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Nasser steps made war inevitable, 2nd

A :Yours: " Despite your assertions, there is no scholarly consensus whether one side was at fault more than the other in increasing those tensions.". Please see the quotes in the next sections. This is the opinions of a lot of wp:rs as seen in the next section. Moreover, Nasser himself realized it before he decided to close the Tiran straits. Ykantor (talk) 22:08, 6 December 2014 (UTC)

Ykantor, by copying these quotes to this talkpage you're not really advancing your point or the cause of improving the article. You choose to quote those sources. Other editors could choose to quote other ones. For example, ones that lay the blame on Israel's doorstep. As you know, most scholarly accounts of the leadup to the war attribute the deterioration of the situation to a multilateral escalation. Historians now dispute Israel's claims of self-defence, based on newly accessed material. Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 18:12, 7 December 2014 (UTC)
Most of the quotes are from recent works, therefore clearly not all the historians "now" dispute Israel's claim of self-defence. Why not represent both POVs ? “WarKosign” 18:19, 7 December 2014 (UTC)
- A significant number of respected historians (might be even a majority) support the claim that it was inevitable that Nasser provocative acts would cause a war. Even Nasser himself (and his seniors) realized it, as quoted. Hence it should be inserted in the article.
- The claim that "most scholarly accounts of the leadup to the war attribute the deterioration of the situation to a multilateral escalation" was already proven wrong few times, and anyway concerning the crisis 3 weeks period (up to the war), initially even the Israelis considered Nasser mobilization of his army as a show off only. However, since later Nasser closed the straits for an Israeli bound shipping although he knew that it leads to a war, than this claim sound hollow.
- I consider adding to the article the "inevitable" issue, and the Egyptian plan to atalk Israel at the 27 May, which was canceled at the last minute. Ykantor (talk) 19:13, 9 December 2014 (UTC)
Ykantor, the "claim" has not been proven wrong, and it's not our place to try to prove sources right or wrong to begin with. The statement is reliably sourced to an academic source that is more reliable than opinions of individual editors. See Quigley: "The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense" on pages 134-5: the view that Israel acted in self defense is now increasingly contested by historians based on newly declassified evidence. Israeli generals said that if Nasser hadn't closed the straits, Israel would have developed another pretext to start the war. The United States told Israel to not start a war, despite the closure. So the war was indeed inevitable, regardless of what Nasser did, since Israeli generals had decided to start it. As is plain, the situation is more complex than your carefully selected sources would seem to imply. Overall, as has been pointed out to you more times than is reasonable, there is a separate article for the background for the war. Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 20:27, 10 December 2014 (UTC)
I am for adding those 2 issues to the article. Tzahy (talk) 16:21, 12 December 2014 (UTC)
  • Just to repeat for the umpteenth time this article is not about the causes of the war, it's about the war itself. The reason why there is a separate Origins of the Six-Day War is that it is too complex and too contraversial to include it here on a part basis only. It warrants a whole article. Hence, it is best to simply say here, in terms, that the war arose out of heightened tensions - see other article for details. This article needs to focus on what happened between 5 and 10 June and aftermath - and it doesn't do that terribly well. It is a great shame that editors aren't more concerned with that. DeCausa (talk) 16:37, 12 December 2014 (UTC)

@ DeCausa:

  • If you continue to modify my talkpage editing for the third time, I'll have to complain.
  • I will appreciate it if you refer to point A ,at the beginning of this section.
  • Just to repeat for the umpteenth time this article is about a war, and like other featured articles (mentioned previously) should relate to the war causes too. If there is a controversy, than according to the rules both sides should be mentioned, provided having a proper support (which you did not bother to produce yet)
  • If you are editing in a Good Faith, you should stand up to your word : "most scholarly accounts of the leadup to the war attribute the deterioration of the situation to a multilateral escalation" and prove it, rather than trying to hide the proof that your claim is wrong. How come that these quotes of significant amount of wp:rs (and growing), is ignored ? Why should not we act according to the rules? Ykantor (talk)
Ykantor, if you continue with this disruption it will end at ANI. Your quote farm is available to you in the collapsed section. There is no point in taking up extensive space on this page; no one else is engaging with you on it, it's just a personal collection for you, that's why it is collapsed. The better thing to do would be to create your own user page for it and link to it whenever you want to refer to it when you post here. DeCausa (talk) 08:12, 15 December 2014 (UTC)
I repeat my previous warning ([1]) :you offend wp:TPO :" you should not edit or delete the comments of other editors without their permission. Ykantor (talk) 08:20, 15 December 2014 (UTC)
You are, once again, trying to recast the article against WP:NPOV by pushing a thesis of unilateral responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities. Israel attacked first, but Nasser was to blame. As de Causa noted, there was a multilateral escalation. (The choice along the line to 'go to war' was Israel's, but it had a range of arguments justifying this choice as dictated by necessity, just as other perspectives see it as dictated by long-term strategic interests following a pattern of aggressive expansion and non-negotiation. The details of all of this are not for this page, but for the linked main pages dealing with these complexities. You simply cannot get away with the bias declared in the section heading above:'Nasser steps made war inevitable'. Nothing is 'inevitable' in world politics except cunning and stupidity.Nishidani (talk) 11:36, 15 December 2014 (UTC)
Your quote-farm is defective from the first instance, by the way:

-The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences, Avi Shlaim, ‎William Roger Louis - 2012 , page 7, 106 = Speaks of Nasser's three steps as making the war 'virtually inevitable'.

the operative word being 'virtually' (almost), but it is preceded by an analysis that argues Syria was trying to drag Nasser into a war he was cautious of avoiding, in order to destabilize his leadership of pan-Arab politics. 'Although he appeared to be challenging Israel to a duel, most observers agree that he neither planned nor wished for one,' his movement of troops into the Sinai being not a prelude to an attack but a move designed to deter an Israeli attack on Syria. What that book argues, persuasively, is that Arab politics were totally fragmented except with regard to a consensus re Israel and the need for war. Rhetoric was at a fever-pitch as competing regimes vied to seize the issue for internal and external political ends, while real coordination was in total disarray. Objectively there was no 'intrinsic' 'existential threat' - the CIA weeks before said the war would be wrapped up in 6, at the most 10 days, with an outstanding Israeli victory. Israel exercised an option to take the empty threats at 'face value' and blitz to smithereens the neighbouring armies. The book also says (p.9) that 'Israel's decision to go to war could be reached only after it had secured the tacit support of its (U.S.) superpower ally'. Had the U.S. not given its 'yellow light' the war was not 'inevitable'. There are numerous other factors, and snippets that simply and cherrypick as yours get us nowhere.Nishidani (talk) 12:27, 15 December 2014 (UTC)
  • @Nishidani: "there was a multilateral escalation". This is true, together with "Nasser steps mage the war inevitable.", as proven by a significant number(perhaps a majority) of wp:rs.
  • "Nothing is 'inevitable' in world politics"

    Technically, this is true, of course. Israel could have continue with big threatening armies positioned close to the borders around Israel ( and Growing), with economy hardly functioning since the working people (and trucks, buses etc.) were mobilized, with no spares for the airforce fighters (France declared embargo) etc. So, why did those significant amount of wp:rs used the term "Inevitable"? I guess that they used it because any other country would have done the same, under these circumstances.

    According to wiki rules, the view of a significant number (perhaps a majority) of the wp:rs should be displayed in the article (which mean 'inevitable' as well), together with the opposing view, provided it is supported. Thus the NPOV is maintained.

    However, in order to find a compromise, I am prepared to use an alternative wording, with the meaning that any other country would have done the same, under these circumstances.

  • Was Nasser interested in a war?

    At the beginning of these 3 weeks just before the war, Nasser was not interested in a war, even according to the Israeli army assessment of the time. However, at the end of the second week ( at 27 May) Egypt planned to attack Israel. The plan was canceled at the last minute, due to the 2 superpowers warnings. Hence, at least during those days he wanted a war. Ykantor (talk) 17:52, 18 December 2014 (UTC)

Levi Eshkol was not interested in exploiting the tensions to go to war: Yitzhak Rabin and several others were very eager, even Abba Eban. Like Nasser, Moshe Dayan made Rabin hysterical and brought him to a nervous collapse because he opposed his plans to go to war. Ben-Gurion was adamant in opposing it. So, why are you obsessing with one Arab leader as being a 'ticking bomb'? To finger a monster, or some overwhelming foreign culprit for Israel's predictable victory?Nishidani (talk) 18:15, 18 December 2014 (UTC)
- The simple answer is: because it is correct. That is what really happened.
- Generally Israel has its own share of wrong doing, but not in this war that erupted despite Israeli efforts to mitigate the tension and to avoid the war. The Israeli public was afraid, and eventually on the verge of panic. The generals wanted to initiate a war , but the reservist soldiers (most of the army) were worried. Eshkol was very cautious, and realized that starting a war with a U.S. red light , is very risky, and has no benefit. The Israeli government voted for the war only after the U.S. red light turned to yellow. (Indeed, As the war started, the U.S banned weapons and spares supply to to Israel and the neighbouring countries).
-Nasser Wiki article says: "On 21 May, Amer asked Nasser to order the Straits of Tiran blockaded, a move Nasser believed Israel would use as a casus belli. Amer reassured him that the army was prepared for confrontation, but Nasser doubted Amer's assessment of the military's readiness. Moreover, Amer anticipated an impending Israeli attack and advocated a preemptive strike. Nasser refused …. Still, Nasser concluded that if Israel attacked, Egypt's quantitative advantage in manpower and arms could stave off Israeli forces for at least two weeks, allowing for diplomacy towards a ceasefire. Towards the end of May, Nasser increasingly exchanged his positions of deterrence for deference to the inevitability of war, under increased pressure to act by both the general Arab populace and various Arab governments. On 26 May Nasser declared, "our basic objective will be to destroy Israel". On 30 May, King Hussein committed Jordan in an alliance with Egypt and Syria.". This text is much better than the this article existing text. Note that this text is based mostly on Arab historians:Kandil, Abu Rish, Mutawi.
-Since the Israeli victory was overwhelming, it might seem that it was predictable. It is suggested to read Kenneth M. Pollack "Arabs at war" [1] , for more detailed view.
  1. The Israeli surprising air attack hardly met an Egyptian resistance since nearly all Egyptian fighters were on ground. ! If some of those fighters were flying (and some ready for taking off) , they would have a good chance to shoot down the coming Israeli aircraft, with a limited maneuverability because of the heavy load of bombs. The Iraqis at H-3 Air Base, for instance, were ready for those aerial attacks and succeeded to shoot a significant amount of the attacking Israeli fighters.
  2. The Egyptian soldiers fought bravely and offered a significant resistance, unlike some french soldiers who run away when the Germans attacked them in the world war.
  3. The Syrian,Jordanian and Iraqi armies were supposed to attack Israel immediately in response to The Israeli attack on Egypt. Had they done that, Israel would have an hard time.
  4. If the war would have continued for more time, than the U.N could possible force a ceasefire. Israel could have been in a big trouble in such a situation.
- re- In order to find a compromise, I am prepared to use an alternative wording to "inevitable", with the meaning that any other country would have done the same, under these circumstances. Ykantor (talk) 13:05, 20 December 2014 (UTC)
This is your known POV. You are trying to edit it in on the page. You are saying Israel strove to avoid a war in full knowledge that if a war took place it was known that it would last for from 6-10 days and end in a resounding Israeli victory. The outcome of the war which Israel was, in your view, eager to avoid, was known before Israel began it by launching a strike. Egypt was told 12 hours before the strike that Israel would attack the next morning, and did not act on this CIA-Jordanian intelligence. That is not evidence of a nation on a war-footing, but of the total incompetent paranoid stupidity of inter-Arab political wrangling, which was of course the ace in Israel's hand. So, what you are doing is massing quotes saying Arabs were screaming for war, while leaving their forces in defensive positions, their air forces grounded within striking distance, and not firing a shot, whereas Israel was unwilling to go to war, while sure it would win any conflict within a week by wiping out the combined Syrian, Jordanian and Egyptian forces. It's all very interesting, but, Ykantor, we are expressly forbidden from using Wikipedia to write articles expressing one partisan version of events. The only way to avoid this is quite simple: you arrange the diplomatic, political and military facts in chronological order, and ignore issues of blame. Nishidani (talk) 13:38, 20 December 2014 (UTC)

(outdent) "this war that erupted despite Israeli efforts to mitigate the tension and to avoid the war" If this is what you really believe, then you've read a severely non-representative sample of sources. Israel begged and cajoled the US to greenlight an attack on Egypt on several occasions, to the extent of fabricating claims (disproved at the time, before the war, by US intelligence) that Egypt was about to attack Israel. Israeli leaders discussed generating an "alibi" for starting a war, including staging an incident in the Strait of Tiran. Israeli leaders have confessed that even without the Tiran closure, Israel would have acted on another pretext in a year or so. Israeli leaders have also explicitly referred to the Six-Day war as a war of choice. There is no way that the balance of sources would indicate that Israel tried to mitigate tension and avoid a war, since Israel tried to do exactly the opposite and the sources say so. Israel in fact started the war, despite initially claiming otherwise. You're beating a dead horse. --Dailycare (talk) 21:45, 20 December 2014 (UTC)

- to Nishidani: yours- "ignore issues of blame". The blame is a by product of the causes, and the article should deal with the causes as well, following featured articles.
- yours: "Israel strove to avoid a war in full knowledge that if a war took place it was known that it would last for from 6-10 days and end in a resounding Israeli victory." This is true in retrospect but was not seen as such by Eshkol, the cautious Israeli prime minister. He was worried about the implication of a successful Egyptian eminent attack, and he was not sure that he could trust the Generals promises. Note that it is difficult to predict the outcome of a war. The C.I.A failed to predict the 1948 and 1973 Israeli Arab wars, which is rather high percentage of their Israel- Arab war predictions.
- yours: 'extent of fabricating claims (disproved at the time, before the war, by US intelligence) that Egypt was about to attack Israel." Nowadays we know that it Egypt was about to attack Israel, and the Israeli alert was not fabricated at all. Please have a look for senior Egyptian officials testimonies.
- yours: "Israel begged and cajoled the US to greenlight an attack on Egypt". Israel was afraid of a repeat of the 1956 war bitter Eisenhower experience, and tried to find out if the American will continue that policy. But this happened at the last 10 days before the war, after Nasser closed the Tiran straits for Israeli shipping, although Nasser was aware that it was a declared Israeli Casus belli. BTW Johnson indeed banned military supply for Israel as the war started.
- yours:"Arabs were screaming for war, while leaving their forces in defensive positions". Rabin said that it might take the Egyptian few hours to move from defensive posture to offensive. The Egyptian airforce was ready for a surprise attack against Israel, and indeed it such an attack was cancelled at the last minute on 27 May. BTW the initial Egyptian well prepared defense plan, called for concentration of the Egyptian armored divisions about 50 km from the Israeli border, in order to destroy the attacking Israeli tanks in a Pincer movement, but Nasser insisted otherwise, so nearly all of his army was position in a in the defense line about 0- 10 km from the border.
- yours:"their air forces grounded within striking distance". The Egyptian Migs daily routine was to be on alert at dawn, the traditional surprise aerial attack time, but couple of hours later they landed and stop their alert. The Israeli attack plan timing took advantage on this phenomena. Imagine what could have happened if the Migs were already on air waiting for the attacking Israeli planes? The attacking aircraft, with heavy bombs and light on fuel could have been in a serious trouble.
- back to yours: (Israel) "sure it would win any conflict within a week". Bear in mind that Israel could not win a prolonged war because of the limited resources, an French & American supply embargo, and A U.N involvement under Soviet pressure.

-Let us try a "what if" scenario:
-- the Migs were already on air waiting for the attacking Israeli planes, as a daily routine.
-- Amer would not have been panicked, and would not command to retreat disorderly. The Egyptian still could not win (without an air force) but the war would be much longer, since the Egyptian soldiers fought bravely. In this scenario, the U.N, under a heavy Soviet pressure, would stop the war while Israel could not destroy the Egyptian army.
--An Israeli deception plan succeeded to divert The best Egyptian division (Shazli's) to a side show. Imagine that they would have been positioned in the right location.
-- The Syrian and Jordanian armies would respond to the Israeli attack on Egypt with immediate full attacks. In that case, Israel would had to divert some forces from Sinai to the other fronts, and the Sinai war would take more time. Actually this was the reason that Eshkol assured Hussein that if the Jordanian attacks and bombardment would be stopped, Israel would not retaliate.
-yours: "we are expressly forbidden from using Wikipedia to write articles expressing one partisan version of events". Sure. We have to obey wp:balance:":"Neutrality assigns weight to viewpoints in proportion to their prominence. However, when reputable sources contradict one another and are relatively equal in prominence, describe both approaches and work for balance. This involves describing the opposing views clearly, drawing on secondary or tertiary sources that describe the disagreement from a disinterested viewpoint...Neutral point of view should be achieved by balancing the bias in sources based on the weight of the opinion in reliable sources and not by excluding sources that do not conform to the writer's point of view."" Ykantor (talk) 19:17, 31 December 2014 (UTC)
Ykantor, see my comment above, timestamped "17:00, 8 November 2014". Israeli generals said the Egyptian forces in the Sinai were insufficient in number to invade Israel. Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 19:46, 1 January 2015 (UTC)


-to Nishidani: "Israel strove to avoid a war in full knowledge that if a war took place it was known that it would last for from 6-10 days and end in a resounding Israeli victory."
-My response was: This is true in retrospect but was not seen as such by Eshkol, the cautious Israeli prime minister. He was worried about the implication of a successful Egyptian eminent attack, and he was not sure that he could trust the Generals promises. Note that it is difficult to predict the outcome of a war. The C.I.A failed to predict the 1948 and 1973 Israeli Arab wars, which is rather high percentage of their Israel- Arab war predictions.
- Also, on May 26 1967, The C.I.A estimated:"The Israelis ... If they attack now they ... would still be able to drive the Egyptians away from the entrance to the Strait of Tiran, but it would certainly cost them heavy losses of men and materiel." (see the source in the article). So they have not foreseen a resounding Israeli victory, and the cautious Eshkol had good reasons for avoiding a war. Ykantor (talk) 13:57, 9 January 2015 (UTC)
According to Sami Sharaf, Minister of State for Presidential Affairs, ...the decision (the closure of the Tiran straits) was known (to Nasser) to make war inevitable" .(Shlaim,Louis,2012,p64)
Both the decision to close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping- commonly accepted as the point where war became inevitable.(Ferris2012p186) [2] Ykantor (talk) 20:19, 26 January 2015 (UTC)

Anyone can play that game. The war was not inevitable this, and this and this and this, where it is dismissed as an old Israeli textbook position, or the bungling at Samu and certain aspects of the military failure to secure the state's political goal (defensive) had a strong impact on the May crisis. Rabin's April decision caught the government up in a war scenario because based on intelligence that Israel could have a free hand hitting Syria because, it was thought, Nasser did not desire war). In short, Ykantor, you are picking and choosing to underwrite your personal verdict. This is an extremely complex story, with many angles, and we are under an obligation to not take sides, but (it's difficult) take the salient elements of most serious books and present them evenly.Nishidani (talk) 21:03, 26 January 2015 (UTC) ]

"Stable" version?

User:Ykantor has made this revert with the edit summary "return to the stable version. (was here from January)". The text was first added on the 21 January 2015 with this edit. In the six days between 21 January and today, the text was then removed or added seven times. Clearly, the stable version is the pre-21 January version, which has been stable for many months and in fact was first put in place in 2011. Per WP:BRD it is quite clear that the pre-21 January version should remain, and the added text should be out until there is WP:CONSENSUS for it on this talk page. DeCausa (talk) 12:58, 27 January 2015 (UTC)

Correct, as far as I have checked. Ykantor? Nishidani (talk) 13:02, 27 January 2015 (UTC)
Sorry. My mistake. Ykantor (talk) 13:03, 27 January 2015 (UTC)
Would you then self-revert please. DeCausa (talk) 13:05, 27 January 2015 (UTC)
I am worried because of the 1RR rule. I'll revert myself in 24 hours. Sorry. Ykantor (talk) 13:38, 27 January 2015 (UTC)
As far as I know, a self-revert is not treated as a revert. See the first item under WP:3RRNO. DeCausa (talk) 14:06, 27 January 2015 (UTC)

Israel could win a war in few days

-Is it important to know that Israel could win in 10 days or 3 days or any other number between 3 and 10? Some editors fought bravely to keep the background section short, but now expand it with some relatively unimportant trivia.

- The source quotes Mcnamara saying what is the Israeli view and not the Israelis themselves. I am not aware that Israel published such a view. It is better to avoid this kind of inaccuracy. Ykantor (talk) 00:36, 12 January 2015 (UTC)

I agree the background section should be kept short, so am OK with removing the CIA statement, which is misleading as it compares the situation to the Suez crisis, and the estimates. However, just leaving the misleading CIA statement in isn't OK. Israel's armed forces were very confident of an easy victory and were itching to get the war started. Of course Israel didn't "publish" such a view since Israel was planning to make the attack look defensive, and to paint a picture of Israel in mortal danger. We have sources that say this clearly. --Dailycare (talk) 21:02, 12 January 2015 (UTC)
to Dailycare:You are not replying, and it is not the first time. I will appreciate it if you reply to those 2 points. Ykantor (talk) 20:03, 14 January 2015 (UTC)
1) Yes. 2) see above. Further to point 1, the source says "3", so you cannot edit that to say "10". --Dailycare (talk) 19:36, 16 January 2015 (UTC)
I think it is important. Israel waged a preemptive war, when it was known beforehand that in any conflict, whoever started it, it would win within 6-10 days and trounce the other armies. It had 280,000 men mobilized close to the Arab borders, with no logistics difficulties, whereas the combined Arab strength, in mostly defensive positions, was less than half off that, about 117,000, and with huge logistic problems. The Israeli diplomatic initiative to spin it that an Arab attack was imminent was consistently rebutted by foreign intelligence services, and going to war with that certainty is a very significant part of the narrative.Nishidani (talk) 20:58, 16 January 2015 (UTC)
-A Yours: Israel "had 280,000 men mobilized close to the Arab borders" . Israel had 300 combat aircraft, Vs 950 to the Arabs. Israel had 800 tanks Vs 2500 tanks. (source- This article)
By Nishidani: You ignore strategic and logistic facts see below. Israel had 215 combat aircraft, and the 950 of the Arabs is just mechanical arithmetic of an abstraction. The preemptive strike on Egypt's airforce wiped out 189 planes of that total within hours. By midday, Israel had total air dominance. The Syrian, Iraqi and Jordanian air probes were small-scale, insignificant, and Iraq's airfleet was far too far away to be effective. Numbers are meaningless when analysed in terms of logistical capabilities.Nishidani (talk) 12:03, 29 January 2015 (UTC)
-B Yours: "The Israeli diplomatic initiative to spin it that an Arab attack was imminent was consistently rebutted by foreign intelligence services". Israel foreign minister Aba Eban himself thought so, but nowadays we know that the attack was indeed imminent on the 27 May, confirmed by senior Egyptian officials.
By Nishidani:Crap. See Qigley p.34 for the so-called Amer plan, which Oren highlights. The US 'did not take the information seriously' Nishidani (talk) 12:03, 29 January 2015 (UTC)
- Yours: "going to war with that certainty"
  1. C The Israeli generals were confident, but the cautious prime minister (and some government ministers) was worried. e.g. He asked the Airforce chief what will be the chance of Tel Aviv being bombed. The General replied that there will be no massive bombing, but could be "some" bombing.
By Nishidani:Foreign analysts knew that it was, from the outstart, a certain victory for Israel and the declaration that Tel Aviv might get a few hits, shows how confident they were.Nishidani (talk) 12:03, 29 January 2015 (UTC)
  1. According to the KGB's deputy resident in Washington at that time, no one in Moscow had any doubt that Israel would be quickly defeated"[3]
  2. D Washington, May 26, 1967. The C.I.A estimate:" The Israelis face dismaying choices. Surprised and shaken by Nasser's action, they failed to take the instant military counteraction which might have been most effective. If they attack now they will face far more formidable opposition than in the rapid campaign of 1956. We believe that they would still be able to drive the Egyptians away from the entrance to the Strait of Tiran, but it would certainly cost them heavy losses of men and materiel. We are not sure that they have sufficient stockpiles of ammunition and equipment for a war lasting more than three or four weeks, and it is possible that they would not embark upon a major campaign without prior assurances from the US of adequate resupply."[4] Ykantor (talk) 13:34, 27 January 2015 (UTC)
By Nishidani:On May 26, yet another agency found no reason to accept Israel's assertion that Egypt would attack. A "Watch Committee" functioned under the Intelligence Advisory Committee of the National Security Council to assess international situations that might result in hostilities.- The committee examined the Israel-Egypt situation: "On the basis of our review of all available intelligence, we do not believe the Israeli claim that Egypt is preparing to launch an attack against Israel." Johnson got a more detailed CIA assessment in response to a request he had made two days earlier. The CIA confirmed Egypt's defensive posture and Egypt's vulnerability: "We estimate that (Israeli) armored striking forces could breach the UAR's double defense line in the Sinai within several days." The CIA confirmed prior assessments that the IDF held an advantage:

The Israel Defense Forces ()IDF) are at a numerical disadvantage to the combined strength of Israel's Arab neighbors in terms of aircraft, armor, artillery, naval vessels, and manpower. Nonetheless, the IDF maintain qualitative superiority over the Arab armed forces in almost all aspects of combat operations., The high quality of training and maintenance, the degree of operational proficiency,. and the important, but intangible, morale factor give the advantage to the IDF, which operates through a single command structure and over interior lines of communication.

Egypt had limited troops available, the assessment continued, and would get little help from the other Arab states:

Only the UAR, Syria, and Iraq are coordinating military activity to any extent, Jordan, with limited offensive strength, is reluctant to become heavily engaged. Iraqi participation is limited by distance ands internal security needs. Lebanon has no offensive capability. . . Johnson said to Abba Evan:' All our intelligence people are unanimous regarding the assessment; that an attack is not imminent, and that if the UAR attacks 'you will whip the hell out of them'.' (John Quigley, The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense,pp.32-33.

The British intelligence estimate on 29 May was that despite Israeli insistence, 'there was no such present intention (to go to war) on the part of the U.A.R.'
What you persistently ignore is that Egypt's hot wind about closing the Straits of Tiran was, operationally, just that, hot air. It 'barely enforced' the declaration, and ships sailed through relatively unhampered. Indeed two ships sailed into Israel's port at Eilat unhampered. (Quigley p.41)
As I said, Ykantor, you are picking stuff for your thesis, whereas the sources can be harvested for the opposite view with equal facility. On Wikipedia, you are required, not to rig a POV thesis, but to simply secure a text that gives both versions. This whole exercise is pointless.Nishidani (talk) 12:03, 29 January 2015 (UTC)
- A . The balance of forces. You are right that the comparison of the 900 Arab combat aircraft Vs the 215 Israeli planes should not be assessed literally. The Iraqi army was indeed far away took minor part in the war. This was indeed one of the Israeli generals worries. They wanted to attack before The Iraqi army would really join the war, together with an expected expeditionary forces of Algeria, Sudan, Kuwait etc. Still, the Arab forces were much bigger, and had good weapons. On the same token, when you compare the 280,000 Israeli soldiers Vs 117000 Arab soldiers, it is better to differentiate between The first line units and the second line / territorial units. BTW The British intelligence erred and underestimated / overestimated the Israeli military strength, and included the territorial units .[5] To be continued. Ykantor (talk) 21:15, 30 January 2015 (UTC)

They wanted to attack before The Iraqi army would really join the war, together with an expected expeditionary forces of Algeria, Sudan, Kuwait etc

It's Friday night, and that's good for a laugh. Do you really know what the logistics of modern warfare is about. Are you seriously entertaining the fantasy that Sudan and Algeria would, under the noses of the world, sneak out through the Mediterranean, or across the desert, significant forces to help make a devastating surprise attack on little Israel. Do you know how long that takes, what secrecy is required, what logistical backup any significant movement of armour and troops requires. I do. My father was there in Rommel's day, and fought through to Gaza. Nishidani (talk) 21:20, 30 January 2015 (UTC)

Nasser threats

I included this edit to present the other point of view that Nasser wasn't really threatening anyone, but the hostile declarations he made in the previous days of the war's outbreak constituted a major factor in Israel's decision to initiate military action (among other catalysts). Furthermore, I know people who lived in Israel at that time and remember the terror of hearing Nasser's threats to "throw the Jews into the sea". I'm ready to reach a compromise, that's why I made the last edit to create a balance, but to remove very respectable sources from historians and newspapers (including BBC) just because you find them inconvenient is not acceptable nor compatible with Wikipedia's policy.--Ashurbanippal (talk) 09:19, 29 January 2015 (UTC)

Oppose. In accordance with WP:BRD I've restored the article to its stable version. Please read WP:CONSENSUS. If you want to introduce this change to the article, because you have been reverted by several editors, the correct course f action is for you to persuade others to your view and implement it only once there is consensus for it in this thread. As far as the addition is concerned, it is very easy to cherry pick statements from both sides to back up a POV. This seems an example of that. If that is allowed there will be those from the other POV who will want to add counterbalancing additions. This is what happened before and the section will simply end up being bloated and contentious. Because there is a separate Origins of the Six-Day War article per WP:SUMMARYSTYLE this section should have only the outline of the issues. Quotes goes beyond that IMO. DeCausa (talk) 10:59, 29 January 2015 (UTC)
I see Ashurbanippal has just been blocked for 60 hours for edit-waring on another article so any response will now be delayed. DeCausa (talk) 11:34, 29 January 2015 (UTC)
- I support enlarging the background section in order to describe the war origins too, including Nasser's and Israeli threats too. This article is crippled (especially the background section) and does not come close to featured war articles, that describe properly the background too.
- Yours: "the section will simply end up being bloated and contentious". There should be no such a problem with the opposed POV, if we follow the "Origin" article structure. Each contentious issue should be split into 2 sections according to the 2 opposing POV, provided they are well supported. We may start with one of those opened issue, and try it.
-Some such contentious issues :
  1. What were the disputes: (Jordan water, territory- DMZ, The right of passage in the straits, etc.)
  2. Did Israel / Arabs wanted a war?
  3. Did Arabs/ Israel welcomed the war?
  4. Did Egypt planned to attack Israel on 27 May? If so, why was it canceled.
  5. Was the war imminent? Ykantor (talk) 20:27, 30 January 2015 (UTC)
One doesn't answer queries to hypotheticals in Wikipedia articles. One describes the state of the art historical literature on the subject. What that literature regards as important becomes our guideline. Your questions have a defect, the assumption that states are personalities with volition (Did Israel want/Did Egypt plan?). States are nothing more that institutional bodies managed, directed or coped with by a congeries of partisan actors, lobbies (military, economic and political), subject to internal pressures (constituency moods) and external pressures (geopolitical forces, great power manoeuvers, and neighbourhood threats or opportunities. To illustrate: your May 27 buzz about 'Egypt' planning a war is one Egyptian general sketching a scenario, a general disliked by Nasser, who in turn had to cope with 'Arab opinion', national honour, rival bids from Syria et al to hog the rhetorical limelight, internal liabilities. The comic book version of history speaks of great leaders deciding things, or nations deciding to do . . it's crap. There's no comfort in history, despite the best efforts of geniuses of simplification to put this or that national story over as the truth.
I concur with De Causa, and oppose the motion.Nishidani (talk) 20:58, 30 January 2015 (UTC)
- Yours:"One doesn't answer queries to hypotheticals in Wikipedia articles" The section titles could be modified, if editors are preferring not to have it formulated as questions.
- Yours:"a defect, the assumption that states are personalities with volition." Again: The sentences could be modified, if editors are preferring other format. However, some respected historians does write about states as personalities, see for instance prof. Quandt: "Egypt accepted the fact" [6]
- One of this article deficiencies, is ignoring WP:BALANCE:when reputable sources contradict one another and are relatively equal in prominence, describe both approaches and work for balance. e.g. The sentence "Nasser steps made war inevitable" is repeatedly deleted here, although there are plenty of good sources for it.
- Yours: "your May 27 buzz about 'Egypt' planning a war is one Egyptian general sketching a scenario, a general disliked by Nasser". It is not one general but rather senior Egyptian officials like:
  1. Egyptian Chief of Staff General Mahmoud Fawzi
  2. Egyptian Vice-President Hussein el-Shafei,
  3. Bassiouny, The Egyptian ambassador to the U.S.S.R
  4. Abdel Magid Farid, The Minister for Presidential Affairs under President Nasser
These officials says that there Egypt planned to attack Israel at 27 May. It is difficult to believe that all of them are lying.— Preceding unsigned comment added by Ykantor (talk • contribs) 19:25, 31 January 2015 (UTC)

The Lead, Background are biased (archived sections)

Nasser steps made war inevitable

bias

Background section

The Lead is biased

- @JoeSperrazza:: The tags are returned, since the lead and the background section are not following Wikipedia policy and featured article, as discussed in the links of this section. If you are interested, you may have a look at one of the better versions of the background section, which unfortunately was deleted Ykantor (talk) 17:28, 25 May 2015 (UTC)

"draw off" which forces?

In the second paragraph of the section "Other Israeli forces" the text:

positioned as a ruse to draw off invasion forces from the real invasion routes,

should be something like

positioned as a ruse to draw off defensive forces from the real invasion routes,

or

positioned as a ruse to draw off Egyptian forces from the real invasion routes,

24.130.56.48 (talk) 03:13, 4 July 2015 (UTC)

done. thanks. Ykantor (talk) 10:51, 4 July 2015 (UTC)

Bias

Overall, this article seems to greatly praise the success of the Israeli army and their tactical superiority in many places without citing any reference to relieable sources. The use of Wikipedia:Weasel word has been noticed in various places as well. I think that lack of citations and deliberate partial praising is enough to question the neutrality and factual accuracy of this article. I wonder why noone has asked this question yet? This article reflects the position of Israeli's much more clearly than Arab forces, which suggests that editors have written certain portions of this article largly from an Israeli perspective. This article has a huge burden of bias on its shoulders. It needs to be removed. I request senior editors to take a closer look at this article and clear out biased information. Even semi-protect the article if necessary. Roshu Bangal (talk) 15:33, 23 August 2015 (UTC)

WP:SOFIXIT. Adding a rather pointless generalised tag and making generalised complaints does nothing to improve the article. And who are these "senior editors" you expect to do your bidding? If you think a particular sentence needs a source, go and look for the source and come back here and add it as an inline citation. If you think a section is biased, post here why you think it is, and suggest a revised wording. Wikipedia doesn't work by you clicking your fingers and other editors come running to sort out the problems that you perceive. It's a do-it-yourself sort of place. DeCausa (talk) 15:46, 23 August 2015 (UTC)
I've removed the tags. User:Roshu Bangal has not identified any specific areas for improvement. Roshu Bangal's claim that nobody has examined the article for bias is without merit. As with every other article on this topic, there has been extensive discussion - there are thirteen archived pages of discussion above. The editor requests that the article be semi-protected, but that has already been done. I would encourage Roshu Bangal to list specific examples from the article that he or she feels are poorly sourced or non-neutral.GabrielF (talk) 17:26, 23 August 2015 (UTC)

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West bank

"The IDF's strategic plan was to remain on the defensive along the Jordanian front, to enable focus in the expected campaign against Egypt". - This section needs to be supported by a source... — Preceding unsigned comment added by 62.61.139.218 (talk) 10:15, 17 September 2015 (UTC)

Israeli supporters

@Samuele1709: I think that by "supporters" it is meant states which sent actual military forces to support one side, rather than 'merely' material, financial, moral or other types of support. It does not seem appropriate to draw a parallel between supporters who committed military forces to a shooting war with other states who may, arguably, have wished the Israelis well but whom it has not been proven even supplied spare parts.

If one is going to add the US and the UK then it seems to me that one should certainly add the USSR and a considerable list of non-listed Arab states.

In short, the list is titled "belligerents" as it is meant to show the actual combatants; and the division is a (sensible in my opinion) way of dividing the major combatants and those combatants who 'merely' supported the front line states. As such I intend, with respect to the good faith editor, to revert this edit unless someone comes up with a good reason why I should not. Gog the Mild (talk) 22:04, 5 October 2015 (UTC)

@Gog the Mild: Sorry, I considered "supporters" as the generic meaning.

@Samuele1709: Very understandable. Would you like to revert it yourself? Gog the Mild (talk) 16:24, 6 October 2015 (UTC)

@Gog the Mild: Sure.

USS Liberty

I believe that it should be explicitly clarified that Israel killed those US Navy sailors in the infobox. --Makeandtoss (talk) 12:30, 16 October 2015 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 10 October 2015

Please change "by which Israel had taken control of the formerly Arab-controlled territory of Palestine" to "by which Israel had taken control of the remaining territory in the British Mandate of Palestine after being invaded by Arab League forces" because Israel was granted territory by the UN and the Arabs rejected their partition and never controlled any of the territory after the British left. Also, the original text makes it look like Israel invaded and took control of the territory when in reality they were granted a partition by the UN and took the rest in a defensive war.<http://www.un.org/depts/dpi/palestine/ch2.pdf /> 69.43.65.112 (talk) 23:34, 10 October 2015 (UTC)

Israel was not 'granted' territory by the UN, United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 says that territory can not be claimed through conflicts. United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine was obviously never implemented.--Makeandtoss (talk) 12:36, 16 October 2015 (UTC)

Notes

Dr. Phillip M. Feldman (talk) 22:55, 1 January 2016 (UTC) The article contains the following statement: "In May 1967, Nasser received false reports from the Soviet Union that Israel was massing on the Syrian border." This claim should be supported with a reference. If it cannot be supported, it should be removed.

Dr. Phillip M. Feldman (talk) 02:55, 3 January 2016 (UTC)Wikipedia reports that my above edit request has been answered, but I can find no evidence of this.

I have added a (further?) reference - C Herzog. It does show for me; although no other does. Gog the Mild (talk) 11:03, 3 January 2016 (UTC)

Contradictory statements about the Golan Heights

In the "Israelis debate whether the Golan Heights should be attacked" subsection, it stated "the attack on Syria was initially planned for June 8, but was postponed for 24 hours". However, it also says that Dayan opposed the attack until the next day. Since the latter is sourced and the former is not, I've deleted that part. If somehow the left hand didn't know what the right hand was doing and both are true, that needs to be made clearer. Clarityfiend (talk) 22:36, 20 February 2016 (UTC)

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Neutrality of the Background section

I am inclined to remove the neutrality box. This section seems succinct, NPOV and reasonably well sourced to me. Gog the Mild (talk) 22:25, 29 May 2016 (UTC)

I would agree that it is no longer required. It seems about the best we can get. Nothing too glaring flies out in reading. Irondome (talk) 22:36, 29 May 2016 (UTC)
Done. Gog the Mild (talk) 18:30, 31 May 2016 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 30 October 2016

In Conclusion the sentence "Overall, Israel's territory grew by a factor of three, including about one million Arabs placed under Israel's direct control in the newly captured territories." is incorrect.

  1. First - the territories are not Israels - they were never recognized by UN or USA or any other state as Israel territory. So it cannot be said that "Israel's territory grew".
  2. Second - only the Sinai Peninsula has 60000 square km. Israel has 20000. It is incorrect to write that the territory grew by factor of three. Factor of three is that you multiply by three which will give 60000 total. It is mathematically incorrect.

Therefore I suggest to Cut the first half of the sentence and make it:
"About one million Arabs were placed under Israel's direct control in the newly captured territories."

Hraju (talk) 20:15, 30 October 2016 (UTC)

Redacted previous response Actually, done. Folks are welcome to dispute, but the request lingered for about 5 days already — Andy W. (talk) 00:33, 4 November 2016 (UTC)

"Mobilization" by Egypt?

The article states that Egypt "mobilized" its forces in the Sinai...this seems misleading as "mobilization" has a specific meaning in military context (preparing for war)...can anyone cite a reference to this effect? Otherwise the wording should be changed methinks. Historian932 (talk) 17:51, 27 December 2016 (UTC)

Israeli mobilization dates

To whoever can edit the article: According to the book "The Six Day War 1967 Sinai" (Written by Siman Dunstan and published by Osprey Publishing 9781846033636) the IDF started mobilizing on the 20th of May and finished on the 30th. It is not the most critical of information but still worth adding whenever an approved editor has the time. 81.227.190.9 (talk) 18:50, 18 January 2017 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 2 April 2017

Change all uses of 'West Bank' to 'Judea and (&) Samaria'. The regions' proper name(s). 85.64.51.202 (talk) 18:15, 2 April 2017 (UTC)

 Not done no consensus for change, 'West Bank' is more commonly used. ProgrammingGeek talktome 19:35, 2 April 2017 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 22 April 2017

2.52.196.123 (talk) 17:05, 22 April 2017 (UTC)

 Not done. Blank request. El_C 11:02, 23 April 2017 (UTC)


Countries like the United States, France, and GB needed to be added on the list as countries involved in the way. The page makes it look like Israel was in it alone HandSack (talk) 19:26, 11 May 2017 (UTC)

Not done: please provide reliable sources that support the change you want to be made. DRAGON BOOSTER ★ 05:13, 12 May 2017 (UTC)

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False conclusion about corroboration

The number of Arab aircraft destroyed was probably not exaggerated. However the statement that "However, the fact that the Egyptian Air Force, along with other Arab air forces attacked by Israel, made practically no appearance for the remaining days of the conflict proved that the numbers were most likely authentic" is false. There could be many reason for non appearance, loss of most aircraft being only one of them.Royalcourtier (talk) 03:20, 30 May 2017 (UTC)

"In reaction to the mobilisation of Egyptian forces along the Israeli border in the Sinai Peninsula, Israel launched a series of preemptive airstrikes"

The following discussion is an archived record of a request for comment. Please do not modify it. No further edits should be made to this discussion. A summary of the conclusions reached follows.
The version proposed by Number 57 has gained clear consensus for use.Winged Blades Godric 07:04, 4 June 2017 (UTC)

The above sentence in the lead was written [2][3] without discussion at the end of 2014.

It is the single most important topic that scholars have argued about non-stop for 50 years. Yet our sentence shows only one side of the debate. The words "in reaction to" and "preemptive" are the Israeli justification. They should not be written in Wikipedia's neutral voice, and the other side of the debate should be noted in the lead.

For those less familiar with the topic, the other (opposite) scholarly perspective is that Israel had coveted Jerusalem ever since the 1948 war (this is undisputed), that Israeli intelligence knew that Jordan had a military treaty with Egypt and that Egypt's actions were chest beating without an intention to attack Israel, and that Israel took the opportunity to launch a war of conquest while blaming the other side for having started it. This is covered in the article Controversies relating to the Six-Day War.

There was significant discussion of this topic many years ago at /Archive 5 and /Archive 9. For example, the threads: Do we need to qualify the statement "Israel launched a pre-emptive attack" in order to conform to NPOV? in July 2010 which had 8 votes to 2 in a debate over whether "preemptive" required a qualifier, and recent revert in March 2012 on a similar debate.

Oncenawhile (talk) 06:32, 22 April 2017 (UTC)

I agree that there has been lots of controversy over the issue. To me, the phrasing in the article seems to be a straightforward case of "B followed A, therefore B was caused by A". At the very least, it implies causation, if not specifically stating it. How to rephrase? My suggestion is the following: split the sentence into two or more sentences. The first part can summarize the situation prior to the airstrikes (on all sides, not just Egypt), and the second part can note the airstrikes, without implying that they pre-empted an Egyptian attack. Kingsindian ♝ ♚ 13:42, 22 April 2017 (UTC)
Agreed. The first, broader, sentence you are suggesting is already in the article:

Relations between Israel and its neighbours had never fully normalised following the [[1948 Arab–Israeli War]]. In the period leading up to June 1967, [[Origins of the Six-Day War|tensions became dangerously heightened]].

I have in mind a couple of sentences as follows:

On 5 June, Israel launched a series of airstrikes against Egyptian airfields. The reason for the strikes is one of a number of [[Controversies relating to the Six-Day War|controversies relating to the conflict]] - after initially claiming that Egypt had struck first, Israel claimed that the strikes were [[Preemptive war|preemptive]] in reaction to the [[mobilisation]] of Egyptian forces along the Israeli border in the [[Sinai Peninsula]], whilst Arab leaders claim the strikes were a premeditated opening act to a war of [[conquest (military)|conquest]].

Oncenawhile (talk) 14:41, 22 April 2017 (UTC)
  • Comment The main question for me is why mention of Egypt closing the straits of Tiran has been removed from the lead – Israel had stated this would be casus belli and Egypt went ahead and did it. The proposed wording by Oncenawhile is not acceptable because it reads as if the Egyptian troop build-up is an Israel claim rather than fact. I would suggest:
In the period leading up to June 1967, tensions became dangerously heightened. Israel reiterated its 1950s statement that the closure of the straits of Tiran to its shipping would be a casus belli and in late May Nasser announced the straits would be closed to Israeli vessels. Egypt then mobilised its forces along its border with Israel and on 5 June Israel launched what it claimed were a series of preemptive airstrikes against Egyptian airfields.
This implies no causation but is a simple chronological order of events. Number 57 10:55, 23 April 2017 (UTC)
  • In the lead, use the above version that is a simple chronological order of events. This is the best version as it most closely conforms to NPOV. In addition, a version which mentions the view that Israel did not attack due to the threat of a very potential Egyptian attack is not a consensus view. For example, Britanica’s article says near the lead of their article: “In response to the apparent mobilization of its Arab neighbours, early on the morning of June 5, Israel staged a sudden preemptive air assault that destroyed more than 90 percent Egypt’s air force on the tarmac.”[4]. We really should use Ockham’s razor here and use the simplest explanation that is also the most likely explanation. For example, Vox Day wrote: “It’s also interesting to note that more than half of these religious wars, sixty-six in all, were waged by Islamic nations, which is rather more than might be statistically expected considering that the first war in which Islam was involved took place almost three millennia after the first war chronicled in the Encyclopedia, Akkad’s conquest of Sumer in 2325 B . C . In light of this evidence, the fact that a specific religion is currently sparking a great deal of conflict around the globe cannot reasonably be used to indict all religious faith, especially when one considers that removing that single religion from the equation means that all of the other religious faiths combined only account for 3.35 percent of humanity’s wars.”[5] So it is not like the Israelis did not have any concern about Egypt’s true intentions concerning their troop movements given the history of Islam/wars. Israel is a small country and does not have the luxury of engaging in speculative gambles.desmay (talk) 01:31, 1 May 2017 (UTC)
Comment. Just to be clear, is that a support for the suggestion from User:Number 57. Moriori (talk) 02:00, 1 May 2017 (UTC)
Desmay's essay does not address the question in terms of Wikipedia policies and so should be discounted. The question here is not what happened in 1967, but how to present the content of reliable sources about it. Zerotalk 02:12, 1 May 2017 (UTC)
  • I support Onceinawhile's wording. This is a complex issue, since on one level the Israeli attack was "reactive" to the Egyptian buildup in the Sinai, but the reality was also that Israeli generals were clamouring for war and a chance to destroy Egypt's military potential. The Strait closure provided a good pretext, but Israel would have used another pretext had Nasser not closed the Straits. Onceinawhile's wording also conveys the important point this is not something everyone agrees on. --Dailycare (talk) 16:49, 3 May 2017 (UTC)
    • The last two comments ignore the misleading wording that can be read as if the Egyptian troop buildup was an Israeli claim, and also the fact that he closure of the Straits of Tiran was a major part of the buildup. It seems to be fairly clear attempt to downplay the Egyptian role in causing the conflict and put the blame squarely on Israel. This is not NPOV and therefore not acceptable for Wikipedia, and I hope the closing administrator takes this into account. Cheers, Number 57 20:46, 3 May 2017 (UTC)

Support User:Number 57's suggestion.

From the Suez-Crisis on Nasser was building up his forces for a show down with Israel. It may have come sooner than he expected so what? I think you will have a hard time finding historians who argue that Nasser was not expecting to have a conflict with Israel at some point.

The Israelis had many reason to expect an attack. UNEF was kicked out, the Egyptian mobilized and closed the Straits. So what if the Israelis lied about Egypt attacking first they did so for rational reasons, to keep Soviet forces out of the conflict as long as possible.Jonney2000 (talk) 08:35, 6 May 2017 (UTC)

Support User:Number 57's suggestion. Hi all. I've been summoned by the rfc bot. 57's proposal is solid in what is a difficult matter. In particular, his first sentence is extraordinarily neutral as it takes passive voice to avoid pointed, specific blame. His entire proposal is very measured and reasonable. I encourage all to avoid speculation on what Israel or any country would have done. While speculative actions are certainly possible, even possibly probable, that speculation should be avoided when making our determination. Thanks to User:Number 57 and all who have participated.Horst59 (talk) 00:18, 18 May 2017 (UTC)

After reading the debate, I Support user:Number 57. The Egyptian blockade should obviously be mentioned, and its not clear to me how Israel could be certain that Egypt was not going to attack, while they were, on the ground, preparing an attack. Heptor talk 13:01, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

Combined version

Both Number57 and my version had support in the discussion above, with Number57's getting more votes. I have therefore taken Number57's version as a base, and added a few clauses from my version, in the below:

In the period leading up to June 1967, tensions became dangerously heightened. Israel reiterated its 1950s statement that the closure of the straits of Tiran to its shipping would be a casus belli and in late May Nasser announced the straits would be closed to Israeli vessels. Egypt then mobilised its forces along its border with Israel, which it claimed to be a defensive measure, and on 5 June Israel launched what it claimed were a series of preemptive airstrikes against Egyptian airfields. Claims and counterclaims relating to this series of events are one of a number of controversies relating to the conflict.

I will put this in the article for now, but further comment appreciated.

Oncenawhile (talk) 22:35, 24 May 2017 (UTC)

A few additional points, thinking about this further:
  • We have the choreography wrong. The mobilisation of Egyptian forces actually preceded the closing of the straits.
  • We are missing a reference to the Israeli invasion of Sinai in 1956, and the subsequent demilitarisation of the Egyptian territory, which formed the crucial context to these moves.
  • The Egyptians claimed the mobilization was "deterrence" rather than defence. The concept being that in retaking control of the Sinai and the straits, they expected an Israeli attack.
Oncenawhile (talk) 13:55, 31 May 2017 (UTC)
You seem strangely determined to make the war appear to be the fault of the Israelis. Seeing as the "which it claimed to be a defensive measure" part wasn't in the suggestion, and now apparently isn't actually the case, I've removed it from the text in the article. Regarding the timing of the mobilisation, I suggest rewording the third sentence: "Egypt had mobilised its forces along its border with Israel earlier in May, and on 5 June..." Number 57 15:31, 31 May 2017 (UTC)
That is an outrageous POV push, Number 57. You remove Egypt's claim but leave in Israel's claim. Either both remain, or both are out. Oncenawhile (talk) 20:44, 31 May 2017 (UTC)
Don't make such ridiculous claims. It was what a majority of users opted for as the best option. You were the one that attempted to unilaterally amend it to get your POV into it. Number 57 21:33, 31 May 2017 (UTC)
None of the comments suggested we should focus on the claims of one side and ignore those of the other. The discussion above was to improve a very poor version that we had previously, and we took a step forward. That doesn't give you or anyone else the right to ignore the remaining deficiencies. For example, your version was factually incorrect (re the choreography), so there's no room to be overly sanctimonious about the quality of the voting.
Per above, it is extreme POV pushing to delete one side's claims whilst leaving the other. Oncenawhile (talk) 23:00, 31 May 2017 (UTC)
I agree with #57. There was an obvious consensus for one version, and you took it upon yourself to change it with no consensus. If you want to introduce more changes, start a new discussion. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 23:04, 31 May 2017 (UTC)
Also agree with #57, and will reiterate my position that any paragraph that contains the word "claim" four times should be blasted from the face of the earth. Poliocretes (talk) 09:00, 1 June 2017 (UTC)
The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Planed Israel Nuclear Demonstration in Sinai

suggested text: In what they called the "Last Secret of the Six Day War" the New York Times reported that in the days before the 1967 Six Day War Israel planned to insert a team of paratroopers by helicopter into a remote area of the Sinai. Their mission was to set up and remote detonate a nuclear bomb on a mountaintop as a warning to belligerent surrounding states, on a clear day the fireball might be seen from Cairo. The Jewish State occupied the Sinai and a ceasefire was imposed before the test could be set up. Retired Israeli brigadier general Itzhak Yaakov referred to this operation as the Israeli Samson Option.[7] — Preceding unsigned comment added by 109.66.76.85 (talk) 14:50, 4 June 2017 (UTC)

1956 Suez crisis in the lead

I see that in the lead, a simple "chronological" version has been written. But why does it skip straight to 1967 after 1948, without including 1956? Kingsindian ♝ ♚ 01:21, 6 June 2017 (UTC)

Agreed. Particularly since the Israeli invasion in 1956 was the key event in the minds of the Egyptians when ordering the troop build up and the key event in the minds of the Israelis when announcing the closure of the straits to be a causus belli. I will make a proposal. Onceinawhile (talk) 09:24, 27 June 2017 (UTC)
I also agree, 1956 should definitely be included. Not to do so represents cherry-picking. I am, however, nor sure that 1956 was THE key event, but it certainly was one of the main 'push' motives for Nassar. Erictheenquirer (talk) 08:02, 28 June 2017 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 12 July 2017

The casualty section lists "34 US Navy sailors" killed during the U.S.S. liberty, but not all of those people were members of the U.S. Navy. 31 of the dead were members of the U.S. Navy, two of the dead were Marines, and one of the dead was actually a civilian working for the NSA named Allen Blue. The confusion with Allen Blue might come from the fact that he had served in the U.S. Navy in World War Two, meaning his grave at Arlington says he was a member of the U.S. Navy (http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/liberty.htm), but he was actually a civilian NSA worker by the time of the attack. I suggest changing it to say "31 American U.S. Navy sailors, two American Marines and one American civilian NSA employee." The U.S.S. Liberty article (https://wiki.riteme.site/wiki/USS_Liberty_incident) gives this source as an explanation for the casualties, but you can find a list easily online: [8] Zwifree (talk) 14:24, 12 July 2017 (UTC)

Not done: please establish a consensus for this alteration before using the {{edit extended-protected}} template. jd22292 (Jalen D. Folf) (talk) 01:47, 13 July 2017 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 1 August 2017

In the sentence that begins, "Israeli morale and international prestige was greatly increased," change "was" to "were." Two separate subjects, plural verb.Dgndenver (talk) 15:21, 1 August 2017 (UTC) Dgndenver (talk) 15:21, 1 August 2017 (UTC)

Done jd22292 (Jalen D. Folf) (talk) 15:38, 1 August 2017 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 9 October 2017

Please, somebody at the end of this section, next to where it says "...and 126,000 immigrated to the United States." add the following information about religious revival:

The great rise in Jewish pride in the wake of Israel's victory also fueled the beginnings of the baal teshuva movement.[9][10][11]

Thanks--181.93.81.19 (talk) 07:49, 9 October 2017 (UTC)

Done SparklingPessimist Scream at me! 23:22, 9 October 2017 (UTC)

Allegations of atrocities against Egyptian soldiers

The heading “Allegations of atrocities against Egyptian soldiers” is ambiguous. It should be changed to “Allegations of atrocities COMMITTED against Egyptian soldiers”. Otherwise it might be misunderstood to mean “Allegations against Egyptian soldiers of atrocities [that they allegedly committed]”. Mumbo-jumbophobe (talk) 18:50, 14 November 2017 (UTC)

User:Mumbo-jumbophobe: I agree, and have changed the heading accordingly, Huldra (talk) 20:22, 14 November 2017 (UTC)

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Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 6 December 2017

There are three repeated links in the lead alone about the Straits of Tiran. Per MOS:DUPLINK, two of them should be removed in the second and third paragraphs.--181.92.195.15 (talk) 01:46, 6 December 2017 (UTC)

Done Thank-you for pointing that out! regards, DRAGON BOOSTER ★ 06:47, 6 December 2017 (UTC)

Jordanian casualties

Something wrong with the 6,000 Jordanians killed or missing figure. Official Jordanian Armed Forces website counts close to 600 [6]. This source says the initial estimates were 6,000 but were later revised to around 600 [7]. Makeandtoss (talk) 14:22, 28 December 2017 (UTC)

Fascinating. There must be a story in there somewhere – perhaps that the Jordanian’s didn’t want Nasser and the rest of the Arab World to know that their casualties were relatively light.
Onceinawhile (talk) 15:35, 28 December 2017 (UTC)
Maybe. In all cases, the sources for the 6,000 figure needs to be double checked. They are not available for me. Makeandtoss (talk) 14:08, 30 December 2017 (UTC)
I have Herzog and he writes "Jordanian casualties in the fighting were estimated by the Jordanians at over 6,000 in killed and missing". I note how careful Herzog is in his phrasing. One might assume that many of the wounded fell into Israeli hands and were listed as missing. Although the article gives 591 as captured - but without a source. Similarly it wouldn't surprise me if there was a fair bit of 'straggling', including desertion, which once troops returned to their units or were identified as deserters would bring the total down. E.g. to Dunstan's 3.200 killed and wounded, excluding missing and captured. I don't have either of the other sources, but one might suspect that they rely on the same initial estimate (or simply copied Herzog, a reliable source). So I don't see why we shouldn't replace the 6,000 number, but would really like input as to exactly what the other sources say - although, judging them just by their titles I would put more faith in Herzog. In passing, King Hussein of Jordon wrote My 'War' with Israel in the immediate aftermath - I hypothesise that that is the original source of the 6,000 figure, but I don't have access to a copy. If it is then I would certainly accept Dunstan's update. Gog the Mild (talk) 16:16, 30 December 2017 (UTC)
Yes it seems that the 6,000 killed figure was made by Hussein very early on (this is an Arabic source of "My War with Israel" which mentions the 6,000 dead figure on page 71), and then picked up by various publishers as fact. Here are the sources that mention the revised figure (whether 700, 696, 575):
JAF official estimate (575)
The Six Day War 1967: Jordan and Syria (696)
The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars, Undeclared Wars with Israel, Six Days of War, The Six-Day War (700)
The Israelis in particular are skeptic:
Knesset Website: "Jordan, according to King Hussein, had 6,000 casualties (other sources give various smaller numbers)."
Israeli history textbook: "..and Jordan announced it had 6,000 dead, although this number seems highly exaggerated." Makeandtoss (talk) 14:54, 3 January 2018 (UTC)
What an excellent piece of research. Thanks for that Makeandtoss. Should we put the wounded, 2,500, in the infobox given that we have the figure? It is given for the Israelis and the Iraqis. Gog the Mild (talk) 12:41, 6 January 2018 (UTC)
I guess so, the 2,500 wounded is reasonable. Well what about the 533 captured, is it reasonable? I am not really knowledgeable on this part of history.Makeandtoss (talk) 18:40, 6 January 2018 (UTC)
It seems reasonable to me. More importantly it is sourced. Get it in. The captured figure seems suspiciously low to me, but we have to go with the sources we have; the Israelis ought to know how many they captured and have no reason to understate it. Gog the Mild (talk) 20:43, 6 January 2018 (UTC)

Issues

The lede excessively discusses the Egyptian front with minimum attention to the Jordanian and Syrian ones. Also why are Kuwait leaders and commanders in the infobox unlike Iraqi and Lebanese leaders who played a more prominent role? Makeandtoss (talk) 18:45, 6 January 2018 (UTC)

Good points. The Kuwaitis should be taken out. And that fifth paragraph of the lead could do with a bit more information on the Jordon and Golan fronts. If no one else comes along and so long as no one raises valid objections I'll do it myself. Gog the Mild (talk) 20:47, 6 January 2018 (UTC)

Amendments to the lead

I have done some work on the lead. As pointed out above, the Jordanian and Syrian fronts had hardly a mention so I have added a little detail regarding them. The lead was already quite long, so not wanting to inflate it further I have deleted the sentence on controversies over the start of the war; it seems to me to not be notable enough to be in the lead and is written so tersely as to not really be comprehensible on its own. I have also taken out a sentence covering territory seized by Israel as all of this is covered earlier in the lead.

I have also altered the Arab casualty figures to match the infobox, the Casualties section and, most importantly, the sources. Gog the Mild (talk) 14:26, 20 January 2018 (UTC)

CIA estimate

Under Background there is the paragraph:

On May 26, 1967, the CIA estimated: "The Israelis … If they attack now they … would still be able to drive the Egyptians away from the entrance to the Strait of Tiran, but it would certainly cost them heavy losses of men and materiel."

Personally I don't see what it adds to the article. I note that Background is described as "bloated". I would propose it for deletion. Thoughts? Gog the Mild (talk) 18:44, 20 January 2018 (UTC)

I tend to agree, especially considering that it mis-represents the CIA's estimate rather badly. In reality, the CIA estimated Israel would score an easy victory in ten days. Israeli generals agreed with this assessment, which is why they were so eager to attack as to consider a military coup to remove the recalcitrant civilian government. --Dailycare (talk) 15:37, 27 January 2018 (UTC)
Thank you. Boldly edited. Gog the Mild (talk) 16:00, 27 January 2018 (UTC)
  1. ^ Kenneth Michael Pollack. Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991. U of Nebraska Press. pp. 58–. ISBN 0-8032-0686-0.
  2. ^ Jesse Ferris (23 December 2012). Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power. Princeton University Press. p. 186. ISBN 1-4008-4523-8. Both the decision to close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping- commonly accepted as the point where war became inevitable
  3. ^ Yaacov Ro'i; Boris Morozov (2008). The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War. Stanford University Press. p. 13. ISBN 978-0-8047-5880-2. According to the KGB's deputy resident in Washington at that time, no one in Moscow had any doubt that Israel would be quickly defeated
  4. ^ Sherman Kent for the Central Intelligence Agency's Board of National Estimates (May 26, 1967). "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 79 79. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency's Board of National Estimates to Director of Central Intelligence Helms". Washington. The most likely course seems to be for Nasser to hold to his present winnings as long as he can, and in as full measure as he can. As of the moment he has vastly enhanced his own prestige in Egypt and throughout the Arab world, diminished the standing of Israel and, at least for the moment, administered a serious setback to the US. Moreover, by simply standing where he is he places the Israelis in an extremely difficult position. He keeps the crisis at high pitch, and as long as this continues the Israelis must remain mobilized. This they cannot do for long without adverse effects upon their economy. 5. The Israelis face dismaying choices. Surprised and shaken by Nasser's action, they failed to take the instant military counteraction which might have been most effective. If they attack now they will face far more formidable opposition than in the rapid campaign of 1956. We believe that they would still be able to drive the Egyptians away from the entrance to the Strait of Tiran, but it would certainly cost them heavy losses of men and materiel. We are not sure that they have sufficient stockpiles of ammunition and equipment for a war lasting more than three or four weeks, and it is possible that they would not embark upon a major campaign without prior assurances from the US of adequate resupply.
  5. ^ R. Gerald Hughes; Peter Jackson; Len Scott (11 March 2008). Exploring Intelligence Archives: Enquiries Into the Secret State. Routledge. p. 236. ISBN 978-1-134-27017-0.
  6. ^ William B. Quandt (1986). Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics. Brookings Institution Press. p. 174. ISBN 0-8157-1344-4. Egypt accepted the fact
  7. ^ https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/03/world/middleeast/1967-arab-israeli-war-nuclear-warning.html
  8. ^ Gerhard & Millington 1981, pp. 29, 28, 52
  9. ^ "The Miracle of '67: Forty Years Since the Six-Day War (Rabbi Moshe Goldstein) 2007". www.wherewhatwhen.com. Archived from the original on December 12, 2007. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  10. ^ "American Jews rediscover orthodoxy". The New York Times. 30 September 1984. Retrieved 9 October 2017.
  11. ^ Aiken, Lisa (2009). The Baal Teshuva Survival Guide. Rossi Publications. ISBN 0977962938.
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