Talk:Formations of the Soviet Army

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Corps

Re: "In the early years of the Soviet Union, motorized and mechanized units received a "larger" designation. For example, an armored unit that was the same size as an armored division in most other armies was called a "tank corps" in the Red Army. The logic supporting this system was that all units with the same designation would have equivalent combat strength. So a "tank corps" was believed to have equivalent combat strength with a "rifle corps," even though the latter unit had about three times as many men.[citation needed]

In the 1950s, this naming system for armored and mechanized units was abandoned, and the Soviets began naming such units in the same manner as other nations.[citation needed]"

I'm not sure why this was added. "Motorized and mechanized units" in the Soviet definitions refer to divisions and not Corps which are called formations. As formations these were only created in the mid-30s at the behest of Tukhachevsky and recreated just before the start of the war. Certainly not "in the early years of Soviet Union". The early Soviet Mechanized Corps in 1940 had over 1,000 tanks in two tank and one mechanized divisions (Glantz, p.19, From Don to the Dnepr, 1984) so they were most certainly not the size of "an armored division in most other armies". I'm not sure how the statement "a "tank corps" was believed to have equivalent combat strength with a "rifle corps" can even be made. Aside from the absolute difference in purpose for each type of the formation, and their equipment which can not be compared in 'raw' quantity of personnel, I also fail to follow the suggested obvious that "all units with the same designation would have equivalent combat strength". Yes, all tank Corps would have equivalent combat strength.

The statement in regards to the reorganisation of the Soviet Army in the post-Stalin period (restructuring of 1956) is utterly wrong. The naming of units was not abandoned, but changed due to changes in technology, changes in doctrine and general restructuring. Tank units were sometimes changed to 'heavy tank - self-propelled' to reflect their equipmnet. Mechanised units were renamed to motor-rifle with increased motorisation of their rifle sub-units, the previous designation reflection only the mechanisation of the tank and artillery units (by and large) in most rifle divisions (remnants of GPW). However, if anything no Soviet Army unit was named "in the same manner as other nations". No other nation, at least in Europe, had units named 'tank division', or motor-rifle division, strictly speaking (even if the German Bundeswehr created soon after with its Panzer divisions is considered).--mrg3105 mrg3105 08:11, 15 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Strategic Directions

The concept of 'strategic direction' is not synonymous with the TVD, but a subset of it in terms of military theory (as referenced). It defines direction of offensive action, while TVD defines all military operations, including those of the strategic rear support, including defence industry. However the TVD did not exist during the Second World War, so its not really something that can be equated with the strategic direction anyway. --mrg3105 mrg3105 02:08, 25 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]

I really do not appreciate the reditection of Strategic Directions to formations of the Soviet Army. They were not formations.--mrg3105 mrg3105 01:14, 30 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]

I would argue that in their 1980s form, they were formations, as they were a military organisation of above battalion size with a commander, staff, headquarters, and assigned subordinate formations and direct reporting units. Buckshot06 (talk) 01:25, 30 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]

That may be, but the article as edited by yourself completely removes them as a distinct type of organisation where they become TVDs. This means that for the start of the Eastern Front operations in the Second World War I have nothing to point to. Should I set up separate articles for each Strategic Direction? --mrg3105 mrg3105 01:35, 30 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Um, firstly, I didn't do the redirect you were complaining above of. If I've been confusing I apologise (and I don't fully understand you when you say 'where they become TVDs' - though I was very clear). Tell you what, I realise from rereading Odom, Collapse of the Soviet Military, that I've been forgetting something that Rezun actually mentions but does not emphasise; we need to be careful to add 'High Commands' in the SDs/TVDs. Odom writes that 'Two of them [TVDs in Europe] had high commands to control their much larger forces'. How about I just insert this direct quote from Odom into the article to try and explain what they were in the late 70s-early 1980s:

'...Beneath the General Staff, four high commands were established, begining in the late 1970s and continuing into the 1980s. In order of importance they were the Western High Command and the SW High Command in Europe; the Far Eastern High Command, which was actually the first established; and the Southern High Command, oriented toward the Middle East and southwest Asia. These commands were established as the program begun in 1978 to improve theater operational capabilities, especially in Europe.

[omit paragraphes dealing with GS control of specific components such as SRF, railway troops, civil defence troops, and military districts]

... A rather confusing aspect of Soviet command and control is the concept of a Theatre of Military Operations - teatr voennykh deistvii, or TVD. These were territorial areas, marked by flank boundaries in most cases. Maps 2 and 3 [US DOD maps reproduced in book] show them marked by radial lines from Moscow. Actually the General Staff divided the entire world into TVDs. North America, Australia, and various oceans were defined as TVDs. Large forces might be deployed within a TVD, or only small forces, or no forces at all. The three TVD projecting into Europe contained forces greatly varying size .... . Two of them, the W and SW TVDs had high commands to control their much larger forces. The Southern TVD had thirty divisions (map 4) and the Far East had 57 divisions (map 5).

(Paragraph break) A 'theater of war' was also a Soviet military category, and Europe was the most important one in the view of the General Staff. The Far Eastern and the southern theaters received lower priority.' (Odom, Collapse of the Sov Military, Yale Uni Press, 1998, p.29 & 33)

Ok, I'm not sure who did the redirect. I think Odom is confused.

Rezun did not invent High Command of Strategic Direction. Its one of those things that is easily understood by any Soviet officer without the need to emphasize it, but may I need to explain it here. High Command only refers to what at lower echelons is called operativny shtab, or operational staff, which has the Western equivalent of forward HQ. Head Command of Strategic Direction also had a Tylovoye Commandovanie Strategicheskogo Napravleniya, or Rear Command of Strategic Direction, i.e. rear HQ that looks after rear services. Every field formation in any armed force has one. The interesting thing about the entry in the military dictionary I referenced this to is not the start of the entry (glavnoye komandovaniye), but the last word, uprazdneno, which is distinctly different to rasformirovanno, disbanded. The Strategic Direction was indeed not disbanded, but abandoned as a form of organisational management of forces in 1942. It was replaced by another pre-Revolution role, the "Stavka representative". Do you think Zhukov went about the front in a jeep with his driver? He and other SD commanders retained their staff officers, and if anything increased them. Not only that, but each Stavka rep Staff had an NKVD security battalion (otdel'niy motostrelkoviy batal'on okhrany NKVD). It is from this role that the Cold War SD and TVD commands developed. However, I would like to again restate that the two are not the same. A TVD is a far larger entity that encompasses far more functions then the SD. The SD is just what it says it is, a direction of the offensive action at strategic level. Such directions were temporarily formed at operational level also, but these were ad-hoc, operation-specific creations. The Stavka representative roles were permanent. BTW, the Far East had one also, but unlike the others in Europe it specified High Command Soviet Troops Far Eastern because there was also a clandestine High Command Strategic Direction that directed the Communist Chinese troops (created before 1939), but almost entirely staffed with Soviet officers.--mrg3105 mrg3105 07:46, 30 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]

I really don't think Odom got himself confused. I have a feeling, reading his book, he understood Russian and knew what he was talking about. To the topic. Yes of course we all know that Stalin stopped using the GlavKoms and went with Stavka representatives from 1942 (though Erickson does describe him going back and forth a bit with the GlavKom for the Northern Caucasus). Let's ignore this english-ism 'strategic direction' and focus on the Russian terms. Odom states, and this is backed up by many including the MilBal, other books, etc, that while the entire world was divided into TVDs from the early 80s, only some had High Commands in them - the four: FE, W, SW, and South. The others -Arctic, Atlantic, Australian, whatever, had no staffs, forward High Command, or Rear Command (well, some of them may have had something, but I've never seen any data - be very keen to see anything on this). Meanwhile, the TVs - Odom's 'Theaters of War' - might cover several TVDs: Europe had the SW TVD and the Western TVD, for example. Am I correctly reflecting what you are saying? Buckshot06 (talk) 08:55, 30 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]

You think Odom knew what he was talking about because he was 1985-1988, Director of the National Security Agency, Fort Meade, Maryland?

Teatr voiny is the really large region that is defined by the maximum reach of the military (voiskoviye) assets within it. With ICBMs there was only one really, Global. Soviets were not looking forward to global'naya voina

Teatr voyennikh deystviy is defined by "deystviy", actions executed by Deystvuyeschiye voyska, active forces.

Every TVD that had active forces, had an active command structure. Where were these active forces? Vietnam, India, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, etc. The Pacific Fleet was a TVD in itself, and Australia was within its AO, as was NZ.

Now, the Strategic Missile Forces were a separate Arm, and they were always deystvuyuchiye just like the US Strategic Command. These forces were not part of any TVDs because TVDs had their own missile assets.

Therefore the only Deystvuyuchiye voyska refer to those that would become active in times of war, that is the Army, Navy, Air forces (Frontal and PVO) and VDV. Once they became active, the same thing that happened during the Second World War would happen again. For example the Transcaucasian MD may become a Front, but its military educational institutions were staffed with generals and colonels that could become the HQ, TVD Tyl (rear services).

However once mobilised, the deystvuyeschiye voiska need to be directed towards executing their planned actions - hence strategicheskiye napravleniya, operazionniye napravleniya, napravleniya boyevikh deistviy, napravleniye aviazionnogo, artilleriyskogo, brinetankovogo udara, etc.

And so it goes...

As an aside, I think there was only one USSR commentator that suggested before 1991 that Soviet Union is no more. People most surprise were the people closest to the analytical frontline, like NSA. In fact in 2000 at NDU the Pentagon people were still trying to believe it.--mrg3105 mrg3105 12:17, 30 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]

One question. Where was the headquarters for all the assets in Ethiopia/southern Africa/Angola etc. How was it run? In general, we're doing a lot of explaining, but you need to cite some sources, and then we need to work out how to do this entry for TV, TVD. Can you reproduce the material in the Soviet Military Encyclopaedia, perhaps, as a start? Buckshot06 (talk) 21:02, 30 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Back to the original question

Why is "Strategic direction" redirected here? Leobold1 (talk) 04:55, 13 March 2008 (UTC)[reply]

A Strategic Direction was a strategic-command echelon of the Soviet Ministry of Defence--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 05:09, 13 March 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Thank you. The original link needs to be changed then. Leobold1 (talk) 05:27, 13 March 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Be my guest ;o)--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 05:40, 13 March 2008 (UTC)[reply]

WikiProject Military history/Assessment/Tag & Assess 2008

Article reassessed and graded as start class. --dashiellx (talk) 17:31, 28 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Tags February 2024

Dear CoconutOctopus, I'm the principal person expanding this article, which is a scratchpad for a future companion to Structure of the United States Army. Would you be able to kindly please tell me more about your concerns on the wording, especially tone, so I can fix them? Kind regards from the sheep of Aotearoa, Buckshot06 (talk) 23:21, 22 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]