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  • "Tiso and his regime were totally complicit. The Slovak politicians' claim during the war and in postwar trials that they believed that the Jews had been deported for work purposes, which some historians in Slovakia still use today, is easily refuted. |P Would these people let their wives get into a railway cattle car with five small children somewhere in Michalovce so they could ride for twenty hours on the floor of the train—only to get to Bratislava—let alone to Auschwitz or Lublin in occupied Poland? Would they agree that it is "normal" for their eighty-year old parents to be transported in the same fashion? Would they survive such a trip? This is how the deportation trains leaving Slovakia looked from April to October of 1942"[1]

Background

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Before 1939, Slovakia had never been an independent country. It had been part of the Kingdom of Hungary for more than a thousand years; after World War I, it became part of Czechoslovakia.

  • Czechslovakia "having seceded from the collapsing Austrian half of the Habsburg monarchy... As for the eastern, Slovak, half of the new state [Czechoslovakia], there had never been a Slovakia; its territory had for a thousand years formed the northern mountainous part of the Hungarian kingdom."[2]
  • "Bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkriegs gehörte die Slowakei zum ungarischen Reichsteil der Donaumonarchie."[3]

It was a heavily Catholic country Following Jewish emancipation in 1896, many Jews had adopted Hungarian language and customs in order to advance in society. Many Jews moved to cities and joined the professions; others remained in the countryside, mostly working as artisans, merchants, and shopkeepers.

  • "die rechtliche Gleichstellung der christlichen und jüdischen Religion 1896 bedeuteten für die jüdischen Gemeinden in gesellschaftlicher, wirtschaftlicher und religiöser Hinsicht eine Zäsur. Wie auch Angehörige andererMinderheiten nutzten Juden nun die von der ungarischen Regierung gewünschte Magyarisierung, d. h. die vollständige Assimilation an die ungarische Sprache und Kultur, zur Verbesserung ihrer wirtschaftlichen Lage."[3]; see also[4]

Their multilingualism helped them advance in business, but put many Jews in conflict with Slovak nationalism.

  • Advance in business: "Dass viele Juden mehrsprachig waren, erleichterte ihnen den Eintritt in die entstehende bürgerliche Gesellschaft."[3]
  • [because many Jews embraced Hungarian language and culture] "the Slovak nationalist press was able to exploit popular antisemitism to bolster" [the Slovak national struggle] "by claiming that Jews were 'agents of magyarization'"[5]
  • "Moreover, Jews were accused of not being Slovaks as many of them continued to speak (mainly) Hungarian, German or Yiddish."[6]

Traditional religious antisemitism was joined by the stereotypical view of Jews as exploiters of poor Slovaks (economic antisemitism), and a form of "national anti-Semitism" accusing Jews of sympathizing with Hungarian and later Czechoslovak national aims.

  • "Pre- war sources of religious, racial and socioeconomic anti-Semitism merged with national anti-Semitism, when the Jews were accused of pro-Hungarian sentiments"[7]
  • "Die slowakische Nationalbewegung gab im 19. Jahrhundert einem seit langem existierenden, religiös motivierten Antisemitismus neuen Auftrieb. Zwar hatten sich auch Juden der slowakischen Nationalbewegung angeschlossen, doch blieb diese Annäherung nach der Verschärfung der ungarischen Nationalitätenpolitik ohne Resonanz.... Das antisemitische Stereotyp vom Juden als Ausbeuter des armen slowakischen Bauern ergänzte das traditionelle religiöse Feindbild."(18) "Aufgrund der starken Identifikation der Juden mit dem tschechoslowakischen Staat erhoben die slowakischen Nationalisten den Vorwurf, Juden seien sogenannte Tschechoslowakisten." (19)[8]
  • "First, was the Christian level that emerged from earlier anti-Jewish stereotypes, such as the deicide myth or the Jews' refusal to accept Jesus as the messiah... There were also national, economic, and political stereotypes. The national-linguistic stereotypes argued that "the Jews are not Slovaks" (or the Jews speak Hungarian, German, Yiddish), which were representative of the magyarization of Slovaks during the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The economic (social) stereotypes included beliefs such as that the Jews exploited and exploit the Slovaks, living off their manual labor and at their expense; and that Jewish pub owners make alcoholics out of the Slovaks. The political stereotypes saw the Jews as "liberal", leftist (or Bolshevik), capitalist, and Marxist."[9]

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In the 1930s, economic underdevelopment and perceptions of discrimination in Czechoslovakia led one-third of Slovaks to support the conservative, ethnonationalist Slovak People's Party (Slovak: Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana: HSĽS).

  • economic underdevelopment etc.: " In response to that underdevelopment and perceived discrimination, the Slovak People’s Party..." [10]
  • support: "One- third of the inhabitants in Slovakia supported HSĽS policies."[10] "Between the world wars, the party presented autonomy as a panacea for Slovak problems—a position that gained it the largest electorate in Slovakia (around a third of all voters" [11]
  • ethnonationalist: "The ethno-nationalist agenda of the Hlinka Slovak People’s Party (HSPP)"[12]

HSĽS viewed minority groups such as Czechs, Hungarians, Jews, and Romani people as a destructive influence on the Slovak nation,

  • "the Slovaks saw danger in the heterogeneous population of Czechs, Hungarians, Jews, and Roma, who were all seen as a destructive influence in the new Slovak Republic and were pushed to the margins of society"[12]

and presented Slovak autonomy as the solution to Slovakia's problems.

  • "Between the world wars, the party presented autonomy as a panacea for Slovak problems"[11]

The party began to emphasize antisemitism during the late 1930s following a wave of Jewish refugees from Austria after its 1938 annexation by Nazi Germany and anti-Jewish laws passed by the neighboring states of Hungary, Poland, and Romania.

  • "... began to push antisemitism to the forefront of L̕udák politics. The dynamism of Nazi Germany, the waves of Jewish refugees it created (most notably during the 1938 Anschluss), and the adoption of antisemitic measures in neighboring Romania, Poland, and Hungary all encouraged antisemitism in Slovakia"[13]

Slovak independence

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The September 1938 Munich Agreement ceded the Sudetenland, the German-speaking region of the Czech lands, to Germany. HSĽS took advantage of the ensuing political chaos to declare Slovakia's autonomy on 6 October 1938. Jozef Tiso, a Catholic priest and HSĽS leader, became prime minister of the Slovak autonomous region.

  • Munich Agreement: "At the Munich conference of September 1938, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Nazi Germany reached an agreement that forced Czechoslovakia to cede the Sudetenland, its predominantly German- inhabited region, to the Reich." (col. 1)[10]
  • HSLS autonomy: "T he H SĽS quickly took advantage of the weakened central government; its leaders seized the opportunity to achieve the party’s long- term goal: autonomy of Slovakia within Czechoslovakia." (col 1)[10]
  • Jozef Tiso: "Jozef Tiso, a Roman Catholic priest and one of the leading Ľudáks, originally from Veľká Bytča, became its prime minister." (col 2) [10]

Under Tiso's leadership, the Slovak government opened negotiations in Komárno with Hungary regarding their border. The dispute was submitted to arbitration in Vienna by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Hungary was awarded much of southern Slovakia on 2 November 1938, including 40 percent of Slovakia's arable land and 270,000 people who had declared Czechoslovak ethnicity.

  • Komárno: " Tiso had hurried to the border town of Komárno for talks with the Hungarians. These negotiations did not go well."(163)
  • Vienna: "On 2 November, Czechoslovak and Hungarian delegations gathered in Vienna for final arguments on the border dispute. The arbiters were Ribbentrop and Count Galeazzo Ciano, the Italian foreign minister." (166)
  • Award: "In fall 1938, Hungary annexed much of the south of the province" (161) "All in all, Hungary received over 10,000 square kilometers with more than 850,000 inhabitants. Slovakia’s losses included around 40 percent of her arable land and some 270,000 “Czechoslovaks” according to the 1930 census." (166) [14]

HSĽS consolidated its power by banning opposing political parties, shutting down independent newspapers, distributing antisemitic and anti-Czech propaganda, and founding the paramilitary Hlinka Guard.

  • enabling act: "Schließlich konnte die slowakische Landesregierung nach Verabschiedung eines Ermächtigungsgesetzes am 15. Dezember 1938 Verordnungen in Angelegenheiten erlassen, für die bislang der slowakische Landtag zuständig war."[15]
  • banning political parties: "some political parties were forced to unite with HSĽS, others, including communists, social democrats, and two Jewish parties, as well as the Slovak National Party, were dissolved."[10] "Die linken und die beiden jüdischen Parteien wurden verboten."[15]
  • opposition newspapers: "[Office of Propaganda] eliminated independent journals and newspapers"[10] "Zahlreiche Presseerzeugnisse wurden verboten"[15]
  • Hlinka Guard: "The HSĽS created its own paramilitary organization called the Hlinka Guard"[10] "Die während der Sudetenkrise im Sommer 1938 gegründete paramilitärische Organisation der Volkspartei, die Hlinka-Garde, avancierte zu einer führenden Kraft des Landes."[15]
  • Propaganda: "In October 1938, the government established the Office of Propaganda... The Office of Propaganda used its control of the press to vilify Czechs and Jews"[10]

Parties for the German and Hungarian minorities were allowed under HSĽS hegemony, and the German Party formed the Freiwillige Schutzstaffel militia.

  • "Another two political parties of national minorities existed within the authoritarian political system: the Magyar Párt (Hungarian Party) and the Deutsche Partei (German Party, DP) which also had its own paramilitary organization, the Freiwillige Schutzstaffel (FS)." [10] "Die linken und die beiden jüdischen Parteien wurden verboten. Nur die Parteien der ungarischen und deutschen Minderheiten erhielten einen Sonderstatus und durften ihre Tätigkeit fortsetzen." "Mitglieder der karpatendeutschen nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Partei und deren paramilitärische Freiwillige Schutzstaffel"[16]

HSĽS imprisoned thousands of its political opponents,

  • "die regierende Volkspartei... inhaftierte bis 1944 Tausende politische Gegner im Internierungslager Ilava und in Arbeitslagern."[17]
  • "Ľubomir Lipták points to the moderate approach of the regime to its Christian, Slovak or German citizens. In the course of the five years of duration of the Slovak wartime republic, the USB (State Security Centre) imprisoned about 1500 individuals due to their underground communist activities and 700 for various anti-state activities."[18]

but never carried out an execution.

  • "the Slovak state never carried out a single death sentence"[19]

Un-free elections in December 1938 resulted in a 95-percent vote for HSĽS.

  • "In December 1938, elections to the new autonomous 63- member parliament (Snem Slovenskej krajiny) were held, but HSĽS allowed only a united list of candidates to run. As a result of these manipulated elections, Ľudáks gained 95 percent of the votes" (1st col, 2nd paragraph) [20], see also [21]

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On 14 March 1939, the Slovak State proclaimed its independence under German protection. Germany annexed and invaded the Czech rump state the following day, and Hungary seized Carpathian Ruthenia with German acquiescence.

  • " Because Nazi Germany sought a pretext to annex the Czech territories of Bohemia and Moravia, it pressed Ľudáks to declare an independent Slovak state. It did so on March 14, 1939. On that day, and with German acquiescence, Hungary seized Carpathian Ukraine..." [20]
  • "On 15 March 1939 Nazi Germany occupied Bohemia and Moravia, with Slovakia declaring its independence one day earlier."[22]

In a treaty signed on 23 March, Slovakia renounced much of its foreign-policy and military autonomy to Germany in exchange for border guarantees and economic assistance.

  • On March 23, Slovakia and Germany concluded a Treaty of Protection, by which Slovakia aimed to “organize its military forces in close agreement with the German armed forces” and also closely align its foreign policy with its new protector.3 The treaty also forged close economic cooperation between the two countries.[20]
  • "Slovakia, as a Schutzstaat , received border guarantees, a promise of political independence, much-desired markets and investment, and assistance in setting up a national bank and currency. But the country’s foreign policy and the building of a Slovak Army had to follow Reich policy."[23]

It was neither fully independent nor a German puppet state, but occupied an intermediate status.[a] (see note for quotes)

In October 1939, Tiso (leader of the conservative/clerical branch of HSĽS) became president; Vojtech Tuka, leader of the party's radical/fascist wing, was appointed prime minister. Both wings of the party struggled for Germany's favor.

  • "In late October 1939 Jozef Tiso was elected the president of Slovakia while the leader of the radical wing within the HSĽS, Vojtech Tuka, became the prime minister... The internal politics of Slovakia was characterized by the power struggle of two wings within the HSĽS: the conservatives (moderates), led by Jozef Tiso, and the radicals, led by prime minister Vojtech Tuka and Hlinka Guard Chief Commander Alexander (Šaňo) Mach... " [20]

The radical wing of the party was fascist and pro-German, while the conservatives favored autonomy from Germany;

  • Two factions, clericalism vs. pro-Nazism: Kamenec: "In 1939, there were two wings with opposing views, a conservative-clerical group headed by President Jozef Tiso, and a radical fascist one led by Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka and the minister of the interior and commander in chief of the Hlinka Guard, Alexander Mach. The conservatives relied on the functionaries of the ruling party and the administrative apparatus of the state, and they received substantial support from the Church hierarchy. The radicals with their demands for the ‘completion of the Slovak revolution’ sought support from the Hlinka Guard and elements of the lumpenproletariat. Above all they relied on support from the Nazis."[27]
  • "However, the radicals, with the irrationalism and social demagogy, failed to generate much support among the Slovak population, and their reliance on decisive help from Berlin proved unsuccessful."[28]
  • Tiso more popular: "Tiso remained Slovakia’s most powerful and popular man. The Ľudák radicals, in contrast, were weak and divided, less troublesome than useful to him." (172) "Tiso, of course, did not stand alone in this fight. The radicals were backed by the guard, the German embassy, Volksdeutsche activists, and disgruntled Protestants. Tiso had considerable popular support plus the party, the moderate ministers, the parliament, and the Nástupists. He could also count on Catholic churchmen." (216)[29]
  • Autonomy: "Tiso and his followers also tenaciously defended domestic autonomy, often undermining or defying German agendas."[30]

the radicals relied on the Hlinka Guard and German support,[27][31] while Tiso was popular among the clergy and the population.[32][29]

Political Catholicism, the religion of 80% of the country's inhabitants, was key to the regime with many of its leaders being bishops, priests, or laymen.

  • "The Catholic Church had close ideological and personal connections with the new state and its regime.The prime minister was a Catholic priest, and dozens of other Catholic Church dignitaries and laymen held positions in the Diet of the Slovak Republic, State Council, structures of the ruling state party, Hlinka Guard, Hlinka Youth and so on."[33]
  • "Slovakia was 80 per cent Catholic, and most of these Catholics believed that their ethnic-religious majority "owned" the state."[34]
  • "Gleichzeitig unterstütztenviele katholische Priester und Bischöfe das Regime: Der Zipser Bischof Ján Vojtaššákwar z. B. Mitglied des Staatsrats."[35]
  • see above[36]
  • [37]

A 1940 census found that 89,000 Jews lived in the Slovak State, 3.4 percent of the population.

  • "By 1940, there were approximately 89,000 Jews in Slovakia, amounting to just over 4 percent of the population."[38]
  • "89,000 Jews were trapped" in Slovakia, footnote notes 1940 census as the source for this information[39]

The largest number of Jews lived in the eastern Šariš-Zemplín region,

  • "Despite having the largest Jewish population, the eastern district of Sarissko-Zemplinska"[40]

and 15,000 lived in Bratislava.

  • "The greatest concentrations of Jews were in Bratislava (about 15,000 people),"[41]
  • "...expulsion of 10,000 of Bratislava's 15,000 Jews..."[42]

Around 5,000 and 6,000 Jews emigrated between 1938 and 1940, and 45,000 lived in the areas ceded to Hungary.

  • Ward cites "over 43,000 Jews" in the formerly Slovak territories held by Hungary as of December 1989 (94); "by 1940 Slovak government policy had convinced some 6,000 Jews to flee the country" (96)[43]
  • "These measures prompted the emigration of 5,000 or 6,000 Jews, both legally and illegally. But some 89,000 Jews were trapped (not counting 45,000 in the territories ceded in 1938 under the First Vienna Award or as a result of Hungary’s 1939 absorption of Ruthenia."[39]
  • Discrepancy probably accounts for the Jews who lived in the narrow strand of Slovakia adjacent to Ruthenia, annexed by Hungary in 1939[original research?]

Anti-Jewish measures (1938–1941)

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Overview

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HSĽS' anti-Jewish measures were based on the party's institutional antisemitism.

  • "The HSĽS's inherent antisemitism was the basis for Slovak antisemitic policy, both in the party's "moderate" wing (Tiso), and among the radicals (e.g., Tuka and Mach)."[44]

Immediately after it came to power in 1938, the autonomous government began firing Jewish government employees.

  • "The Slovak government also began revoking Jewish rights and firing Jewish civil servants." (discussed as part of the autonomous government's first actions, see 162–164)[45]

The Committee for the Solution of the Jewish Question was founded on 23 January 1939 to discuss anti-Jewish legislation.

  • "Die Regierung beschloss am 23. Januar 1939, eine „Kommission zur Lösung der Judenfrage“ zu gründen."[17]
  • "V januári 1939 autonómna vláda zriadila prvý samostatný orgán zameraný na „�idovské otázky“ podvedením ideológa HS¼S Karola Sidora tzv. Sidorov komitét."[46]
  • " In January 1939, the autonomous government created the Committee for the Solution of the Jewish Question"[47]

The state-sponsored media demonized Jews as "enemies of the state" and of the Slovak nation.

  • Enemies of the state: "A power ful propaganda machine, building on existing currents of antisemitism in Slovakia, set up the Jews as the perfect target— the “enemies of the state.”"[47] "The 89,000 Jews of Slovakia were declared the enemies of the Slovakstate and nation."[48]

Jewish businesses were robbed,

  • "Attacks on Jewish-owned shops—many promulgated by the ethnic-German minority—began simultaneously."[49]

and Jews were attacked in the streets.

  • "Street attacks on Jews and looting of property became the order of the day."[50]
  • "Spontaneous anti-Jewish riots in various Slovak towns were already reported shortly after the declaration of Slovak autonomy on 6 October. The Hlinka Guards and Freiwillige Schutzstaffel incited pogroms in many Slovak towns such as Piešt’any, Trnava, Kežmarok, and Banská Bystrica.[51]

On his first radio address following the establishment of the Slovak State in 1939, Tiso emphasized his desire to "solve the Jewish Question";

  • "Jozef Tiso, who stressed the need to “solve the Jewish Question” in his first radio address on March 15, 1939, one day after the establishment of Slovak Republic"[52]

anti-Jewish legislation was the only concrete measure that he promised.[53] The persecution of Jews was a key element of the state's domestic policy.

  • "The persecution of the Slovak Jewish population from 1938 to 1945 was central to the domestic policy of the Slovak state"[47]
  • "In reality, antisemitism represented an indelible part of the HSPP policial program beginning in Autumn 1938 when the autonomy of Slovakia was first declared"[54]

Discriminatory measures affected all aspects of life, to isolate and dispossess Jews before deporting them.

  • "Anti- Jewish mea-sures permeated every aspect of public and social life... The regime’s agenda was systematically and purposefully employed to isolate, dispossess, and deport the majority of Slovakia’s Jewish citizens."[47]

1938 deportations and emigration

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In the days after the announcement of the First Vienna Award, antisemitic rioting broke out in Bratislava; newspapers justified the riots because of Jews' alleged support for Hungary during the partition negotiations. SS official Adolf Eichmann, who had been sent to Bratislava, coauthored a plan with Tiso and other HSĽS politicians to deport impoverished and foreign Jews to the ceded territory.

  • Rioting: "Slovak newspapers, in contrast, made the Jews the main culprit [for the First Vienna Award]. In reporting anti-Jewish riots in Bratislava, Slovák described Slovak youth’s“justified anger”at the Jews,“who in recent days were the most audacious supporters of the partition of Slovakia."[55]
  • Plan for deportation: "Tiso indeed began to“put in order”the Slovak Jews. His immediate counselor for this was Adolf Eichmann, a German“expert”on“the Jewish Question,”who appeared in Bratislava. On November 3 Eichmann, Konrad Goldbach, a Bratislava correspondent for the Völkischer Beobachter, and Jozef Faláth, a Slovak radical, worked out a plan to deport Slovak Jews to the territories to be ceded to Hungary. The plan... targeted indigent and foreign Jews."[55] "Am 2. November 1938 reiste Adolf Eichmann nach Bratislava, wo er von Tiso empfangen wurde und sich mit slowakischen Politikern traf. Tiso befahl am 4. November allen Kreisämtern, mittellose und ausländische Juden mit ihren Angehörigen sofort über die Grenzen in die an Ungarn abzutretenden Gebiete zu deportieren und den Besitz vermögender Juden sicherzustellen."[56]

Meanwhile, Jews with a net worth of over 500,000 Czechoslovak koruna (Kčs) were arrested to prevent capital flight.

  • "The plan also aimed at limiting Jewish capital flight by interning wealthy Jews"[55]
  • "Moreover, Jews who possessed more than 500,000 Czechoslovak crowns (Kč) were arrested to prevent their emigration."[47]

Between 4 and 7 November, 4,000

  • "Between November 4 and 7, 1938, Slovakia deported 7,500 Jews into the annexed territory"[47]
  • "Od pátečního – šabatového – večera (4. listopadu) do zastavení akce stačilo četnictvo a Hlinkova garda zadržet a deportovat přibliž-ně 4 000 Židů." (see note 22 for explanation of different estimates) [1][57]

or 7,600 Jews were deported, in a chaotic, pogrom-like operation in which Hlinka Guard, Freiwillige Schutzstaffel, and the German Party participated.

  • 7,600: "Insgesamt wurden in den ersten Novembertagen 1938 mehr als 7600 Juden nach Ungarn deportiert."[56]
  • Other aspects: "Aus Berichten der Kreisämter wird deutlich, wie chaotisch, zum Teil pogromartig, die Deportationen abliefen. Die Hlinka-Garde, Mitglieder der karpatendeutschen nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Partei und deren paramilitärische Freiwillige Schutzstaffel taten sich vielerorts mit Übergriffen und Grausamkeiten gegenüber den Juden hervor."[56]

The deportees included young children, the elderly, and pregnant women.[58] (already checked)
A few days later, Tiso canceled the operation; most of the Jews were allowed to return home in December.

  • "Die meisten der ver-triebenen slowakischen Juden durften nach einem Erlass vom 8. Dezember 1938 wiederin ihre Wohnorte zurückkehren, sofern diese innerhalb der neuen slowakischen Grenzen lagen."[17]
  • "Quickly confronted with sobering economic consequences such as capital flight, Tiso canceled the operation three days later"[59]

More than 800 were confined to makeshift camps at Veľký Kýr, Miloslavov, and Šamorín on the new Slovak–Hungarian border during the winter.

  • Population:"U Velkého Kýru, o němž máme (snad kvůli větší vzdálenosti od Bratisla-vy) mnohem méně informací, mělo na konci listopadu podle bratislavské ortodoxní židovské komunity živořit 344 lidí (132 mužů, 73 žen a 139 dětí). U Miloslavova žilo na konci listopadu 302 vyhnanců, z toho 122 mužů, 77 žen a 103 dětí různého věku, včetně kojenců.46 Dne 6. prosince mělo být ještě v Miloslavově na 250 lidí47 a Beatrice Wellington, která skupinu u Miloslavova navštívila těsně před koncem existence této země nikoho, zde našla 253 osob.48 Zhruba ve stejnou dobu tam však okresní velitel-ství v Šamoríně napočítalo již jen 190 lidí (108 mužů, 40 žen a 42 dětí).49" (103)[60]

The deportations occurred just after Germany's Polenaktion;

  • Insgesamt wurden in den ersten Novembertagen 1938 mehr als 7600 Juden nach Ungarn deportiert. Zeitgenössische Beobachter sahen hierin eine Analogie zur Vertreibung von 17 000 Juden polnischer Staatsangehörigkeit über die deutsch-polnische Grenze durch das Deutsche Reich Ende Oktober 1938.[56]
  • "Vyhnání polských Židů, tzv. Polenaktion, předcházelo uzavření hranic evrop-ských zemí pro židovské uprchlíky. Polsko se bezprostředně po „anšlusu“ Ra-kouska snažilo zabránit návratu polských Židů žijících v zahraničí a kromě ad-ministrativních opatření přistoupilo k revizi jejich občanství. Právě ta se stala podnětem pro nacistické deportace 27. – 29. října 1938."[61]

attracted international criticism

  • " These camps existed for only a few months and drew a strongly negative international response"[47]

The deportations reduced British investment, increasing dependence on German capital,

  • "For one thing, [the deportations] encouraged Jewish capital flight and destroyed investment opportunities from Britain,which were linked to maintaining Jewish rights in Slovakia.133The alternatives that the Slovak government found were to look to Germany for investment, and later simply to seize Jewish assets"[62]

and were a rehearsal for the 1942 deportations.

  • "Most significantly, they [the deportations] provided an unintended trial run for the tragic exterminations of 1942."[63]

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Initially, many Jews believed that the measures taken against them would be temporary.

  • "Viele Juden hofften noch, dass die gegen sie gerichteten Maßnahmen nur vorübergehend in Kraft blieben und sie am Ende unentbehrlich für die slowakische Volkswirtschaft sein würden."[64]

Nevertheless, some attempted to emigrate and take their property with them. Between December 1938 and February 1939, more than 2.25 million Kčs were transferred illegally to the Czech lands, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom; additional amounts were transferred legally. Slovak government officials took advantage of the circumstances to purchase the property of wealthy Jewish emigrants at a significant discount, a precursor to the state-sponsored transfer of Jewish property (Aryanization).

  • Kcs figure: "Pod¾a viacerých indícií v domácich aj zahranièných prameòoch sa od decembra 1938 do februára 1939 ilegálne prelial zo Slovenska do èeských krajín a ïalej do Holandska a Ve¾kej Británie �idovský majetok v peòa�nej forme v celkovej hodnote pribli�ne 2 250 mil. Kè." (149) [2]
  • Legal transfers: "Zároveò prebiehali transferymajetku legálnych �idovských emigrantov." (149) [3]
  • Precursor to Aryanization: "Kapitálové skupiny spojené s vládnymi kruhmi vyu�ívali oslabenú hospodársku a �a�kú osobnú situáciu majetných �idov a odkupovali ich kapitálové vlastníctvo štandardnými metódami, ale za mimoriadne výhodných podmienok. Tieto postupy boli predobrazom tzv. dobrovo¾nej arizácie." (150)[65]

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By early 1939, the British consulate in Bratislava was receiving 40 visa applications daily. Interest in emigration among Jews surged after the invasion of Poland, as Jewish refugees from Poland told of atrocities there. Although the Slovak government encouraged Jews to emigrate, it refused to allow the export of foreign currency, ensuring that most attempts remained unsuccessful. No country was eager to accept Jewish refugees, and the tight limits on legal emigration to Mandatory Palestine prevented Jews from seeking refuge there. In 1940, Bratislava became a hub for Aliyah Bet operatives organizing illegal immigration to Palestine, one of whom, Aron Grünhut, helped 1,365 Slovak, Czech, Hungarian, and Austrian Jews emigrate. By early 1941, further emigration was impossible; even Jews who received valid United States visas were not allowed transit visas through Nazi Germany.[64]

  • visa applications: "Schon im Frühjahr 1939 gingen im britischen Passkontrollbüro in Bratislava täglich etwa 40 Visaanträge ein."
  • Invasion of Poland: "Nachdem jedoch jüdische Flüchtlinge aus dem besetzten Polen seit Herbst 1939 über Gräueltaten der Deutschen berichtet hatten, versuchten auch viele slowakische Juden das Land zu verlassen"
  • Slovak government actions: "Die slowakische Regierung unterstützte zwar prinzipiell die Auswanderung, verbot aber – ähnlich wie das Deutsche Reich – die Ausfuhr der von den Einwanderungsländern geforderten Devisen, weshalb den meisten die Emigration nicht gelang."
  • Lack of interest in accepting refugees: "Allerdings zeigten weder Großbritannien noch andere Staaten Interesse, Flüchtlinge aufzunehmen."
  • Legal emigration to Palestine: "Aufgrund der rigiden Vergabepolitik für Palästina-Zertifikate war den Bemühungen zur legalen Auswanderung nach Palästina kaum Erfolg beschieden."
  • Aliyah Bet, Bratislava hub: " Überhaupt war Bratislava bis Ende 1940 die „große Drehscheibe der illegalen jüdischen Einwanderung nach Palästina“."
  • Grunhut: "Der Funktionär der orthodoxen jüdischen Gemeinde Aron Grünhut organisierte 1939 illegale Transporte nach Palästina, durch die 1365 slowakische, tschechische, ungarische und österreichische Juden gerettet wurden."
  • End of emigration in 1941: "Im Frühjahr 1941 kamdie Fluchtbewegung praktisch zum Erliegen. Selbst Juden mit gültigen Visa für die USA erhielten von deutscher Seite keine Durchreiseerlaubnis durch das Reich"

The total number of Slovak Jewish emigrants has been estimated at 5,000 to 6,000.[43][39] (see above)

Aryanization

[edit]

Aryanization in Slovakia, the seizure of Jewish-owned property and exclusion of Jews from the economy,

  • "Problematika arizácie, èi�e vyvlastnenia majetku �idovskej komunity, v období voj-novej Slovenskej republiky 1939–1945"[66]
  • "Vorrangiges Ziel der antijüdischen Politik war die vollständige Verdrängung der Juden aus demWirtschaftsleben, die ohne Störungen für die slowakische Volkswirtschaft umgesetzt werden sollte."[67]

was justified by the stereotype (reinforced by HSĽS propaganda) of Jews obtaining their wealth by oppressing Slovaks.[68]

  • "Since the supposed wealth of the Jews was viewed by the government and much of the public as “unjustly” acquired, the policy of expropriation was perceived as righting some imagined previous wrongdoing."[69]
  • "Propaganda used and misused many stereotypes including the above mentioned notions of poor Jewish immigrants arriving from Galicia and becoming rich inn-keepers shortly after their arrival, stereotypes of Jews who allegedly abused Slovaks for their own personal profit... state propaganda emphasized a presupposed right of Slovaks to confiscate all Jewish properties"[70]

Between 1939 and 1942, the HSĽS regime received widespread popular support by promising Slovak citizens that they would be enriched by property confiscated from Jews and other minorities.

  • "The exclusion of the Jews from the economic and social life in Slovakia was boosted by propaganda claims that this process would present an opportunity for ordinary people to gain access to the confiscated Jewish property."[70]
  • "Between 1939 and 1942, the new Slovak state earned the support of its citizens by creating expectations of enrichment via Czech and Jewish properties"[71]

This was a significant amount of money; in 1940, Jews registered more than 4.322 billion Slovak koruna (Ks) in property (38 percent of the national wealth).

  • "Following the issue of decree 203/1940 SlC, Jewish property was registered. As a result, 54,669 individuals declared their belongings, which were valued at 4,322,239,000 Ks (Slovak crowns), representing 38 per cent of the national wealth."[72]

The process might more aptly be described as "Slovakization",

  • "Die slowakische Regierung beabsichtigte nicht, die deutsche Volksgruppe wirtschaftlich zu stärken, denn trotz des Terminus „Arisierung“ war im Kern eine „Slowakisierungsaktion“ bezweckt"[73]
  • "Although the term ‘Aryanization’ was used almost consistently, in character the expropriations were essentially ‘Slovakizations’"[74]
  • "... include stripping Jews of their economic rights—or to say it more boldly, stealing their property. In spring and early summer 1939, first drafts of this discriminating solution were adopted. These decrees gradually started the Aryanization—or rather Slovakization—process in the wartime state."[75]

as the Slovak government took steps to ensure that ethnic Slovaks, rather than Germans or other minorities, received the stolen Jewish property. Due to the intervention of the German Party and Nazi Germany, ethnic Germans received 8.3 percent of the stolen property,

  • "The Slovakian government fulfi lled all the economic and military obligations set out in its treaties with Germany, but it was not interested in letting the German Reich establish extensive economic holdings in its territory, nor did it endorse the increasing German influence over its national economy or the strengthening of the German minority. The ethnic Germans tried to pursue various claims, and the leader of their Volksgruppe , Franz Karmasin, complained to Himmler himself that everything was going to the Slovaks. After this, Wisliceny created a Slovak-German Commission within the CEO to clarify controversial cases. With a policy of ‘rubber walls’, the Slovaks thwarted the expectations of the Volksgruppe . 52 The Germans wanted ‘their share’ of the expropriated houses and temporary trustee positions too. They ended up with about 8.3 per cent of the Jewish property"[74]
  • Above, "Die deutsche Volksgruppenführung unter Franz Karmasin rang mit dem Zentralwirtschaftsamt um ihren Anteil an den jüdischen Betrieben. Zahlreiche Volksdeutsche bewarben sich – zumeist erfolglos – um eine Übertragung des Eigentums von Juden."[73]

but most German applicants were refused, underscoring the freedom of action of the Slovak government.

  • "Die Auseinandersetzung mit der deutschen Volksgruppe verdeutlicht, welche Handlungsspielräume die slowakische Regierung besaß, um ihre Interessen gegenüber dem Deutschen Reich durchzusetzen."[73]

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[edit]

The first anti-Jewish law, passed on 18 April 1939 and not systematically enforced, was a numerus clausus four-percent quota of the numbers of Jews allowed to practice professions such as medicine and law; Jews were also forbidden to write for Christian publications.

  • "The first restrictions, sporadically inflicted on the Jewish population, were intended to oust them from economic life and to limit their activity in the free professions; those affected were mainly lawyers and physicians."[76]
  • "Only a month after the declaration of independence, the first official anti- Jewish law went into effect. On April 18, 1939... The very same law limited the number of Jews allowed to practice the profession of lawyer to 4 percent. All journalists falling into the category of “Jew” were expelled from all non- Jewish newspapers."[38]
  • "The Slovak Republic’s initial Jewish law, Decree 63, promulgated shortly after the creation of the state in March 1939... set their analogous limit for lawyers at a much lower four percent, also banning Jews from beingpublic notaries or working for Christian publications"[77]

The Land Reform Act of February 1940 turned 101,423 hectares (250,620 acres) of land owned by 4,943 Jews, about 40 percent of it arable, over to the State Land Office; the land officially passed to the state in May 1942.

  • "The Land Reform Act passed on 22 February 1940 concerned almost exclusively the land owned by Jews. According to the register of Jewish agricultural properties, land reform affected 101,423 hectares, including 44,372 hectares of arable soil, owned by 4,943 Jewish people.54 The State Land Office organized and directed the land reform. By a declaration of the State Land Office in May 1942 all Jewish agricultural property was automatically transferred to the Slovak state."[72]

The Land Reform Act did not explicitly target Jews, but it was rarely enforced against non-Jewish landowners.

  • "Die Regierung erließ am 29. Februar 1940 das Gesetz über die Bodenreform, das dem Staat das Recht gab, große Grundeigentümer zum Verkauf ihres Bodens zu zwingen, um ihn an Bauern zu veräußern. Es wurde ausschließlich auf jüdische Eigentümer angewendet, obwohl diese nur 6,5 Prozent der unter die Regelung fallenden Flächen besaßen."[67]
  • "Virtually all of the land redistributed under the Slovak reform had belonged to Jews."[78]

The First Aryanization Law was passed in April 1940. Through a process known as "voluntary Aryanization", Jewish business owners could suggest a "qualified Christian candidate" who would assume at least a 51-percent stake in the company.

  • "In April 1940, the Slovak Assembly adopted the First Aryaniza-tion Law (No. 113/1940). It defined the term “Jewish business” and authorized the county offices and the Ministry of Economy “to decide, according to free consideration and with final validity whether and under what conditions” the Jewish business should be liquidated or Aryanized. Aryanization was defined as “selling of the business to a qualified Christian candidate.”15 The property owner could suggest the Aryan person who would become the owner of at least 51 percent of the company. This was colloquially called “voluntary Aryanization.”"[38]

Under the law, 50 businesses out of more than 12,000 were Aryanized and 179 were liquidated.

  • "Z celkového poètu vyše 12 tisíc�idovských podnikov sa na jeho podklade arizovalo iba 50 a likvidovalo 179 subjektov."[79]

HSĽS radicals

  • "Aryanization of enterprise property was sharply criticized by radical Ľudáks who demanded quick “removal” of Jews from the society. "[38]

and the Slovak State's German backers believed that voluntary Aryanization was too soft on the Jews.

  • "The Germans criticized the First Aryanization Law, saying it was insufficient, and it was abrogated in October."[80]

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[edit]

At the July 1940 Salzburg Conference, German negotiators convinced the Slovaks to replace several members of the cabinet with reliably pro-German radicals.

  • "Probably the most significant change occurred after the German-Slovak talks in Salzburg at the end of July 1940. In Salzburg, Adolf Hitler demanded changes in the Slovak government, and Ferdinand Ďurčanský was removed. The radical prime minister Vojtech Tuka then took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Alexander (Šaňo) Mach became the Minister of the Interior."[81]
  • "Changes in the cabinet were usually initiated or directly dictated by the Nazis, often after theylearnt that a government figure was deemed to be disloyal to the Third Reich, or was showing signs of pursuing a more independent Slovak policy. In summer 1940, after a Slovak–German summit in Salzburg, Berlin imposed personnel changes in key Slovak ministerialposts, promoting those who were considered most reliable. Prime Minister Tuka became foreign minister, and Alexander Mach became minister of the interior."[82]

Ferdinand Ďurčanský was replaced as interior minister by Alexander Mach, who aligned the anti-Jewish policy of the Slovak State with that in Germany.

  • "Für die slowakischen Juden bedeutete die engere Anlehnung an Deutschland durch Ministerpräsident Mach infolge des Salzburger Diktats vom Juli 1940 eine tiefe Zäsur, denn auch die antijüdischen Maßnahmen in der Slowakei sollten sich fortan stärker an denen im Reich orientieren."[83]
  • "The Germans discussed the matter in Salzburg in July 1940 and then prevailed upon Tiso to replace Ďurčanský with the more radical Vojtech Tuka as minister of foreign affairs and Alexander Mach as minister of interior"[84]

Another result of the Salzburg talks was the appointment of SS officer Dieter Wisliceny as a "Jewish adviser" for Slovakia; he arrived in Slovakia in August.

  • "Der Berater für Judenfragen, SS-Hauptsturmführer Dieter Wisliceny, traf im Sommer 1940 in Bratislava ein."[83]
  • August: "In August 1940 the SS — in effect, Eichmann's "Jewish" department at the Gestapo — nominated Dieter Wisliceny to be the adviser on Jewish affairs with the German embassy in Bratislava."[42]

He aimed to impoverish the Jewish community so it became a burden on non-Jewish Slovaks, who would then agree to deport them.

  • " In support of the radicals, the Germans supplied the advisor Dieter Wisliceny, a deputy of Eichmann. Wisliceny’s strategy was to impoverish the Slovak Jews, thus creating a social problem that only emigration or deportation could “vent.”"[85]

Wisliceny convinced the Slovak parliament to pass a law creating the Central Economic Office (ÚHÚ), led by Slovak official Augustín Morávek [cs; de; sk] and under Tuka's control, in September 1940.

  • "Wisliceny accelerated the expropriation of the Jews by initiating the founding of the Central Economic Office in September 1940. 17 This was put under Tuka’s sole control and was headed by

his protégé Augustín Morávek."[86]

  • "Die slowakische Regierung schuf im September 1940 zwei von Wisliceny initiierte Institutionen, die die Segregation der Juden massiv beschleunigten: am 16. September das Zentralwirtschaftsamt, dessen Aufgabe es war, die Juden aus dem Wirtschaftsleben zu drängen"[83]

The ÚHÚ was tasked with assuming ownership of Jewish-owned property.

  • "Within a few months, the Slovak government adopted regulations allowing the Central Economic Office (ÚHÚ) to take complete control over various types of Jewish property."[38]

Jews were required to register their property; their bank accounts (valued at 245 million Ks in August 1941) were frozen, and Jews were allowed to withdraw only 1,000 Ks (later 150 Ks) per week.

  • "The bank accounts of Jews in all banks in Slovakia were blocked, and any payments made to Jews could be put into these blocked accounts only. Jews could withdraw only 1,000 Slovak crowns (Ks) per week, and this sum was re-duced subsequently to 500 Ks and 150 Ks."[38]
  • "The banks in Slovakia declared to the Central Economic Office the amount of money held in deposit accounts by Jewish citizens. In August 1941 the deposits amounted to 245 million Slovak crowns. Following the October and November 1940 decrees, all Jewish money was to be deposited into frozen accounts from which a maximum of 1,000 Slovak crowns and later only 150 Slovak crowns could be withdrawn weekly by the Jewish owner."[72]

The 22,000 Jews who worked in salaried employment were targeted:

  • "another 22,000 [Slovak Jews] were private employees"[87]

non-Jews had to obtain ÚHÚ permission to employ Jews, and had to pay a fee.

  • "Employment of Jews was subject to ÚHÚ’s approval, and a special fee had to be paid by the employer."[38]

By mid-1940, the position of Jews in the Slovak economy had been largely wiped out.

  • "Bis zum Sommer 1940 war die wirtschaftliche Position der slowakischen Juden weitgehend zerstört"[67]

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[edit]

A second Aryanization law was passed in November, mandating the expropriation of Jewish property and the Aryanization or liquidation of Jewish businesses.

  • "From November 1940 on, the Central Economic Office became the sole body to decide whether a Jewish business would undergo the pro cess of Aryanization (now called “transfer”) or be liquidated. In this new process, in contrast to the First Aryanization Law, the Aryanizer no longer needed to be a “qualified Christian candidate,” and “voluntary” Aryanization was no longer possible"[38]
  • "In November 1940 a ‘Second Aryanization Law’ was enacted, which covered the expropriation of all kinds of possessions and the deprivation of gainful employment for all Jews"[88]

In a corrupt process overseen by Morávek's office, 10,000 Jewish businesses (mostly shops) were liquidated and the remainder – about 2,300 – were Aryanized.

  • "About 12,300 Jews owned ‘‘enterprises’’ (that is, they were shopkeepers)... by January 1942, 9,950 enterprises had been entirely liquidated"[89]
  • " Under the leadership of Morávek, the ÚHÚbegan to issue liquidation and Aryanization decrees in great numbers in 1941, thus depriving thousands of Jews of a means of earning a living. Aryanization of businesses culminated in the middle of 1941. Of a total of about 12,300 businesses, nearly 2,300 were Aryanized and about 10,000 liquidated.22 The whole process was heavily corrupt."[38]
  • "The Central Economic Office57 under the leadership of Augustín Morávek was directly responsible to the prime minister and had dictatorial power over Jewish affairs.58 In autumn 1940, of the 12,500 Jewish shops and businesses in Slovakia 10,000 were put into liquidation and 2,223 businesses were Aryanized, i.e. sold."[72]

Liquidation benefited small Slovak businesses competing with Jewish enterprises, and Aryanization was applied to larger Jewish-owned companies which were acquired by competitors. In many cases, Aryanizers inexpert in business struck deals with former Jewish owners and employees so the Jews would keep working for the company.

  • "Liquidation, which occurred in every branchof industrial and commercial activity,18 was the principal benefit accordedto the small competing Slovak entrepreneurs. Aryanization, on the otherhand, was designed to serve larger Slovak firms... To be sure, capital and know-how were scarce in Slovakia, and often enoughdeals were struck between Jewish owners and utterly inactive SlovakAryanizers in such a way that little or no money was paid to the Jews, withthe understanding that the Jewish owners and managers could continuein the business as nominal partners or employees of the Slovaks."[90]
  • "...in many cases the original owner was needed by the Aryanizer, because he himself was unable or unwilling to run the Jewish business."[91]

The Aryanization of businesses did not bring the anticipated revenue into the Slovak treasury, and only 288 of the liquidated businesses produced income for the state by July 1942.

  • "Despite the expectations of the government, the Slovak Aryanization policy resulted in enormous financial losses for the country. Only the Aryanizers themselves – the buyers of Jewish goods – became rich. Prior to July 1942, only 288 liquidated companies yielded any assets."[92]

The Aryanization and liquidation of businesses was nearly complete by January 1942,

  • "Thus, by January 1942, 9,950 enterprises had been entirely liquidated, 2,100 had been transferred, and a few ‘‘complicated’’ cases awaited disposition."[90]

resulting in unemployment for 64,000 of 89,000 Jews.

  • "As a result of the pro cess of exclusion of Jews from social and economic life, the Jewish population in Slovakia was in ruins. About 16,000 of the 27,000 Jewish house holds lost their regular income. In other words, the pro cess deprived about 64,000 of 89,000 Jews of their means of living"[93]

Manufactured Jewish impoverishment was a pressing social problem for the Slovak government, which it "solved" in early 1942 by deporting the unemployed Jews.

  • "The Aryanization and liquidation of Jewish businesses in Slovakia turned the ‘Jewish question’ into a severe poverty problem... [statistics on Jewish job losses and impoverishment] ... 64,000 Jews, were left without any means of earning a living. If we compare this number to the approximately 60,000 deported Jews and add about 4,000 Jews confined in Jewish work camps, we come to the conclusion that the government conceived the deportation of the Jews as the ultimate consequence of its envisaged ‘final solution of the Jewish question’"[94]
  • "...in Slovakia, there was a casual connection between impoverishment of the Jews through Aryanization and liquidation of their businesses and property and the subsequent deportations of Jews."[44]
  • "Die Regierung hatte das selbst geschaffene sozi-ale Problem, das die 64 000 verarmten Juden darstellten, die vom Staat hätten versorgtwerden müssen, durch die Deportation von fast 58 000 Menschen „gelöst“."[95]

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[edit]

Aryanization resulted in immense financial loss to Slovakia and great destruction of wealth. The state failed to raise substantial funds from the sale of Jewish property and businesses, and most of its gains came from the confiscation of Jewish-owned bank accounts and financial securities. The main beneficiaries of Aryanization were members of Slovak fascist political parties and paramilitary groups, who were eager to acquire Jewish property but had little interest (or expertise) in running Jewish businesses.

  • "Despite the expectations of the government, the Slovak Aryanization policy resulted in enormous financial losses for the country. Only the Aryanizers themselves – the buyers of Jewish goods – became rich. Prior to July 1942, only 288 liquidated companies yielded any assets. The belated confiscation of real estate initiated in 1944 had similarly disappointing results... The Aryanization process brought about an enormous destruction in value... Only leading functionaries of the state, party and Hlinka Guard, along with the actual Aryanizers (who were almost exclusively members of the HSPP, Hlinka Guard, pro-Nazi Deutsche Partei and the Central Economic Office) profited from the looting."[92]
  • "The government preferred to favour unqualified but politically ‘safe’ applicants—members of the HSĽS and of its militia, the Hlinka Guard—and offered courses for the untried new business owners... Under these circumstances, with barely competent new people heading the enterprises, the former Jewish owners were often employed just to keep the businesses running."[96]

During the republic's existence, the government gained 1.1 billion Ks from Aryanization and spent 900–950 million Ks on enforcing anti-Jewish measures. In 1942, it paid the German government an additional 300 million Ks for the deportation of 58,000 Jews.

  • "The benefits of Aryanization thus amounted to 1.1 billion Slovak crowns, whereas the cost of financing the process was 900 million. Of the 1.1 billion, 300 million were paid to the Germans to finance the deportation of 58,000 Jews"[97]
  • "Slovenský štátodèerpal z majetku �idovskej komunity rôznymi cestami hodnotu pribli�ne 1 100 mil. Ks.Náklady na proti�idovské opatrenia však dosiahli okolo 950 mil. Ks"[98]

Jewish Center

[edit]

When Wisliceny arrived, all Jewish community organizations were dissolved and the Jews were forced to form the Ústredňa Židov (Jewish Center, ÚŽ, subordinate to the ÚHÚ) in September 1940.

  • "One of the first results of Wisliceny's arrival was the eradication of Jewish community organizations on September 26 1940, and the formation of the Judenrat, which would henceforth represent the Jews vis-a-vis the authorities. In its Slovakian version, this body was known as the "Jewish Center," the Ustredna Zidov, or ÚŽ"[99]
  • "Die slowakische Regierung schuf im September 1940 zwei von Wisliceny initiierte Institutionen, die die Segregation der Juden massiv beschleunigten... am 26. September 1940 die Judenzentrale als Zwangsorganisation für alle Juden bzw. diejenigen, die die Machthaber als Juden definierten"[83]

The first Judenrat outside the Reich and German-occupied Poland, the ÚŽ was the only secular Jewish organization allowed to exist in Slovakia; membership was required of all Jews.

  • First: "This Slovak Judenrat, called the Ústredňa Židov (UZ), or Jewish Central Office, was the first Judenrat outside Germany and Poland."[100]
  • "It [ÚŽ] was the only non- religious organization of Jews in Slovakia that was allowed at the time, and each Jew was obliged to become a member."[38]

Leaders of the Jewish community were divided about how to respond to this development. Although some refused to associate with the ÚŽ, believing that it would be used to implement anti-Jewish measures, more saw participation in the ÚŽ as a way to help their fellow Jews by delaying the implementation of such measures and alleviating poverty.

  • "They [Jewish leaders] suspected that the organization would be forced to realize the anti-Jewish decrees... In both the above mentioned Jewish communities [Orthodox and Neolog] they discussed whether or not to join the organization [ÚŽ]... [Supporters of joining]—and they were the majority—believed that the organization... would prevent or at least slow down the process of Jewish reprisals... They [Jewish leaders] also expected big social problems as a result of excluding the Jews from economic and social life, as the religious communities, although they had not been banned, could not solve this problem."[101]
  • "The formation of the Judenrat under duress frightened Jewish activists, who debated the wisdom of joining the new agency. Those who favored participation, from all factions within the community, won their case by arguing that the existence of such an organization, even if imposed from above, would facilitate intervention and relief work."[99]

The first leader of the ÚŽ was Heinrich Schwartz, who thwarted anti-Jewish orders to the best of his ability by delaying their implementation. In particular, he sabotaged a census of Jews in eastern Slovakia which was intended to justify their removal to the west of the country; Wisliceny had him arrested in April 1941.

  • "The authorities chose the secretary of the national Orthodox organization,Heinrich Schwartz, to set up the Judenrat board... Schwartz was a bold, dedicated communal worker who intended to fight the decrees by footdragging. Observing these qualities, the authorities replaced him several months later with Arpad Sebestyen..."[102]
  • Census: "[Schwartz] was accused of sabotage by D. Wisliceny [because] Schwartz tried to hinder the statistical work [of the census] because he considered it very dangerous... Because of this he was removed from his office, arrested and tortured."[103]
  • "In April 1941, however, Schwartz was arrested on charges of obstructing the relocation of the Jews of Bratislava"[104]

The Central Economic Office appointed the more cooperative Arpad Sebestyen as Schwartz' replacement.

  • "In his stead the Central Economic Office nominated a nondescript, inefficient, and submissive Orthodox school principal by the name of Arpad Sebestyen."[105]

Wisliceny set up a Department for Special Affairs in the ÚŽ to ensure the prompt implementation of Nazi decrees, appointing Karol Hochberg (a Viennese Jew) as its director. The ambitious Hochberg had no reservations about implementing anti-Jewish measures to increase his own standing.

  • "At the same time, Wisliceny set up a "Department for Special Affairs" within the Judenrat. To head this department he chose Karl Hochberg, a young, ambitious, non-native Jew. The purpose of this appointment was to ensure the precise and swift implementation of Wisliceny's orders."[102]
  • "The key role in this [deportations] was played by Karel Hochberg, a Jewish engineer, who had become Wisliceny's helper and head of the internal "department for special tasks."28 Hochberg was in the mold of Jewish traitors during the Nazi period."[105]

Forced labor

[edit]

Jews serving in the army were segregated in a labor unit in April 1939, and were stripped of their rank at the end of the year. From 1940, male Jews and Romani people were obliged to work for the national defense (generally manual labor on construction projects) for two months every year. All recruits considered Jewish or Romani were allocated to the Sixth Labor Battalion, which worked at military construction sites at Sabinov, Liptovský Svätý Peter, Láb, Svätý Jur, Zohor and other locations, the following year.

  • "In 1940, another ruling mandated that Jews and Roma work for two months each year for state defense. The associated labor units belonged to the National Defense Ministry (Min-isterstvo národnej obrany, MNO). According to the Defense Law, Jewish and Roma recruits could serve only in labor units. In 1941, all Jewish and Roma recruits were assigned to the Sixth Labor Battalion (Šiesty robotnýprápor), made up of three Jewish and two Roma companies... were subsequently sent to vari ous construction sites all over Slovakia. They worked in Sabinov, Liptovský Svätý Peter, Láb, Svätý Jur, and Zohor."[38]

Although the Ministry of Defense was pressured by the Ministry of the Interior to release the Jews for deportation in 1942, it refused.

  • "Nasadenie robotných rôt na veľké stavby malo všetky znaky nútených prác. Ministerstvo vnútra pripravovalo v apríli a v auguste 1942 deportácie zaradencov VI. práporu. Vo februári 1943 minister vnútra ohlasoval obnovenie transportov. MNO sa však podarilo deportácii práporu zabrániť."[106]

The battalion was disbanded in 1943, and the Jewish laborers were sent to a number of work camps.

  • "The Sixth Labor Battalion was dissolved in 1943, and its Jewish members were sent to various labor camps for Jews."[38]
  • "Das Bataillon wurde am 1. Juni 1943 aufgelöst und die Männer wurden in die Arbeitslager überstellt."[95]

The first labor centers were established in early 1941 by the ÚŽ as retraining courses for Jews forced into unemployment; 13,612 Jews had applied for the courses by February, far exceeding the programs' capacity.

On 4 July, the Slovak government issued a decree conscripting all Jewish men aged 18 to 60 for labor.

  • " in July, the government issued a regulation that authorized the ÚHÚ to order Jews to perform labor assignments."[93]
  • "Das erste „Arbeitszentrum“ für Juden wurde im April 1941 in Strážske errichtet und am 4. Juli 1941 für alle Juden zwischen 18 und 60 Jahren die Zwangsarbeitspflicht verfügt"[108]

Although the ÚŽ had to supplement the workers' pay to meet the legal minimum, the Slovak historian Ivan Kamenec notes that the labor camps greatly increased the living standard of Jews impoverished by Aryanization.

By September, 5,500 Jews were performing manual labor for private companies at about 80 small labor centers,

  • "n September 1941, there were about 80 smaller labor camps for Jews in Slovakia, with about 5,500 Jews working manually for private companies."[93]

most of which were dissolved in the final months of 1941 as part of the preparation for deportation. Construction began on three larger camps – Sereď, Nováky, and Vyhne – in September of that year.

  • offline[109]
  • "By the end of 1941, most of these camps had been dissolved... Some proposals suggested moving Jews to large labor camps. In August 1940, Minister of Interior Alexander Mach officially announced that the state would build such labor camps for Jews in Sereď and Nováky. Construction started in September 1941... It did not take long until the government realized that building labor camps for thousands of socially deprived Jews would be a lengthy and costly process." [instead deportation was suggested][110]

Jewish Code

[edit]

Initially, antisemitic laws defined Jews by religion rather than ancestry; Jews who were baptized before 1918 were considered Christian.

  • "On April 18, 1939, the government defined the term “Jew” (Slovak: Žid) on the basis of religious criteria, describing Jews as all persons of the Jewish faith who had not been baptized prior to October 30, 1918, or persons without any denomination born to Jewish parents."[38]
  • "The first anti-Semitic law, Law 63, passed in April of that year, defined ‘Jewishness’ according to religious criteria and emphasized the ideological importance of segregating Jewish citizens"[80]

By September 1940, Jews were forbidden from owning motor vehicles, sports equipment, or radios, or attending secondary schools.

  • " In August, he had signed legislation that banned Jews from all schools except Jewish elementary ones. Since the law also affected con-verts, Catholic circles pushed the government for exemptions."[85]
  • "Juden durften weder Radios noch Sport- und Kunstgegenstände oder Motorfahrzeuge besitzen bzw. führen. Einegroße Anzahl weiterer Verordnungen verstärkte die Rechtlosigkeit der slowakischen Ju-den und schränkte ihre Bewegungsfreiheit weiter ein. Jüdische Kinder durften seit dem30. August 1940 nur noch jüdische Volksschulen besuchen, alle höheren Schulen warenihnen verschlossen."[73]

Local authorities had imposed anti-Jewish measures on their own; the head of the Šariš-Zemplín region ordered local Jews to wear a yellow band around their left arm from 4 April 1941, leading to attacks.

  • " On their own initiative, local representatives of the regime perse-cuted Jews living in the territory under their control. Thus for example Andrej Dudáš, the head of Šariš- Zemplín County, or-dered tens of thousands of Jews living in the county to wear “a 3 cm [a little over an inch] wide yellow (lemon) ribbon” around the left arm from April 1941 on. This triggered vari ous mani-festations of physical violence."[38]
  • "Schon am 5. April 1941 verfügte der Gauleiter Andrej Dudáš dort die Kennzeichnung aller Juden mit einem gelben Band am linken Arm"[111]

As the focus shifted to restricting Jews' civil rights rather than depriving them of their property, Department 14 of the Ministry of the Interior (headed by Gejza Konka) was formed to enforce anti-Jewish measures.

Paragraph

[edit]

The Slovak parliament passed the Jewish Code [cs; de; sk] on 9 September 1941, which contained 270 anti-Jewish articles.

  • "The state then adopted, on September 9, 1941, Decree 198/1941... commonly referred to as the Jewish Code (Židovský Kódex, ŽK). Its 270 paragraphs defined Slovakia’s anti- Jewish restrictions..." [93]

Based on the Nuremberg Laws, the code defined Jews in terms of ancestry, banned intermarriage, and required that all Jews over six years old wear a yellow star. The Jewish Code excluded Jews from public life, forbidding them from traveling at certain times, using radios or phones, shopping at certain hours, or belonging to clubs or organizations.

  • "Jews six or more years old had to wear the yellow star and also affix a Jewish star on their correspondence and envelopes, something even the German authorities had not mandated... The humiliating laws forbade Jews from being members of any clubs, sports teams, or organizations, and Jews could only shop for groceries during restricted hours. They were no longer allowed to use radios and phones. Jews were allowed to travel, but only on third- class railway cars at set times... All these and numerous other measures within the ŽK effectively isolated Jews from the rest of society. No longer allowed to control property or businesses, participate in public life, or have social ties to non-Jews, they were outcasts."[93]
  • "Jews could be employed in state and private services only with the consent of the appropriate offices; they were excluded from allsecondary schools and institutions of higher education; they had no access to public social, cultural and sporting events; they had a morning and an evening curfew; they were forbidden to assemble or to travel; they had to wear a symbol (a six-sided yellow Star of David); they could not marry non-Jews; they were interned in labour camps and centres; their complete segregation into ghettos was planned; and so on."[113]

In addition, Jews had to pay a 20 percent tax on all property.

  • "Zudem wurden alle Juden zu einer Abgabe in Höhe von 20 Prozent ihres Vermögens verpflichtet, die bis Mai 1942 in fünf Raten zu zahlen war"[111]

Slovak propaganda boasted that the Jewish Code was the strictest set of anti-Jewish laws in Europe.

  • "according to domestic propaganda, they were the strictest in all of Europe, even more stringent than the Nuremberg racial laws."[93]
  • offline[114]

The president could issue exemptions protecting individual Jews from the law.

  • "According to Paragraph 255, the president of the Slovak Republic had the right to partly or fully exempt individual Jew from the regulations in the ŽK"[93]

Employed Jews were initially exempt from some of the code's requirements, such as wearing the star.

  • "Even the code wasnot all-inclusive, for it exempted Jews who were working in the free economy and Jews (with families) who remained in government employ."[115]

Paragraph

[edit]

The racial definition of Jews was criticized by the Catholic Church, which successfully lobbied the state to exempt converts from some of the laws.

  • "The introduction of the racial principle into politics was unacceptable for the Catholic clergy... The publication of the Jewish Code in 1941 therefore marked the beginning of some opposition by Catholic priests to radical antisemitic measures... In a memorandum to leading governmental officials dated 7 October 1941, the bishops expressed their concerns about the racist nature of the Code and their wish to protect several thousand new Catholics who were to be persecuted under its rubric."[116]
  • " Soon after, additional compromises excluded converts and other groups from such obligations as wearing yellow stars... Tiso’s decision to work with the Jewish Code worsened his relationship with the hierarchy. Pius XI had condemned the materialist theory of racism as a dogmatic error, yet the priest Tiso led a state that boasted of the strictest race law in Europe."[117]

The Hlinka Guard and Freiwillige Schutzstaffel increased assaults on Jews, engaged in antisemitic demonstrations on a daily basis, and denounced insufficiently antisemitic non-Jews as "white Jews".

The law enabled the Central Economic Office to force Jews to change their residence.

  • "Most important, however, was the provision [of the Jewish Code] empowering the Central Economy Office to assign new residences to Jews"[119]

This provision was put into effect on 4 October 1941, when 10,000 of 15,000 Jews in Bratislava (who were not employed or intermarried) were ordered to move to fifteen towns.

  • "Predseda Ústredného hospodárskeho úradu (ÚHÚ) Augustín Morávek vydal v Úradných novinách 4. októbra 1941 vyhlášku o povinnosti Židov vysťahovať sa z Bratislavy2a o ich nasťahovaní sa do obcí (miest), ktoré budú uvedené v dislokačných opatreniach Ústredne Židov (ÚŽ) alebo iných príslušných úradov. Sťahovacia povinnosť sa predbežne netýkala štátnych a verejných zamestnancov – Židov, pokiaľ boli v aktívnej službe, ich manželov (manželky) a ich detí, ktoré žili v spoločnej domácnosti s nimi. Výnimky sa vzťahovali aj na osoby poberajúce štátne a verejné výslužné platy, ako aj na židovských partnerov Nežidov, pokiaľ sa dalo dokázať, že v skutočnosti spolu žijú. Od povinnosti vysťahovať sa boli oslobodení aj majitelia hospodárskych podnikov, členovia verejných obchodných a komoditných spoločností a ich rodinní príslušníci."[4][120]
  • "In October 1941 the Jews were to be expelled from Bratislava. The Slovak capital had a Jewish population of about 15,000, but only 10,000 Jews were subject to expulsion. The remaining 5,000, comprising holders of work permits, government employees, entrepreneurs, and professionals (with their families), were permitted to stay."[119]
  • For the number of towns, see list on Hradska p. 321.

The ÚŽ had to pay for the relocation, which was organized by the Hochberg's Department of Special Tasks.

  • "The Jewish Center had to pay all the costs associated with the forcible movement." (191) "The department for special tasks in the Jewish Centre was entrusted with preparation of the relocation action." Mentions Hochberg as head of the department later in the paragraph.[121]

Although the Jews were ordered to leave by 31 December 1941, fewer than 7,000 people had moved by March 1942.

  • Date: The original deadline of 31 December was not maintained, since by the beginning of March 1942 only 6,713 people had moved."[122]
  • See table for numbers[123]

Deportations (1942)

[edit]

Planning

[edit]

The highest levels of the Slovak government were aware by late 1941 of mass murders of Jews in German-occupied territories.

  • "The highest authorities were informed early on what the ultimate fate of the deportees would be. Tiso, for example, had known about the killings of Jews in Shitomir since the end of 1941 and in 1942 had received a letter from an escaped deportee telling him what was happening."[124]
  • "Als sich Tiso und die slowakische Führung im Herbst 1941 dazu entschlossen, den deutschen Vorschlägen nachzukommen und die slowakischen Juden in das deutsche Herrschaftsgebiet zu deportieren, war den Verantwortlichen bewusst, dass den preisgegebenen Juden der Tod drohte."[125]

In July 1941, Wisliceny organized a visit by Slovak government officials to several forced-labor camps run by Organization Schmelt for the Reichsautobahn that imprisoned Jews in East Upper Silesia. The visitors understood that Jews in the camps lived under conditions which would eventually cause their deaths.

  • "Aus diesem Anlass organisierte Wisliceny für Regierungsmitglieder eine Besichtigung verschiedener Zwangsarbeitslager für Juden in Ostoberschlesien (Dok. 34, 2.7.1941). Die Direktion der Reichsautobahnen hatte bei der slowakischen Arbeitseinsatzdienststelle zu dieser Zeit erstmals wegen jüdischer Arbeiter angefragt. Die Delegation besuchte unter anderem das Autobahnarbeitslager Grünheide und weitere Lager der Organisation Schmelt. Izidor Koso, Präsidialchef im Innenministerium, soll nach der Besichtigungstour zu slowakischen Delegationsmitgliedern bemerkt haben, „das System des jüdischen Arbeitseinsatzes wäre in dieser Form unchristlich und inhuman und dass man in der Slowakei eine andere Form werde finden müsse“. Mit dem Besuch der deutschen Arbeitslager für Juden in Ostoberschlesien im Sommer 1941 erhielt die slowakische Regierung Kenntnis über die katastrophalen Lebensbedingungen, unter denen jüdische Zwangsarbeiter eingesetzt wurden."[126]
  • "It was at this time that Wisliceny organized an offi cial state visit to the Jewish forced labour camps in German-occupied East Upper Silesia. The visit brought some of the Slovak offi cials to the realization that the Jews ‘had to exist there under conditions which would ultimately lead to their deaths’."[88]

Slovak soldiers participated in the German invasions of Poland and the Soviet Union;

  • "Die Slowakei beteiligte sich sowohl am Krieg gegen Polen 1939 als auch später gegen die Sowjetunion"[35]

they brought word of the mass shootings of Jews, and participated in at least one of the massacres.

  • "Soldiers from the Eastern Front spoke about mass killings of Jews in the Soviet Union. Slovak troops had themselves taken part in at least one of them."[127]

Some Slovaks were aware of the 1941 Kamianets-Podilskyi massacre, in which 23,600 Jews, many of them deported from Hungary, were shot in western Ukraine.

  • "Einige Slowaken hatten auch von den Massenverbrechen in Kamenez-Podolsk erfahren, wo am 26. August 1941 das Polizeibataillon 320 und Mitglieder des Sonderaktionsstabs des Höheren SS- und Polizeiführers Russland-Süd, SS-Obergruppenführer Friedrich Jeckeln, 23 600 Juden erschossen hatten."[128]
  • "Of the 18 , 000 Jews deported from Hungary some 14 , 000 – 16 , 000 were shot at the end of August about 15 km from Kamenetsk-Podolsk by Jeckeln ’ s staff company and Police Battalion 320 along with further thousands of Jews from the local area; the Ukrainian militia and Hungarian soldiers helped seal off the area."[129]

Defense minister Ferdinand Čatloš and general Jozef Turanec reported massacres in Zhytomyr to Tiso by February 1942,

  • "Tiso wusste vermutlich spätestens seit Februar 1942 auch von den Massenmorden an Juden in der besetzten Sowjetunion, da ihm unter anderem Verteidigungsminister General Ferdinand Čatloš von den Massakern in Žitomir Ende 1941 berichtet hatte, dort befand sich ein Hauptquartier der slowakischen Armee.54"[125]
  • "Even if he did not learn at this time of the massacres from his soldiers or locals, both Čatloš and General Jozef Turanec later testified that they had reported mass killings to him by February 1942"[130]
  • "Both Minister of National Defense general Ferdinand Čatloš and Slovak gen-eral Jozef Turanec later testified that they had reported the mass killings of Jews to Tiso by February 1942"[131]

Both bishop Karol Kmeťko and papal chargé d'affaires Giuseppe Burzio confronted the president with reliable reports of the mass murder of Jewish civilians in the Ukraine.

  • " Bishop Kmeťko claimed to have confronted Tiso with reliable reports about the genocide in Ukraine, also asking him, “ ‘How can the government allow [the deportations], when it is said that they carry the [Jews] off to their death?’"[132]
  • "Roman Catholic bishop Karol Kmeťko, as well as the Vatican’s diplomat in Slovakia, Giuseppe Burzio, both of whom had received reliable reports about the genocide of Jews in Ukraine, also confronted Tiso."[131]

However, the Slovak government was not aware of the Nazi plan to murder all Jews.[133]

  • " It was the Slovaks, not the Germans, who initiated the deportations, though they did so without knowledge of the mass murder plans of the Germans... The main point to remember, however, is that not even the Slovak leadershad any definite knowledge in March, April, or perhaps even May or June that all the Jews were indeed destined to die in Poland."

Paragraph

[edit]

In mid-1941, the Germans demanded (per previous agreements) another 20,000 Slovak laborers to work in Germany. Slovakia refused to send gentile Slovaks and instead offered an equal number of Jewish workers, although it did not want to be burdened with their families.

A letter sent 15 October 1941 indicates that plans were being made for the mass murder of Jews in the Lublin Reservation of the General Government to make room for deported Jews from Slovakia and Germany.

On 23–24 October 1941, Tiso, Tuka, Mach, and Čatloš visited the Wolf's Lair (near Rastenburg, East Prussia) and met with Adolf Hitler. No record survives of this meeting at which the deportation of Jews from Slovakia was probably first discussed, leading to historiographical debate over whether the Slovak or German government proposed the idea.

  • "The debate around the issue of the Slovak offer of Jews to Germany and the nature of Slovak-German relations remains heated and is an unresolved issue. The crux of the debate is the content of the missing record of the meeting at Hitler’s headquar-ters on 23–24 October 1941, at which, most likely, the first steps of deportations were discussed."[136]
  • "On October 20, 1941, [sic] SS- chief Heinrich Himmler suggested to Tiso, Mach, Tuka, and Čatloš, during their visit to Hitler’s headquarters near Rastenburg, that they should deport the Slovak Jews to German- occupied Poland."[93]

Even if the Germans made the offer, the Slovak decision was not motivated by German pressure.

  • "Slovakia was the first of the German satellites voluntarily to start deporting its Jews to Nazi Poland.255 This was done intentionally and without any significant German pressure"[137]
  • "The émigré historians’ discourse that relativizes the Holocaust is built on two arguments: first, that deportation was just an “evacuation;” and, second, that Slovakia deported its Jews under the direct pressure of Hitler. These are apologetic statements made to cleanse Slovakia of its responsibility for the Jewish Holocaust."[138]
  • "However, the question of initiative should not be overrated. There is no doubt at all that, regardless of who actually took the initiative, the Germans did not have to force Ľudáks to deport the Jews from Slovakia"[131]
  • "To the surprise of the Foreign Office, the Slovak authorities agreed ‘‘without any German pressure.’’"[139]

In November 1941, the Slovak government permitted the German government to deport the 659 Slovak Jews living in the Reich and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia,

  • "In November 1941, Nazi Germany requested permission from Bratislava for the deportation of Jewish Slovaks from the territory of the Third Reich, including the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the Ostmark, to a designated area in the east."[93]
  • See table[140]

with the proviso that their confiscated property be passed to Slovakia.

  • "in November the Foreign Ministry of fi cially asked the governments of Slovakia, Croatia, and Romania whether they had any objections to the deportation of their Jewish nationals living in Germany. The governments of all three countries replied positively; but the Slovakian government agreed only after lengthy hesitation, and made it an express condition that its claims to the property of its deported nationals were entirely secured."[141]

This was the first step towards deporting Jews from Slovakia,

  • "As historian Eduard Nižňanský noted, once permission had been given to deport Jewish Slovak citizens from the territory of the Reich, the deportation of Jews living in Slovakia was the next logical step."[93]
  • "Since the Slovak side agreed to the deportation of Jews with Slovak citizenship from the territory of the Third Reich, the logical next step was deportation from the territory of Slovakia itself."[5][142]

which Tuka discussed with the German government in early 1942. As indicated by a cable from the German ambassador to Slovakia, Hanns Ludin, the Slovaks responded "with enthusiasm" to the idea.

  • "As we learn from a telegram, which ambassador H. Ludin sent to Berlin on 20 February 1942. “The Slovak side accepted the proposal with enthusiasm. It is possible to begin preparatory work.”"[6][143]
  • "Tuka and the German advisor Wisliceny meanwhile negotiated the deportation of Jews from Slovakia. The premier announced the decision at a 3 March ministerial council."[144]

Paragraph

[edit]

Tuka presented the deportation proposals to the government on 3 March, and they were debated in parliament three days later.

  • "The Slovak government discussed the deportation of Jews on March 3, 1942, and the State Council did so on March 6, 1942. It was Prime Minister Tuka who briefed these bodies about deportation and presented the displacement of Jews in economic terms."[93]

On 15 May, parliament approved Decree 68/1942, which retroactively legalized the deportation of Jews, authorized the removal of their citizenship, and regulated exemptions.

  • "On May 15, 1942, however, the Slovak Assembly legalized the deportations retroactively."[131]
  • " Tiso also helped to establish a broader system of exemptions, most notably through a May 1942 constitutional law. Although it sanctioned the deportations and tightened exemptions, the measure also gave the latter a stronger legal basis. The legislation was a compromise between the radicals’ plan to deport all Jews and the moderates’ desire to move more slowly in the interests of the economy and converts."[145]
  • "Schließlich verabschiedete der Landtag am 15. Mai 1942 das Verfassungsgesetz 68 über die Aussiedlung der Juden, das den Deportationen einen legalen Anstrich gab und festlegte, dass die Ausgesiedelten ihre Staatsangehörigkeit verlieren und ihr Vermögen an den Staat fallen sollte, was rückwirkend auch für die 38 169 zu diesem Zeitpunkt bereits deportierten Juden galt. Auszunehmen von der Deportation waren dem Gesetz nach folgende Gruppen: die bis zum 14.März 1939 konvertierten, die mit einem Nichtjuden verheirateten und die mit Ausnahmepapieren versehenen sogenannten wirtschaftlich wichtigen Juden."[146]

Opposition centered on economic, moral, and legal obstacles, but, as Mach later stated, "every [legislator] who has spoken on this issue has said that we should get rid of Jews".

  • " Although not to the extent later claimed, the deportations immediately drew criticism from Slovak moderates. A member of the State Council, for instance, argued against the plan, pointing out the economic, moral, and legal problems that it would cause. But, as Mach summed up the resulting debate, “every [council] member who has spoken on this issue has said that we should get rid of Jews, just in such a way that we will be able to hold up before history. [That is to say, we should] act according to natural law.” 209 Although the council sanctioned the deportations, it asked that “important economic interests” be considered."[147]

The official Catholic representative, Bishop of Spiš Ján Vojtaššák, only requested separate settlements in Poland for Jews who had converted to Christianity.

  • "Bischof Ján Vojtaššák, der sich lediglich für getrennte Lager für jene Juden aussprach, die getauft waren, deren Konversion gemäß den Bestimmungen im Judenkodex aber nicht anerkannt wurde"[148]

The Slovaks agreed to pay 500 Reichsmarks per Jew deported (ostensibly to cover shelter, food, retraining and housing)

  • "Die Regierung erklärte sich sogar bereit, für jeden deportierten Juden 500 RM – angeblich für Verpflegung, Umschulung und Unterbringung – an das Reich zu zahlen."[148]
  • "The exaction consisted of a bill presented bythe Reich to the Slovak government for ‘‘shelter, food, clothing, andretraining [Unterbringung, Verpflegung, Bekleidung und Umschulung].’’ For these fictitious expenses the charge was not less than 500 Reichsmarkper head, or 45 million Reichsmark if all 90,000 Slovak Jews were to be deported."[149]

and an additional fee to the Deutsche Reichsbahn for transport.

  • "The Slovak Transport Ministry had to compensate the Reichsbahn for a major portion of the distances covered in the deportations, namely all thetrack kilometers in Upper Silesia and (for trains to Lublin) also the routes in the Generalgouvernement."[139]

The Germans promised in exchange that the Jews would never return, and Slovakia could keep all confiscated property.

  • "The Slovak state agreed to pay 500 RM for each deportee, to ‘cover’ pretended accommodation and food, but insisted on a German promise that the Jews would never come back"[127]
  • "Das Reich sicherte der Slowakei auf ihr Verlangen hin ausdrücklich zu, dass die deportierten Juden nicht wieder zurückkehren würden und dass Deutschland keinen Anspruch auf deren Vermögen erhebe"[146]

Except for Croatia (which paid 30 Reichsmarks per person), Slovakia was the only country which paid to deport its Jewish population.

  • "Apart from the Slovaks, the Croats also had to pay for the deportation of Jews, but only a sum of 30.- Reich marks."[150]
  • " The Slovak government also gave its consent to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs to deport Slovak Jews living in the territory of the Third Reich and also agreed to provide a so-called colonization payment of five hundred reichsmarks for every deported Jew to cover “resettlement costs.”34 Only Croatia paid a similar colonization payment of thirty reichsmarks per every deported Jew"[151]

Implementation

[edit]

The original deportation plan, approved in February 1942, entailed the deportation of 7,000 women to Auschwitz and 13,000 men to Majdanek as forced laborers.

  • "In February 1942, in response to a request from Himmler, the Foreign Office sent a request to the Slovakian government for 20 , 000 Jewish workers to be sent to the Reich for deployment ‘ in the East ’ ... The original deportation plan had allowed for the deportation of some 13 , 000 men to the Majdanek camp and 7 , 000 women to Auschwitz."[152]
  • "The agreement to deport Slovakian Jewry was evidently concluded by die Slovakianauthorities and representatives of Germany in the first half of February 1942. Theyintended first to deport 20,000 able-bodied Jews—7,000 girls and young women and13,000 young men—and later all the rest"

Department 14 organized the deportations,

  • "the 14th Division of Mach's Ministry of the Interior, which carried out the deportations."[153]
  • "MV’s Department 14 managed the nationwide organization and deportation of Slovak Jews"[131]

while the Slovak Transport Ministry provided the cattle cars.

  • "The Germans wanted Slovak railroad cars, andSlovak Transport Minister Stano claimed that he did not have them.Because the Slovak car shortage was actual, the Germans could not be certain whether they had been given a reason or an excuse.53 By mid-May, however, Sturmbannführer Günther in Eichmann’s office was able toreport that much to the relief of the Germans, who faced a strained train situation in the Reichsbahn, the Slovaks were supplying the rolling stock."[154]
  • 216: Stano is minister of transportation; "The moderate Stano’s ministry, however, supplied the trains."[155]
  • for cattle cars see "Güterwaggons"[146]

Lists of those to be deported were drawn up by Slovak officials based on statistical data provided by the Jewish Center's Department for Special Tasks. "The lists of designated deportees were compiled by Interior Ministry officials on the basis of more complete lists and statistical data drawn up earlier by members of the Jewish Center."[156]

  • "Hochberg and a group of specially recruited Jewish agents who composed his team were very active in helping the Slovaks and the Germans round up Jews. They provided technical and secretarial help, and theyworked on lists supplied to them by Slovak authorities—and because theywere supposedly attached to the UZ, many people in the community identified the UZ with them. But the lists of people to deport were put togethernot by Hochberg's people but by special committees with SL'S and Hlinka Guard members, in many cases with the addition of Freiwillige Schutzstaffel delegates and local officials"[157] Earlier in the page, mention of "Hochberg's special department"

At the border station in Zwardon, the Hlinka Guard handed the transports off to the German Schutzpolizei.

  • "From the railway stations in Slovakia the trains were sent to the border post at Zwardon in Upper Silesia. There the armed escorts and railway workers were changed, and the deportees were handed over to the German police (Schutzpolizei), who escorted all the transports to their destination."[158]
  • "Von dort aus wurden sie zum Grenzbahnhof Zwardon gebracht und der deutschen Schutzpolizei übergeben, die die Deportationszüge bis zu den Zielorten bewachte."[148]

Slovak officials promised that deportees would be allowed to return home after a fixed period.

  • "To allay the Jews' fears, Slovakian officials spread rumors that the young women would be put to work for a fixed period and then return to their homes."[159]

Initially, many Jews believed that it was better to report for deportation rather than risk reprisals against their families.

On 25 March 1942, the first train departed from Poprad transit camp for Auschwitz with 1,000 unmarried Jewish women between the ages of 16 and 45.

  • "The first transport left Slovakia from Poprad on March 25, 1942; it consisted of 1,000 girls and women between the ages of 16 and 45."[131]

During the first wave of deportations (which ended on 2 April), 6,000 young, single Jews were deported to Auschwitz and Majdanek.

  • "The deportations took place in waves, the first occurring between 25 March and 2 April, when the Slovak state dispatched around 6,000 young Jews to Auschwitz and other extermination camps"[161]

Paragraph

[edit]

Members of the Hlinka Guard, the Freiwillige Schutzstaffel, and the gendarmerie were in charge of rounding up the Jews, guarding the transit centers, and eventually loading them into train cars for deportation.

  • "The gendarmerie, together with the Hlinka Guard and FS, first took Jews from individual municipalities to district seats and from there to one of the newly established concentration camps for Jews ... from there the Jews were to be put on transports and deported from Slovakia."[131]

However, there was a German captain stationed at each of the concentration centers.

  • "In each of these centers there was one German captain helping to implement the deportations."[162]
  • "The direct involvement of non-Jewish Slovaks, both in the govern-ment which ordered the expropriation and deportations and the policing forces – the Hlinka Guard, regular police and gendarmerie orˇzand ́arstvo–which carried them out,"[163]

Official exemptions were supposed to keep Jews from being deported, but local authorities sometimes deported exemption-holders.

  • "We also learn about cases, such as Henrik Schreiber from Hlohovec, the Poprad Jews or the Jews from Trebišovce and Sečovce who were deported despite the fact that they possessed ministerial exemptions. Furthermore, public anger that “the rich Jews” managed to obtain the exemptions and the poor encouraged local authorities to deport the holders of the exemptions"[164]

The victims were given only four hours' warning, to prevent them from escaping. Beatings and forcible shaving were commonplace, as was subjecting Jews to invasive searches to uncover hidden valuables.

  • 4 hours' warning: "Na základe nariadení posielali povolancom zvolávacie lístky 4 hodín pred termínom nástupu, aby sa predišlo ich úteku či skrývaniu."(346)
  • "Bitie a fyzické týranie Židov bolo relatívne bežné, podobne ako ponižovanie spojené s ostrihaním bra­dy či vlasov, znázornené na sugestívnych fotografiách, ktoré sa nám v malom počte zachovali dodnes.1388 Strážcovia z radov HG vystavova­li Židov ponižujúcim prehliadkam, pri ktorých u nich hľadali schované cennosti, okrádali ich o veci osobnej potreby, zabávali sa na vydieraní odvedencov, ktorým sľubovali poskytnutie pomoci či stretnutie s prí­buznými, samozrejme za peniaze, či znásilňovali sústredené židovské ženy."[7][165]

Although some guards and local officials accepted bribes to keep Jews off the transports, the victim would typically be deported on the next train.[166] Others took advantage of their power to rape Jewish women.

Jews were only allowed to bring 50 kilograms (110 lb) of personal items with them, but even this was frequently stolen.

  • offline[168]
  • "Despite instructions that the Jews could take fifty kilograms of strictly defined movable property with them, they were robbed and physically attacked either during the "local transports" from their homes to the holding centers, or in the holding centers."[162]

Paragraph

[edit]

SS leader Reinhard Heydrich visited Bratislava on 10 April, and he and Tuka agreed that further deportations would target whole families and eventually remove all Jews from Slovakia.

  • "On 10 April Heydrich explained the deportation programme in Bratislava. 67 The following day the deportations of whole families began. Now the deportation plan was changed: seven transports are known to have arrived in Auschwitz, where the deportees were deployed in forced labour; another thirty-four transports set o ff for the district of Lublin at around the same time."[152]
  • Tuka: offline[169]

The family transports began on 11 April, and took their victims to the Lublin district.

  • See above[170]
  • Family transports specifically to Lublin: Büchler dates the family transports to Auschwitz after mid-June. Before this only able-bodied individuals were sent: "Then systematic murder of most Jews immediately upon arrival at Auschwitz began on July 4, 1942, when the first family transport from Slovakia reached the camp."[171]

During the first half of June 1942 ten transports stopped briefly at Majdanek, where able-bodied men were selected for labor; the trains continued to Sobibór, where the remaining victims were murdered.

  • "Since the beginning of June the inmates of a total of ten transports that were not deemed ‘ fi t for work ’ at the selection in Lublin and were not locked up in Majdanek camp, women and children above all, had no longer been placed in a ghetto, but rather taken directly to Sobibor extermination camp where they were murdered. This meant that the Slovakian Jews too were now caught up in that escalation of extermination to which the Jews deported to Minsk from the ‘ Greater German Reich ’ had fallen victim since mid-May. The last Sobibor transport set o ff from Slovakia on 14 June, a day before the deportations from the Reich to the district of Lublin were stopped."[170]

Most of the trains brought their victims (30,000 in total)

  • "In the Lublin District, about 9,000, mainly younger men, were sent on to the Lublin camp (Majdanek), and 30,000, mostly older people or families with children, were distributed in small towns and villages from which Polish Jews had already been deported."[172]

to ghettos whose inhabitants had been recently deported to the Bełżec or Sobibór death camps. Some groups stayed only briefly before they were deported again to the death camps, while other groups remained in the ghettos for months or years.

  • "The Slovakian Jews were mostly transported to places from which the indigenous Jewish population had been taken to the extermination camps of Belzec and Sobibor. Accommodation in these places — for which in general no preparations whatsoever had been made — was in some cases only a brief stop before further deportation to the extermination camps, in others it became an imprisonment under wretched conditions that lasted for months and even years."[170]

Some of the deportees ended up in the forced-labor camps in the Lublin area (such as Poniatowa, Dęblin–Irena, and Krychów).

  • Mentions Slovak Jews at Dęblin–Irena and Poniatowa (159) and Krychów (161)[173]

Unusually, the deportees in the Lublin area were quickly able to establish contact with the Jews remaining in Slovakia, which led to extensive aid efforts.

  • "However,the efforts of the Slovakian deportees in the Lublin district to save themselves werecharacterised by singular factors. Most significant were the links established at an earlystage between the deportees and the Jews still in Slovakia. These resulted in widespread activity to aid the deportees.43 They also opened a vital channel of information, throughwhich reports on the fate of the deportees flowed back to Slovakia."[174]

However, the fate of the Jews deported from Slovakia was ultimately "sealed within the framework of Operation Reinhard" along with that of the Polish Jews, in the words of Yehoshua Büchler.

  • "As a result, the experience of those deported from Slovakia was different from that ofthose deported to Auschwitz. They were dispersed to various places in the Lublin region,and in most cases their fate was sealed within the framework of 'Operation Reinhard', together with most of the Jews of Poland."[158]

Paragraph

[edit]

Transports went to Auschwitz after mid-June, where a minority of the victims were selected for labor and the remainder were killed in the gas chambers.

  • "After this [cessation of transports to Lublin) all Slovakian transports came to Auschwitz where, beginning with the train that arrived on 4 July 1942 , a selection now regularly occurred on the ramp: Jews who were ‘ fit for work ’ were sent to the camp, while those deemed ‘ unfit for work ’ , meaning in particular all children, their mothers, and elderly people, were murdered in the gas chambers immediately after their arrival. By 21 October we are able to identify eight transports from Slovakia whose inmates suffered this fate."[175]
  • For "minority" see data table in Büchler 1996, p. 320

This occurred for nine transports, the last of which arrived on 21 October 1942.

From 1 August to 18 September, no transports departed;

  • "the cessation of the deportations from the end of July until September 18 had nothing to do with bribing Wisliceny."[178]
  • see data table[177][176]

most of the Jews not exempt from deportation had already been deported or had fled to Hungary.

  • "By the end of July, 52,000 Jews had already been sent to Poland" (75) "A statisticalanalysis in Gila Fatran's thesis shows that so-called Presidential exemptions(letters by Tiso protecting the addressees from the danger of deportation)accounted for 1,111 persons in 1943. There were 985 mixed marriages, 4,217 converts prior to March 1939, and 9,687 economically "useful" Jews, for atotal of nearly 16,000. To what extent these numbers include members offamilies is not quite clear, however. According to Fatran's calculations, 8,000 escaped to Hungary, leaving 24,000 in Slovakia after October 1942. Some ofthese were there illegally."[179]

In mid-August, Tiso gave a speech in Holič in which he described Jews as the "eternal enemy" and justified the deportations according to Christian ethics.

  • "On August 17, 1942, Tiso gave a speech in Holíč in which he claimed that the deportations were for the good of the nation: “ People ask whether what is being done with the Jews is Christian. Is it human? Is it not robbery? . . . I ask is it Christian when the nation wants to free itself from its eternal enemy? . . . And we did it according to the commandment of God: Slovak, free yourself from those who harm you."[131]
  • Similar translation provided on[180]

Three more transports occurred in September and October 1942 before ceasing until 1944.

  • see data table[177][176]
  • "At the time of [Tiso's Holic speech], the Slovak Republic had already handed over around 55,000 Jews to its ally, Nazi Germany. Tiso’s regime would deliver 2,800 more Jews to Germany before ceasing deportations in fall 1942. No further transports occurred until the outbreak of the 1944 Slovak National Uprising,"[181]

By the end of 1942, only 500 or 600 Slovak Jews were still alive at Auschwitz.

  • "Von den 18 725 nach Auschwitz deportierten Juden waren Ende 1942 noch 500 bis 600 am Leben"[146]

Thousands of surviving Slovak Jews in the Lublin District were shot on 3–4 November 1943 during Operation Harvest Festival.

  • "It is estimated that of the approximately 18,000 Jews murdered in Majdanek on 3 November 1943, some 600 were from Slovakia"[174]
  • "Bei dem unter der Tarnbezeichnung „Aktion Erntefest“ durchgeführten Massenmord im Distrikt Lublin töteten Polizei und SS am 3. und 4. November 1943 mehr als 40 000 Juden, darunter auch Tausende aus der Slowakei"[146]

Paragraph

[edit]

Between 25 March and 20 October 1942, about 58,000 Jews (two-thirds of the population) were deported.

  • "Altogether, almost 58 , 000 people had been deported in fi fty-seven transports."[175]
  • "...their deportation to Nazi extermination camps began in March 1942. During the following six months, almost58,000 people, that is, two-thirds of the Slovak Jewish community,were forcibly deported from Slovakia and subsequently killed"[182]
  • For dates see [183]

The exact number is unknown due to discrepancies in the sources.

  • "Although the sources provide very accurate approximations of the number of Jews deported, it is difficult to establish exact statistics for deportees, arrivals, places of dispersal, dates of subsequent deportation, etc. For example, using mostly identical sources... [three scholars came up with three slightly different estimates of the number of Jews deported from Slovakia to Lublin district]. Moreover, there are discrepancies both within and among the various lists and records of embarkation and arrival." Gives examples[184]

The deportations disproportionately affected poorer Jews from eastern Slovakia. Although the Šariš-Zemplín region in eastern Slovakia lost 85 to 90 percent of its Jewish population, Žilina reported that almost half of its Jews remained after the deportation.

  • "Only a few dozen were from Slovakia’s easternmost, most heavily Jewish county. Poor, rural, and Orthodox, the Jews here were the most vulnerable to deportation."[145]
  • "Despite having the largest Jewish population, the eastern district of Sarissko-Zemplinska received the fewest direct exemptions, a total of 49; Giraltovce, a county with 1,200 Jews in 1940, received none, while Michalovce (with 5,669 Jews in 1940), Bardejov (3,523 Jews), and Medzilaborce (1,487 Jews) each received less than one direct exemption per 1,000 Jews in 1940. In contrast, the predominately Slovak western districts of Zilina and TurCiansky Svaty Martin received, respectively, 16 and 18 direct exemptions per 1,000 Jews in 1940. These also were areas in which an unusually high number of Jews were spared deportation. In September 1942, Zilina reported a Jewish population that was nearly half of its 1940 level; in contrast, several counties in Sarissko-Zemplinska reported only 10-15% of their 1940 levels." (484) "The bulk of these exemptions were to individuals who least needed protection; those who needed it the most-the rural, poor, Orthodox Jews of Sarissko-Zemplfnska-he forsook."[185]
  • "Oběti druhé vlny židovských deportací ze Slovenska do Osvětimi i táborů, na něž se zaměřuje tato práce, patřily vesměs k menší části slovenské židovské populace, již před první vlnou deportací v roce 1942 uchránil systém výjimek udělovaných orgány Slovenského štátu. Šlo zejména o osoby, jejichž kvalifikace byla potřebná pro fungování národního hospodářství a veřejného sektoru, a spolu s nimi i o jejich nejbližší rodinné příslušníky; před válkou patřili tito lidé vesměs ke střednímu stavu. Výrazně nižší je naproti tomu ve sledované skupině podíl lidí z dříve početných chudých vrstev židovského obyvatelstva, jež byly první vlnou deportací naprosto zdecimovány." Notes that most of the poor Jews had been killed in 1942 and the wealthier, skilled ones remained[186]

The deportees were held briefly in five camps in Slovakia before deportation;

  • "At the beginning of March 1942, five concentration centers were gradually established [those listed later] through which the deported had to pass."[162]

26,384 from Žilina,

  • "According to published records, 26,384 Jews passed through the camp" [Žilina][187]

7,500 from Patrónka,

  • "Transports totaling approximately 7,500 persons left the camp under Vašina’s command."[188] (Note: later on the page it states that Vasina commanded the camp until August 1942, after which there were no more transports from Patrónka, see Fatran 2007 p. 181)

7,000 from Poprad,

  • "The number of persons who passed through the transit camp [Poprad] reached 7,000"[189]

4,463 from Sereď,

  • "Three full transports and five smaller transports carry ing 4,463 people departed Sereď by the end of September 1942."[190]

and 4,000 to 5,000 from Nováky.

  • "Several smaller transports were sent from Nováky to a concentration camp in Žilina, where the prisoners were put into the transport departing for German- occupied Poland. Although the exact number of people deported remains unknown, the es-timate is that the number is between 4,000 and 5,000."[191]

Nineteen trains went to Auschwitz, and another thirty-eight went to ghettos and concentration and extermination camps in the Lublin district.

  • "The first wave of deportations took place in 1942 and lasted almost seven months, from 26 March to 20 October. Fifty-seven trains weredispatched, with almost 58,000 Jews deported. Nineteen of the 'transports' were'sent tothe Auschwitz death camp, while the remaining 38 trains, carrying approximately 39,000 Jews, were sent to the district of Lublin in the German General-Government in Poland"[192]

Only a few hundred survived the war,

  • "Only a few hundred people survived the deportations of 1942."[131]

most of them at Auschwitz; almost no one survived in Lublin.

  • See table, death rate of 98,50% is cited for Auschwitz while "100%, except individuals" (100 % kromě jednotlivců) died in Lublin district.[193]
  • The largest group of survivors at Lublin was probably the few dozen who survived Dęblin–Irena Ghetto[original research?]

Opposition, exemption, and evasion

[edit]

The Catholic Church opposed deportation, fearing that such actions from a Catholic government would discredit the church.

  • "...the Vatican for its own reasons was nevertheless distressed over the deportations. Sixteen of the sixty-three members of the Slovak parliament, or fully one-quarter, were priests who all voted for the authorizing degree. Burzio charged Interior Minister Mach with implicating the Catholic Church in the deportations... President Tiso himself was a priest, so the church would be implicated in his crimes. The deportations would stain the holy character of the church"[36]
  • "Domenico Tardini summed up the Vatican’s frustration [with the deportation of Jews by the Tiso government] in a note: “Everyone understands that the Holy See cannot stop Hitler. But who can understand that it does not know how to rein in a priest [Jozef Tiso]?”"[132] (Both insertions by me)

However, Slovak bishops, influenced by nationalism, were equivocal in their April 1942 statement on the deportations, endorsing antisemitic canards while insisting that anti-Jewish actions had to be "Christian".

  • "On 26 April 1942 the country's bishops spoke out publicly on the deportations in a joint declaration read out in churches throughout Slovakia. The statement was riddled with ambiguity including both contempt for Jewry, the view that Jews were a continuing threat to the nations that had offered them "hospitality", and the injunction to treat Jews humanely. The bishops reminded their countrymen that Jews were a people punished by God, made to wander the earth as strangers, for the "Jewish nation... did not acknowledge the Saviour and caused his cruel and ignominious death on the cross". The bishops' statement went on to say that to our day the Jews remained "hostile to Christianity" and had "played a considerable part in the bloody persecutions of Christians in Russia and Spain."[194]

Vatican Secretary of State Luigi Maglione protested to Karol Sidor and other members of the regime without distinguishing between converts and Jews.

  • "... five days later Maglione protested to Sidor, without singling out Catholics of Jewish descent as the special concern of the church... [Maglione] also pulled his punches. He wanted to avoid offending and alienating the Slovak bishops... [195]

Giuseppe Burzio condemned the deportations; according to a SD (Sicherheitsdienst) report, he threatened Tiso with an interdict.

  • "According to the Nazi secret service SD, Burzio even threatened Tiso with an interdict."[131]
  • "According to the SS security service, the Sicherheitsdienst ( SD ), Burzio (who had received Slovak reports on the genocide in Ukraine since October 1941) even threatened Tiso with interdict."[132]

However, the Catholic Church ultimately chose not to discipline any of the Slovak Catholics who were complicit in the regime's actions.

  • "Why then did Pius XII not impose religious sanctions on Tiso or on Slovak priests who as parliamentary deputies had approved the deportations... With Tiso as president, the Slovak church could exert pressure on the government. Tiso was popular with the Slovak public, far more so than the radical faction in the Slovak People's Party... As such, Tiso's presence was a buffer, if a fitful one, against German plans and pressure.... A condemnation from the Vatican would only have weakened Tiso's position. So while Monsignor Tiso was implicating the church in mass crimes, there were reasons not to take action against him."[196]

Many Slovaks opposed the deportations,

  • "Zweitens nahm die slowakische Regierung einen Stimmungswandel in der Bevölkerungwahr. Die Transporte waren, wie der Gesandte Ludin am 26. Juni 1942 berichtete, „inweiten Kreisen des slowakischen Volkes sehr unpopulär“. Die Slowaken erlebten oft-mals aus nächster Nähe, wie mit ihren jüdischen Nachbarn umgegangen wurde. Im Um-feld der Deportationszentren wurden sie unmittelbare Zeugen von Übergriffen."[95]
  • "The simplest recorded positive instance of the majority population behavior is empathy (or pity) shown toward the deported. This can be found in the records of the district heads in Bardejov, Prievidvza, and Presov."[197]
  • "Hanns Ludin, Germany's minister to Slovakia, reported to Berlin that the deportations were "very unpopular". This wide unpopularity did not, however, translate into strong episcopal or popular pressure on the government to halt them."[36]

but this did not translate into action against them.

  • "Despite the reports from different districts, which noted that the society objected to the antisemitic policies at the beginning of the 1942 deportations, the entire process of dislocating the Jews and depriving them of citizenship, was implemented without any significant resistance. Only individual acts of help to Jewish fellow citizens emerged"[198]
  • See above[36]

Jewish religious organizations sent petitions to Tiso, but he did not reply.

  • "On March 5, 1942, two Jewish religious organizations, Central Office of the Autonomous Orthodox Jewish Religious Community and the Jeshurun Federation of the Religious Communities (Zväz židovských náboženských obcí Ješurun), sent a memorandum to the President-Priest Jozef Tiso, protesting against the planned deportations on various grounds." [discusses another memorandum, sent by Armin Frieder] "Both memoranda were left unanswered by the president."[199]

The Working Group—an underground organization which operated under the auspices of the ÚŽ, led by Zionist organizer Gisi Fleischmann and Orthodox rabbi Michael Dov Weissmandl—bribed Anton Vašek, head of Department 14, and Wisliceny in an effort to save Slovak Jews. It is unknown if the group's efforts had any connection with the halting of deportations.

  • "In the spring of 1942, the government’s decision to start deportations to Poland prompted this Working Group led by Gizela (Gizi) Fleischmann, the head of the ÚŽemigration department, and Rabbi Michael Dov Weissmandel— together with Andrew (Ondrej) Steiner, Tibor Kováč, Oskar Neumann, Rabbi Abraham (Armin) Frieder, and a group of public figures and activists in the various youth movements—to massively lobby among state functionaries, economic leaders, and Catholic clergy. Members of the group bribed key Slovak figures and intervened with Tiso, yet failed to stop the deportation wave... Many credit the Working Group with the halting of mass deportations, but other factors also influenced their suspension after October 1942, including pressure from the Vatican and local bishops who were displeased with Tiso."[200]
  • "the so-called ‘ subsidiary government ’ around the Zionist youth leader Gisi Fleischmann and the rabbi Michael Dor Weissmandel... The ‘ subsidiary government ’ went so far as to bribe the German ‘ Jewish adviser ’ , Dieter Wisliceny, with a considerable sum of dollars to bring the deportations to a standstill; but the question of whether this method really played any part in the decision to stop the deportations remains unresolved."[175]
  • "The group's membership was very diverse; the leaders were Glsl Flelschmann, a Zionist activist, and Michael Dov Weissmandel, an Orthodox rabbi"[201]
Paragraph

Many Jews heard about the mass deaths in Poland in mid-1942, from a variety of sources including letters from deported Jews and escapees.

  • Various examples listed, including letters from deported individuals, and an escapee.[202]
  • "More testimonies of this kind all point to the conclusion that Slovak Jews learned of the life-threatening conditions in Poland in the summer of 1942—from postcards sent by relatives, from those who escaped from Poland, from Slovak friends with contacts in Poland."[203]

Around 5,000 to 6,000 Jews fled to Hungary in early 1942,

  • "Approximately five to six thousand Jews had already fled to Hungary,"[131]
  • "Asi 6 tisíc židov ušlo do Maďarska. Väčšina si tento útek zaisťovala rôznymi úplatkami, na slovenskej i maďarskej strane. Vyhľadávaní boli hlavne ilegálni prevádzači cez hranice." (The word "úplatok" specifically refers to bribes and not other illegal payments.)[204]
  • "It can be assumed that at least some of the 8,000 Jews who avoided deportation to the Generalgouvernement in 1942—5,000 to 6,000 escaped to Hungary and around 2,000 others obtained Aryan papers—were helped by the majority population. Help escaping over the border to Hungary was quite extensive, even if the cases recorded quite clearly tell of the majority population asking for /page break/ payment for this help... [91]

many by paying bribes

or with help from paid smugglers

  • "These interviews indicate that rescue resulted from a chain of multiple acts and various forms of assistance, such as hiding in the countryside in exchange for money, bribery of guardists and gendarmes, crossing the southern border with the assistance of paid smugglers" Many examples are described in Chapter IV[205]
  • see above[206]
  • see also: "Viele Juden wagten die Flucht nach Ungarn oder bezahlten Fluchthelfer, um wenigstensihre Kinder zu retten."[207]

or Zionist youth movements

  • "Mitglieder des Haschomer Hazair schufen an der slowakisch-ungarischen Grenze Kon-taktstellen, wodurch die Fluchtwege nach Ungarn sicherer gemacht werden konnten."

about one third survived the war.

  • "Historians Ivan Kamenec, Martin Hetényi, and Martina Fiamová claim that one-third of the Jews who made it to Hungary survived the war. In 1942, Hungary was a safer place for Slovak Jews." (all of the publications cited by Paulovicova for this are RS and could be used without attribution)[208]

Many owners of Aryanized businesses applied for work exemptions for the Jewish former owners. In some cases this was a fictitious Aryanization; other Aryanizers, motivated by profit, kept the Jewish former owners around for their skills.

  • "The most positive example of a majority population's reaction to Aryanization was its willingness to fictitiously aryanize Jewish businesses and thus save not only the firms, but also the Jewish families.... In 1942 [these work permits] could save the original Jewish owner and his family from deportation." (62) ... an effort by all the non-Jewish business licensees to obtain work permits for Jewish helpers, thus helping Jewish families avoid deportation.... in many cases the original owner was needed by the Aryanizer, because he himself was unable or unwilling to run the Jewish business." (70)[209]
  • "Work permits became extremely important for Jews—both so that the lucky possessors could earn a living, and as documents that could help them avoid deportation. For historians, they also raise the suggestion that some Slovaks may have been taking up these last remaining legal opportunities to protect Jews. In the archives, we can fi nd a good many requests by Slovaks asking for work permits for Jews. It is diffi cult to say whether, and to what extent, such requests were driven by compassion, because the applicants could only express offi cially acceptable reasons, usually economic in nature." (176) "The First Aryanization Law (as it was called) offered the opportunity of ‘voluntary Aryanization’, and a Christian Slovak called A. Filadelfi used this as a loophole to help the Vig family. In a fi ctitious act of ‘Aryanizing’, he took over 55 per cent of their business and, in 1942, the whole enterprise, in this way saving the Jewish owners from deportation. He gave the business back to them in 1946." (178)[210]

Christian clergy baptized Jews, even those who were not sincere converts. Although conversion after 1939 did not exempt Jews from deportation, some clergy edited records to predate baptisms and being baptized made it easier to obtain other exemptions.

  • "The remaining 5434 Jews, who received baptism after the establishment of the Slovak state, were not immediately safe but could utilize their baptism as a means of securing a ministerial or presidential exemption"(279) "Likewise, willingness on the part of the clergy to shorten the preparation period or antedate the act of baptism to before 14 March 1939 did save some lives; but many more could have been saved. The forging of baptismal documents by priests, Christians and Jews themselves became a means of rescue for some, an act of mercy for others and simply a profit-making opportunity for some others still"[211]
  • "Of [the Jews who converted to Catholicism] about 2,350 had converted between March 1939 and September 1942, which indicates, in accord with Slovak government suspicions, that many conversions were a bid for safety and survival and that there were clerics willing to baptize Jews on this basis."[196]

Paragraph

[edit]

At the end of the deportations, between 22,000 and 25,000 Jews were still in Slovakia.

  • "While I will not guess the ultimate survival rate of the presidential exemption holders from 1942, the reader should note that of the approximately 24,000-25,000 Jews left in Slovakia, the Germans deported 13,500 in 1944, of which perhaps 10,000 perished"[212]
  • "Auf dem Territorium der Slowakei lebten Ende 1942 noch etwa 22 000 Juden unter sehrunterschiedlichen Bedingungen."[213]

Some 16,000 Jews had exemptions; there were 4,217 converts to Christianity before 1939, at least 985 Jews in mixed marriages, and 9,687 holders of economic exemptions

  • "There were 985 mixed marriages, 4,217 converts prior to March 1939, and 9,687 economically "useful" Jews, for a total of nearly 16,000. To what extent these numbers include members of families is not quite clear, however."[179]
  • "Moreover, to judge from the 1940 census of Jewish property, there were perhaps 1,250 mixed marriages in Slovakia before the deportations; after the deportations, according to an apparent 1943 14th Division report, at least 985 individuals were still exempt on this basis.98 It is entirely possible that another 250 are hidden among the other categories in the report."[214]

(particularly doctors, pharmacists, engineers, and agricultural experts, whose professions had shortages).

  • "The remaining Jews of Slovakia avoided deportation in various ways:by fleeing to Hungary, by going into hiding underground and especially by gaining exemption because of work, mainly in the cases of doctors, pharmacists, veterinarians, engineers and agricultural or other experts, for whom the state did not have enough qualified replacements."[215]

One thousand Jews were protected by presidential exemptions, mostly in addition to other exemptions.

  • " By late October 1942, Tiso had granted around 650 exemptions. These dispensations, which also applied to some family members, protected around 1,000 legally defined Jews... Most of Tiso’s exempted, in contrast, already held other dispensations."[216]
  • "I conclude that by the end of the 1942 deportations Tiso had granted around 550-750 direct exemptions, which protected a total of around 900-1,100 legally defined Jews. ... Three-quarters of those Tiso protected were in minimal or no danger of deportation at the time they received the presidential exemption; of the remaining quarter, over half were highly useful to the state. It would appear that either government directives or Law 68 of 1942 already protected over half of the exemption holders present on the 1942 census. Tiso's exemptions, thus, were largely redundant and not decisive in preventing the state from deporting a significant number of Jews."[217]

In addition to the exempted Jews, around 2,500 were interned at forced labor camps

  • "Im Januar 1943 befanden sich in den Lagern 2573 Juden, darunter viele Kinder unter 14 Jahren; im Sommer 1944 lebten dort etwa 3300 Juden."[213] Forced labor: "Die Juden in Nováky, Sered und Vyhne mussten in einer Vielzahlverschiedener Werkstätten Zwangsarbeit leisten" (same page)

while about a thousand were serving in the Sixth Labor Battalion.

  • "Auchdie 1000 jüdischen Männer im VI. Arbeitsbataillon, die dem Verteidigungsministeriumunterstanden, wurden nicht deportiert."[95]

When the deportations were halted, the government knew the whereabouts of only 2,500 Jews without exemptions.

  • "Exactly why the deportations ceased is unclear... Another conspicuous correlation is that, by then, the Slovak government knew the whereabouts of only around 2,500 unexempted Jews."[218]

Hiatus (1943)

[edit]
External image
image icon Women performing forced labor at Nóvaky

The enforcement of anti-Jewish laws grew less severe with time, and many Jews stopped wearing the yellow star.[219] Nevertheless, the remaining Jews – even those with exemptions – lived in constant fear of deportation.

  • "Jews were under constant threat of the resumption of deportations."[200]

The Jewish leadership worked to improve conditions for laborers in the Slovak camps

  • "In addition, Jewish Councils bribed commanders of camps and HG in order to ease the life of the inmates."[200]

and to convert the camps to productive industrial centers to create an incentive to keep their workers.

  • offline[220]
  • "Within the framework of the Jewish Center the Working Group sought to increase productivity in the labor camps Sered Vyhne and Novaky by launching new projects and workshops, thus producing goods and material vital to the Slovak economy."[221]

In 1943, the labor camps earned 39 million Ks for the Slovak State.

  • "In the labour camps, thousands of Jews produced goods for the benefi t of the state, their total value amounting to 39 million crowns."[222]
  • "Im Jahr 1943 wurden inden Lagern Produkte im Wert von über 39 Millionen Kronen für den Staat hergestellt."[213]

The halt in deportations from Slovakia enabled the Working Group to launch the Europa Plan, an unsuccessful effort to bribe SS chief Heinrich Himmler to spare the surviving Jews under German occupation.

  • "The temporary halt in deportations convinced the members of the Working Group that bribery was effective. For this reason, Rabbi Weissmandel initiated the Europa Plan, an at-tempt to save the remaining Jews in German- dominated Eu rope by paying ransom. The group entered into secret negotiations with SS officials in the fall of 1942,"[200]
  • "According to Weissmandel's account, toward the end of 1942 the Working Group approached [Wisliceny], again through Hochberg, and suggested the Europa Plan to stop the deportations to Poland, perhaps to stop the killing inPoland as well." (79)
  • "The Europa Plan negotiations... started in November [1942]. It is clear that Himmler sanctioned the continuation of the talks.23 He hedged his agreement by saying that Wisliceny couldpromise whatever he liked; he, Himmler, would later see what part of the promise should be kept." (99)[223]

It also smuggled aid to Jews in Poland,

  • "The attempts to find out where the transports had been sent, to obtain information and extend aid to the deportees became a top priority for Slovakian Jews bothat the local community level and the national level, especially among members of the 'Working Group'"[224]
  • "the Group hired trustworthy Polish speakers to cross the border illegally and offer assistance [to Slovak deportees in Poland]—a difficult and dangerous task... In each deportation center where the couriers had established ties, a trustee was appointed to distribute the money and the relief provisions. To confirm the transfer of the money and the supplies, these trustees provided the couriers with signed receipts."[225]

and helped Polish Jews escape to Hungary via Slovakia.

  • "The couriers escorted the refugees to small towns on the Slovakian side, whence they were transported in small groups to nearby towns with the help of Working Group assistants. In Slovakia, the number of refugees from Poland was estimated at 2,500."[226]

In late April 1944 two Auschwitz escapees, Rudolf Vrba and Alfred Wetzler, reached Slovakia.[227] The Working Group sent a report to Hungary and Switzerland.[228]

  • "On 21 April 1944 the first two Slovak Jewish escapees from Auschwitz, Alfred Wetzler and Walter Rosenberg (Rudolf Vrba), who had been deported in 1942, reached Slovakia. Through the assistance of the Working Group their eyewitness account—the famous Auschwitz Protocol—of the structure and methods of annihilation in the extermination camp was dispatched to Budapest and via Switzerland to the free world."[229]
Paragraph

After the Battle of Stalingrad and other reversals in the increasingly unpopular war in the east, Slovak politicians realized that a German defeat was likely.

  • "Viele Slowaken standen der Kriegsbeteiligung ihresStaates skeptisch gegenüber, und die sich seit 1943 abzeichnende deutsche Niederlageverstärkte diese Haltung."[128]
  • "The refusal of the Slovakian government to comply with German demands has much to do with the change of political climate that had occurred in Slovakia since early in 1942, but increasingly since early 1943 , with the defeat at Stalingrad. The deportations had encountered opposition among influential circles of the Slovakian population, and that attitude of opposition became more marked after details of the fate of the deportees leaked out and, with the Red Army’s advance towards the national border, it became increasingly likely that this blatant crime would be punished."[230]

Some HSĽS politicians (especially those in the radical faction) blamed economic setbacks on the Jews and agitated for the deportation of the remaining population.[231] On 7 February 1943, HSĽS radical Alexander Mach announced at a rally in Ružomberok that the transports would soon resume.[232] In early 1943, the Hlinka Guard and Vašek's department prepared for the resumption of deportations: registering Jews, canceling economic exemptions, and hunting down Jews in hiding.

A plan to dispatch four trains between 18 and 22 April was not implemented.

In response to the threatened resumption, Slovak bishops issued a pastoral letter in Latin on 8 March condemning the plan and defending the rights of all Jews.

  • "Slovak bishops now spoke out forcefully and unambiguously in a pastoral letter of 8 March 1943, saying "[With] resolve we must raise our determined and warning voices against these measures." They went on, asserting "Our attitude towards human beings must not be influenced by their linguistic, state, national, or racial affiliation." Collective punishment of a "racial minority" violates legality and divine law... Two weeks later the pastoral letter was read out in all churches in Slovakia."[235]
  • "Most significantly, in March 1943, the Slovak bishops condemned deportations in a pastoral letter.... The bishops equated deportation with collective guilt, which they condemned as violating the state constitution, natural law, and church teachings." (236) "The reading of the letter (which happened in Latin) did not stir mass action on behalf of Jews." (238)[236]

Germany put increasing pressure on the Slovak State to hand over its remaining Jews in 1943 and 1944, but Slovak politicians did not agree to resume the deportations.[237]

Paragraph

In late 1943, leading army officers and intelligentsia formed the Slovak National Council to plan an insurrection against the regime;[238] other anti-fascists retreated to the Carpathian mountains and formed partisan groups.

  • "Schon 1943 hatte der SD über zunehmende Partisanenaktivitäten in der Slowakei berichtet. Diese verstärkten sich im Sommer 1944 und erreichten im August ihren Höhepunkt."[239]

Preparations for the uprising evoked mixed feelings in the remaining Slovak Jews, who feared that an uprising would bring about a crackdown on their community.[240] Underground movements formed at Sereď[241] and Nováky.[242]

  • "In Nováky und in geringerem Maße auch in Sered hatten sich Widerstands-gruppen von Mitgliedern der Haschomer Hazair und jungen Kommunistengebildet, diemit illegalen Gruppen der Kommunistischen Partei in Verbindung standen."[243]

Slovak authorities began to re-register Jews in January 1944, prompting some to flee to Hungary.[244] On 19 March 1944 Germany invaded Hungary, including Carpathian Ruthenia and the areas ceded by Slovakia in 1938.[245][246] The Slovak ambassador in Budapest, Ján Spišiak, issued documents to 3,000 Jews allowing them to legally cross the border,

  • "Der slowakische Gesandte in Budapest, Ján Spišiak, stellte Schutzbriefe undReisepässe aus, mit denen etwa 3000 Juden offiziell wieder von Ungarn in die Slowakeieinreisen konnten."[239]

bringing the total Jewish population to 25,000.[240] Between 14 May and 7 July 437,000 Jews were deported from Hungary, most to Auschwitz;

  • "By the time the deportations were halted in early July, a total of 437,000 people had been deported from the five zones [of Hungary], almost exclusively to Auschwitz."[247]

including many Slovak Jews living in Hungary.

  • "Viele slowakische Juden wurden von Ungarnaus nach Auschwitz deportiert,"[239]

To counter the perceived security threat of Jews in the Šariš-Zemplín region with the front line moving westward, on 15 May 1944 the Slovak government ordered Jews to move to the western part of the country.[248]

1944

[edit]

German invasion

[edit]

Concerned about the increase in resistance, Germany invaded Slovakia; this precipitated the Slovak National Uprising, which broke out on 29 August 1944.

  • "On August 29, 1944, the landscape in Slovakia changed dramatically when the first German units crossed Slovakia’s borders. What came to be referred to as the Slovak National Uprising (Slovenské národné povstanie, SNP) to resist the German occupation and overthrow the Tiso government began under the command of the Banská Bystrica- based Military Center."[249]
  • "Ilegální Vojenské ústředí vyhlásilo 29. srpna 1944 povstání proti německým okupantům a slovenským kolaborantům, s cílem obnovení Československé republiky a svržení Tisovy vlády. Postupně bylo mobilizováno až šedesát tisíc mužů, kteří bojovali v řadách 1. Československé armády po boku asi osmnácti tisíc partyzánů proti přibližně padesáti tisícům Němců. Podnětem pro vyhlášení povstání se stalo obsazování území Slovenska německými jednotkami, jejichž úkolem bylo opětovné nastolení pořádku a klidu v „ochraňovaném státě“."[250]
  • "Disappointed with the government’s inability to suppress the increasing partisan activities, on August 29, 1944, the Wehrmacht entered the western borders of Slovakia and triggered an armed rebellion."[251]

The insurgent forces seized central Slovakia but were crushed by the end of October, after which partisan forces withdrew to the mountains around Banská Bystrica.

  • "For a time, the Slovak rebels controlled central Slovakia, including Bánovce. In Banská Bystrica, the Slovak National Council declared itself the government of Slovakia within Czecho-Slovakia. Uprising broadcasts called on Slovaks not only to battle “the advancing German army” but also “its traitorous domestic assistants.” 25 By October, Golian had sixty thousand soldiers supported by eighteen thousand partisans. The uprising’s prospects, however, were dim. The conspirators never gained the crucial eastern Slovak divisions. German troops quickly disarmed about half of these soldiers, also shipping thousands of them to the Reich to labor. A Soviet and Czechoslovak offensive to break through from the northeast bogged down in the mountains. Neither the Western Allies nor the Soviets airlifted the rebels more than modest supplies and reinforcements. (249–250)... The Germans defeated the rebel army, now commanded by General Rudolf Viest, in October 1944. Even though hopelessly outgunned, Viest refused to surrender. He and his remaining troops withdrew into the mountains around Banská Bystrica. By this time, the Germans had killed perhaps four thousand rebels."[252]
  • "The First Czechoslovak Army in Slovakia, under the command of General Ján Golian, succeeded later by General Rudolf Viest, fought against better equipped and trained German units (and their Slovak collaborators) until October 27, 1944. On that day, the center of the uprising, Banská Bystrica, fell. Insurgents retreated into the mountains and carried out a guerilla campaign; this combat continued until the liberation of Slovakia in 1945."[249]

A new government was sworn in, with Jozef Tiso's cousin Štefan as prime minister; Jozef remained president.

  • "Am 5. September 1944 wurde die Regierung neu gebildet, die jetzt ein Cousin Jozef Tisos, Štefan Tiso, führte. Die Eigenstaatlichkeit der Slowakei blieb formal gewahrt."[253]
  • "The revolt forced an overdue change in government. Tuka was an invalid. Slovak radicals pushed to sack not only conservatives but also the “sellout” Mach. Stano and Medrický wanted to resign, the latter arguing that otherwise the government would “be sullied by the crudeness and inhumanity of war, which the insurgents brought to Slovakia.” 19 Tiso let Stano, Sivák, and Fritz go, but he insisted that Medrický, Mach, and others man their posts. “Everyone sees,” he reportedly told Medrický, “that [war] is really here and that, because of this unfortunate turn, we . . . don’t have full sovereignty. But if it’s possible to protect something, it’s our duty to do so. We must also maintain statehood.” 20 Tiso pushed Tuka’s (and Fritz’s) portfolios on his cousin, the jurist Štefan Tiso. Štefan Haššík, a noted loyalist of the president, replaced Čatloš."[254]

Burzio met with Tiso on 22 and 29 September, reportedly calling Tiso a liar when the president denied knowledge of deportations.

  • "When Tiso claimed no knowledge of plans for deportation, Burzio reportedly called him a liar. Insulted, Tiso pounded his desk and, “almost shouting,” threw the chargé d’affaires out of his office. 34 Burzio returned a few days later, hoping to squeeze out a measure “at least for the baptized.” But, as he reported to Rome, “I did not encounter any understanding . . . or even a word of compassion for the persecuted. Tiso sees in Jews the cause of everything bad and he defends the measures of the Germans as compelled by the highest military interests.”" (dates are in the footnotes)[255]
  • "Der vatikanische Geschäftsträger in Bratislava, Giuseppe Burzio, berichtet am 6. Oktober 1944 über die Interventionen, die er vor Ort unternommen habe. Am 22. September habe er bei der slowakischen Regierung interveniert, am 24. und 29. September beim Staatspräsidenten. In seinem Bericht an das Staatssekretariat beklagte er, dass er bei Tiso „kein Verständnis und kein einziges Wort des Mitgefühls mit den Verfolgten gefunden habe, da dieser in den Juden die Ursache alles Schlechten sieht und die Maßnahmen der Deutschen gegen die Juden, die durch die höchsten Kriegsinteressen diktiert werden, verteidige" ."[256]

Pius XII sent a private message to Tiso condemning the persecution of individuals for their race or nationality.

  • "Der Papst ermächtigte Burzio Ende Oktober 1944, Tiso mitzuteilen, er sei „tief betrübt“ über die Qualen der wegen ihrer Nationalität, Religion oder Rasse leidenden Menschen."[257]
  • "Ende Oktober 1944 beauftragte der Vatikan Burzio, Tiso mitzuteilen, dass der Heilige Vater zutiefst betrübt sei angesichts der Qual der vielen Menschen, die wegen ihrer Nationalität oder ihrer Rasse zu leiden hätten, was menschlichen Prinzipien und der Gerechtigkeit widerspreche. Der Heilige Vater fordere ihn auf, seine Gefühle und Absichten an seiner Ehre und seinem Gewissen als Priester zu messen."[256]
  • "Am 3.Oktober, nach der Wiederaufnahme der Deportationen, telegraphierte der Vertreter des Vatikans in Washington seinem Staatsekretariat: „Die hiesige Regierung ersuchte mich vor kurzem, dem Präsidenten Tiso zur Kenntnis zu bringen, daß sie die Geschehnisse verfolgt und seinen Anteil und den seiner Helfer bei der Durchführung der Aussiedlungen und der Verfolgung der Angehörigen der jüdischen Rasse nicht vergessen wird." Tardini hat den Inhalt des Telegramms am 6. Oktober an Burzio mit dem Vorschlag weitergeleitet, er solle die Angelegenheit, wenn es ihm richtig und nützlich erscheine, den verantwortlichen Stellen vorlegen."[258]

The United States and Switzerland issued formal protests against the deportation of Jews.[259]

  • "Weitere Proteste kamen aus der Schweiz. Am 24. Oktober übermittelte das schweizerische Generalkonsulat dem slowakischen Außenministerium folgendes Schreiben: ,,Im Auftrage des schweizerischen Bundesrats gibt sich das schweizerische Generalkonsulat die Ehre, der slowakischen Regierung zur Kenntnis zu bringen, daß die Nachrichten über die in der Slowakei von neuem in die Wege geleitete Verfolgung der jüdischen Bevölkerung in der schweizerischen Öffentlichkeit größte Beunruhigung hervorgerufen haben. Der schweizerische Bundesrat gibt der Befürchtung Ausdruck, daß diese Maßnahmen eine schwerwiegende Belastung in den gegenseitigen Beziehungen der beiden Länder zur Folge haben könnten.""[256]
  • "Auch das Außenministerium der Vereinigten Staaten bat um Intervention des Heiligen Stuhls, um die Deportation der slowakischen Juden zu verhindern."[260]

Slovak propaganda blamed the Jews and Czechs for the uprising,

  • "According to official propaganda, the armed rebellion was the work of the Czechs and the Jews. Consequently, the hate campaign against members of these communities was intensified. The daily Slovák, for example, the official newspaper of the state party, claimed that “A Jew remains a Jew even if he is hanged; he will never change and we have every reason to look upon the Jew as the saboteur of the nation.”60 In a similar tone, the Slovák explained that the Uprising started when the “Czechs and Jews joined the wealthy Slovaks, bolshevik partisans, to help them enslave the Slovak nation.”'[261]
  • "In Slovakia, this threat [of Jews] was accentuated with the outbreak of the Slovak National Uprising, which was dismissed as the work of Jewish and Czech (that is, non-Slovak) elements."[262]
  • "Sie bewertete den Aufstand als ein Werk von „russischen Fallschirmspringern", Tschechen und insbesondere Juden, die mit Unterstützung von „bolschewistischen Banden" die Slowakei erobern und sich an allen guten Slowaken bzw. Christen würden rächen wollen. 161 In der Presse gab es wieder eine starke antisemitische Propaganda, der nach ein paar Tagen neue antijüdische Verfügungen der Regierung folgten."[263]

The Slovak government preferred the concentration of Jews in concentration camps in Slovakia to their deportation.

  • "Dennoch zeigte sich letztere anfangs nicht vorbehaltlos willig, die Deportationen aus der Slowakei wieder aufzunehmen. In ihrem Interesse war vielmehr die Konzentration von Juden in Arbeitslagern auf slowakischem Gebiet, wo man sie isolieren, bewachen und sich ihre Arbeitskraft zunutze machen wollte."[263]

Tiso asked for the Germans to spare at least baptized Jews and those in mixed marriages, but the Slovak exceptions were not honored by the Germans.

  • "During the conflict with Himmler over the verbal note, however, Tiso indeed asked that exemptions be made for baptized Jews and spouses in mixed marriages. Himmler rejected the request “purely for security and pacification reasons,” giving threadbare assurances that the Jews would be treated well. According to Höfle, Tiso “answered in perhaps this sense, that it was not possible to change anything if they supposedly behaved thus.” 36 To be sure, Tiso had little influence over these deportations, as the Germans even ignored his [presidential] exemptions. He now cancelled many of them, later claiming that he hoped thus to restore the dispensation’s credibility. But he was also driven by anger over Jewish participation in the uprising, especially by exemption holders."[255]
Paragraph

The uprising provided the Germans with an opportunity to implement the Final Solution in Slovakia.

  • "Der Ende August 1944 ausgebrochene Aufstand wurde zum Anlass genommen, die „Endlösung der Judenfrage" in der Slowakei zum Abschluss zu bringen."[264]

Anti-Jewish actions were nominally controlled by the Slovak State Ministry of Defense, but in practice the Germans dictated policy.

  • "Für die „Lösung der Judenfrage“ war nun formal das slowakische Verteidigungsministerium verantwortlich, tatsächlich lag sie vollständig in deutscher Hand."[253]
  • "Bei alledem, trotz der Ernennung eines neuen Ver­teidigungsministers und der bereits erwähnten Maßnahmen, ging die absolute Zustän­ digkeit in Judenangelegenheiten an die Deutschen über."[265]

Unlike the deportations of 1942, the roundups of Jews were organized and carried out by German forces.

  • "Im Unterschied zu den Deportationen von 1942 wurde dieses Mal die Aktion von Anfang an fast ausschließlich von deutschen Stellen organisiert und durchgeführt." [264]

Einsatzgruppe H, commanded by SS officer Josef Witiska [de; fr; sv], was formed to suppress the uprising immediately after it began and round up Jews and Romani people.

  • "Další v pořadí podle abecedy – Einsatzgruppe H – byla vytvořena po vypuknutí povstání na Slovensku a vyslána s rozličnými úkoly na jeho území."[266] "Již dva dny po vypuknutí povstání, na schůzi za účasti velitele Einsatzgruppe H Josefa Witisky"[267]
  • "Gleichzeitig mit der Invasion der deutschen Armee in die Slowakei erschien auch die Einsatzgruppe der Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo) und des Sicherheitsdienstes (SD) unter dem Befehl des SS-Obersturmbannführers Dr. Joseph Witiska."[265]

Aided by local collaborators including SS-Heimatschutz (HS), Freiwilige Schutzstaffel, and the Hlinka Guard Emergency Divisions (POHG),

  • "Da das Militär wegen Illoyalität und teilweisem Anschluß an den Aufstand entwaffnet wurde, wurden im Rahmen der „Hlinka-Garde", die den Deutschen gegenüber Loyalität bewies, bewaffnete Stoßtruppen (Pohotovostně Oddiele Hlinkovej Gardy- POHG) gebildet. Parallel hierzu errichtete die Volksdeutsche Minderheit, laut Befehl des Kommandanten der deutschen Okkupationskräfte vom 2. September, Einheiten „zum Schutze der Heimat" (HS-Heimatschutz)."[265]
  • "Pod velením EG H, resp. v koordinaci s ní, byly pak do akcí proti partyzánům i civilnímu obyvatelstvu nasazeny i POHG, jednotky Heimatschutzu, FS (Freiwillige Schutzstaffel - polovojenského křídla oficiální menšinové strany Deutsche Partei a lokální „filiálky“ SS) aj. zvláštní teroristické a diverzní útvary jako Stíhací zväz Slovenska (krycí jméno „Josef“),108 218. skupina abwehru („Edelweiss“),109 pohotovostní komanda SD vytvořená z maďarských Šípových křížů a jednotky vyčleněné z bojové skupiny SS „Schill“, trestné jednotky SS „Dirlewanger“ a 18. divize Zbraní SS „Horst Wessel“, pracovníků ÚŠB aj"[268]

The success of Einsatzgruppe H was largely due to denunciations and the cooperation of the POHG and the HS,

  • See below[269]
  • "The arrest and deportation of Jews could not have been carried out without Slovak auxiliaries, especially from the Hlinka Guard Emergency Units (POHG)."[270]
  • "Beide Formationen zählten zu den treuesten Helfern der Deutschen bei der Enttarnung von Partisanen und ihren Hel­fern, ganz besonders von Juden, die in der Slowakei oder an verschiedenen Konzentra­tionspunkten exekutiert wurden."[265]

who could impersonate partisans due to their local knowledge and ability to speak Slovak. Collaborators aided with interrogations and searched houses for Jews in hiding.

  • "Nejochotnější a nejspolehlivější pomocníci Einsatzgruppe H se rekrutovali především z řad Pohotovostních oddílů Hlinkovy gardy a také německé domobrany. Tyto dvě ozbrojené složky byly vytvořeny záhy po vypuknutí povstání a jejich členové se s pomocí svých jazykových a místních znalostí s různou motivací podíleli na zatýkání, deportacích a v mnoha případech i na přímé likvidaci spoluobčanů. Je zcela zřejmé, že by Einsatzgruppe H bez pomoci místních aktivistů nikdy nedosáhla takových výsledků, jakými se mohla nakonec po sedmi měsících své činnosti prokázat. A je s podivem, kolik kolaborantů i v těchto posledních měsících války dokázala na Slovensku pro své zločinné konání získat. Místní občané se přímo podíleli na několika masových vraždách, byli využíváni jako tlumočníci u výslechů, sami nezřídka výslechy brutálním způsobem vedli, pátrali po úkrytech Židů, prováděli domovní prohlídky, v převleku se vydávali k partyzánům na výzvědy a působili jako udavači."[269]
Para

After the uprising was proclaimed, thousands of Jews fled to the mountainous interior and partisan-controlled areas around Banská Bystrica.

  • "Noch an diesem Abend wurde in Banská Bystrica, der Bezirkshauptstadt, die von den Aufständischen beherrscht war, der Nationalaufstand ausgerufen. Sobald sich die Nachricht verbreitete, strömten die Juden mit ihren Familien in das befreite Gebiet in der Mittelslowakei. An die 5000 Personen hatten sich in die Stadt der Aufständischen aufgemacht. Es ist nur natürlich, daß ein so großer Zustrom von Menschen in einer 13 000 Einwohner zählenden Kleinstadt auf keine allzu sympathische Gastfreundschaft stieß."[271]
  • "viele Juden versuchten, in das Kerngebiet des Widerstands um Banská Bystrica zu gelangen... Die Menschen versuchten sich zu verstecken, um der Jagd der deutschen und slowakischen Häscher zu entkommen. Viele flohen in die Berge der Tatra, wo sie so sehr unter Hunger und Kälte litten, dass etliche die Gefangennahme riskierten und zurück in die Dörfer gingen." [272]

Guards at the labor camps fled during the uprising; the young and fit joined the uprising and many families also fled towards the interior.

  • "Als die Deutschen in die Slowakei eindrangen, wurden die Lagertore von der Gendarmerie sperrangelweit geöffnet. Jetzt standen die „Befreiten" vor einem großen Dilemma: Wohin sollten sie sich wenden? Ein Teil - abgesehen von den Jugendlichen, die sich dem bewaffneten Aufstand anschlössen - strömte in die von Aufständischen beherrschten Gebiete und ganz besonders in die Hauptstadt des Aufstands, Banská Bystrica (andere Städte gingen schnell in den Herrschaftsbereich der Deutschen über). Andere hingegen suchten Zufluchtsstätten auf, welche sie sich beizeiten vorbereitet hatten, oder sie begannen erst jetzt, in bedrängter Lage, solche zu suchen. Es gab auch Personen, die verwirrt und verstört in den Lagern zurückblie­ ben, nachdem sie keine Mittel zur Rettung besaßen."[273]

Around 1,600 to 2,000 Jews fought as partisans, ten percent of the total insurgent force.

  • says ten percent of 16,000 fighters[274]
  • Etwa 60 000 Soldaten der slowakischen Armee und 18 000 Partisanen, darunterungefähr 2000 Juden, beteiligten sich an den Kämpfen." [239]

some Jewish fighters hid their identity due to antisemitism in the partisan movement.

  • "Auch unter den Partisanen gab es Kämpfer, die wegen antise­mitischer Erscheinungen ihre jüdische Identität verheimlichten."[275]

Although anti-Jewish legislation in the liberated areas was canceled by the Slovak National Council,

  • "Die antijüdische Gesetzgebung war in den durch die Aufständischen befreiten Gebieten vom 1943 illegal gegründeten Nationalrat, dem Zentralorgan des slowakischen Widerstands, für ungültig erklärt worden" [239]
  • "During the deportations in 1944/1945, around 10,000 Jews were able to survive in the Slovak Republic through the assistance and protection of ethnic Slovaks, even though their helpers now had to fear the death penalty."[276]
  • "Obwohl auf das Verstecken von Juden nun die Todesstrafe stand, halfen 1944/45 mehr Slowaken den Bedrängten als noch 1942."[277]

The attitude of the local population varied; some risked their lives to hide Jews, and others turned them in to the police.

  • "Někteří místní obyvatelé je podporovali a například jim dodávali zásoby, jiní ovšem prozrazovali jejich úkryty německým jednotkám a po-díleli se i osobně na jejich zatýkání."[278]

The majority of rescuers provided help for a fee—not least because they were not wealthy enough to support additional people—although there were also cases of selfless rescues.[257][279]

  • "Jews often paid their protectors, especially in the winter of 1944/1945. Because of their poverty, many Slovaks would not have been able to support additional people and therefore concealed Jews needed to contribute to the cost of food."[279]

Many Jews spent six to eight months in makeshift shelters or bunkers in the mountains,

  • "Mnozí Židé již navíc tušili, co by je potkalo, pokud by padli do německých rukou. Rozhodli se proto neuposlechnout německé výzvy a rozkazy, opouštěli své domovy a odcházeli do hor, kde přebývali v různých bunkrech a skrýších ve snaze přečkat do konce války."[278]

while others hid in the houses of non-Jews. Regardless, Jews going into hiding required money for six to eight months of living expenses and non-Jews willing to provide assistance. Jews who hid in the mountains over the winter of 1944–1945 faced a wait for liberation, and often a choice between starvation and surrender.

  • "Man mußte einen vertrauenswürdigen NichtJuden finden, der bereit war, ein Risiko auf sich zu nehmen. Es fehlte an finanziellen Mitteln; und vielfach gab es Greise, Kranke oder Säuglinge in der Familie, mit denen man nicht so einfach untertauchen konnte. Auch die Illusion, daß es gar nicht so schlimm kommen würde, spielte eine Rolle. Andererseits fügten sich viele - nach mißlungenen Fluchtversuchen - in ihr Schicksal. Der Bau eines eigenen Unterschlupfs war außer den technischen Schwierigkeiten auch mit dem Problem ver­bunden, daß man für eine zuverlässige Verpflegung auf die Bewohner der nächst­liegenden Dörfer angewiesen war... Wer die Berichte jener Überlebenden gelesen hat, die sich während des harten Win­ters in den verschneiten Bergen versteckten und mangels Proviant oft vor der Ent­scheidung standen, entweder Hungers zu sterben oder sich den Behörden zu stellen, kann verstehen, wie schwer es war, eine solche Entscheidung zu treffen, um so mehr, wenn es um kinderreiche Familien, Kranke und Greise ging... Im „großen und ganzen" befanden sich diese Flüchtlinge nicht länger als sechs bis acht Monate in ihren Verstecken, aber diese Zeit war schwer und nervenzer­ mürbend. Die Lage derjenigen, die Unterschlupf in Häusern von NichtJuden fanden und deren Finanzmittel bis Kriegsende reichten, war etwas besser. Abgesehen von der sie ständig begleitenden Angst, hatten diejenigen Juden das bessere Los gezogen, die dank glücklicher Umstände an den unterschiedlichsten Orten, wo man sie nicht kannte, mit gefälschten arischen Dokumenten untertauchten."[280]

and other Jews in shelters had to turn themselves in later in the winter.

Living openly and continuing to work under false papers was typically only possible in Bratislava.

  • see above[281]
  • "Většinou se s pomocí jedné či několika „árijských“ osob ukrývali v některém bytě či domě, případně ve městě žili a pracovali na základě „árijských“ dokladů. Takový život s falešnou identitou spojený se snahou o splynutí s anonymním davem byl mimo hlavní město těžko představitelný."[282]

Roundups

[edit]

Most Jews who were captured were arrested by Einsatzgruppe H and briefly imprisoned at local prisons or the Einsatzgruppe H office in Bratislava, from which they were sent to Sereď for deportation. Local authorities provided lists of Jews, and many local residents also denounced Jews.

  • 1st sentence: "Zatčení Židé byli zpravidla nejdříve dopraveni do nejbližšího vězení, respektive na úřadovnu Einsatzgruppe H, kde byli buď vyslýcháni nebo byli odsud rovnou převezeni do koncentračního tábora v Seredi."[278]
  • "Zatčení podle výpovědí zpravidla prováděly německé, jen v některých případech slovenské orgány."[282]
  • "Značná část pamětníků zmiňuje, že byli zatčeni na základě udání místních obyvatel - většinou Slováků a v některých případech Němců, někdy však i jiných osob židovského původu."[282]
  • "Die Verhaftung der Juden wurde in der Regel von den Angehörigen der Einsatzgruppe H vollzogen, häufig mit Unterstützung von Slowaken oder Volksdeutschen. Hierauf folgte zunächst die Verbringung der Festgenommenen in das nächste Gefängnis, das zumeist zu diesem Zweck der Einsatzgruppe H von slowakischen Stellen zur Verfügung gestellt werden musste."[283]
  • Local authorities + denunciation: "Zatýkání probíhalo často na základě seznamů, které připravovaly místní úřady, a také v důsledku udání."[278]

In the first half of September there were large-scale raids in Topoľčany (3 September), Trenčín, and Nitra (7 September), during which 616 Jews were arrested and imprisoned in Ilava and Sereď.

  • "Schon am 3. September machte das Einsatzkommando 14 in Topoľčany Jagd auf versteckte Juden... [253]
  • "Größere Razzien mit zahlreichen verhafteten Juden gab es in den ersten Septembertagen insbesondere in Topol'cany und Trencin, wo die Einsatzkommandos vorläufig ihre Stäbe errichtet hatten. Am 7. September fanden Festnahmen in Nitra statt, zu denen nähere Erkenntnisse vorliegen. Die Aktion soll mit acht Gruppen zu je drei Mann, nämlich einem Gendarmen, einem Hlinkagardisten und einem Angehörigen des Stützpunktes des Einsatzkommandos 13 in Nitra durchgeführt worden sein. / Es wurden 616 Juden festgenommen und in die Lager in Ilava (234) und Sered (382) überführt."[284]

In Žilina, Einsatzgruppe 13 and collaborators arrested hundreds of Jews over the night of 13/14 September. The victims were deported to Sereď or Ilava and thence to Auschwitz, where most were murdered.

  • Einsatzkommando 13: "Einige Tage später erfolgte eine ähnliche Aktion gegen Juden in Zilina, wo es einen weiteren Stützpunkt des Einsatzkommandos 13 gab." Collaboration: "Die Zusammenfassung der Juden habe die Staatspolizei unter Mitwirkung der deutschen Polizei und der Hlinkagarde vorzunehmen und zwar in der Bürgerschule, von wo die Festgenommenen durch die deutsche Polizei abtransportiert würden. "[285]
  • Am 13./14. September führte das Einsatzkommando 13 in Žilina Razzien durch, verhaftete Hunderte Juden und transportierte sie zunächst nach Sered bzw. Ilava, von dort zumeist nach Auschwitz; nur wenigevon ihnen überlebten.[253]

The United States embassy organized protection for some 300 Jews with foreign citizenship, housing them in a castle in Marianka. Brunner raided the castle on 11 October; all but three of the prisoners were taken to Sereď and deported to Auschwitz on 17 October.

  • "Damals initiierten amerikanische Bürger eine Petition an das slowakische Außenmini­sterium und verlangten Schutz vor der Deportation. Das Außenministerium sagte unter der Bedingung zu, daß die Betroffenen zu ihrem eigenen Schutz an einem Ort konzentriert werden müßten, und die Bittsteller waren einverstanden. Sie wurden in einem eigens angemieteten Schloß, in Marianka bei Bratislava, zusammengeführt, wobei alle Auslagen von den Insassen getragen wurden. Später wurde es auch Besit ­zern von südamerikanischen oder anderen Pässen erlaubt, sich ihnen anzuschließen. Aber nicht für lange. Ihre Immunität war kein Hindernis für Brunner. Anfang Okto­ber überfiel er mit seinen mit Maschinenpistolen bewaffneten Horden das Schloß, nahm die Bewohner gefangen, und an die 300 Personen (in den erwähnten Dokumen­ten ist von 400 die Rede) marschierten zu Fuß zum Bahnhof in Stupava, von wo sie mit einem Militärzug nach Sered transportiert wurden. Sie wurden am 17. Oktober zusammen mit Gisi Fleischmann nach Auschwitz deportiert. "[286]
  • [287]

Einsatzgruppe H reported that some Jews were able to escape because of insufficient personnel, but that both Germans and Slovaks generally supported the roundups and helped track down evaders.

  • "Zur Stimmung der Bevölkerung in Bratislava notierte er, dass in volksdeutschen Kreisen und bei der Hlinkagarde die Aktion begeisterte Zustimmung gefunden habe. Auch breite slowakische Schichten würden positiv zu ihr stehen; aus loyal eingestellten Regierungskreisen seien ebenfalls zustimmende Äußerungen erfasst worden. Lediglich die tschechoslowakische Intelligenz und Wirtschaftskreise sowie ausgesprochene Judenfreunde würden die Aktion ablehnen."[288] "Häufig wurden in den Berichten die Mitwirkung von einheimischen Stellen und die allgemeine Zustimmung der slowakischen Bevölkerung zu den Festnahmen herausgestellt und unterstrichen... Man beschwerte sich über den Mangel an Mannschaften, weshalb es manchen Juden gelungen sei, sich der Festnahme durch Flucht zu entziehen. Dennoch war man überzeugt, dass die Festnahme auch dieser Juden im Laufe der Zeit möglich sein wird, da „Bevölkerung, Hlinka-Garde und slowakische Gendarmerie aufgefordert wurden, Nachforschungen anzustellen und der hiesigen Dienststelle im Erfolgsfalle Mitteilung zu machen. Darüberhinaus werden bei allen Aktionen des Kommandos die Ortschaften nach versteckten Juden überholt. Die Mitarbeit der Hlinka-Garde war überall sehr gut."[288]

After the defeat of the uprising, the German forces also hunted the Jews hiding in the mountains.

  • "Jiní bývalí vězni byli polapeni v lesích, kam přešli - někdy spolu s partyzánskými jednotkami - po porážce SNP. Značná část pamětníků zmiňuje, že byli zatčeni na základě udání místních obyvatel - většinou Slováků a v některých případech Němců, někdy však i jiných osob židovského původu. "[282]
  • "Das Leben auf der Flucht im Winter im Hochgebirge, mit der ständigen Angst entdeckt zu werden, war gewiss nicht leicht.... Es scheint in der Tat so gewesen zu sein, dass die Festnahmen von Juden häufig auf Grund von Denunziationen erfolgten. Urheber solcher Angaben war zumeist die einheimische Bevölkerung."[289]

Although the bulk of arrests occurred during the first two months of occupation, the hunt for the Jews continued until 30 March 1945, when a Jewish prisoner was taken to Sereď just three days before the camp was liberated.

  • "Von Anfang September 1944 bis Ende März 1945 wurden fortlaufend Häftlinge nach Sered gebracht. Die meisten von ihnen gelangten nach den größeren Razzien in den ersten zwei Monaten nach der Besetzung der Slowakei durch deutsche Truppen in das Lager,.. Der letzte Häftling wurde am 30. März 1945 und somit drei Tage vor der Befreiung des Lagers durch die Rote Armee eingetragen."[290]
  • "... který byl do tábora dopraven 30. března 1945, tedy tři dny před osvobozením Seredě a jeden den před vypravením posledního transportu."[278]
Paragraph

In Bratislava, some Jews were arrested by 20 September. However, the largest roundup was carried out in Bratislava during the night of 28/29 September by Einsatzkommando 29, aided by 600 HS and POHG collaborators and a Luftwaffe unit that guarded the streets: around 1,600 Jews were arrested and taken to Sereď.

  • "Die größte Razzia gegen Juden wurde Ende September 1944 in der slowakischen Hauptstadt durchgeführt. Der Chef der Einsatzgruppe H berichtete am 20. September über die dort bereits erfolgten Festnahmen und erwähnte hierbei, dass noch größere Aktionen geplant seien. Die umfassendste fand in der Nacht zum 29. September statt, als ungefähr 1600 Juden festgesetzt wurden. Witiska meldete noch am selben Tag dem RSHA: ,,Die Judenaktion erfolgte auf Anordnung der hiesigen Abteilung IV. Es wurden dazu 600 Mann des Heimatschutzes und der HG genommen, 185 eine Kompanie Luftwaffe wurde zu Strassensperren eingesetzt. Reichsdeutsche Stellen traten also der Öffentlichkeit nur gering in Erscheinung. Das Durchgehen des Judenviertels ergab 1000 Festnahmen. Durch Einzelaktionen wurden prominente und auch getaufte Juden zusätzlich festgenommen. Zahl der Festnahmen insgesamt 1600. Die Juden werden heute nach Sered überstellt, und von dort ins KL Auschwitz weitergeleitet.""[284]
  • Luftwaffe: [270]
  • "V noci z 28. na 29. září 1944 proběhla v režii SK ZbV 29 razie na Židy v Bratislavě.152 Do akce bylo zapojeno 600 příslušníků Heimatschutzu a POHG; v židovské čtvrti bylo zajištěno na tisíc osob, celkem 1 600 lidí (včetně pokřtěných Židů, zatýkaných individuálně po celém hlavním městě) bylo pak téhož večera deportováno do Seredi."[291]

The one to two thousand Jews left in Bratislava were ordered to turn themselves in on 20 November or face imprisonment, but few did so.

  • "Das Notariatsamt rief im Auftrag des slowakischen Verteidigungsministeriums die in der Hauptstadt lebenden Juden auf, sich zwecks Abtransports nach Sered zu melden. In einer Bekanntmachung vom 16. November wurde angeordnet, dass sie sich „aus Rücksichten der öffentlichen Sicherheit" unabhängig von ihrer Staatsangehörigkeit, Beschäftigung und der „wie immer gearteten Bescheinigung slowakischer oder deutscher Amtsstellen oder Organe und ohne Rücksicht auf Alter und Geschlecht, am 20. November 1944, morgens 8 Uhr im Hofe des alten Rathauses am Primatial-Platz"... "Das gewünschte Ergebnis der Meldeaktion blieb jedoch aus; nur eine geringe Zahl von Juden in Bratislava folgte dem Aufruf und meldete sich. Der Chef des z.b.Y.-Kommandos 29, Sturmbannführer Franz Hoth, beschrieb am 23. November den Ausgang der Aktion wie folgt: ,,Von Sachkennern wird die Zahl der noch im Bereich der Stadt Pressburg anwesenden Juden auf tausend bis zweitausend geschätzt..."[292]

In mid-October, an office was established at the former Jewish Center to hunt down Jews in hiding, which tortured captured Jews into revealing the names and addresses of other Jews.

  • "Ähnlicher ,Vernehmungsmethoden' bediente man sich auch in der „Judensammelstelle", die bei Festnahmen von Juden eine wichtige Rolle spielte. Sie wurde Mitte Oktober 1944 in der Edelgasse in Bratislava eingerichtet, in jenem .,, Gebäude, in dem sich zuvor die mit Beginn des Aufstands aufgelöste „Judenzentrale" befunden hatte. Die Aufgabe der Sammelstelle bestand in der Suche nach versteckten Juden, ihrer Verhaftung und Überführung nach Sered."[283]
  • [293]

Half of the Jews arrested after 19 November were in Bratislava, most in hiding with false papers.[294] Henri Dunand of the Red Cross provided funding for a clandestine group led by Arnold Lazar, which provided money, food, and clothing to Jews in hiding in Bratislava.

  • "In Bratislava half eine kleine Gruppe junger Juden, angeführt von Arnold Lazar, den Versteckten mit Geld, Lebensmitteln und Kleidung. Der Delegierte des Internationalen Komitees vom Roten Kreuz, Henri Dunand, unterstützte diese Gruppe mit einem größeren Geldbetrag. Häufig wurde Hilfe nur gegen Bezahlung geleistet."[257]

Deportation

[edit]

Sereď concentration camp was the primary facility for interning Jews prior to their deportation. Although there were no transports until the end of September, the Jews experienced harsh treatment (including rape and murder) and severe overcrowding as the population swelled to 3,000 – more than twice the intended capacity.

  • "On September 12, 1944, the Einsatzgruppe H der Sipo und des SD, which established its headquarters in Bratislava, sent 33 members of the SS into the Sereď camp, which then became a detention and penal camp.19 During the next two weeks, units subordinated to Einsatzgruppe H, including the Slovak HG units and other security bodies, brought hundreds of Jews, whom they had arrested during their advance, into the Sereď camp. The camp became overcrowded with Jewish prisoners very soon, reaching a population of about 3,000 inmates.20 This was more than double the camp’s maximum capacity. During these two weeks Jews were not deported from Sereď, but numerous cases of harassment, rape, and murder occurred."[241]
  • "Bei diesen von Häckel erwähnten „freundschaftlichen Beziehungen" dürfte es sich vielmehr um Vergewaltigung der im Lager inhaftierten Jüdinnen durch ihre Bewacher gehandelt haben, wodurch sich die Betroffenen laut NS-Gesetzen der Rassenschande schuldig machten und demzufolge vor Gericht gestellt werden mussten. / Der September 1944, als Knollmayer das Lager leitete, galt als Vorbereitungszeit für die Deportationen. In dieser Phase gab es noch keine Transporte in die Vernichtungslager. Im Lager herrschte Improvisation und zum Teil vollkommene Willkür. / Die Angehörigen der Wachmannschaft folterten die Inhaftierten; in einigen Fällen kam es zu Erschießungen von Häftlingen... Die Lebensbedingungen in Sered waren für die meisten Häftlinge sehr hart."[295]

SS officer Alois Brunner, who had participated in the organization of transports of Jews from France and Greece,[296][297] took over the camp's administration at the end of September.

  • "Sometime at the the end of September 1944, one of Adolf Eichmann's trusted subordinates, SS-Haupsturmfuhrer Alois Brunner, came to Slovakia, took command of Sered, and organized the renewed deportations"[297]

About 11,700 people were deported on eleven transports;[241][297] the first five (from 30 September to 17 October) went to Auschwitz, where most of the victims were gassed. The final transport to Auschwitz, on 2 November, arrived after the gas chambers were shut down. Later transports left for Sachsenhausen, Bergen-Belsen, Ravensbrück, and Theresienstadt.

  • For list of transports: [298]
  • "In mindestens elf Transporten wurden zwischen dem 30. September 1944 und 31. März 1945 etwa 12 000 Juden zunächst – bis Anfang November 1944 – nach Auschwitz, später nach Theresienstadt, Sachsenhausen und Ravensbrück deportiert... Am 2. November stellte die SS die Morde in den Gaskammern in Birkenau ein, so dass der am Tag darauf eintreffende Transport aus Sered ohne Selektion in das Lager aufgenommen wurde."[277]
Paragraph

Two small transports left Čadca for Auschwitz on 1 and 5 September; Fatran estimates that the total number of deportees was about 400. In September and October, at least 131 people were deported from Slovakia via Zakopane; two of the transports ended at Kraków-Płaszów and the third at Auschwitz. A transport from Prešov, departing 26 November, ended up at Ravensbrück. According to a Czechoslovak criminal investigation, another 800 Jews were deported in two transports from eastern Slovakia on 16 October and 16 December. Details on the transports leaving from locations other than Sereď is fragmentary,

  • Cadca: "Im Kalendarium der „Hefte von Auschwitz" etwa werden am 1. und 5. September 1944 RSHA-Transporte mit Juden aus der slowakischen Stadt Cadca verzeichnet. 249 Laut Fatran seien aus Cadca ungefähr 400 Juden deportiert worden"
  • Zakopane: "Nach den Ermittlungen der Hamburger Staatsanwaltschaft Ende der 1960er Jahre seien von Anfang September bis Ende Oktober 1944 mindestens 131 Juden in drei Transporten über Zakopane deportiert worden, wobei die ersten zwei Transporte Plaszow bei Krakau und der letzte Auschwitz zum Ziel gehabt hätten."[299]
  • "Am 26. November ging ein Transport mit bis zu 1000 Häftlingen über Presov direkt nach Auschwitz; da aber inzwischen die Vergasungen eingestellt worden waren, sei der Transport nach einigen Stunden Aufenthalt an der Auschwitzer Rampe nach Ravensbrück weitergeleitet worden." Note: It is disputed if this transport actually went through Auschwitz, hence the wording.
  • "In einer Übersicht tschechoslowakischer Ermittler werden außer dem November-Transport noch zwei weitere große Transporte mit mindestens 800 Juden erwähnt, die am 16. Oktober und am 16. Dezember die Ostslowakei verlassen hätten. "
  • Fragmentary info: "Ein geringerer Teil der Deportierten wurde aber auch aus anderen Orten abtransportiert. Da bis heute genaue Erkenntnisse über diese Transporte fehlen bzw. sehr unterschiedlich oder lückenhaft sind, sollen hier nur ein paar kurze Hinweise aus verschiedenen Quellen, ohne Anspruch auf Vollständigkeit, erwähnt werden."

The exact number of Jews deported is not known.[264] Slovak historian Ivan Kamenec estimated that 13,500 Jews were deported, of whom 10,000 died,

  • "From the end of September 1944 to March 1945, 11 transports from the Sereď concentration camp and several transports from Prešov carried the remaining Jews out of Slovakia. Some were sent to Auschwitz, and others to Sachsenhausen, Ravensbrück, or Terezín. Approximately 13,500 people were deported." (citing Kamenec)[249]
  • [300][212]

but Israeli historian Gila Fatran and Czech historian Lenka Šindelářová consider that 14,150 deportees can be verified and the true figure may be higher.[264][275]

The Slovak regime also transferred several hundred political prisoners to German custody. Deported to Mauthausen concentration camp, many died there.

  • "Tiso also agreed to hand over several hundred Slovak political prisoners to the Gestapo, who shipped them mainly to Mauthausen... Many of the deportees, not surprisingly, were murdered."[301]

Massacres

[edit]

After the German invasion, about 4,000 people were murdered in Slovakia, mostly by Einsatzgruppe H, but with help from local collaborators. About half (2,000) of the victims were Jews; other victims included actual and suspected partisans and Romani people.

  • "Die meisten Aktionen wurden von der Einsatzgruppe H organisiert und häufig unter der Mitarbeit von Einheimischen durchgeführt. Zu den Opfern gehörten vor allem Juden, aber auch zahlreiche Roma sowie festgenommene Partisanen und Aufständische oder ihre Unterstützer. Ihre Schicksale verbanden sich in den letzten Kriegsmonaten und waren nicht mehr voneinander zu trennen; sie alle wurden nach dem Krieg Seite an Seite aus den vielen Massengräbern in der Slowakei exhumiert.... Vom September 1944 bis zum März 1945 wurden auf slowakischem Boden ungefähr 4000 Menschen ermordet. ... Rund die Hälfte von ihnen waren Juden. Beinahe 90 DörfeT und Gemeinden wurden niedergebrannt. 257 Verantwortlich für den Terror war in erster Linie die Einsatzgruppe H."[302]
  • "Mehr als 2000 Juden, aber auch Roma und Partisanen, wurden von den Einsatzkommandos auf slowakischem Boden ermordet."[277]
  • "During the subsequent occupation of Slovakia, the Germans, with Slovak assistance, deported some 12,000 more Jews. Perhaps another 2,000 [Jews] were murdered directly on Slovak territory."[303]

One of the first executions occurred in the Topoľčany district, where Einstazkommando 14 began its mass roundups of Jews. Many of the arrested Jews were taken to Sered for deportation, but 53 were shot in Nemčice on 11 September.

  • Das Einsatzkommando 14 zum Beispiel nahm kurz nach seiner Aufstellung seine Tätigkeit in Topol'cany auf, sodass es bereits im September 1944 in diesem Bezirk zu massenhaften Verhaftungen von Juden kam. Diese wurden zunächst im Gefängnis des Bezirksgerichts in Topol'cany zusammengefasst, von wo ein Teil später in das Konzentrationslager Sered gebracht wurde. Insgesamt 53 Juden, darunter 24 Frauen und elf Kinder, wurden jedoch am 11. September 1944 in die Gemeinde Nemcice überführt und dort in der Nähe auf dem Felde erschossen und in einem Massengrab begraben.[304]

The largest execution was in Kremnička, a small village 6 kilometres (3.7 mi) away from Banská Bystrica. Upon the capture of the rebel stronghold, Jews, partisans, Roma, and others arrested in the area were held in the prison in the town. Of these, 743 people were brought to Kremnička for execution in a series of massacres between November and March, by Einsatzgruppe H and the POHG. Victims included 280 women and 99 children; half were Jewish. Hundreds of people were murdered at the nearby village of Nemecká, where the victims' bodies were burned after they were shot.

  • "K největším masovým zločinům došlo v okolí obcí Kremnička, kde byly povražděny 743 osoby, a Nemecká, kde byly v lednu 1945 v tamní vápence zastřeleny nebo upáleny další stovky obětí."[269]
  • "Die größte Zahl der Ermordeten gab es in Kremnicka, einer Gemeinde ungefähr sechs Kilometer von Banska Bystrica entfernt. Nach der Besetzung von Banska Bystrica Ende Oktober 1944 wurde der Stab des Einsatzkommandos 14 in die Stadt verlegt sowie einer seiner Stützpunkte unter Führung des Obersturmführers Herbert Deffner errichtet. In das dortige Gefängnis des Bezirksgerichts wurden in den folgenden Tagen nach und nach alle in der Umgebung festgenommenen Personen (Juden, Roma, Partisanen und Aufständische) gebracht, wo man über ihr weiteres Schicksal entschied. Bereits am 5. November wurden die ersten Häftlinge zum Erschießungsort nach Kremnicka gefahren. Die Erschießungen liefen zumeist nach einem erprobten Schema ab. Als die Lastwagen anhielten, mussten die Häftlinge aussteigen und zu Fuß in die Nähe des Panzergrabens gehen. Dort hatten sie sich mit Gesicht zum Boden hinzulegen und wurden dann in Gruppen zum Panzergraben gebracht, an dessen Rand sie sich hinknien mussten. In dieser Stellung wurden sie durch einen Genickschuss erschossen und fielen mit dem eigenen Körpergewicht in den Graben. Anschließend wurden sie zum Teil mit Erde oder Schnee zugeschüttet. Ihre persönlichen Sachen, die sie vorher abzugeben hatten, wurden verbrannt... Am ersten Tag, den 5. November, wurden auf diese Weise schätzungsweise 200 Menschen ermordet. Die nächsten Erschießungen folgten am 20. November, 12. Dezember, 19. Dezember, an einem Tag Anfang Januar 1945, am 5. Februar und an einem Tag Anfang März. Insgesamt wurden 743 Menschen getötet, darunter 280 Frauen und 99 Kinder."[305]

Zvolen's Jewish cemetery was used as an execution site; 218 bodies were exhumed after the end of the war.

  • In der Stadt Zvolen wurde der jüdische Friedhof als Hinrichtungsstätte ausersehen. SS-Unterscharführer Wich dirigierte persönlich die Überführung der zum Tode Ver­urteilten aus dem Bezirksgefängnis. Die Gruben waren beizeiten vorbereitet. Nach dem Krieg wurden 218 Leichname aus sechs Massengräbern exhumiert. [306]

Aftermath

[edit]

The Red Army captured Slovakia by the end of April 1945.

  • "By December 1944, Romanian and Soviet troops had driven the Ger-mans out of southern Slovakia. On January 19, 1945, the Red Army,accompanied by the First Czechoslovak Army Corps, took over easternSlovakia including the cities of Preˇsov and Koˇsice. Three months later,in March 1945, both armies entered the northwest and central regionsof Slovakia with Bansk ́a Bystrica (central Slovakia), among others. On April 1, 1945, the Soviet and Czechoslovak military entered Topoľˇcany and, three days later, Bratislava – the capital of Slovakia today. The lastdays of April 1945 marked the demise of the Tiso regime."[307]

Around 69,000 Jews, 77 percent of the prewar population, had been murdered. "In the Shoah, Slovakia lost 69,000 or 77% of its 1938 Jewish population"[308]

  • "Slovakia lost 69,000 or 77 percent of its 1938 Jewish population"[309]

After the Red Army's conquest of Slovakia in 1945, it became part of the Third Czechoslovak Republic.[308] In addition to the 10,000 Jews who survived in Slovakia,

  • "Following the 1944 deportations, approximately 10,000 Jews survived the last months of the war, most of them by hiding. At this point, it would not have been possible to hide without assistance from the majority population."[310]

9,000 Jews returned who had been deported to concentration camps or fled to Hungary, and 10,000 Jews survived in the annexed territories. By the end of 1945, 33,000 Jews were living in Slovakia. Many survivors had lost their entire families, and a third suffered from tuberculosis.

  • "As Robert Y. Büchler estimated, about 11,000 Slovak Jews survived the war in theterritory of Slovakia.9Another 9,000 returned or were repatriated from Hungary andGermany, among other places. Ten thousand Jews survived in the Magyar-occupiedterritories that now were part of Slovakia. The number of Jewish survivors in Slovakiareached approximately 33,000 at the end of 1945. Survivors were psychologically damaged and physically wrecked. They lost their families, their homes, and theirsources of income. Every third Jewish survivor suffered from tuberculosis; many lost the use of their hands and legs."[308]

Although a postwar law negated property transactions arising from Nazi persecution, the autonomous Slovak government did not enforce it.

  • "Immediately after World War II, Czechoslovakia (restored following the German surrender) issued Decree No. 5/1945 and passed Act No. 128/1946, which provided that all property transfers occurring under pressure of Nazi occupation between 1939 and 1945 were invalid. However, the Slovak National Council resisted implementation of the law and even suspended its execution in 1946."[311]
  • "One of the first laws attempting to regulate the restitution of propertyin postwar Czechoslovakia was presidential decree no. 5/1945, whichinvalidated any property transactions made after the Munich Agreementof 1938 “under duress of occupation and threat of national, racial, and political persecution.” It also authorized the government to establishnational management (n ́arodn ́aspr ́ava) of property confiscated from the“politically unreliable.” As with any legislative act coming from Prague,this act did not legally bind Slovakia unless it was confirmed by its legisla-tive (the Slovak National Council, Slovensk ́an ́arodn ́a rada, SNR) andexecutive (the Board of Commissioners, Zbor poveren ́ıkov, ZP) bodies... The end result was that the Slovak National Council did not invalidatewartime transactions but instead adopted a system of national man-agement on all abandoned or confiscated property, except for banking,mining, large industry, and large estates, which were left under Council’smanagement."[312]

Heirless property was nationalized in 1947 into the Currency Liquidation Fund.

  • "Instead of using heirless property to create a rehabilitation fund for victims of racial persecution, in 1947 the Czechoslovak government used heirless property to fund its Currency Liquidation Fund. The fund facilitated currency reform by reimbursing those whose accounts were blocked after Czechoslovakia was liberated. This meant that all property without heirs and owners passed to the state, and Czechoslovak Jews were not promised access to any money from the fund."[311]

Those who had stolen Jewish property were reluctant to return it; former resistance members also obtained some stolen property. Conflict over restitution led to intimidation and violent attacks, including the September 1945 Topoľčany pogrom and the rioting which accompanied the Partisan Congress in August 1946.

  • "Furthermore, the immediate postwar period of retributions and trials was marked by a general animosity toward the returning Jews who demanded the restitution of their property and businesses. As a result, anti-Semitic riots took place in many Slovak towns such as Topol’þany, Humenné, and Bratislava."[313]
  • Aryanizers: Polish and Slovak authorities were apprehensive of full Jewish restitution for a number of reasons. First, they both feared potential socialunrest: “with a view to avoid social and political conflicts, the govern-ments . . . tended to sympathize with citizens who have benefited from the anti-Jewish laws, and now resisted efforts to enforce restitution.” In Slovakia, these were the former Slovak aryanizers and the newly appointed national managers of abandoned property. (111–112)
  • Partisans: "Property restitution proved particularly detrimental to Jewish safety and their relations with non-Jews, especially with the partisans. Many veterans were also national managers of Jewish enterprises – positions granted to them as a reward for their service. Obviously, restitution threatened their newly acquired material stability – stability that wasprecious in the economically volatile times of destruction, poverty, and shortages. Veterans also felt a sense of entitlement believing that thosewho sacrificed their lives deserved better from their country." (104-105)
  • Partisan Congress riots: "The document came in response to events in Bratislava on August 1–6, 1946 when participants of the Partisan Congress robbed at least ten apartments, wounded nineteen people (four seriously), and demolished a kitchen for Jewish returnees.25The SRP reported a four-day-longseries of robberies and beatings of Jewish residents across Bratislava thatspread far outside the city limits."(118–119)
  • Topolcany background: "Regardless of their origins, the aryanizers stayed in the town afterthe war and became fierce defenders of their economic gains. Whenabout 750 Jewish survivors returned to Topoľˇcany, the new owners andtheir families turned against them, especially since the majority of the returnees were well-to-do former owners who survived thanks to their financial resources"(127)
  • Topolcany riot: "On Monday, September 24 [1945], at 8.00 am, about sixty women (mainlymothers of the students) came to the offices of the district national committee... Throughout the town, 200 to 300 people attacked and beat Jewish residents on the streetsand looted their apartments.(127–129)[314]

Polish historian Anna Cichopek estimates that at least 36 Jews were murdered and more than 100 injured in postwar violence.

  • "I have no definitive estimates of how many Jews were killed or injured in Slovakia after the war. On the basis of fragmentary sources, I speculate that at least thirty-six people were killed and at least one hundred injured in 1945–8 across Slovakia."[315]
  • "The precise number of those who died is unknown due to fragmentary sources. Anna Cichopek-Gajraj speculates that at least 36 people were killed and about a hundred were wounded during the waves of postwar antisemitic violence from 1945 to 1948."[316]
Para

Tiso (who had fled to Austria) was extradited to Czechoslovakia, convicted of treason, sentenced to death on 15 April 1947, and executed three days later.

  • " After the Red Army conquered Slovakia in April 1945, Tiso fled first to Austria and then to a Capuchin monastery in Al-tötting, Bavaria. U.S. forces captured him there in June 1945 and extradited him to the restored Czecho slo va kia, where he was tried. On April 15, 1947, the Czechoslovak National Court (Národný súd) found him guilty of treason and sentenced him to death. Tiso was executed wearing his clerical garb in Bratislava on April 18, 1947."[249]

According to the court, his "most immoral, most unchristian, and most inhuman" action was ordering the deportation of the Slovak Jews.

  • " The section on the destruction of Slovak Jewry, in particular, significantly expanded on the indictment. These crimes were character-ized as Tiso’s “most immoral, most unchristian, and most inhuman.” Tiso “was an initiator, and when not an initiator, then an inciter of the most radical solution of the Jewish question.”"[317]

Other perpetrators, including Tuka and Kubala, were also convicted and executed.

  • Trial and sentences: "Najvyšším súdnym tribunálom v sústave ľudových súdov bol Národný súd v Bratislave, ktorý začalsvoju činnosť 22. júna 1945 a do septembra 1946 odsúdil 20 obžalovaných, z toho šesť na trest smrti (Ján Šmigovský, Vojtech Tuka, Otomar Kubala, Anton Vašek, Jozef Steinhübel a Sigmund Keil). Do 31. augusta1946 NS a ľudové súdy vyniesli celkovo 29 rozsudkov smrti, z ktorých 17 sa vykonalo."[318]
  • Executions: "An advantage to this defense was that these “loose cannons” were not around to contradict Tiso. Ďurčanský was in exile, while Tuka and Kubala had been executed."[319]

All three perpetrators were tried under Decree 33/1945, an ex post facto law which mandated the death penalty for the suppression of the Slovak National Uprising.

  • "In its war-crimes decree (33/1945), the Slovak National Council adopted retroactive punishment, in effect outlawing Czechoslovak constitutional changes that occurred between the Munich Conference and the war’s end... Domestic treason and betrayal of the uprising carried the death penalty, although having aided the resistance could reduce this punishment. Denied right of appeal, defendants condemned to death had a mere forty-eight hours within which to obtain clemency from the council or (from mid-1946) Beneš."(258) "More damaging for the court’s claim to impartiality, the legislation governing the trial, Decree 33/1945, not only retroactively criminalized Tiso’s suppression of the uprising but also mandated the death penalty as punishment. The decree thus amounted to a predetermined verdict and sentence."[320]
  • Name of the law: "Predstavitelia Demokratickej strany (ďalej DS) a Komunistickej strany Slovenska (ďalej KSS), ktorí tvorili SNR, prijali na jej zasadnutí v Bratislave dňa 15. mája 1945 vlastné retribučné nariadenie č. 33/1945o potrestaní fašistických zločincov, okupantov, zradcov a kolaborantov a o zriadení ľudového súdnictva..." Retroactive: "Ďalším sporným bodom v slovenskej retribučnej právnej normebola otázka retroaktivity, absencia odkladného účinku žiadosti o milosť a inštitútu odvolania sa protirozsudku súdu."[8][321]

In the cases of Tuka and Tiso, their roles in the Holocaust were a subset of the crimes for which they were convicted.

  • "The court delivered its verdict [on Tiso] on 15 April... The 214-page verdict found Tiso and Ďurčanský guilty on all charges... His superficial ties to the Henleinists, for instance, were linked to the Czechoslovak decision not to resist the Munich Agreement. The consequences for the world supposedly had been tragic, as the judges held that the republic had been defensible. 136 In short, they blamed Tiso for the Second World War. They also scapegoated him for the failure of the uprising, laying its ill timing at his rather than the partisans’ feet. But the verdict also rose above such agendas. The section on the destruction of Slovak Jewry, in particular, significantly expanded on the indictment."[317]
  • Tuka: "Súd ho uznal vinným ztrestného činu domácej zrady podľa § 2 písm. nar. č. 33/1945 Sb. n. SNR tým, že (parafrázujúc) pomáhalNemecku rozbiť Česko-slovenskú republiku a viesť vojnu proti spojencom, ďalej tým, že škodilslovenskému národu a demokratickým inštitúciám a propagandisticky obhajoval Nemecko. V. Tuka boluznaný vinným aj z trestného činu kolaborantstva za zvlášť priťažujúcich okolností podľa § 3 toho istéhonariadenia SNR, pretože spôsobil protiprávnu ujmu aj smrť pre rasovú, náboženskú a národnú príslušnosť,a zariadil vysťahovanie do táborov a na prácu pre Nemecko."[322]

The trials painted Slovak State officials as traitors, thereby exonerating Slovak society from responsibility for the Holocaust.

  • "Tiso’s trial was about creating a “political truth.” 119 As Rašla wrote privately to Čatloš in 1966, the postwar defendants’ guilt demonstrated the nation’s innocence. By condemning Tiso, Slovaks ostensibly condemned all things fascist, thus proving themselves worthy of postwar Czechoslovakia. Tiso needed not only to be a traitor to the First Republic but also, more important, to the Slovak nation. Consequently, the indictment and the trial focused more on the suffering of Czechs and Slovaks than of Jews."[319]
Para

The Czechoslovak government supported Zionism, insisting that Jews assimilate into Czechoslovak culture or emigrate to Israel.

  • "Czechoslovakia was well known for its positive attitude towards the practical Zionism that aimed at creating a Jewish state in Palestine. T. G. Masaryk, the late President, had been sympathetic to the Jewish national movement. Also Beneš during the war frequently expressed support for the Zionist programme. However, overt Czechoslovak support for the creation of the Jewish state in Palestine during the Second World War has to be seen in the context of Czechoslovaks’ efforts to solve the minority question in the Republic. In comparison with other minorities, the Jews were to have the option to decide whether they wanted to stay in Czechoslovakia. Yet if they did decide to stay, they had to accept Czechoslovak conditions and assimilate or integrate into the main Slavonic nations. All Jews who wanted to declare their Jewishness as a national group were expected to move to Palestine."[323]

Jews who had declared German or Hungarian nationality on a prewar census were accused of disloyalty to Czechoslovakia and stripped of their citizenship, losing any right to restitution, and were threatened with deportation.

  • "In August 1945, Beneˇs stripped Germans and Magyars of Czechoslovak citizenship with his notorious decree no. 33.... The revoking of citizenship was necessarily followed by expulsion and expropriation." (165–166)
  • "As in the property management, national committees made crucial decisions about citizenship... it is clear that [the committees] often denied Jews (especially those whose mother tongue was Magyar or German) certificates of reliability."(166)
  • "Even if a person had not declared German or Magyar nationality in any census after 1929 and had consistently declared Jewish nationality but was suspected of “germanizing” or “magyarizing” activities as defined above, he or she was considered a traitor. “Germanizers” and “magyarizers” were to be deprived of Czechoslovak citizenship, expropriated, and expelled" (169) [324]

Most Jews in Czechoslovakia emigrated to Israel or other countries in the years after the war. Emigration accelerated in 1948 after the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Israeli Declaration of Independence. Between 14,000 and 18,000 Jews remained in Czechoslovakia at the end of 1950.

  • "We do not have exact numbers for the amount of Jews who left Czechoslovakia immediately after the war, between 1945 and 1948, but there was no general exodus... It was only in the second half of 1948, after the Communist coup in Prague and the establishment of the State of Israel that the numbers of Jews who decided to leave Czechoslovakia (mostly for the new Jewish state) dramatically increased. In 1948, 5,000 Czechoslovak Jews left for Israel, and 3,000 for other countries... the Encyclopaedia Judaica asserts that 18,879 Jews went from Czechoslovakia to Israel in 1948–50, while more than 7,000 emigrated to other countries.258 In early 1950, when the Communists closed the doors of Czechoslovakia to any further legal emigration, around 18,000 Jews lived in the country... Other sources estimate that between 14,000 and 18,000 Jews lived in Czechoslovakia at the end of 1950."[325]

Many of those who chose to stay changed their surnames and abandoned religious practice in order to fit in with the Slovak middle class.

  • "Those who decided to stay slovakized their surnames, turned to secularism, and tried to build postwar society as members of the middle class and as intellectuals"[316]

As of 2019, the Jewish population is estimated at 2,000 to 3,000.

  • "Today, there are approximately 2,000 Jews in Slovakia."[311]
  • "Although there are only 3,000 Jews currently living in Slovakia,"[326]

Legacy

[edit]

The government's attitude to Jews and Zionism shifted after 1948, leading to the 1952 Slánský trial in which the Czechoslovak government accused fourteen Communists (eleven of them Jewish) of belonging to a Zionist conspiracy.

  • "The Czechoslovak communists initially attempted to maintain good rela-tions with the new Jewish state of Israel. The sudden change came in 1949 when the Soviet Bloc lost its influence there. In a self-critical report from the 1960s from a commission established by the Czechoslovak communist party’s central committee, it was asserted that Czechoslovakia’s anti-Zionist strivings after 1949 were actually the most active within the whole Soviet Bloc... The Stalinist anti-Semitic wave culminated in the trial against the earlier leader of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Rudolf Slánský, who had been arrested in November 1951... A total of fourteen previously high-ranking communists were prosecuted in the Slánský affair. Eleven of them had Jewish origins.21 They were forced to confess to high treason against the government in Prague, espionage for the benefit of the West and sabotage of the socialist economy. Even if it was not true, they confirmed that the Gestapo, Zionism, international capital and Western intelligence agencies had stood behind their activities against the Czechoslovak state."[327]
  • "Slánsky was accused of being “one of the organizers of Zionist anti-state activity in Czechoslovakia and the most significant agent of the Israeli secret service."... Since 11 [of the 14] accused men were of Jewish origin, they were all charged with plotting a Zionist conspiracy, which at that time was identified with Western imperialism. Jews were also accused of being “Jewish Gestapo agents,”53 “Zionist conspirators,” “Western imperialists” or “cosmopolitan capitalists”—a new label for fascists in the 1950s."[328]

Political censorship hampered the study of the Holocaust, and memorials to the victims of fascism did not mention Jews. In the 1960s, which were characterized by a liberalization known as the Prague Spring, discussion of the Holocaust opened up.

  • Memorials: "Memorial plaques or monuments to victims of the Second World War routinely omitted the names of the murdered Jews, though Jewish victims were sometimes vaguely mentioned as “victims of racial oppression"[329] "The memorials were not intended first and foremost for the victims of the Holocaust... If Jews were mentioned at all, it was done so in a very muddled way."[330]
  • "In the atmosphere of the anti-Semitism of the 1950s, scholars only occasionally referred to various aspects of the Holocaust in Slovakia, and then within broader contextual frameworks... But even in the 1960s, in the era of “communism with a human face,” the publication of Holocaust scholarship could occur only if (1) the scholar employed the antifascist rhetoric within a class struggle paradigm and (2) he or she avoided the sensitive theme of Slovak nationalism. In the 1960s a few scholarly articles addressing the situation of Jews in the Slovak state and within the resistance movement were published."[331]

The Academy Award-winning 1965 film, The Shop on Main Street, focused on Slovak culpability for the Holocaust.

  • "The most important work of the new wave was the Slovak film, Obchod na korze (‘The shop on Main Street’), based on Ladislav Grosman’s novel of the same name from 1965. Obchod na korze became important not only within the Czechoslovak context. Directed by Jan Kadár and Elmar Klos, it won an Oscar for best foreign film in 1966 and was the first film about the Holocaust to receive an Oscar award."[332]
  • [331]

Following the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, authorities cracked down on free expression,

  • "The 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact armies shut down this reevaluation of Tiso and his state. The invading powers feared that the reform communism of the Prague Spring would “spill over” their borders. Gustav Husák took control of Czechoslovakia, overseeing a repressive period dubbed “normalization.” Cultural Life was shut down, The Shop on Main Street was banned, and plans for a scholarly conference on Tiso were scuttled."[333]
  • "The normalisation regime, which reintroduced the old rules from the end of the 1940s and start of the 1950s, prohibited all the aforementioned films focusing on the Holocaust complex of problems... The ideological use of the Second World War once again took over, which was tantamount to a new ideologically controlled non-use of the Holocaust"[334]

while anti-Zionist propaganda, much of it imported from the Soviet Union, intensified and veered into antisemitism after Israeli victory in the 1967 Six-Day War.[335]

Para

The fall of the Communist regime in 1989 led to a nationalist resurgence that manifested in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993 and the nationalist Mečiar government. After Mečiar's fall in 1998, the Slovak government promoted remembrance of the Holocaust to demonstrate the country's European identity before it joined the European Union in 2004.

  • Dissolution of Czechoslovakia, 73
  • Nationalism: "The Slovak movement, Verejnost’ proti násiliu, splintered in 1991. This led to a marked weakening of liberal political tendencies and a strengthening of left populism that cleverly exploited many Slovaks’ fear of the radical economic reforms advocated by the right-wing economists in Prague. A new political party was established, the Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko (‘The movement for a Democratic Slovakia’ [HZDS]). Led by Vladimír Mecˇiar, who after Czechoslovakia’s breakup became Slovakia’s Prime Minister, the HZDS dominated Slovak politics until 1998. The political scientist, Shari Cohen, describes this movement with the term ‘history-less nationalists’; bureaucrats who lacked their own clear ideological profile, and who therefore demonstrated a significant ideological flexibility when concerning, above all, tolerance towards extreme nationalist demands"" 74–75 "The national-Catholic narrative’s diffusion in the media during ‘Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Divorce’ was made easier by the media’s attentiveness towards certain extreme statements by domestic nationalist politicians." 84 "The fact that the Catholic-nationalist narrative, which to a great extent was imported to Slovakia by the Slovak diaspora, attained such a significant position in the Slovak public debate at the beginning of the 1990s was not only due to the active support the diaspora received from the domestic extreme nationalist political circles. Two other important factors in this success were a ‘discreet’ support from those forces which could be termed mild nationalists, and a passive resistance from those who did not concur with the Tiso-friendly national-Catholic narrative but did not manage to answer it with a convincing independent alternative" 84–85
  • "The need for a new non-nationalistic Slovak historical narrative that would point towards a democratic future was evident already in the shadow of nationalism’s successes prior to the partition of Czechoslovakia in 1992. However, it developed fully only during Slovakia’s independence after 1993. Its contours became clear after 1998, when Vladimír Mecˇiar and his party... lost the parliamentary election and were forced to leave their posts. The attempts to use part of Slovakia’s war history to create a kind of Slovak ‘European-democratic’ narrative then began to characterise the process aiming at Slovakia’s entry into the EU, which finally took place in 2004."[336]
  • [337][338]

Memorials were constructed in many Slovak cities during the 1990s to commemorate Holocaust victims,

  • "The growth of a Holocaust memorial culture in Slovakia marks an increasing Europeanized consciousness in Slovak society— a successful outcome resulting from EU pressure on Slovakia." [list of memorials][339]
  • "The Holocaust began to be highlighted in the form of various memorial plaques at those places where the deported were moved to before their journey to death, or where they had earlier lived."[340]

and in October 2001 Slovakia designated 9 September (the anniversary of the passage of the Jewish Code) as Holocaust Victims and Racial Hatred Day.

  • "In 2000 Holocaust memorial culture was further enhanced by making 9 September—the day in 1941 when the notorious “Jewish Codex” was introduced by the wartime Slovak government—a memorial day to commemorate Holocaust victims and victims of racial violence."[341]

The National Memory Institute was established in 2002 to provide access to the records of both the Slovak State and Communist state.

  • "Only recently has the controversy between émigré and liberal historians been joined by a third actor, Ústav Pamäti Národa (Nation’s Memory Institute), established in 2002. According to its founder, Ján Langoš, the institute’s mission “is to provide access to undisclosed records of the activities of the repressive organs of the Slovak and Czechoslovak states in the period of oppression 1939–1989.”"[342]

The post-Communist government enacted various laws for the restitution of Jewish property, but residency and citizenship requirements prevented emigrants from filing claims.[343] In 2002, ten percent of the value of the nationalized heirless property was released into a fund that paid for Jewish education and Holocaust memorials.[344] As of January 2019, Yad Vashem (the official Israeli memorial to the Holocaust) had recognized 602 Slovaks as Righteous Among the Nations for risking their lives to save Jews.[345]

Para

Holocaust relativism in Slovakia tends to manifest as attempts to deflect the blame for it onto Germans and Jews.

  • "Although I would argue that Holocaust denial does not occupy an important place in Slovak postwar historiography, relativization, including deflecting political responsibility for the Holocaust on others—either Germans or Jews—is a widespread and dangerous issue."[58]
  • "The émigré historians’ discourse that relativizes the Holocaust is built on two arguments: first, that deportation was just an “evacuation;” and, second, that Slovakia deported its Jews under the direct pressure of Hitler. These are apologetic statements made to cleanse Slovakia of its responsibility for the Jewish Holocaust."[138]

A 1997 textbook by Milan Stanislav Ďurica and endorsed by the government sparked international controversy (and was eventually withdrawn from circulation) because it portrayed Jews as living happily in labor camps during the war.

  • "The continuity of the wartime Slovak state’s legacy became an international issue in 1997. Dejiny Slovenska a Slovákov (History of Slovakia and the Slovaks), published by émigré historian Milan S. Durica, provided an initial spark for the so-called Slovak Historikerstreit... [it] downplayed the responsibility of the World War II Slovak leadership for the Holocaust. Durica went so far as to state that the overall atmosphere in Jewish labor camps in Slovakia was one of gaiety and happiness.100 The book was promoted by the ministry of education in the Slovak Republic and cofinanced by the phare program, which supports the transition of EU-accession countries in Central and Eastern Europe to democracy and market economies.101 The financial support of this biased work led the European Commission to harshly criticize the phare program.102 Due to public pressure, the ministry of education withdrew the book from schools, effective 1 July 1997.[346]
  • "Dˇurica’s main contribution to a historical view that trivialises the persecutions and the Holocaust, came in the mid-1990s, when his work on Slovakia’s history was introduced as an official textbook in Slovak schools. The book was entitled Dejiny Slovenska a Slovákov"[347]

Jozef Tiso and the Slovak State have been the focus of Catholic and ultranationalist commemorations.

  • "The Slovak Nationalists meanwhile became extremists. Led now by Ján Slota, they and the Matica slovenská pushed ultranationalism as the model for Slovak society. Their program would eventually call for Tiso’s rehabilitation (276)... Ján Korec, now a cardinal, and Ján Sokol, the archbishop of Trnava, praised Tiso or absolved him of responsibility for the abuses of the wartime state. A search for relics began the next spring when a pro-Tiso organization exhumed a body from his alleged grave."[348]
  • "Public praise of Jozef Tiso by Roman Catholic priests is not unusual." [gives examples][52]

The neo-Nazi[349] Kotleba party, which is represented in the national parliament and the European Parliament and is especially popular with younger voters,[350] promotes a positive view of the Slovak State. Its leader, Marian Kotleba, once described Jews as "devils in human skin".

  • "On March 14, 2004, in his public speech to commemorate the establishment of the 1939 Slovak state, Marian Kotleba, the leader of the extreme PP-OS (People’s Party Our Slovakia), mocked efforts to come to terms with the Holocaust past and marked out Jews as “devils in human skin.” Kotleba further promoted the view of Ľudovít Štúr—the leading representative of Slovak national revival in the nineteenth century—that Jews have no historical, cultural, or social ties with Slovaks. When the Jewish community expressed outrage against the demonstration of Kotleba supporters in Komárno in 2005, Kotleba defended the extremists by accusing Jews of plotting “against the Slovak nation, statehood, and Christian traditions” often with the help of the “Magyar chauvinists and domestic traitors.” In Kotleba’s eyes, every political skirmish in Slovakia is a “very well prepared performance” directed by Z. O. G. (the “Zionist Occupation Government”)."[351]

Members of the party have been charged with Holocaust denial,[352][353] which has been a criminal offense since 2001.[352]

References

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