Talk:T-34/Archive 3

This is an archive of past discussions about T-34. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page.

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Archive 4

Archive 5

Archive 6

DO NOT EDIT OR POST REPLIES TO THIS PAGE. THIS PAGE IS AN ARCHIVE.

This archive page covers approximately the dates between 2006-01-28 and 2006-07-31.

Post replies to the main talk page, copying or summarizing the section you are replying to if necessary.

Please add new archivals to Talk:T-34/Archive03. (See Wikipedia:How to archive a talk page.) Thank you. —Michael Z. 2006-07-14 02:07 Z

T-34s as "liberation from nazism" monuments all around E-C Europe and their defacing in the 80-90s

I am not sure how to work this into an article and whether elaborating on this should be done at all in the article right now. But this is certainly encyclopedic in some form since it brings some interesting information for readers. Many in N. America would not know at all. The issue here is that many towns of different significances in the Eastern Block as well as in many Soviet republics had and most still have the monument which was basically a T-34 on the plinth that was supposed to mean the "First Soviet tank that entered the city in the liberation from the Nazi occupation" (driving out the Nazis may be used as a substitute to the "liberation" term that may seem incorrect in some contexts). These monuments were well-cared for despite mixed feelings of certain parts of populations in certain places. Following the collapse of the Eastern Block and the USSR they were defaced. While the thombs to the fallen soldiers, when defaced, were usually repaired and cleaned up, no one bothered about the tanks and they stood covered by Graffitti to the general ridicule. The picture of such tank in Poland can be seen in the PL- or RU-wiki articles linked to this one. Making no moral judgements on either imposing the tank for decades on the ambivalent population, or the vandals who defaced them and the authorities not caring to clean up, could we add the info to this article or this is too far from what it now covers? --Irpen 06:58, 28 January 2006 (UTC)

Definitely deserves mentioning, and might warrant an article of its own.

This includes the story of the famous pink tank of Prague. This was an IS-2m, erected as monument representing the first tank to enter Prague, actually Ivan G. Goncharenko's T-34-85. Anarchists painted it pink in the 1990s, the Russians protested, the government repainted it, but then a large protest including government deputies painted it pink again. It was removed to a museum. There's a good write-up of the event in Patrick Wright (2000) Tank: The Progress of a Monstrous War Machine, and the original tank is mentioned in Zaloga (1996:42–43). —Michael Z. 2006-01-28 07:23 Z

Yep, IS-2 it was instead of Goncharenko's T-34: "the wrong tank, the wrong type of tank with the wrong number on its turret." This article gives some info too. And in the museum it is still pink [1] --Irpen 07:35, 28 January 2006 (UTC)

Used at Lang Vei?

The article Lang Vei mentions PT-76 tanks. No T-34 of any kind is mentioned in the article. What`s the truth?

Veljko Stevanovich 18. 2. 2006. 22:10 UTC+1

Identify version please

File:Dog mine.jpg

What version is this?

Is it a dummy turret or a flamethrower version or a T-34 with 57 mm gun ? Turret looks like from T-34/85 --Denniss 11:04, 2 March 2006 (UTC)

It's a T-34-85 model 1945 or later. The main recognition characteristic is the mushroom ventilation dome on the front of the turret roof; earlier turrets had two domes at the rear instead of one front and one back. The gun mantlet doesn't look right (possibly bent plywood), so I'm guessing that that's a dummy gun; possibly on a tank decommissioned for training purposes. —Michael Z. 2006-03-02 15:09 Z

That's correct; this is a photo of mine-dog training taken from the 1960s or later. It's a 1945 or later production example with a dummy gun & mantlet.DMorpheus 18:54, 2 March 2006 (UTC)

Thanks ! --Denniss 12:08, 3 March 2006 (UTC)

Military Discovery Channel's Ranking

Last week, someone copy/pasted the quote from Military Discovery Channel's "Top Ten" feature in regard to tanks. No surprise there; T-34 was number one. Someone else deleted that section later on. While the paragraph was most certainly not at its best form, I think it was actually a good idea to put that in. It shows that the group of experts (of not only various fields but also nationalities) agree that the T-34 was the greatest tank of all time based on various factors, and it can be referenced (I googled and found that article on Military Discovery's official website).

I think this should be incorporated into the article. The opening is full of "greatest", "best all around", etc without references. But here is an opinion from various experts and such that can have a footnote added.

If not comments are made in the near future, I will probably add it myself.

Bedsprings

Zaloga & Kinnear (1996 [2004]:15):

During the battle for the Seelowe Heights on the approaches to Berlin, tankers of the 11th Tank Corps and several other units created improvised anti-panzerfaust screens by taking bed springs from German homes and fastening them to the turret and hull side. . . .

An anonymous poster points to battlefield.ru article which says "The Soviet industry manufactured various shields instead".

The quotation above is part of the caption a photo of the side of a tank, clearly showing at least two different screens, which do look like different sets of bedsprings.

Battlefield.ru is usually reliable, but all things being equal, I would go with the respected published source over the web site. Anyone have some more insight? —Michael Z. 2006-05-23 13:54 Z

Marshal Koniev's memoirs used the word 'mattress' when translated to english in the 1950s. That's consistent with the bedspring theory. However, other authors have mentioned the possibility that the screens were manufactured. It is of course perfectly possible that both are true. Looking at various photos, no two tanks look alike to me, so even if they were manufactured for the purpose, they must have been installed in the field, by units, and probably in a hurry. DMorpheus 15:17, 23 May 2006 (UTC)

Thanks. Neither Zaloga nor battlefield.ru cites a source for their statement about these stand-off armour screens.

So, they may have just been nicknamed "mattress springs" because that's what they looked like, or they actually were, or they were purpose-made replacements for field-expedient bed-frames used earlier. Or all of the above.

I'll change the wording so that it reflects what we (sort of) know. I'll also excise the statement about solid plate versions for now, pending the citation of a reference (or am I getting too picky?). —Michael Z. 2006-05-23 17:51 Z

Yes, you are being picky. ;) Especially when there are photographs clearly documenting the employment of such shields. http://www.battlefield.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=33&Itemid=50&lang=en And if you do want a definitive answer on this, you should drop a line to Valera Potapov, the guy who runs battlefield.ru. He is a professionally trained historian, though he works exclusively in Russian. That does mean, however, that he has access to sources that we do not in the West. And I would still contest your assertion of the edit as to tactical proficiency, because the way that you said it, it seems as if there is a timeless German standard of excellence. While I do agree that while German training was superb throughout much of the war period, quality levels declined in 1944 and precipitously so in 1945, when they were truly scraping the bottom of the barrel in manpower. So I think it's really difficult what tactical proficiency on absolute terms was at that time. Which is why I qualified the assertion of German training with "at its height." I do not feel that this is an unreasonable edit. I would like to hear why apparently this is a no-no.

I agreed with mzajac's removal of the qualifier "..at its height". First, I agree with you that it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to state in "absolute terms" what any unit's proficiency level is. That is precisely why stating it in relative terms makes sense. The best evidence that, on the tactical level, the germans never lost their advantage even in the closing period of the war is the loss ratio. The germans consistently inflicted more casualties than they took, whether they were fighting the Red Army or any other opponent. Even in 1945, Soviet tank loss ratios were highly unfavorable. They weren't nearly as bad as in 1941-42, but they were negative.

This whole line of argument is peripheral to the subject but it's a good sidebar. :::: DMorpheus 19:16, 24 May 2006 (UTC)

Actually, this is not the case. Doing military analysis from the perspective of irrevocable casualties (killed and taken prisoner), the Red Army had achieved parity in 1944 and relative advantage by 1945--the big turning point if my memory serves me correctly was with the Bagration operation. Just going from the most recent Krivosheev and Overmans estimates of the respective total losses in those years, there were about equal numbers of killed for both years, with an advantage towards the USSR in 1945. If one adds prisoners into the equation, the numbers of people taken permanently out of combat definitely favored the red army. Furthermore, the issue of tank loss ratios. Read my comment about why I edited in the first place. I removed it because it is implying tank-on-tank combat, which was in the overall scope of things a relatively minor source of tank losses. The majority were, I believe, lost due to anti-tank artillery and later to the very effective panzerfaust portable AT system. That is why I feel there can't be a valid comparison among crew skill levels on absolute terms when most Soviet tanks were not destroyed as the result of action against enemy tanks, nor was it the case the other way around. And as to the reason why German tank losses remained low, there's a very simple expanation of the fact that you can't shoot more fish than there are in the barrel. If an army has more tanks in the field and is using them in general offensive operations against enemy artillery and infantry, it is only natural that armor losses incurred would be greater than the side that has much less armor to spare. I am only proposing to qualify assertions that are perhaps a bit too bold and are subject to a variety of confounding factors.

Also, about the HEAT shields, you guys should drop a line to Valera. I was active on that site way back, and from what I've seen he is eager to answer questions. It's obviously not going to be as credible if I contact him myself and report back, but in any case I do remember he had copies of Red Army orders regarding the deployment of such equipment. You guys should drop him a line. The man's an incredible resource.

The comparison of the armoured forces' relative tactical (vs operational and strategic) skills was paraphrased from Zaloga & Grandsen (1984), so I didn't want to change the sense of it too much. We're relying on a published expert opinion here, which for this type of statement seems to make more sense than trying to extrapolate tactical training levels based on vehicle loss figures, which are influenced by a thousand other factors.

The standoff screen pictured on battlefront.ru is interesting (1/2-way down, captioned "A JS-2 with anti-HEAT shields in 1944"). It doesn't look like it's made from bedframes, but plain steel mesh (it looks opaque at the angle, but you can see the horse cart through it). [but it appears to be attached by struts to both hull and turret or superstructure; are we sure that vehicle's not an ISU?]

It would be great to have an expert like Valera review this article and comment on it. Anonymous, since you sound like you're familiar with him, would you invite him? —Michael Z. 2006-05-25 05:07 Z

Well, I would cite NPOV in that we have to at least give attention to both sides of a debate. In this sense, a qualified statement seems to be the most diplomatic way to skirt the line. Or, rather, one can take the style of the excellent M4 Sherman article that diplomatically skirts the issue of tactical training levels altogether. Nowhere am I saying that we should extrapolate from loss ratios--I was merely responding to Morph's fallacious justifications, which he grounded some cursory examination of tank loss rates. Read my statement. I have always said that there are too many confounding factors to make any sort of definitive assessment. There are sources that proclaim tactical inferiority throughout, and there are those that claim that the German army was so decrepit by 1945 that it was outclassed by all combatants engaged. I just don't see how putting in a qualifier such as "German training at its height" will change the tone of the passage, as we all agree as to the high level of proficiency that the Wehrmacht displayed in the early part of the war. Regarding Valera, I used to be really active on his site back when it was the RMZ, but I haven't been there in like 5 years. I doubt he or most of the people there even remember me. In any case, I'll see what I can do.

Valeri Potapov (www.battlefield.ru). I would like to add a couple words about the "bedsprings" theme. Although infantry HEAT weapons developed at the beginning of the war, its wide usage on the Eastern Front (Russia) appeared in mid-1944 when the Red Army launched a massive advance on Nazi Germany and started to re-capture a lot of cities and towns. That time German panzershtrecks and panzerfausts apeeared to be very effective infantry antitank weapon. Soviet armor casualties were very high especially because in most cases panzerfaust ignited a tank and it completely writed-off. A hurry measures had to be made to improve this situation. I don't know who was the author of the very first anti-HEAT screen but the idea was very useful and cheap. The idea was to make the fuse of the HEAT projectile to explode BEFORE it hit the armor. Various experiments conducted on NIIBT proving ground at Kubinka in 1944. Most effective and cheap to manufacture were screens made from 5-8 mm steel wire. Some of them looked like a bedsprings but they weren't. Real bedsprings were also tested at Kubinka but results were negative, they were too soft and too weak to explode a HEAT round. Special GKO order (issued on 12.04.1944) introduced those wire screens and additionally it prohibited to use any bedsprings because they did not provide any protection at all. Today the copy of this order is located in Tech Library in Kubinka as well as detailed reports on tests with anti-HEAT screens.

Do you know the title of the GKO order, or is there a document or publication which we can cite? It would be good to include a reference here and in the article "vehicle armour", since this question isn't sufficiently treated in any English-language sources we know of. Thanks a lot for the input, and please have a look over the rest of the article if you have the time. —Michael Z. 2006-06-15 05:10 Z

Importance section

I've completed a minor rewrite of the T-34#Importance section, which I've been intending to do for some time. It separates the tank's immediate effect on the war and its technical legacy from the its role in development of military theory and the concept of main battle tank. Please have a look over and comment or improve. I would like to keep this section brief and to the point, but ensure that it is supported by the text of the article.

Once this appears to be stable, I'd like to nominate this article as a featured article. —Michael Z. 2006-07-02 21:53 Z

Drive for Featured Article quality

In case anyone hasn't noticed, I've nominated this article as a candidate for FA. Please read the comments, and leave your own at Wikipedia:Featured article candidates/T-34/archive1. The comments so far are positive, but the article still needs some work to reach FA status.

I've addressed most of the comments, but the article is still lacking references for a number of facts presented in it. I'll be adding some more in the next few days, but I don't think I can find them all myself. If you have a bit of time, please pull out your books and throw in a reference or two.

As I go through the article, perhaps I'll list some of the specific statements which require support here. Thanks, all. Urrraaah! —Michael Z. 2006-07-06 22:34 Z

Passages which would benefit from a citation (please add if available):

"Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, newly-declassified sources have demonstrated that all T-34s with the original turret and F-34 gun (conventionally known as Models 1941 and 1942) were officially called Model 1941, and hexagonal-turret T-34 (Model 1943) was officially called Model 1942." [added by me [2], based on discussion with user:DMorpheus (see #Model 1942 or 1943)]

Does anyone have a copy of the Russian publication The Uknown T-34 (Неизвестный Т-34)?[3]

I do - what do you need? This book uses the designation '42' to refer to the six-sided turret, although it more often uses the term 'hexagonal' or 'six-sided' turret. DMorpheus 00:20, 9 July 2006 (UTC)

ISBN no is 5-94038-013-1 published by Ex Print Publication, PO box 26, Moscow, 121552, Russia. I don't know how to supply the Russian-language reference, sorry. ;)

Thanks. I've added this as a passim reference, meaning that the source takes the information for granted, but doesn't explicitly talk about it. This is sufficient, but keep your eyes open for a reference which more explicitly states what the official naming scheme was. —Michael Z. 2006-07-11 16:05 Z

"The Finns called the T-34 Sotka..."

Working on this at talk:Lauri Heino#T-34 tank in Finnish use. —Michael Z. 2006-07-07 21:58 Z

The detailed (Finnish-language) reference is not available at this time. See the above talk link for info. In the meantime, I've edited this section so it only contains easily-verifiable information. —Michael Z. 2006-07-13 17:15 Z

"At the outset of the war, only about four percent of all Soviet tanks were T-34 variants (based on figures from Zaloga 1984:125–6); this increased to fifty or sixty percent by mid-1943 and was even higher by the war's end" [added by user:217.225.53.167 [4], figures modified by user:MWAK [5] and me [6]]

Needs a reference for the 50-60% figure, and for "even higher", or better yet, a single reference for the whole sentence. —Michael Z. 2006-07-08 04:32 Z

Here are production figures from "The Unknown T-34" :

1940: 115

1941: 2996

1942: 12661

1943: 15710

1944: 14648

1945: 12551

Total 58681

Zaloga (1984 cited elsewhere) gives production figures for all major Soviet AFVs on page 225. I have used his table, omitting minor types such as the T-80 light tank, a few very late BTs etc. Here are the numbers and proportions for all wartime production. This of course would not include inventory on hand on June 22 1941 but almost all of that was gone by the end of 1942.

SU-76: 12,671 (15%)

T-34 and T-34-85: 46,219 (55%)

IS-2: 3854 (5%)

T-60: 6292 (8%)

T-70: 8226 (10%)

T-26: 1549 (2%)

KV (all variants): 4711 (6%)

So - "fifty or sixty" percent is almost exactly correct for numbers produced, but that is different from numbers on hand. If we consider that virtually all T-26, KV, and T-60 would have been expended by the end of 1943, but almost all SU-76 and IS-2 production was in 1944-45, it is hard to say what the on-hand percentage would have been. In 1944, almost 2/3rds of all new production of tanks were T-34s and T-34-85s. In 1945 it is nearly 3/4s of all tank production.

I've counted the SU-76 here even though it is not a tank, since it is a very important Soviet AFV. But if the SU-76 is omitted the T-34's proportion changes to 65% of all production for 1941-45.

Lend-Lease shipments add approximately another 16% to the tank figures. DMorpheus 00:24, 9 July 2006 (UTC)

Zaloga's 1984 numbers are probably not as accurate as The Unknown T-34, but without comparably-accurate numbers for all the other AFVs I don't think the higher number should be used in the comparative table. DMorpheus 00:20, 9 July 2006 (UTC)

I've tried to summarize this. How does that look? —Michael Z. 2006-07-11 21:04 Z

"Visibility from the driver's seat was also poor, with some drivers reporting that their optics were so bad they kept their hatch open slightly even in combat." [added by user:199.184.22.3 [7]]

Quote available at a tanker's story at www/battlefield.ru DMorpheus 00:20, 9 July 2006 (UTC)

Battlefield.ru is at least partly back. I've done some searching, but I still can't find a relevant quote there. Please post a link if you can. —Michael Z. 2006-07-11 16:18 Z

Thanks for all that, DMorpheus.

Uknown T-34: can you provide a full bibliography entry, with author, date, place and publisher? Either Russian, transliterated, or translated would be fine. Does the book make specific reference to nomenclature from declassified Soviet documents?
Thanks for the production figures. I'll rewrite the 4% 50-60% bit to reflect what we have.
Battlefield.ru seems to be missing in action since a few days. I've tried Googling, but I can't find a story that mentions driver's visibility. Can you remember the title or any details, or perhaps supply the URL or a Google cache link?

Very close to FA now; thanks for all the work. —Michael Z. 2006-07-09 06:24 Z

NPOV

As part of the drive to FA status, we should settle the POV question once and for all. Consensus on this talk page has so far been to leave statements like this one in the introduction:

It was the world's best tank when the Soviet Union entered the Second World War, and is credited as the war's most effective, efficient and influential design.

See #comments, #Best tank Quotes, and #Best tank on this page.

But regularly, an editor reads the article and tries to eliminate or qualify these statements to make them neutral.[8]

But in my view, there is only a neutrality problem if some opposing point of view is neglected or minimized. This article is full of quotes supporting the 'best' position, and I haven't seen a single informed opposing point of view anywhere, or any controversy on the topic. The article also goes into some depth explaining why the T-34 was the best tank in terms of the three main characteristics of effectiveness, as well as its industrial success and influence on tank design, and also discusses some of its failings, although none of them negates the 'best in 1941' status. Stating uncontested views is Neutral, according to my interpretation of the rather unambiguous guidelines (WP:NPOV & WP:POV). Are there any problems with my reasoning here?

Specifically referring to the sentence in the introduction, I think the statement is expanded upon in the following paragraph: "At its introduction, it was the tank with the best balance of firepower, mobility, and protection in existence, . . .". If it does need qualification in the first sentence, I'd rather not write "It was' considered to be the world's best tank. . .", because that is a statement about opinion in 1941, and may not even be correct. I'd rather write one of the following, but I'm concerned that either version reduces the impact of the sentence, and may be confusing for a reader not familiar with "hard factors":

It was the world's best tank in hard factors when the Soviet Union entered the Second World War, and is credited as the war's most effective, efficient and influential design.

It is considered to have been the world's best tank at the time the Soviet Union entered the Second World War, and is credited as the war's most effective, efficient and influential design.

Can we improve on either of these versions while preserving its sense? —Michael Z. 2006-07-11 15:57 Z

I think the second version reads better and can be substantiated. I would also say it will be difficult to find any source that opposes the statement. This addresses your 'uncontested' issue. DMorpheus 19:34, 11 July 2006 (UTC)

I don't like "hard factors" unless there is a good definition of it. Can we break down and individually stubstnaiate the "effective", "efficient" and "influential" bits.

Influential is probably as good a one as any to start with - what did it influence and how? Panther and King Tiger mostly. Efficient - well it could be built quickly, operated easily and repaired easily. Effective is the hard one. GraemeLeggett 16:09, 11 July 2006 (UTC)

All of this is discussed throughout the article, so I want to keep the introduction spare, rather than bloat it merely to justify itself.

Hard factors are defined in the following paragraph: "balance of firepower, mobility, and protection". Also efficient as a basis for further development: increased armour, up-gunning as the T-34-85, and remarkable component compatibility (later T-34s were retrofitted with T-55 engines and track, while later T-55s were retrofitted with T-72 engines and track, and Morozov sells T-80UD engine upgrades for the T-72!). Influential also on a longer scale by demonstrating the effectiveness of a well-balanced medium tank, helping lead to the obsolescence of light and heavy tanks and development of the main battle tank concept. Effective thanks to all of these characteristics and massive production, especially as the Soviets gained experience in armoured warfare. —Michael Z. 2006-07-11 18:39 Z

I would add to the influential bit the fact that the quality of the T-34 design set the pace for prety much all tank development for the next few years. That is, the Germans responded with better Pzkw-IVs (with long 75mm guns), with the Tiger and Panther, and with much-improved towed and man-portable AT weapons. This in turn forced the US and UK to improve tank and antitank weapons (17 pounder, Firefly, towed 3-inch gun, 76mm-armed Shermans, the M-26, the M-36, the Comet, etc). Zaloga has a great quote about this, which I believe we referenced many months ago, to the effect that the T-34 shifted the center of gravity of tank design away from Britain and France, where it had been for years, eastwards to Germany and the USSR. DMorpheus 19:31, 11 July 2006 (UTC)

Component compatibilty could be a case of sticking with what is known. The 17 pdr design work was started in 1940 and in action in 42. Comet is a natural progression from Crusader via Cromwell (which was planned early but late arriving). I personally don't deny it was an important tank nor that it was a good one but I hold that like the Sherman the strength is in simplicity and production rates. GraemeLeggett 20:14, 11 July 2006 (UTC)

Compatibility certainly is a result of Soviet standardization, centralization, and design conservatism, as opposed to Western free-enterprise capitalism involving a low bidder. But it was done for a number of reasons, and can be an important advantage. For example, when Chinese Type 90-II (Al Khalid) tanks wouldn't run right in the Pakistani desert heat, Ukraine was able to step in and supply 1,200-hp power plants built for the latest T-84. Syria, for example, could choose to have their T-54/55s upgraded with the latest high-performance engine, but I don't think Taiwan could choose to put an M1 Abrams engine in their M60 Patton tanks.

It also speaks to the soundness of a power-train design which has resisted about 65 years of potential obsolescence. —Michael Z. 2006-07-11 20:43 Z

There is absolutely no reason to edit the current opening sentence (introduction). The article opens with the statement and goes on to PROVE that statement. Along with quotes, figures, citations, etc the article fulfills it's duty of proving that it indeed was the best tank at the time. Once again, there is absolutely no violation of NPOV with the current introduction. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 72.0.194.60 (talk • contribs) .

Successor

user:Mieciu K removed the phrase "its successor" in the following introduction sentence :

It was the most-produced tank of the war, and the second most-produced tank of all time, after its successor, the T-54/55 series.

With the edit summary:

"its successor,"? the T-54/55 series tank were successors of the T-44 series tank not the T-34

I've reverted. The T-44 was a transitional design which never fully replaced the T-34 in service or on the production line. It was considered inadequate, because it only mounted an 85mm gun and suffered from automotive problems. It was only built at a low rate, alongside continuing production of the T-34. According to Zaloga & Johnson (2004:6, reference at T-55#References), even when the early T-54-1 had already been put into production at Uralvagonzavod and KhPZ, but stopped because it failed to live up to expectations, the T-34-85 still accounted for "85% of production through 1950". Only after the T-54-2 with the round turret started production did the Politburo authorize the Omsk factory to stop making the T-34 and switch over to the T-54.

Yup, the production history still could use a section covering 1945–1981. —Michael Z. 2006-07-12 14:48 Z

Agreed, the T-54/55 series is the real successor. DMorpheus 14:58, 12 July 2006 (UTC)

IMHO T-54/55 series is the de facto succesor of the T-34, but the T-44 was the first mass produced tank meant as a replacement for the T-34 so technically speaking it should be called the T-34's succesor, and around 2000 units produced is by western standards a significant number. Mieciu K 16:05, 12 July 2006 (UTC)

In the big picture, I would argue that the T-44 is a beta version of the T-54: it had essentially the same hull, and an early, problematic version of the same drive-train, and was waiting for a turret capable of carrying the larger 100mm gun which Morozov had been testing on the T-34-100 and T-44-100 prototypes in the summer of 1944. I don't think it was ever intended as a permanent replacement without further development. Even if it had been intended as a replacement, it didn't become one: stopping production of the T-34 wasn't approved until the T-44 and T-54-1 were both no longer being produced, and the T-54-2 was considered good enough to completely replace the T-34.

The T-54/55 series was definitely the T-34's successor in another way, as the tank emblematic of Soviet military might, industrial productivity, and political influence around the world, during the Cold War and to this day. In the mean time, the T-44 saw no combat, was never exported, I think never issued to active units (as I recall from somewhere, a battalion may have been issued T-44 tanks, but they were withdrawn before advancing on Berlin), and relegated to the reserves early on (although it was not retired early, like the initial T-54-1). Very few people in the West ever heard of it, apart from military intelligence and dedicated armour buffs. —Michael Z. 2006-07-12 17:22 Z

I agree that the T-54/55 was the successor of the T-34 "as the tank emblematic of Soviet military might, industrial productivity, and political influence around the world". But to peiple that do not know much about soviet armour might get the idea that the T-54/55 was the direct successor of the T-34, could we add a phrase like "the de facto successor" or as you said the successor "as the tank emblematic of Soviet military might, industrial productivity, and political influence around the world" or something like that to clarify that issue? Mieciu K 12:03, 13 July 2006 (UTC)

Could someone please explain to me why the T-34 is considered one of the best tanks in WW2? I hear this over and over, and all types of praise, yet no one mentions the fact that the only reason it had any success was because Russia had more resources than Germany. For example, the German Panther was vastly superior to the T-34, and had a kill ratio of 1:9 versus T-34s. How can a tank that was only successful due to high numbers and Russian resources be considered the greatest, when it was an inferior tank? Yes, it was a good tank early on in the war, but it was no match for for mid to late war tanks. The situation of World War 2 should not be considered when judging the tank itself. The tanks' abilities have nothing to do with the resources the respective countries had available, but should be judged on neutral terms. My argument is basically this: if 10 mediocre boxers gang up and beat one great boxer, this does not mean that the 10 boxers are better. It's the same situation here.

Whew, this will get complicated since you have raised a lot of issues. First, the USSR did not have "more resources" than Germany. Quite the contrary, the Soviet economy was far smaller than the Germany economy. Once the war began, the Germans were able to add the industrial capabilities of highly advanced economies such as Belgium and France to their potential. They bungled the management of those assets, but they had them. They also captured some of the best industrial areas of the USSR - the mineral wealth of the Donbass and the industrial center of Kharkov (the prewar site of early T-34 production) are just two examples. Again, even though the Germans did not make great use of those assets, they denied them to the Soviets for much of the war. This is a very complex topic, but just scratching the surface, the fact is that the USSR was able to outproduce the Germans in some key weapons systems while posessing a far smaller economic base. I am grossly oversimplifying but this is only a talk page....

Second, you might perhaps go to some of the other sources listed and see for yourself what the basis of the authors' arguments are. Zaloga's books, for example, are widely available and inexpensive.

Third, recall that the T-34 was developed in the late 1930s and was actually in production in 1940. The Panther did not appear until three years later, and it appeared at all *only* because the T-34 was so good and so numerous. Comparing the T-34 (at least the 76mm-armed models) to the Panther makes little sense. Interestingly, in many books on the Panther, the first chapter will describe the T-34. In one book I recetnly read, the very first photograph was a T-34. The Panther was specifically designed to outclass the T-34. Designed several years later and from a much richer economy, it is not surprising that a first-glance analysis would rank the Panther much higher than the T-34.

Fourth, it is a bit nonsensical to ignore the reasons *why* the advanced German tanks of 1943-45 were usually vastly outnumbered. Numbers count for a lot in combat. The USSR and the western Allies both made the deliberate decision that they would rather have huge numbers of less-than-ideal weapons systems than a few fantastic weapons. The Germans in many cases made the opposite decision. Again I am grossly oversimplifying. But the Panther was outnumbered, in part, *because* it was a Panther. As Zaloga said (far better than I) the decision to build a heavy, expensive tank like the Panther led inevitably to having very few of them.

Fifth, look at the other tanks available worldwide in 1940 and find one that is even close in firepower to the T-34. The only one is the KV. The Pzkw-III was beginning to appear with a short 50mm gun then. Find another tank as well-protected. The KV, the Matilda and perhaps the S-35 or B-1 will come to the top of the list. None has the mobility of the T-34. None has the firepower (except the KV). The only tank that is at or near the top in all of the 'big three' is the T-34.

None of this is to say it was a perfect tank or the best tank in one-on-one combat throughout WW2. But the Soviets, and the Germans, managed to ensure that one-on-one combat rarely had to happen. Sure one Panther can kill a lot of T-34s. But if your Panther platoon has to defend against my T-34 brigade, guess what? You lose, even if I take more casualties. So your 10 boxers analogy is not quite right. If you and I are both notified that there will be a fight, and I show up with ten guys to your one, isn't that a pretty smart move? Even if my ten are not the equal, one-for-one, as your own guy? Would you bring a knife to a gun fight? As they used to say at Fort Benning, "Dead men and losers fight fair". DMorpheus 19:54, 14 September 2006 (UTC)

When I'm referring to resources, I'm referring to resources that can be used to fight a war, such as steel, oil, rare minerals, manpower, factories, trading partners and overall conditions, and in these areas Russia had superiority, since Germany was lacking in many of these supplies (through geography, poor leadership, fighting a two front war and the constant Allied bombing campaigns). The point still remains: a tank that needs to be produced in large numbers and take heavy losses to succeed is not a good tank, it a cheap tank. The Sherman was much the same; a cheap tank that could be sacrificed and replaced, and that didn't protect its crew. Sure, ten T-34s may be better than one Panther, but we're not discussing the strategic choices of generals or the allocation of resources, we're discussing the tank itself and how it performed. Once again, in 1941 it might have been the best tank, but the war lasted from 1939 to 1945, so from a neutral, objective point of view, the T-34 was not the best tank. If 1 panther can destroy 9 T-34s on average before biting the dust, I'd say it's clear as day that the Panther is the superior tank.

Not so. For most critical economic factors the USSR was far behind Germany, especially when you count the economies the Nazis captured more or less intact early in the war. In manpower, yes, the USSR had an advantage. Germany far outproduced the USSR in steel (by a factor of 2:1 IIRC), and obtained most of the raw materials they needed from their conquests and from 'neutrals' like Sweden. They faced no systematic fuel shortages before 1944, nor did they face any serious bombing before 1944. In terms of trading partners, again, Germany made strategic *choices* to pursue a policy of autarky. The USSR sought, and got, overseas trading partners. Those were strategic choices, not god-given immutable factors. Fighting a two-front war was also a strategic choice. The USA fought a two-front war too. This is a complex subject far beyond the scope of the T-34 article. We can only be thankful the Nazi regime was as stupid as it was.

I am not arguing that the Panther is inferior to the T-34 in one-on-one combat - I am saying it is a nearly irrelevant issue for a whole bunch of reasons. There is a whole set of strategic choices that gets made long before any tank fires its gun. The Germans chose to build a few very high-quality tanks. The USA and USSR chose to build a much larger number of cheaper tanks. There were no German tanks in the victory parades. You cannot separate the issue of the stategic choices and the resulting quality and quantity of tanks that are deployed. It is all one interrelated issue, and it is completely invalid to argue one side of the triangle while ignoring the other two. There is nothing neutral or objective about that. It is like arguing over what the best car is. I'd love to drive a Ferrari around and go fast, but when it's february and I am in Montreal, driving snowbound hills, I am much better off in my jeep. Arguing that the Ferrari is faster is not wholly irrelevant, but it is a case of cherry-picking one characteristic and ignoring all the others that count. If you need to move a tank battalion 100 miles, a Sherman battalion will mostly get there. A T-34 battalion will mostly get there, with a few more lost to mechanical failure. If half the Panther battalion gets there you've beaten the odds.

In 1941 when the T-34 first saw combat there were no Panthers. No German tank was then the equal of the T-34. Not even close.

Finally, this is an encyclopedia, and our job is to report what the published experts say, not our opinions. And the consensus of the experts is pretty clear on this.

DMorpheus 01:07, 15 September 2006 (UTC)

Very good, thorough reply, DMorph. The resource superiority of the USSR is a pervasive myth, and I only recently read about the real picture, which is not quite so one-sided. I can't improve on what you wrote, but I would pick out a few salient big-picture points: four ways in which the T-34 is uniquely superior.

In June 1942: the T-34 was hands down the best tank in the world when Germany invaded the USSR. The Germans were shocked that rounds from the tanks and antitank guns which had led the blitzkrieg literally bounced off of its armour, while it turned panzers into Swiss cheese when it was competently manned.
Throughout World War Two: the T-34 was the best tank platform for further development during the entire war. It was suitable for upgrading with more armour, a new turret and gun, which, although not quite matching the Panther, allowed it to continue to hold its own until the armistice. Was any other tank useful right from 1940–45? Meanwhile, the Germans had to develop a completely new vehicle from the ground up, and despite all the hindsight (and perhaps abetted by national pride) it had to be much heavier, more complex and expensive to surpass the clunky old T-34.
In productivity: for those reasons and because of its simplicity, and its efficient and constantly improved production design, the T-34 out-produced the Panther in 1943–5, 6.8 times over. Second-most produced tank ever. In the big picture, this is another way in which it is an outstanding design.
In tank history: the T-34 was the conceptual prototype of the main battle tank, the very first tank to 'get it right': in 1939–40 it embodied the design principals necessary to achieve not only outright superiority in firepower, mobility and protection, but also the perfect balance which eventually rendered light and heavy tanks obsolete. While other countries were still struggling to achieve this in the 1950s, the Soviets kept building gradually on the same design philosophy with the T-44, T-54 (significantly outclassing the Panther by 1947), T-55, and T-62, and with the addition of all-new technologies in the T-64, T-72, T-80, leading to the post-Soviet T-90 and T-84. ...And yet, the T-34 was still in service with European countries fifty-six years after its debut!

To put the Panther's superiority in a historical perspective: by the time Germany had any, it wasn't winning a war any more. To compare apples to apples, the Panther was in the same class as its contemporary, the IS-2: faster, but relatively outgunned and under-armoured.

There have been many other excellent and notable tank designs, but surely none can match the legacy of the T-34. —Michael Z. 2006-09-15 07:03 Z

Agreed. I would nominate the Pzkw-IV as probably the only other tank that was useful in combat throughout the period you specified- 1940 to 1945. The Pzkw-IV's basic design was good enough to enable it to stay in the same league as the T-34, but not good enough to leapfrog ahead. The US M4 would be a better contender, but it was not available until 1942. In terms of the basic design it was far more 'upgradable' than the Pkzw-IV of course.

Interesting (although merely coincidental) that the IS-2 and Panther weigh about the same, and debuted in combat only about seven-eight months apart. Yet you rarely hear anyone making one-on-one comparisons between the two tanks. DMorpheus 15:27, 15 September 2006 (UTC)

Such a comparison wouldn't please a large group of WWII mil-fans, who enjoy admiring German technical superiority. Likewise, the Panzer 38t, III, and short-gunned IV which equipped the forces invading the Soviet Union are rarely compared directly to the T-34 they faced. The 45-tonne "medium" Panther tank of 1943 compares much better to a 32-tonne T-34 developed before the war, than to a contemporary 46-tonne Soviet heavy tank. —Michael Z. 2006-09-15 16:50 Z

T-34 is a Featured Article

T-34 is now one of Wikipedia's Featured Articles. Congratulations everyone, and thanks for all of the discerning eyes, attention to detail, and hard work which has helped this article grow and improve.

Please keep it up here, and in other articles. Cheers! —Michael Z. 2006-07-14 02:16 Z

Hitler's intelligence

I'm removing the following addition

Hitler reportedly remarked that if he'd known that the Russians were capable of making so many, he'd have second thoughts about invading

I recall that Hitler said he wouldn't have invaded the USSR if he'd believed Guderian's published statement that it had 10,000 tanks at the start of the war. In fact it had 30,000, although many obsolescent and in disrepair. Anyway, my recollection is that this was not directly related to the rate at which T-34's could be produced. If I'm mistaken, please set me straight—a reference would be helpful, too. —Michael Z. 2006-07-31 19:18 Z

My recollection matches yours - the statement had nothing to do with the T-34 itself. Also IIRC the total Soviet tank park in June 41 was around 20,000, but whatever - that's irrelevant to the point right now. DMorpheus 19:30, 31 July 2006 (UTC)