Talk:Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011/Archive 1

Archive 1

Appointing and dismissing a PM

Is there anything in the law that restricts the Queen's prerogative to appoint and dismiss the prime minister at will, or for a prime minister to resign? I'm assuming that, for instance, the 14-day window after a vote of no confidence is intended to provide time for someone else to assemble a government that would have the confience of the commons without new elections. Plus PMs in the recent past have been forced to step down (Thatcher) or have stepped down voluntarily (Blair) in the middle of the parliamentary term. Perhaps it should be made more explicit that these scenarios are still possible under the new rules? --Jfruh (talk) 17:52, 19 January 2014 (UTC)

Duration

If parliament has never expired, isn't five years too long? What do the British think? In Australia, fixed-term elections are usually attached to extensions from three to four years, and this has been enough to see them defeated at referendum. (What is a better forum for asking about this sort of queston?—not being English, I have no idea how to find that sort of thing out.) —Felix the Cassowary 00:12, 24 August 2010 (UTC)

I guess an appropriate forum would be WP:RDH, but (to answer your question) you can read this BBC article which details some criticisms of the proposed changes. I don't know what the populace in general think, but the Labour party (currently in opposition) have said they will argue for four years instead, and have called it a "stich-up", among other things. Note that the BBC article predates the current text of the bill. Gabbe (talk) 10:47, 24 August 2010 (UTC)

The 1 May 1997 elections were more than five years after the 9 April 1992 elections. The 6 May 2010 elections were almost exactly five years after the 5 May 2005 elections. In every case the timings of the elections were decided by the then Prime Minister rather than because the parliament expired, though the parliament would have expired very shortly afterwards, and the early May dates were designed to coincide with local elections which were happening anyway. --Rumping (talk) 13:46, 18 March 2013 (UTC)

I don't think we British really think about it to be honest. The custom used to be that elections were held every four years, but a government would hang on to the bitter end if it thought it might lose and was desperately hoping the economy would perk up in time (the Tories in 1959-64, again in 1987-92 (successfully in that case) and 1992-7, or Labour in 2005-10). A custom had also evolved that elections were held in the spring (autumn being the other possibility) as the weather would be neither too hot for people to vote or so miserable they would hate the government, with much press speculation for months beforehand about which Thursday the PM would "advise". Elections were supposed to be every seven years between the early 1700s and 1911, but by the late nineteenth century a habit had evolved that governing parties lasted about 4 or 5 years before their Commons majority disintegrated.Paulturtle (talk) 14:39, 23 October 2014 (UTC)

Long Parliament

Can a Parliament still vote to extend its own life past five years? And the Lords still have the power to veto the idea, which veto cannot be overridden? I assume so, but am not sure how this Act affects the other laws that allow this. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.28.168.115 (talk) 11:22, 28 November 2013 (UTC)

Yes, in the sense that there is no written constitution in the UK so Parliament can pass any law it likes. The only exception, I think, would be if the Courts were to decide that the Fixed Term Parliaments Act is a "constitutional act" (an evolving convention, that one) which takes priority unless Parliament explicitly declares otherwise (in the same way that the courts would decline to apply an Act which clashes with EU Law, as the 1972 European Communities Act which gives priority to European Law, is deemed to take priority unless Parliament explicitly says otherwise). But for Parliament to vote to extend its own life would need a national crisis, so they'd get away with it under those circumstances.Paulturtle (talk) 14:47, 23 October 2014 (UTC)

Questions that many readers may have

1. Under this bill, is the Royal Prerogative to dissolve Parliament removed? It might seem so, but the bill could be phrased in such a way as to be a restriction on the Prime Minister - that he or she may not recommend to the Monarch that Parliament be dissolved on his or her own judgment, and must recommend it in the cases outlined in the bill. This would leave untouched the generally unused (since 1835) but still valid personal Prerogative of the Monarch.

2. While the previous question is one that is easily answerable (I suppose) as a matter of fact about what the bill actually states, the next question may be too speculative, although reasonable and citable opinions from notable sources may emerge in coming days. Under what plausible circumstances would 2/3 of the House of Commons call for an early election, given that it only takes 50% plus one to carry a vote of no confidence, which has (nearly) the same effect. Isn't that provision wholly redundant and therefore useless?

3. How does this bill affect situations of Loss of Supply? These are situations in which "the defeat of a supply bill (one that concerns the spending of money) automatically requires (by convention) the resignation of the government or dissolution of Parliament, much like a non-confidence vote, since a government that cannot spend money is hamstrung" (says Wikipedia).--Jimbo Wales (talk) 16:03, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

1) Section 3(2) of the Bill says that "Parliament cannot otherwise be dissolved", to which the explanatory notes adds "which means that the Queen will not be able to dissolve Parliament in exercise of the prerogative". This would thus be one of several Acts of Parliament specifying, explicitly or implicitly, things that the monarch no longer has the authority to do.

2) As our article on fixed-term elections notes: "In Germany, in 1982-83 and again in 1998, the incumbent Chancellor manipulated this provision by arranging for MPs from his own side to support a no-confidence motion, so he could obtain an early election. The German Constitutional Court allowed this manoeuvre but warned that it might block a future dissolution of the Bundestag that went against the spirit of the German constitution." While the UK has no such constitutional court, it would be presumably be viewed as quite dastardly for the incumbent government to produce a dishonest vote of no confidence solely in order to circumvent the law in calling an early election. All of this is, of course, highly speculative. In any case, if the incumbent government wants to call an early election under the present system, the Prime Minister only needs to meet the Queen. Under the "motion of no confidence" provisio of the Fixed-terms Parliament Bill, government would be require most if not all Members of Parliament representing the governing party (or parties), as well as the Speaker, to go along with an insincere vote of no confidence.

3) The bill says that "An early parliamentary general election is also to take place if the Speaker of the House of Commons issues a certificate certifying that—on a specified day the House passed a motion of no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government (as then constituted), and (b) the period of 14 days after the specified day has ended without the House passing any motion expressing confidence in any Government of Her Majesty." While this explicitly refers to "a motion of no confidence", since it is up to the speaker issue such a certificate I assume a "Loss of Supply" would count as passing a motion of no confidence. At present, such motions are rare (there's only been one since 1925). I hope more sources appearing in the following months (or possibly alterations to the Bill itself) can make this clearer. Gabbe (talk) 23:43, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

Thanks! This is very helpful. I suppose what you're suggesting is that there could be cases where the incumbent government wants to call an early election, but doesn't want to do so via a bogus vote of no confidence. They could do so under Clegg's proposal if they could muster 2/3 vote. I suppose that makes sense, although it seems quite odd to me.--Jimbo Wales (talk) 12:09, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

There were indeed alterations to the bill, and as passed it requires the specific form of, “That this House has no confidence in Her Majesty's Government.” The Speaker has no discretion. Gsnedders (talk) 19:08, 27 April 2015 (UTC)

4. Does a new five-year period begin after an early general election or is this similar to what is called an "extra election" in Sweden, i.e. the period to the next ordinary election is not changed? Björn Knutson (talk) 13:13, 8 December 2014 (UTC)

A new five-year period begins after an early general election. There is one exception: if such an early election is held before the first Thursday in May of a year, Parliament's term ends after four years rather than five years. The reason for this is that if the subsequent election was held five calendar years after such an early election Parliament would sit for a time period exceeding five years by days, weeks or even months. Gabbe (talk) 14:29, 9 December 2014 (UTC)

References

If the majority changes - then what ?

As MPs "drop off" (due to death, bad health or if an MP simply resigns) there are extra elections for their constituencies, which might change the majority after some time. Is this taken in mind in this Act ? Boeing720 (talk) 17:21, 9 June 2017 (UTC)

The intention of the act is to allow the House of Commons to decide if there is to be an early election, instead of the government deciding. A vote in parliament is required to call an early election rather than the Prime Minister simply asking the Monarch, which used to be the case. It was expected that the government's small majority following the United Kingdom general election, 2015 would have prevented it calling an early election. It was only possible for parliament to call the United Kingdom general election, 2017 because the government and the opposition both voted for it. For a government to be able to call an election on its own it would have to win a landslide election victory and gain two-thirds of the seats in parliament, and it would lose the ability if its number of seats fell below two-thirds. If a government loses all of its parliamentary majority over time, the opposition gains the possibility of calling an early election by winning a vote-of-no-confidence in the government. This was the case before the act was passed (it occurred to trigger the United Kingdom general election, 1979, for instance). – Polly Tunnel (talk) 18:24, 9 June 2017 (UTC)

Power to postpone a general election

The article states that "The Prime Minister has the power, by order made by statutory instrument under section 1(5), to provide that the polling day is to be held up to two months later than that date. Such a Statutory Instrument must be approved by each House of Parliament." This does not make sense. If a statutory instrument that would bestow on an official the authority to make an order needs to be approved by each house of parliament, then the official does not at present hold the said authority. I have removed the self-contradictory two sentences. Please can someone clear this up. 73lendge (talk) 11:33, 13 June 2017 (UTC)

This is the section of the act in question:

(5 )The Prime Minister may by order made by statutory instrument provide that the polling day for a parliamentary general election in a specified calendar year is to be later than the day determined under subsection (2) or (3), but not more than two months later.

(6) A statutory instrument containing an order under subsection (5) may not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.

It sounds like the Prime Minister has the power is to lay a draft proposal before the House and, if it is approved, the Prime Minister then has the power to change the polling day by using the statutory instrument.

Polly Tunnel (talk) 11:53, 13 June 2017 (UTC)

How about changing the wording to:

The Prime Minister may lay a draft statutory instrument before the House proposing that polling day is held up to two months later than that date. If the use of such a statutory instrument is approved by each House of Parliament, the Prime Minister has the power, by order made by statutory instrument under section 1(5), to provide that polling day is held accordingly.

Polly Tunnel (talk) 09:53, 15 June 2017 (UTC)

 Done as no comments received. Polly Tunnel (talk) 12:52, 16 June 2017 (UTC)

This provision recognises that in a hung parliament it might be possible for a new government to be formed

This seems a little unclear. IF DUP decided to support Corbyn and passed a vote of no confidence, would Corbyn get chance to form government with coalition/confidence and supply from other parties? Or, would this only give T. May the chance to form government with Labour or LD or DUP or other arrangements, and if a confidence motion is not passed, then there has to be a general election without Corbyn getting chance to form a government? I can't see that 14 day period is likely to be long enough for T May to try and then Corbyn to get a chance. So should the sentence be changed to indicate that only the largest governing party gets the chance to form a new government potentially with changed coalition and/or confidence and supply partners? crandles (talk) 11:46, 13 July 2017 (UTC)

If I understand this correctly, the procedure is the same as that which occurs after general elections. The sovereign offers the leader of the largest party the chance to form a government, and if they are unable to do so the opportunity is offered to the leader of the second largest party. Your point about the 14 day period potentially not being long enough for all this to happen is interesting, but of course has not been tested yet. After the United Kingdom general election, 2010, negotiations between the three largest parties as to which of them should form a government took less than a week. Polly Tunnel (talk) 13:52, 13 July 2017 (UTC)

Thank you for your reply. I wonder if a new procedure might need to emerge: eg pass a different resolution eg 'this house has confidence in an opposition minority government' which should be sufficient to force government to resign and Queen to invite leader of opposition to attempt to form a government, allow at least 2 weeks if necessary, and prevent PM telling Queen we are still having interesting discussions with other parties until the 14 day period is effectively over. This is speculation and has no place in article. What might be useful for article is if there are any refs on Queen's role (if any) during such a 14 day period.crandles (talk) 20:29, 13 July 2017 (UTC)

[1] includes "Even if such events occurred, he might only be Prime Minister for a short time – the 2011 Act isn’t clear on whether May would resign straight away". This suggests Corbyn would be PM during election if no confidence vote passed and Corbyn couldn't get confidence motion passed. Not sure if there is anything there that can be usefully added to article. crandles (talk) 21:05, 13 July 2017 (UTC)

The thing about the Act is that it actually has nothing to say explicitly about the appointment and dismissal of the prime minister and other members of the government; it merely dictates the timing of elections. Under the old procedure, a no-confidence vote did not have the force of law, but by convention such a vote would invariably be followed by the PM advising the monarch to use her legal authority to dissolve parliament and call new elections. That convention is now enshrined in law and happens automatically.

The appointment and dismissal of the PM remains a royal perogative: in law, it happens at the discretion of the monarch, but in practice only performed on the advice of her ministers. Since this particular perogative involves the transition from one set of ministers to another, however, the whole thing is very thorny. For instance, imagine if Labour were able to convince the DUP to join all the other non-Tory parties in currently in parliament (not likely, but imagine it for the sake of argument) in some sort of alliance with the intention of forming a government. Someone would put forward a no-confidence motion, which the government would lose. This starts the clock ticking to a dissolution two weeks later and a subsequent new election, with no further action from Parliament, the government, or the monarch necessary to make that happen.

In theory, at this point Teresa May would have no legal obligation to do anything but let the next election happen. She wouldn't be legally obliged to resign, either. In even more theoretical terms, the Queen could dismiss May and appoint Corbyn as PM on her own initiative, but in practice the monarch would never act in a political fashion like this without the advice of her government -- and Teresa May is still her prime minister.

What seems likely in practice in this scenario, based on convention and British political culture, is that May would tender her resignation to the Queen and advise her to appoint Corbyn PM, because he has a parliamentary majority behind him. Once that happened, Parliament would cast a vote of confidence in Corbyn's government, which under the Act would cancel the impending election triggered by the previous no-confidence vote.

But because this has never been tested, I don't know if anyone's certain that this is how it would play out. It seems like May refusing to allow Corbyn to form a government if he has a clear parliamentary majority behind him would be extermely bad politics, and if she might be punished for it by voters if she just allowed the early election to happen instead of handing over power. On the other hand, she could make an argument that the people should get to decide who the next PM was, and if the 2017 election proved anything, it's that voters can defintely surprise you, so she might decide it was worth the risk. --Jfruh (talk) 04:57, 14 July 2017 (UTC)

I should also add that the likely scenario I outline above assumes that Corbyn (or some opposition leader) has assembled a parliamentary majority willing to back his future government in advance of the vote of no confidence, and made that fact publicly known. That would almost certainly put a lot of pressure on May (or whoever was PM) to allow the new parliamentary majority a chance to form a gov't before an election. In a scenario like the 1979 vote of no confidence in the Callaghan ministry, however, where the opposition parties agree on voting the government out but haven't/can't come to an agreement on who should be the new PM, it seems clear that the PM would simply let the parliament dissolve after two weeks and the next election happen. --Jfruh (talk) 05:02, 14 July 2017 (UTC)

Sorry, and one more reply. You say:

I wonder if a new procedure might need to emerge: eg pass a different resolution eg 'this house has confidence in an opposition minority government' which should be sufficient to force government to resign and Queen to invite leader of opposition to attempt to form a government, allow at least 2 weeks if necessary, and prevent PM telling Queen we are still having interesting discussions with other parties until the 14 day period is effectively over.

Such a procedure could not "emerge" without new legislation. Under current law, the only types of meaningful votes are "This house has no confidence in her majesty's government" (which starts the clock ticking to dissolution within 14 days) and "This house has confidence in her majesty's government" (which would stop the ticking clock and reset the next election date to its previous schedule).

Again, in practice, there are probably going to be two types of no-confidence vote scenarios. The first is one where a minor party or faction currently supporting the government defects to the opposition, creating a majority that would support a new government. This doesn't have to be a full coalition and could just be a "confidence and supply" arrangement like the current one between the Tories and the DUP; however, the new government would still need a parliamentary majority to cast a no confidence vote and then a subsequent confidence vote in a new government. In that scenario, it seems extremely likely that after the initial no-confidence vote the PM would voluntarily resign and advise the queen to appoint whoever had the backing of the new parliamentary majority as PM, and that person would then receive a confidence vote from parliament, preventing an early election. It seems to me that the opposition would only attempt this maneuver -- and the sitting government would only accept it and allow for a transition of power -- if they already had a new majority in waiting, so there wouldn't be any trouble beating the 14-day clock. However, again, this hasn't been tested, and the sitting PM might refuse to resign and instead simply let the early election happen. Legally, they could, but it seems like it would be very bad politics.

The second scenario is one where there's a minority government and the opposition can't agree on who should be the new PM but is united in wanting new elections. In that scenario, they would pass a no-confidence vote and just let parliament dissolve. It's possible in that scenario the government or largest opposition might do some chaotic scrambling to try to cobble together a new majority, but it seems more likely that everyone would just launch into the campaign for the new election -- and the sitting government would still run the country in a caretaker capacity until the election results were in. --Jfruh (talk) 05:35, 14 July 2017 (UTC)

The part I am unclear on is suppose DUP got fed up of Tory govt, a no confidence motion is passed, T May tenders govt resignation and monarch invites Corbyn to attempt to form a govt. Suppose DUP fell out with Corbyn over terms so Corbyn attempts and fails to get confidence motion passed. An election has to be held. Who is PM during new election? Independent article seems to think it would be Corbyn. I would have thought that Corbyn govt is only formed on passing of confidence motion which hasn't happened so T May is still PM. Signing of any confidence and supply agreement(s) would only be part of attempts to form a government, so what event makes Corbyn PM if it is not passing of confidence motion? (I could well be being stupid and article is fine as it is.) crandles (talk) 11:22, 14 July 2017 (UTC)

I have to say that I don't particularly agree with the constitutional speculation in the article in the Independent. It would be useful if we can find some more sources. I believe Jfruh's point about it being the sovereign who appoints and dismisses the prime minister is central to all this. General elections and votes in parliament have never been able to, by themselves, change the prime minister and by extension the government. This act does nothing to change that.

Take the example of general elections. A sitting prime minister remains so during a general election, and indeed thereafter, until a replacement is ready to form a government and expected to win a confidence vote. Gordon Brown received criticism in 2010 for remaining in 10 Downing Street as prime minister for several days after the election until a new government had been formed. In fact, he was doing what was constitutionally expected of him. A prime minister is generally expected not to resign until a successor has been found. Harold Wilson announced his resignation in March 1976 but did not cease to be PM until a leadership election had found his successor Jim Callaghan in April. When Callahan's government was brought down by a confidence vote in March 1979 he remained in office as prime minister until the Conservatives won the general election in May. I am not aware of any prime minister resigning immediately their government lost a confidence vote. It is not completely impossible of course, but it would only occur in the unlikely event that the opposition had the parliamentary numbers to immediately replace them.

So in the current example, there would be nothing to make Theresa May resign as prime minister merely because her government lost a confidence vote. Indeed, there is every likelihood that the sovereign would wish her to stay until a replacement is found. If nothing happened for 14 days she would go into an election as PM. If the opposition wished to avoid that eventually it would be up to them to assemble a coalition (or confidence and supply arrangement) with the numerical potential to win a confidence vote. This is the point at which "conventionally" the sitting prime minister would resign – technically any prime minister who refuses to resign risks being dismissed by the sovereign so resignation is rather a formality – and the sovereign would appoint the new PM from the erstwhile opposition. Then the house would have to have the vote of confidence in the new government. It is, I suppose, theoretically possible that this new coalition could disintegrate during the hours between the appointment of a new PM and the vote in the house. In that case, if nobody can come up with another coalition to vote on before the 14 days are up, the election would take place with the new PM in place. Polly Tunnel (talk) 14:49, 14 July 2017 (UTC)

I agree that the Independent is incorrect here. Corbyn would not become PM until May advises the sovereign to appoint him as such, and she would never do that unless he had assembled a clear parliamentary majority.

Using the current parliament membership as an example, there are again two possible realistic scenarios. One is where the DUP gets sick of the Tories and decides to cast its lot in with Labour and the rest. In that case, a deal would've been worked out in advance and would've been made public, so May would have really no politically viable choice but to advise the Queen to appoint Corbyn PM, who would then get a confidence vote that would stop the countdown to an election.

The other scenario is where the DUP decides they're sick of the Tories, but doesn't come to a deal with anybody, so literally no parliamentary majority exists. Under that scenario, everyone would probably immediately launch into their election campaigns, and May would stay on as caretaker PM. Since no alternative capable of winning a confidence vote would exist, there would be no point in her advising the Queen to appoint anybody new as PM until after the election clarified matters.

The total chaos scenario Polly Tunnel outlines above -- May hands over power to a DUP-Labour-Etc. coalition that falls apart in the hours between Corbyn's appointment and the confidence vote in parliament, leading to Corbyn serving as caretaker PM during an election -- is theoretically possible, but would represent catastrophic political mismanagement on the part of the opposition. --Jfruh (talk) 19:31, 14 July 2017 (UTC)

Date of next election after 2017

Article says that the next general election after 2017 will be scheduled for 2021 - this doesn't seem to fit with the Act. Explanatory Notes to Act says this (my bolding); "Subsection (4) provides that where an early general election takes place under section 2 of the Act, the next general election will generally take place on the first Thursday in May in the fifth year from the date of the last election. However, if the early election is held before the first Thursday in May in an election year, the next general election will be held on the first Thursday in May in the fourth year from the previous election. The effect being when an early general election is held, the election day of the first Thursday in May is restored at the next election, and the duration of the Parliament resulting from the early election will normally be no more than five years in length."

The 2017 GE is not being held before the first Thursday in May, so I read this as saying that the next one will be on the first Thursday in May, 2022 and the 2017 Parliament will run just short of five years. --Bcp67 (talk) 10:21, 25 April 2017 (UTC)

The edit history of this page reveals that original text which was added on 20 April said:

As the Act requires scheduled elections to take place on the first Thursday in May, the date of the next election after 2017 (assuming no earlier election is called) will be 5 May 2022, meaning that the term is one month short of five years.

The text was modified to the current form on 24 April. Both of these edits were by unregistered users. I'd agree that the current form seems erroneous. Media sources are quoting 2022; for example the BBC here and the Independent here. Unless anyone else has any information to the contrary, I would support reverting to the earlier text. Polly Tunnel (talk) 13:11, 25 April 2017 (UTC)

Next general election is 5 May 2022. The text in the Act says that the fixed-term drops to four years only if an early election is called before the first Thursday in May in a given year. So for example, if the 2017 general election had taken place anytime between Sunday 1 January 2017 and Wednesday 3 May 2017, then the next general election under the Fixed-term Parliaments Act would have been Thursday 6 May 2021 (to ensure no parliament exceeds its five-year term). As the 2017 general election happened after the first Thursday in May of 2017, the next election will be Thursday 5 May 2022.

Furthermore, it is now precedent that general elections cannot take place at the same time as elections to the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly, both of which are currently scheduled for 6 May 2021. (Ironically, these were originally scheduled for 7 May 2020 and were moved back a year because of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act setting this as the date of the next general election after 2015). — Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.18.232.37 (talk) 06:13, 17 August 2017 (UTC)

Prorogation vs dissolution

There have been a couple recent edits like this one changing the article to say that the Fixed-Term Parlimanent act does not actually remove royal prerogative to dissolve parliament. The source cited is section 6(1) one of the Act, which provides that "This Act does not affect Her Majesty’s power to prorogue Parliament."

This misunderstands the difference between the proroguing parliament, which ends a parliamentary session and sends parliament into a recess, and dissolving it, which terminates the mandates of elected MPs and starts a timetable for new elections. For more info, see Legislative_session. The Queen (in practice always under binding advice from the PM) can prorogue parliament but, unless there's some other clause of the Act I'm not aware of, cannot dissolve it absent the other conditions laid out by the act.

Please let me know if I'm misunderstanding the situation, of course, but since this has happened a couple times I thought I would lay out my reasoning for reverting these edits here. --Jfruh (talk) 00:15, 17 October 2017 (UTC)

I think you're right Jfruh. I've added a wikilink to Dissolution of the Parliament of the United Kingdom and a citation of Lord Norton of Louth's belief that "the Queen has now no prerogative power of dissolution". Do you think it's worth adding a statement along the lines of "The royal prerogative to prorogue parliament is not affected by the Act" to try and stop these confusing edits? - Polly Tunnel (talk) 13:01, 30 October 2017 (UTC)

Seems worthwhile to me! --Jfruh (talk) 14:59, 30 October 2017 (UTC)

 Done - Polly Tunnel (talk) 15:27, 3 November 2017 (UTC)

What is the point of this act?

Before this act, prime ministers could call a snap election at any time.

Now, they can call a snap election at any time, provided their party supports them (or more precisely, as long as half the parliament supports them).

Is this ever going to matter in practice? A PM is not going to call a snap election unless they are convinced they will win it. I suppose some MPs might disagree, but you would expect this to happen in an environment where the ruling party is feeling pretty upbeat about their chances as a whole (not just the PM).

As I understood it at the time, this act was introduced to do away with strategic snap elections completely. In this regard, the act seems to be an utter failure.

I appreciate that Wikipedia is not a forum, but some readers may wonder the same thing, so I think this should be addressed in the article. KarlFrei (talk) 15:07, 15 November 2018 (UTC)

Well, to be more precise, either half of parliament has to cast a vote of no confidence or two-thirds has to vote for an early election. I imagine the thought was that a PM wouldn't engineer a vote of no-confidence in themselves just to have an early election, because that would be politically embarrassing. You're literally going on the record as saying you don't have confidence in yourself, after all. So I don't know if it's really quite true to say that they can call a snap election with the support of half of parliament.

On the other hand, as 2017 showed, if the government calls for an early election it's politically difficult for the opposition to not go along with the idea, because doing so would make them look weak. Isn't the rhetoric of the opposition party always that they want the government voted out as soon as possible? Are they ever going to say no to being given the opportunity? --Jfruh (talk) 21:02, 15 November 2018 (UTC)

The idea that the Act has not achieved the objectives set for it is interesting, but it's hard to find reliable sources expressing that view. A lot of journalism on the subject seems to be little more than speculation. Around the time of the 2015 general election a blog piece published by the LSE (Why the Fixed-term Parliaments Act should not be repealed) discussed backbench calls for the act's repeal in the context of short-term parliamentary advantage. Shorty before the 2017 general election, a FT opinion piece (The Fixed-term Parliaments Act has failed) said that "a prime minister with a good majority in the House of Commons can still call a snap election, with the only objective of making that majority bigger". Such a view doesn't seem to have been repeated much since the election, and comparatively little seems to have been written on the subject after that. The parliamentary committee review required by the act in 2020 will hopefully produce a more useful assessment of it. In the meantime I'd be interested to know if anyone has found any other sources about the act's effectiveness. - Polly Tunnel (talk) 11:33, 16 November 2018 (UTC)

Wait, doesn't the FT piece exactly support my view? Unfortunately I cannot read it (for free). Of course, it is only an opinion piece... I am not surprised this view has not been repeated after the election, given how that worked out :-) KarlFrei (talk) 13:58, 16 November 2018 (UTC)

OK, I understand. I did not realize that what happened in 2017 was not a vote of no confidence. But it still seems to me that the Act was a complete failure if the goal was to stop strategic snap elections. The option of calling an early election for no particular reason, even with two thirds of parliament, should not be available to the PM at all in my view. If the PM wants early elections, let them resign.

It would be interesting to know why this option was put into the law. Now this is nothing but idle speculation, but I wonder if whoever came up with this idea put it in specifically to undermine the whole act from the beginning. They might have gamed it out in advance and realized the opposition would never be in a position to say no to a public offer of new elections. So everything continues as before... It is funny that the article actually describes Cameron's government saying that they can't call a snap election anyway, immediately followed by May doing just that. The article currently does not really comment on this apparent contradiction.

Anyway, is any motivation for having this option in the act publically known? Was this part of the debate at the time? KarlFrei (talk) 13:54, 16 November 2018 (UTC)

As far as I remember there was no public discussion of the options available when the bill was written. As the LSE piece points out: "some countries, such as Norway, simply do not allow early elections at all". However, the LSE piece also says that "this change moves the UK considerably closer to the practices and norms that predominate in most European countries concerning parliamentary dissolution". I believe that may have been one of the motivations for the legislation. As regards snap elections, there had been some discussion during the 1980s–2010s concerning whether it was appropriate for a prime minister to call an election on a date of their choosing after around four years of a parliament had elapsed, with the legislative programme largely complete and their party popular in the polls. Such a practice took place under both Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair. If I remember correctly, Thatcher was criticised by opposition leader Neil Kinnock for choosing to "cut and run" when she called the 1987 election. This may also have been a motivation behind the legislation. Such a step would now typically require opposition approval, and it is untested as to whether it would be forthcoming in those circumstances. 2017 was a different type of snap election, more akin to the November 1974 election. Both were called comparatively early on during a parliament in order to gain a majority capable of completing the legislative programme. A comment I read at the time of the 2017 election (I cannot remember the source) made the point that it was unclear whether 2017 violated the intention behind the act, or whether Brexit provided the sort of special circumstances that the two-thirds rule was included to allow. - Polly Tunnel (talk) 11:26, 19 November 2018 (UTC)

Separate point - Possibly the intention (from minority LibDems under Con) was that if a coalition govt fell, there was chance for the minority parties to realign for remainder of Parliament, without a quickly triggered election. --Lessogg (talk) 16:00, 19 November 2018 (UTC)

Context and Why tags

CapnZapp I have added brief paragraph on why change was made supported by a bbc Q&A ref. Perhaps that could do with expanding (and maybe having own heading?) before removing the why tag. Don't really understand need for context tag, the background section seems to cover it to me. Perhaps also add main political parties views on the subject from the who wants fixed terms question in the Q & A article? crandles (talk) 18:50, 4 May 2019 (UTC)

Done and why tag removed by CapnZapp. Do we need the context tag? — Preceding unsigned comment added by C-randles (talk • contribs)

I added the general context tag after looking at the very many question marks raised by this very talk page. The "why tag", {{missing information}}, I added because I specifically wanted a section detailing the background leading up to the Act. (This tag is removed since such a section now exists). As for {{context}}, I'd personally rather await neutral editors (not you and me or other major contributors) and let them decide whether to keep it or not. Cheers, CapnZapp (talk) 14:40, 5 May 2019 (UTC)

Structure of Article

The 'no-confidence motions', 'Early election motions' and 'other effects' section have become a mess, currently include repetition, and it isn't clear why this structure is like this. It would seem more logical to divide the subject matter into headings more along the lines of 'Uses of the Act', 'Contemplated uses of the Act', and 'Other effects of the Act'. Is that appropriate or any better structure? crandles (talk) 11:14, 5 May 2019 (UTC)

mess .. repetition .. isn't clear Agree. CapnZapp (talk) 14:41, 5 May 2019 (UTC)

"Uses" of the Act

Now there's a "Uses of the Act" section. Only wrinkle - the section can only be about using the exceptions to the act. I mean, every time the Act is "used" as intended, that means... no action is taken for five years, and there will be no entry in this section. Could we find another name? CapnZapp (talk) 06:43, 7 May 2019 (UTC)

You may be right, but I am not sure. The Act sets out the timetable not only for the election date but also things like parliament rising 25 days before election. Is following that timetable a 'use' of the Act? Perhaps it is more 'implementation of Acts requirements'. That seems a mouthful of a title, but if there is something better or that is required to be strictly accurate, then I don't have a problem with it being changed. Not sure I see a big difference and prefer a simple title to make clear the structure of the material to follow, but if it is considered inaccurate then feel free to suggest or implement an alternative. crandles (talk) 09:52, 7 May 2019 (UTC)

 Note: - split discussion out into own section CapnZapp (talk) 13:38, 10 May 2019 (UTC)

My point: the Act is (colloquially speaking) meant to make Parliaments last five years and/or stop the PM from calling "snap elections". It would then stand to reason that when the Act is used to do exactly what it was meant to stop we shouldn't be calling that "using" the Act. A "use" of the Act would be to have a 5-year period between elections. What is currently characterized as "using" the Act is really invoking its exceptions. Do you see my point? I'm not saying there is any inaccuracy - I'm saying that our choice of words comes across as bureaucratic and narrow rather than intuitive. CapnZapp (talk) 13:44, 10 May 2019 (UTC)

This seems to me to be playing with words: Is the Act meant to "make Parliaments last five years and/or stop the PM from calling 'snap elections' ", or is it meant to 'define when general elections take place'? The latter seems more in line with what the Act actually does and an election which follows the Act's timetables seems to me to be a natural/intuitive 'use of the Act'. I am not completely sure that I am right here and I would welcome other opinions and/or suggestions. crandles (talk) 18:32, 10 May 2019 (UTC)

I agree with crandles. Much confusion arises from the name of the Act, which does not describe its contents particularly well. The long title is better, calling it: "An Act to make provision about the dissolution of Parliament and the determination of polling days".

We need to be clear about the distinction between the Act itself and the diverse motivations of the various actors involved in its introduction. Like most articles on Acts of Parliament, this article originally focussed on the Act simply as a piece of functioning legislation. The questions raised on this talk page indicate that readers are also interested in (i) How the Act would function in various hypothetical situations, and (ii) Why it was introduced. It's hard for the article itself to answer the former, but there is some scope for the latter and we've seen expansion in that area. But we do need to bear in mind that the function of the Act is a separate issue from the motivations of legislators. Sometimes courts may take the latter into account, but this Act has never been tested in court.

In terms of the word uses, I do not find it to be a problem here. Both the 2015 and 2017 elections are listed as uses of the Act. Neither is an exception to the Act – an exception to an Act would typically be an amendment in a separate piece of legislation. Section 2 of the Act simply provides for "Early parliamentary general elections" within the scope of the Act.

Polly Tunnel (talk) 12:49, 13 May 2019 (UTC)

Okay. Then we should probably avoid calling them "exceptions" as in here: Under the provisions of the Act, parliamentary general elections must (with certain exceptions) be held the first Thursday in May of the fifth year after the previous general election, beginning in 2015. and here: The two most important exceptions are that a vote of no confidence in the government, or a vote of two-thirds of the House of Commons, can still trigger a general election at any time. Why? Because what you're saying is that we should take the view that "using" either is a fully intentional path to take that should be given equal weight to the "path" that keeps Parliament running for the full five years.

Also we should probably avoid phrasing things like the section on "Main parties views on fixed terms" as if this act accomplishes this. (Just because the politicians like to delude themselves doesn't mean we have to) We can still discuss what parties think about things, including fixed terms. We should probably distance our article from the unspoken implication that this act accomplished anything they were thinking about, though. In particular the way we lead with ...introducing fixed-term elections to the Westminster parliament for the first time. What you have said tells me this is what the politicians want us to say, not what they themselves realize the Act is for! In other words, I fully agree "We need to be clear about the distinction between the Act itself and the diverse motivations of the various actors involved", and not let the name "speak for itself". Our readers should not need to delve deep into the article to understand that, in fact, there is nothing about this act that ensures fixed terms. Remember the definition: "A fixed-term election is an election that occurs on a set date, and cannot be changed by a majority of incumbent politicians." (my emphasis, quote taken directly from our own page!)

My point: we aren't legislators, our priority should not be legalese. I don't intend to get bogged down into an introvert discussion about how we use a particular word. Let us lift the gaze - our priority is to our readers. We should obviously stick to facts, but we do not need to present them in a way that perpetuates the fantasy that the name of this Act suggests. The article certainly started out this way. Thank you for listening. CapnZapp (talk) 08:14, 14 May 2019 (UTC)

Attempted a removal of the 'exceptions' terminology, feel free to improve. Re Fixed-term election page, that seems to have a clear contradiction problem - added discussion of this at Talk:Fixed-term_election#Contradiction. crandles (talk) 15:24, 19 May 2019 (UTC)

Note: my problem isn't the "contradiction". We can't forbid politicians from using misleading terms. My problem is if our article doesn't make the incongruity between name and content sufficiently clear. CapnZapp (talk) 14:28, 21 May 2019 (UTC)

Recent edits

While I generally agree with your edits, User:Polly Tunnel, allow me to make a few comments:

1. The previous system could result in a period of political uncertainty if an early election was widely anticipated Please clarify we're talking about a period before the early election is announced (or not announced).
2. Early elections have an additional cost to the treasury associated with them, and they may not always resolve the situation that has led to them I feel it's not sufficiently clear we're basically saying "more elections cost more". Also, I'm unsure of the logic of the second part - isn't the risk of ordinary elections not resolving "the situation" exactly as high or low as that of early elections? Was a nuance lost there somewhere?

Finally, you removed "constitutional speculation". Let me just remind you that it was you who edited the section. That is, as I said I'm not directly objecting to your removal of the section, but I am questioning your two-stage process for doing so, since that basically means you evaded having to supply a rationale for doing just that in your edit summaries. Could I ask you for an edit summary (=a reply here, not an actual edit summary) as if you removed the entire section starting with "The anti self interest to change problem..." in one go, allowing us to assess your criteria for doing so? Thank you CapnZapp (talk) 09:19, 19 June 2019 (UTC)

Thanks for your comments CapnZapp. I had hoped someone else might try and improve this section, but after waiting a while I thought I'd better give it a go myself. As to your questions: with regard to your Q1 and Q2 you're completely right. In attempting to précis the original text (which I felt was over-written) I'd lost those two points. I'll try and expand them as you suggest – let me know if there are any problems with what I add.

Your third question regarded my removal of the original #4 piece in the section. I did not actually intend to remove it in its entirity, but rather to précis it as I had done with the previous three. I moved the first part further down the article and re-wrote it (for the reasons I gave in the edit summary) and this resulted in markup which seemed sufficiently complex for one edit. Hence I used a another edit when I went on to précis the second part, and discovered that it also had sufficient problems that I didn't think it should remain in place (and gave the reasons for that in the separate edit summary). I'd hoped that these two summaries would add up to a rationale for the whole piece's removal.

I don't believe that in principle there should be no content in this section concerning coalitions. I think there have been some who – possibly rather cynically – have suggested that making coalition government more common was a Lib Dem motive for the legislation, though I have no sources for this. However, the text I've removed was effectively unsourced (the sources cited didn't confirm the content) and the text speculated about what might happen in a coalition government in a way that's contrary to WP:CRYSTAL.

Incidentally, I proposed a new first paragraph for Fixed-term election at Talk:Fixed-term election#Contradiction – did you have any thoughts on that?

-- Polly Tunnel (talk) 10:56, 19 June 2019 (UTC)

setting a date

In either of these two cases, the Monarch (on the recommendation of the prime minister) appoints the date of the new election by proclamation. Parliament is then dissolved 25 working days before that date.

That's what our article states. But is there no directives re: choosing that date? In essence: could a PM say "okay so we must have a GE. I suggest Monday three years from now, Your Majesty." CapnZapp (talk) 09:17, 4 September 2019 (UTC)

There's some more detail about the procedure in this Institute for Government piece: The prime minister's powers over the date of an early election. - Polly Tunnel (talk) 11:28, 5 September 2019 (UTC)

Thank you, Polly! I leave it up to you (and others) to decide if this is sufficiently notable to be included in our article. CapnZapp (talk) 11:44, 5 September 2019 (UTC)

As a personal reflection, I note the piece was updated only yesterday. I wonder if this bit was among the additions...

Second, if they were worried about the prime minister changing his mind or breaking his promise, then they could instead try to bind him to a particular date with legislation.

;-) CapnZapp (talk) 11:49, 5 September 2019 (UTC)