, although the article by itself is quite moderate and reasonable, this is not a 'World War II' article. Its correct name should be Western Front, Mediterranean and Pacific (World War II).

However, if the articles pretends to be World War II there are two ways to do it. First, this article should be re-organized. This is hard and complicated. Therefore, I propose a second way: to make following statement in the preface: "the key and major part of WWII was the war between USSR and Nazi Germany (see. 'Eastern Front (World War II)'). And then it should be stated clearly that the present article is mainly devoted to the events in the rest of the world. This would be noble and honest way and it would be exactly what Sir Winston Churchill did in the preface to his brilliant book. Paul Siebert (talk) 23:35, 16 July 2008 (UTC)

You make a clear and excellent point, the only sticking point for me in your solution is that an article called World War II has to cover every front of the war. It almost seems dismissive to say "see Eastern Front". I certainly agree with you that the Eastern Front should have a little more space in this article. Jack forbes (talk) 02:33, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

Paul Siebert, if it is true that the eastern european front is a bit undercovered, I do not agree with your proposal of "the key and major part..." for two reasons :1) you can't judge the strategic importance of battles only by the death toll, 2) You entirely omit the sino-japanese front where there were lot of important battles involving more than hundred of soldiers such as the Battle of Changsha (1942) and the Battle of Wuhan.--Flying tiger (talk) 13:44, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

I agree the eastern front is probably underrespresented. However, I do not necessarily agree with the analysis on the number of casualties as that is not the only issue. One of the reasons the Soviets suffered from massive casualties is their own lack of organisation, and the massive number of soldier they deployed. Both the British and US effort was charaterised by more technological effort (ships, planes and weaponry); well trained units (e.g. airborne and special forces divisions) compared to the Russians (see Stalingrad where 1 rifle was available for each 2 soldiers). Arnoutf (talk) 14:21, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

The eastern European front could be given more coverage but support Flying Tiger and Arnoutf comments. When you talk of key and major then how do you factor the breaking of the enigma code into this? How do you factor the length of time each ally was in the war? How about the development of the atomic bomb? Jniech (talk) 14:26, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

It is right to point out that the Soviets were not the most technological army in the world, leading to massive casualties. This does not explain however the 5 million military casualties suffered by the axis, who were among the leaders in military technology. It is for this reason I think that the Eastern front is underepresented in this article. Jack forbes (talk) 15:04, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

Most of the Western front was a technological battle for the Axis too (Bismarck, U-boot, Battle of Britain); while they had to deploy massive amounts of infantery in the east (as aircover did not work thoruhg lakc of basis near the front and tanks did not cope well with the cold and bad roads, and huge distances in russia). So Germany was forced into a long lasting, relatively low tech ground battle there. Arnoutf (talk) 15:11, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

Withought having any figures to hand, I believe the Germans had more tank divisions operating at the Eastern Front than the Western front. As you say, they could not cope well in the freezing Russian winter, but they were a big factor in the German advance till the winter set in. They also had problems with their supply lines, leading to many tanks being abandoned due to lack of fuel. Another factor in the campaign was that the German army were not issued with winter clothing, Hitler believing it would be over before they were needed. Jack forbes (talk) 15:27, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

<--Raw numbers of panzerdivisionen doesn't tell the full story; Hitler created them in part by parcelling out existing armor into new divisions, so the actual per-unit strength of a '43-44 div was about half what it was in '41. And don't overemphasize the "winter uniforms", either; had Hitler not meddled, it would have been over by winter... Lack of bases was only part of it, too; it was also a lack of aircraft, because production was too low (not to mention keeping Fliegerkorps X in Italy bombing Malta, nor the continual stretching of the front line). I would put the Soviet losses down more to poor training & leadership than lack of tech; the T-34 was the best tank of the war, & Sov CAS (the Il-2) was among the best. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 16:04, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

Interesting to hear you say not to overemphasize the lack of winter clothing, I've never been in the military, but I would imagine this would go a long way to undermining moral, and freezing to death. When you say it would have been over by winter if Hitler had not meddled, I presume you mean the decision to attack Stalingrad? Jack forbes (talk) 16:16, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

I don't. That was compounding a problem & demonstrating corporals with delusions of grandeur should not be making strategic decisions. I meant the decision in (September?) 1941 to drive an army all the way across the Ukraine & back again, for nothing, rather than concentrate on capturing Moscow before winter. Stolfi (Hitler's Panzers East) explains. It's the ability to come to an end before winter I meant by "winter uniforms", too; Germany could well have been victorious before it became an issue. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 16:36, 17 July 2008 (UTC) (Neither do I consider Winston was without error, lest anyone think so; the Greek fiasco was off his bat. And the "two-roads" strategy was a gaffe from FDR's inability to make up his mind; or maybe to tell MacArthur where to get off, for fear he'd come Stateside & run for President.)

I agree T34 was the best tank of its time. Much of the Soviet losses are from the time when there were not enough of them around, that's what I meant with "lack of tech". In comparison, the battle of the Atlantic and Britain required high tech to do anything at all (e.g. ships, planes, anti aircraft). But all to say, comparison is almost impossible based on casualties only Arnoutf (talk) 16:52, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

First. Don't mix total losses, military losses and the amount of armed forces at the certain theatre. According to the first criterion, Eastern Front should take about 50% of space in the article, Sino-Japanese - 45%, and all others - 5% (it is not my opinion. I just take the data from Wikipedia). According to the second criterion the ratio should be roughly 55-30-5.
This in not what I propose, however. Generally speaking, strategic significance of certain battlefield correlates with the amount of troops there. During 1942 Hitler had about 1,000,000 men near Stalingrad, and this was about one quarter of the total amount of troops at the Eastern Front. I doubt additional 4 Nazi divisions sent there could play a decisive role. But at El Alamein they definitely would lead to decisive Nazi victory. So my question is. If other fronts were so important as Wikipedia tells, why Hitler was keeping about 3/4 to 4/5 of all his land forces in the Soviet Union? I think, taking into account Nazi's strategic planning abilities, the answer is obvious.
I agree, in this concrete case, the amount of Allied losses (civilian or total) is not important. The major criterion should be the amount of Axis troops and Axis military losses. Starting from 1941 to 1945, the amount of losses (Axis) at Eastern Front was 5,178,000+ (military dead) versus 8,000,000 (total dead). These 8 millions include half a million Japanese killed during Sino-Chinese war and about 80,000 Japanese killed by Soviets during the Battle of Manchuria. I think those numbers are self-evident. So other nations, including US, UK, Poland, France (in that order, if we consider military contribution) during 1939-1945 killed less than 2,5 million Axis soldiers.
I repeat myself. If 78% of Nazi forces were located at Eastern Front and they suffered 66% losses there (lower estimate, actual percent is definitely higher) than any unbiased person must admit that this was generally a Nazi-Soviet war at that time (I consider the period described in the The Tide Turns chapter). If for some reason other battles are more strategically important than figures tell us, then reasonable arguments should be provided. For example, Dieppe has zero significance. It demonstrated a total inability of Western Allies to invade Nazi Europe until overwhelming majority of German land forces is destroyed at the Eastern Front.
Argument about a need of high tec doesn't work. Four to five million Nazis didn't fight naked at the Eastern Front, so high tec plains, tanks and artillery were needed there to oppose them. Who can tell what is more hi-tec, one hundred Tiger tanks or one Bismark battleship? However, during some period Soviets were fighting with obsolete weapon and, as we can see, did this successfully. Therefore, high tec is needed not for doing anything, but for doing something with reasonable casualties.
In other words, during 1942-44, British and American had a choice: to start invasion of Western Europe suffering heavy losses, or to procrastinate to prepare for 'hi-tec' invasion saving lives of their soldiers. They decided to follow the second way paying with lives of Soviet peoples, who had no other choice than to fight.
Of course, comparison by the number of troop involved (once again, I don't consider casualties!) works only for similar type battles. No one can tell what was more important, the Battle of Salamis, or the Battle of Plataea? Obviously, defeat of Japan was possible only after its naval power ceased to exist. That is why the contribution of the US is decisive in this case, and it is much greater than the role Chinese and Soviet played. This doesn't work for Europe, however. Thanks to UK, naval domination of the Allies was evident there, however, in contrast to Japan, naval domination was not vital for Germany and Italy, especially would they get an access to Caspian oil fields. Therefore the only way to destroy Nazis was to prevent them from expansion to the East followed by massive land invasion into the Germany heartland. Figures tell us, who provided that opportunity.
Please, note, that I don't focus on Soviet military losses. However, according to Wikipedia, they are quite moderate: compare 10,651,000 (killed) Soviet military losses with 5,178,000 (killed) Axis military at Eastern front. You see that the ratio is slightly greater than 2 to 1. For the Sino-Japanese war the situation is absolutely different: 3,220,000 military (probably killed, but it is not clear from the data they give) Chinese versus 480,000 killed Japanese. That is why I absolutely agree with Sir Winston Churchill who pointed out that Americans for some reason overestimate Chinese military contribution. --Paul Siebert (talk) 19:31, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

Simply put; in 1942-43 Hitler had no means to transport substantial amounts of troops anywhere else but to the Sovjet Union. He could not reach the UK because of lack of sea and air power, he could not attack Turkey, among other because of the Partisans, he could hardly ship many more troops to Africa because of UK sea and naval power in the mediteranean, he had no free access to important mediterranean ports (Vichy France status for Marseille, Italy status for Italian ports). Basically, he had no place to send massive amounts of troops anywhere else but to the Sovjet Union. Arnoutf (talk) 20:07, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

Good point! Can I conclude from your words that the only serious opponent of Nazis in 1942-1943 was Soviet Union? I that's a case, why the major part of the article tells about something else.

Small comment. Is far as I know, Hitler invaded Libya because Italy needed urgent help (its army was almost defeated by UK there). Therefore, I am sure Italy would provide all possible help to deliver extra German divisions for the Rommel army. However, Hitler didn't take even few divisions from, for instance, Leningrad, Murmansk or Novorossiysk for that. In contrast to that, Italian Eight Army was fighting at Stalingrad at the time Rommel was attacking El Alamein. Tell me, please, why?--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:22, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

I think in 1942-43 Russia was indeed Hitler's main (land) focus (basically the Western front was a stalemate as neither Hitler, nor the UK could seriously threaten each other with a serious land-war).

Re Italy and Libya I think you should not underestimante mistrust between the Axis (and for that matter Allied) powers. So I am not sure that Italy would sell out completely for Libya, or that Hitler wanted to spend his efforts because of failure of the Italians, but that is all speculation.

In general I agree that the Western (ie UK/US) bias is prevalent in many articles (and most likely this one); so yes I would argue for more balance, I only think your arguments are not as objective as they seem (by use of numbers). So I thin we disagree in the reasoning more than in the conclusion. Arnoutf (talk) 20:31, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

The numbers per se are not objective, and the paper cannot be based on numbers solely. But the paper must be consistent with numbers. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Paul Siebert (talk • contribs) 20:48, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

I cannot agree more Arnoutf (talk) 20:51, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

I wouldn't give too much weight to raw numbers, even as a % of those deployed. What % USN/IJN were at Coral Sea? Midway? Sub Force (22%, IIRC), which had an effect out of all proportion to the raw number?

"Obviously, defeat of Japan was possible only after its naval power ceased to exist" Not so obvious. Sub Force could have immobilized IJN without actually fighting any fleet actions by destroying the Japanese merchant fleet (tankers, specifically), as virtually had happened by October 1944, & could readily have been done sooner, had Nimitz put higher priority on tankers & the lousy' Mark 14 torpedo's problems been cured before September 1943. (Sorry, this is a pet peeve of mine.) TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 21:22, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

We were NOT allies with the Soviet Union. The only reason we were called Allies is because we were fighting against the same enemy. If we were good allies with the Soviet Union, the Cold War would have almost never happened. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Sfd1905 (talk • contribs) 02:19, 3 August 2008 (UTC)

You, probably, weren't. However, both Churchill and Roosevelt had an opposite point of view:-).
Powers that formed a military alliance and were fighting against the same enemy were not allies? You, probably, have your own definition for the word allies. Something like: our allies are good guys who are fighting against the same enemy.
The greatest problem of Western history is the fact that bad guys were their allies and these bad guys had made a major contribution into the victory. --Paul Siebert (talk) 05:07, 3 August 2008 (UTC)

Comments on "Allies close up"

"On the Germans eastern front, the Soviets launched a series of powerful offensives. Starting in early June the Soviets launched massive assaults against Finland, Belarus, Ukraine and Eastern Poland, Romania, and Hungary.[134] " This must be corrected immediately. "Soviets were unable to start any offensive against Belarus and Ukraine. It sounds as weird as UK started offensive against Scotland.
Believe you or not, Ukraine, Russia and Belarus were three co-founders of Soviet Union. From the point of view of population size, industry, and all others, Ukraine constitutes one third of Russia. Formation of Soviet Union was impossible without Ukraine and Belarus. I think, that more than one third of Soviet leaders were born in Ukraine, including Trotsky, Khruschev, Brezhnev, Chernenko, Dybenko, Kaganovich, Zinovyev ets. Moreover, I would say that during his history USSR had only one Russian leader, Lenin. Stalin was Gerogian, Khruschev, Brezhnev and Chernenko were Urkanians, and even Gorbachev speaks with a strong Urkainan accent. Situation is absolutely similar to that in UK: after England and Scotland had united, UK was ruled by Scottish dynasty.
Peoples who wrote this are too concerned about neutrality. Things don't have to be neutral. They should be correct.
By the way. How could Soviets start their offensive against Ukraine in 1944 if Ukrainan capital, Kiev, was liberated in 1943?
Moreover. Person who wrote this is possibly unaware that Belarus had lost more than a quarter of civilian population, mainly because they were exesecuted by Nazis in response on continuous partisan attacks. In addition to numerous Belasussian who fough in Soviet Army, a huge amount of them were partisans. Their relative contribution into the Victory is enormous. In addition to that, despite Ukrainans, there is a cocnensus among Belarussian about the War and about collaborationists. So the author, who mentioned Urkaine and especially Belarus along with Finland, Romania and Hungary (Nazis allies) insultes whole nations.
Why this page is locked from editing? --Paul Siebert (talk) 05:58, 18 July 2008 (UTC)

That's not too bad - the Soviets were trying to liberate their own territory in the Ukraine, Russia and Belarus and its correct to say that they attacked these areas (just like the US assulted the Alaskan island of Attu in 1943). I'd suggest that it be changed to "Starting in early June the Soviets launched massive offensives in Finland, Belarus, Ukraine and Eastern Poland, Romania, and Hungary". The page is presently semi-protected and established editors can edit it - you should be able to in a few days. Nick Dowling (talk) 07:22, 18 July 2008 (UTC)

It doesn't sound absolutely good. Hungary, Romania and Finland were Axis allies. Poland fought against Axis in Italy by this moment. Belarus and Ukraine were parts of USSR. So the Soviets really launched massive assaults against Hungary, Romania and Finland, invaded Poland and started operation Bagration in Belarus. The name of the latter deserves mentioning explicitly because the scale and strategic results of this battle, taken alone, are comparable with those of invasion of Normandy. As regards to Ukraine, its major part was Soviet by this time. Kiev was liberated by the moment Tehran converence had started. So the statement about offensive in Ukraine is simply incorrect. Only very western part of Ukraine was liberated in 1944.
So I would propose the following: the Soviets started offensive in Western Ukraine and reached the USSR state border, that allowed them to launch massive assaults against Hungary and Romania, along with assault against Finland at North. The massive offetsive in Belarus (Operation Bagration) led to the loss of about a quarter of Nazis Eastern Front manpower. This had opened a way for Soviet invasion of Eastern Poland.--Paul Siebert (talk) 08:07, 18 July 2008 (UTC)

Comments on "Axis advances"

The first paragraph is confusing. If the chapter's name is "Axis advanses", why the first paragraphs tells us about Soviet activity? Does the author imply Soviet Union to be the Axis country at that time?
The next paragraph tells about sluggish activity of UK and France. What relation does it have to Axis advances?
The text must be clear, because ordinary reader (especially in the English speaking world) sometimes even is not certain if USSR fougt together or against UK and the US during WWII. Someone could conclude that USSR was the Axis country during 1939-1940. But the Pact of Non-Agression was not a military alliance. Japan and USSR signed a pact of non-argession too, but USSR had never been a Japanese ally.
It is logical to expect story of Axis advances to start with real advance of some Axis country, the best moment to be the end of Phony War.
I propose to move these two paragraphs up and to start this chapter with:
On that same day, May 10, 1940, Germany invaded France and the Low Countries.--Paul Siebert (talk) 09:38, 19 July 2008 (UTC)

Stalingrad

The Soviets decided to make their stand at Stalingrad which was in the path of the advancing German armies...

This is not entirely correct. The main thrust of the Germans was towards the Caucasus i.e. to the south of Stalingrad. Stalingrad was only assaulted to cover the flanks of the Army Group A. Originally the city itself was not even an objective, as Hitler didn't want to become involved in street fighting. The objective was to cut the Volga supply line to the Russian forces in the Caucasus and block the Don-Volga-gap.

The original operation Blue was meant to cut the supply lines at Stalingrad first and *then* advance towards the Caucasus, but Gröfaz decided to split AG South and pursue the campaign towards Caucasus while simultaneously securing AG A's flank. //roger.duprat.copenhagen. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.243.127.89 (talk) 09:34, 1 August 2008 (UTC)

When in the 1940's, 1950's, 1990's did the Second World War End?

As the article is now it states that the war ended with the victory over the axis Armed forces, e.g. VE and VJ day but technically this was not the correct date for the ending of the war.

The U.S. ended its state of war with Germany on October 19, 1951 at 5:45 p.m. The U.S. state of war with Germany had been maintained for legal reasons[4] (In 1949 the state of war was modified but not suspended since "the U.S. wants to retain a legal basis for keeping a U.S. force in Western Germany") but in mid 1951 the Western Allies; the U.S., UK, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the Italian Republic moved to end the state of war with Germany.War's End The state of war between Germany and the Soviet Union was ended in early 1955.[5].

The U.S. President declared the termination of Hostilities of World War II on December 31, 1946. Treaties of peace with Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary were concluded on February 10, 1947. By a joint resolution approved July 25, 1947, many wartime statutes were repealed. The U.S. Congress, by a joint resolution of October 19, 1951, declared the 'end of the war' with Germany.[6]

West Berlin was formally under Allied occupation and a final peace treaty not signed until the 1990's, when did the Allies end the state of war with Japan, and when did they sign a peace treaty? This should be noted somewhere in the article. --Stor stark7 ^Speak 17:01, 24 July 2008 (UTC)

Good point. It is also worth mentioning that there still no peace treaty between Japan and Russia, as well as neither the date of Sept 2, 1945 nor the Missouri battleship were mentioned in the article.
However, even without that the article looks more like being written by lawer, not historian. As compared to grandious battles and terrible crimes that were mentioned in the article only briefly (if mentioned at all), those facts hardly deserve mentioning. So if someone is intended to expand the article, let's better tell about the War itself.--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:41, 24 July 2008 (UTC)

Archive needed

This discussion page has gotten rather long. Can someone archive it? I'd do it but I don't know how to archive. Thanks. Caden S (talk) 16:26, 24 July 2008 (UTC)

I've archived all of the threads related to the start date into a topical archive, accessible from the archive box. It seems to me that the issue is more or less resolved, so the threads here aren't really necessary anymore. Parsecboy (talk) 16:51, 24 July 2008 (UTC)

I agree. And good job. Thanks. Caden S (talk) 17:04, 24 July 2008 (UTC)

The last sentence in "Axis advances"

Could anybody explain me what does it mean: "By contrast the Germans were steadily making preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union, amassing forces on the Soviet border, particularly in Finland and Romania"? According to the plan Barbarossa, major German forces were staged in Eastern Prussia and Poland with almost no troops in Finland. If noybody minds I'll delete "particularly in Finland and Romania". Best regards. --Paul Siebert (talk) 15:26, 4 August 2008 (UTC)

Casaulties diagram

Casaulties diagram shows more than 1,5 mln deaths in India. Most of them as civilians, only small number - as military. There was, of course, many India soldiers in British expeditionary or colonial units, but what is a reason for such a huge number of civilian deaths, when India wasn't the theatre of direct military action during WWII?!

Are there any reliable sources?

217.98.34.129 (talk) 23:31, 6 August 2008 (UTC)Paul

Perhaps, the Bengal famine? With respect, Ko Soi IX (talk) 23:54, 6 August 2008 (UTC)

Yeah it was the Bengal famine I think. Wokelly (talk) 15:21, 12 August 2008 (UTC)

What America?

Umm.. did america actually fight in this war? This article relegates operations such as Iwo Jima to one sentence while going indepth on shit people don't really need to know much about. There's too much reference to "western allies", allies and commonwealth. Say which country did what damn it.

I mean wow.. there's even a section on home front and production and no mention of American production? Was this written by germans?

If you compare the Battle of Iwo Jima (that was mentioned only briefly) with the Battle of Smolensk (that wasn't mentioned at all) you understand that major battles of Pacific and Western Front were just a childish sports as compared with ordinary battles at Eastern Front. Just do what I did: go to your local library and look through archives of old newspapers (NYT, for instance). During the WWII peoples were ignorant: they didn't see the "Save Private Ryan" and other films of this type, so their vision was a little bit different and little bit more adequate.
You can also look at the List of World War II battles to see where major WWII battles took place.
I guess after that you will have to agree that American contribution is even exaggerated. --Paul Siebert (talk) 18:19, 15 August 2008 (UTC)

By the way, the German point of view is the most adequate: they know who really won them. --Paul Siebert (talk) 18:25, 15 August 2008 (UTC)

For the Germans, the Western front was little more than sideshow. If they won in the east, the US would not be able to touch them, if they lost in the east, they were far more ruined then they would be at the hands of the Americans. In June 1944, just before the (over-emphasized) Overlord landings, something like a quarter of the forces available to the Wehrmacht were deployed in the west, while millions of soldiers were grinding each other away in the massive battles of attrition in the east. Strategically, the American war effort is incomparable to the Soviet one. The casualties say it all: Americans lost (both in the Pacific and Europe) just over 300,000 men, the Soviets lost 20,000,000.

Also, the Western Allied forces were simply no match to the Germans. Their equipment and tactics (especially tanks) were far inferior to those of the Wehrmacht (and the Soviets). The Ardennes offensive and the Battle of Normandy are the best examples of this. (Patton's 3rd Army is probably the only formation coming anywhere close) --DIREKTOR ^(TALK) 18:36, 15 August 2008 (UTC)

I wouldn't agree with the Soviet loss number. The total loss (military plus civilian) were 26 to 27 million provided that population of Baltic states, Western Belarussia and Western Ukraine considered to be Soviet (otherwise that number is 2 to 3 million less). Soviet military losses were in between 8.6 and 10.5 million. The difference comes form the number of Soviet POWs. However, the most important is a number of Axis losses: number of Germans, Romanians, Italians, Hungarians killed or captured during Eastern Front battles was much higher than in other places. --Paul Siebert (talk) 19:03, 15 August 2008 (UTC)

The casualties do NOT say it all, not by a long way. War is a bit more complex than that. Casualties in the Battle of Britain, for example, were miniscule, but the battle had enormous strategic implications.

By the way, most of the time US units faced german units, they won. I wonder how they did that, being "far inferior". Anyway, I am not sure what any of this has to do with improving the article. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 18:53, 15 August 2008 (UTC)

Sometimes even a small scale battles have an enormous importance. Sometimes their importance is self-evident, sometimes is not.
What you guys take for granted is an extreme importance of Western Front/Pacific, despite all major land forces were concentrated at the Eastern front and despite WWII was primarily a land war, not naval one. I disagree, and I can provide evidences. My first evidence is a number of enemy soldiers killed. If you think breaking the Enigma code or occupation of Madagascar is equally important - explain that, please. Vague phrases like War is a bit more complex are beautiful of course, but they explain nothing. I can argue that war is much more simple: you must kill the enemy, and probably pay with you life for that, and there no other way to win a war. Small battles with enormous strategic implication just help to to that.
As regards to US units facing german units, it is impossible to compare the end-of-the-war Germans, who suffered multiple calamitous defeats from the Soviets, who had lost their air superiority, who were badly outgunned and outnumbered by Allies, with Germans during 1941-1942 when the Soviets were fighting almost alone. And, when those weakened Germans hammered US at Ardennes the major Soviet Vistula offensive was needed to push them back.
By the way, as far as I remember, US tanker had an order not to enter any direct engagements with German Panther tanks.--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:42, 15 August 2008 (UTC)

I do not mean to belittle the American war effort. It simply was what it was, I myself am certainly not pro-Soviet or "pro-Red Army". However, there is a tendency in western historiography (for example: Sulzberger), and especially in the media, to over-emphasize the western allies because emphasizing their victories is more "politically correct". Noone likes Stalin or his rule, but his army did the work. The Wehrmacht was destroyed in the east (Stalingrad, Kursk, Bagratian), and was attacked in the west only when it was little more than a shell of its former self. Even then, a fraction of this depleted military force was able to frustrate, delay, and humiliate the numerically far more superior Western allied forces (sans air support!). Of course, the allied bombing campaign was significant but, as Paul says, this was in the end a land war.

Hypothetically, had the Wehrmacht been split equally between the western and eastern fronts, Overlord would not have stood a chance, and Italy would have been cleared. Of course, that would mean the 500 divisions of the massive Red Army would have steamrollered the Germans in the east... --DIREKTOR ^(TALK) 20:09, 15 August 2008 (UTC)

Whatever. This page is to discuss improvements to the article, not to argue our personal opinions, however interesting those may be. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 19:54, 15 August 2008 (UTC)

We're not "arguing opinions". We're discussing possible (unlikely) changes in emphasis by using simple facts. --DIREKTOR ^(TALK) 20:13, 15 August 2008 (UTC)

Absolutely agree. I don't want the article to be "pro-Soviet" or "pro-American". I want it to be correct. That is why I am interested to know what are the arguments that support the present structure of the article: Pacific > Western Front > Eastern Front. --Paul Siebert (talk) 20:24, 15 August 2008 (UTC)--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:24, 15 August 2008 (UTC)

I'm not sure I understand your question, we should definitely consider an increased emphasis on the events in the eastern front... --DIREKTOR ^(TALK) 11:18, 16 August 2008 (UTC)

My question was actually addressed to peoples who shares DMorpheus' vision of the WWII history. The argument like The casualties do NOT say it all, not by a long way. War is a bit more complex than that is very common. Those guys imply that, for some reason, comparatively small military operation in the West and Pacific had more significant strategic implication that those in the Eastern Front. Sometimes their rationale is quite obvious. For instance, the effect of the Battle of Britain was much more serious that just shutting down 1,887 German aircrafts. Similarly, sinking Bismark was much more important than destroying several German infantry divisions. However, for many other cases it simply doesn't work. Let us take the War Becomes Global section. I admit that formation of the alliance between Britain and USSR or American oil embargo were extremely important to be described in details. Nevertheless, the major event, that had ultimately lead to Nazis defeat, was the failure of the plan Barbarossa. The failure of blitzkrieg had broken German's schedule and caused the first major defeat of Wehrmacht in the second bloodiest battle in the world history. It is also worth mentioning that starting from June 22 USSR was fighting against Axis almost alone (I found numerous articles in that time newspapers where everyone points out that German pressure on UK almost disappeared, so she got a break that was vital for her), and even when the US entered the war it had a little effect during 1942. Have those facts been reflected in this section? You see, they wrote: "Hitler went to Moscow, but the winter was too cold, so Germans decided to wait a little but, whereas Russians took some divisions from Far East and slightly moved Nazis back". I don't know who wrote that but sources used were terrible and the facts were presented absolutely unsatisfactorily.
As regards to sources, I have a feeling that during last 50 years there was a considerable drift among Western researcher towards exaggeration of Western efforts and belittling the contribution of USSR. If you look, for instance, at the war time newspapers, you will see how dramatically the facts presented there differ from what they write about WWII now.
Therefore, I suspect, the whole description of the war in the current article is extremely biased, although I am not 100% sure. That is why I am very interested to know what is a ground for such a representation of the WWII history (I mean sources other that popular websites, Discovery channel and revisionist history books). If I got no serious arguments supporting the present state of things, I am intended to rise a question about considerable changing of the article's structure.
Funny, but the anonymous author who had initiated the current section made very reasonable suggestion: Say which country did what damn it. The article is very faceless: it looks like those guys who wrote it were trying to avoid any mentioning of concrete names, countries and events. They, probably think the vague article is more neutral. Formally everything is correct: you can find needed references somewhere in the article and obtain needed information there. However, you can do it if you already know the history of WWII, whereas an ordinary reader, who knows almost nothing about that, will get absolutely wrong impression. We have to fix it. --Paul Siebert (talk) 19:52, 16 August 2008 (UTC)

A minor factor in how the current article was shaped is that, when writing about an attack by 3000 soldiers versus another made by 3 million soldiers, the art of writing will not support absolute quantitative parity between the two martial efforts. You can't have a thousand times as many words for the larger attack or you'll get bogged down in descriptions of units standing by, waiting their turn to be sent forward. Just sayin'... Binksternet (talk) 22:09, 16 August 2008 (UTC)

Correct. That is why it is so important to define major points, otherwise people just write about thing they are familiar with leaving really important events behind the scope. This simply causes amplification of ignorance, because the next generation of writers will take these 'facts' for granted.
There is no need to devote 1000 times more space for the battle of 3 million soldiers. Just say: "that was a key battle that determined the fate of the war". What we have in the article, however, is just enumeration of events without any serious attempt to estimate their strategic implications. As a result, we have 10 skirmishes in one theater plus one major battle on another combined together - and you cannot understand from the text what was the relative scale and importance of them. To understand something, a reader have to go by the references provided (or not provided; I've just inserted a reference on the Battle of Britain that appeared to be absent in the "Axis Advances" section!). --Paul Siebert (talk) 00:02, 17 August 2008 (UTC)

An additional section is required regarding the end of the war and all activities held post-war (trials, settlements etc.).

<--I think there may be an issue of significance in play. On the EFront, there were lots of large battles that didn't (or didn't seem to) change the course of the E war much, any more than battles in China had a big impact on the PacWar. The WFront battles tended to have a more obvious influence on the outcome. If you can show EFront battles (outside the obvious ones: Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk) changing the course, include them. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 18:55, 17 August 2008 (UTC)

The difference between Sino-Japanese war and Nazi-Soviet war was quite obvious. Although a full scale war raged in China staring from 1937, Japanese were strong enough to start full scale offensives against the US and UK in Indochina, Indonesia, Burma, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Pacific etc. In addition to that, they kept their best million sized Kwantung Army near the Soviet border. In contrast to that, after Hitler invaded USSR, Germans appeared to be unable to pay serious attention to other theatres, because Eastern Front took almost all their resources and manpower. For instance, on Jul 13, 1941, the New York Times reported:" There must have been relief in the western half of occupied Europe when Hitler turned his attention to Russia. While his mammoth campaign engages all his energies he cannot concentrate on the organization of the "New Order".... The truth is that the balance in favor of Britain has been restored in the Mediterranean even more strikingly than in the Atlantic".
You probably know that during 1941-1944 both Western Allies and the Soviets used to call the prospective full scale invasion of Western Europe a "Second Front". Neither Roosevelt nor Churchill consider the campaign in Libya or invasion of Sicily to be an adequate substitute for the Second Front, therefore there was a consensus among them about Eastern Front as the major land theatre of war in Europe until D-Day at least.
After D-Day, situation didn't change much. During operation Overlord, Western Allies faced 380,000 German army and ultimately destroyed it, opening the path to Northern France. Almost at the same time the Soviets launched their operation Bagration against 800,000 German Army Group centre, and also destroyed it opening the path to Berlin. In addition to that, almost at the same time they started another, equally successful, major Lvov-Sandomierz offensive against 900,000 German troops, making the Soviet invasion of Hungary and Slovakia possible. A month later one more Jassy-Kishinev offensive destroyed 500,000 Genman troops and 400,000 Romanian troops and forced Romania, the last Nazi's oil source, to surrender. Note, operation Overlord started on June 6 and ended on August 30, operation Bagration started on June 22 ended on August 19, Lvov-Sandomierz started on July 13 ended July 29, Jassy-Kishinev started on Aug 20, ended August 29, so those four campaigns proceeded almost concurrently.
I think the natural conclusion unbiased reader has to draw from that should be: Not only the Eastern Front battles did changed the course of the war. They, actually, constituted the major part of WWII. --Paul Siebert (talk) 04:13, 18 August 2008 (UTC)

I just did quick count and the US gets more mentions as a country than either the UK or Soviets. I think that's enough. DJ Clayworth (talk) 19:10, 18 August 2008 (UTC)

I think, Paul, you've demonstrated my point. Both Germany & Japan had large proportions of their forces tied down in other theatres, unable to deploy them elsewhere, & unable to achieve decisive results where they were, while their enemies, for the most part, couldn't, either. I don't disagree the simple fact these forces were tied down was an important factor to the outcome(s), & it demonstrably was; to illustrate how is reaching into speculation (or OR, absent sources).

What I'm trying to get at is, few battles in these "forgotten" theatres had major influence on the broader war except those noted. By the time of of Bagration, Germany was well doomed & I'm not sure that counts as a "turning point" (but does merit inclusion as important). By contrast, 2d Alamein, Torch, & Husky in ETO, & Coral Sea, Midway, & Watchtower in PTO, do count as turning points. Am I making myself clear? (It's a perennial problem for me not to be...)

Was the Eastern Front the major German theatre? No argument. Was it "the major part of WWII"? Not for the U.S., Britain/Commonwealth, ROC, or Japan. Overemphasis on EFront is as wrong as underemphasis. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 19:27, 18 August 2008 (UTC)

Probably, I didn't completely understand your point, but I don't think I demonstrated it. The difference between Eastern front and China is dramatic, and they cannot be combined under the common definition other theatres. Once again, by 1940 Japan had almost neutralized China, that was unable to start any serious offensive against IJA. Were Japan be unable to deploy forces elsewhere, the WWII in Burma or Pacific had never started. However, the events in December 1941 clearly demonstrate that Japan was more than capable to launch major offensive against two great powers, and subsequent events demonstrated that she only slightly overestimated her capabilities. The only role China played during the war was tying down Japanese army. Form 1940, it didn't pose a serious military threat for her, and Operation Ichi-Go, that happened less then a year before the end of the war, is clear example for that. Even after complete naval defeat of Japan and devastating bombing campaign the major Soviet offensive was needed to defeat Japanese forces in the continent.
Situation in Eastern Europe was completely different. Starting from Operation Barbarossa, Hitler conducted only one offensive strategic campaign outside Eastern Front, the battle in North Africa. He was absolutely unable to do anything serious outside those two fronts. Many researchers agree that after Stalingrad and Kursk the need in Second Front was not crucial any more to defeat Nazis. Of course, fighting alone until the end of the war would be too costly for the Soviet Union, but its victory over Germans would be inevitable.
Not only Hitler appeared unable to advance in the East, it was incapable to stop the advancement of the Red Army: the Battle of Smolensk had breached a formidable defense line of Germans in the centre, the Battle of Dnieper demolished the "Eastern Wall" aimed to stop Soviet offensive in Urkaine, Bagration steamrolled German defence in Belarussian marshes, and so on. I think, there is no need to repeat that the scale of each of these operation is more impressive than that of the whole Italian campaign, or even Western Europe campaign. Their strategic implication is also quite obvious: they were breaching barriers, one by one, that protected Germany from full scale invasion of Soviet troops on its territory (that eventually happened). Therefore, I cannot understand why do you call all these battles just "tying down (or wearing down) German troops"? And the second things is absolutely unclear for me: why strategic significance of battles you named is so obvious for you? Torch, without any doubts, was a sideshow, both its scale and strategic (un)importance of Southern Italy doesn't make it a turning point for sure. I would agree about El-Alamein, but it cannot be compared with Stalingrad. Battles in Pacific, of course, were important for the victory over Japan, but, without doubts, Germany was a senior Axis member, and its defeat automatically led to defeat of Japan, whereas bloody battles during 1943-45 and, for instance, counter attack in Ardennes, clearly demonstrate how tremendous German capabilities were.
As regards to your notion that Eastern Front was not major for the US - you are absolutely right. It was not major for the US because American didn't fight there. Therefore, there is no sense to pay an attention to it in the article "America in WWII". But the name of present article is "World War II"....
I absolutely agree that overemphasis of Eastern Front is wrong. Really neutral article must be free of all overemphases. That is why it is absolutely necessary to come to consensus about major key points in WWII. I propose to create a list of these major battle and then to discuss it.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:20, 19 August 2008 (UTC)

My biases may be showing. I confess broad ignorance of the war in SU. Torch's significant for entry of the U.S. to ETO. (Its "sideshow" aspects I don't disagree with in a broader context, but that's speculation/OR.) I think you give too much credit to defeat of Germany influencing surrender of Japan. (I'd say defeat 'cause the two aren't necessarily connected, & it was perfectly within reach for Nimitz to bring it about, without ref Germany, before 7 May 45.) I discount any overwhelming importance to any battles on the EFront, comparable to (say) Midway, for Germany's continuing ability to hold. If it's of that level of importance, there should have been a bigger impact on Sov ability to advance, & I'm unaware of it. (Again, I avow ignorance, if it happened & I don't know it.) Alamein can't be compared with Stalingrad? On sheer numbers, no; on strategic influence, yes. Eighth Army had effectively turned the tide in NAf. (Leave aside Monty's incompetent pursuit & the decision to destroy PAA, rather than plug the Tunisian peninsula.) If ROC was insignificant, why weren't more troops withdrawn, as the Pacific went increasingly worse? Maybe it's just a matter of bad IJA decisions... And I repeat, simple ref to "scale" doesn't get it. Did the battle(s) in question transform the course of the war in theatre? Torch did. Alamein did. Midway did. Guadalcanal did. Moscow did. Stalingrad did. Kursk did. The Battle of the Atlantic did. And the Pacific submarine war unquestionably did, on smaller numbers than any others. What others did? TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 21:26, 19 August 2008 (UTC)

My understanding of situation with Japan is as follows. Japan was mostly a marine power, her land troops were able to conduct a war with China, but when ROC was generally neutralized, Japan faced a dilemma: to attack the US and UK (marine powers), or switch on the USSR. Since the first experience of the land engagement at Khalkhin-Gol was very negative, Japan decided to choose the US as more suitable opponent. (Probably, that was a suicidal decision, because UK and USSR (if the US maintained a neutrality) were hardly able to withstand against United Europe and Japan, but who knows? On July 1941 observers were absolutely sure that the USSR had no chances.)
I think that Khalkhin-Gol was too painful, otherwise I cannot understand why did Japan keep its largest and the best Kwantung Army near the Soviet border, apart from major theatres of war? Despite its successes in South Asia/Pacific, Japan was still very vulnerable against land invasion into Manchuria and Korea, that were strategically very important for her. By the way, these regions are very close to Japanese main islands so no naval domination in Pacific was needed to transfer materials and troops from/to there. Until Japan was not defeated in Manchuria, it was very difficult to force her to surrender, however, after loosing Manchuria Japan, had no chances. That is why Roosevelt and Churchill insisted the Soviets to enter the war against Japan.
As regards to troops withdrawal from ROC. In contrast with Germany that, thanks to the world's best railroad network, was quite able to move quickly any amount of troops from East to West and back, Japanese abilities to transfer troops by sea were limited by the end of the war. And I didn't say ROC was unimportant: it really tied down a huge amount of troops, they simply couldn't start their own offensive and defeat Japan. But, taking into account their limited resources, their contribution was more than considerable, and their ability to fight despite tremendous losses deserves utter respect.
El-Alamein was definitely a decisive battle, and if Rommel won this battle it could be a turning point also. However, even after defeat at El-Alamein the Germans could achieve the same goal (breaking to the Baku and Persian Gulf) by winning the Battle of Caucasus and the Battle of Stalingrad. The problem was that the Allies had to win both of these battles, whereas for Hitler even one victory (and a stalemate on the other theatre) was sufficient. Therefore, although the El-Alamein victory was vital for the Allies, it was not a turning point.
I would say, the real turning point was a battle of Smolensk and a battle of Moscow. It was the first major failure of Hitler's blitzkrieg strategy. The battle of Smolensk, that ended with German decisive victory, had broken the Barbarossa's schedule and first time during the war caused unacceptable Nazie's losses. As a result, they came to Moscow much later than they planned, and Red Army, devastated by pre-war Stalin's purges, got a time needed to prepare for counter-offensive.
1. Therefore, a summer-autumn campaign in 1941, despite a huge Axis advances did change a course of the war: the war that was expected to be a blitzkrieg, turned to a long war of attrition.
2. We both agree that The Battle of Moscow was a turning point.
3.I would say the Leningrad changed the course of war also: besides its intrinsic strategic significance, it was the last stronghold on the path to the Murmansk railroad. With Leningrad captured by Germany, American lend-lease would be very problematic, and Atlantic convoys became senseless.
4.Sevastopol/Crimea was also very important, because it is close to Romanian oil field. 350,000 German troops fought there for almost a year, because otherwise this peninsular could become a base for air attack on the sole German oil supply. Their victory changed the course of the war in favor of Germans, but it changed, nevertheless.
5. I already agreed about El-Alamein.
6. Stalingrad, obviously, although, Caucasus was equally important. Some sources point out that, probably, the biggest Hitler mistake to pay too much attention to Stalingrad that led to withdrawal of some (not all!) forces from Caucasus.
7. I would add a Tunisia campaign, because of a large number of KIA and POWs.
8.Kursk, definitely. The first large scale summer offensive campaign lost by Germans.
8. Torch, despite a small strategic effect caused Italian surrender, so politically it was very important.
9, 10, 11. Three battles in the East against formidable German defense lines (Smolensk, Dnieper, Bagration), did change a course of the war, because, would Germany stop the Soviets there, the war lasted much longer, and political map of the Europe was completely different.
And, of course, number 0. Battle of Britain. It definitely changed the course of the war.
I deliberately leave Pacific beyond the scope, although its importance for the victory over Japan was obvious. But, once again, I think that the major theatre was Europe, nevertheless. Best regards. --Paul Siebert (talk) 00:23, 20 August 2008 (UTC)

Japan attacked the Western Allies because it had no choice, or in other words, war was inevitable, this should pobably be noted. It certainly could not wage a war against both China, and potentially, the USSR with an embargo by the colonial powers and the US. The only choice Japan potentially had in 1941 was a complete retreat from China and acknowledgement of American economic dominance in the Pacific. This was a political impossiblity. A state like Japan was not about to give up the fight for the economic zone in its neighbourhood without a military struggle. Of course, the reason for the American embargo was the massive Chinese market for American industry, which was being contested by new Japanese economic power and its protectionism (not some romantic call for Chinese freedom). --DIREKTOR ^(TALK) 00:47, 20 August 2008 (UTC)

"Japan was mostly a marine power," Wrong. Japan was a mainly continental power with almost no grasp of blue water warfare. Her grasp of modern industrial war was derisively bad. Both IJA & IJN continued to believe expanding the war was a solution to the "China problem". I think you overrate IJA performance in China; the Chinese had held since 1937, with no sign of quitting.
"Khalkhin-Gol " It proved IJA was incapable of dealing with the Soviet Army on anything like equal terms (per above), & IJA, given a choice afterward between modernizing equipment & training, chose instead to emphasize moral superiority & bayonet charges.
"Japan decided to choose the US as more suitable opponent." This had less to do with a preference to the U.S. than a mistaken belief attacking UK would inevitably bring the U.S. in (which had more to do with interagency politics in Japan than reality).
"why did Japan keep its largest and the best Kwantung Army near the Soviet border, " Same reason she moved against UK & U.S.: to "settle the China question". As late as August 1945, IJAHQ suggested attacking the Soviet Union. (Believe it, or not.)
"vulnerable against land invasion into Manchuria and Korea" She was by far more vulnerable to strangulation of her SLOCs, & proved incompetent to protect them. (Viz PacFlt Sub Force.)
"Smolensk" Don't credit that one to SU, credit Hitler. Moscow, too, for all that. (Viz Stolfi's Hitler's Panzers East for why.) I won't argue against it as rising to the level of suited for inclusion. Ditto Alamein.
"Leningrad" Overrated. The Arctic convoys saw more end up on the bottom than delivered (or a comparable amount). Overland thru Iran made more sense, IMO; we can argue the delay mitigates that, & how much.
"Crimea" Agreed. I'd forgotten that one.
"Stalingrad" Agreed, but only because Hitler went there to begin with. It was strategically stupid, & isolation of N SU from Caucasian resources could have been readily done further south, with no quagmire or defeat there.
"Tunisia" If you mean a NAf campaign broadly, yes. If you mean after Torch/2d Alamein, no, because of the undue delay to no strategic benefit. Torch should have come ashore at Bonê , Monty & Ike should have bottled PAA in the peninsula & interdicted evac/resupply with sea/air power, then jumped directly to Sicily (blocking the escape across Strait of Messina from D-day), & set up strong light naval forces (PTs/MGBs) & bombers (B-25s/B-26s/Mossies) for interdiction & harassment/interdiction of LOCs in Italy, & heavies for attacks on S Ger & oil targets & places like Schweinfurt. I follow 1943, here. With this in place, jump immediately to France, with Anvil, followed promptly by Neptune (or vice versa, but promptly). With this before major 'phib ops begin in PTO (Galvanic?), the LC shortages shouldn't be an ish, which they were in the event, so the originally mooted timing would be able to be carried out, with the desired (& highly desirable!) fx.
"Torch" No reference Italy. It diverted force from England & what became Overlord, but saw the U.S. entry.
Husky, for bringing down Mussolini.
Avalanche, for its strategic folly & tying up manpower, resources, & shipping that otherwise would have accelerated the date of Neptune.
"Smolensk, Dnieper, Bagration" No comment; don't know enough. I question if it lengthens the war substantially, tho. UK/U.S. should manage to get ashore in 6/44 anyhow, & if SU is in more dire straits, pressure to move sooner is higher, getting Winston off his Italian pipedream & freeing men (& LCs!) for invading France; or if Germany is more heavily committed, defs in Normandy are weaker, emboldening UK/U.S..
"Battle of Britain" Agreed, letting UK serve as springboard, per Napoleonic Wars (among others). Also, however, a great missed opportunity for Winston & Portal (& whoever Harris replaced...) to deliver a hammer blow to Luftwaffe in France; Allen in Who Won the Battle of Britain? proposes attacking Ger bases & posits enough losses to Ger to make success in SU extremely unlikely. (Of course, this may have tipped the balance in favor of Herkules & Ger victory in NAfr....)
Japan out of scope? For importance postwar, yes; for consideration of importance during, I'd only add one: Saipan, which brought down the Japanese government. The Philippines was a stunt & sop to MacArthur. Iwo & Oki were driving the final nails home, nothing more; may have influenced the decision to drop the Bomb (effect is overstated, IMO).
Sov invasion of Manchuria was completely unnecessary for defeating Japan. FDR boobed in a major way, & precipitated the Korean War, stalemate in Korea to this day, the Chinese Civil War, & (IMO) ChiCom victory there. That, tho, rises to level of importance for postwar. And so does the use of the Bomb; it's been suggested (Clayton & Wells in Deutsch & Showalter's What If, if I've got my sources right) the U.S. willingness to use it on civilians, combined with city bombing in ETO, persuaded SU it might be used on them just as readily, & so prevented WW3.
"Japan attacked the Western Allies because it had no choice" Fat chance. Japan attacked in the hope of defeating China ("settling the China question", as Japan put it), cutting ROC LOCs. The attack on the U.S. at Pearl was in service of a defense of an attack on DEI, which needed (in Japanese eyes) an invasion of the Philippines. She'd have been better served striking south into DEI & ignoring P.I., & trying to cut a deal with the U.S., or effectively daring FDR to do something about it. (Politically, this was fabulously unlikely for Japan, I know; so was FDR keeping his promise to Winston, absent an attack on U.S. forces, even ones in the P.I..)
Battle of the Atlantic, on which most of the war in WEur, & aid to SU, depended.
Battle of the Pacific (if I can call it that), the destruction of Japan's merchant fleet by U.S. PacFleet subs, on which Japan's Pacific war depended. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 05:33, 20 August 2008 (UTC)

First. "Japan/Pacific beyond the scope" means this theatre had already got attention it deserves, everything is fine, therefore, no discussion is needed. I didn't want to understate its importance.
Second. It seems to me we use different scale in current discussion. For instance, under the invasion of Italy I mean Husky (sorry, when I wrote Torch I meant Husky), Avalanche and all auxiliary land, aeral and naval operations. If we apply you approach (consider each event separately) to the Eastern Front, the "Battle of Stalingrad" turns to a series of events as follows:
1. Fall Blau - attempt of German Army Group South to capture Stalingrad, Voronezh, North Caucasus. June 28-Aug 19.
2.Battle of City of Stalingrad, end of August - Nov 17.
3.Operation Uranus. Double enveloping of Italo-Romano-German forces. Nov 17 - beginning of December.
4. "Winter Storm". On Dec. 12, three panzerdivisions launched an offensive aimed to relieve German 6th army in Stalingrad.
5. Operation Saturn. Counter-offensive to Rostov-Kharkov. December - February.
Each of these evens deserves separate consideration. For instance, had Winter Storm be successful it turned Uranus to a disaster, so the importance of this battle is comparable to that at El-Alamein (6th army relieved, Soviet troops defeated, Germans moved to Caspian Sea, Iran, pro-nazi uprising in Iraq etc, etc.).

Third. Unfortunately, I cannot respond at all your points right now, I'll try to do it later. So now I just argue about strategic importance of Leningrad and Stalingrad. For you, the European part of USSR is just a featureless territory. However, besides advancements and retreats the Soviets used their territory and cities to produce armaments. Only 10% of all armaments were obtained from West. Soviet T-34 was produced in Kharkov and Stalingrad. Soviet KV-1 - in Leningrad. It was not easy to move all military plants to Ural for less than on year. Leningrad was a huge industrial centre. During the siege its plants continued to produce armament, so it was a huge military unit tying down German Army Group North. It was a base of Soviet Baltic fleet. It was a transport node. It was a barrier to Nazi's advancement to Archangel and to encirclement of Moscow. When I wrote about Murmansk railroad, I just mentioned one more reason (I though, others were obvious) for Leningrad's importance. And, with Leningrad captured, Soviet offensive in North would be much more problematic. So I would say, strategic significance of Leningrad was even underrated.
Regarding strategical stupidity of the move to Stalingrad. Hitler had no choice. He needed to solve several tasks simultaneously.
1. To destroy Soviet military industry. I already told, Stalingrad was an industrial centre. "Stalingrad tractor plant" the place of the fiercest battles, in reality produced T-34, and even during Sept-Oct was used as a tank repair facility.
2. To cut transport path from South to Moscow and Ural. Stalingrad was a huge transport node. During the battle the Soviets had to transfer oil from Baku to Krasnovodsk (Caspian east cost), and then by railroad through Central Asia. That created tremendous problems.
3. Simulteneously, he needed to neutralize Red Army that had nor been defeated and was preparing for new strategic offensive. So he was not in position to decrease a pressure on Soviets and to move where he wanted. And, in addition, there are only three land road to Transcaucas region: one railroad goes by the Black sea cost, another - by Caspian, and one highway through the middle of Caucasus ridge. They all can easily be blocked, so it was a separate task to reach Baku oil fields.
Many steps that Hitler did seem stupid because we don't take in consideration all factors. --Paul Siebert (talk) 04:23, 21 August 2008 (UTC)

The US liberated western-europe, together with the Soviets defeated Germany and single handedly defeated Japan. To dispute their involvement is a joke. Grey Fox (talk) 20:40, 21 August 2008 (UTC)

You've been watching too many films. Single handedly defeated Japan? Sure... Chinese, British and ANZAC forces etc did nothing at all and Russia did not rout Japanese forces in Manchuria. It was all the the US. --LiamE (talk) 21:49, 21 August 2008 (UTC)

I appreciate the cynical comment, but as you perhaps may have know the UK was weak and London lay in ruins and Australia was just a minor ally. It's true that the UK also contributed a lot to Japan's defeat, but that doesn't take anything away from the US. As for China, Japan destroyed China, quite literally. Ever seen the casualty counts? The US liberated them when they defeated Japan. Grey Fox (talk) 22:26, 21 August 2008 (UTC)

"beyond the scope" I don't intend to divide by theatre or say an equal # each, I mean to mention (say) 10 most-significant battles, the maj turning points in PTO, E/MTO, EFront.

Leningrad. Agreed on the strength of production; not so sure on strictly combat considerations. How do we measure the production impact? And how do we compare against the effect of Bomber Command & sub/ASW campaigns? And how do we judge the influence of tying up Ger troops there? As to encircling Moscow, I think that's overblown; the Germans had the strength for it in AGCenter, had Hitler not meddled. I won't argue against a keep on Leningrad, tho, just a caution on its status when we've got 12-13 candidates & need to trim a list.

Stalingrad. I'd subsume Fall Blau, the battle of the city, & Uranus under "Battle of Stalingrad", & link out with mentions of the discrete operations. I won't say it's unimportant, if only for the same reason Avalanche was: sheer strategic stupidity, but going more discrete is getting too "operational" for an umbrella article, which ought to be looking at strategy/grand strategy.

Saturn. 1st maj Sov counterattack? Include.

I divide Husky from Avalanche because 1 was reasonable & the other wasn't, &, yes, because I'm more familiar with ETO than EFront. Taking the same reasoning as Stalngrad (for the sake of a common approach), include 'em both under "Battle of Italy" & link out.

Having (somehow...) managed to overlook it before, let me now suggest, include the bombing campaign, & its repercussions on the Battle of the Atlantic. Yeah, another ETO point...except, Speer says bombers led to deploying 88s to AA rather than AT on EFront...

Off topic (some), I say Stalingrad was stupid for the same reasons I think the Tunisia campaign & Patton's clearing of Brittany were: blockade would have idled production there (as it would've bottled up troops elsewhere) without active operations, by cutting fuel supplies. (U.S./UK Bomber Command made the same mistake attacking factories, rather than river/rail transport.) I think the vaunted "move beyond the Urals" is overstated; Cockburn (I think) says the move was well in progress, nearly complete, before 6/41. (I don't have it in front of me, & I think my copy's in storage. *sigh*) And, if it isn't mentioned already in BoAtl,ref Middleton's (?) proposition in Convoy RN goofed by not heavily attacking German subs with all available DDs early in the war; he suggests RN had the chance to stop the U-bootwaffe in its tracks. (This may be too speculative, demanding a change in RN doctrine to one closer the USN's prosecute to kill, rather tnan RN "get the convoy thru", & I don't know enough about Middleton to know which he was following.)

Form a practical standpoint, I do see a problem with a "Battle of Stalingrad" or "Battle of Italy", tho: how to link to more than one article at once. Create a variety of dab page? TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 23:48, 21 August 2008 (UTC)

I just realized, the task is getting more complicated that seemed to be. This article is about the course of WWII, not the story how the brave Allies defeated the evil Axis. For instance, you say Smolensk cannot be credited to the Soviets, but it is not a reason to be not included. If we decided to select 10-15 candidates, the most prominent German and Japanese successes must be among them definitely: the Battle of France, the Battle of Norway, Yugoslavia, probably Poland, Pearl Harbour, maybe China, Burma, Singapore, initial phase of Barbarossa. And finally it will resemble a typical lousy book like Top 10 Battles of the Great War, that I hate. It will be absolutely misleading whatever candidate we choose, because it is impossible to fit all WWII into 10-15 battles. Therefore, I propose to go to a larger scale and to look at the article Campaigns of World War II as a starting point.

As regards to Stalingrad, what blockade do you speak about? Do you know a terrain there? A large forestless plane, without any barriers suitable for defense, spans from Rostov to Volga, and at the very end of that plane a thin band of urban area (in some places, only three blocks wide) is stretched for 50 kilometer along Volga. That was a city of Stalingrad during a war time. I cannot imagine any city that was more vulnerable towards an attack from the west. It was extremely tempting to try to take it at one huge blow. (In connection to that, the phrase the Soviets decided to make their stand at Stalingrad which was in the path of the advancing German armies is simply insulting for the Soviets, because one has to be absolutely stupid to make such a decision. They simply had no choice, but they didn't plan such a defense in purpose, in contrast to Kursk, for instance.)
On other hand, if you look at the map you understand that a siege or a blocade of Stalingrad would create tremendous problems for the attackers. Therefore, Hitler was not as stupid as he seemed to be.
In addition, Hitler could not afford another major siege because by that moment Germany had a blitzkrieg economy. Try to look at this: A. S. Milward. The End of the Blitzkrieg. The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1964), pp. 499-518. This is a study devoted to the evolution of German economy during the war. This research is based generally on the United States Strategic Bombing Survey and discuss a reason why did the "blitzkrieg" economy switched to the "war of attrition" economy in 1942. To my big surprise, the article considers only two factors: failure of Operation Barbarossa and Stalingrad. According to the Survey, The disaster of Stalingrad concluded definitely the Blitzkrieg phase of World War Two., whereas the author argues that it was the failure of the first Russian campaign, rather than the catastrophe of Stalingrad, that caused Hitler to abandon the Blitzkrieg, so economically the Blitzkrieg ended in January I942. Stalingrad merely convinced the unbelievers. The most interestingly, the article is written in such a way like there was no other war at all outside Eastern Front during 1941-1942, no African campaign, no bombing, no battle of Atlantic, nothing. I conclude that during that time no events outside Eastern Front had a comparable impact on Germany. Therefore, I think it would be necessary to state explicitly in the article that continuous high scale battles in the Eastern Front during 1941-1945, that took more than 2/3 of whole military resources of Germany and its satellites, created a background for the course of whole WWII in Europe, and, after that, to discuss everything else: Afrika, Stalingrad, Kursk, Italy, Atlantic, Normandy, bombing, Bagration and whatever else we decided to include.
--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:52, 23 August 2008 (UTC)

Yugoslavia an "Axis success"? The invasion was standard blitzkrieg steamrollering, yes, but something like that was expected, its hardly an "amazing success". Afterwards, the most annoying resistance movement in Europe spawned there and diverted literally hundreds of thousands of Axis troops from the Eastern front. :) --DIREKTOR ^(TALK) 01:36, 23 August 2008 (UTC)

It was a success in the same degree as Barbarossa during a period of July - October 1941 was. I think, you agree that initially everything looked fine for Hitler... :-) --Paul Siebert (talk) 03:19, 23 August 2008 (UTC)

Smolensk. Important for the same reason Avalanche & Stalingrad broadly are: senior command stupidity (Hitler's).
Blockade. I'm relying on accounts (Devil's Virtuosos among them) suggesting Fall Blau should have cut the Don-Volga bridge south of Stalingrad, along with (IIRC) rail & pipeline links north.
"'the Soviets decided to make their stand at Stalingrad" AFAIK, it was Hitler, more than the Russians, who decided to feed more & more men into Stalingrad; whether this made strategic sense for the Russians is way outside my knowledge.
"Top Ten List of Battles of World War Two". No, I hope it doesn't degenerate into a Letterman bit, either. I just mean to limit the number so it's not a litany of Battle A, Battle B, Battle XC, & no context. Ditto my "strategic/grand strategic" POV.
"This article is about the course of WWII, not the story how the brave Allies defeated the evil Axis." At the risk of being facetious, I'm not sure how you separate the two. I understood the issue to be seeking a balance between Sov & U.S./UK contributions, & between theatres.
"the most prominent German and Japanese successes must be among them definitely" No argument, except my immediately previous comment holds.
"more than 2/3 of whole military resources of Germany and its satellites" And we are back at the central problem as I see it. The bulk of that effort was an indecisive seesaw until, what, mid-'43? That amounts to describing the Pacific War as, "The IJA fought continuously in China from 1937, until the U.S. attacked Guadalcanal & Saipan, then began bombing Japan. A few U.S. submarines (& a handful of British & Dutch ones) attacked Japan's trade, too." I can already hear the howls of protest that is bound to engender, never mind latent Cold War opposition to more credit to SU.

I repeat, numbers alone do not tell the full story. If they did, nothing in North Africa would ever be included, because none of the actions until after Torch involved more than, what, 3 divisions on either side? Nor Guadalcanal (about 1.5 each?). Saipan? Tarawa? Midway? (Let's see, 7 carriers at about 3500 each, 4 crudivs... Nope.) The U.S. subwar amounted to about 2 infantry divisions, even counting Nimitz's staff & the cryppies; it had more effect than any of the battles fought in PTO. (Don't complain, read Blair's Silent Victory.) Would you seriously suggest omitting it? And Burma may've had more manpower, but it most assuredly had less influence. (As the joke went, in 1975, BBC reports from Burma, "Normal patrol activity continued.") Shall we place Imphal over Guadalcanal & Saipan in importance? I should say, no. The measure cannot be raw numbers, or EFront & CBI will always supervene. It must rely on importance or effect on the outcome. Otherwise, IMO, it's giving undue weight. Was 2d Alamein, or Coral Sea, or whatever, less strategically important simply because fewer troops were engaged? No. In none of these cases, for or against, do raw numbers tell the full story. And I'm not sure there's a way out of the conundrum. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 07:53, 23 August 2008 (UTC)

Dear Trekphiler. You probably misunderstood me. I didn't propose to go back to old arguments, and I was never insisting on focusing at raw numbers solely. However, I cannot agree that the Eastern Front was an indecisive seesaw. You probably agree that WWII had two stages: a tremendous success of militarized powers with comparatively limited economical capabilities (a blitzkrieg stage), and a battle of economics (a war of attrition stage). I think, you agree that both USSR (Europe) and US (+UK) (Pacific) used similar strategy: the USSR was capable to deploy larger amount of troops, tanks, fighters, whereas the US (and partially UK) were building a wast number of battleships, carriers and strategic bombers (and provided armaments for other Allies). And there were no chances for Germany and Japan to win the war as soon it had passed to the second stage. Therefore I conclude that the turning point of the war was be the moment when such a transition happened, and the events that led to this transition, accordingly, should be considered decisive events (see above what these events were according to the sources cited).
In addition, I would say that possession of Ukraine and Caucasus (with their resources) was sufficient for Germany to continue a war of attrition for considerable time, and possession of the whole European part of USSR would make Germany almost invincible. Japan resolved similar problem before her attack of the US/UK by occupation of Korea and Manchuria. Generally speaking, a situation in China by 1941 was similar to a situation in Europe if Hitler managed to conquer Moscow and Leningrad (equivalent of Chinese Beijing and Shanhgai), Eastern Ukraine (similar to Chinese Manchuria and Huang-He valley) and push Soviet troops beyond Ural. Therefore, since European territories of the USSR had intrinsic strategic value, any battle there could have strategic importance. The difference between them and El-Alamein, for instance, was that in Afrika there was a single bottleneck, Cairo, that prevented Germans form penetration to Middle East, whereas in the USSR such a bottleneck was 2000 km wide.
Conversely, after Germans were pushed beyond Dnieper they got doomed. What made that possible? I would draw the following sequence of events: 1941, Smolensk, Sevastopol, Moscow, Leningrad. 1942, Stalingrad, Caucasus, Rzhev (the last one was a disaster, but it made Uranus possible). 1943, Kursk, Smolensk. Those are the event making a break throug the Eastern Wall possible, therefore I don't understand if one of them could be considered "indecisive".
And, in parallel to those battles, the Soviets were conducting a minor battles in a background mode along about 2000 km long front, that took more Axis troops and resources that all other theatres taken together.
I agree everything there looks like a seesaw, that is why I decided to look at the World War I article. You remember that in the West there was a similar seesaw there. However, the description of the cource of the war starts from that very seesaw, continues with naval battles, Serbia, Turkey and then ends with: "While the Western Front had reached stalemate, the war continued in the East" with a reference to Eastern Front (World War I) article. And I wouldn't say such a way to present a course of WWI is incorrect. It was that seesaw that eventually determined the fate of WWI. If we apply such an approach (which is common in the Western historiography) to WWII we should start our story with Poland, France, Yugoslavia and then to pass to Barbarossa, Stalingrad, Kursk, Bagration, Berlin with a brief reference to the Western front ("see main article").
Note, please, I don't propose that, I just try to demonstrate that the argument like indecisive seesaw doesn't work here.
Besides inverted East-West polarity, there is one more considerable difference between WWI and WWII. Whereas (during WWI) Western Entente powers appeared to be unable to exit a stalemate by themselves, the Soviets (during WWII) ultimately managed to divert a seesaw towards the West ending the war in Berlin and Vienna. Therefore, a description of indecisive seesaws that had led to that results deserves to be discussed at least in the same extent as the Western seesaw of during WWI does. Therefore, I don't understand why a full paragraph in the article is devoted to rather moderate pre-war American contribution (Throughout this period, the neutral United States took measures to assist China and the Western Allies. In November 1939, the American Neutrality Act was amended to allow Cash and carry purchases by the Allies.[47] In 1940, following the German capture of Paris, the size of United States Navy was significantly increased and after the Japanese incursion into Indochina, the United States embargoed iron, steel and mechanical parts against Japan.[48] In September, the United States further agreed to a trade of American destroyers for British bases.[49]) whereas the fact that several million sized German troops were continuously being destroyed during four years long bloodiest seesaw has not been reflected almost at all.
I also agree that situation with numbers is rather complicated. However, although the raw numbers doesn't tell a full story, it does not mean that raw numbers mean nothing, so the problem remains how elaborate a balanced description of the course of the war. Actually, I see almost no events already present in the article that can be omitted. The problem is that many other events and factors, equally important (at least), have been omitted, or their representation has been done in such a manner that doesn't allow newcomers to understand their actual importance.
In addition, sometimes even the raw numbers can tell a full story. For instance, although at least 2 to 3 million Japanese troops were tied down in China, the total Japanese losses (KIA) were 480,000 in that theatre, with about 2 million at all theatres totally. I conclude that these raw numbers make American and UK contribution quite evident. In Eastern Front, however, Axis members lost 5,100,000 KIA (4,300,000 of them - Germans) with total Germany losses of 5,300,000 (in Eastern, Western, Mediterrain, North).
Honestly, I don't see our points of view are too different, I hope we can improve the article working together. By the way, what do you thing about creating a new talk section?--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:27, 24 August 2008 (UTC)

What America? arbitrary break (cont.)

Well, here is a new talk section.

I feel like saying "I told you so", but essentially the problem of the article is that it was built upon a rather broad and one sided source of references. This is not really Oberiko's fault because many authors who write Second World War, do so badly, not understanding concepts like Theatre's of war, campaigns, strategy, and that not every battle, is a "battle".

Given the article is a strategic overview, it can only include strategically important events and people connected to them. However, how is this possible when the use of the word "Strategic" is voted down by Wikipedia editors in reference to Red Army operations, preferring to call everything possible a "battle" regardless of the scope or significance because of the "its an English Wikipedia" argument!

Strategy is absolutely about territory and numbers because they are the raw representation of national commitment in terms of national resources to the war effort. However, many argue that US effort in the Pacific and Atlantic was over an area considerably larger than that of the Eastern Front. I can only suggest that one can compare area troop density for the theatres. The average battleship or aircraft carrier had crew equivalents of a full strength Soviet brigade, but at times a division. During the war the Red Army fielded just over 1,000 pre-war or wartime raised or rebuilt infantry-type divisions (not counting independent brigades and regiments) alone. US and UK between them did not put to the seas 1,000 battleships, cruisers and aircraft carriers, and ultimately its people who counted and not hardware.

Its hard to compare for example the total time in combat theatre of the Western Front after Normandy of just over 10 months when most Allied troops spent 3-6 months in the front line at most, and no more than a few weeks of continuous combat to the Eastern Front where troops on both sides stayed in the combat theatre for an average of 2-3 years, and saw combat for months at a stretch with the occasional few days of a lull when they were only subjected to occasional harassing artillery fire or strafing.

In my humble opinion, the article is good, but needs to be gone over for identifying if something is mentioned because there are more books published on it, or because it was truly significant to the course of the conflict--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 08:34, 24 August 2008 (UTC)

As has been said before, troop numbers do not mean everything. Technological superiority (look at the recent Gulf wars) and strategic territorial gain are important too. In extreme example of this is the Battle of Britain, where the number of combatants on both sides was tiny but the end result was that Germany could not overrun the UK thus leaving it as an essential foothold for the Allies later in the war. Martin Hogbin (talk) 09:16, 24 August 2008 (UTC)

1. I never proposed to compare field division with a battleship. Sinking Bismark was much more important than destroying one German division. However, a comparison between different land battles is quite possible and it has to be done taking into account both strategic significance and troops sizes, although the numbers by themselves are not necessarily a major criterion. In my previous post (see above), that I modified recently, I tried to demonstrate a strategical significance of the East. In addition to that, the fact that more than a half of all Axis troops were fighting there during 1941-1945 is significant by itself. However, that fact has not been reflected in the article in its present version.
As regards to strategic operation, as far as I know it is a literal translation from Russian. They called their major offensives a strategic operation. Of course all of them had an immense strategic effect, but you are absolutely right that a terminology of the article has to be uniform.
2. Arguments about technological superiority are very common, but they must be used carefully. During the war the Soviets produced armaments that were comparable with what Germany had, although, in majority cases there were on superiority, of course. For instance, during 1941-42 modern Soviet tanks were superior that urged Germans to develop their famous Panther, Tiger, Bengal Tiger tanks (made especially as a response to T-34, KV-1 and IS-2) and even their formidable Ferdinands (that were sent to West later, because they appeared to have low efficiency in the East. Western Allies know Ferdinand under the name "Elefant"). However, both German and Soviet tanks were superior over Western Allies' tanks. As regards to planes, Soviet planes were on average somewhat inferior, although such a difference was not dramatic. And one have to take into account that during Barbarossa July - December the Germans lost at laest the same amount of aircrafts in the East as they did during the Battle of Britain, although aeral battles were only a minor part of Barbarossa. Generally, I see no appreciable difference in the technology level betwee the Soviets, Germans and Western Allies, although the tremendous capabilities of the US to produce a vast number of armaments played significant role when the war passed to the war of attrition stage.
Therefore, I don't see how do "technological superiority" arguments work in this case. --Paul Siebert (talk) 18:49, 24 August 2008 (UTC)

My point was just that troop numbers are not the only measure of importance in war. I think that we generally agree about this.Martin Hogbin (talk) 19:13, 24 August 2008 (UTC)

And my point is that operation of unproportionally small troops took unproportionally large space in the article without reasonable explanation. Note, I don't state the structure of the article to be incorrect by default, I am just trying to say the arguments for such a structure are not satisfactory. You see the technological arguments don't work, for instance.--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:23, 24 August 2008 (UTC)

I do not think there is much disagreement between us. No single measure tells all, and article space should correspond roughly with importance in the overall picture.Martin Hogbin (talk) 19:33, 24 August 2008 (UTC)

Paul, I think we may be arguing past each other to some degree over choice of words. What you call attrition I'd call a seesaw (or stalemate), because both sides were in rough balance, til SU (or WAllies, agreed) tipped it & it began to go mostly their way afterward, as it had for Germany before. (The same kind of situation more/less pertained in NAfr til 2d Alamein, IMO.)

"possession of Ukraine and Caucasus" That's a common view. Had it only been Ger/SU, I'd agree. Given Br & U.S., in keeping with traditional Br technique (dating to before Napoleon) of adding allies & nibbling at the edges (more/less what the MTO strategy was), I don't think it was practical, as much sense as it probably made in Ger.

"in Afrika there was a single bottleneck, Cairo" No, there was a single bottleneck, Malta, which the Brits used to strangle Rommel's supplies thru a masterful combo of crypto (reading Enigma) & air/sea power. The actual fighting in Africa was subordinate; absent supplies, notably fuel, Rommel was helpless.

"sequence of events" Put in those terms, i wouldn't disagree; I don't claim sufficient knowledge to debate it. I tend to see most of '42-'43 with Sov attacks met by Ger ctrattack, neither gaining clear success til the tide obviously turns in '44, & that's on a very rudimentary knowledge of EFront.

"stalemate" If I understand you correctly, parallelling WW1, I might be inclined to support greater emphasis on EFront, except WW1 saw only stalemate in most theatres. The situation here, I think, is more in line with how much weight Italy/Austria, Mesopotamia/Arabia, war at sea/convoys, & airwar get against the backdrop of stalemate. How much weight do the EFront battles deserve against how much effect they had? Again, I won't argue against your choices, just ask you to consider; as you describe them, the number & the significance sounds right.

"breaking stalemate" If I understand you correctly, again, I don't disagree. My only concern is which battles, & how much overall attention to give them. In that light, the weight on the U.S. contribution is overblown. Only, it plays into how UK & ROC managed to survive at all, which has strategic consequences that are of sufficient weight to deserve explaining. Maybe not all at once... (I'd delete "following the German capture of Paris, the size of United States Navy was significantly increased" as not strictly essential {& needlessly U.S.-centric} & move the rest to de-emphasize the U.S.) The problem is when it's happening & keeping the focus clear; it's a choice between putting events chronologically, like, "Ger & Rus fought here, then here, Japan fought here, U.S. passed Law, SU retreated, Japan advanced, U.S. traded DDs", & putting the national events together in blocs during around the same period (which the U.S. description now does). The first seems to me to require a greater familiarity with the subject to keep a handle on; the latter may seem to give undue weight to certain powers or events. I don't see a really good way to do it.

On China, I think the effect is overstated. Japan was still fighting there, with no end in sight, in 9/45, after 14 years. That fits my definition of stalemate (of quagmire, frankly); you think Vietnam was a long one...? I picture Chiang saying what (IIRC) Ho did: how long will the war last? Until we win. And don't forget, Chiang thought (correctly, I think) Mao was more dangerous than Japan.

On omissions, I won't disagree. I'm not by any means suggesting deletions (or big ones, anyway).

On collaborating, that's my hope always. It isn't always possible (I've come across pages where minds seem closed, & the "advance knowledge" fanatics don't seem susceptible to argument...), but while we may never come to complete accord, I get the feeling we can settle on a middle ground. I want the page as good as it can be, & I'll be strenuous defending my views, & stubborn but (I hope!) not closed-minded. Hang in there with your arguments. ;D TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 01:22, 25 August 2008 (UTC)

No, troop numbers are the only measure important in war.

Technological fascination is all well and good, but tanks do not drive themselves and planes do not fly themselves either. More importantly, each tank and aircraft required an additional 3-4 personnel to service them in the Wehrmacht, they only required one in the Red Army, and in the case of the tanks it was the driver. When it comes to the crunch, what field officers think of in terms of being capable of combat is troop density in the front linemodern perspective, and not how sophisticated their only tank is...covering a front of 20km. What the Second World War taught, is that numbers win wars. By Soviet admission, the ability to sacrifice some large numbers in 1941 they were able to hold German forces for long enough to regroup. The same applies to the Western Allies. A collective sigh of relief in the UK could be heard on the 22 June 1941, and after the counter-attack at Moscow there were celebration parties in London. The RAF and the British Army were rebuilt. USA could count on an unsinkable aircraft carrier (previously thought to be imminently subject to a German invasion). The numbers again told in Italy, and in France. Ultimately numbers in the front line also affect war economies, particularly during the Second World War when much of the industrial labour involved in war production was physical, and required male participation. 150,000 Polish Jews were saved primarily due to the shortages in labour being suffered by German industry due to its male population down to the age of 14 being conscripted into the forces.

There is a cult of fascination with technology that dominates the literature on the Second World War. Count the books on the German tank troops, and compare with literature on the infantry that were 75% of the actual troops in combat. Count the books on Luftwaffe fighter aircraft; however there were never more than a few thousand aircraft on the Eastern Front at any one time (peak of about 7,000 counting liaison).

Although this article is taking a strategic approach to history, ultimately it reflects the success of tactics, that is the ability of platoons, companies, battalions, regiments, brigades and divisions to take and hold ground. Only infantry can do that, and that means brute numbers--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 01:46, 25 August 2008 (UTC)

Well, probably it makes sense to start improving the article? I would propose to look at the first paragraph of the "War Becomes Global" section. I would say it is quinessentia of ignorance. Although that period was one of turning points of the war, it is represented as an idle rambling of German troops that, for some reason, forgot their winter clothes in Deutschland... Does anybody have any idea on this account? --Paul Siebert (talk) 03:23, 25 August 2008 (UTC)

As regards to numbers, I wouldn't agree completely. Sometimes they don't, remember 300 spartans, for instance. However every time we pay unproportional attention to small troops the reason should be obvious, or the ground for that should be provided.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:34, 25 August 2008 (UTC)::

Chronological vs "theatre-wise" representation. I don't think the approach should be uniform. For instance, there is absolutely no sense to tell about Pacific and Europe chronologically in the middle of the war: they were too distant and rather independent. However, sometimes chronological order is necessary. For example, during the Battle of Bulge Churchill directly asked Stalin to start Soviet offensive earlier, and Vistula Offensive didn't allow Germans to send reinforcements to Ardennes. Another example was Kursk/Sicilia: in that case situation was reverse. Therefore, it probably makes sense to the story about the end of the war chronologically.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:01, 25 August 2008 (UTC)

Not sure what the "300" Spartans has to do with this article, if only to highlight my point given there were substantially larger numbers involved there also.

I'd like to suggest that before "diving into" editing the article, which is a testament to Oberiko's huge work performed, I'd like to suggest that the methodology of editing is considered. It seems to me that completely rewriting the article is ill advised.

There is no conflict between Chronological vs "theatre-wise" structuring because many theatre strategic decisions were based on operations in particular seasons; in fact campaigns are defined by their environments, and predominantly weather.

It seems to me that in the first place a worthwhile exercise is to build up a skeletal structure of the article to see where there are missing parts, and where less significant parts have been overstated

The precondition for doing this is determining the criteria for what a significant part of the war was, and to me this seems to be any decision that is strategically decisive, usually combat activities that were large in scope, scale and resources committed--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 05:32, 25 August 2008 (UTC)

I didn't propose to rewrite the article, just to improve it where it is necessary. I see some flaws, the major one is an impossibility for a reader with poor historical knowledge (to whom the article is primarily addressed) to get an adequate impression about a scale of events the article tells about, and about major factors that determined a course of the war. As a result, the concept post hoc ergo propter hoc starts working in the reader's mind, and the text becomes deceiving (although all facts it contains are true). Sometimes the article provides too simplistic representation of the course of events. For instance, it tells about pre-Munich and Czechoslovakian events as if it was a kid's play in a sandbox: "He promised to be a good boy, she believed him, but he reneged". Sometimes, even small changes may clarify everything. For instance "Hitler began making claims on the Sudetenland" -> "Hitler began making claims on the industrially developed Sudetenland populated mostly by ethnic Germans" clarifies why did Hitler needed Sudetes, and what arguments did he provided to substantiate his demands. References to appropriate specialized pages, as a rule, don't help because these pages are sometimes too long and they divert a reader to a specialized field. Therefore, besides references, a few words on a subject have to be present in the major article.
On July 4th, the Germans launched their attack, though only about a week later Hitler cancelled the operation. What does it mean? He had visited astrologist and changed his mind? Is it a good style to talk about a second largest and one of the decisive battles of WWII?
"Axis collapsed", first paragrapf. Sure, you would agree that there was a direct connection between Ardennes and Vistula. However, these events are represented in such a way like someone deliberately tried to conceal this connection (actually I don't blame anyone, it simply looks like that).
Although I can show a number of similar examples, I agree that overall structure of the article is good. I don't think improving separate paragraphs would be a testaments to anyone's work. That is why I propose to start with Barbarossa and look if we can do something.
As regards to significance, I would agree that turning points should be represented from "strategico-economical" rather than geographical point of view. Therefore, importance of battles for remote territories is overstated. I think, no one doubts America was more than capable to win Japan would they fight one by one, even if Japan managed to occupy all Pacific islands. That is why it seems not reasonable to start "The tide turns" section with Pacific, although a defeat of Japan must be credited mostly to America. Frankly, the tide had turned few days before America entered the war, when "after the counter-attack at Moscow there were celebration parties in London", although nobody argues that both Empire of Japan and Das Dritte Reich would never fall spontaneously, and tremendous efforts were needed to destroy them even after the tide had turned. Howevever, as I stated before, the turning point was the end of Blitzkrieg, and it was Europe where this had happened. --Paul Siebert (talk) 16:03, 25 August 2008 (UTC)

"Poor bloody infantry." I'm not saying infantry as %engaged don't count, I'm saying total numbers as a measure of importance isn't revealling. If we put an artificial floor on it (not what I think you meant, mrg, but to illustrate), no battle outside Russia or China would pass. For strategic importance, 1943's ~~SC122/HX226~~ (IIRC; I'm ashamed to say I can't keep the numbers straight) HX-229/SC-122 was the largest convoy battle of the Atlantic campaign. slaughter was up there with the Battle of Britain, since it nearly persuaded HMG to abandon convoy; they couldn't see the tide had turned. Had they stopped, it would have been a self-inflicted disaster exceeded only by Pearl Harbor & Barbarossa, with Hitler's declaration of war close on its heels. Yet the raw numbers were on the order of a couple of divisions, so a "floor" would exclude it, along with the likes of 2d Alamein & Midway; PTO actions where whole convoys of reinforcements were wiped out (I'm thinking of Mush Morton's effort, & not the "massacre" he's accused of.), or the interception of troops en route for the Philippines who ended up in Okinawa (where, arguably, they influenced the decision to use the Bomb), wouldn't even be blips. Do I mean to include them? Hell, no. I am saying numbers alone don't tell the whole story (which is also, I think, what the Spartans ref was about).
"Chronological vs "theatre-wise" representation" I'd be wary of separating them too much, even in 1942-3. Remember, MacArthur's & Nimitz's 'phib ops, & demand for LCs, influenced the #available for Italy (which could've taken the approach used by IJA in Malaya, leapfrogging at sea, instead of slogging up the spine), & had a direct (if not immediately obvious) effect on Neptune & Anvil (& timing of same, especially Anvil).
"strategically decisive, usually combat activities that were large in scope, scale and resources committed" Usually, but not always, as noted; with due attention to the less obvious taken as given, no argument.
"post hoc ergo propter hoc" (Sorry, I couldn't resist adding italics. ;) ) I'd say pay special attention to the connectedness of the war. It's usually treated in effect as 2 separate wars with no relation to one another. That's demonstrably, if not obviously, incorrect. There are cases where post hoc isn't fallacious, but may be hard to recognize or appreciate without a global view, especially for the uninitiated (& even the widely read, among whom I include myself, may not always see or know about it).
"tide turned" If we accept your argument, Paul (& if I've understood you correctly), it's a much too Eurocentric view. Defeat of Germany would do nothing to stop Japanese aggression in China, given Hitler hadn't stupidly connected the 2. The attack at Pearl turned the tide in China as surely as Barbarossa in Europe, & as indirectly. Should Pearl be put first, or higher? Probably not. Should it be omitted? Not a chance.
"strategico-economical" On that, I'm in complete agreement, because that will eliminate any debate over whether the numbers engaged decide inclusion, or even pertain. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 21:57 & 22:01, 25 August 2008 & 21:58, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

I'm not making categorical statements, and on some occasions numbers do not tell the story, but in general they do.

I would suggest that land, naval and air strategies were very different approaches to the same problem. Comparison between the Red Army and the US Navy in the Pacific can be made based on the fire power they were trying to deliver, and consequently the personnel and resources it took to deliver it, and if the RAF Bomber Command accomplished same goal more effectively. This sort of analysis is very rarely done because most authors do story telling--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 22:44, 25 August 2008 (UTC)

Section renaming

142.161.177.41 (below) is right, the war became global when Australian troops as part of the Commonwealth countries' declaration of war occupied German territories in the Pacific, so a new name is required for The war becomes global.

The section headings need to reflect that it was a war using appropriate terms, and that the headings should capture the gist of the section content, so suggestions:

Replace War breaks out in Europe -> The war becomes global

Replace The war becomes global-> Soviet Union and United States attacked

Replace The tide turns -> Successful Allied counter-offensives

Replace Allies gain momentum -> Allied offensives gain momentum

Replace Allies close in -> Axis retreat

Replace Axis collapse, Allied victory -> Axis defeated

Section contents - revision process

I'd like to suggest we do a bit of reverse engineering on Oberiko's effort and go through each section, listing sentences and seeing where undue emphasis might have been given, and insufficient inclusion afforded so new section below--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 22:33, 25 August 2008 (UTC)

Australia occupied the German possessions in the Pacific in WWI, not WWII. They were retained as Australian 'protectorates' after the war and when Australia and New Zealand first dispatched troops in WWII (in December 1939/January 1940) they went to Egypt to prepare for an expected deployment to France. The current section titles look fine to me. Nick Dowling (talk) 10:38, 26 August 2008 (UTC)

Looks can be deceiving. I think they look lousy--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 00:18, 28 August 2008 (UTC)

What's the need to reverse engineer anything? The process through which Oberiko and a couple others hammered out the article as it is now is right in the archives. Most of it appears to be here. Parsecboy (talk) 12:52, 26 August 2008 (UTC)

I'm aware where the archives are, but prefer to work from current version. I do appreciate the effort Oberiko had put into the article, but while he worked on it any editing was highly contested, and in any case, it seemed to me that he should be given a chance to complete what he had begun. However, the output of that process has appeared to produce a version of the Second World War that is not always reflective of the events in context and from analytical perspective--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 13:35, 26 August 2008 (UTC)

The suggestion with the section titles is that in a military history article more explicit and appropriate terms be used rather than reference to war "breaking out", tides turning, gaining of momentums, and close ins followed by collapses, which all seem to belong in a more literary genre--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 22:38, 26 August 2008 (UTC)

Mrg, I don't agree with your statement that the editing which Oberiko led was "highly contested" at all. Text was developed and endorsed on this talk page betfore it was added to the article in an outstanding display of consensus editing. Given that this work was completed only a few months ago and the article is in very good condition, why re-invent the wheel? Nick Dowling (talk) 10:04, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

Mrg, re firepower, I don't disagree necessarily, only trying to point out differences in approach which may not make numbers alone enough. I do think it's also an issue of addressing the audience, not just story-telling; if your audience is a conference of infantry or naval officers, you're going to deal with the subject differently than if it's school kids, & most historiography is for a (more/less) general audience.

"Australia occupied the German possessions in the Pacific in WWI, not WWII" I do know that. ;) I was trying (evidently with incomplete clarity, as usual ;D ) to draw the parallel to WWI by extension. Perhaps I stretched the point (get it? =]) too far? (In retrospect, I may have misread. 22:01, 27 August 2008 (UTC))

In re headings: I'd change "Axis defeated" to "Axis collapse", prefer "Allies gain momentum" ("offensives" I presume), & seriously question "Soviet Union and United States attacked" (it's true, & important, but it strikes me as somehow Cold Warish, as if only U.S./SU were important, before their domination of geopolitics became a fact). How about "Axis overextend"? (I don't suppose "Axis leadership make themselves look like idiots" will pass the "unencyclopedic" test... ;D ) TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 21:58, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

Nick Dowling, I would disagree with your statement about good condition of the article. Although its overall structure is good, there are number of weaknesses and factual errors there. Sometimes the sources are not completely appropriate, and, in addition to that, the POV is not completely balanced. Therefore, I would agree with Mrg, that the article can be improved without considerable alteration of its structure. --Paul Siebert (talk) 22:54, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

The war becomes global (26 Aug 08) section revision

Please add alternative wording of existing sentences indented under the current versions and new sentences as for example: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, etc. in the place they need to be inserted after existing sentences

Paragraph A
1 In late June, Germany, along with other European Axis members and Finland, invaded the Soviet Union.

2 They made significant gains into Soviet territory, inflicting large numbers of casualties, and by the start of December had almost reached Moscow, with only the besieged cities of Leningrad and Sevastopol behind their front-lines left unconquered.^[1]

3 With the onset of a fierce Soviet winter though, the Axis offensive was ground to a halt^[2] and the Soviets launched a counter-offensive using reserve troops brought up from the border near Japanese Manchukuo.^[3]

Paragraph B
4 Following the German attack on the Soviets, the United Kingdom began to regroup.

~~5 In July, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union formed a military alliance against Germany^[4] and shortly after jointly invaded Iran to secure the Persian Corridor and Iran's oilfields.^[5]~~

~~6 In August, the United Kingdom and United States jointly issued the Atlantic Charter, a vision for a post-war world which included "the right of all peoples to choose their form of government".^[6]~~

~~7 In November, Commonwealth forces launched a counter-offensive in the desert, reclaiming all gains the Germans and Italians had made.^[7]~~

Paragraph C
8 Japan, hoping to utilize Germany's control over the Netherlands, made several demands, including a steady supply of oil, from the Dutch East Indies; these talks, however, broke down in June.^[8]

9 In July, Japan seized military control of southern Indochina since it would not only put them in a better position to coerce the Dutch East Indies into yielding, but it would also be a blow against China; should war be necessary, it also improved their strategic position against the Americans and British.^[9]

10 The United States, United Kingdom and other western governments responded to Japan's incursion by freezing all Japanese assets^[10] and the United States, which supplied 80% of Japan's oil, further placed an oil embargo against Japan.^[11]

11 With the unexpected embargo, Japan was essentially forced to choose between withdrawing from their aggression in Asia, or seizing the oil they needed directly; the Japanese military did not consider the former an option, and many of them considered the oil embargo as an unspoken declaration of war.^[12]

Paragraph D
12 The Imperial General Headquarters thus planned to create a large perimeter stretching into the Central Pacific in order to facilitate a defensive war while exploiting the resources of Southeast Asia; to prevent intervention while securing the perimeter it was further planned to neutralize the United States Pacific Fleet on the outset.^[13]

13 On December 7th Japan attacked British, Dutch and American holdings with near simultaneous offensives against Southeast Asia and the Central Pacific, including an attack on the American naval base of Pearl Harbor.^[14]

Paragraph E
14 These attacks prompted the United States, United Kingdom, China, and other Western Allies to declare war on Japan.

~~15 Italy, Germany, and the other members of the Tripartite Pact responded by declaring war on the United States.~~

16 In January, the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and China, along with twenty-two smaller or exiled governments, issued the Declaration by United Nations, affirming the Atlantic Charter^[15] and formalizing their alliance against the Axis Powers.

~~17 The Soviet Union did not adhere fully to the declaration though, as they maintained their neutrality agreement with Japan^[16] and exempted themselves from the principle of self-determination.^[6]~~

Paragraph F
18 The Axis Powers, however, were able to continue their offensives.

19 Japan had almost fully conquered Southeast Asia with minimal losses by the end of April, 1942, chasing the Allies out of Burma and taking large numbers of prisoners in the Philippines, Malaya, Dutch East Indies and Singapore.^[17]

~~20 They further bombed the Allied naval base at Darwin, Australia and sunk significant Allied warships not only at Pearl Harbor, but also in the South China Sea, Java Sea and Indian Ocean.^[18]~~

21 The only real successes against Japan were a repulsion of their renewed attack on Changsha in early January, 1942,^[19] and a psychological strike from a bombing raid on Japan's capital Tokyo in April.^[20]

Paragraph G
22 Germany was able to regain the initiative as well.

~~23 Exploiting American inexperience with submarine warfare, the German Navy sunk significant resources near the American Atlantic coast.^[21]~~

~~24 In the desert, they launched an offensive in January, pushing the British back to positions at the Gazala Line by early February.^[22]~~

~~25 In the Soviet Union, the Soviet's winter counter-offensive had ended by March.^[23]~~

~~26 In the desert, there followed a temporary lull in combat which Germany used to prepare for their upcoming offensives.^[24]^[25]~~

~~--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 22:33, 25 August 2008 (UTC)~~

LOL, so the minute war broke out between Germany and the UK it "became global"?! When was it "not global" then? the first several hours? According to you, the war was "global" while the Polish campaign wasn't even fully underway. --DIREKTOR ^(TALK) 12:48, 26 August 2008 (UTC)

Actually, any world war is global. World war and global war are synonyms (because our world is the globe), whereas "regional world war" is oxymoron. It is natural to expect any war to become a world war as soon as it became a global one and vise versa. Discussion about the date WWII became global is a continuation of discussion about the start date of WWII, that have just finished (I hope). That is why I would agree that having two separate sections for start of WWII and passing it to a global phase is logically inconsistent. I also agree with new namings style for sections because the old style is too general and too vague. --Paul Siebert (talk) 16:36, 26 August 2008 (UTC)

Disagree, this event is called a "world war" because it did indeed eventually become "world-wide" or "global". It simply wasn't global until it reached a certain point. This is not a discussion about the start date, as this all one and the same war we are talking about. It simply lived up to the adjective "global" or "world" at one point. To call the war "global" at the time when it basically boils down to the Polish campaign is nonsensical (though it still is the same war, World War II). --DIREKTOR ^(TALK) 23:01, 26 August 2008 (UTC)

I would say, everything depends on definitions you use. If you assume the war becomes global if it affects more than one continents, then any war where Russia participates has to be global, because it is both European and Asian country. However, some textbooks consider Europe and Asia to compose a single continent Eurasia (that is geologically correct), so everything depends on what geography textbook did you read in school. If you tell that hostilities must spread out a single continent, then the very fact of a single battle of River Plate, along with Poland campaign, is sufficient to consider WWII had become global by 1940. If you assume that the war must considerably affect both Old and New Worlds to become global, we have to agree that the global war is possible only the US are involved. On other hand, can we consider a Falklands War a global war?
This is too vague and too arbitrary to discuss it seriously. --Paul Siebert (talk) 00:31, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

Between the Polish campaign and the global war was the Phoney War--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 11:00, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

In reply

Paragraph A

3 With the onset of a fierce Soviet winter though, the Axis offensive was ground to a halt^[26] and the Soviets launched a counter-offensive using reserve troops brought up from the border near Japanese Manchukuo.^[27]

Delete, per Stolfi, Hitler's Panzers East. This is a very common misconception The issue had been decided before winter.

Paragraph B

11 seizing the oil they needed by force; the Japanese military did not consider the former an option, and many officers considered the oil embargo an unspoken declaration of war.^[28]

Paragraph E

16 affirming the Atlantic Charter ^[29]

Link for those unfamiliar (unless it's already linked...).

17 The Soviet Union did not adhere to the declaration, maintaining ar neutrality agreement with Japan^[30] and exempting herself from the principle of self-determination.^[6] In making the decision to drop the atomic bomb, the United States refused to clarify if the Atlantic Charter applied also to the defeated Axis.

Japan clung to retaining the Emperor as her irreducible demand, & held up the U.S. signature on the Charter as a guarantee she'd be entitled to keep him, per its terms. The U.S. wouldn't make clear if this was true. The problem is how to phrase this in a few words... Source it from Racing the Enemy & Alperowitz's Decision.

Paragraph F

19 Japan had almost fully conquered Southeast Asia with minimal losses by the end of April, 1942, driving the Allies from Burma, taking large numbers of prisoners in the Philippines, Malaya, Dutch East Indies, Singapore,^[31] and achieving naval victories in the South China Sea, Java Sea and Indian Ocean.^[32]

Rewrite to this.

20 They further bombed the Allied naval base at Darwin, Australia

Delete. Insufficiently significant to the outcome.

21 The only real success against Japan was a repulsion of their renewed attack on Changsha in early January, 1942^[19]

Delete Doolittle. Insufficiently significant to the outcome, & the reprisal killing of 250K Chinese that resulted doesn't fit my definition of "success".

Paragraph G

23 Exploiting dubious American naval command decisions, the U-boat arm sunk significant resources off the American Atlantic coast.^[33] Despite this, an American admiral was placed in charge of more experienced Canadian escort forces, which carried out more of this duty in the Atlantic than the U.S. for the duration of the war.

This was the direct product of King's decision; it's in question if it was as bad as it's often made out, or a necessity, given the need to defend harbors against potential raids like Campbeltown, or Zeebrugge of WW1, not to mention commerce raiders. Also, I'd link directly to KM subs; it wasn't KM as a whole. Source "Canadian forces" from Milner (mainly) & van der Vat.

26 In the desert, there followed a temporary lull

Was this a product of British interdiction of supplies, thanks to Ultra & still holding Malta? If so, it bears mentioning. So does the influence on Barbarossa (diversion of FK X to suppress Malta, hence not available on EF). Mooted Op Herkules might bear mentioning, too.

27 In the Atlantic, U-boats continued to savage shipping to Britain as far south as Trinidad, intercepting precious supplies of oil from Texas and South America; the Allies responded with a sophisticated system of interlocking convoy routes. While British and U.S. destroyers escorted fast convoys, Canadians (lacking destroyers) were assigned to protect slow convoys (which were more vulnerable for this very fact) with corvettes, which were also being built in Canada.

Canadians were assigned to the more difficult to protect slow convoys in part because of a shortage of DDs in RCN, which traces to RN policy of holding DDs for anti-invasion duty (& wasn't helped by FDR retaining about 75 antique DDs he could just as well have surplused off; this, of course, might have made NF the 49h state, before Alaska & Hawaii joined... ;) ) Slow convoys were more vulnerable for the very fact they were slow, hence exposed longer; also, RCN 'vettes were less well equipped (less effective radar & sonar, less readily fitted with what was available), as a result of bad command decisions by RCN SOs, & lack of Canadian engineering capability, which account also for Canadian inability to build destroyers. Source it from Milner (mainly) & van der Vat. And yes, I'm showing some Canadian chauvinism; I'll bet most Canadians don't even know RCN escorted over half the Atlantic convoys for the duration. (I'm ashamed to admit I didn't even know. :[ )

On the issue of invading Antarctica, given Japan & China were at war by 1937, & given UK included Canada, Oz, NZ, & India, the war became global 3 Sept 39. Just my $0.0215. (C$ is near parity for the first time since the '70s! Yay! {Sorry.}) TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 23:25, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

Paragraph A, a new version

On June 22, 1941 Germany, along with other European Axis members and Finland, invaded the Soviet Union. The invasion's three primary objectives were the Baltic region, Moscow and Ukraine with an ultimate goal to end 1941 year campaign near the line connecting Caspian and White Seas. During the summer, Axis made significant gains into Soviet territory, inflicting immense losses of manpower and materiel, however by the middle of August the offensive of the Army Group Center was suspended. for rehabilitation of troops, whereas advancement toward Leningrad and Kiev continued.^[34]. By October, after Axis troops almost achieved their operational objectives in Baltic and Ukraine with only the besieged cities of Leningrad and Sevastopol behind their front-lines left unconquered,^[35] a major offensive against Moscow had been renewed. For two months of fierce battles German army almost reached Moscow suburbs, where the further advancement of exhausted German army was ground to a halt. Despite impressive territorial gains, no strategic goals had been accomplished: major Soviet cities hadn’t been captured, Red Army hadn’t been destroyed and the Soviet Union still retained its military potential. The blitzkrieg phase of WWII in Europe had ended.^[36]
On December, using freshly mobilized reserves ^[37], the Soviets launched a massive counter-offensive forcing Axis troops to retreat from Moscow.

This is a very preliminary version, probably, even just a starting point, so any rewording and editing is welcomed. --Paul Siebert (talk) 15:26, 26 August 2008 (UTC)

Paragraph A, a v.1.1

On June 22, 1941 Germany, along with other European Axis members and Finland, invaded the Soviet Union. The primary objectives of this surprise offensive^[38] were the Baltic region, Moscow and Ukraine with an ultimate goal to end campaign of 1941 near the line connecting Caspian and White Seas. Although before the war the Red Army was preparing for a strategic offensive, "Barbarossa"' forced Stavka to adopt a strategic defence. During the summer, Axis made significant gains into Soviet territory, inflicting immense losses in personnel and matériel, however by the middle of August, German OKH decided to suspend the offensive of a considerably depleted Army Group Center, and to divert a part of its armored force to reinforce troops advancing toward central Ukraine^[39]. The Kiev offensive was overwhelmingly successful, resulting in encirclement and elimination of four Soviet armies, and made further advance into Crimea and industrially developed Eastern Ukraine possible. By October, Axis operational objectives in the Baltic region and Ukraine were achieved, with only Leningrad and Sevastopol resisting in sieges^[40] a major offensive against Moscow had been renewed. After two months of fierce battles, the German army almost reached Moscow suburbs, where the exhausted German army was forced to go on the defensive. Despite impressive territorial gains, no strategic goals of the war had been accomplished: two major Soviet cities hadn’t been captured, Red Army's capability to resist was not broken, and the Soviet Union retained a considerable part of its military potential. The blitzkrieg phase of WWII in Europe had ended.^[41]
In mid-December, when freshly mobilized reserves ^[42] allowed the Soviets to achieve numerical parity^[43], they launched a massive counter-offensive along 1000 km front, although success was temporary, and in January was halted.

I tried to make it shorter, but I have no idea how to do it. Judging by raw numbers these events weighed more than all western battles taken together. More importantly, however, each of them seems to have an immense strategic significance. For instance, the August pause, that, probably saved Moscow, still rises a debates among historians. The battle of Kiev, a largest encirclement in the world history, ultimately led to Stalingrad, Kharkov, Sevastopol and Kursk.

I found no reliable sources that seriously consider a climate factors to play a key role in Eastern campaigns, although the weather sometimes favoured one or another side. Therefore, I excluded anything like: With the onset of a fierce Soviet winter though.

I doubt several divisions from Far East could play a decisive role in the winter offensive. In the article I cite, that was specially devoted to creation of reserves, those troops had not been mentioned at all. I conclude they were not a decisive factor.
Any critique?--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:42, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

A few things.

"the offensive of the Army Group Center was suspended. for rehabilitation of troops" This was after Hitler (dithering between the Ukraine & Moscow) diverted forces to AGSouth (where they weren't needed), then back again, after about an 800km route march to no purpose, while, had they simply continued advancing, they'd have been in Moscow by the time the stop order finally came (historically). I rely on Stolfi.
" The blitzkrieg phase of WWII in Europe had ended." True, but I think most will read it as "The blitzkrieg phase of WWII had ended", when Japanese offensives, not yet begun, had a blitzkrieg character.
"freshly mobilized reserves". I think a mention of them coming from Siberia, where they could be safely withdrawn after Sorge assured Stalin Japan was going south, is in order, if only because it's so often mentioned. If you've got solid sourcing for the relative insignificance of the Siberians, I'd mention the mobilized reserves, in connection with the above-mentioned route march delay (which gave SU crucial breathing space), & add something like, "influence of the Siberians, & Sorge, is overstated" (probably in a footnote). One other thing there: wasn't Zhukov brought with them? That is crucial, whether the troops themselves had an effect or not, & Zhukov's detachment probably did depend on Sorge.
Climate. Thank you! The influence of winter is very overblown. I would mention rasputitsa prominently, tho, to lay to rest the other myth, delay engendered by the Yugoslavia campaign.
Moscow August. What do you think of addressing whether taking Moscow would ultimately make any difference? The government could have simply moved inland (per ROC), & plans were already in train for it (IIRC). Balance this against German control of the road network. Also, worth a mention Hitler blew a big opportunity by not turning Russians, or at least Ukranians & Byelorussians & other ethnic minorities, against the Communists? For this, I rely on (I think) Cockburn's The Threat & Scott & Scott's on the Soviet Army

Some tightening can come when we settle on what's essential. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 23:54 & 23:59, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

1. Guderian's Panzerdivisions diverted to South made an encirclement of Kiev army group (at least half a million POWs) possible, and pawed a way to Sevastopol and Donbass ("Soviet Rhineland"), so I wouldn't say it was purposeless. In addition, other troops were really exhausted.

2. That is why I wrote in Europe. By the way, a blitzkrieg term implies a specific strategy and tactics that rely on massive use of mechanized troops. Therefore, it usually relates mostly to Germany, not Japan which never applied this against western allies (because majority battles there were naval of insular.

3. I'll try to think about that.

4. I think, the Soviets suffered from climate and terrain factors in the same extent. By the way, due to Coriolis' force, most rivers (Don, Dnieper etc.) have steep right (western) bank and slopy left (eastern) bank. That extremely facilitated a defense for Germans.

5. I think that Russia, like France, is very centralized. Moscow is a huge transport hub and industrial center. So losing Moscow would create tremendous problems for the USSR. Germany resembles UK and is much less centralized, that, probably, affected the Hitler's decision:"Ukraine - first, Leningrad - second, Moscow - third".

As regards to ethnic minorities, I would say, it is completely incorrect. Russia, Ukraine and Bielorussia were co-founders of the USSR, and it ceased to exist when they decided to do so. I tried to count a percentage of Ukrainians among Communist leaders and it seems to me that Ukraininas (including Ukrainian Jews) were even overrepresented there. I would say, Communist ideology was even more popular among Ukrainians (excluding Western Ukraine) than among Russians. As regards to Belorussians, they never had any separatist intentions. --Paul Siebert (talk) 00:31, 28 August 2008 (UTC)

As regards to No3, one has to discriminate Siberia and Far East. Besides Siberia, there was Trans Baikal military district and Far East military district, only the latter has a border with Manchuria. Far East, Trans Baikal, Siberia, Caucasus and Central Asia sent totally 27 new divisions to West (I mean Eastern Front), whereas interior regions produced 70. Far East alone organized 30 divisions, only 8 rifle and 3 tank divisions were took West. Interestingly, the mobilization of new troops allowed the strength in the Far East to double over the prewar level. --Paul Siebert (talk) 06:04, 28 August 2008 (UTC)

By the way, that means the USSR didn't trust Japan. That was probably a reason why Japan kept Kwantung Army there. So the Soviets did the same job for the US as UK did for the Soviets: tying down Japanese and German forces, accordingly on their "backyards". --Paul Siebert (talk) 06:30, 28 August 2008 (UTC)

"above-mentioned route march delay (which gave SU crucial breathing space)". Under that "delay" you mean a battle of Kiev? For Soviets it was equal to two Stalingrads. I wouldn't call it a "delay"...--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:35, 28 August 2008 (UTC)

Zhukov and Sorge.
Zhukov was appointed a chief of the Red Army General Staff before Barbarossa started. Although he was replaced just before the invasion, he never returned to Far East, so Sorge's information didn't affect Zhukov detachments or appointments. Sorge didn't tell Japan never attack, according to him, there will be no attack until the ratio of Japanese/Soviets is larger that 3 to 1. Therefore, by keeping about 20 divisions there the USSR was tying down the whole Kwantung Army. Therefore, the present version sound too simplistic and little bit misleading. I think, we either have to tell that in more appropriate manner, or don't tell at all. Taking into account a lack of space, the second variant is preferable for me.--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:11, 28 August 2008 (UTC)

"diverted to South" My understanding from Stolfi (I don't have it in front of me) is, AGSouth could have succeeded without aid, or could have waited 'til after the fall of Moscow, in early/mid-Aug '41, holding (pausing) until fresh troops arrived if needed.

blitzkrieg I guess I'm using the term more broadly, common since the war, of a surprising, shocking, highly successful operation, which is how Willmott seemed to be using it & how I expect most readers will see it. I won't disagree on the narrow sense.

Moscow. I won't argue it's important for transportation. Nor for manufacturing (maybe less then than now). The strategic effect isn't in question. The grand strategic (political) effect its fall could have is: a) revolution; b) gov't moved inland, per ROC; c) something else. My $ is on b). IMO (& Stolfi's too, IIRC), Hitler's priority of Moscow #3 was the gaffe; strategic, & grand strategic, considerations should have put it #1.

"probably a reason why Japan kept Kwantung Army there" Probably, tho my suspicion is, IJA still hoped for an opportunity. The fact they'd blown it by going south, & not cutting a deal with Chiang (who considered Mao the worse enemy), only shows how short-sighted IJA leadership was, IMO. I won't argue leaving out Sorge/KTA for lack of space, if mobilization is the bigger factor.

Delay. I meant the time it took to march south & back. IIRC, this would've been long enough to take Moscow, then rest, move S, aid AGS, & isolate Stalingrad...given capture of Moscow didn't do that, & given it didn't lead to revolution.

Ethnic minorities. Maybe it's overstated, & maybe influenced by postwar considerations that didn't pertain at the time. I do wonder if more openness to Russians (& others) wanting to fight Communists wouldn't have been of benefit had it begun sooner, rather than a policy of wholesale slaughter, which only strengthened Stalin's hand.

Zhukov. Noted. I was recalling his former Sib/FE command. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 01:50, 1 September 2008 (UTC)

The War Becomes Global

On June 22, 1941 Germany, along with other European Axis members and Finland, invaded the Soviet Union. The primary objectives of this surprise offensive^[44] were the Baltic region, Moscow and Ukraine with an ultimate goal to end campaign of 1941 near the line connecting Caspian and White Seas. Although before the war the Red Army was preparing for a strategic offensive, "Barbarossa"' forced Stavka to adopt a strategic defence. During the summer, Axis made significant gains into Soviet territory, inflicting immense losses in personnel and matériel, however by the middle of August, German OKH decided to suspend the offensive of a considerably depleted Army Group Center, and to divert a part of its armored force to reinforce troops advancing toward central Ukraine^[45]. The Kiev offensive was overwhelmingly successful, resulting in encirclement and elimination of four Soviet armies, and made further advance into Crimea and industrially developed Eastern Ukraine possible. By October, when Axis operational objectives in the Baltic region and Ukraine were achieved, with only Leningrad and Sevastopol resisting in sieges^[46] a major offensive against Moscow had been renewed. After two months of fierce battles, the German army almost reached Moscow suburbs, where the exhausted German army was forced to go on the defensive. Despite impressive territorial gains, no strategic goals of the war had been accomplished: two major Soviet cities hadn’t been captured, Red Army's capability to resist was not broken, and the Soviet Union retained a considerable part of its military potential. The blitzkrieg phase of WWII in Europe had ended.^[47]
In mid-December, when freshly mobilized reserves ^[48] allowed the Soviets to achieve numerical parity^[43], they launched a massive counter-offensive along 1000 km front, although success was temporary, and in January was halted.
Paragraph B
4 With majority Axis troops tied down on Eastern Front the United Kingdom got an opportunity to regroup.^[49]

5 In July, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union formed a military alliance against Germany^[50] and shortly after jointly invaded Iran to secure the Persian Corridor and Iran's oilfields.^[51]

6 In August, the United Kingdom and United States jointly issued the Atlantic Charter.^[6]

7 In November, Commonwealth forces launched a counter-offensive in the desert, reclaiming all gains the Germans and Italians had made.^[52]

Paragraph C
8 Japan, hoping to utilize Germany's control over the Netherlands, made several demands, including a steady supply of oil, from the Dutch East Indies; these talks, however, broke down in June.^[53]

9 In July, Japan seized military control of southern Indochina since it would not only put them in a better position to coerce the Dutch East Indies into yielding, but it would also be a blow against China; should war be necessary, it also improved their strategic position against the Americans and British.^[54]

10 The United States, United Kingdom and other western governments responded to Japan's incursion by freezing all Japanese assets^[55] and the United States, which supplied 80% of Japan's oil, further placed an oil embargo against Japan.^[56]

11 With the unexpected embargo, Japan was essentially forced to choose between withdrawing from their aggression in Asia, or seizing the oil they needed by force; the Japanese military did not consider the former an option, and many officers considered the oil embargo an unspoken declaration of war.^[57]

Paragraph D
12 The Imperial General Headquarters thus planned to create a large perimeter stretching into the Central Pacific in order to facilitate a defensive war while exploiting the resources of Southeast Asia; to prevent intervention while securing the perimeter it was further planned to neutralize the United States Pacific Fleet on the outset.^[58]

13 On December 7th Japan attacked British, Dutch and American holdings with near simultaneous offensives against Southeast Asia and the Central Pacific, including an attack on the American naval base of Pearl Harbor.^[59]

Paragraph E
14 These attacks prompted the United States, United Kingdom, China, and other Western Allies to declare war on Japan.

15 Italy, Germany, and the other members of the Tripartite Pact responded by declaring war on the United States.

16 In January, the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and China, along with twenty-two smaller or exiled governments, issued the Declaration by United Nations, affirming the Atlantic Charter ^[60]

17 The Soviet Union did not adhere to the declaration, maintaining ar neutrality agreement with Japan^[61] and exempting herself from the principle of self-determination.^[6] In making the decision to drop the atomic bomb, the United States refused to clarify if the Atlantic Charter applied also to the defeated Axis.

Paragraph F

19 Meanwhile, Japan had almost fully conquered Southeast Asia with minimal losses by the end of April, 1942, driving the Allies from Burma, taking large numbers of prisoners in the Philippines, Malaya, Dutch East Indies, Singapore,^[62] and achieving naval victories in the South China Sea, Java Sea and Indian Ocean.^[63]

20 They further bombed the Allied naval base at Darwin, Australia

21 The only real success against Japan was a repulsion of their renewed attack on Changsha in early January, 1942^[19]

Paragraph G
22 Germany retained the initiative as well.

23 Exploiting dubious American naval command decisions, the U-boat arm sunk significant resources off the American Atlantic coast.^[64] Despite this, an American admiral was placed in charge of more experienced Canadian escort forces, which carried out more of this duty in the Atlantic than the U.S. for the duration of the war.

24 In the desert, they launched an offensive in January, pushing the British back to positions at the Gazala Line by early February.^[65]

25 In the Soviet Union, the Soviet's winter counter-offensive had ended by March.^[66]

26 In the desert, there followed a temporary lull in combat which Germany used to prepare for their upcoming offensives.^[67]^[68]
I tried to take into account all comments (if I didn't miss something). My comments: The sentence No 18 seems to be redundant, so I removed it. In the sentence 14 mentioning China looks strange. ROC was already at war with Japan by that moment. If there was no war declared on Japan since Marco-Polo, then it should be stated clearly in the War in China section. I am not sure about No 17, as I doubt the USA considered a use of A-bomb seriously by that moment (by the way, according to Churchill, the experiments were carried out mostly in UK/Canada that time). --Paul Siebert (talk) 18:12, 4 September 2008 (UTC) Comment on "By October, Axis operational objectives in the Baltic region and Ukraine were achieved". The Germans failed to make a connection with Finns, although they planned to do so, therefore, they didn't achieved their operational objectives there (in contrast to Ukraine). I propose to rephrase it.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:08, 4 September 2008 (UTC)

Section for End of War

An additional section is required regarding the end of the war and all activities held post-war (trials, settlements etc.).ThirstyThought (talk) 02:02, 17 August 2008 (UTC)

The 'Aftermath' and 'Casualties and war crimes' sections already cover those topics. Nick Dowling (talk) 02:06, 17 August 2008 (UTC)

Typo and page is locked

Beyond their increased effectiveness, carriers were also more economical then battleships due to the relatively low cost of aircraft

should be

Beyond their increased effectiveness, carriers were also more economical than battleships due to the relatively low cost of aircraft

thanks in advance

Thanks for pointing that out, I just fixed it. Parsecboy (talk) 12:27, 17 August 2008 (UTC)

Introduction

I made some changes in introduction according to what I proposed in the Mediation page (no one objected, so I conclude I can do it). I also removed mentioning of atomic bombing, because this was only one reason for surrender (non necesserily the major one). I changed the date of German surrender making it consistent with the page Victory in Europe Day. Since the date of sept 2, 1945 was the date of formal surrender of Japan, I chainged that date either. In addition to that, I would propose to remove the finansial cost data: it is not an appropriate plase to speak about that. It would be better to move it to Impact section. --Paul Siebert (talk) 20:28, 19 August 2008 (UTC)

Agree on cost. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 21:29, 19 August 2008 (UTC)

War becomes Global?

I could have sworn that Canada, New Zealand, Austrailia, South Africa and many, many other countries are not in Europe. Is America all over the world and is only a world war until it joins? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 142.161.177.41 (talk) 22:19, 21 August 2008 (UTC)

Its the start of the Pacific conflict... --DIREKTOR ^(TALK) 01:29, 23 August 2008 (UTC)

The perhaps the heading should say that, it is a bit more NPOV.Martin Hogbin (talk) 09:25, 24 August 2008 (UTC)

The headline doesn't only refer to the "start" (it actually started in 1931) of the Pacific conflict, but also to the beginning of the Soviet-German war. 96T (talk) 18:43, 25 August 2008 (UTC)

I do not think the Second Sino-Japanese war or the invasion of Manchuria are considered a part of WW2 before 1941. And I am not sure how the start of the fighting on Europe's eastern front qualifies as making the war "global". Perhaps we should consider June 10 1940 as the date the war became "global", since that's the date fighting began on another continent (the North African Campaign). (It does not make sense to call a war "global" simply if it involves countries of more than one continent.) --DIREKTOR ^(TALK) 20:45, 25 August 2008 (UTC)

I would propose to stop a discussion about the moment when the war became global. Such a discussion can be endless because the question is as futile as the question about exact length of a coastal line or of a contour length of a fractal. There is no single moment after which the war became global, and nobody can propose a unique criterion for that. I can propose several criteria each of them being equally objective and each of them will tell us the war became global in 1931, or in 1940, or 1941, or the global war had never started at all (there are at least 2 criteria suggesting that: (i) the war didn't come to Antarctida, and (ii) there were no hostilities in South America).
I propose to agree that the war had become global during 1940-1941, and this would be both correct and polite towards peoples who participated in it. I am afraid, peoples who fought during WWII would be very disappointed if they knew how futile are the questions their descendants discuss. --Paul Siebert (talk) 23:27, 25 August 2008 (UTC)

Ahm....with all due respect Paul, there were hostilities in South America, if it is defined by the continental waters and participation of Brazil. The war didn't come to Antarctica chiefly because there were no military objectives there :)

Strictly speaking the war expanded from continental (although "continentality" of Europe is questionable), to inter-continental (two continents) and global (more than two continents) very rapidly by the virtue of the far-flung British and Commonwealth interests, so that date was the declaration of war by UK and France. Even if Australia had not taken action against German processions in the Pacific, UK could have done so from Malaya before 1941. The shipping of Indian troops to North Africa, also made it literally global because India is a sub-continent, and to reach North Africa they had to bypass Asia--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 00:24, 26 August 2008 (UTC)

Correct me if I'm wrong, but "Home front" is just a pretty term, its not really a "front", and a few ships getting sunk in the oceans of the world does not mean war has spread to the continents that are near them. Also, continents are landmasses by definition, and do not include the surrounding territorial waters of the states they may or may not have on their surface. Hypothetically, Tibet could have declared war on Germany and still not make the war global, unless fighting actually took place there. The "continentality" of Europe is generally accepted, and is probably questionable only from a Russian perspective. The term "global" encompasses "inter-continental" at least in these considerations. --DIREKTOR ^(TALK) 01:06, 26 August 2008 (UTC)

Home Front was a term used by the British Government to refer to the civil defence activities and war production in support of its forces as its citizens died in the streets. There was very little "pretty" about it.

Not sure what your definition of "a few ships" is but hundreds were lost on the shipping lanes of the Atlantic and the North Sea.

Yes, continents are landmasses by definition, and are therefore defined by the continental shelf as far as naval warfare is concerned due to the requirement to navigate the coastal regions, including by submarines.

Fighting need not take place on a given territory for it to be included in the war. Much of the Allied naval activity in the South Atlantic was directed at preventing German shipping from deriving any benefit from the South American resources although the resource providers were neutral. Economics are as much a part of a conflict as actual combat.

The continentality of Europe is not "generally accepted", and has been questioned since before the arrival of Slavs in Europe, and certainly since that time, with no clear definition for what is a sociopolitical identity.

By definition any global activity or global event must encompass the planetary globe, as in circumnavigation. This is possible only by naval or air means, and until the entry of the United States into the war, was not in effect because Eastern Pacific was not accessible to Commonwealth forces. From this perspective the war became global on the 3 June 1942--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 01:56, 26 August 2008 (UTC)

Yes, ships were sunk in the Atlantic off the shore of the US. Does that mean the war spread to the North American continent? (As I said, Europe is generally accepted to be a continent.) --DIREKTOR ^(TALK) 02:04, 26 August 2008 (UTC)

The war in North America begun on the 10 September 1939

We have a definition of a continent, and it doesn't seem to apply to Europe--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 13:46, 26 August 2008 (UTC)

I'm sorry, but to say that there was any warfare on the North American continent does not make sense. Exactly which engagement took place on the date of Canada's entry into the war? Also, Europe is a political continent and is traditionally considered one. We are discussing in political, not scientific terms. --DIREKTOR ^(TALK) 13:51, 26 August 2008 (UTC)

When a country goes to war, it doesn't just go to war where there is shooting!

As I said, Europe is a sociopolitical identity, not a "political continent". Actually even the sociopolitical tag doesn't apply because of the diversity of societies and because until Russia is a part of the EU, along with every other country, it will not be a politically united entiry either--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 11:37, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

It may surprise you to know that Europe was widely considered one of the traditional seven continents long before 1957 and the advent of European integration, and that Russia is a European country. I am not going to discuss whether or not Europe is a continent, as that is utterly ridiculous. Something like "forbidding" the use of the adjective "Soviet".

I'm sorry if I misunderstood you. Which campaign took place on the North American continent? Remember, we are not talking about whether or not Canada was at war, or whether the war affected the country (it affected nearly every country, neutral or not) we are talking about warfare. --DIREKTOR ^(TALK) 12:15, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

Furthermore, are you aware that according to your "definition" of war there is currently one taking place in North America (the Iraq War)? --DIREKTOR ^(TALK) 12:25, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

Tradition is a dynamic concept, continent is relatively less so.

Russia had not always been considered a part of Europe.

"Soviet" when applied to an organisation that did not bear that name is inappropriate.

I'm glad you asked that because during the Second World War Defense of the Americas Campaign took place on the North American continent from 7 December 1941 to 2 September 1945.

The Iraq War is in fact an official US DoD military campaign and a medal has been issued as an award as was the case for other campaigns in the past. Wikipedia is not always a good source, and its article headings can be misleading when someone things the real name sounds lousy--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 00:02, 28 August 2008 (UTC)

Global? As I understand it, the usual definition of "involvement" of a country is, are its forces fighting? Given Canadians were, "North America" was "involved". The fact there were U-boats in the St. Lawrence also qualifies NAm as "involved", since territorial waters are usually included in a nation's geographical limits. Of course, being Canadian, perhaps I'm not the one to ask... And Iraq? You don't honestly mean to suggest the U.S. isn't "involved"? (Nor Canada in Afghanistan, BTW.) TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 00:29, 28 August 2008 (UTC)

What started in 9/39 leaded to fighting at least in division strength in Europe, Africa and Asia (Middle East) directly, without necessarily having Japan, US or Soviet Union involved. It also included participants from all populated continents. Countries from North America, Asia, Africa and Australia have been involved directly linking tothe German attack on Poland. Therefore, in terms of countries participating, the world war started in September 1939. If not then, then it hasnt been a world war at all. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 59.42.203.67 (talk) 08:44, 6 October 2008 (UTC)

Ardennes Mountains?!?!!?

The Ardennes is a forest. Someone needs to change that. I don't have an account. But it's glaringly wrong - the kind of wrong that makes everyone doube Wikipedia. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.128.204.96 (talk) 07:31, 24 August 2008 (UTC)

Good catch: I justed fixed it. Nick Dowling (talk) 07:46, 24 August 2008 (UTC)

The Ardennes are (geographically) a forested hill range. The tactical importance is mainly in its hilly nature (natural barrier - causing problems for the Germans in their battle of France and earlier in WWI as they went around the hills; also making a counter attack through it unlikely according to Allied command).

With this addition to the anon's only forest remark, I agree mountains should go, and Nick Dowlings fixes in mainspace are great. Arnoutf (talk) 08:28, 24 August 2008 (UTC)

You may agree, but Ardennes are Givetian (Devonian) mountains (old) that are overgrown with forests, and are not hills, but a part of the geological formation that stretches through the Harz Mountains across Europe into Iberia, and can not be described in general geographic terms as uniformly hilly either [7]--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 02:47, 26 August 2008 (UTC)

Yes but check any history book or anything about world war 2, other than this wikipedia page, and it'll talk about the ardennes forest and how the Germans came through there. Just referring to it as the Ardennes region is alright I guess, but it'll be specifically referred to as a forest in any other place. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.128.204.96 (talk) 03:01, 26 August 2008 (UTC)

I did better. Not only did I look at the books, I also looked at the maps where the German Army passed. From a tactical perspective the forest was non-consequential. The simple truth is that getting through that region is made difficult by the few and narrow motorways that act like choke-points to any attacking force. They are not easily negotiated because the "hills" that are mountains have fairly steel slopes (tanks can only do 60 degrees gradients), and require bridging if the defender is able to do some demolition. The trees are not much help either as they can be easily felled across the roads using the simple imperative of detonating artillery shells. As it happens Bastogne is located on a 500m high plateau which makes attacking artillery not all that useful without air correction observers (consider weather and Allied air superiority), and attackers would be fighting "down hill" so the position that runs across the entire width of the German front is a very good one for defenders. Then there is the issue of logistics. Going up slopes takes more fuel and horses, going down-hill leaves tanks, the principal offensive weapon in the offensive, less effective due to limited gun elevation. And this is in the middle of winter when moving on flat terrain is not as easy. The authors that speak about Germans going through the forest are of course right because the roads were cut though it, but forests actually benefit both sides, though less so for Germans given they were lost for avenues of escape when Allied FBs begun to attack the roads. Technically though the area is mountains. saying that its "forest" belies the topography of the ground under the trees. Saying its "hills" belies the geological nature of the terrain that was only hilly towards the extreme extent of German penetration given their staging area was in the Eiffel Mountains. Situation was much different in 1940 of course--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 14:17, 26 August 2008 (UTC)

This seems like a needless argument. Why not simply use the term Ardennes, linked, so that readers can figure it out themselves. There is no need for the terms "forest", "mountains" or anything else. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 14:27, 26 August 2008 (UTC)

mrg is right, Allied reasoning on the supposed "impassibility" of the Ardennes was centered around the terrain, not the degree of forestation. However, perhaps we should clarify all this, I suggest calling the Ardennes a "densely forested mountainous region of the Ardennes". We should lay the facts bare for the reader --DIREKTOR ^(TALK) 14:30, 26 August 2008 (UTC)

War in North America

This is a rather important point and I'd like to ask everyone's opinion on this. Simply: what was the last war that took place on the North American continent? --DIREKTOR ^(TALK) 12:21, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

Maybe, invasion of Panama?--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:14, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

I just got confused by mrg's statements above that if a state on the North American continent is involved in a war, then that means there is war on the North American continent ("The war in North America begun on the 10 September 1939", the date of Canada's entry into the war). As you may know, I'm not a professional historian but my common sense rebelled against such a claim. That would mean that there is currently a war in North America, the Iraq War. —Preceding unsigned comment added by DIREKTOR (talk • contribs)

If someone wrote that phrase in the article, I'd say to fix it. As it is, I think we're all clear on the facts, and there's no sense in quibbling over talk page wording. -- SCZenz (talk) 18:09, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

The idea was that that was the date World War II spread to another continent and became global, and that we should include that... --DIREKTOR ^(TALK) 22:04, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

The last war that took place on the North American continent is still taking place, and in the United States is officially called the Global War on Terror. Troops have been decorated with two medals for it. The award is presented for all participants in operations, including those that have never left United States territory.

If your common sense rebelled against my statement that war on the North American continent begun on the 10 September 1939, you can try reading books. A war begins with decisions, not fighting. This is not always made obvious by some authors on the subject. Barbarossa for example didn't begin on 22 June 1941, and war between Japan and the USA didn't start on the 7 December 1941 either. I know its hard to comprehend this because in people's imagination the physicality of actual combat serves as a sort of starting pistol, but warfare is far more complex as a process than popular sports. These decisions are not really reflected in the current article, or selectively so. Both the Soviet Union and the United States knew that war was inevitable. Both chose to delay preparation for it (reasons aside) and suffered accordingly. In the case of Canada the decision taken on the 10th had a wide-ranging consequence for its population as wartime Acts of Parliament started to come into effect, and many Canadians found themselves in uniform. No one would question that war had begun, and indeed this was also the case in other Commonwealth countries. There are many memoirs from different countries that make the statement "a sense of war was already in the air" in the first days after the country's entry into the war--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 23:46, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

That's mrg allright, coming out with outrageous claims and defending them mercilessly, never admitting he's wrong... --DIREKTOR ^(TALK) 23:55, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

I don't make "claims". These are statements of fact. Therefore, I am right. That you are not aware of facts, or refuse to acknowledge them is neither my problem nor a matter for discussion here--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 02:24, 28 August 2008 (UTC)

You're always "right", mrg... that's also a statement of fact. --DIREKTOR ^(TALK) 09:22, 28 August 2008 (UTC)

Raw numbers-2

I was looking through the archive and I found the following Oberiko's remark regarding the present version of the "War become global".
"I was thinking about putting more emphasis on Barbarossa, but it's actually about the same number of combatants as the Battle of France, which I didn't emphasis in terms of scale. Oberiko 20:42, 24 October 2007 (UTC)".
That is quite interesting. Apparently, the authors of the present version kept in mind to put emphases generally based on raw numbers, that don't tell a full story...
I definitely cannot understand anything.--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:09, 27 August 2008 (UTC)

You & me both. Is that real? I'll bet it's the later, heavier involvement by Red Army, or discounting the Hungarians, Ukranians, Finns, & Italians, or something, that throws off the #s. I certainly don't think of them as showing equal strength. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 00:34, 28 August 2008 (UTC)

Brand new start - defining inclusion/exclusion criteria

I changed my mind after another review of the substantial part of the article from the section now titled "War becomes global".

As with any project, the first act is to define criteria by which it is to be judged on completion. In this case the necessary step was skipped in conception. The very name of the article suggests, that the article needs to deal with:

strategic decisions by national leaders of primary belligerents
their diplomatic strategies affecting nations and regions
strategic economic policies and development (economic expansion)
and military strategies that resulted from them

Currently the article does not do this consistently.

Primary national leaders

In the Background section while Stalin, Mussolini and Hitler are named, the leaders of Japan, China, UK, France, Poland, Finland, and Romania are not, while Franco is named although Spain was not involved.
The "the replacement of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain by Winston Churchill on May 10, 1940" appears as a mere footnote in the War breaks out in Europe section.
Other than political leaders were involved. The people who managed supplying the war efforts were also important, as were the major military commanders. Its a history article so a bit of name dropping would not be out of place.

I think the name mentioned are a "brand names" whereas majority others can be omitted without problems. Spanish Civil War was an important pre-war event, actually the first (indirect) battle between Communists and Nazis, and is associated with Franko. As regards to incorporation of other names or events I would propose alternative strategy: we should discuss not a possibility to include something, but impossibility to exclude it. For instance, it is impossible to omit Churchill (I would agree the vague statement you cited is insufficient, because his appointment had a profound effect), whereas including Ignacy Mościcki would hardly clarify anything.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:38, 29 August 2008 (UTC)

I'm just saying that these were significant personages--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 05:08, 29 August 2008 (UTC)

"War is a continuation of politics (diplomacy) by other means"

There really needs to be an expanded section to explain how diplomatic decisions led to events of 1939, and what roles they played during the war, although I think there is already a good coverage there.

Economies at war

The war was a major burden on the national economies, but you wouldn't think so reading this article. The entire reason for German expansion was largely a reaction to the German economic aspirations before First World War (unmentioned), the effects of Depression of 1920s (unmentioned), and the ostensible expansion of German "power" on the continent (unmentioned). Main Kempf says so fairly explicitly (unmentioned). The same was true of Japan (barely mentioned). The oil embargo is a form of economic warfare, although the real crunch came with the embargo on scrap metal sales. Romania was a strategic ally for Germany largely for its oil (unmentioned). The North African campaign was intended to initially cut communications between UK and India (unmentioned), and eventually bring Turkey into the Axis alliance. Soviet Union survived because of the massive strategic relocation of its industries (unmentioned), and because of the Lend Lease (mentioned as support the United Kingdom and China?!). Italy failed as an economic power before it failed as a military one, and US prevailed economically in 1943 before it achieved military victory in 1945. Why didn't Japan make a greater effort to occupy Australia? Because the bulk of Australian mining output at the time was in lead, zinc and copper, and they needed oil and iron ore.

(That and it was strategically impossible after the Coral Sea, Guadalcanal and Midway... --DIREKTOR ^(TALK) 09:29, 28 August 2008 (UTC))

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^ Dunn, Dennis J. Caught Between Roosevelt & Stalin: America's Ambassadors to Moscow, pg. 157
^ Klam, Julie. The Rise of Japan and Pearl Harbor, pg. 27
^ Hill, J. R.; Ranft, Bryan. The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy, pg. 362
^ ^a ^b ^c Hsiung, James Chieh; Levine, Steven I. China's Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937-1945, pg. 158
^ Chun, Clayton K. S. The Doolittle Raid 1942: America's First Strike Back at Japan, pg. 88
^ Gooch, John. Decisive Campaigns of the Second World War, pg.52
^ Molinari, Andrea. Desert Raiders: Axis and Allied Special Forces 1940-43, pg. 91
^ Welch, David. Modern European History, 1871-2000: A Documentary Reader, pg. 102
^ Mitcham, Samuel W.; Mitcham, Samuel W. Jr. Rommel's Desert War: The Life and Death of the Afrika Korps, pg. 31
^ Glantz, David M. From the Don to the Dnepr: Soviet Offensive Operations, December 1942-August 1943, pg. 215
^ Burroughs, William James. Climate: Into the 21st Century, pg. 115
^ Whymant, Robert. Stalin's Spy: Richard Sorge and the Tokyo Espionage Ring, pg. 314
^ Lightbody, Bradley. The Second World War: Ambitions to Nemesis, pg. 125
^ Mingst, Karen A.; Karns, Margaret P. United Nations in the Twenty-First Century, pg. 22
^ Dunn, Dennis J. Caught Between Roosevelt & Stalin: America's Ambassadors to Moscow, pg. 157
^ Klam, Julie. The Rise of Japan and Pearl Harbor, pg. 27
^ Hill, J. R.; Ranft, Bryan. The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy, pg. 362
^ Gooch, John. Decisive Campaigns of the Second World War, pg.52
^ Alan F. Wilt. Hitler's Late Summer Pause in 1941. Military Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Dec., 1981), pp. 187-191.
^ Shukman, Harold. Stalin's Generals, pg. 113
^ A. S. Milward. The End of the Blitzkrieg. The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1964), pp. 499-518.
^ Louis Rotundo. The Creation of Soviet Reserves and the 1941 Campaign. Military Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Jan., 1986), pp. 21-28.
^ Amnon Sella. 'Barbarossa': Surprise Attack and Communication. Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 13, No. 3, (Jul., 1978), pp. 555-583.
^ Alan F. Wilt. Hitler's Late Summer Pause in 1941. Military Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Dec., 1981), pp.187-191.
^ Shukman, Harold. Stalin's Generals, p.113
^ A. S. Milward. The End of the Blitzkrieg. The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1964), pp. 499-518.
^ Louis Rotundo. The Creation of Soviet Reserves and the 1941 Campaign. Military Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Jan., 1986), pp. 21-28.
^ ^a ^b Cite error: The named reference GlantzDecCounter was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^ Amnon Sella. 'Barbarossa': Surprise Attack and Communication. Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 13, No. 3, (Jul., 1978), pp. 555-583.
^ Alan F. Wilt. Hitler's Late Summer Pause in 1941. Military Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Dec., 1981), pp.187-191.
^ Shukman, Harold. Stalin's Generals, p.113
^ A. S. Milward. The End of the Blitzkrieg. The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1964), pp. 499-518.
^ Louis Rotundo. The Creation of Soviet Reserves and the 1941 Campaign. Military Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Jan., 1986), pp. 21-28.
^ In the Mediterranean. The New York Times: Jul 13, 1941
^ Pravda, Alex; Duncan, Peter J. S. Soviet-British Relations Since the 1970s, pg. 29
^ Heptulla, Najma. The Logic of Political Survival, pg. 131
^ Gannon, James. Stealing Secrets, Telling Lies: How Spies and Codebreakers Helped Shape the Twentieth Century, pg. 76
^ AFLMA Year in Review, pg. 32
^ AFLMA Year in Review, pg. 33
^ Ropp, Theodore. War in the Modern World, pg. 363
^ Northrup, Cynthia Clark. The American economy: a historical encyclopedia, pg. 214
^ Lightbody, Bradley. The Second World War: Ambitions to Nemesis, pg. 125
^ Morgan, Patrick M. Strategic Military Surprise: Incentives and Opportunities, pg. 51
^ Thurman, M. J.; Sherman, Christine. War Crimes: Japan's World War II Atrocities, pg. 68
^ Mingst, Karen A.; Karns, Margaret P. United Nations in the Twenty-First Century, pg. 22
^ Dunn, Dennis J. Caught Between Roosevelt & Stalin: America's Ambassadors to Moscow, pg. 157
^ Klam, Julie. The Rise of Japan and Pearl Harbor, pg. 27
^ Hill, J. R.; Ranft, Bryan. The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy, pg. 362
^ Gooch, John. Decisive Campaigns of the Second World War, pg.52
^ Molinari, Andrea. Desert Raiders: Axis and Allied Special Forces 1940-43, pg. 91
^ Welch, David. Modern European History, 1871-2000: A Documentary Reader, pg. 102
^ Mitcham, Samuel W.; Mitcham, Samuel W. Jr. Rommel's Desert War: The Life and Death of the Afrika Korps, pg. 31
^ Glantz, David M. From the Don to the Dnepr: Soviet Offensive Operations, December 1942-August 1943, pg. 215

[1] Shukman, Harold. Stalin's Generals, pg. 113

[2] Burroughs, William James. Climate: Into the 21st Century, pg. 115

[3] Whymant, Robert. Stalin's Spy: Richard Sorge and the Tokyo Espionage Ring, pg. 314

[4] Pravda, Alex; Duncan, Peter J. S. Soviet-British Relations Since the 1970s, pg. 29

[5] Heptulla, Najma. The Logic of Political Survival, pg. 131

[AdvenBrit223-6] Louis, William Roger. More Adventures with Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain, pg. 223

[7] Gannon, James. Stealing Secrets, Telling Lies: How Spies and Codebreakers Helped Shape the Twentieth Century, pg. 76

[8] AFLMA Year in Review, pg. 32

[9] AFLMA Year in Review, pg. 33

[10] Ropp, Theodore. War in the Modern World, pg. 363

[11] Northrup, Cynthia Clark. The American economy: a historical encyclopedia, pg. 214

[12] Lightbody, Bradley. The Second World War: Ambitions to Nemesis, pg. 125

[13] Morgan, Patrick M. Strategic Military Surprise: Incentives and Opportunities, pg. 51

[14] Thurman, M. J.; Sherman, Christine. War Crimes: Japan's World War II Atrocities, pg. 68

[15] Mingst, Karen A.; Karns, Margaret P. United Nations in the Twenty-First Century, pg. 22

[16] Dunn, Dennis J. Caught Between Roosevelt & Stalin: America's Ambassadors to Moscow, pg. 157

[17] Klam, Julie. The Rise of Japan and Pearl Harbor, pg. 27

[18] Hill, J. R.; Ranft, Bryan. The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy, pg. 362

[ChinaBitter158-19] Hsiung, James Chieh; Levine, Steven I. China's Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937-1945, pg. 158

[20] Chun, Clayton K. S. The Doolittle Raid 1942: America's First Strike Back at Japan, pg. 88

[21] Gooch, John. Decisive Campaigns of the Second World War, pg.52

[22] Molinari, Andrea. Desert Raiders: Axis and Allied Special Forces 1940-43, pg. 91

[23] Welch, David. Modern European History, 1871-2000: A Documentary Reader, pg. 102

[24] Mitcham, Samuel W.; Mitcham, Samuel W. Jr. Rommel's Desert War: The Life and Death of the Afrika Korps, pg. 31

[25] Glantz, David M. From the Don to the Dnepr: Soviet Offensive Operations, December 1942-August 1943, pg. 215

[26] Burroughs, William James. Climate: Into the 21st Century, pg. 115

[27] Whymant, Robert. Stalin's Spy: Richard Sorge and the Tokyo Espionage Ring, pg. 314

[28] Lightbody, Bradley. The Second World War: Ambitions to Nemesis, pg. 125

[29] Mingst, Karen A.; Karns, Margaret P. United Nations in the Twenty-First Century, pg. 22

[30] Dunn, Dennis J. Caught Between Roosevelt & Stalin: America's Ambassadors to Moscow, pg. 157

[31] Klam, Julie. The Rise of Japan and Pearl Harbor, pg. 27

[32] Hill, J. R.; Ranft, Bryan. The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy, pg. 362

[33] Gooch, John. Decisive Campaigns of the Second World War, pg.52

[34] Alan F. Wilt. Hitler's Late Summer Pause in 1941. Military Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Dec., 1981), pp. 187-191.

[35] Shukman, Harold. Stalin's Generals, pg. 113

[36] A. S. Milward. The End of the Blitzkrieg. The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1964), pp. 499-518.

[37] Louis Rotundo. The Creation of Soviet Reserves and the 1941 Campaign. Military Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Jan., 1986), pp. 21-28.

[38] Amnon Sella. 'Barbarossa': Surprise Attack and Communication. Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 13, No. 3, (Jul., 1978), pp. 555-583.

[39] Alan F. Wilt. Hitler's Late Summer Pause in 1941. Military Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Dec., 1981), pp.187-191.

[40] Shukman, Harold. Stalin's Generals, p.113

[41] A. S. Milward. The End of the Blitzkrieg. The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1964), pp. 499-518.

[42] Louis Rotundo. The Creation of Soviet Reserves and the 1941 Campaign. Military Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Jan., 1986), pp. 21-28.

[GlantzDecCounter-43] Cite error: The named reference GlantzDecCounter was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

[44] Amnon Sella. 'Barbarossa': Surprise Attack and Communication. Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 13, No. 3, (Jul., 1978), pp. 555-583.

[45] Alan F. Wilt. Hitler's Late Summer Pause in 1941. Military Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Dec., 1981), pp.187-191.

[46] Shukman, Harold. Stalin's Generals, p.113

[47] A. S. Milward. The End of the Blitzkrieg. The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1964), pp. 499-518.

[48] Louis Rotundo. The Creation of Soviet Reserves and the 1941 Campaign. Military Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Jan., 1986), pp. 21-28.

[49] In the Mediterranean. The New York Times: Jul 13, 1941

[50] Pravda, Alex; Duncan, Peter J. S. Soviet-British Relations Since the 1970s, pg. 29

[51] Heptulla, Najma. The Logic of Political Survival, pg. 131

[52] Gannon, James. Stealing Secrets, Telling Lies: How Spies and Codebreakers Helped Shape the Twentieth Century, pg. 76

[53] AFLMA Year in Review, pg. 32

[54] AFLMA Year in Review, pg. 33

[55] Ropp, Theodore. War in the Modern World, pg. 363

[56] Northrup, Cynthia Clark. The American economy: a historical encyclopedia, pg. 214

[57] Lightbody, Bradley. The Second World War: Ambitions to Nemesis, pg. 125

[58] Morgan, Patrick M. Strategic Military Surprise: Incentives and Opportunities, pg. 51

[59] Thurman, M. J.; Sherman, Christine. War Crimes: Japan's World War II Atrocities, pg. 68

[60] Mingst, Karen A.; Karns, Margaret P. United Nations in the Twenty-First Century, pg. 22

[61] Dunn, Dennis J. Caught Between Roosevelt & Stalin: America's Ambassadors to Moscow, pg. 157

[62] Klam, Julie. The Rise of Japan and Pearl Harbor, pg. 27

[63] Hill, J. R.; Ranft, Bryan. The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy, pg. 362

[64] Gooch, John. Decisive Campaigns of the Second World War, pg.52

[65] Molinari, Andrea. Desert Raiders: Axis and Allied Special Forces 1940-43, pg. 91

[66] Welch, David. Modern European History, 1871-2000: A Documentary Reader, pg. 102

[67] Mitcham, Samuel W.; Mitcham, Samuel W. Jr. Rommel's Desert War: The Life and Death of the Afrika Korps, pg. 31

[68] Glantz, David M. From the Don to the Dnepr: Soviet Offensive Operations, December 1942-August 1943, pg. 215

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