Talk:List of philosophical problems

Categories

The articile is ridiclously categorized, there should be more sub categories, philosophy of mind is certainly not a branch of epistemology, ( well maybe if you were a positivist...) I would also appreciate it if Daniel would recognise philosophy of religion questions as well, it's really not his call on whether or not gods existence is too vague and leads to too many flights of fancy for philosophers to disscus it, if he believes the assertion of gods existence is only an opinion thats fine but he shouldn't expect us to pretend that this makes the problem solved, since there's plenty of philosophers who'd disagree with him one way or another ( Quentin smith for the atheists who thinks it can be established as false, Swindburne for the theists who thinks it can be established as true).

To the previous unsigned poster, I would argue that the philosophy of religion questions that you added are not really valid philosophical problems. First of all, the coherence of the trinity, while occasionally found in philosophical forums, is generally in the domain of theology rather than philosophy. As for the relationship of God to morality, that question IS a philosophical one, but extends far beyond the mere purview of atheists and Christians. The initial question of moral priority was posed (if I'm not mistaken) by Plato in Euthyphro, and it has been therefore termed the "Euthyphro Dilemma" not "What is the relationship of God to morality?" which is a rather vague way to pose the question. At any rate, this has pretty clearly been categorized as an ethics question (not philosophy of religion). As to the question of whether God exists, there are three intractable positions: 1) God is logically impossible, therefore He cannot exist. 2) Logically, God MUST exist. And 3) It is impossible to logically determine whether God exists. I personally believe this issue is resolvable, however it carries so much baggage that philosophers have tended to avoid the question (although minor firefights still break out on this issue). Generally, philosophy of religion questions presuppose that God exists and then attempts to solve the philosophical ramifications and apparant paradoxes that result. The "Is there a God" question is not really a philosophical problem in the same sense as the "Gettier Problem" or "Sorites Paradox" in that it is neither well-defined nor sufficiently specific nor "solvable". I have no particular objection to including problems with the same degree of philosophical specificity as the "Gettier Problem" in philosophy of religion, although at the present time none are listed in the article. I will therefore rephrase the Euthyphro problem and move it to ethics and delete the Philosophy of Religion category, with the understanding that if someone wants to list legitimate problems in the philosophy of religion, they may feel free to do so without any objection on my part. As to my personal opinion vis-a-vis religious questions, I agree that it is not "my call" as to whether they are substantial philosophy (I am obviously of the opinion that they are generally not), and by no means do I intend on imposing my opinion in an ostensibly objective forum. However, I think, when compared to my other listings (again, e.g. sorites paradox and gettier problem) there is clearly a difference in scope, analyzability, solvability, and perspicuity. I don't consider the problem solved (in the sense that consensus has been reached), and I recognize that a significant minority of philosophers would disagree with the atheistic norm. I would, on the other hand, assert that the problem ought to be solvable (i.e. the philosophical debate could potentially end with consensus) to be considered "unsolved". If you would like to create a new article entitled, "Unsolvable Problems in Philosophy," I think the "whither God" question would fit in very nicely there. More realistically, an "Unsolved problems in theology" question might be in order. Danny Pi 07:01, 15 April 2006 (UTC)

I am that unsigned poster. Here are some pages on the Stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy which largely concern the issue of God's existence:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/teleological-arguments/ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/

Any philosophical problem that has at least these four articles devoted to it along with many other articles which reference and discuss the problem ( i.e the article's on miracles and the afterlife) is surely worthy of inclusion. Compare the number of articles addressing the question of the existence of God with the number of articles addressing the Molenyux problem (1 article).

In response to your "Unsolvable problems" quip I would like to point out that it is likely that the majority of philosophical questions on the page are unsoluble.

I'd also like to point out ( though I am an analytic philosopher) that there are no continental philosophy problems on the page, we probably should have some.

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The previous listing for this was hideous. I have deleted it in its entirety and attempted to set up a better page, although I admit much work is still needed. I hope contributors keep the listings here specific, and avoid such ridiculous "unsolved questions" like those previously submitted: "What is reality?" "What is the meaning of life?", etc. While these may be legitimate problems- and legitimate philosophical problems, I don't think that this is what is generally intended for this article, if you compare it with other listings of unsolved problems (e.g. mathematics).

Would questions about ethics belong under the umbrella of "philosophy?" I'll add a few posers and see if they survive. --Mozai 00:18, 5 December 2005 (UTC)

Delete?

This article is un-writeable. Consider what an article titled Solved problems in philosophy would contain... --Jmstylr 16:30, 12 November 2005 (UTC)

Hear, hear! After ten years, nobody has suggested a "solved problem." Mikedelsol (talk) 21:07, 2 June 2015 (UTC)

Perhaps this article could be a placeholder for "Problems eternally debated in philosophy, and nobody yet agrees on the answer." That seems to describe the questions in the other Unsolved Problems lists. I understand that people are going to give flip answers to the questions ("Yes, and He is. Now stop asking."), but some people give flip answers to Unsolved problems in physics too: "God does not play dice with the universe." --Mozai 00:18, 5 December 2005 (UTC)

I think it's not so much a question of problems "eternally debated" but questions that have been historically important. We can't speak for the future of philosophy, can we? Furthermore the idea that philosophy is always about the same questions is one that several philosophers have sought to problematize (such as Richard Rorty in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature). -- anonymous 2:17, 2 August 2006

Sorry to make it relative, but instead of "unsolved" (as if there's deductive solutions to reconcile all inconsistencies between concepts that exist only in minds), how about "problems without universally-accepted solutions" or "problems without formal proof solutions"? I think for several of these sections, there is more debate than actual problem, and that any "solved problem" can be added to this list once debated. 68.149.26.160 (talk) 03:15, 17 September 2013 (UTC)

There's absolutely no reason to delete an informative and relevant philosophy article because of disagreements about the title. The issue, to the extent that there is an issue, would be easily solved by simply rephrasing the title into "List of major problems in philosophy". This would evade the disagreements about the status of philosophical problems and their (potential) solutions while still expressing the relevance and importance of the problems listed. At the same time, the term "major" also evades the issue of current versus historical problems as it could mean either, or both. On the other hand, the term "major" also works well as a prefix to "historical problems" or "current problems" if there arises a need to specify problems in the past or present. Abvgd (talk) 04:41, 18 February 2018 (UTC)

Total rewrite

In response to "Questions Posed", which was unsigned, the *opinion* that a God exists is certainly an opinion (there is no incontrovertible evidence that there IS a God), and I cannot possibly see how the QUESTION poses an opinion (is not the very nature of a question a REQUEST rather than STATMENT of opinion?). The post itself is beyond puerile, the misspelling of which surely demonstrates this fact. I for one consider God an absolute logical impossibility, and the insistence of religious fanatics that their mythological idols are universally accepted facts is beyond incompehensible. They may be deluded enough to believe that "God" exists, but are they so deluded as to believe that everyone agrees with them? All the same, *I* think people have a right to their opinion, no matter how wrong it may be, and wiki should not be the playground for the religious right but an objective source of information (I find the correlation between IQ and atheism very informative here. Namely, studies have shown quite convincingly that IQ correlates to atheism- namely, the higher the IQ the more likely that the person is an atheist. People with IQ's below 100 almost certainly believe in God)

However, this is all mere digression. I think the page posted previously was a nice attempt, however there was a grave lack of information, and a total lack of focus. I've tried to keep the unsolved problems fairly focused (Sorites paradox, Gettier problems, etc), organized them into the four conventional "branches of philosophy", and avoided any references to vague questions that invite flights of fancy (meaning of life, existence of God, etc). I fully admit that this needs some cleaning up, and I hope people will add more unsolved problems into this format. I really think this is a big improvement, and I hope no one is too upset that I trashed the previous material. Danny Pi 21:37, 24 December 2005 (UTC)

Not upset at all; I was surprised my material lasted a week. It's true that there was a lack of focus: it was an attempt to give the page more gravity, and attract a more dedicated effort to elicidate the subject by better philosophers than I. Mozai 04:08, 24 March 2006 (UTC)

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Very happy to see people cleaning this up and wikifying it. Also happy to see that this is becoming one of the more respectable "unsolved problems" articles, when, indeed, "Unsolved Problems in Philosophy" very much invites vague and unsubstantiable garbage. I'm a huge fan of the wiki community. Still hope that people don't just edit but also add to this list. Danny Pi 02:14, 12 January 2006 (UTC)

Even though the problems listed here are all certainly interesting and important philosophical problems which should be debated (and HAVE been debated -- much more successfully than they are here, I might add) and even though some of the writing here is intelligent and informative, the category itself ("Unsolved Problems of Philosophy") is so ridiculous, misleading and ill-conceived that it really ought to be deleted. It presupposes (and worse, sends the signal to laypeople who want to begin learning about philosophy) that philosophy is about dividing problems into a "solved" category and an "unsolved" category, and as each problem is "solved" it is simply moved from one column into the other. Until, presumably, they are all in the "solved" category and our job is done. Mardiste 15:20, 15 August 2007 (UTC)

Yes. Delete.

This should be deleted. As others have said, the topic taken on is completely ludicrous and reflects, at best, a serious misunderstanding of the subject. Warm Worm (talk) 20:10, 25 November 2011 (UTC)

Sorites Paradox

Might it be more proper to include the example of the human being who slowly replaces all of their organs with robotic or electronic equipment. At what point does that person become a robot. When is bob, no longer bob. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.173.54.40 (talk) 21:23, 7 August 2008 (UTC)

Bob is no longer Bob when his original consciousness is gone. Bob isn't an identifier for his body, but his consciousness. His personality. A group of cells isn't Bob. See 'I think, therefore I am.' --Guugolpl0x (talk) 19:28, 3 November 2008 (UTC)

Then if Bob hits his head causing brain damage that alters his personality or his ability to recollect memories then is he no longer Bob?—GraemeMcRae^talk 17:24, 4 November 2008 (UTC)

Depends on the nature of the brain damage. If Bob forgets all his past life and must start all over, then I suppose he could be considered a different person, but if Bob has merely lost some portion of his memory, then Bob is still Bob (he's just lost a portion of his memory). "Bob" is defined by the maintenance of a lifetime of neurological pathways formed in his host human brain. If those pathways are completely destroyed (ie Bob dies and a sufficient period of time passes such that electrical activity completely ceases in the brain) and then Bob's body (and brain) are somehow revived in the future, then Bob would no longer be Bob as he would be starting from scratch (having to learn to speak, eat and shit all over again and starting a new life). An interesting question might be whether in that scenario "Bob 2" had the same instinctual behaviour as the original Bob, instinct being what a baby starts with before he/she develops. --Jared

" Firstly, what are the criteria for intelligence? "

This claims that we do not know the criteria for intelligence, yet, it looks like that the men and women working on Artificial Intelligence have some idea, else they are going in random directions. That's not very scientific; have I missed something? -- kanzure 13:33, 12 January 2006 (UTC)

Kanzure- researchers in AI are largely going in random directions. Some take Turing's lead an suppose that a sufficiently convincing simulation will eventually become indistinguishable and therefore identical to intelligence (I'm sure this is fallacious for too many reasons to list). Others are pursuing neural networks. Some are trying to create adaptive algorithms to describe intelligence. Linguists are trying to understand cognition from the point of view of language, while psychologists have tried any number of promising and/or crackpot theories. The truth is that intelligence, while easy to understand intuitively, is very difficult to describe formally. And it is entirely unclear today, of what components intelligence may be composed. In only the vaguest sense, we understand intelligence as that mental property which humans possess, which allows us to communicate, play chess, compute mathematics, feel emotions, etc. This definition is, however, totally inadequate for the purposes of serious philosophy, and therefore the question of "what are the components of intelligence," remains a relevant and pressing concern.Danny Pi 23:20, 16 January 2006 (UTC)

TOC Format

I think that the Table of Contents on this page is a little long and instrusive to be on the left; are there any objections to it being moved to the right-hand side of the page? Ziggurat 00:06, 18 May 2006 (UTC)

Have revamped TOC during recent edit. Regards, David Kernow (talk) 23:52, 13 October 2006 (UTC)

Moore's disbelief

The statement "Albany is the capital of New York, but I don't believe it" is false...

I read this statement as the speaker agreeing that the assertion "Albany is the capital of New York" is true, then immediately contradicting him/herself by stating that they don't believe this truth condition. So it seems to me that the statement is either insufficient (cf "It's common belief that Albany is...") or contradictory. What am I missing...?  (Hope it's not obvious!)   Thanks, David Kernow (talk) 00:21, 14 October 2006 (UTC)

Truth and belief are not always simultaneous. I may accept truths I disbelieve, even regardless of common belief. Belief doesn't have to be rational. I can even assert truths I believe to be lies as truth. Language and consciousness aren't as limited as formal logic. Albany is the capital of New York, but in size and name and cultural dominance and perhaps where governing decisions are made and in all things that make a capital the capital, I believe New York city is the clear and obvious capital of New York state. Maybe I'm wrong, but that last sentance can be true.68.149.26.160 (talk) 02:47, 17 September 2013 (UTC)

Continuum Hypothesis

The section about the continuum hypothesis is absurd. There is no question or "problem" with the continuum hypothesis in the sense that the author seems to understand it. The hypothesis is independent of the axioms of (ZFC) set theory, and since axioms are ultimately arbitrary, that is the end of the story. If our discussions of mathematical systems make any sense at all then it can't be "true" or "false". When mathematicians talk informally about the hypothesis, what they are really discussing is in which path the mathematical community should invest their time and energies developing. This section should be removed unless/until there is a coherent alternative. Rljacobson 03:19, 5 February 2007 (UTC)

I very much agree with you, and have removed the section. For future editors, this is not a question of philosophy, but one of mathematics, and it is not an unsolved problem. The question is whether certain types of infinity have the same cardinality ("size", but intuitive notions of size are mostly meaningless when talking about infinity). It has been shown that this question is unanswerable in the currently acccepted set of mathematical axioms, and since these infinities are mathematical constructions, rather than intuitive notions of "undefinably large," the question doesn't mean anything.

mkehrt 10:21, 4 March 2007 (UTC)

A case can be made for putting it back, i.e. there are set theorists out there who believe CH is still the most important open problem in set theory, and the axioms of set theory are not arbitrary any more than the axioms for natural number arithmetic are arbitrary. There are statements independent of first-order Peano arithmetic but are either true or false for the true mathematical integers. That CH is independent of ZFC, according to some, just means ZFC is insufficient for determining whether CH is true, so we need a better description of what the real numbers are. CH is certainly not unanswerable in the "currently accepted set of mathematical axioms" since there is no such "currently accepted set of mathematical axioms", at least in the lofty realms of set theorists who concern themselves with this sort of question. 76.197.56.242 (talk) 16:03, 11 August 2008 (UTC)

Molyneux Problem

This isn't really much of a philosophical problem. A baby has the visual equipment to see as well as someone much older than itself, however its brain must teach itself to see. At first it might only see fuzzy fields of color. The brain doesn't know what color is, only that its there. Then the brain learns to resolve borders, and find shapes. Eventually the brain gets so good at it that the now-teenage human being can drive cars at high speed.

Therefore, if a man were suddenly given his sight after never having it, all neural-connection problems aside, he would take time to learn to cross-reference touch with sight. Granted it would be much less time than a baby which must learn both the senses of touch and sight, it would still take him some time. I would say that he could not do it immediately, even if he were touching the objects. He probably doesn't have any kind of visualization or at least any kind of visualization he can describe. --Kevin Hutson, azurerenraku@yahoo.com

Oliver Sacks, a neurologist has actually given sight to people born blind with some interesting results. -- Garth Herman, Garth.Herman@gmail.com —Preceding unsigned comment added by 64.110.222.116 (talk) 22:36, 10 May 2010 (UTC)

I'm not a philosopher, but it seems to me that the empirical experiments by Held et al., cited in the relevant section of the article, means that this problem was solved in 2011. Unless there still remains some form of debate over this in the philosophical community, I think this problem should be removed from the article. Edderiofer (talk) 00:18, 1 October 2021 (UTC)

• Update: Having been pointed to https://philpapers.org/browse/molyneuxs-problem , it seems like there is still debate over whether this is in fact a solved problem; if I'm reading this right, one point of contention (as in https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-012-9355-x and https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1603246) is the idea that the Molyneux problem is actually a class of various different problems, in part dependent on the mechanism by which the subject may differentiate the cube and the sphere; another being the idea that the cube-sphere Molyneux problem is just one problem in a class of problems relating vision to touch. Unfortunately my knowledge of this matter is limited, so I have tagged the relevant paragraph(s) with a fact-or-opinion tag directing people here. If anyone with knowledge of philosophy is able to sort through the literature and tell what the consensus on the problem is, with good sources, they can feel free to edit the article for it. Edderiofer (talk) 17:49, 1 May 2022 (UTC)

Problem of unsolved problems

This problem description added by Rasqual seems more of a joke than real article, or at best case of original research. Someone more confident could perhaps remove it, or find external links? lav 16:22, 6 February 2007 (UTC)

Question about this article

"Unsolved problems in philosphy"? Um, are there any solved problems in philosophy? If it was solved, it wouldn't be philosophical, almost by definition, right? (For example, our article on philosophy calls it a "discipline concerned with questions...", etc.) zafiroblue05 | Talk 20:07, 31 March 2007 (UTC)

Unfortunately, I think that the answer to your question here is going to have to be one that is more social in nature ... as in, some people get together and consider a problem solved and then throw a few parties or something. So do not think of the article as anything more than summarization of what some people would like to see others do-- namely professors in university environments. Hope this helps, and I'm always willing to discuss philosophy if you're up to it, -- kanzure 18:24, 1 April 2007 (UTC)

Problem of evil

I don't get this statement: "If the existence of God and evil are indeed consistent logically, does the existence of evil nonetheless prove the absence of God". If two possibilities are logically consistent, how can one also exclude the other? --217.18.21.2 18:51, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

Kant's theory of the "antinomies of pure reason" (from which Hegel developed his entire dialectical theory) is based on the proposal of two possibilites that are logically consistent, yet exclude and/or contradict one another. Mardiste 15:05, 15 August 2007 (UTC)

As far as I understand it, by "logically consistent" he doesn't mean consistent with each other, he just means internally consistent (definition of antimony: "A contradiction between two statements, both apparently obtained by correct reasoning"). On the other hand to say that two statements are consistent (with each other) and contradictory is itself self-contradictory. If such a self-contradictory statement is [i]not[/i] intended in the article, then it has been phrased poorly. Read both points a and b in the article; the phrasing strongly suggests it means consistent with one another and yet contradictory.--217.18.21.2 15:23, 4 December 2007 (UTC)

Deduction nit-pick

It seems that the induction problem sub-section has confused deductive reasoning with A Priori. Furthermore:

All batchelors (sp) are male is not deduced. That is by definition —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 70.253.176.28 (talk) 02:30, 10 May 2007 (UTC).

Socrates's problem of Evil

What about Socrates's statement that "evil is lack of knowledge"? is it not considered an open problem? Dan Gluck 11:22, 22 June 2007 (UTC)

See the is-ought problem. Socrates was probably working with the concept of objective values, as opposed to subjective / normative values, or lists of priorities. It is, however, a deep statement to ponder. --205.201.141.146 21:06, 2 July 2007 (UTC)

Subjectivism of relevance

"In practice, this has caused little concern to philosophers, as it is usually clear when a reasonably exhaustive investigation becomes irrelevant. (citation needed)" The citation tag adds an ironic whimsy to this article. After all, the person who added the tag is probably referring to citations of "In practice, this has caused little concern", without following the thought through to its end. Can you imagine hundreds of thousands of philosophers struck mad, babbling, "It's true, because it's true, because it's true..."? Heh. The human brain (usually) has enough sense to detect a possible infinite regress, and move to more fruitful arenas of thought. --205.201.141.146 21:04, 2 July 2007 (UTC)

Limited in scope

Perhaps the title should "Unsolved problems in analytic philsophy". 213.112.137.175 15:32, 15 August 2007 (UTC)

Does continental philosophy deal with "problems"? I thought continental philosophers were more interested the Freudian and Marxist neo-postmodern psycho-social signification of metaphorisms, although I'm sure that Derrida would point out that such a summary misses the socio-linguistic element of antiredeconstructionist ethics. Seriously, what would the counterpoint to "Unsolved problems in analytic philosophy" be? "Unsolved ramblings in continental philosophy"? There are no "problems" in continental philosophy. Continental philosophy *is* the problem. Danny Pi 07:16, 23 September 2007 (UTC)

Postscript: In seriousness, I am all for keeping an open mind, and I don't think that wiki should represent some sort of dogmatic bias. However, I really don't think that continental philosophy deals with "problems" in the same way that analytic philosophy does, and I think it would be foolish to insist that "continental philosophy" merits any mention in an otherwise academically sound article. Danny Pi 07:20, 23 September 2007 (UTC)

However unless you change it, the reader might get the impression that all philosophy is about solving qestions, and this is incorrect. Dan Gluck 08:48, 24 September 2007 (UTC)

I vaguely remember that the first sentence in Camus' "Myth of Sisyphus" said that there was only one problem in philosophy and that was "suicide". 76.197.56.242 (talk) 16:04, 11 August 2008 (UTC)

Tesla invented the light bulb?

Nowhere in the light bulb article or the Nikola Tesla article does it say that Tesla invented the light bulb. A better example should be substituted, or else the dubious nature of this example (which is helpful, actually, given the subject matter) should be better explained.—GraemeMcRae^talk 23:44, 28 December 2007 (UTC)

Confusion regarding AI

"Can an artificial entity die, or will its next reboot generate an identical entity?" These statements do not conflict with each other. The artificial entity could "die" when being turned off and an identical entity could be "born" during the next reboot. The author is assuming that the new identical entity is not just identical, but is that entity. Letharis (talk) 20:53, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

Friend, in a philosophical context, "identical" does not mean "perfectly similar" but "the very same as". T of Locri (talk) 06:45, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Is there a difference? You must define your metric for evaluation before you can begin to say words like "same". If not, you descend into meaningless babble about ill defined terms. And what is the point of "very"? Can things be more the same than already equal? Philosophers should take a few hints from mathematicians. (At least what they do has relevance.)

173.79.105.197 (talk) 05:06, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

Locri's point was that philosophers almost always mean quantitative or numerical identity as opposed to qualitative or descriptive identity. To explain: imagine there are two cars, exactly alike in every way, somehow down to the subatomic level; no scientific test imaginable could determine a difference between these two cars. Yet there are indisputably TWO of them; they are not the SAME car, but rather, two perfectly SIMILAR cars. This is qualitative or descriptive identity: multiple objects bearing the exact same qualities.

By contrast, when someone says that Samuel Clemens and Mark Twain are identical, they are not claiming just that there are no differences between them, but rather, that Mark Twain IS Samuel Clemens: there is one person who goes by two different names. This is quantitative or numerical identity: the nominally two objects actually ARE each other, not just alike in every way but actually the same one single object.

The point he was making against Letharis is that the question in the article, "will its next reboot generate an identical entity", is not merely asking whether the next reboot will produce something in every way like the one that was shut down before, but rather, will the new one be THE SAME ONE as the one that was shut down before? This harkens to questions about identity across time in general: I am certainly different in many, many ways now from the five-year-old who bore my name and social security number thirteen years ago, but I am ostensibly the "same" person despite those differences. The question in the article is whether the same could be said of an artificial intelligence with a discontinuity in its existence.

In other words, Locri was saying that Letharis' claim that "The author is assuming that the new identical entity is not just identical, but is that entity" is trivial, because in the normal philosophical sense of the word, saying that two things are identical just means saying that they "are" each other. --Pfhorrest (talk) 05:35, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

A human is truly dead only when the electrical impulses in our brain cease to operate, which may last for a significant period after being clinically pronounced dead. It has little to do with our body. If these electrical impulses could be maintained after otherwise fatal trauma or old age, then it would be possible to sustain a human life forever. They may not be able to live without any sensory input or communication, but they would nonetheless continue to be technically alive. The same goes for AI (when it comes about); if the state of an AI instance can be maintained throughout a shutdown (whether by dumping volatile memory to permanent storage and retrieving it on reboot similarly to the hibernation concept used by operating systems today) then the life of the AI could be maintained. Hibernation of a program or AI would be similar to hibernation of a human (as far as the mind is concerned). If the state of the AI is lost, then by definition it is irretreivable and that particular AI instance can never be maintained or reborn so it could be considered dead. A new AI that has all the same characteristics may be possible, but it still wouldn't be the same instance of the previous AI (it would be like the two cars thing). If you started a conversation with an AI (assuming that was possible) and then dumped the program memory to a disk, rebooted and then restored the previous state of the program from the data stored on disk, you would be able to continue your conversation. The life of a program is generally characterised as an instance, so the definition of an artificial life (AI) would be by its running instance, and if that instance is stopped or cannot be restored from a hibernation state then it is dead. Multiple instances makes multiple separate lives. Hibernation of an AI instance may not be possible if the AI "brain" is as complex as a human's, but the concept of AI life being characterised by its running instance would be the same; even for human life. If someone was pronounced dead, buried for a long enough time and then exhumed and somehow revived, would they be the same person? I don't think they could have any recollection of their previous life except if the period between death and revival was short enough that there was residual electrical activity from the previous life, and they would have to learn how to talk, walk, eat, crap, etc all over again (again unless residual impulses were recovered). Given enough time between clinical death and revival, the same body would be two different people. --Jared

Focus on a bit more high-profile topics?

No point listing everything as an unsolved problem, I mean the Sorites paradox, seriously? I would suggest requesting citations for everything included here, where someone actually says "this is one of the important open problems in philosophy". Vesal (talk) 23:00, 18 February 2009 (UTC)

The scope and title of this article

The early portions of this article seem devoted more to Metaphilosophy, specifically the issue of progress in philosophy, than anything related to a listing of unsolved problem in philosophy. I would suggest that the quality portions of everything prior to the section currently titled "Popular philosophical questions" be merged into one or both of the afore-linked articles, and the aforementioned section become the basis of the new lede for this article.

For that matter, why is this article here at "Philosophical problems" rather than at Unsolved problems in philosophy, like all of the other "Unsolved problems in..." pages (c.f. List of unsolved problems)? Absolutely no main article pages (i.e. non-user, talk, category, etc) pages link to this page directly; they all link to either Unsolved problems in philosophy or, in just two cases, Philosophical problem in the singular. I recommend this article be moved back to Unsolved problems in philosophy; unfortunately, I believe that requires someone to delete the redirect currently there first, but I will test that momentarily... --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:43, 19 January 2010 (UTC) Nope, no admin powers required. Move completed. --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:48, 19 January 2010 (UTC)

incandescent lightbulb: Edison or Tesla?

Isn't it a popular misconception that Edison instead of Tesla invented the incandescent lightbulb? --TiagoTiago (talk) 21:49, 4 July 2010 (UTC)

And what has that to do with unsolved problems in philosophy? --Pfhorrest (talk) 08:02, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

I agree. You will have the philosophers confused/ponderous for years with a question like this (normal people will just go look it up) :) --Jared — Preceding unsigned comment added by 203.129.23.146 (talk) 22:00, 26 August 2011 (UTC)

Qualia a question? NO!

This section is not a philosophical problem, at least by modern standards. Anyone who continues to doubt that color is a physical property derived from a frequency spectrum is clearly ignoring modern science. This might have been an issue around, I don't know, 1400, but it is now quite resolved.

Modern neurology presents to answer to the questions raised in the brief flirting with philosophical ideas in the second part of this paragraph. Light hits the retina at the back of the eye, where special cells called rods and cones convert the intensity and approximate frequency maximum into neuron impulses. These then travel to the visual cortex, where processing of information from multiple parts of the eye takes place. This information is then forwarded to the rest of the brain for higher level processing. At no point is there a "green" signal being transmitted. The response to different frequencies and intensities (that is, how it is encoded in a pattern of neuron activations) may very well vary from person to person, and even from cell to cell in one eye. The important bit here is the visual cortex itself. The visual cortex adapts itself to the signals from the eye. For example, before the cortex is trained, a person might be looking at a blank white wall and see a speckled image. This is because the cortex hasn't learned to adjust for the different response of each individual cell to the same light level. The point is that the cortex adapts to the signals presented to it.

The scenario explored in this paragraph, where one person somehow sees in the mind of another, is a complete fantasy. The closest thing in realty would be if one person's neuron signals from the eye were read by a machine, and replicated before being sent into someone else's cortex, thus bypassing their eyes. The person would not see "green skies" as the paragraph suggests, but likely would see random noise or nothing at all. The problem is their cortex is still adjusted for their own eye signals, and not those of the second person. In time, the cortex could adapt enough for the person to see properly again. Whether this is actually possible is a question of neuro-adaptability, which is an interesting biological problem, not a philosophical one. We all receive a different pattern of impulses for the same image. The failure of this paragraph is when it says "However, when George sees the sky, his mind assigns green to that light frequency." George's mind doesn't assign green to anything. The cortex translates from one set of neural impulses from the eye, into ones going to the other parts of the brain. It is the language center that makes a mapping between the word "green" and the specific set of impulses from the cortex. There is not two associations (light to color, and color to "color"), as implied in the paragraph. Color is an inherit property of objects, but the mapping to words is created by the mind. This is the same as with any other sensing faculty of the body. Finally, the idea that blue is blue to all people clearly neglects color-blind people, or blind people for that matter, and is thus clearly false. There is no disputing this result, and therefore this question is not unsolved.

This section has no references. It deal primarily with physics and neurology, not philosophy. It has no redeeming value (the only value it would have would be as a solved problem, but then it wouldn't belong here anyway!). It should be deleted. In fact, I will go do that now. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 173.79.105.197 (talk) 05:02, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

The question of qualia is still actively discussed in contemporary philosophy (see for example Mary's room), thus it counts as an unsolved problem in philosophy. Whether or not you think the answer is obvious is not the point for a Wikipedia article: what published reliable sources are saying is, and they are still talking about it. I've undone your deletion. --Pfhorrest (talk) 05:41, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

You misunderstood the question. What we are asking about is whether the qualia of "greeness" is physically intrinsic or generated in the mind. That is, could two people be set up so that one actually sees blue where others would see green. Yes, it is well understood that colors are different frequencies, but how do we know that the actual qualia of these colors map to the seem frequencies for each person? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.255.99.210 (talk) 03:45, 21 November 2010 (UTC)

If "greeness" was perceived differently or inconsistently then there would be no such thing as "greeness" because it wouldn't be definable in the first place. If it's generated in the mind then it's still physical because it's part of the physical wiring of the brain (call it "instinct" or the brain's equivalent of a BIOS). We don't have to trick our mind into making things look a certain color; they just appear that way. Regardless of how it is perceived by individuals, it is nonetheless physically intrinsic or it wouldn't be consistently observable. How much evidence is needed to convice philosophers that color is real? If color still confuses the philosophy fraternity, I can only imagine how baffled they are when someone mentions more newly understood concepts like "gravity" and "electricity". I guess that's why philosophy is the science of looking into things too much. Q: How do you confuse a philosopher? A: Ask them which way is up. --Jared — Preceding unsigned comment added by 203.129.23.146 (talk) 01:15, 6 August 2011 (UTC)

We do know, they don't. For real science, this stuff is solved. If you find it a nice topic to discuss with like-minded people, then obviously noone can hinder you. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 46.115.18.68 (talk) 09:15, 17 May 2011 (UTC)

Don't philosophers watch movies? The "Matrix Revolutions" highlighted something fairly simple that addresses the problem of human perception; a human is taught things about their environment by their parents and peers ("love is just a word; what matters is the connection implied"), and so we inherently associate color similarly to our parents and teachers. The problem with the Qualia section and the "Fred" and "George" example is that it would in reality be an impossible scenario. Even if colors appeared differently to each person, they would be taught by example that the sky is blue, because "blue" is just a word invented by humanity (of the English persuasion). If someone isn't taught the names of the colors they would still come to realise that the sky and a blue crayon had a similar visual property, even if they didn't know it as color. This can be seen from the behaviour and response of babies to color. If I met someone that told me the sky was green, I wouldn't assume they perceive the sky any different; I would simply imply that they were taught differently. Everyone is generally taught that regardless of how they perceive the color of the sky, that color is given the name "blue", and it has been shown that items of similar color are also "blue". If perception was inconsistent, then color would be confused. If I'm taught that the sky is blue and that a crayon is blue, then they must naturally appear the same color or I would tell my teacher that they are different colors. This on occasion does happen, but we usually associate these occurences with conditions; color blindness, tunnel vision, etc. Most people historically perceive color in a similar way and it is quite self-evident and easily justifyable. Color is physical, but is artificially defined for convenience and communication. People of different langauges don't see the sky as being blue because they see it as whatever their language defines the physical aspect of the color of the sky as. Translation from one language to another is made possible because of similar perception regardless of definition. Color is an observed physical phenomenon, and while observation can be subjective, objectivity is characterised by generality and the general populus observes color in a similar way so it is a consistent observed phenomena. This is similar to all physical properties, such as which way is "up" or the feeling of acceleration. If they weren't consistent they wouldn't be predictable. Even animals can be trained to associate color in a similar manner, and we can measure color without our eyes using Spectroscopy. --Jared — Preceding unsigned comment added by 203.129.23.146 (talk) 00:37, 6 August 2011 (UTC)

Interesting answer. publish it,or find someone who has, and we'll put it in the article 75* 17:18, 9 May 2013 (UTC) Couldn't they just draw and see? --Theoneandonlyduncan (talk) 00:14, 5 January 2014 (UTC)

"The medium is the message"

Not at all clear how this is an "unsolved problem" (although problems, once solved, rather fail to be philosophy no?) This sort of thing is more popular in communications and fine art departments, less so in academic philosophy. And what's the problem exactly? Hairhorn (talk) 02:42, 14 September 2010 (UTC) Not clear why this is a philosophical problem. Propose delete para.--Philogo (talk) 16:09, 24 November 2010 (UTC)

NATURE

NATURE REFERS TO THE PHYSICAL WORLD AROUND US.THERE IS A CO RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND NATURE.NATURE CONTROLS HUMANS AS WELL. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 41.78.76.190 (talk) 08:29, 25 September 2010 (UTC)

As "God" is a creation of humanity, the hierarchy would logically be: NATURE -> HUMANS -> GOD. -Jared — Preceding unsigned comment added by 203.129.23.146 (talk) 07:09, 16 August 2011 (UTC)

Lede changes proposed by 78.151.195.78

User 78.151.195.78 recently proposed changes to the lede, which have been reverted and restored and reverted again. To forestall a revert war I am initiating discussion here per WP:BRD.

I acknowledge the IP editor's intentions in pointing out that not everything on this page is uncontroversially considered "unsolved". That is perhaps a good point to be made. But the specific way it was made was, I think, unconstructive, in removing the completely neutral first sentence of the lede simple describing what this article is, and segueing with unclear validity into the next sentence about philosophical questions in a lay sense.

The lede as it stands makes two points:

• This article is about unsolved questions in philosophy.
• That does not mean vague questions like "what is the meaning of life"?

If the IP editor wishes to follow that with a third point, that not everything listed here is considered "unsolved", I would not strongly object to that. One objection I can foresee, however, which we may want to address here first, is that an absence of consensus on whether or not a question is solved would seem to be prima facie evidence that it is not solved, at least not undeniably so.

Please discuss. --Pfhorrest (talk) 08:46, 3 November 2010 (UTC)

doesnt occums razor apply to half of these questions anyway — Preceding unsigned comment added by 92.30.150.183 (talk) 22:42, 12 July 2012 (UTC)

Free Will & Determinism?

How are the problems (plural) that Free Will or Determinism introduce (such as Free Will vs. God's Omniscience) or their incompatibility with one another mentioned nowhere on either the list or this discussion page??? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Recurve7 (talk • contribs) 16:59, 3 December 2010 (UTC)

Existence of God?

I would say the question of a God or Pantheon's existence is an unsolved problem of philosophy. The article seems almost one-sided in the fact it neither mentions this question or its implications on other questions (or their implications on this question). — Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.39.176.248 (talk) 00:35, 11 March 2012 (UTC)

The existence of "God" is not a problem of philosophy. It is a scientific question, to which the answer can only be given by empirical evidence. The existence of any deity requires demonstration, not just thought. ♆ CUSH ♆ 11:07, 23 March 2013 (UTC)

This seems to be an unfair response. There are many arguments for the existence and non-existence of god, and there is debate about which of these arguments are valid and sound. I do not, however, think that it constitutes a major unsolved problem in philosophy. Most philosophers have a view on the existence of gods that's rooted in other philosophical beliefs, such as the nature of causality, justification, or complexity in nature. I think that this article is more about these other sorts of issues, such as 'what is causation?', rather than what these issues - once decided - can be taken to prove. Though this article is necessarily limited in scope, it does a good job of introducing problems as real problems in their own right. -STC — Preceding unsigned comment added by 49.49.24.105 (talk) 03:57, 12 May 2013 (UTC)

That's rhetorical nonsense. Philosophy is not about beliefs, least of all about any determination of causality that is not ultimately rooted in empiricism. The assumption of any deity as a (first) cause is a well explored and explained fallacy. And complexity in nature is the least justification of all, as design inference is the foundational fallacy of all creationism. Ascertaining the existence of something is always a scientific endeavor in which existence has to be demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt. One can develop concepts about unicorns, leprechauns, fairies all year long, but that does neither create nor demonstrate their existence. Same goes for Santa Claus, the Easter Bunny, and any Gods, including the biblical one. ♆ CUSH ♆ 07:15, 17 September 2013 (UTC)

You're jumping the gun here. I didn't suggest that anyone ought to be committed to any of those claims. I merely said that justifications for the belief that a god exists usually depend on more foundational questions in philosophy, and that those questions are more appropriate material for this page. You're also committing yourself to more principled positions than you ought to as a Wikipedia editor. It's not up to you to decide what the role of philosophy or science is - it's the role of mainstream philosophers and scientists. You mention, for example, that 'philosophy is not about beliefs' when some mainstream philosophical thinkers would argue just the opposite. Socrates, for instance, was known among some Ancient Greek philosophers for thinking that philosophy is merely the elimination of false beliefs (e.g. Plotinus). You make strong claims about science that are contentious as well. The claim that one cannot claim that anything exists without doing 'science', for example, is in contradiction with theses held by some property dualists (e.g. Chalmers). This is the discussion page for an encyclopaedia entry - not a soapbox for your ideology.

What makes "Art" and "Music" finally answered by a lamen

you dont have to add this to the wikipedia page, i just wanted to write this after reading this section. I'm not brainy or anything, i've lived on council estates and im actually watching family guy as i write this "giggidy". my i.q. is only 118. so im no stephen hawkings but i think what im about to say makes sense, to me it does anyway. so here goes. what makes art "art" isn't where its placed, or even the context, just as the content, timing and context of music doesn't actually make it music. what makes something become art and something become music, is the person listening to or viewing said medium. how many times have you heard someone saying "that's not music, its just noise" or "thats not art its just a can of cambells". its people themselves that determine what art and music is. At the same time, the people creating said objects and sounds helps to dertmine what they are. something drawn by a child isn't classified as art in the same way that something created by a well known artist is. take the painting 'the black square' by that russian artist, if had have been painted by just a run of the mill no-one in his spare time in his garage it would probably wouldnt be classed as a piece of art, but because Kazimir Malevich painted it, its considered art. So the answer to this question 'what is art?' is 'people'. its people that determine what something is and why. though people's imaginations would be more precise, generally speaking, the answer is 'people' which means there are two answers to the question 'what makes art/music' (as in what constitutes as art/music) and because people determine what makes art/music, that means that everything and nothing can be art/music both at the same time. "everything and nothing can be considered art or music simultaneously according to to the people that both view, hear or make said things" quote by me Dean Anthony Smith from Newcastle-Upon-Tyne 2012 — Preceding unsigned comment added by 92.30.150.183 (talk) 22:37, 12 July 2012 (UTC)

You are of course correct. However, I have come to suspect that many people have difficulty with the concept that things like "art" and "music" are arbitrarily defined concepts, and that there is no absolute definition of either. Perhaps they may be trying to define what art "ought" to be, but even that is a worthless endeavor. It all probably amounts to nothing more than an attempt to justify one's own personal views by giving them a false sense of authority or importance. 150.203.179.56 (talk) 00:42, 23 July 2014 (UTC)

Ethics

The Ethics problem is badly explained. It assumes that there is no choice after poverty and before a theft, and that "striking a pedestrian" is not an act, that both are only results of circumstances or previous choices. A more clear example would be trying to strike a pedestrian, who may die or evade the vehicle, making the difference between attempted murder (not so bad) and murder (very serious). A less clear but more accurate example could involve Schrodinger's Cat, where there is zero control over an event after a choice. Furthermore, "moral luck" is not an Ethics problem, but a Consequentialist Ethics problem; if concequences define your ethics, then random situations & consequences are complication for your ethics. 68.149.26.160 (talk) 03:58, 17 September 2013 (UTC)

Infinite Regress

This section is bad and you should feel bad. "The obvious question that this definition entails is how one can know whether one's justification is sound. One must therefore provide a justification for the justification. That justification itself requires justification, and the questioning continues interminably. The conclusion is that no one can truly have knowledge of anything, since it is, due to this infinite regression, impossible to satisfy the justification element."

This is not the conclusion, because the definition given of knowledge above states that knowledge is a justified true belief, not a true belief that is known to be justified by the believer. It could also be believed to be justified by the believer. What it boils down to is the question of what kinds of belief are justified. This problem however exists on the very first level. Not only is there no infinite regression involved here, there is no regression at all. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 88.73.77.253 (talk) 20:27, 4 November 2013 (UTC)

Bread-ladder

The Bread-Ladder item lists is main article as "Material conditional," but that page seems to have no reference to the Bread-Ladder problem. Should the reference be changed or the "Material conditional" article be added to? Cancilla (talk) 22:05, 18 November 2014 (UTC)

I think it deserves its own page; I don't think material conditional can handle it. --Noidzar (talk) 22:31, 24 November 2014 (UTC)

I think the item should be deleted. I can't find any reference in Google to a bread-ladder problem apart from an actual art installation.

I think it is original research, and not very good research either. Bread is a substance, ladder a particular. So it is not a problem, it is a thing made of a certain material, not a thing which has two different substances.

Unless anyone objects I will delete it.

TonyClarke (talk) 11:46, 25 November 2014 (UTC)

Philosophy doesn't solve problems. Request to rename.

When something does solve problems, we call it science. Isn't this entire article a non sequitur? Shouldn't it just be called "List of Philosophical Questions"? By calling them "unsolved" it implies they can be solved, and aren't just ill-formed questions like "is math created or discovered". I think it's more to the point to call that just "a philosophical question" than "an unsolved philosophical question". It also is POV to call them unsolved. I would consider "depends how you define create and discover" a perfectly valid answer to the aforementioned question, and so to me, it's solved that it was a dumb question. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 173.228.31.160 (talk) 15:26, 12 December 2014 (UTC)

Both philosophers and non-philosophers often think of philosophers as solving problems. Plato aimed to solve problems, as did Russell and Wittgenstein. Each attempted to solve problems in different ways while remaining quintessentially philosophical in their efforts. Historically some 'solutions' to philosophical puzzles have prompted scientific investigations, as in the case of Psychology. Other solutions have not done this. To say that any successful process of discovery is 'called science' seems unwarranted, in the face of these facts. If you have one I'd like to see a reliable source on this issue, since it would surprise me if any philosopher would make this claim outside of a popular context. The proposed labelling also doesn't track the extent to which philosophical investigation informs scientific investigation. Many subjects only become/became areas of scientific investigation after considerable philosophical analysis. In this sense some philosophical problems are 'solved' only when their relationship to scientific investigation becomes clear. The solutions to these problems, however, are not scientific (by most conventional definitions of the term), but they do form the grounds for some scientific investigations (see: Philosophy of Science). The question that you mention, about the status of mathematical truths, is an old one that, according to most philosophers, is not yet solved. There are many proposed answers to the question but very few (or perhaps none) are uncontentious today. The answer you consider ("I would consider 'depends how you define create and discover' a perfectly valid answer to the aforementioned question") is not commonly accepted as a satisfactory solution to the question. If you would like to continue this discussion further then I recommend providing some sources for us to work with. It's hard to discuss these higher-level changes without a shared text. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.158.150.137 (talk) 23:17, 12 December 2014 (UTC)

Material implication

Just a minor point, but in this section the statement "'1+1=2' is true regardless of the content of the antecedent..." Actually 1+1=2 is only true if you are using a number system that contains 2. For example if I choose a ring by using modulus 2, then the only numbers in this system are 0 and 1. Therefore 1+1 = 0. So, since 1+1=2 is not always true (always true to me means under all conditions and assumptions), then by my understanding of the section's definition, the example "If today is Saturday, then 1+1=2" is not an instance of Material implication. If I am in error of this, then I apologize. LudditeLou (talk) 21:33, 11 August 2016 (UTC)

It's a problem in the true sense of the word, a ballgame played by teachers to train the student's reflexes, but is not an unsolved Problem at all in boolean logic, as the article explains it already, well, tries to. It doesn't even attempt to state what should be left to solve! This wouldn't fool anyone if the then-clause were using the modal would, which is necessary to confer the intended meaning, as the article proofs.

Request to delete the item from the list. 2.247.251.194 (talk) 06:56, 22 January 2018 (UTC)

Solved Problems

Can a list of solved, or at least recently solved, problems be added or referenced from this article? This would be helpful in understanding how the field has made progress and in identifying the contributions and accomplishments arising from the work. Thanks! --Lbeaumont (talk) 13:46, 11 January 2018 (UTC)

Poor diction

"This problem actually defines a field, however its pursuits are specific and easily stated."

This sentence from the article not only misuses the word "however" but also contains a comma splice.

This might not be so bad, except that it changes the meaning of the sentence to something other than the apparent intention of the author.108.245.209.39 (talk) 22:30, 20 May 2018 (UTC)

Lack of political philosophy problems

Problems in political philosophy doesn't seem to be included. I would be interested in knowing what the unsolved problems are in this area. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Ndcroos (talk • contribs) 14:46, 15 October 2019 (UTC)

moved to list of philosophical problems

There seems to be fairly robust academic debate over whether or not philosophical problems can be solved or not, so I'm inclined to think we shouldn't take a side, as having "unsolved" in the title might imply to some readers. I don't see any reason we can't keep it on the unsolved problems lists though; either none of these problems are solvable or none of them are solved. - car chasm (talk) 01:08, 16 January 2023 (UTC)

The title is all wrong

The problems listed are not actually problems of universal philosophy, they are only problems for a specific subset of Western Philosophy, what could perhaps be termed 'Standard Western Philosophy'. Other approaches to philosophy would not meet these problems at all. So the title should be changed to : 'List of problems for Standard Western Philosophy.' 47.72.160.192 (talk) 03:16, 10 October 2024 (UTC)