Talk:Problem of evil/Archive 2

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RfC

Comments are solicited on the attempts by an anon editor to make substantial changes to the article:

Anonymous is irrelevant. You're suppose to be bold. The point is to improve the article, not to get famous writers to write it. Also, you are blanking out a lot of my edits. Do you even have a specific complaint? Infinity0 17:15, 16 October 2005 (UTC)

Explain the reason behind your reversion. I think my edits make it much more clearer. Infinity0 23:32, 16 October 2005 (UTC)

I referred to an anon editor because I thought that it was an anon editor; in fact it was you. I've asked for comments from other editors (that's what an RfC – Request for Comments – is). --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 21:54, 18 October 2005 (UTC)

It looks like many of the editors are providing various descriptions of the problem of evil as they understand it. This kind of personal digest can be helpful for starting an article on a subject which one is familiar with. However, for improving an article on a complicated topic with widely divergent views it is likely to lead to edit and revert wars. The best that all interested parties could do would probably be to look to extant philisophical work: then to refer to the concepts and theories by famous philosophers and the terms they have coined which have gained currency. Hopefully this will depersonalize the content you add. -- Alan McBeth 21:44, 21 October 2005 (UTC)

Recent edit

Though an individual can infer acts which please and displease their own particular god, to assert the existence of an absolute evil is to try and infer the purpose of that god, which transcends pleasing/displeasing that god. For Judeo-Christian religions, the purpose of God is unknowable, thus "evil" can only be defined in terms of humanity. Therefore, the Problem of Evil as it applies to a Judeo-Christian God could be seen as irrelevant.

That misses the point. Evil makes HUMANS suffer, so god would destroy evil to relieve the suffering. God wouldn't be destroying evil for himself. The above point is more part of Transcendental argument for the existence of God, not the problem of evil. Infinity0 19:49, 28 October 2005 (UTC)

Not to belabor the dispute, since I will accede to the will of someone who knows better (the above text is mine), but the Problem of Evil not only presupposes an evil that acts upon humans, but also that God is omnibenevolent as that term applies to humans]. To assert that evil exists is de facto to assert that God is not omnibenevolent towards humans only insofar as the purpose of God is to be omnibenevolent towards humans. Since the purpose of God cannot be known, the Problem of Evil could be seen as irrelevant because in its precepts is a spurious conclusion. This is what I was trying to say. If God wanted to stop suffering, He could have said so somewhere. He didn't. In fact, He says just the opposite. This is an extension of St. Augustine's statement about suffering, that we don't really know if suffering is a part of his purpose, but since it happens, it must be. Therefore, "evil" can only be defined in human terms -- we do not know if this evil is the same for us as it is for God (presumably not), but assuming that God has a purpose is not the same as assuming the knowledge of what that purpose is. My feeling was that this was a valid response to the Problem of Evil, so I put it here. Still 15:27, 29 October 2005 (UTC)

The problem of evil tries to argue that humans suffer needlessly, (since God is omnipotent and can do anything). I don't think it's relevant what *his* purpose is or might be, since whatever that purpose is, any end result of suffering could be accomplished by other means. Infinity0 17:45, 29 October 2005 (UTC)

God created humans in his own image: so surely what we consider evil is included within what God is?

Would people prefer to live in a world/universe whose aspects can be deduced from logical principles, where bad things happen or one in which nothing bad is allowed to happen, however illogical the the consequences?

And, quoting from memory, "We are free to do as we wish, but we have to choose to do rightly" - God allows evil etc to occur so that we can choose not to be evil?

Um, the second paragraph sounds for-god, but the other paragraphs sound anti-god... Anyways, here are my thoughts.

I don't think who thinks what is evil is really relevant in this argument - i don't like the name "problem of evil", but more of "problem of suffering". All suffering is unnecessary if God is omnipotent, because whatever end results, he can bring about by suffer-less ways. If God is omnipotent, then he can make a world where nothing bad happens, AND the consequences are logical.

How can a meta-physical being have an image??

God allows people to be evil so people can choose not to be evil? Why doesn't god just make people not evil in the first place - we are still choosing aren't we? We just have a different spectrum of choices, most of which weigh towards good rather than evil.

Infinity0 20:03, 1 November 2005 (UTC)

What's so bad about suffering? If a child suffers emotional pain because they can't have an ice cream, most adults don't seem too worried about it. To any god, our suffering must seem pretty minor. We're wimps! Even the worst forms of torture, to God, can't seem all that bad. He probably rolls His Most Holy Eyes at this question. Besides, if we're all going to heaven, then one day we'll all look back and laugh at it: "remember the time when I was tarred and feathered, and then drawn and quartered? And I was so worried. Seems so insignificant now, hahahahaha."24.64.223.203 01:56, 10 November 2005 (UTC)

But to us, they seem major. And that's the point. Also, physical suffering cannot be self-averted - but God can avert them. Infinity0 21:20, 10 November 2005 (UTC)

Augustine vs Epicurus: Nonsensical passage?

In the section describing Augustine's response to Epicurus' version of the Problem, there appears this sentence:

Augustine also argued that Epicurus had ignored the potential benefits of suffering in the world. An omnipotent God could give the world any benefits derived from suffering without those in the world having to suffer.

Is sentence number two ("an omnipotent God...") not a counterargument to sentence number one ("Augustine also argued")? If so, the wording needs to be made clearer. SpectrumDT 00:13, 25 November 2005 (UTC)

Yeah, i'll go clarify it. Infinity0 00:31, 25 November 2005 (UTC)

Origonal research in responses

Someone placed what Infinity and I considered origonal research in the responses section. It was taken out, with the following comments added into the text:

The above paragraph is pointless waffle. Somebody please condense it down and add the counter-response that it's not a problem of evil (whose definition is disputed) but of *physical suffering* which is an objective concept. I'd do it, but I'm busy right now. Infinity0 20:13, 30 November 2005 (UTC)

I say that without some outside refferences or sources it be cut out.... it sounds more like someone's opinion Sethie 18:23, 25 November 2005 (UTC)

I have moved them here for discussion.

The paragraph in question has no sources and just sounds like someones's ideas to me. Any comments?

SAT! Sethie 19:27, 30 November 2005 (UTC)

The problem of defining evil is already covered in the article. This is just repeating stuff. The paragraph needs to be heavily rewritten and shortened and moved to the "Types of Evil" section (near the top). Infinity0 20:13, 30 November 2005 (UTC)

No further discussion or edits have come of it, I am going to remove it. Sethie 23:38, 31 December 2005 (UTC)

Requested addition

Christians that don't accept the concept of "free will", such as Greg Bahnsen, argue that the existence of evil does not contradict the nature of God because God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil which exists. Morally sufficient, in this context, meaning one which satisfies God's omnibenevolence. God has not made this reason known to us yet, but this doesn't mean that such a reason doesn't exist. The existence of this reason, Bahnsen says, is to be taken by faith. He gives the examples of Abraham and Job who were faced with obvious "evils", but had to trust God that He had a morally sufficient reason for them, which turned out to be true in both occasions, according to the Bible. Critics of Bahnsen say that God could have tested Abraham and Job without causing them such evil. Proponents of Bahnsen's logic respond that what happened to Abraham and Job didn't compromise God's omnibenevolence, as the state in which Abraham and Job are now is not any worse than it would have been without the evil (i.e. the evil has been undone in a sense). In the same way it can be speculated that God will undo the evil present in the Earth.

First of all, stop being so christian-centric.

"God has a morally sufficient reason" is irrelevant. It is people, humans, who suffer. They hurt. Also, god cannot have a "morally sufficient reason" to allow evil, since he is omnipotent. That point is already in the article, at the start: an.. omnipotent god should be able to arrange the world according to his intentions - so god intends evil to exist. Infinity0 ^talk 21:53, 11 January 2006 (UTC)

Presuppositional Response

The current paragraph about "inferring a moral standard" doesn't address the logic of the paradox. It is some handwavy composition of words, which tries to prove something out of nothing and fails miserably, without even talking about the paradox itself.

This is an intentional attempt to draw a grotesque picture of the Presuppositionalist response.

I've talked to Presuppositionalists regarding this issue and the conversation goes like that:

• How could the almightly, infitinely good God create a world in which evil exists?
• What do you mean by evil?
• Well, suffering, rape, murder, you know.
• How do you know this is evil?
• Well, don't you agree it's evil?
• In what sense of the word evil? What's the definition of evil? I can't agree that something's evil without a definition.
• Well, evil is what's commonly understood as evil. Let's say murder is defined to be evil.
• God didn't claim to be good (i.e., omnibenevolent) by the "commonly understood" evil. He doesn't subject Himself to our definitions of good and evil.
• Well, isn't "murder is evil" his own definition?
• This is His definition regarding us. Regarding Himself He has different criteria. He is the creator of the universe. He does as he pleases. He defines good and evil. What he pleases is good, so He is good.
• But then "God is good" means nothing, doesn't it?
• Out of the context, yes. In the context of the Bible it means that God sent his only begotten son to die for our sins and that we'll be with Him till eternity.
• Wait, wait, do you claim that evil doesn't actually exist in the world?
• By what standard of evil?
• Well, murder is evil.
• By what standard?
• By God's standard! See, if he's really good he would eradicate evil, he wouldn't create a world with evil at all!
• There are two standards here. God is good by one standard. Somebody dying by murder is evil by another standard. You have to pick one standard only.
• OK, murder is evil. That's my standard.
• Then God isn't good by this standard. He never claimed being good by your standards.
• So by his standard evil doesn't actually exist? Suffering is no evil?
• Exactly. He is good. The definition of good isn't "without any suffering". At least not His definition.

and so on...

I've tried to capture this in logical terms. The thing is that the paradox builds on two premises: that God claimed being good and that evil exists. However the paradox assumes these words "good" and "evil" are mutually exclusive. They aren't. God is good by His standard. Evil is evil by our standard. The premise that "an omnibenevolent God by his own standard will eradicate every evil by our standard" is simply wrong.

If you take one and only one standard and apply the whole paradox to this one standard you would either have "God is benevolent by our standard", or "Evil exists by his standard". These are both false.

That's it. Your description of the Presuppositionalist position ("when talking about evil you're inferring a moral standard") doesn't capture the above logic AT ALL. It needs to be replaced with a better explanation of their position. A logical explanation, not a handwavy one.

The "inferring moral standard" position which you call "presuppositionist" (never heard this word before, if it means something else then oh well, i'm using it the same way you are) is just a broad version of your own viewpoint that "God has his own standards". I cannot see the difference between these two versions:

Another response, based on the definition of evil, claims that the whole logic of the paradox is flawed as it assumes equivalent criteria for the omnibenevolence of God and the evil that exists. According to this response, God is omnibenevolent by His own standards, while the evil that exists is evil by our standards. God doesn't claim to be omnibenevolent on our standards and the existence of what we see as evil is not evil by His standards. If we actually fix one standard for good and evil we would either get that God is not omnibenevolent by this one standard, or that evil doesn't actually exist by this one standard. We would not get that God doesn't exist.

Another response to this paradox argues that by asserting "evil exists", that person is inferring a moral standard against which to define good and evil (see Argument from morality). Therefore, by using this argument one implies the existence of a moral law, which requires a law-maker. Most theists would assert that this law-maker is God, whilst many atheists would argue that morality can just as easily be subjective and/or consensual – that this law is in fact a social contract agreed to by all humans; and/or that this problem is more accurately described as a problem of physical suffering, which can be objectively defined against a standard (of zero physical suffering).

Except that that the first one (your version) is informal and uses POV words like capitalisation of "he".

You say "God doesn't claim to be omnibenevolent by our own standards"; the previous version said "inferring a standard against which to define good and evil". Surely, your point is just a subset of the prev version, since you are inferring that God's standard is the one that counts which is NOT THE POINT of the argument. The argument's point is that HUMANS suffer, and so it is humans' standards that count. Infinity0 ^talk 18:44, 12 January 2006 (UTC)

The sentence "humans' standards count" is the greatest POV in the whole article. Why? This is exactly what "presuppositionalism" means. You are pre-supposing that humans' standards count and from that you derive that there's no God. Sure. A baby could derive that. From Christian perspective humans' standards are irrelevant. God's strandards matter. Capitalizing He is as much POV as stating that humans' standards are the one that matter. In fact, the presuppositional apologetics claims exactly that: there could not be objective proof of God's existence or non-existence. It always comes down to someone's assumptions (presuppositions), such as the one that it's humans' standards that matter.

Also, you are completely missing the point of the article. The article is called "The problem of evil". The point is not that humans suffer. Evil and human suffering are NOT equivalent. Your point is that they are, but this is just a POV.

If you want to be objective and unbiased, you have to include both points of view. One that builds on atheists' definition of "evil" (human suffering, I guess) and one that builds on the Christian definition of "evil" (whatever God defined as evil).

The meat of the article is the logic. Premises, consequences, conclusion. My version of the response is the only one that actually contains any logic. It says that by having one standard for good and evil, one of your two basic premises becomes false and so does the conclusion.

The other version talks about standards too, but it doesn't address the paradox and doesn't conclude through logic that the paradox is flawed. It tries to make up a stupid argument that "proves" God's existence. It's clear from the paragraph itself that their argument is flawed. Presenting a flawed argument as a response is a crappy response. The logical response that derives the flawness of the paradox is the good version of the response.

The old version contains no conclustion (except "what you just read is clearly crap"). The new version contains a clear, logical conclusion. If you still don't see the difference, please let those more intelligent than you to put the logical response instead of the flawed one. I have nothing against you editing the response and removing POVs. But you have to keep the logic there, otherwise you make the article biased. I'll leave it as is for now, as I have to travel out of town for two days. I hope that you'll have put a better (read: logical) version of the response on the webpage by then. If not, I'll have to put it myself. Talk to you on Saturday.

No, actually "humans standards count" is the ARGUMENT. Evil and human suffering are NOT equivalent. - what tree are you smoking? The argument wouldn't even exist if there was no such thing as suffering. Fine, let's pretend evil is not suffering. Why is the problem of evil a paradox then? Oh yeah, because evil causes suffering.

Including "Christian definitions of evil" misses the point of the argument. This is an atheistic argument and BY DEFINITION uses atheistic definitions. BTW, it's nice to know that you think "christian" equates to "theist". You're narrow minded. Infinity0 ^talk 19:23, 12 January 2006 (UTC)

You still don't get it. If you are starting with atheistic definitions (assumptions) it is obvious that you will end up "proving" God doesn't exist. You don't even need to use the pseudo-logic in this argument. By atheist definition God is something non-existent. That's a one line "proof" equivalent to this whole article.

If you start with atheist assumptions and atheist definitions, then this article is biased. If you want to be objective, you have to allow other definitions of "evil". The definition "whatever God defines as evil" is one of the most popular definitions in the world. However, you insist on ignoring this definition in this article. Thus you're making it biased and you're also demonstrating your single-mindedness to all of us.

Grow up, kid. Stop thinking that your definitions are the only true ones. It's childish.

You don't understand the point of the argument, do you... God's motives or reasons are irrelevant to the argument. Infinity0 ^talk 12:52, 14 January 2006 (UTC)

You've totally lost your mind, kid. I totally understand it's not about God's motives. I'm not saying that it's about God's reasons or motives. I'm saying that the article is biased because it uses atheist definitions of evil. This is not an objective article. I am also saying that it is pointless because if you start with atheist definitions it is totally obvious that God doesn't exist. He doesn't exist by definition. Think about what "atheist" actually means.

Which of the two do you disagree with? The fact that the article is biased, or the fact that it's pointless? You said the definitions are atheistic, so I believe you don't disagree with that (i.e., you don't disagree with yourself).

What "atheist" definition of evil? And how does that make the argument biased? It's only set of concepts, and we apply a word, "evil" to describe those concepts. That doesn't mean those concepts don't apply or are invalid. Stop talking crap about how it's "POV". Infinity0 ^talk 14:02, 14 January 2006 (UTC)

If you use another set of concepts such as the "christian" definition of evil, then of course the argument won't work, since the argument is designed TO work with the "atheist" set of definitions. Infinity0 ^talk 14:03, 14 January 2006 (UTC)

Saying that the existence of evil is implied by the existence of suffering is an atheist definition of evil.

The article never says that it uses atheist definitions of evil. It claims to be an objective article based on logic alone. At the end it concludes "God does not exist" as if logic just proved that God does not exist. No. The truth is that atheist definitions + logic just proved that God doesn't exist.

I am claiming two things:

1. If you are having atheist definitions, then you don't need the logic at all. God does not exist by definition.
2. The fact that the article is made to appear as if logic proved no God, while in fact atheist assumptions "proved" there's no God, is confusing to readers.

Now first you have to explain why the whole article isn't pointless, given the fact that God doesn't exist by definition (atheist definition).

Then you have to fix the article and make it so that it doesn't pretend to be what it isn't. Either you have to state explicitly that it uses atheist definitions, or you have to keep something like my paragraph in the responses section, which objects to these definitions.

What do you mean by "atheist definitions"? You're not making sense. Why should an "atheist definition" mean the argument is pointless? The logic is non sequitur. Infinity0 ^talk 16:30, 14 January 2006 (UTC)

This argument (the problem of evil) would be complete nonsense if the words "evil" and "omnibenevolent" are not defined. Agree? Now, what definitions of these words do we use? The atheist ones (implying that the existence of suffering implies evil, which contradicts benevolence)? Or do we allow for other definitions, such as the Christian definition of "evil is what God defines as evil"?

The article is written as if evil and omnibenevolent have clear definitions and everyone agrees on these definitions. That is not the case. The article is written as if logic implies the non-existence of an omnibenevolent (and the other omnis) God. That is not the case. It implies that only with atheist definitions of "evil" and "omnibenevolent".

Thus, I conclude, the article is confusing to readers and should be improved (so that it's clear to non-experts that the logic assumes atheist definitions of the terms used). Also, I say, article which concludes "God does not exist" based on atheist definitons and logic is pointless, as you could as easily prove "God does not exist" based on atheist definitions alone. Which of the above paragraphs is not making sense now?

There is a link to omnibenevolence and also there is a paragraph about the definition of evil. Yes, I agree it could be expanded. But your first point makes no sense. All you are saying is that "the argument works if we take "evil" to mean this, but not if we take it to mean that". Well, that doesn't show anything about the validity nor the correctness of the argument, since you still admit the argument works with "this". "This" is a real concept, ie. suffering. So, the problem of evil is still a valid argument and I'd appreciate it if you stop spewing the crap about "but it's not valid if you take the Christian definition of evil"

"implying that the existence of suffering implies evil, which contradicts benevolence" IS NOT an "atheist" definition, so stop trying to twisted this using propanganda words. It is a premise which follows from the logic. Infinity0 ^talk 19:12, 14 January 2006 (UTC)

This is not "problem of suffering", this is "problem of evil". From now on please stick to the word "evil". The fact that you see suffering as evil is your personal opinion and you're not entitled to imposing that opinion on all of us. The word "suffering" is present on 11 places in the article. The word "definition" is nowhere to be found (except in the paragraph, which I wrote and you erased).

In the paragraph about types of evil "suffering" even comes with the adjective "pointless" which is very, very subjective. If you don't see the point it doesn't mean that there isn't any.

Anyway. You didn't answer my main point: In order for the logic to be valid, you need one and only one definition of evil. That definition has to be clear to everyone. Otherwise the article is confusing to readers.

It is clear from all the comments/edits/objections/"propaganda" you get, that people see this article as proving the non-existence of the Christian God. Why? Because the Christian God clearly states he is omnibenevolent and clearly calls some things, present in this world, evil.

Nevertheless, the Christian God never claimed applying the same standard to himself and to the people. Namely, the context of "omnibenevolent" uses one definition (criterion, standard) of evil, while the context of "the evil in this world" uses another definition.

That is why, I claim, many people get confused by this article, thinking that the logic applies to the Christian God, while it doesn't. In order to clear that confusion, you need to clarify that the argument is only valid if "omnibenevolent" and "existing evil" use the very same standard for good and evil and not different ones.

Apart from that, I do agree that the argument holds, no matter what definition you use (as long as it is consistent). What I am saying is that if you are consistent in your definitions the "paradox" is not applicable to almost anything. There isn't any popular religion whose God claimed being omnibenevolent in the sense that he never causes suffering or any of that humanistic crap.

You have to understand that an omnipotent God doesn't allow human beings to define "good" and "evil" for him. He defines them himself. Thus you can never judge him as being good or evil, since you don't know what he means by "omnibenevolent", except for what he tells you, but you clearly aren't interested in this. Anyway. Never mind this paragraph if you don't understand what it means.

OK, so you suggest that we should make the definition clear. Well, then, there's no point inserting a "response" to a version of the argument that is NOT strong, see Straw man. We could mention it, but still, what you wrote implied that all instances of this argument was wrong. Infinity0 ^talk 01:13, 15 January 2006 (UTC)

I agree that maybe the response section is not the most appropriate place for the edit and I agree that not all instances of the argument are wrong (e.g. if some religion's god claims to be the omnis in terms of humanistic views such as suffering, I agree this god is non-sense).

What I don't agree with is the edition that you made. It's not a question of morality. Morality is the criterion for good/evil that applies to humans. It's not moral to kill (at least by most moral systems). However, we say this in the context of humans (as applied to humans). Applying the same moral standard to God is wrong. He is not subject to the same moral law we are subject to. He can kill whomever he pleases and that's not immoral (read: that's not evil).

Morality (right and wrong for humans) is one thing; evil and omnibenevolence (right and wrong for God) is another.

The thing is that when you take the logic of the problem of evil and try to apply it to a real world problem (such as the existence or non-existence of the Christian God, or maybe even any other God) you hit this wall: you cannot assert the premise "evil exists" in the same terms (same standard for good/evil, right/wrong) as in the premise "God is omnibenevolent". God (at least the Christian God) is omnibenevolent in his own standards. We can assert that evil exists by our standards (the standards that apply to us). We cannot do the logic of the problem of evil with two different standards. There has to be only one for the logic to be valid.

That is why, I claim, the logic doesn't prove the non-existence of the Christian God (and maybe a number of other religions' Gods). Most readers, however, are left with the impression that it does. We need to correct this and make it clear that it doesn't (and explain why it doesn't). Otherwise we're making a reader-confusing Wikipedia article and Wikipedia articles are not meant to confuse readers, nor to leave them with the wrong conclusions.

In summary:

1. The logic of the "paradox" cannot be applied in practice to almost any religion (e.g. it doesn't work with Christianity).
2. This is unclear to the readers at this point.
3. We need to make it clear.

If you still don't agree, let me know which of the three points above is problematic.

The problem of evil only shows that if an omnipotent being exists, he doesn't want to stop human suffering. There are various ways to explain why, but "he actually does care, he's doing this for <insert reason>" fails since he is omnipotent. I don't think this article, nor the argument, claims anything about god's own "moral" standards, since it's irrelevant to the point. If you want, you might add a sentence stating "omnibenevolence normally means that god wants to prevent suffering." Infinity0 ^talk 13:43, 15 January 2006 (UTC)

Do you even read what I say?

• No one is talking about reasons here. I'm talking about definitions of evil. I don't assign reasons to God.
• I told you this is not the problem of suffering! Omnibenevolence does not normally mean that God wants to prevent suffering. This is only in your own, subjective, humanistic mind!

Please, answer my questions. Which of the three points (in my last post) you don't agree with? Are you saying that the paradox disproves the Christian God? Are you saying that it's evident to readers that it doesn't? Or are you saying that we shouldn't make that evident to readers?

1. I have told you time and time again that evil is normally taken to be suffering. What's your problem? Of course the argument doesn't work if you take "evil" to not mean "suffering", because then you are twisting definitions. That's like saying "2+3 != 5", because I choose to say that 2 actually means 4.
2. The logic of the argument is applied to whatever it says it applies to: in normal cases, suffering and pain. It is clear to readers.
3. The problem of evil only shows that if an omnipotent being exists, he doesn't want to stop human suffering. This may or may not be whatever god, depending on what characteristics that god has.
4. "Omnibenevolence" is defined as all-good. Now if christian god doesn't want to prevent suffering, he's not omnibenevolent. Again here, you are twisting definitions.

Infinity0 ^talk 17:13, 15 January 2006 (UTC)

What's my problem? My problem is this:

Who defines good and evil? Humans or God? You claim that "evil is normally taken to be suffering". Are you saying that I am not normal and you are? Or that humans "normally" define good and evil and God "abnormally" defines good and evil?

Claiming that humanistic definitions of good and evil are "normal" is very subjective and biased. It claims atheistic is "normal" and (mostly) theistic is not "normal".

Since you seem incable of understanding my point, I'll make an edition myself. I'll do my best to make it as non-intrusive, "objective" and tolerant as possible.

You seem to not be understanding my counter-argument that you are putting up a straw man. Do you at least agree that if (evil==suffering), the problem of evil shows that if an omnipotent being exists, he doesn't want to stop human suffering? Here, the objective definition of evil (whenever somebody is in pain or not) makes the argument work. Infinity0 ^talk 17:57, 16 January 2006 (UTC)

I agree with the statement in bold. I don't agree that you can call your definition "objective". There exist objective definitions for which evil doesn't exist (e.g. if we define evil to be a purple giraffe).

Well, what I meant was "suffering" is an objective concept. I agree that evil is a subjective concept. Infinity0 ^talk 18:42, 16 January 2006 (UTC)

I think the issue is resolved now.

By the way, if you really want to know where suffering comes from, the Biblical theory says that it came about because humans wanted to define good and evil themselves. That's actually the whole thing about Adam, Eve and the Garden of Eden. They wanted to "be like God, knowing good and evil" and so they ate the fruit of that tree and God gave them suffering. Now it's easy for humans to define evil (they even call it a "normal" definition). Suffering is not evil, actually. It's just what God gave them, so that they can play defining good and evil, as they wanted to.

The curious thing is that in this article you (or Epicurus rather) ask "why is there suffering in the world?", while giving the answer as well - because you want to define good and evil. Now, with suffering present in the world, it's made easy for you to define it. :)

Yes, I know you don't give a damn about that. :)

Actually, I always thought of this argument as the "problem of suffering", since I never liked subjective concepts such as evil. The argument basically is that humans don't like suffering, and so any all-powerful being can't be good. Infinity0 ^talk 19:55, 16 January 2006 (UTC)

Oops! You used the term "good". That's subjective. ;)

All-powerful beings can't be "good" in humanistic terms. I think it's pretty normal that all-powerful beings don't like to think of themselves in the terms of their creatures. They like to keep the right for defining things like good/evil, right/wrong, just/unjust for themselves. After all, they are all-powerful, so they can afford to do whatever they please and then call it good, right and just. Whether you like it or not is up to you of course. :)

I suppose. I just think a god that doesn't try to prevent suffering isn't really benevolent, and not worthy of worship. Infinity0 ^talk 23:04, 16 January 2006 (UTC)

Okay, what I've taken (possibly erroneously) from this discussion then is "It is logically consistent that God is both omnibenevolent and omnipotent, if we define omnibenevolence not in terms of what we consider to be evil (for example, suffering)".

This leads me to draw one of two conclusions, given that I don't know Christian scripture that well. I shall start with the weaker, either:

1) "God is ominbenevolent, but that benevolence has no meaning to us". In which case even saying this is pointless (though not nonsensical), as I could equally well say "God is a purple giraffe, but purple giraffe has no meaning to us". My question is, under this alternative, why even say it? God is not all loving by our standards, so that could mean anything. That is, unless you imply...

2) "God is omnibenevolent, because He finds himself to be omnibenevolent". This particular phrasing is awkward I know, but conveys my main point. Does this not mean that the Christian church believes it knows how God feels about himself? Is He not written to be unfathomable? If the Christian church then believes we cannot understand Gods ways, then this particular defense of a Christian God within this paradox, is moot.

This does not get around the question "does evil exist", but frankly we are trying to argue this within a view of (atleast) Christianity; this religion give a particular moral yard stick and declares acts good or evil (c.f. Ten Commandments), and in doing so has declared acts that have occured to be evil. Incidentally, I believe "Free Will Theodicy" is the only defense, though weak [in my opinion], and hinges largely on whether or not you consider natural disasters to be an evil of the world, which if a Pope ever said "x is evil" about a disaster would, atleast, kill papal infallibility. mr_happyhour 30 April 2006

Interestingly enough, anyone who claims that there can be no God because there is evil in the world is making two claims they may not realize. Claim #1: From saying that there is evil, then there must be such a thing as evil. Then there must also be something known as good. There must also then be something that determines what is evil and what is good. It is obviously not humans, as even though we know what is 'good' and what is 'evil', we choose to do evil nonetheless. If there were no God, this raises an interesting conundrum. How can there be a system which determines good and evil (i.e. a moral system) and humans disobey this system, then where did this system come from if there is no God? Claim #2: By suggesting that the presence of evil disproves the presence of God is the same as saying that the evil is God's fault. Christian belief states that man sinned and that brought death and suffering into the world. This puts the blame on man not on God. Why doesn't God get rid of all the evil, then? He will and most likely soon. Evil is not a permanent condition. Why doesn't God just wipe all evil out now? God is giving everyone the opportunity to join his side willingly. When he comes back, that opportunity will not exist and then evil will be wiped out. This is what Christians believe and I think it adequately takes care of the question of evil. I can not speak for other religions, though. My information came from C.S. Lewis' Mere Christianity. Alisyd 16:44, 2 May 2006 (UTC)

At the risk of flaming please read this talk page. 1) The paradox works on the assumption, within Christianity, that evil exists; Christians define a moral yardstick (above, ten commandments etc) implying evil does exist by these (and their God's) standards. Of this, Free Will Theodicy is in my opinion a completely valid defense - on the condition that, as a Christian, you do not consider natural disasters an evil, and all evil is committed by man. The point is that given the Christian God, the paradox occurs. If you start with the premise God doesn't exist, then you would not consider this paradox, that is why it is a paradox!

2) is largely answered in the text, and in brief an answer could be "God could bring about the same result by any means", omnipotence implying he could give us the opportunity without the presence of evil being necessary, and omnibenevolence implying he would do just that; I do not see how this is a valid defense. Your argument of "When He comes back..." is answered by this same omnipotence problem, He doesn't need to leave it there. I'm pretty sure most people who take this argument seriously aren't as glib as you have been. I believe though in this you are circling around the Free Will Theodicy - evil exists because giving us the choice is the greater good (though being glib myself) - in your second argument, and of this there is more interesting discussion. mr_happyhour 2 May 2006

Some extra content?

Probably the earliest theodicy still used today is that offered by Hinduism. At first it seems no different from the early Christian beliefs, that all pain and suffering are the results of past sins. But the difference is reincarnation. When Hinduism says ‘past sins,’ it is talking of sins which could have been committed in a past life. Although with many lives lived peacefully and well, one can break the chain and transcend physical life, it is not uncommon for a Hindu mother to scold her children and warn them that evils committed in this life could be returned in the next, perhaps being reincarnated as an animal! Life seems very pitiless. We are punished for sins that we cannot possibly remember doing, and possibly would not do if faced with the same circumstances. To be born a beggar, a king, an athlete or a helpless cripple is simply the composite consequence of the deeds of other lives. It is no use inventing a devil to explain evil. Life is purely what we’ve made of it. Looked at from this standpoint, despair lurks close, but many seers have had different ideas. From their perspective, life is no longer an unpitying court of justice, but instead a gym, where obstacles in life seem more like the ropes and parallel bars and vaulting boxes which make us strong.

Saint Irenaeus was born in the early 3rd century in Asia Minor. He was born into a Christian family, surprising as Christians were still prosecuted for another 50 years. He became the 2nd Bishop of Lyon in his later life, by then well known for his book, of which only one copy remains, a Latin translation. He believed that Mankind had been created immature and needed to overcome evil and brave suffering before it can be pure and be, in every sense of the word, good. He said that Adam and Eve’s argument with God had been not a fully fledged rebellion, but instead a childish tantrum, portraying man’s desire to have everything, now. He believed that God is keeping Eden safe and untainted, waiting for when man grows up. He likened death and suffering to the whale which ate Jonah: it was only in the depths of the whale’s stomach that he could turn to God. Saint Augustine was born in a Roman city in northern Africa, son of Saint Monica. He was raised in Carthage and grew up to teach rhetoric and philosophy but moved to Rome, often considered the centre of the civilised world. He became known later on for his privation boni theory which is very popular today. He believed that Evil was not created by God, but was just an absence of Goodness. For example, God did not create darkness, he created light. He created life and justice, but did not create injustice and loss of life. This is often known as the Constant Theodicy.

Karl Barth thought that current theodicies relied too much on the a priori notion of God’s omnipotence. He agreed with the Constant Theodicy, calling the opposite of good ‘das nichte’, which always threatens to reduce God’s creations to nothing. He talked much about Hope. He said that was what God had given to help man against das nichte, so that man would be helped through pain and suffering by the hope that God’s eventual triumph over evil would soon come. The most recent and probably the most popular theodicy is that concerning Free Will. This believes that God created man with the potential in him for both good and evil and the ability to choose, for obedience and goodness is pointless if it is forced and there is no alternative. God then set limits on his own powers, so that he could not interfere with man’s thoughts and actions.

This was put in the "See Also" section. I think it's useful information, but atm there is too much of it. Someone please condense it down. Infinity0 ^talk 23:29, 29 January 2006 (UTC)

"Moral argument"

I have no idea what the "moral argument" (as listed in the "formalised arguments" section) is trying to argue, what it's about, and how the premises listed form the conclusion. Therefore, I assume most readers won't understand it either. If someone DOES know what it's about, then could they re-write it so it's easier to understand? Thanks. -- infinity0 16:31, 9 March 2006 (UTC)

I tend to agree; there shouldn't be any need to divide people into the subjective "most rational theist" in a structured argument. I think the point is if all evil is objectively justified, a (rational) theist is justified in letting it exist, because he knows it is justified, and also not justified because he has justified God and God's definition of evil. I could easily be wrong though as some of the latter points a failed to understand. If it isn't cleared up then I'm not sure what to do with it... mr_happyhour 3 Apr 2006

Something to consider

'Shall a trumpet be blown in the city, and the people not be afraid? shall there be evil in a city, and the LORD hath not done it?' Amos 3:6

What is the claim that a god must be 'all-good' based upon? I'd reckon its probably not from a religous book, but rather some idea pushed by modern priests.

Added 10/03/06

There are quotes from the bible in omnibenevolence. But thanks for pointing out that contradiction; I'll add it to my list so I can show it to the next Jehovah's Witnesses that come knocking on my door ;) -- infinity0 21:48, 10 March 2006 (UTC)

'Perfect' equals 'Benevolent'?

Ah I see them now, but just a question.. Since when does things like 'the way of the lord is perfect', mean that he would have to be all good?

What is 'perfect' would be quite relative wouldn't it.. Couldn't even total evil be perfect? (For example, if someone would be so evil that nobody or nothing could be more evil than him.)

Or this; "As for God, his way is perfect: the word of the LORD is tried: he is a buckler to all those that trust in him." Psalms 18:30

Who knows who he would regard as 'those who trust in him'?

For instance read Matthew 7:21-23:

"Not everyone who says to me, 'Lord, Lord,' will enter the kingdom of heaven, but only he who does the will of my Father who is in heaven. Many will say to me on that day, 'Lord, Lord, did we not prophesy in your name, and in your name drive out demons and perform many miracles?' Then I will tell them plainly, 'I never knew you. Away from me, you evildoers!'"

Maybe he feels that nobody truly trusts in him anymore? Oh well, this isn't a theological debate anyways.. :)

But yeah, I still don't think there is anything (in the bible atleast) that supports omnibenevolence.. Atleast nothing I know about.

And those jehovas witnesses are a real pest aren't they? Tell them to prove their faith by drinking poison.. ;)

"And these signs will accompany those who believe: In my name they will drive out demons; they will speak in new tongues; they will pick up snakes with their hands; and when they drink deadly poison, it will not hurt them at all; they will place their hands on sick people, and they will get well." Mark 16:17-18

Added 18/03/06

Well, being evil is generally considered a fault, so that would make god not perfect. But I suppose you could argue it your way. Meh. -- infinity0 20:51, 18 March 2006 (UTC)

Yeah, but 'generally considered' is simply an opinon held by a majority, is it not? Cause I try to not deal in opinons.. :P

What Im saying is that almost everything could be perfect. When it cannot be surpassed, then it is perfect.

Anyways, I think evil is an overused concept.. That which is evil to someone may not be evil to someone else. It's all opinons and belief, cause most of our precepts of right and wrong comes from our culture or/and religion.

Though lets consider this; If one buys the idea that this being (usually referred to as 'god') has created all life (which I don't buy), then who has the right to deny him to take life, or let life suffer? After all, if this was the case, then without him there would be no life at all.. Life would be his to create, to play with, and to destroy, since he would own it.

Have a good one. :)

Significant changes to the article in March, 2006

Infinity0 and anonymous contributor: Nice work on the reformatting and clarifications-- the article suddently starts to make some better sense. I will need some time to fill in the history, maybe a week. No doubt Augustine of Hippo, who really defined the problem in ways that affect views even today, and perhaps Anselm at the end of the first millenium CE, and who else I don't know at the moment. Later...Kenosis 06:37, 22 March 2006 (UTC)

I spent maybe two hours reading everything in this article and its talk. I like the formal arguments but it gets muddled afterwards. My favorite explanation was eloquently sung by Satan himself: "...without evil there could be no good, so it must be good to be evil sometimes..." NorrYtt 07:49, 9 April 2006 (UTC)

God and Satan

If you believe in God you usually believe in Satan/the devil. This means that good and evil balance out because God is good and Satan is evil—Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.210.184.32 (talk • contribs)

Unless your religion states that your God is all powerful and all knowing, and that Satan isn't -- Chris Q 06:19, 13 June 2006 (UTC)

As I've mentioned before, I find the problem of "suffering" in general to be a bigger stumbling block for monotheistic religion than the problem of "evil". Christians and Muslims can put evil down to "mankind's free-will" and say that it's our fault that murder, for instance, exists. But when an innocent child gets bowel cancer or a peaceful village of pios people is brutally wiped out in an earthquake, not even the religious can really say this is man's evil. This is supposed to be God's territory.

At this point, somebody willing to face the question logically will conclude that (1) there is no God after all, (2) God has no power to prevent terrible random natural atrocities (meaning he's not God), or (3) God CHOOSES to sit back and watch these kind of horrors unfold (God is a cruel pervert).

The problem with religion is that believers refuse to face these issues in any meaningful or logical way - because none of the possible answers is acceptable to them.-Neural 23:18, 10 July 2006 (UTC)

It's been a while since I read up on theodicy, but can't we agree that the world must be left in a neutral state, with possibility of torment and joy. Why? Because if the physical world was made in a way which would limit human free will (ie we couldn't grab rocks and smash our brother upside the head because we were jealous), then we could not choose to sin in certain ways. I'm trying not to be needlessly verbose, so I hope what I said is sufficient to state my counter. Piepants 16:57, 18 August 2006 (UTC)Piepants.

Buddhism and Islam

The article does not discuss the problem of evil as understood by Buddhism or Islam, which makes the article incomplete. Anyone interested in providing such a discussion? Coolmoon 04:57, 26 July 2006 (UTC)

I lack the knowledge to write such an entry, but my understanding is that Islam has the same "Problem of Evil" as Christianity. Buddhism does not have a problem of evil, viewing what we call evil as suffering caused by unnecessary attachment. -- Chris Q 06:30, 26 July 2006 (UTC)

Thanks for that. Some info in the article about the Islamic view would be good, though. Regarding Buddhism, may be an addition to the article mentioning how Buddhism deals with evil/suffering, then? Coolmoon 10:44, 27 July 2006 (UTC)

In Mormon Theology

When I say Mormon, I mean pertaining to The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in this context.

First, we believe that God is omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient. We also believe that there is evil in this world, but that it is not His evil--it is Satan's. We believe that before this life, both Satan and Jesus formulated plans for the salvation of mankind. Jesus' plan was to give men free will and judge them for it accordingly in the end. Satan's plan was to force mankind to be perfect. When God the father chose Jesus' plan, Satan rebelled and took a third of the hosts of heaven, who agreed with him, down to hell. These spirits who followed Satan are evil, and tempt men to do evil today.

Now, it seems like a paradox to most people that a perfect God can allow any sort of evil to exist, but: being perfect does not entail this. The omniscient God knows that men must have temptation in order to give them choice. Free will would mean nothing if there was no temptation to do wrong. God tolerates Satan because He knows this temptation is necessary for men to be able to choose their own way. If there was no temptation, men would never sin, and there would thus be no opportunity for good, as it were. The Book of Mormon states in 2 Nephi 2: 11, 13:

"[11] For it must needs be, that there is an opposition in all things. If not so, my first-born in the wilderness, righteousness could not be brought to pass, neither wickedness, neither holiness nor misery, neither good nor bad. Wherefore, all things must needs be a compound in one; wherefore, if it should be one body it must needs remain as dead, having no life neither death, nor corruption nor incorruption, happiness nor misery, neither sense nor insensibility."

"[13] And if ye shall say there is no law, ye shall also say there is no sin. If ye shall say there is no sin, ye shall also say there is no righteousness. And if there be no righteousness there be no happiness. And if there be no righteousness nor happiness there be no punishment nor misery. And if these things are not there is no God. And if there is no God we are not, neither the earth; for there could have been no creation of things, neither to act nor to be acted upon; wherefore, all things must have vanished away."

In essence, God wants his children to be happy, and the plan he has for us is one of agency, or free will. We must choose to become what we become, or else life would mean nothing. And Satan must exist to tempt us to do evil, as Christ teaches us to do good. Satan is not an omnipotent being and God could destroy him immediately, but He knows that Satan is necessary for the greater good and eventual happiness and eternal life of mankind, no matter how much it pains Him. This scripture from Moses 1:39 illustrates God's greatest glory:

"[39] For behold, this is my work and my glory—-to bring to pass the immortality and eternal life of man."

I am wondering whether I should put this or a shorter summary in the main article, but I thought I'd post it here first. Tom Stringham 17:16, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

Defining the Evil of God

First let's start by defining Evil, then defining it in the biblical terms. Evil that which results in pain, sorrow, or distress. Okay that was easy, now on to the biblical terminology. The Hebrew word "ra'" is variouly translated as "bad," "gloomy," "ugly," "evil," "calamitous," "malignant," "ungenerous," and "envious," depending on the context. The Greek word "ka•kos'" may be defined as that which is morally evil and/or destructive; the translations are as follows: "bad," "evil," "hurtful," "injurious," and "wrong."

The bible first uses (ra') as the polar opposite of "good." This is shown with God's command to Adam not to eat from the tree of "Good" and "Bad." Further God warned Adam of the concequences for disobedience. (Genesis 2:16, 17) Therefore, it is evident that God sets the standard as to "what is good" and "what is bad or evil." Further, this account shows that is is not within humankind's perogative to set the standard for themselves apart from God.

It is interesting to note that in the bible, God is referred as being the creator of evil or calamity. (Isaiah 45:7) God's enforcing of the penalty for sin, that being death, has proved to be an evil, or calamity for humankind. This reveals that evil is not always synonymous with wrongdoing. Simply put when the administrators of justice must enforce a law they do so by penalty. The penalty is in itself an evil against to one breaking the law. For example if no penalty was given against those who break the laws and practice lawlessness there would be no justice. Sex offenders, Murderers, thiefs of everykind would constantly be free to do as they will, if it were not for Police, judges, court officials, and jailers. Do we as a society see these as evil doers or as those who enforce the law thereby protecting our own civil liberties? If we look at the situation from the vantage point of the law breaker everything these law enforcer do to them is evil and wrong. However, from the vantage point of justice what these law enforcer do is legal and right. Is it wrong to put a person into a small room, limit their freedom to the public or punish them for the crimes thay have committed by whatever means the government of this world have approved? Ofcourse I am aware, as are you that many governments and their laws and law enforcers are in fact cruel and unjust. Does this mean God is cruel and unjust? It sould be taken into account that God always gave warning, well in advance as to what He was going to do if they people continued practicing evil. This was done to give them time to change their ways,and could extend mercy. To do this was in fact undue kindness on God's part. So it is interesting that God in the postition of Law giver, Judge, and Law enforcer, must inflict "evil" against practicing evil doers, in fact seeks to extend mercy where ever possible. See the examples of the flood and also the plagues of Egypt. In both cases God allowed time for people to take advantage of the situation, to escape the intended "evil" against them.

Evil can then be thus put into two different catagories. That of unjustified evil and that of justified evil. For something to be justified it must be within the limits of the law; be that legislative law of governments or divine law or both (being only if the legislative law of the land does not contradict divine law.) Therefore, the arguement is brought into the realm of justice, that of law and order. For that we need to define Justice. Then, both kinds of Evil can be defined. I can only give to a start. Justice is the maintenance, or administration of what is right, in a fair and impartial way and according to a standard.

There are of course questions, such as why does God allow unjustified evil to exist? If God is Almighty, Benevolent, and All-knowing why does He not just remove such obviously unbenificial evil from this world? These questions are not addressed here, see Theodicy discussion: The Biblical Explaination of the problem of evil. This was just to give some perspective on the definition of Evil. As it is so very clearly distorted and blurred. Here is a question for you as a reader of this: Can we honesty attribute our own cruel and unjust works of evil to God? I hope this in some way improves the article of Wikipedia and add some useful insight. As always I invite all to examine and critique what I have written here. Truth-Seeker 24.150.46.62 22:34, 9 September 2006 (UTC)

You say 'These questions are not addressed here' - yes they are. Have you read the article? 84.70.185.115 23:19, 30 September 2006 (UTC)

Move part into Theodecy?

I suggest at least some of this article, e.g. the responses to the arguments against God, be moved to Theodecy - and preferably improved, as a lot of it reads like unsourced 'original research'. 84.70.185.115 23:17, 30 September 2006 (UTC)

Removed pov simplistic "solution" from introduction

Removed this:

However, the problem can be solved by looking at it this way: - Is there such thing as cold or darkness? The answer is no. Cold and darkness are the absence of heat and light. Using this example, we can say that evil and suffering is the lack or absence of good.

This is obviously very simplistic. Example:

"The fact that a cellar is dark would disprove the existence of a man with an all-powerful torch who wanted light at all costs."

"But dark is just the absence of light" (has no bearing on the above argument)

If a citation were provided the removed sentence could be an illustration of some of the less than satisfactory arguments, but it certainly has no place in the introduction. -- Chris Q 13:07, 30 October 2006 (UTC)

But the question isn't "Why isn't good everywhere?", it's "Why is there any evil at all?" (added anonymously by 66.167.147.167)

god or God?

Should the spelling by god or God? In some sections it's god and in some it's God. - jlao⁰⁴ 08:44, 8 November 2006 (UTC)

It was God and Gods until [this edit] where someone decided they were both not proper nouns. His edit only affected the introduction, which seemed to bug him for some reason. I don't mind whether its "god" and "gods" or "God" and "Gods", but would object to any POV differentiation. -- Chris Q 11:04, 8 November 2006 (UTC)

I think it should be "a god" and "gods" generally and "God" for the Judeo-Christian god specifically. It is both a common noun and a proper noun. Kronocide 16:14, 20 January 2007 (UTC)

I agree, except "God" should be used when referring to any god, not just the Abrahamic ("Judeo-Christian") one. It depends on the context. It's similar to the words "mom" and "dad," for example. One might say, "Hi Mom," or, "I believe in God." One might also say, "I have a mom," or, "I believe in a god." --Alexc3 ^(talk) 19:57, 8 September 2007 (UTC)

RE paragraph at "Challenge cannot be proved false"

(newbie alert)

It seems to me that this rebutal to a challenge to the POE (Problem of Evil) is not logical for this reason: It is not necessary for a challenge to a proof (here, the POE proof) to be falsifiable. What is under test here is the POE: does it, in fact, prove its conclusion. The challenge points out a potential problem with the proof. If the proof cannot prove its conclusion without merely assuming things that are in doubt (e.g., that humans are capable of judging God), then its proof fails.

Moreover, it could be argued that if the challenge cannot be falsified, as paragraph suggests, that must mean that the assumption (that man can judge God) cannot be proved to be true. (Since one way to prove the challenge is false, would be to prove the assumption is true. But since the challenge is not falsifiable, then there must be no way to prove the assumption is correct.) If that is so, we know that POE cannot succeed in its proof.

What is the correct way to handle, what seems to me, something that needs to be corrected?

-- Davrids Tuesday, 2006-12-12 T 23:44 UTC

Well I tried what I though was a well cited edit, but got reverted.

Did I do something wrong with my edit?

Here is what I added:

vvv

But this conclusion (the Ignorance of Man Challenge is unfalsifiable) leads directly to the total debunking of the problem of evil. Since the Challenge cannot be proved false, there must be no way to prove the assumption, that man is capable of judging God. (Because the assumption, if proved, would falsify the challenge, which, as we just saw, cannot be falsified.) Since that unprovable assumption is essential to the problem of evil, the problem of evil is also unprovable.

Immanuel Kant was thinking of this result when wrote in "Failure of All Theodicies,"

"We can understand the necessary limits of our reflections on the subjects which are beyond our reach. This can easily be demonstrated and will put an end once and for all to the trial [that is, the trial of God before the tribunal of reason]."

(As quoted in [http://www.designinference.com/documents/2003.04.CTNS_theodicy.pdf Making the Task of Theodicy Impossible?)

^^^

I can add another citation if that's the problem.

Or maybe "total debunking" should be less assertive??

Please advise.

(I have moved this discussion to this talk page as I believe it is of general interest) -- Chris Q 08:29, 20 December 2006 (UTC)

Did I do something wrong with my edit? -- Davrids Saturday, 2006-12-16 T 14:34 UTC

Basically firstly it was original research. Secondly, showing that an argument is not falsifiable obviously shows that it gives us no scientific understanding of whether a problem is right or wrong. -- Chris Q 07:36, 18 December 2006 (UTC)

Thanks for your response. Leaving your first point alone for now, it is true that the challenge cannot be shown to be false. But, since that is true, doesn't showing that an assumption in the problem of evil (POE) cannot be shown to be true, also mean we have no scientific understanding of whether the conclusion of the POE proof is correct?

I see that this is a sort of circular argument. You might say

"Nobody lives next door because we never hear or see anything"

a counter argument might be

"We don't fully understand what hearing and seeing is. Maybe someone lives there and makes ultrasonic sounds and is visible in ultraviolet."

Someone might point out that:

"That is not falsifiable, and goes against our assumptions of physical existence".

I don't think you would gain much by saying. "It is impossible to prove that there are not people living there who can not be seen or heard by humans. It means your argument that nobody lives next door is unfalsifiable and therefore cannot be proved and may be false!"

Basically this type of argument could be applied to any theory; the idea that gravity is caused by invisible imps is not falsifiable! -- Chris Q 08:29, 20 December 2006 (UTC)

All of that is true, but misses my point: If we take the time to show that a challenge (it is not a theory) to a proof cannot be proved false, is it not more important that a premise necessary to the proof cannot (or has not) been proved?

The unproved premise here in question is that humans are smart enough to criticise the actions of any god which could have created them. Without proving that, the POE is fatally flawed. -- Davrids 16:27, 20 December 2006 (UTC)

It depends whether it is considered to be a reasonable challenge. You could have a proof:

All cats are animals

Ginger is a cat

Therefore Ginger is an animal.

You could use the same argument against a premise here, that you cannot prove that Ginger is not something that appears in every way to be a cat to humans, but is really something else. This is not falsifiable (in that every test can be claimed that any test is unable to differentiate Ginger from a cat), but would not be considered a reasonable challenge. -- 88.105.122.128 14:26, 21 December 2006 (UTC)

The atheistic POV present in the preceding paragraph ignores the problem that an unfalsifiable challenge presents to the POE. The problem (as seen by a theist) is this: if the challenge cannot be shown to be false, that means that the thesis it challenges also cannot be shown to be true. To a theist, this would seem to be a fatal flaw in the POE.

There is atheistic POV in, "Another problem with the argument from human ignorance," because it lables the unfalsifiable _attribute_ as a "problem" (in a "host of difficulties").

That atheistic POV also asks a challenge to meet the qualifications of an argument of a proof when it is _not_ an argument of a proof. The challenge merely asks that a weakness in the POE proof be corrected before its conclusion is accepted.

For the theist, it doesn't matter whether we have any scientific understanding of whether the challenge is right or wrong. He is not trying to prove that his challenge is correct, he is only asking that the POE proof use no unproven or unprovable assumptions. What matters here to the theist is, whether the correctness of the proof contained in POE can be shown. That's what the article is about, after all.

Wouldn't it be more NPOV to show both the atheist and the theistic viewpoint of what an unfalsifiable challenge means?

The problem of evil argument can only be shown not to be true by saying that one of the premises is wrong. In this case the challenge is to the idea that evil exists, i.e. in affect saying that there is no evil and everything is perfect, but we see "evil" because of our lack of understanding. I know that this is the belief of some mystics, but if introduced should be phrased as such rather than in a round about way.

Our Lord God . . . is at the center of everything, and he does everything. And I was certain that he does no sin; and here I was certain that sin is no deed, for in all this sin was not shown to me . . . . For a man regards some deeds as well done and some as evil, and our Lord does not regard them so, for everything which exists in nature is of God's creation, so that everything which is done has the property of being God's doing. -- Julean of Norwich [1].

Of course if you argue that there is no evil this goes against the teachings of many religions, and this should be mentioned too. -- Chris Q 08:29, 20 December 2006 (UTC)

This seems to be a straw man. Whether evil exists or not is moot in this challenge.

No, it is not a straw man. Consider the possibilities. The argument that people cannot judge good is not falsifiable, but never the less must be true or false. If it is false, then the proof stands anyway.

If true, then there are these logical possibilities:

God is Good and acts accordingly so that there is no evil, but we perceive it though ignorance.

We are wrong in judging God to be good, and there is evil.

We are completely wrong, and God is not good, but for some other reason there is no such thing as evil.

Most people arguing that we cannot judge good and evil would assert the first possibility.

Basically the argument stands that if God is good (whether or not we can determine it) and all powerful then there would be no evil (whether or not we can determine it

In my rush to respond before going out of town, I neglected to ask whether you meant to say what this seems to say.

“Whether or not we can determine [evil],” seems to allow the possibility that humans cannot correctly judge evil. This is very close to saying that we do not know that the premise is true, that humans can correctly judge the actions of God. And since this unproven premise is necessary to POE, it seems that we must acknowledge that the conclusion of POE remains unproven.

It seems unlikely that you meant that. Did I misunderstand? -- Davrids 23:44, 28 December 2006 (UTC)

The premise challenged here is the one that states that humans are capable of judging the actions of a god capable of creating them. It doesn't matter that most presentations of POE fail to state this premise. It is still there and still needs to be proved before POE can be scientifically considered valid. -- Davrids 16:27, 20 December 2006 (UTC)

Thanks for considering my long reply. -- Davrids 06:12, 20 December 2006 (UTC)

No problem -- Chris Q 08:29, 20 December 2006 (UTC)

I still think that the NPOV can be improved by _neutrally_ stating the challenge is not falsifiable and then stating what that means to the atheist and also to the theist. -- Davrids 16:27, 20 December 2006 (UTC)

I disagree, because the falsifiability is itself a response to the challenge. In any case, the logic of the argument stands, so the only way to counter it is to show that a premise is wrong. There is no advantage to saying that a premise is falsifiable but then continue to assume that it is true. -- 88.105.122.128 14:26, 21 December 2006 (UTC) (Chris Q)

No, there is another way to successfully challenge a proof.

One can insist that an included premise _must_ be proved.

We have seen no proof for the premise that humans have the capability of judging the actions of any god capable of creating them.

Indeed, the very arguments that show that the challenge is not falsifiable, also show that the challenged premise _cannot_ be proved.

Even if this were not so, the POE proof is still unproven theory because it does not have the necessary proof of its challenged premise.

The question of whether evil exists is moot. It doesn't matter whether it exists, or if it doesn't exist, or, as you argue, "if God is good (whether or not we can determine it) and all powerful then there would be no evil (whether or not we can determine it)."

What matters in this challenge, is whether or not the challenged implicit premise in the POE proof has been proved. To argue against some other position, is to argue against a straw man.

_This_ is the challenge's position: The proof is, and will remain, unproven until the challenged premise has been proved. A NPOV requires that the challenged premise be proved.

Merely assuming as correct, a premise that requires God to not exist, is circular.

For instance: "I assume that I can correctly judge God. God, if he does exist, cannot be wrong, and he says that he cannot be correctly judged by man. But I can correctly judge God. Therefore, God is wrong and, thus, does not exist."

Every presentation of POE assumes the premise that humans can correctly judge God, and so, merely assumes that God does not exist. Every proof that assumes its conclusion, is invalid. Therefore, the POE proof is invalid.

If the atheist really wants to test the proposition that the God of the Bible exists, he may not just assume, as true, things that contradict that proposition.

Those are the reasons the theist would not agree that his challenge to the POE premise is comparable to your example challenge to, "Ginger is a cat."

The atheistic POV of the paragraph in the article exists. It assumes that this challenge can be dismissed for being a non-falsifiable theory.

A balancing theistic POV is that the challenge is not even a _theory_ and, so, doesn't need to be falsifiable. In fact, the theist is _glad_ his challenge cannot be proved false, because it shows the challenged premise cannot be proved to be true. Thus, POE is just unproven theory.

The article's paragraph needs NPOV. -- Davrids 17:36, 22 December 2006 (UTC)

I am beginning to think that the section "Challenge cannot be proved false" is rather pointless. The point of the argument of the problem of evil is that the following cannot all be true.

• God exists
• God is completely good.
• God is all powerful.
• God is all knowing (at least with regard to the consequences of His/Her actions).
• Evil exists.

The falsifiability of an objection to a premise is not a big deal, as the argument ONLY shows that there is a contradiction if all are true. In this way it is particularly aimed at certain religions that claim all of the above as pert of their beliefs. If you look at the premises it is hard to see how any of them can be proved falsifiable, so why is that one singled out. Add to this the fact that that section has no citations and I think there are grounds to delete it.

Note that if any of the above are false then the argument falls and the other points cannot be determined. For example:

• God does not exist. Points 2, 3 and 4 are meaningless and point 5 may or may not be true.

• God is not completely good. All the other points could be true or false as God would not necessarily avoid evil.

• God is not all powerful. Some other cause may or may not cause evil.

• God is not all knowing. He/She might have had good intentions but messed up creation so that evil was an unforeseen consequence.

• Evil does not exist. This may or may not be because of a good God, who may or may not be all powerful, all knowing, etc.

-- Chris Q 07:56, 2 January 2007 (UTC)

As you say, in any _reductio ad absurdum_ argument, if an impossibility is produced from a set of premises, one or more of those premises must be false. If we can prove as true, all the premises except one, then we know the unproven premise must be false.

Unfortunately for the validity of POE, this has not been achieved.

In POE, there are at least two unproven premises, as was shown above. One unproven premise is stated. This is, "God exists."

The second one is unstated and, thus, often ignored. But still must be examined.

That premise supposes that non-omniscient humans are as smart as an omniscient god. This is _absurdum_ on its face.

So here is one more possibility to add to your list:

• God exists, is all knowing, is all powerful, is all good, and his actions cannot be correctly judged by any being that is not all knowing.

Actually this statement disproves itself. If a being cannot correctly judge God or God's actions then they cannot even determine if God is All Good, All Powerful or All Knowing. It's all assumptions. -- [MDH] 19 January 2007

—The preceding unsigned comment was added by 152.216.7.5 (talk) 21:29, 19 January 2007 (UTC).

This is true, if you mean the statement does not prove itself to be a truth. If the statement were presented as a truth, it would then be necessary to provide proof of its correctness.

But it is not presented as a truth. Instead, the statement is presented as a _possibility_.

This possibility has not been successfully excluded from reality by the Supposed Problem of Evil. That is the result of this discussion.

I predict (if I have not here proved) that POE will never be able to correctly exclude this possibility.

(Possibly, someone will challenge me to produce proof that this possibility is more than just possibility. Such a discussion is not relevant to whether the POE proof is valid.)

The Problem of Evil is a major liability to atheism. -- Davrids 20:24, 28 January 2007 (UTC)

Fortunately, there are religions which do conform to this possibility.

I support your removal of the paragraph because it was citation-less and POV. -- Davrids 03:24, 13 January 2007 (UTC)

Improper redirect

Searching for the problem of pain (in all lowercase) redirects to Problem of Evil. Instead it should redirect to The Problem of Pain (the C.S. Lewis book). I tried to change it, but it doesn't seem to be working. Perhaps someone more savvy can fix it. --kidbritish 23:46, 14 December 2006 (UTC)

This redirect has already been fixed, seeing nobody mentioned it here in the past. --54x 12:40, 4 October 2007 (UTC)

Suggestion: argument from world creation

This is against teologies saying "there is no God in THIS world, because he wants to preserve your free will".

Assume people have free will (and I'm actually not gonna agree with this, but let's assume it anyway).

World could be constructed in another way and people would still have free will. Example: if you play dice, you could have got a 6 instead of 1, as a one-time exception being a part of world laws. This still wouldn't make you unfree.

Having another world order affects your will, but it is still free. As in the above example: you could be more willing to keep playing if your results were better.

Note, the overall probabilities of your life actions shifted a bit (and multiplying this experiment, they could be shifted a lot). You are more towards one direction, even more: your character could change - whilst still being free.

Now, a better example: God knew how world would look like when he created it. He knew what would be the effect of human free will. But was him tied by a destiny? Of course, not. He could have created completely another world, so that human free decisions in it would be other; and would be in better proportions. So that less people would be surprised by hell.

Then why there is so little God in this world? Why doesn't he help us a little, for example in the XXth century?

And well, if you keep saying it's because he wants to hide and wants to keep the number of believers lower... because he wants to keep a fair amount of evil... then I'm going to fulfill this desire of him. ;) I don't think anything could happen against God's will; so whatever I finally do must be already a subject of his plans and the result of some earlier will of him.

Actually, I believe God's precepts should be treated like the ancient virtue, like some kind of a tip, a guide-post how to live well and what to do to succeed in life. But I can't agree they are so strict and absolute that breaking them means your condemnation and eternal hell: is man only a mistake of God? does he not love us enough, also those who follow other ways?

83.31.15.129 00:35, 18 December 2006 (UTC)

Cinema

Should this be removed as original research, or is it just that there is inappropriate use of the first person? Also archived some of the older messages on this page (older than 20th August, roughly) Angus Lepper 20:12, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

The Free Will argument

Where does the cited formulation come from? It is very bad, so is it really from an authoritative source? To wit (I have added line numbers for reference):

1. Good and evil are products of free will (premise)

2. Thus, there can be no good nor evil without free will

3. Thus, to remove evil would be to remove free will, which would also remove all good

4. Thus, to remove all evil is to remove all good, which is evil, so therefore, free will is necessary and is a divine manifestation of God.

Criticism: Either 1 or 2 is redundant; they say the same thing, that free will is a necessary condition for good and evil. 3 does not follow from 1 and/or 2. They say that free will is necessary for good and evil, not that good and evil are necessary for free will. 3 also contains an implication of its own: "To remove evil would be to remove good." The first part of 4 follows from this implication, but only because A implies A (since it is a verbatim repetition). 4 is moreover self-contradictory; it says that to remove all evil is evil. The final part of 4, "Free will is a divine manifestation of God" doesn't follow from anything previously said. (It wouldn't even if what was previously said had made sense.) Suggestion: find an argument that is valid, or rewrite this so it doesn't look like something that tries to be a logical argument. Kronocide 03:06, 10 December 2006 (UTC)

Yes, 2 is an implication from 1. Well you could say all logical proving process is redundant (except the assumptions)...

2 is an implication from 1 as A implies A. All logical proofs are tautologies, but they are not all formally redundant. Kronocide 20:28, 18 December 2006 (UTC)

3 is correct: 1 says that free will "spawns" both good and evil (just as unawareness spawns both options; or 50% probability makes both options equally popular). If there is only good, we cannot say it is choosen freely. So if you remove evil, free will is no longer possible.

Whether 3 is correct or not is not the question. It doesn't follow. Your explanation is interesting, but irrelevant for the logical validity of the argument. Kronocide 20:28, 18 December 2006 (UTC)

4 is also correct: nothing self-contradictory! It says that a quest for power which attempts to remove all evil and leavy only good cannot be considered good. It is like saying that universalism is evil. (But then what other options for good people? Ascethism?)

Again you are reading things into the text that aren't there. 4 does not say that attempting to remove evil is evil, it says that removing evil is evil. That is as self-contradictory as f___ing for virginity, or it is at the very least highly confusing.

I'm not sure why you spend time defending this text instead of improving it, since you understand it. Trust me, it makes no logical sense. It may still make sense, but it's not an argument of sentence logic or any other proper kind, so should not be formulated and structured as if it was. Kronocide 20:28, 18 December 2006 (UTC)

However, the free will then opens another problem: if God is omnibenevolent, how can he create hell? If he made the world so that all paths are realized, how can he condemn people for following the "wrong" ones? And finally, if he wants all paths to be realized, then he doesn't want all people to be saints. Indeed, free will means 'we give the Earth to the people and let them rule themselves however they like, basing on whatever morals they like'. By the moment God gives free will to people, he can no longer have any wishes or longings (especially because he already knows the future). Actually it is a curiosum to say God's will is not fulfilled... Nothing could ever happen without former omniscient God's will. So assuming free will is more like a vision of dead God - deism... 83.31.15.129 00:14, 18 December 2006 (UTC)

I find it interesting that one of the most well-written books ever to be issued on this topic has not once been mentioned in the entire article. I am referring to C.S. Lewis' "The Problem of Pain". This work addresses each objection raised in this topic, and the wonder is that no one, apparently, has gone to look at it. Why? (Centurion13 20:42, 31 December 2006 (UTC))

One common thread runs through many of these exhaustive discourses on God's goodness, the question of free will, etc., and that is the curious idea that God somehow knows what we will do before we do it. But as C. S. Lewis pointed out in "Mere Christianity", many theologians believe that "some things are not in Time at all", and that Christian theologians believe God is not, either. As Lewis points out:

"Another difficulty we get if we believe God to be in time is this. Everyone who believes in God at all believes that he know what you and I are going to do tomorrow. But if he knows I am going to do so-and-so, how can I be free to do otherwise?"

Lewis goes on to explain that this difficulty arises if we think of God as progressing along the Time-line as we do, the only difference being that He can see ahead and we can't. But suppose God were outside, above the Time-line? Then tomorrow, yesterday and today would be visible to Him in exactly the same way - all the days are 'Now" for Him. He doesn't remember you doing things yesterday, or forsee you doing them a year from now. He simply sees you doing them. In a way, He does not know what you are going to do until you do it, but then, the moment at which you finally do it is already 'Now' for Him. (Centurion13 21:28, 31 December 2006 (UTC))

Kronocide is perfectly correct - the validity of each statement is completely irrelevent - they do not follow logically from each other, and thus do not represent a coherent argument. Since this argument was flagged up a while ago has still not been acted on, I am going to attempt to formulate a more logically-sound version myself. How about the following:

• Free will requires the potential to so anything one chooses. (premise, or by definition)
• Thus, free will requires the potential to do evil.
• Thus, removing the potential to do evil would remove free will.
  

Note that I have not changed any of the other content in the section, as I am not at all well-versed in Theology. I am simply replacing the bad logical deduction. My conclusion is not exactly the same as the original conclusion, but I think that it is actually closer to the intended result as originally described above the deduction. Branfish 21:07, 12 March 2007 (UTC)

Theodicy vs Defense (or maybe a Challenge)

The introduction to this article is incomplete. It says that a "proposed solution" to the problem of evil constitutes a "theodicy." This is not correct, and the distinction is important. Alvin Plantinga ("God, Freedom, and Evil," 1977) distinguishes between a "defense" and a "theodicy." A defense merely seeks to show that the claims of any argument from evil are not sufficiently substantiated, such as the idea that a 3-0 God (Omniscient, Omnipotent, and Omnibenevolent) is inconsistent with the existence of evil. With a defense, the goal is merely to show that these three attributes of God, combined with the existence of evil and premises asserting that an all-good God would prevent all evil, are not logically inconsistent, such that they generate a logical contradiction. The way to do this is to show that the premises of such "logical" or a priori arguments from evil are not necessarily true. If this is the case, then they cannot show that the mere concept of God is inconsistent with the existence of evil. This is different from a theodicy, which comes from the Greek words "theos" and "dikaes" and means "to justify God," where one is concerned to offer an actual reason for why God allows evil. Thus a defense merely seeks to show that certain premises in the a priori argument from evil are not necessarily true, whereas a theodicy attempts to explain the existence of evil. Timm001 03:16, 10 January 2007 (UTC)

I understand what you are saying and the distinction you make is real. If this defense shows that the POE argument is not complete, then it is not necessary to justify why God might allow evil.

Still, I would have called this action a "challenge" since it challenges the correctness of the argument. "Defense," instead, suggests that something is being defended (at least to me).

I'm quibbling, though.

You might consider this substitution for the sentence:

"Some question the logical validity of this dilemma. Others suggest a theodicy (a reason why such a god would allow evil)." Davrids 04:47, 23 February 2007 (UTC)

evil in heaven - removed sentence.

I have removed the following sentence:

Critics of this argument note that there is evidence in these religious traditions that free will and evil might both indeed exist in heaven.

This sentence does not add anything, the text already says: What about those in heaven - they are free, yet some claim that no evil would ever happen in heaven.

The heaven example is in any case a weaker example, the strong one being why couldn't God create beings that were like Himself. One could argue that if there were evil in Heaven it would be an even stronger indication that God was either not all good or not all powerful. -- Chris Q 07:31, 11 January 2007 (UTC)

Logical Error in Logical problem of evil

The final statement non-existence of God is easily circumvented in the Logical argument for the Problem of Evil. The current statement does not define God as omniscient, and does classify that God must know evil to eradicate it. Since God is defined as existing in the first statement, this argument should be concluded that God is not aware of evil, not that God doesn't exist.

The Problem of Evil is only a 'problem' when you prove that God does not exist. The first statement should therefore be a definition of God, not a statement about his existence.

I'll make these changes after 24 hours if I don't receive a rebuttal.

Fenricwolf 00:48, 17 February 2007 (UTC)

I both agree with that and have a problem of my own with the "argument." Namely object 9, the "premise" that evil has always existed and will always exist, combined with the conclusion that god will immediately and totally eliminate all evil, does not necessarily invalidate premises 1, 2, 3, etc. It seems that 9 is arbitrarily injected to artificially create a contradiction. 9 does not follow from any of the original premises it seeks to disprove, so the only premise it can disprove is itself. It's totally independent of premises 1, 2, 3. I feel like I'm just rambling now, but I think people will get the point.

97.101.61.57 11:16, 12 July 2007 (UTC)

I agree with Fenricwolf that there should be a premise that God is omniscient. I think that it was assumed (incorrectly) that omnipotence implied omniscience. The first statement says that God exists because this is a Reductio ad absurdum. I don't really follow what 97.101.61.57 is saying, 9 is clearly marked as a premise and so does not follow any other. The nature of Reductio ad absurdum is such that the contradiction shows that not all premises can be true. If you assume that 9 is false then other premises could be true. Thus Julian of Norwich and followers of Advaita Vedanta for example do not have a problem of evil. -- Q Chris 11:55, 12 July 2007 (UTC)

"he nature of Reductio ad absurdum is such that the contradiction shows that not all premises can be true. If you assume that 9 is false then other premises could be true." That's exactly what I was getting at, except stated in a better manner. The argument on the page says that because premise 9 creates a contradiction, premises 1, 2, or 3 must be false, and that is an error in logic. As Q Chris said, "...9 is clearly marked as a premise and so does not follow any other," therefore, one cannot use 9 to disprove 1, 2, or 3, since they have no logical inter-dependence. The fact that premise 9 creates a contradiction only proves that the argument, assuming premise 9, is invalid. It would be perfectly valid, though incomplete, assuming only 1, 2, 3. Again, Reductio ad Absurdum arguments show that "not all premises can be true," not that "all premises are not true". 97.101.61.57 03:13, 14 July 2007 (UTC)

I think we are agreeing here, the only thing the argument proves is that not all premises cannot be correct. Id does not say that the premise "God exists" is false or that the premise "evil exists" is false and so on for all the other premises. Despite its limited scope, I still think this is a useful argument as many people do claim that they believe all the premises to be true, it shows them that there must be some error in their beliefs. -- Q Chris 19:29, 14 July 2007 (UTC)

Strange assumption..

From where comes the assumption that a god must be "all-good"? It doesn't come from the basis of the Abrahamic religions (ie scripture) So is that really an idea we could argue that a god MUST be? Its' not, and many religious people don't believe god is only good, but rather that he is in and behind everything due to his supposed omnipotence.

I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the LORD do all these things. Isaiah 45:7

Shall a trumpet be blown in the city, and the people not be afraid? Shall there be evil in a city, and the LORD hath not done it? Amos 3:6

Doesn't sound like scriptures support this modern idea (it hasn't been around for very long.) of a god who is "all-good"... The base of the Abrahamic religons (the O.T) doesn't support it at all, it contradicts it. And I can't find anything supporting it in the Qur'an or the N.T either.

And what is this:

"Actually this statement disproves itself. If a being cannot correctly judge God or God's actions then they cannot even determine if God is All Good, All Powerful or All Knowing."

I agree that no being could determine such but not that is disproves itself. Or does something always have to be proven to be true? (I'm not saying that particular statement you referred to is true, however, but lets assume so for sake of argument.) Wasn't (for example) the theory of gravity true before it was written? Or did gravity work differently before the theory was written? No, it did not, it worked exactly the same way, and when we humans are all gone: It will continue to work the same way it always has, without us. (This is of course, assuming that the theory of gravity is correct, which I'm pretty sure we all do, as evidence suggests so.)

The problem of evil is not God, it is man...

All powerful; The confusion comes by the wrong definition of all powerful. There are logical limits to all powerful. Example. Can God make something that He cannot lift? Can God make something that He cannot control? Can God make rules that limit Himself?

By saying this, it does not diminish the power of an all powerful God, it merely defines the power.

If you were to equate it to something else. You can equate it to the speed of light. For your average person, the speed of light is infinite. No time passes between turning a light on and the light coming on. But if you want to get technical about it, the speed of light is not infinite, just VERY VERY fast. For most practical purposes, there is no speed of light, practically instantanious. The only time that the speed of light becomes an issue, is if you push it to extremes. Measuring distances to stars, or comparing the differences between different light colours. etc...

In the same way, for all practical purposes, God is all powerful. God made man with the intention to not control him. Does this limit His power? yes. Does that make Him any less God? no.

Man has the potential to be whatever they choose to be, and their is no evil in this world that has not been brought about by man.

The problem of evil is not God, the problem of evil is man.

• • • As a side note, I received the following comment on the above thought.

"God is supposed to have made man with a certain nature, liking this, disliking that etc. Our free-will chooses in accordance with our nature. Instead of an omnipotent God giving us a nature which is aligned with his --so that we choose with our free-will what also delights him as well-- we are supposed to have been given a nature that is in rebellion with his own, i.e desiring at times and choosing with our free will that which offends him- see original sin. God then is supposed to punish man for His own workmanship. GoldenMeadows 11:48, 23 April 2007 (UTC)"

Yes, God did make man with a certain nature, and if you read the whole "Garden of Eden" story, then you see that man was made with a pure nature to start with. Until the turned their backs on God and corrupted themselves. And by saying that "our free will chooses in accordance with our natures". Well that is not true. You might be prone to certain decisions, and prone to certain quirks, but you maintain the ability to either choose for it or against it.

--Mootieman 14:55, 23 April 2007 (UTC)

A practical example rooted in Christian teaching illustrates the problem. Nobody suggests that the saints in heaven sin. Aquinas argued that this is so because a soul immersed in the beatific vision is incapable of sinning. Now presumably the saints in heaven have free-will and this being so it suggests that God is quite capable of ordering our nature such we are not inclined to sin whilst still retaining free will, i.e why does God not simply "mend" the fallen nature we are supposed to have been born with rather than punish a soul for a damaged nature not of his own making? GoldenMeadows 15:07, 23 April 2007 (UTC)

That is a very, very good question, You had me stumped there for a bit ... Allow me to break down your statement. 1. There will be no sin in heaven. (Premise) 2. God can "fix" us without taking away free will. (Conclusion from 1) 3. Why does He not just fix us, instead of punishing us. (Question from 2)

I am not going to try and answer the first two statements, because in essence, we can debate it, but there is not a lot of information about it, so at best, it will only be a guess.

Why does God not just fix us? God will not force himself on us, (have His way with us against our will). On the contrary, He has gone to great lengths in order for Him to reunite man with Himself. In order for Him to "fix" us, we need to submit ourselves to his authority, and for the most part, humanity likes their indipendance.

--Mootieman 07:38, 24 April 2007 (UTC)

The above answer still does not answer the problem about sin in heaven. If there is no sin in heaven then either only perfect people will go to heaven (which contradicts the Christian belief that Jesus died so that sinners could go to heaven) or god will interfere or "fix" us at the time we go to heaven. If he will do it then, why not now? -- Q Chris 12:27, 24 April 2007 (UTC)

In order for me to ensure that we are all on the same wavelength, allow me to break down your questions.

Your questions:
1. Will there be sin in heaven? No

2. Either (Only perfect people go to heaven) or (God can fix us)?
Firstly, There are no perfect people, so then that would mean that God will have to "fix us" in heaven.

3. If God can "fix us", why not now?
I will not presume to guess his reasons or motives.

Which leaves the question:
4. How would it be possible to ensure that there is no sin in heaven without taking away free will?
This one is going to be very difficult to answer as there is not a lot of information about it. Which means I will have to specultate.

I see in one of your previous posts, you ask why God didn't create us as good and pure and godlike... Well, he did... the original man/woman was made in the likeness of God. Until they were deceived by the devil and rebelled against God. You see, if God was to restore our innocence and remove the temptator, then you can have heaven without sin and retain our free will.

--Mootieman 15:39, 25 April 2007 (UTC)

I agree with your summary of the argument. I actually agree that God created us as good, pure and godlike, though I think your assertion that they were deceived by the devil has its own pitfalls. God also created the devil, so why was the devil not good and pure? I think that this, combined with point 3 (why doesn't God fix us now), makes me believe that God intended things to be as they are. This being the case how could God subject people to hell for acting in a way that was intended? I am finding better answers to these questions in the Bhagavad Gitathan I did in the Bible. -- Q Chris 06:29, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

Your question as to why God made the devil bad? Well, the Devil was made good and pure. He grew arrogant because of his beauty and rebelled against God.
We seem to have gotten side tracked a little bit ... But here is the point ... It is quite clear that Evil comes from a rebellion against God
The existance of evil proves that we are rejecting God, not that God doesn't exist...

--Mootieman 07:18, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

Yes, it only disproves one view of God. It disproves the existence of a God who is all powerful, all knowing, all good and would not have wanted what we see as evil emerge. -- Q Chris 09:08, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

I do not understand how your previous comment fits in with the rest of this argument. You say yes, as if you agree, then you say the opposite of what I am saying. Explain pls.

--Mootieman 09:35, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

OK go back to your summary

1. Will there be sin in heaven?

No

(OK)

2. Either (Only perfect people go to heaven) or (God can fix us)?

Firstly, There are no perfect people, so then that would mean that God will have to "fix us" in heaven.

(OK)

3. If God can "fix us", why not now?

I will not presume to guess his reasons or motives.

(what you are saying is that God has some reason not to fix us now. I just extended this back to say why did he not fix us yesterday and so on until I got to the point where evil first emerged. Why God let evil emerge is really the same question as why God won't fix us now, except way back in the past and there must have been some reason)

Which leaves the question:

4. How would it be possible to ensure that there is no sin in heaven without taking away free will?

...

So the argument just as I could have said: It disproves the existence of a God who is all powerful, all knowing, all good and who wants to "fix us" now. The statement I made is the same but projects back into the past to the point where evil emerged. -- Q Chris 12:49, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

It is not his existence that is at stake, but our understanding of His character. --Mootieman 07:34, 30 April 2007 (UTC)

I think that is a good summary. The argument makes so many assumptions about our understanding of God that it is not really a proof of the non-existence of God. Take the analogy that the absence of light in a dark cellar proves that there is not a man in the cellar with a functioning lamp, who is awake and knows how to use it and who really does not want the cellar to be dark. Some uses of this argument are just like saying "absence of light in the cellar proves that there is nobody in the cellar. -- Q Chris 08:56, 30 April 2007 (UTC)

Well, since sin/=evil (destructive) acts, but is instead the "seperation from God of man", it makes perfect sense for sin to be impossible in heaven, where you are in perfect unity with God. Furthermore, the saints are not made by God to be sinless and worthy, they choose to be that way - so it seems God can/will not subvert free will to make people sinless.KrytenKoro 14:19, 28 July 2007 (UTC)

The problem of Evil in Islam

I have added the following tags. {{off-topic}} {{expert-subject}}

This section needs attention from someone knowledgeable in this subject. The current entry appears to be a good faith edit describing Islam's attitudes to good and evil rather than addressing the topic of the article. The small amount that I have read about Islam's ideas on predestination and evil make me think that Islamic philosophy has much more to say on this topic. -- Q Chris 09:32, 11 June 2007 (UTC)

Moral argument from evil

Am I not understanding something, or is the argument "Moral argument from evil" in the Formalised arguments just a rambling and less robust expression of the argument given in "Logical problem of evil"? If so I think it adds little value and should be removed. -- Q Chris 06:38, 20 July 2007 (UTC)

The whole argument is pretty flaky. Specifically, I have a problem with: 11. No theist knows that a god exists; 12. For any given theist, that theist's belief that a god exists is either false or unjustified; 13. If a god exists, then some theists are justified in believing that a god exists; and 15. If a god exists, then some theists know (i.e., have a justified, true belief) that God exists. The concept of "justification" is used ambiguously here to conclude in faulty logic. If 11 begets 12, then it is implied that actual nonexistence of a god would make the theist's belief "false" instead of "unjustified", while "unjustification" lies in his lack of proof (factual knowledge) of a god's existence. Thus, because the existence of a god doesn't require or necessarily create "proof" of itself, and in the absence of proof the theist remains unjustified in his belief whether a god exists or not, 13 and 15 are invalid (and by extension the whole conclusion.) Just my two cents. Succubus MacAstaroth 15:16, 21 October 2007 (UTC)