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RFC, 25 February 2023

Taking Iskandar323's comments as a partial refutation of the opposition, I see rough consensus to adjust to lead as proposed. ScottishFinnishRadish (talk) 11:10, 17 May 2023 (UTC)

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.


Should we include 1981 bombings in the lede? Yes or No? Ghazaalch (talk) 18:05, 25 February 2023 (UTC)


Currently we have the following sentences related to the events of 1981 in lede:

  • By 1981, authorities had banned the MEK and begun a major crackdown on the group's members and supporters, driving the organization underground.[1][2]
  • In June 1981, the MEK organized the 20 June 1981 Iranian protests against the Islamic Republic in support of president Abolhassan Banisadr, claiming that the Islamic Republic had carried out a secret coup d'état.[3][4] Afterwards, the government arrested and executed numerous MEK members and sympathizers.[5][6][7] As the Iran regime started to clamp down on civil and human rights, the MEK initiated attacks targeting the clerical leadership that lasted until 1982.[8][9]

Should we replace them with the following paragraph?

Survey, 25 February 2023

  • Yes the main events of the 1981 as attested by many scholarly sources are the Assassinations allegedly done by MEK, but there is no coverage of them in the lede. Of course, there are some sources that mention other suspects besides the MEK, but most of the sources consider MEK responsible for the bombings. Fad Ariff objected above (see 1981 events in the lede (WP:RFCBEFORE)) that it should not be stated as fact, that is why I used the word "allegedly" in my proposal. I hope it is okay now.Ghazaalch (talk) 18:15, 25 February 2023 (UTC)
  • No. The lead's original version is a more accurate review of the academic literature and the article's sections. Also cherrypicked allegations is not something for the lead. Looking at those pages about the bombings for example the only things that seem beyond doubt is that "Khomeini blamed the MEK, which didn't take credit but also never denied responsibility"[30], and that the bombings "were shocking displays of the regime's faulty security and infiltration by foes".[31] The sources in those articles also attest that "It is possible, as Claude Van England notes, that those who planted the bombs were assisted by the Mujaahideen though they were not actually members of the organization. Much of the expertise involved was thus not necessarily that of the old Mujahideen, but may have been the product of collective efforts with other opponents of the regime."[32] Also that "there has been much speculation among academics and observers that these bombing may have actually been planned by senior IRP leaders, including current iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rasanjani, to rid themselves of rivals with the IRP"[33] Abrahamian also says "Even now it is not clear who planted the bomb", and that "SAVAK", "the Iraqi regime", "the Mojahedin", "Iraqi agents", "Mehdi Tafari", "royalist army officers" were all either charged or accused.[34] Another source also attests that "the bomb explosion in Tehran on 30 August 1981 - which killed Muhammad Ali Rajai, the newly elected president of the IRI, as well as prime minister Muhammad Javad Bahunar - was attributed to the United States and its local agents."[35] We also already had a conclusive RFC about part of what Ghazaalch wants to remove from the lead a few months ago. Fad Ariff (talk) 13:06, 27 February 2023 (UTC)
    Some of the key words in those statements are 'possible' and 'speculation' - you are transparently avoiding the sources that assign blame in no such uncertain times, e.g.: [1], [2]. That alternative postulations exist does not detract from the mainstream narrative, and frankly, given the number of sources fingering the MEK for this particular bombing, it's a bit ridiculous. If the IRP wanted to make a scene with a, sigh, false flag operation, it hardy need to blow up 70 of its own members to do so. Again, speculation. Iskandar323 (talk) 15:01, 27 February 2023 (UTC)
Fad Ariff, there are many scholarly sources that say the bombings are done by MEK, how many scholarly sources say that they are not? Nothing. If you can't find a similar number of scholarly sources that deny the allegation, then your argument amounts to WP:FALSEBALANCE. As Iskandar323 said, you are trying to cherrypick some speculations from some sources that if you look into them you'll find that those speculations are not even the authors' view. The last quote for example starts with "according to ..." which you preferred to cut it from your quotation. Ghazaalch (talk) 05:58, 28 February 2023 (UTC)
Ghazaalch, your proposal acknowledges that all this finger pointing largely consists of only allegations, yet your proposal wants to remove verified content from the lead and replace it with allegations. Fad Ariff (talk) 13:30, 28 February 2023 (UTC)
  • Yes Wikipedia:LEAD: the lead section should be a summary of most important contents of the article. The 1981 bombings are among the most important contents of this article and contain a large section called Assassination. The current version of the lede is biased because it keep repeating that Islamic Republic of Iran banned and executed members of MEK because of a peaceful demonstration.Ali Ahwazi (talk) 18:36, 3 March 2023 (UTC)


Discussion, 25 February 2023

Hello Stara Marusya. I am agree with your edit here, however since part of the lede you changed is under an RFC, I guess you should revert the part, but you could put your vote concerning changing the whole lede in above RFCs. Thank you. Ghazaalch (talk) 07:06, 8 March 2023 (UTC)

References

  1. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 206. sfn error: multiple targets (6×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  2. ^ "Making Sense of The MeK". National Interest. Retrieved 21 November 2019.
  3. ^ Sinkaya, Bayram (2015). The Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics: Elites and Shifting Relations. Routledge. p. 105. ISBN 978-1138853645. The most drastic show of terror instigated by the MKO was the blast of a bomb placed in the IRP headquarter on 28 June 1980 that killed more than seventy prominent members of the IRP, including Ayatollah Beheshti, founder of the IRP and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; four cabinet ministers; and twenty-seven members of the Majles.
  4. ^ Svensson, Isak (2013). Ending Holy Wars: Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars. ISBN 978-0702249563. On 20 June 1981, MEK organized a peaceful demonstration attended by up to 50 000 participants, who advanced towards parliament. Khomeini's Revolutionary Guards opened fire, which resulted in 50 deaths, 200 injured, and 1 000 arrested in the area around Tehran University
  5. ^ Katzman 2001, pp. 98–101. sfn error: multiple targets (7×): CITEREFKatzman2001 (help)
  6. ^ Abrahamian 1989, pp. 36, 218, 219. sfn error: multiple targets (6×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  7. ^ Cite error: The named reference auto7 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  8. ^ Ostovar, Afshon (2016). Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran's Revolutionary Guards. Oxford University Press. pp. 73–74. ISBN 978-0-19-049170-3. Unsurprisingly, the decision to fight alongside Saddam was viewed as traitorous by the vast majority of Iranians and destroyed the MKO's standing in its homeland.
  9. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 208. sfn error: multiple targets (6×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  10. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 206–207, 219. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. by the fateful day of 20 June, the Mojahedin - together with Bani-Sadr - were exhorting the masses to repeat their 'heroic revolution of 1978-9'...The success of 1978-9 had not been duplicated. Having failed to bring down the regime, Bani-Sadr and Rajavi fled to Paris where they tried to minimize their defeat by claiming that the true intention of 20 June had not been so much to overthrow the whole regime.
  11. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019. On 20 June 1981, the MEK organised a mass protest of half a million people in Tehran, with the aim of triggering a second revolution… 50 demonstrators were killed, with 200 wounded. Banisadr was removed from office...
  12. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 101. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9. On June 20, 1981, the PMPI held a major anti-Khomeini demonstration that turned into an armed confrontation in which the PMOI was badly defeated.
  13. ^ Sinkaya, Bayram (2015). The Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics: Elites and Shifting Relations. Routledge. p. 105. ISBN 978-1138853645. The most drastic show of terror instigated by the MKO was the blast of a bomb placed in the IRP headquarter on 28 June 1980 that killed more than seventy prominent members of the IRP, including Ayatollah Beheshti, founder of the IRP and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; four cabinet ministers; and twenty-seven members of the Majles.
  14. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 57. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. The most ambitious attack attributed to the MeK was the bombing of the IRP's Tehran headquarters on June 28, 1981. This attack killed more than 71 members of the Iranian leadership, including cleric Ayatollah Beheshti, who was both secretary-general of the IRP and chief justice of the IRI's judicial system.
  15. ^ Fayazmanesh, Sasan (2008). The United States and Iran Sanctions, wars and the policy of dual containment. Routledge. pp. 79–80. ISBN 0-203-94620-0. In 1981, the MEK detonated bombs in the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and the Premier's office, killing some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, including Chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei, and Premier Mohammad-Javad Bahonar
  16. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857. the MEK leaders found that they had no role in the new regime…In response, supporters launched a terror campaign against Khomeini's regime. On June 28, 1981, two bombs killed 74 members of the Khomeini Islamic Republic Party (IRP) at a party conference in Tehran.
  17. ^ Colgan, Jeff (31 January 2013). Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War. Cambridge University Press 2013. p. 167. ISBN 978-1-107-02967-5.
  18. ^ S. Ismael, Jacqueline; Perry, Glenn; Y. Ismael, Tareq (5 October 2015). Government and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East: Continuity and change. Routledge (2015). p. 181. ISBN 978-1-317-66283-9.
  19. ^ Newton, Michael (17 April 2014). Famous Assassinations in World History: An Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO (2014). p. 27. ISBN 978-1-61069-286-1.
  20. ^ Pedde, Nicola. "ROLE AND EVOLUTION OF THE MOJAHEDIN E-KA". ojs.uniroma1.
  21. ^ McGreal, Chris (21 September 2012). "Q&A: what is the MEK and why did the US call it a terrorist organisation?". The Guardian. Retrieved 21 September 2012.
  22. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 58. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. Khomeini's Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps brutally suppressed the MeK, arresting and executing thousands of members and supporters. The armed revolt was poorly planned and short-lived. On July 29, 1981, Rajavi, the MeK leadership, and Banisadr escaped to Paris
  23. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. p. 219. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. The success of 1978-9 had not been duplicated. Having failed to bring down the regime, Bani-Sadr and Rajavi fled to Paris where they tried to minimize their defeat by claiming that the true intention of 20 June had not been so much to overthrow the whole regime
  24. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857. These attacks led to a brutal crackdown on all dissidents. Throughout 1981 a mini - civil war existed between the Khomeini regime and the MEK . By the end of 1982 , most MEK operatives in Iran had been eradicated . By the time, most MEK leaders left Iran for refugee in France.
  25. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 220–221, 258. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. By the autumn of 1981, the Mojahedin were carrying out daily attacks...The number of assassinations and armed attacks initiated by the Mojahedin fell from the peak of three per day in July 1981 to five per week in February 1982, and to five per month by December 1982.
  26. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 85. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  27. ^ Newton, Michael (2014). Famous Assassinations in World History: An Encyclopedia [2 volumes]. ABC-CLIO. p. 27. ISBN 9781610692861. Retrieved 19 July 2019. On August 30, 1981, a bomb exploded in the Tehran office of Iranian prime minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. The blast killed Bahonar, as well as President Mohammad-Ali Rajai...Survivors described the explosion occurring when one victim opened a briefcase, brought into the office by Massoud Kashmiri, a state security official. Subsequent investigation revealed that Kashmiri was an agent of the leftist People's Mujahedin of Iran (MEK)
  28. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 101. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9.
  29. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 85. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  30. ^ O'Hern, Steven K. (2012). Iran's Revolutionary Guard: The Threat that Grows While America Sleeps. Potomac Books. p. 32. ISBN 978-1-59797-823-1.
  31. ^ Amanat, Abbas (2019). Iran: A Modern History. Yale University Press. p. 803.
  32. ^ Ram, Haggay (Summer 1992). "Crushing the Opposition: Adversaries of the Islamic Republic of Iran". Middle East Journal. 46 (3): 426–439. JSTOR 42763892.
  33. ^ Kenneth Katzman (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Albert V. Benliot (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova Publishers. p. 101. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9.
  34. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 219–220. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3.
  35. ^ Pirseyedi, Bobi (2017). Arms Control and Iranian Foreign Policy: Diplomacy of Discontent (Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics). Routledge. p. 190.
The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Rajavi's "ideological revolution" in the lede (WP:RFCBEFORE)

Now superseded by #RFC, 30 March 2023. --MarioGom (talk) 22:28, 14 May 2023 (UTC)

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Currently there is no information about Rajavi's "ideological revolution" in the lede. I suggest changing the fourth paragraph of the lede from:

to:

Ali Ahwazi (talk) 17:16, 5 March 2023 (UTC)

I think we could do the replacement. Ghazaalch (talk) 16:21, 24 March 2023 (UTC)
@Fad Ariff: Considering that there are no objections, I will implement the new proposal. Do you have any comments? Ali Ahwazi (talk) 22:33, 25 March 2023 (UTC)
There are many different things to consider about the ideological revolution. Why would you choose something about "divorces" specifically for the lead? Also why would you remove "so in response, it re-established its base in Iraq" from the lead? Fad Ariff (talk) 12:17, 27 March 2023 (UTC)
Because there is currently no information about the current MEK leader and the way she became the leader, in the Lede. If you have no other objection I will implement the changes. Ali Ahwazi (talk) 08:02, 28 March 2023 (UTC)
You have not addressed either one of my objections. If you want to put material about the ideological revolution in the lead, why not add for example that "For MEK members, the marriage between Massoud and Maryam Rajavi became a platform for women to challenge forced marriages."[27]? Also why would you remove "so in response, it re-established its base in Iraq" from the lead? Fad Ariff (talk) 12:03, 28 March 2023 (UTC)
Because what I proposed is a fact and what you propose is an opinion. Ali Ahwazi (talk) 08:34, 30 March 2023 (UTC)
First, Shirin Saeidi’s passage is not an opinion. Second, you are attempting to remove from the lead review of the academic literature with cherry picking. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:04, 30 March 2023 (UTC)
Shirin Saeidi’s passage is Wikipedia:Cherrypicking because it is not supported by mainstream sources about MEK. Ali Ahwazi's addition, in contrary, is supported by multiple academic sources written by subject matter experts.Ghazaalch (talk) 14:09, 30 March 2023 (UTC)
The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

RFC, 30 March 2023

There is no consensus forthcoming from this RFC. ScottishFinnishRadish (talk) 11:12, 17 May 2023 (UTC)

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.



Should we add some information about Maryam Rajavi, and the way she became a leader of People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran to the lede? Ali Ahwazi (talk) 08:34, 30 March 2023 (UTC)


To add the information about Maryam Rajavi, I suggest changing the fourth paragraph of the lede from:

to:

Ali Ahwazi (talk) 08:46, 30 March 2023 (UTC)

Survey, 30 March 2023

Yes. Because currently there is no information about Maryam Rajavi as a leader of the People's Mojahedin-e Khalq, and the way she became the leader, in the Lede. Note that I condensed the old information of the paragraph a bit to make more room for new information. Ali Ahwazi (talk) 08:46, 30 March 2023 (UTC)

  • Comment: There are a variety of problems with this RFC. First, the MEK has two current leaders, not one. Second, Ali Ahwazi’s proposal doesn’t address his own RFC question and instead cherry picks a small aspect of a very complicated ideological revolution. These problems were mentioned in the above discussion, where Ali Ahwazi proposes to replace review of the academic literature with cherry picking. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:01, 30 March 2023 (UTC)
Fad Ariff, I fixed the first problem for Ali Ahwazi. I do not understand the second. What you mean by Ali Ahwazi’s proposal doesn’t address his own RFC question? Ghazaalch (talk) 13:53, 30 March 2023 (UTC)
@Ghazaalch the RFC question suggests that we should replace some (indisputable) material with some information about how Maryam Rajavi became a leader of this group. Although something like 'Maryam Rajavi was a candidate for the parliamentary elections in Tehran in 1980, and was elected as the Mojahedin's joint-leader in 1985, later becoming the Secretary General of the organization' would be a suitable proposal for this, Ali Ahwazi's proposal is the usual WP:COATRACKing with no context. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:04, 31 March 2023 (UTC)
Ali Ahwazi's proposal is not a replacement, but it is an addition. And as you see, nothing important has been removed from the lede. Now tell me what is disputed about adding some information about Rajavi's ideological revolution and the way he turned the MEK from an active political group into a Cult of personality? there are at least two sections concerning these changes in the main body of the article. Why shouldn't we have a bit of them in the lede?Ghazaalch (talk) 14:03, 31 March 2023 (UTC)

Discussion, 30 March 2023

Sources

  1. ^ Shay, Shaul (October 1994). The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror. Routledge. ISBN 978-0765802552. The organizations' ties with Iraq (mainly Rajavi's meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1983) were exploited to demonstrate the organizations betrayal due to its willingness to join forces with Iran's enemies on the outside.
  2. ^ Piazza 1994: "At the beginning of January of 1983, Rajavi held a highly publicized meeting with then Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq Tarqi Aziz, which culminated in the signing of a peace communique on January 9 of that year. Rajavi, acting as the chairman of the NCR, co-outlined a peace plan with Aziz based on an agreement of mutual recognition of borders as defined by the 1975 Algiers Treaty."
  3. ^ "Iraqi Visits Iranian Leftist in Paris". The New York Times. 10 January 1983. The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the exiled leader of an Iranian leftist group met for four hours today and said afterward that the war between their countries should brought to an end. The conversations between Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz of Iraq and Massoud Rajavi, leader of the People's Mojahedin, an organization that includes a guerrilla wing active in Iran, were described by Mr. Rajavi as the first of their kind. He said the exchange of views had been "an important political turning point on the regional level and for the world in relation to the Iran-Iraq War"
  4. ^ Shay, Shaul (October 1994). The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror. Routledge. ISBN 978-0765802552. Despite the mortal blow inflicted on the organization, the Iranian regime continued to regard the Mujahidin as a real threat, and therefore continued to persecute its followers and damage their public image. The organizations' ties with Iraq (mainly Rajavi's meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1983) were exploited to demonstrate the organizations betrayal due to its willingness to join forces with Iran's enemies on the outside.
  5. ^ a b c d Piazza 1994, pp. 9–43.
  6. ^ a b c d Lorentz, Dominique; David, Carr-Brown (14 November 2001), La République atomique [The Atomic Republic] (in French), Arte TV
  7. ^ a b c d Dehghan, Saeed Kamali (2 July 2018). "Who is the Iranian group targeted by bombers and beloved of Trump allies?". The Guardian. ...by then sheltered in camps in Iraq, fought against Iran alongside the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein...
  8. ^ a b c d Farrokh, Kaveh (20 December 2011). Iran at War: 1500–1988. Oxford, England: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78096-221-4.
  9. ^ a b c d Buchan, James (15 October 2013). Days of God: The Revolution in Iran and Its Consequences. Simon and Schuster. p. 317. ISBN 978-1-4165-9777-3. Retrieved 17 October 2020.
  10. ^ a b c d Al-Hassan, Omar (1989). Strategic Survey of the Middle East. Brassey's. p. 7. ISBN 978-0-08-037703-2. Retrieved 17 October 2020.
  11. ^ a b c d Alaolmolki, Nozar (1991). Struggle for Dominance in the Persian Gulf: Past, Present, and Future Prospects. University of Michigan. p. 105. ISBN 9780820415901. Retrieved 17 October 2020.
  12. ^ a b c d Cohen, Ronen A. (2018-11-02). "The Mojahedin-e Khalq versus the Islamic Republic of Iran: from war to propaganda and the war on propaganda and diplomacy". Middle Eastern Studies. 54 (6): 1000–1014. doi:10.1080/00263206.2018.1478813. ISSN 0026-3206. S2CID 149542445.
  13. ^ a b c d Abrahamian 1989, p. 208. sfn error: multiple targets (6×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  14. ^ a b c d Graff, James (14 December 2006). "Iran's Armed Opposition Wins a Battle — In Court". Time. Archived from the original on 28 April 2011. Retrieved 13 April 2011.
  15. ^ a b c d "Behind the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MeK)". Archived from the original on 28 September 2009. Retrieved 3 August 2009.
  16. ^ a b c d "Khomeini fatwa 'led to killing of 30,000 in Iran'". The Independent. Archived from the original on 10 February 2006. Retrieved 12 September 2021.
  17. ^ a b c d "I was lucky to escape with my life. The massacre of Iranian political prisoners in 1988 must now be investigated". The Independent. Archived from the original on 25 May 2022.
  18. ^ Buchta, Wilfried (2000), Who rules Iran?: the structure of power in the Islamic Republic, Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, pp. 52–54, ISBN 978-0-944029-39-8
  19. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019. Rajavi, as the head of the organization, launched an "ideological revolution", banning marriage and enforcing mandatory "eternal" divorce on all members, who were required to separate from their husbands or wives. He married one of the new divorcees, Maryam Azodanlu, who became, in effect, his chief lieutenant and took his name.
  20. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. pp. 60, 71. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. In 1985, Rajavi announced that he had appointed Maryam Azodanlu, the wife of his close associate Mehdi Abrishamchi, as co-leader of the MeK. She would soon divorce her husband and marry Rajavi. Together, they would launch a new "ideological revolution" that would, over time, transform the MeK into a cult group… As a part of the "ideological revolution," the Rajavis mandated divorce.
  21. ^ Cohen, Ronen (2009). The Rise and Fall of the Mojahedin Khalq, 1987-1997: Their Survival After the Islamic Revolution and Resistance to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Sussex Academic Press. pp. 32–39. ISBN 978-1845192709. At the Neshest it took Rajavi five days to convince members of his main revolutionary demand - that they should divorce their spouses. He wanted to ensure that members' sexual identity would be denied and thus bring about their complete devotion to himself as their leader... Massoud and Maryam Rajavi were married in February 1985. Members were given an ideological explanation: "Maryam chose to divorce her husband in favour of her marriage to the Mojahedin's ideological leader so that she could work with him as cooperating leading partners."
  22. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 251–255. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. the Mojahedin had raetamorphized from a mass movement into an inward-looking sect in many ways similar to religious cults found the world over. This metamorphosis rapidly crystallized in early 1985 with Rajavi's new marriage...Until then, Mojahedin activists had known Maryam Azodanlu as merely the younger sister of a veteran member, and the wife of Mehdi Abrishamchi, one of Rajavi's close colleagues…proclamation also mentioned almost in passing that Maryam Azodanlu and Mehdi Abrishamchi had recently divorced in order to pave the way for this 'great revolution...It smacked of wife-swapping, especially when Abrishamchi announced his own marriage to Khiabani's younger sister...
  23. ^ Regencia, Ted (2018). "MEK's violent past looms over US lobby for regime change in Iran". Aljazeera.
  24. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 102. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9. By 1987, the PMOI had formally established the NLA, set up base camps along the Iran Iraq border, and began conducting military exercises and attacks inside Iran. Many analysts believe the PMOI's decision to ally with Iraq caused its support inside Iran to evaporate.
  25. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 4. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. Prior to its exile, the MeK was the most popular dissident group in Iran. It lost much of its popularity due to its willingness to fight with Saddam—the instigator of the destructive Iran-Iraq War—and to kill Iranian conscripts.)
  26. ^ Buchta, Wilfried (2000), Who rules Iran?: the structure of power in the Islamic Republic, Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, pp. 52–54, ISBN 978-0-944029-39-8
  27. ^ Saeidi, Shirin (2022). Women and the Islamic Republic: How Gendered Citizenship Conditions the Iranian State (Cambridge Middle East Studies, Series Number 66). Cambridge University Press. p. 127.
  28. ^ Shay, Shaul (October 1994). The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror. Routledge. ISBN 978-0765802552. The organizations' ties with Iraq (mainly Rajavi's meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1983) were exploited to demonstrate the organizations betrayal due to its willingness to join forces with Iran's enemies on the outside.
  29. ^ Piazza 1994: "At the beginning of January of 1983, Rajavi held a highly publicized meeting with then Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq Tarqi Aziz, which culminated in the signing of a peace communique on January 9 of that year. Rajavi, acting as the chairman of the NCR, co-outlined a peace plan with Aziz based on an agreement of mutual recognition of borders as defined by the 1975 Algiers Treaty."
  30. ^ "Iraqi Visits Iranian Leftist in Paris". The New York Times. 10 January 1983. The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the exiled leader of an Iranian leftist group met for four hours today and said afterward that the war between their countries should brought to an end. The conversations between Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz of Iraq and Massoud Rajavi, leader of the People's Mojahedin, an organization that includes a guerrilla wing active in Iran, were described by Mr. Rajavi as the first of their kind. He said the exchange of views had been "an important political turning point on the regional level and for the world in relation to the Iran-Iraq War"
  31. ^ Shay, Shaul (October 1994). The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror. Routledge. ISBN 978-0765802552. Despite the mortal blow inflicted on the organization, the Iranian regime continued to regard the Mujahidin as a real threat, and therefore continued to persecute its followers and damage their public image. The organizations' ties with Iraq (mainly Rajavi's meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1983) were exploited to demonstrate the organizations betrayal due to its willingness to join forces with Iran's enemies on the outside.
  32. ^ Buchta, Wilfried (2000), Who rules Iran?: the structure of power in the Islamic Republic, Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, pp. 52–54, ISBN 978-0-944029-39-8
  33. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019. Rajavi, as the head of the organization, launched an "ideological revolution", banning marriage and enforcing mandatory "eternal" divorce on all members, who were required to separate from their husbands or wives. He married one of the new divorcees, Maryam Azodanlu, who became, in effect, his chief lieutenant and took his name.
  34. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. pp. 60, 71. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. In 1985, Rajavi announced that he had appointed Maryam Azodanlu, the wife of his close associate Mehdi Abrishamchi, as co-leader of the MeK. She would soon divorce her husband and marry Rajavi. Together, they would launch a new "ideological revolution" that would, over time, transform the MeK into a cult group… As a part of the "ideological revolution," the Rajavis mandated divorce.
  35. ^ Cohen, Ronen (2009). The Rise and Fall of the Mojahedin Khalq, 1987-1997: Their Survival After the Islamic Revolution and Resistance to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Sussex Academic Press. pp. 32–39. ISBN 978-1845192709. At the Neshest it took Rajavi five days to convince members of his main revolutionary demand - that they should divorce their spouses. He wanted to ensure that members' sexual identity would be denied and thus bring about their complete devotion to himself as their leader... Massoud and Maryam Rajavi were married in February 1985. Members were given an ideological explanation: "Maryam chose to divorce her husband in favour of her marriage to the Mojahedin's ideological leader so that she could work with him as cooperating leading partners."
  36. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 251–255. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. the Mojahedin had raetamorphized from a mass movement into an inward-looking sect in many ways similar to religious cults found the world over. This metamorphosis rapidly crystallized in early 1985 with Rajavi's new marriage...Until then, Mojahedin activists had known Maryam Azodanlu as merely the younger sister of a veteran member, and the wife of Mehdi Abrishamchi, one of Rajavi's close colleagues…proclamation also mentioned almost in passing that Maryam Azodanlu and Mehdi Abrishamchi had recently divorced in order to pave the way for this 'great revolution...It smacked of wife-swapping, especially when Abrishamchi announced his own marriage to Khiabani's younger sister...
  37. ^ Regencia, Ted (2018). "MEK's violent past looms over US lobby for regime change in Iran". Aljazeera.
  38. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 102. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9. By 1987, the PMOI had formally established the NLA, set up base camps along the Iran Iraq border, and began conducting military exercises and attacks inside Iran. Many analysts believe the PMOI's decision to ally with Iraq caused its support inside Iran to evaporate.
  39. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 4. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. Prior to its exile, the MeK was the most popular dissident group in Iran. It lost much of its popularity due to its willingness to fight with Saddam—the instigator of the destructive Iran-Iraq War—and to kill Iranian conscripts.)
  40. ^ Buchta, Wilfried (2000), Who rules Iran?: the structure of power in the Islamic Republic, Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, pp. 52–54, ISBN 978-0-944029-39-8
The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Follows-up RFC

Hello ScottishFinnishRadish, some RFCs like the one above were only objected by users like Fad Ariff and Iraniangal777 who were blocked later. Could we implement the changes they objected into article or should we open new discussions? Ghazaalch (talk) 03:38, 10 June 2023 (UTC)
I would say implement them and see if there's any other objections. ScottishFinnishRadish (talk) 03:44, 10 June 2023 (UTC)

VF

@Ghazaalch: since you removed ‘verification fail’ from the sources '[1]' and '[2]', can you show how those sources support those statements? Fad Ariff (talk) 12:01, 6 April 2023 (UTC)

@Ghazaalch and Iskandar323: "The MeK carried out a number of violent attacks on a range of Iranian government and Western targets that it deemed to be supportive of the Shah." That is only cited to RAND, so why are you stating it as fact? But I think the main problems here are about the Assassination of Paul R. Shaffer and John H. Turner, for example, which are attributed to: Vahid Afrakhteh, a founding member of Peykar, who confessed to the killing and later was executed. What about the U.S. civilians killed in 1976 as well as Harold Price or Lewis Lee Hawkins? The article is saying that despite Vahid Afrakhteh and Bahram Aram confessing to the killings of Americans, some sources have nevertheless attributed the assassinations to the MEK. Why are you overlooking that information? Also nobody has commented on the pending challenge concerning WP:V in Piazza 1994 and Abrahamian 1982. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:05, 12 April 2023 (UTC)
Except it's not just cited to RAND, is it? Because RAND in turn cites Slavin and Abrahamian, which anyone can see if they take but a few seconds to look at the footnotes. And yes, the footnote expands that the MEK has claimed that it wasn't responsible (as per usual), and has tried to shift the blame elsewhere, but, as always, MEK denials are just MEK denials. Iskandar323 (talk) 12:45, 12 April 2023 (UTC)
But wait, the sources in Lewis Lee Hawkins, Assassination of Paul R. Shaffer and John H. Turner, and in this article show that the people who confessed to these assassinations were part of a different group. Why would you ignore that? ParadaJulio (talk) 09:03, 13 April 2023 (UTC)
Both of those pages are start-class and clearly have major problems. Peykar only became Peykar in 1978, and the split between the two MEK splinters only occurred in October 1975 - that's on the Peykar page - so later. Iskandar323 (talk) 09:25, 13 April 2023 (UTC)
No, @Iskandar323: Those pages don't have "major problems", and the schism separating the group into a Marxist camp and a Muslim camp started in 1973 (that's on the MEK page), with its official announcement in 1975 . Those who were charged and executed for these assassinations belonged to the Marxist camp (rival of the MEK). It's clearly said in the citations of those articles. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:11, 13 April 2023 (UTC)
Yes, so you agree it started splitting on 1973, but only actually split on October 1975, i.e.: up until that point, the same. It doesn't matter what 'camp' of MEK they were in; they were still in MEK at that point. Iskandar323 (talk) 12:43, 13 April 2023 (UTC)
"By 1973, the members of the Marxist–Leninist MEK launched an "internal ideological struggle" "This new group adopted a Marxist, more secular and extremist identity" "This led to two rival Mojahedin, each with its own publication, its own organization, and its own activities" "The new group was known initially as the Mojahedin M.L. (Marxist–Leninist). A few months before the Iranian Revolution, the majority of the Marxist Mojahedin renamed themselves Peykar"[3][4][5][6]. The information in the article makes it clear that the Mojahedin M.L. (Marxist–Leninist), as it became known in 1973, is not the same group as the Muslim MEK (the subject of the page). Fad Ariff (talk) 12:10, 14 April 2023 (UTC)
Read again: it "led to" two rival groups - yes, separate groups, from October 1975, when they actually split. Iskandar323 (talk) 13:42, 14 April 2023 (UTC)
WP:HUH? By 1973, the new group was called the Mojahedin M.L. (Marxist–Leninist), and by 1975 the same group was called Peykar (read also the Peykar page: "Originating in 1972 and officially founded in 1975, by the early 1980s Peykar was no longer considered active."[7]. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:21, 17 April 2023 (UTC)
"Founded in 1975..." - that this needs explaining over and over again just raises WP:CIR issues. Iskandar323 (talk) 12:29, 17 April 2023 (UTC)
WP:HUH?? "By 1973, the new group was called the Mojahedin M.L. (Marxist–Leninist)". Sources are saying that the members of the Mojahedin M.L. (Marxist–Leninist) were the ones charged for this. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:05, 18 April 2023 (UTC)
It helps when you read full sentences. By 1973, the members of the Marxist–Leninist MEK launched an "internal ideological struggle". N.B. "internal". Iskandar323 (talk) 17:01, 18 April 2023 (UTC)
Read the full sentence if you prefer, it still doesn't change the fact that this was attributed to members of Marxist Mojahedin, a group that broke away from the MEK and became the MEK's rival. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:13, 19 April 2023 (UTC)
@Ghazaalch: why have you not replied about removing the ‘verification fail’ from the sources '[1]' and '[2]'? Fad Ariff (talk) 12:12, 28 April 2023 (UTC)

The last two paragraphs of the lead

These are the last two paragraph of the lede:

In 2002, the MEK was a source for claims about the nuclear program of Iran.[8] Following the occupation of Iraq by U.S.-led coalition forces in 2003, the MEK signed a ceasefire agreement with the U.S. and put down their arms in Camp Ashraf.[9][10] The European Union, Canada, the United States, and Japan have previously listed the MEK as a terrorist organization. The MEK is designated as a terrorist organization by Iran and Iraq.[11]

In June 2004, the U.S. designated MEK members in Camp Ashraf ‘protected persons’ under the Fourth Geneva Convention, relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War[12][13][14][15] which expired in 2009 after the attainment of the full sovereignty of Iraq.[16] Its critics have described the group as "resembling a cult",[17][18][19] while its backers describe the group as proponents of "a free and democratic Iran" that could become the next government there.[20]


I'm going to merge them as bellow and add some context:

In April 1992, MEK carried out attacks against Iranian embassies in 13 countries. [21][22] [23] since 1997, MeK was listed as a terrorist organization by the United States and many other countries.[24][25][26] Following the occupation of Iraq by U.S.-led coalition forces in 2003, the U.S. did not hand over MEK fighters to Iran.[27][28] Then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney argued that the MEK should be used against Iran.[29][30]In June 2004, Donald Rumsfeld designated the MeK as protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention.[31][32] Since 2009, when the Iraqi government became openly hostile to MEK, the U.S. led efforts to get the group's members out of Iraq.[33] At the same time the MEK paid Western political influencers to lobby for its removal from the list of designated terrorist organizations.[34][35][36][37] After it was no longer designated as a terrorist group, the US was able to convince Albania to accept the remaining 2,700 members who were brought to Tirana between 2014 and 2016.[38][39][40]

Any comment? Ghazaalch (talk) 17:32, 7 April 2023 (UTC)

This proposal provides the readers with more information, especially about the recent history of the Mojahedin-e Khalgh, and should replace the existing information.Ali Ahwazi (talk) 19:29, 10 April 2023 (UTC)
@Fad Ariff:, do you see any problem with this? Ghazaalch (talk) 06:38, 13 April 2023 (UTC)
Why are you trying to remove that the MEK was a source for the nuclear program of Iran, or about its cease-fire agreement in 2003, or that its terrorist designation was removed by all the Western countries? And why would you want to add instead that the U.S. did not hand over MEK to the I.R., or that Cheney argued that it should be used as a proxy against the I.R.? Your proposal also has copyright violations, but balancing any form of neutrality seems to be the worst part. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:16, 13 April 2023 (UTC)
You have to admit that the current two paragraphs are consisting of some irrelevant sentences with no context. What I did was to provide the contexts for readers who don't know, for example, why America signed a ceasefire with a terrorist group. Adding the context to an already long article, requires us to condense or remove the information that are not very important, such as the information about MEK being the source of claims about Iran's nuclear program, etc. Nevertheless, to address your objections, I have modified the above proposal as follows:

In April 1992, MEK carried out attacks against Iranian embassies in 13 countries.[41][42][43] Periodic attacks on Iranian targets continued until May 2003, but ended during the US-led invasion of Iraq,[44][45][46] when Coalition aircraft bombed MEK bases. The leadership of MEK ordered its members not to resist.[47][48] Then U.S. forces signed a ceasefire with the group that the US had designated as a terrorist organization in 1997.[49][50][51] US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said the MEK should be treated as a terrorist group, but Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney argued that the MEK should be used against Iran. In June 2004, Donald Rumsfeld designated MEK as protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention.[52][53] By 2009, when the Iraqi government became hostile to MEK, the United States led efforts to get the group's members out of Iraq.[54] At the same time the MEK paid Western political influencers to lobby for its removal from the list of designated terrorist organizations.[55][56][57][58] After it was no longer designated as a terrorist group, the US was able to convince Albania to accept the remaining 2,700 members who were brought to Tirana between 2014 and 2016.[59][60][61]

@Fad Ariff:, Do you see any problem with this new proposal? Ghazaalch (talk) 10:04, 15 April 2023 (UTC)

@Fad Ariff:, Do you see any problem with this new proposal?Ghazaalch (talk) 09:03, 19 April 2023 (UTC)
@Ghazaalch: Yes, fundamentally a WP:POVFORK problem. I'll be more specific after I've addressed your other recent edits with similar problems. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:17, 19 April 2023 (UTC)
@Fad Ariff: can you explain how WP:POVFORK apply here? could you name other POVs that are not included in this proposal? Ghazaalch (talk) 06:56, 23 April 2023 (UTC)
@Ghazaalch: You say you "provide the contexts for readers who don't know" but instead you're trying to remove any established neutrality from the lead and replace it with cherrypicks. The attacks on Iranian embassies derived from attacks on the Mojahedin, but you don't say anything about the last part. Likewise, the attacks against the I.R. were about a power struggle between the two. Also the reasons why the MEK was removed from the terrorist lists is incorrect ("Secretary of State Clinton said in a statement that the decision was made because the MEK had renounced violence and had cooperated in closing their Iraqi paramilitary base.") You're still removing that the MEK was a source about the nuclear program of Iran, or that most of the countries that had previously listed it as a terrorist organization no longer do. Your edits also still contain a lot of copyright violations, and having to explain all these things to you each time is a huge WP:TIMESINK. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:25, 24 April 2023 (UTC)
What one politician says is not the reason why something was done. Four sources support the notion that the MEK's delisting was linked to lobbying, and, given that the only reason that almost anything gets done in US politics is due to lobbying efforts, this is hardly surprising. Washington is basically one big laundromat for lobby money. Iskandar323 (talk) 12:43, 19 May 2023 (UTC)
I tried to add the parts that Fad Ariff didn't object to above, but he reverted them too. Ghazaalch (talk) 05:18, 25 May 2023 (UTC)
@Iskandar323 and MarioGom: since the only user who objected this proposal was blocked, I am restoring the changes. Feel free to summarize or modify it. Ghazaalch (talk) 02:15, 10 June 2023 (UTC)
Sources

  1. ^ a b Abrahamian 1982, pp. 141–142.
  2. ^ a b Piazza 1994, p. 14.
  3. ^ Vahabzadeh, Peyman (2010). Guerrilla Odyssey: Modernization, Secularism, Democracy, and the Fadai Period of National Liberation In Iran, 1971–1979. Syracuse University Press. pp. 167–169.
  4. ^ Abrahamian 1982, pp. 493–4.
  5. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand, Tortured Confessions, University of California Press (1999), p. 151
  6. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 152. sfn error: multiple targets (6×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  7. ^ The Shah of Iran, the Iraqi Kurds, and the Lebanese Shia. Palgrave Macmillan. 2018. p. 8. ASIN B07FBB6L8Y. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |authors= ignored (help)
  8. ^ Katzman 2001, p. 105. sfn error: multiple targets (7×): CITEREFKatzman2001 (help)
  9. ^ Jehl, Douglas; Gordon, Michael R. (29 April 2003). "American Forces Reach Cease-Fire With Terror Group". The New York Times.
  10. ^ "Patterns of Global Terrorism 2004, U.S. Department of State" (PDF). 2009-2017.state.gov. Retrieved 21 July 2022.
  11. ^ Cite error: The named reference bdt45cgf112 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  12. ^ "URGENT ACTION DETAINEES HELD INCOMMUNICADO RISK TORTURE" (PDF). Retrieved 2 April 2022.
  13. ^ "FACTBOX-Who are the People's Mujahideen of Iran?". Reuters. 26 January 2009. Retrieved 2 April 2022.
  14. ^ Wills, Siobhán (2010). "The Obligations Due to Former 'Protected Persons' in Conflicts that have Ceased to be International: The People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran". Journal of Conflict and Security Law. 15 (1): 117–139. doi:10.1093/jcsl/krq002.
  15. ^ Said, Wadie (2015). Crimes of Terror: The Legal and Political Implications of Federal Terrorism Prosecutions. OUP USA. ISBN 978-0199969494. Retrieved 2 April 2022. in 2004 obtained 'protected person' status under the Fourth Geneva Convention for all PMOI members at Camp Ashraf based on the U.S. investigators' conclusions that none was a combatant or had committed a crime under any U.S. laws; disbanded its military units and disarmed the Pmoi members at Ashraf, all of whom signed a document rejecting violence and terror
  16. ^ "Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK)".
  17. ^ Erlich, Reese (2018). The Iran Agenda Today: The Real Story Inside Iran and What's Wrong with U.S. Policy. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-429-94157-3. Retrieved 14 January 2020. But critics question that commitment given the cult of personality built around MEK's leader, Maryam Rjavi.
  18. ^ "How Iranian MEK went from US terror list to halls of Congress". Middle East Eye.
  19. ^ CBC
  20. ^ "Trump allies' visit throws light on secretive Iranian opposition group". The Guardian. 15 July 2019.
  21. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857.
  22. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 105. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9.
  23. ^ Fayazmanesh, Sasan (2008). The United States and Iran Sanctions, wars and the policy of dual containment. Routledge. p. 80. ISBN 0-203-94620-0.
  24. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857.
  25. ^ Jehl, Douglas (April 29, 2003). "AMERICAN FORCES AND TERROR GROUP REACH CEASE-FIRE". New York Times.
  26. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. xi. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  27. ^ Graff, James (Dec. 14, 2006). "Iran's Armed Opposition Wins a Battle — In Court". Time. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  28. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. pp. xiv, 17. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  29. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019.
  30. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. pp. xiv, 17. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  31. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. pp. 5, 41. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  32. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019.
  33. ^ Harb, Ali (17 July 2019). "How Iranian MEK went from US terror list to halls of Congress". Middle East Eye.
  34. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019.
  35. ^ "For Obscure Iranian Exile Group, Broad Support in U.S." New York Times. Nov 27, 2011.
  36. ^ Milani, Abbas (August 18, 2011). "The Inside Story of America's Favorite Terrorist Group". National Interest.
  37. ^ "John Bolton support for Iranian opposition spooks Tehran". Financial Times. 2018.
  38. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019.
  39. ^ ALGHURABI, REZA. "Terrorism and Corruption: Albania's Issues with EU Accession". Retrieved JULY 17 ,2019. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |access-date= (help)
  40. ^ Dehghan, Saeed Kamali (2 Jul 2018). "Who is the Iranian group targeted by bombers and beloved of Trump allies?". The Guardian.
  41. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857.
  42. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 105. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9.
  43. ^ Fayazmanesh, Sasan (2008). The United States and Iran Sanctions, wars and the policy of dual containment. Routledge. p. 80. ISBN 0-203-94620-0.
  44. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857.
  45. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 105. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9.
  46. ^ Fayazmanesh, Sasan (2008). The United States and Iran Sanctions, wars and the policy of dual containment. Routledge. p. 80. ISBN 0-203-94620-0.
  47. ^ "Patterns of Global Terrorism 2004, U.S. Department of State" (PDF). 2009-2017.state.gov. p. 105. Retrieved 21 July 2022.
  48. ^ Fayazmanesh, Sasan (2008). The United States and Iran Sanctions, wars and the policy of dual containment. Routledge. p. 80. ISBN 0-203-94620-0.
  49. ^ Jehl, Douglas (April 29, 2003). "AMERICAN FORCES AND TERROR GROUP REACH CEASE-FIRE". New York Times.
  50. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857.
  51. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. xi. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  52. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019. Condoleezza Rice, the US secretary of state, argued that the MEK was on the list of terrorist organisations and should be treated as such. But Iran hawks, including then secretary of defence, Donald Rumsfeld, and vice-president Dick Cheney, argued that the MEK should be used as a weapon against the Islamic republic – the next target in the neoconservative roadmap for remaking the Middle East.
  53. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. pp. 5, 17, 41. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. in June 2004, without tribunal review, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld determined the legal status of the MeK. Instead of prisoners of war, he designated MeK members as civilian "protected persons" under the terms of the Fourth Geneva Convention... the United States selectively chose to apply the Geneva Conventions to a designated terrorist organization and, further, to grant it a special status... Although maintaining the MeK as a possible proxy force in a regime change mission may have appeared reasonable to some U.S. policymakers and analysts in 2003, MNF-I's heightened understanding of the MeK, its operations, and its cult practices have shown that the group would offer limited operational value and questionable intelligence value.
  54. ^ Harb, Ali (17 July 2019). "How Iranian MEK went from US terror list to halls of Congress". Middle East Eye.
  55. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019. the MEK donated to political campaigns, blanketed Washington with advertisements and paid western political influencers fees to pen op-eds and give speeches – and to lobby for its removal from the list of designated terrorist organisations.
  56. ^ "For Obscure Iranian Exile Group, Broad Support in U.S." New York Times. Nov 27, 2011. The American advocates have been well paid, hired through their speaking agencies and collecting fees of $10,000 to $50,000 for speeches on behalf of the Iranian group. Some have been flown to Paris, Berlin and Brussels for appearances.
  57. ^ Milani, Abbas (August 18, 2011). "The Inside Story of America's Favorite Terrorist Group". National Interest. And so their remarkably well-oiled machine of PR firms, powerful American politicians (all handsomely paid for services rendered) and other pressure groups is now at it again. These advocates repeat what the MEK and its many front organizations claim: The group has jettisoned its violent past and is now, in its new incarnation, a key component of the democratic movement.
  58. ^ "John Bolton support for Iranian opposition spooks Tehran". Financial Times. 2018.
  59. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019.
  60. ^ ALGHURABI, REZA. "Terrorism and Corruption: Albania's Issues with EU Accession". Retrieved JULY 17 ,2019. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |access-date= (help)
  61. ^ Dehghan, Saeed Kamali (2 Jul 2018). "Who is the Iranian group targeted by bombers and beloved of Trump allies?". The Guardian.

Unexplained revert of Literal translation of "Mujahedin-e-Khalq"(WP:RFCBEFORE)

@Fad Ariff: why did you delete the literal translation of Mojahedin-e khalq? Ghazaalch (talk) 21:35, 14 April 2023 (UTC)

@Ghazaalch: see this post by User:Hogo-2020 , and this report by User:Iraniangal777. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:18, 17 April 2023 (UTC)
I am restoring a discussion here by Vice regent:

Here are 25 sources that use the two English translations for MEK:

Honestly, this should not have been a controversial edit. All I did was add English translation of the Farsi/Arabic name and provided 6 scholarly sources. I should not have to dig up 25 sources just to make small edits.VR talk 17:22, 29 December 2021 (UTC)

Fad Ariff, if you do not give me a reasonable explanation for the revert, I would restore it. Ghazaalch (talk) 09:17, 18 April 2023 (UTC)
Ghazaalch, once again, your addition is only representative of a small handful of sources. If we are following WP:WEIGHT (and we should be), then an alternative name should be in proportion to other alternative names. ‘People's Holy Warriors (of Iran),’ is far off from being in that category. The "People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI)" is the group's name. "Mujahedin-e khalq", "MEK", "MKO", and "People’s Mujahedin of Iran" is what is prevalent in academic sources as the group’s other names. Hogo-2020 (talk) 11:20, 19 April 2023 (UTC)
I don't see anything in WP:WEIGHT about excluding information (here a simple literal translation) altogether just because you just don't like it. There are more than enough sources using this term to justify a three-word mention. Iskandar323 (talk) 11:50, 19 April 2023 (UTC)
@Fad Ariff: No more objections? Ghazaalch (talk) 09:06, 19 April 2023 (UTC)
@Ghazaalch: yes, WP:UNDUEWEIGHT like Hogo is saying. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:34, 19 April 2023 (UTC)
Parroting policy is not the same thing as explaining how it applies. WP:ALTNAME says nothing about ignoring alt names. Iskandar323 (talk) 13:12, 19 April 2023 (UTC)
Fad Ariff, as I said above this is about adding a literal translation for MEK's original/Persian name, and it is quite often in articles like this.Ghazaalch (talk) 06:40, 20 April 2023 (UTC)
How on Earth the English translations, as used by at least 25 reliable sources, included several academic sources are not due weight? Of course they are due weight. MarioGom (talk) 19:20, 2 May 2023 (UTC)
Yes I started the RFC when you failed to give a satisfying response here. Ghazaalch (talk) 16:27, 16 May 2023 (UTC)
Sources

  1. ^ Amin Saikal. The Rise and Fall of the Shah. Princeton University Press. p. xxii.
  2. ^ The Cambridge History of Iran, volume 7. =Cambridge University Press. 1968. p. 1061.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)
  3. ^ Christian Emery (2013). US Foreign Policy and the Iranian Revolution. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 60.
  4. ^ Mohsen Sazegara and Maria J. Stephan. Civilian Jihad. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 188.
  5. ^ Charles Kurzman. The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran. Harvard University Press. p. 146.
  6. ^ this PhD thesis
  7. ^ Barry Rubin, Judith Colp Rubin. Chronologies of Modern Terrorism. Taylor & Francis. p. 398.
  8. ^ Ronen A. Cohen. Revolution Under Attack: The Forqan Group of Iran. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 28.
  9. ^ Amin Saikal. Iran Rising: The Survival and Future of the Islamic Republic. Princeton University Press. p. 37.
  10. ^ Larry C. Johnson (February 1, 2001). "The Future of Terrorism". American Behavioral Scientist. 44 (6): 899.
  11. ^ Gavin R. G. Hambly. The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 7. Cambridge University Press. p. 284.
  12. ^ "Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)". Conflict in the Modern Middle East: An Encyclopedia of Civil War, Revolutions, and Regime Change. ABC-CLIO. p. 208.
  13. ^ Mahan Abedin (2019). Iran Resurgent: The Rise and Rise of the Shia State. C. Hurst & Co. p. 60.
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