Talk:Junkers Ju 87/Archive 2

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Archive 4

Rating

I think the article deserves a B-Class rating, the start-class rating is silly now. Dapi89 (talk) 23:47, 18 January 2008 (UTC).

Evaluation of the Stuka

I would suggest the article be revised as to the section remarking on the evaluation and impact of the Stuka. Aviation historian Peter C. Smith wrote a book called "Junkers Ju87 Stuka," part of the Crowood Aviation Series, and he paints a very different picture of this aircraft. Please refer to this monograph. The Stuka was in fact highly maneuverable, far from helpless against a fighter plane, and when flown in close groups, it was difficult for fighter planes to engage in a successful attack. A little known but documented fact (well researched and referenced in the book) shows that the Stuka had the lowest loss ratio of any bomber in the war, Allied or German. Most of the claims for downed Stukas from contemporary Allied documents have been proven to show false numbers when compared to verified German records. It should be remembered that the Stuka was not a fighter, and cannot be considered to be a failed design simply because it could not take a Mustang or P-47 (or Spitfire) one-on-one. It was not designed to do so. Yes, it was vulnerable in the dive and recovery, but every bomber was vulnerable during its bombing run, and the fact that fewer Stukas were lost than any other bomber shows it was in fact less vulnerable than other bombers, either dive-bombers or level multi-engine bombers, just the opposite of what is normally thought and what is implied in the article.

They were badly used and badly directed during the Battle of Britain, but its failure to make an impact there was not a fault of the design, and its removal from the British airspace and use elsewhere is shown by extant German records (according to Peter Smith) to have been mostly driven by their need in other theaters of war. The Stuka was highly feared by all combatants who faced the aircraft, and in fact the very suspicion of Stukas in the vicinity was likely to cause a panic in Allied infantry and ground personnel. It was for this reason that the specious claim of its vulnerability and ineffectiveness, and the manipulation of statistics relating to downing of Stukas was fabricated, and the effectiveness of this propaganda campaign continues to infect historical writers to this day, including the writer of this article. I hate to edit somebody else's work, so I strongly suggest to the author that he review Peter Smith's book and revise the relevant parts of this article.72.203.163.208 (talk) 05:17, 16 April 2008 (UTC)

I think your evaluation is seriously flawed. I think Peter Smith is Ju 87 fan, therefore is attempting to write a revisionist book on this aircraft.

• The Stuka was highly feared by all combatants who faced the aircraft: Only those on the ground. Fighter pilots were more than happy to engage Stukas. The Australian ace Cladwell shot down five in as many minutes. This was the other way round. I have extensive literature on the combat history of the Ju 87. In North Africa in 1943 and even France in 1944 (incredibly the Luftwaffe used them here as well). When Ju 87s were intercepted, even with escort they tried desperately to land immediately without being fired on!

• The Stuka was in fact highly maneuverable, far from helpless against a fighter plane, and when flown in close groups, it was difficult for fighter planes to engage in a successful attack.: This is complete nonsense. I take it you have never heard the term "Stuka party". Read Osprey's Thomas, Andrew. Tomahawk and Kittyhawk Aces of the RAF and Commonwealth. Oxford, England: Osprey Publications, 2005. ISBN 978-1-84176-083-4, and the Osprey titles in the articles bibliography. The G variant that was equipped with 37 mm cannon became even more difficult to handle.

• It should be remembered that the Stuka was not a fighter, and cannot be considered to be a failed design simply because it could not take a Mustang or P-47 (or Spitfire) one-on-one. It was not designed to do so. : Nobody is saying it was a failed design, or that it was designed to "take a Mustang or P-47 (or Spitfire) one-on-one".

• the fact that fewer Stukas were lost than any other bomber shows it was in fact less vulnerable than other bombers, either dive-bombers or level multi-engine bombers: By far the most offending comment. Less vulnerable !, No way. There were never more than 500 Ju 87s operational in the Luftwaffe during the peak of its career. Only 5,000 were produced, and production was severely reduced after 1943. Is it any wonder losses were not as high as more widely produced aircraft that served in larger numbers? The Stukas could sustain quite some damage, but are you telling me that the Mosquito, Beaufighter, B-17, B-24, B-29, Lancaster, Halifax bombers were easier to shoot down than the Ju 87, a machine that carried one 1×7.92 mm MG 15 (81 in the "G") as a defensive weapon???!!!!!!!!!!

• They were badly used and badly directed during the Battle of Britain, but its failure to make an impact there was not a fault of the design, and its removal from the British airspace and use elsewhere is shown by extant German records (according to Peter Smith) to have been mostly driven by their need in other theaters of war

Laughable to say the least. What other theatres? The Germans were not involved in any other theatres at the time of its withdrawal in August 1940. The Stuka was not missused and badly directed. It could only operate in clear skies, thats why it failed in the BoB. It was too slow, too poorly armed and unmanouverable. For two months of operations over Britain, for the damage caused, the losses incurred were heavy. I'm sorry to rubbish your points, but they really could not be further from the truth. The Ju 87 was a great ground attack weapon but it was appallingly vulnerable.

If smith does say these things, it has got to be the worst book on this aircraft I have ever heard of. I strongly recommend it stays out of the article. Dapi89 (talk) 20:15, 30 April 2008 (UTC)

Bomber?

Why is its name translated as 'dive bomber'? Fighter would be a much better translation for Kampfflugzeug. #### —Preceding unsigned comment added by 84.28.178.150 (talk) 16:47, 8 June 2008 (UTC)

I do not speak German, but I believe the full term Sturzkampfflugzeug would be literally translated as "dive battle aircraft". If this is incorrect, would a German speaker please correct me. GMan552 (talk) 00:37, 9 June 2008 (UTC)

Indeed Sturz (dive/fall) - kampf (battle/combat) - flugzeug (aircraft/plane) MisterBee1966 (talk) 05:21, 25 July 2008 (UTC)

"Revisionist History?"

Peter C. Smith may be a Stuka fan, and the author of this Wikipedia article a Suka hater, but it doesn't matter what our personal feelings about an aircraft are, we should just look at the data. Obviously, the author of the article has not read Smith's book. It is not a hagiography of a machine, but a carefully researched and referenced historical record. The fact that the Stuka suffered fewer losses than other bombers, both dive bombers and level bombers, is calculated as a percentage of aircraft flying. The dismissive comment that fewer losses for Stukas were recorded because there were fewer Stukas flying is an unreflective puerile cavil.

Similarly, Smith did exhaustive research on Allied claims of downed Stukas, and found almost universal exaggeration of claims. This data was confirmed by, for example, seeing a claim for several Stukas being downed from a particular German unit, then tracing, by serial number, the continued existence of these aircraft, and their further operational use in theater. Allied pilots were clearly inflating their ability to shoot down Stukas, and their baseless claims were used as reference for many post-war publications. These publications were obviously the article writer's main source of information, which is why his article is seriously flawed.

I've never flown a Stuka, much less in combat, and neither, I suspect, has the author. I really strongly suggest he obtain a copy of Peter Smith's monograph and at least consider an alternative view of this aircraft.Cd195 (talk) 04:15, 13 July 2008 (UTC)

Yes it is

As I have already explained, the information is distorted to the Stukas advantage, in other words, he is making the Ju 87 look good. Your other comments serve to highlight your complete misuse and misunderstanding of stats. 1,100 medium bombers were employed during the BoB in 1939-40, Ju 87 strength never reached 1/3 of that. You will also find Smith's "calculations" of ratios and missions is ridiculous, given the Kampfgruppen flew tens of thousands of sorties more than Stuka units during the war. You also seem to forget, the Ju 87 was withdrawn just 6 weeks into the BoB, while other types continued the struggle into 1941! This trend continued on the Eastern Front. Just 151 took part in Fall Blau in 1942, against 400 Ju 88s and another 400 He 111s (approx). Most of the loss claims against Ju 87s in this article come directly from German records. Tell me, did Smith use the German Archives? Or second hand sources? I think you will find that the RAF confirmation of kills system was better than the Luftwaffe's, as they could count the wrecks. Claims don't necessarily lead to a pilot being granted a kill. The Germans were operating over enemy territory, so kills were much harder to confirm. Besides, this misses the point. The Ju 87 was withdrawn as the Germans knew it was painfully vulnerable. Your last comment is confusing. Just how many Ju 87 pilots do think are left in 2008? Most information pertaining to losses in this article has been sourced using German records. And I don't dislike the Ju 87, if I did I wouldn't contribute to the article. Dapi89 (talk) 16:56, 24 July 2008 (UTC)

BTW, you still havn't answered the holes "punched" in your initial post. Dapi89 (talk) 17:04, 24 July 2008 (UTC)

Yet more revisionism

Dapi89, your analysis of the Stuka is wrong at so many levels one hardly knows where to begin. I would love to answer each pseudo-point you made as you tried to "punch holes" in my argument, but that would take more space than we have here. Suffice it to say you haven't "punched" any holes into anything, except possibly your brain. By way of illustration, lets just consider the Battle of Britain (BoB).

After the BoB was over, Churchill (although correctly warning that this was just "the end of the beginning") exulted in Parliament over the massive defeat of the Luftwaffe. Some members of Parliament were not so sanguine. One in particular, Aneurin Bevan, cautioned that the Stukas had been incorrectly utilized as a tactical weapon, rather than as a strategic weapon, which accounted for some of them being shot down. Churchill said that such fine distinctions were worthless, and that what counted is that the RAF had "destroyed hundreds of them." Really? Let's look at the facts of the Stukas in the BoB.

Hundreds of Ju87's were deployed. The BoB lasted two months (July-August 1940). During that time, when hundreds of Stukas were subjected to the most intense fighter attacks, FIFTY-NINE were shot down. That's right, not "hundreds." Just 59. Only on August 18th, when 14 were shot down, did the daily loss climb to double digits. Most days NONE were shot down, other days two or three, some days five. During this phase of WWII, the battle which is considered the worst defeat the Stukas ever had, let's see what they accomplished in two months at the cost of 59 aircraft:

1. One anti-aircraft ship sunk

2. One destroyer sunk

3. Five destroyers damaged

4. Destroyers deployed around Dover withdrawn. Very important

   as this was part of the fleet supposedly deployed in the path
   of the planned German invasion.

5. Four smaller warships sunk

6. Fourteen merchant ships sunk

7. Twenty-nine merchant ships damaged

8. Through-Channel convoys halted for the period

9. Seven airfields hit and damaged

10. Forty-nine British aircraft destroyed on the ground

11. Three radar stations damaged and put out of comission for the period

Quite an impressive list of accomplishments, and one not generally known or divulged during that time.

How do the losses of Ju87's compare to Allied losses? Well in comparable two month periods, such as the Berlin bombing campaign of Nov/Dec 1943, the RAF lost 1,047 bombers. During various raids in the three day period between 8 and 10 October 1943, the USAAF lost 88 aircraft. The PERCENTAGE losses of Ju87's was lower than these Allied losses. And this is considering only the JU87 losses during their "worst" defeat, during the BoB.

Really, the data available is too voluminous to be worked over comprehensively in these discussion pages. I continue to feel that the author of this article, rather than being defensive and offering insulting and condescending responses to my comments, should simply try to do some more research and perhaps change his analysis of the Stuka. This isn't personal.

Nonsense

This is completely ridiculous. Firstly don't call my points "pseudo", secondly your ignorance is palpable, and thirdly it couldn't be more abundantly clear your initial posts were extremely poor and inaccurate, and your bullshit and erroneous assertions about me, and in this debate, serve only to highlight your own lack of knowledge on this subject. Calling the Stuka manoeuverable is hysterical, even more so when one considers the Ju 87 G.

You don't seem to able to grasp the most basic of points and continue to make mistakes:

• I have never made a big deal out the Ju 87s performance during the battle of Britain. I even removed information of "heavy losses", for text that related to its vulnerability - and this is correct. When you consider the Luftwaffe began the campaign with 220 machines 59 losses represents a 26 percent loss rate, in six weeks (not two months). During the French Campaign it lost 120 to enemy action, again in six weeks (just over one-third of its strength), despite air superiority and poor coordination among the Allied air arms. Its vulnerability in hostile airspace is undeniable.

• You continue to miss the point. Types that flew tens of thousands of more sorties and operated and were produced far more widely had more chance of incurring heavy losses. What don't you understand about that? Do you have any idea how many Ju 87 sorties were flown over Britain in 1940? Was the Lancaster or Halifax bombers withdrawn from service due to attrition losses?

• You still have not answered my questions from your initial post. What other theatres was the Luftwaffe involved in in August 1940 that prompted its withdrawal?

• You think the Stuka was the reason the RN withdrew their destroyers from the Channel? Did it not occur to you this was during the most intense period where invasion was imminent, therefore they needed to conserve their strength? Were you also aware than only 6 Destroyers were lost at Dunkirk, despite being stationary?

• Besides, the issue of the Ju 87s effectiveness was not and is not an issue, and I certainly don't need lecturing by you on the operational career of the Ju 87. What is an issue is that aircraft was appallingly vulnerable because it was lightly armed, slow and unmaneuverable, just ask a Stuka pilot, I have.

And above all stop referring to me as the "editor of this article", many users contribute sensible and well researched information. Dapi89 (talk) 23:50, 10 August 2008 (UTC)

Furthermore, your precentages, as I have already said, are massively distorted. 6-800 bombers a mission went on those raids. Out of 9,111 bombers dispatched, 492 were lost, so the precentage was only 5%! You are using those stats in a way that implies an aircraft (the Ju 87) which operated 30 times fewer, in number, thus incurred less losses, is somehow not as vulnerable? Rubbish. Dapi89 (talk) 11:19, 11 August 2008 (UTC)

"Revisionism"

Ok, it's obvious this is no longer about the Stuka. Your last post was just a horribly disrespectful puerile harangue, full of insults and personal attacks. Your kind of post is not worthy of Wikipedia. The readers should not have to be subject to that kind of obscene screeching diatribe. I just thought we could engage in a friendly discussion about the merits or faults of the Stuka, and that it would be very interesting to Wikipedia readers to learn about alternative assessments of this airplane. You seem to be interested only in starting a bar room brawl. I refuse to be a party to this. Good bye.Cd195 (talk) 20:40, 11 August 2008 (UTC)

Rubbish. There was nothing obscene or puerile about what I said, its is an accurate observation. I have used nothing other than factual arguments in this case, the fact that you are discontinuing tells me that you are out of your depth, not that there is much depth to this debate. You are completely missing the point, and your arguments have more holes in them than swiss cheese. I find your ignorance appalling. So long. Dapi89 (talk) 09:20, 12 August 2008 (UTC)

Yet more revisionism, one more time

Ok, I was wrong. But only about refusing to be a party to this unwelcome discussions any more! I'm so sorry, I just can't disappear while "the author of this article" waves me off in such a rude manner. I do promise, though, not to use the words "rubbish," "nonsense," or "appalling ignorance" no matter how tempted I am to reply in kind.

Mr. Author of the Article, this is my basic point. You are not ignorant. You obviously have given this matter a tremendous amount of thought and effort. But you cannot escape the fact that you have to form your opinions based on the data you have available. Which is to say, statistics which have been published in numerous books, monographs and reports since the end of the war, and which all carry the bad seed of fabricated numbers. For example (quotations are from the Peter C. Smith book): on November 14, 1940 Helmut Mahlke's III./St.G.1 made an assault on Dover. They were met by numerous British fighters. Although two whole fighter Geschwaders were supposed to protect the Stukas, they failed to join up due to weather. Arriving over the Thames estuary and not finding any ships, they proceded to the radio station at Dover. Without fighters, the Stukas had to defend themselves against the fighters. The following quotes are from Helmut Mahlke himself:

  "..Our Stukas were greatly outnumbered, I had nineteen Stukas on this     
   mission.  Despite this, we did not lose more than two JU 87's in the
   area of Dover, and the crew of one of these, Oberleutnant Blumers was
   the pilot, was rescued and made POW's.  Most of my aircraft were damaged, 
   but all managed to get home.

   Some two or three of these had to make forced landings in France near
   the coast.  All the others succeeded in landing on our home airfield
   despite a hell of a lot of hits (the maximum on one Stuka was 82 holes).
   Only one JU 87 returned without a single hit, Oberleutnant Schairer, who
   managed to out-maneuver many fighter attacks.  All our aircraft, except
   the two shot down over Dover, were combat-ready again in a few days."

This story is significant on many levels. First, it belies the myth of the completely helpless Stuka, clunky and un-maneuverable and totally vulnerable if attacked. Secondly, it is typical of many Stuka missions. And thirdly, it is significant in the response the episode had on the Allied reports.

Typically, yes, typically, the RAF grossly exaggerated the Allied successes in this battle: for this battle which saw 2 Stukas downed, and the rest returned to service in a few days, the British claimed SIXTEEN Stukas destroyed. It is that sort of fraudulent claim which has found its way into the post-war literature, and it is that sort of false statistic which leads many contemporary writers astray.

Another typical mission: On 8 November 1940, eighty Stukas attacked a Channel convoy, damaging three merchant vessels and one destroyer. They were attacked by three squadrons of RAF fighters. Three (out of 80) Stukas were downed. The British claimed FIFTEEN Stukas destroyed. The list goes on and on. You simply cannot believe the standard Stuka literature.

Capt. E.M. Brown, RN, flew the Stuka after the war, and was impressed by its nimble handling. Richar K. Smith recounts Brown's experience:

  "The low wing and power loading for the JU 87B make it the most nimble
   airplane of the whole bunch. [He test-flew most dive bombers used by 
   combatants in WW II on either side]  The JU 87 was a very versatile
   airplane.  Paradoxically, those who malign it have no understanding of 
   the subject and those who praise it really do not understand why it
   is praiseworthy."

One of the faults attributed to the Stuka was supposed lack of ability to place bombs accurately on ground targets. This alledged deficiency was belied by its effectiveness in the Russian theater (Operation Barbarossa, and the effort to martial his aircraft resources for the upcoming invasion of the Soviet Union, set for 1941, by the way, was the reason Hitler pulled the Stukas from the European theater).

I have a personal story associated with this. I have not spoken with a Stuka pilot, but have spoken with Spitfire and Typhoon pilots, one of whom was a personal friend. He not only confirmed the agility of the Stuka in the air, he was present at the British airfield where the great Stuka pilot Hans-Ulrich Rudel was briefly held after the war. Rudel was being held on his honor under some sort of "stay in the barracks" house arrest, but all the British pilots, including my friend, were eager to talk to him, and he became quite popular at the base. They had a Stuka there, one of the few not destroyed on the spot, but rather brought to England for testing.

During the course of their conversations, the issue of their accuracy came up. Rudel bet his new "friends" that he could but a bomb on a square meter mark on the first try. My friend decided to take him up on it. He and a couple of other pilots decided to mark a square meter on a grass field with white tape, fuel up the Stuka with just enough fuel take off, climb to altitude, and make one dive-bombing run with a dud bomb before landing. Rudel was spirited out of confinement, but unfortunately, as my friend was helping him into the Stuka (remember that Rudel was missing a foot by this time), the base CO showed up, fit to be tied. Rudel was confined under guard, and my friend and his accomplices had hell to pay. So I'm sorry there isn't an exciting end to the personal story, but the point is that experienced Stuka pilots were indeed confident of their accuracy.

I guess the bottom line here is that I'm not trying to get anyone angry, or start an unpleasant confrontational argument. I'm just pointing out that opinions are properly based on data, and if your data is faulty, the opinion will likewise suffer. My argument is that the long published and voluminous data on Stukas are faulty, and a re-assessment of the aircraft and its impact on the battlefield is in order.

There. No insults. Conciliatory tone. Please try to be polite in your rebuttal. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Cd195 (talk • contribs) 20:43, 13 August 2008 (UTC)

Firstly I would like to know if Smith supplies primary sources. A quote from a pilot, regardless of rank, is irrelevant and impossible to base any assertion on, for obvious reasons. The author would need to get hold of the German archive records for the Stuka units during the war to comment on losses. Quoting one German pilot is not good enough.

Secondly, as I have said twice already, the issue here is that the Ju 87 was withdrawn from the battle because it couldn't operate in hostile skies against well coordinated fighter opposition. Browns comments, I note, are comparisons to other dive-bombers, not any other types of bombers, like the B-17 or Lancaster. Furthermore, Brown never flew the type in combat, so how would he know how vulnerable it was? Many Stuka pilots, when caught unprotected, dumped their bombs and made a run for it. RAF Squadrons over Africa encountered entire formations that would try and land as soon as possible. At one point StG3 had a crisis of morale during 1941 on the eastern front, when gunners refused to serve aboard the Ju 87, unless heavy fighter protection was provided. Browns comments do nottake into account that an aircraft that served in far greater numbers (formations), and suffered heavy losses, cannot be compared to another that did not fly in waves of 800+. Any data will, of course, be distorted. As you probably know, Rudel was shot down 32 times in a Ju 87. I could use this to claim that the best Ju 87 pilot couldn't avoid being shot down an incredible 32 times! Therefore the Ju 87 was not a capable aircraft. But this would ignore the point that he undertook over 2,000 missions, an was more likely to get shot down than most other Allied dive-bomber pilots. A significant number of pilots found the Ju 87 G variants, with the 37mm cannon, very difficult to fly. It seems Brown was not flying that particular model. I also take issue with your interpretation of the German pilot's comments. In that text, it does not say that they were unprotected. I find it hard to believe that the Germans, who withdrew the Ju 87 in mid-August due to its failings, would send a formation across the channel in November unescorted. Thirdly, as I have said, quoting its dive-bombing feats at me is not relevent to this debate, it was a good ground-attack aircraft, but that is not the issue here. I would most certainly agree with you that any criticisms of its ability is certainly not supported by me, or the main stream. I hope I don't have to keep repeating that. I have been fortunate in my hobby (which this is) to have met a number of Stuka pilots, by chance, at Hendon. Apparently its quite a "hot bed" for German pilots as it houses, IMHO, the best collection of German types in the world - it has one of everything (well almost). They contain one of the only two complete Ju 87s left. And according to them, the Ju 87 was vulnerable against single-engined fighters. Data is a good thing to have, but it can distort was is ultimately established facts. Using the information I have already given, I could just as easily claim the opposite. Anyone can argue that the Ju 87 didn't lose heavily every time its units were engaged. The bottom line is a) it was removed from the Luftwaffe's order of Battle in August 1940 because they feared the StG's decimation, and b) it later replaced by the Fw 190 on the eastern front, for exactly this reason again. Dapi89 (talk) 15:58, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

I would like to request again that you stop referring to me as the author of this article, anyone and everyone contributes. Dapi89 (talk) 16:06, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

Having done some reading, according to the Generalquartiermeister der Luftwaffe 59 Ju 87s were lost and a further 33 damaged to varying degrees since the 8 July. Losses from 8 August - 18 August represents 20 percent of the Stuka force lost. For just 10 days this is a serious loss rate. The success of the Ju 87 with relation to anti-shipping and airfield attcks occurred when the formations were not intercepted, particularly the attack against RAF Tangmere - that is why just one Stuka was lost. Do you see now how data is distorted? The RAF did not take any part in the action. Does Smith mention that? Dapi89 (talk) 16:14, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

And yet more on revisionism

I believe that by this time we have more in agreement than not. We all agree that the Stuka could not operate without heavy fighter cover. My point is that this is true for all bombers. The Stuka's relatively small size and "fighter-like" appearance (ok, slightly fighter-like!) may lead some to think that it was a bad fighter. It was that, but it was bad because is was not a fighter. Nevertheless, it was, by accounts I've read, an aircraft with well harmonized controls, and more maneuverable than heavy multi-engine level bombers. As Minister of Parliament Bevin (whom I've previously mentioned) stated, the Stuka was meant to be used in a strategic manner, in concert with advancing infantry and armored divisions, protected by fighters and augmented by level bombers in comprehensive Blitzkrieg movements. The Battle of Britain was not this type of battle. The Stukas were sent in tactical groups, and often devoid of adequate fighter cover. Of course they did not fulfill the expectations of the battle planners, they misused the aircraft. They were properly pulled and saved for the invasion of the Soviet Union. Later in the war, other aircraft were indeed used for ground attack roles, especially the Fw190, but remember that the Stuka was a 1930's design. Most aircraft that began the war were obsolete in later years. The Bf (or Me)109 underwent many iterations to remain competitive, as did the Spitfire.

At this point, we gauge the effectiveness of WW II aircraft by looking at statistics, and my contention is that many of the statistics relating to the Stuka were skewed against the aircraft for propaganda purposes. In other words, we have difficulty making a good assessment of an aircraft for whose numbers we have doubts.

In the case of Rudel, I have read that he was shot down 32 times, but I believe not every one of those cases was air-to-air combat. As I recall, most of the damage his Stukas recieved throughout the war was from ground fire. I recall that he was quoted as saying "nobody ever put a bullet in my Stuka," referring to aerial combat, but that's surely an exaggeration, and my friend who spoke with him frankly was doubtful that was true. However, once again, this kind of remark indicates that experienced Stuka pilots felt they had a good handling airplane under them. It should also be noted that Rudel had 4 or 5 air-to-air kills. I don't know if they were all in a Stuka, though, as I know that he flew an Fw190 on occasion. You are correct that quotations from isolated pilots are not proof. (I suspect that applies to pilots with whom you've spoken!), but such statements are, as we say in science, of heuristic importance. They indicate directions of inquiry which we should follow. Smith's monograph, which is quite extensive and well documented, does not rely on hearsay evidence, but on his own research into contemporary documents. Really, you should make an effort to obtain one, if only for your own quiet interest.

So here is how I read it: Stuka--Good dive bomber, lousy fighter.

                                 Did better than usually acknowledged.
                                 Bad-mouthed by allied publicists.
                                 Effectiveness and loss-ratio better
                                    than usually quoted statistics.

BTW--Sorry about that last "author of the article" bit. Silly bit of puerile irritant on my part!Cd195 (talk) 22:54, 20 August 2008 (UTC)

A breakthrough

I believe you have slightly contradicted yourself in your opening paragraph. The Ju 87 was not a poor fighter, because it was never meant to be. Also Blitzkrieg (which is not an official theory) is an operational and tactical doctrine, not a strategic one. Everything the Germans did throughout their military history was related to tactics rather than strategy. It is what I like to call "the German way in war", i.e on overfocus on tactics and operational expediance rather than a sound strategy, something they were always devoid of, and of course if you don't have a sound strategy, you don't win wars in the long term. Blitzkrieg is full of wholes, and has no plan B. The Ju 87 was used in a strategic role (not tactical), as was the Luftwaffe, during the Battle of Britain. You seem to have this the wrong way around.

The Stuka was as nimble as its job role allowed, it was a dive-bomber after all. I am sure Smith is saying it was better than contemporaries, and is not attempting to try and claim it was far more nimble than ever thought, just was that its performance was not as bad. Would this be fair? No-one is saying that it was supposed to be able to defend itself from fighters, but it still doesn't mean that it wasn't vulnerable to them, or this should be omitted. On the B-17 page I have added material to show the extent of its losses, and the article points to the Schweinfurt raids. But it must be said, the firepower of most other bombers enabled them to defend themselves much more adequately, a B-17 vs Ju 87 had 11 defensive MGs on the B-17 to one on Ju 87.

I share your point about my chance encounter with the Ju 87 pilot (I only spoke with one, very briefly). But then again, German historians in particular have never adequately explained the Ju 87s withdrawal in August 1940. Griehl, who I have used quite allot for this article hardly meantions the BoB at all! I wonder why? The only actions he relates to about the Ju 87 over the UK stays almost exclusively to early 1941, and the small anti-ship raiding parties that were sent out. I guess both sides can be bias. Dapi89 (talk) 00:17, 21 August 2008 (UTC)

More on breakthrough

Actually, I don't believe I really contradict myself too much about the Stuka's role. I mention that it was a bad fighter because it was not designed to be one. Essentially what you say. Your comments on strategy vs. tactics are an interesting new aspect to this discussion. Of course, I have a slightly different viewpoint, but this is a more fluid issue, since so much depends on the definitions of strategy and tactics, which I suspect are easily defined but not so easily applied to specific cases. If you read Liddell Hart's "Strategy," an older text but, I think still relevant, you will notice that he defines strategy very broadly, in terms of war goals. Although he does make a distinction between "grand" strategy (ie, winning a war) and strategy, which may involve specific theater objectives. In such a stratospheric scheme, the actual use of particular weapons is all confined to the tactical realm.

Another older book, Edward Mead Earl's "Makers of Modern Strategy," defines the terms more clearly, I think: "Strategy deals with war, preparation for war, and the waging of war. Narrowly defined, it is the art of military command....It is different from tactics, which is the art of handling forces in battle." The disposition of Stuka squadrons during the Battle of Britain comes under, in my opinion, a tactical decision. A Blitzkrieg movement, whether that was an official German military term or not, involves a broad strategic aim. For example, it may not have been "grand strategy," but the campaign to take Poland in 1939 by a lightning fast co-ordinated movement of infantry divisions, armored divisions, and air attack goes beyond a tactical move, which traditionally would involve the movement of only a division size or smaller unit. I know, some may argue the point, but in my opinion the Polish campaign was a strategic move.

Likewise, the invasion of Britain was a strategic plan, which, had it been carried through, would have involved the movement of vast numbers of invasion forces, land battles, and ultimately the occupation of England. The Battle of Britain was exactly that, a battle. It was to be the opening gambit of the invasion (take control of the skies), and follows Earl's definition of tactics: the handling of forces in battle. Among the forces handled tactically in an attempt to obtain air supremacy were the Stuka squadrons, sent to accomplish missions for which they were poorly suited. In other words, isolated dive bombing attacks without adequate fighter cover. I really don't think that one can say that the Stukas were a strategic weapon during the BoB, but we could spend a lot of time on definitions!98.170.200.38 (talk) 04:42, 21 August 2008 (UTC)

I think clausewitz would disagree, and given he has made far more of a contribution than modern military historians (particularly Liddell Hart!) I tend to share his opinion that operations and tactics are very different to strategy, they are the means with which to achieve strategic ends. But, as I have said, if you don't have a coherent strategy, let alone one at all, you lose.

I think the second author, Edward Earl, has a much better grasp than Hart. I mean, lets face it, Hart was a proponent of airpower which could win wars without a ground battle by destroying military targets only. This is only one step away from Douhet's absurd notion that bombing could destroy morale and bring about enemy collapse. Both ill-conceived theories, which have been proven wrong in warfare ever since.

I disagree that the Ju 87 was used in a tactical way. Blitzkrieg operated in the relm of combined arms, land and air. No such cooperation took place in the BoB, it purely an aerial battle. It has to have been strategic. It was used to destroy enemy airpower on airfields and in the factories - "Hart and Douhetiean" style. By definition this must be considered strategic deployment. The strategy was not simply to defeat Britain, that is very simplistic, and is not a strategy. The Strategy revolves around what miliatry goals need to be obtained before the invasion could to take place. After this, the Luftwaffe would be shifted to tatical support to help the operational plan - defeating the enemy in the field, after the strategic advantage (eliminating enemy airpower completely for supremacy rather than air superiority;tactical), had been won. The only tactical way the Ju 87 was used would be in the role after the invasion.

It failed because the Luftwaffe was not designed as a strategic air force. Furthermore calling it the "Battle of Britain" does not imply or condone the tactical argument. The RAF bombing of Berlin was called the Batle of Berlin, although this was meant as a strategic knock out blow that would win the war. Besides, if the invasion had been launched, it would not have become a battle, but rather a campaign. Many articles that are named "Battle of" should not be. The Battle was a part of far greater and more important strategic scope. Anyway, I digress. Dapi89 (talk) 13:06, 21 August 2008