Talk:Epistemology/Archive 7

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The History section

It is not true that it is widely accepted that knowledge was always considered as justified true belief. Until after Locke, knowledge was not considered a form of belief. In particular, scientific knowledge has an important know-how aspect that cannot be separated from it. It's not a belief. We can believe in science, but that something else. Science has nothing to do with beliefs. It's not something studied in the justified true belief approach. It's fine to have a part of the history that covers knowledge that comes with a skill or a technology that cannot be separated from it, just as is the case with scientific knowledge. I restored this content, because it can a part of that early history. However, we need another part of the History section that focuses on how the justified true belief approach came along. Dominic Mayers (talk) 02:57, 17 May 2023 (UTC)

Here are some sources that I intend to use to continue my edit of the Historical Context section.

• Moss 2021 : This source presents the view that Plato's epistemology is not really todays' epistemology. Two aspects are important. First, his epistemological project is driven by metaphysical and ethical views: views about what there is, and how one should live. Second, his notion of episteme and doxa cannot be interpreted as the modern notions of knowledge and belief, respectively, even if there is plenty of disagreement among contemporary epistemologists about the meaning of these terms. The source explains that, indeed, a lot of statements in Plato's dialogues about episteme and doxa "align naturally with contemporary epistemology's knowledge and belief." But the source adds that "quite a number of Plato’s epistemological views are so hard to construe as views about knowledge and belief that one might reasonably wonder if the effort is worthwhile."
• Parry 2021 : This sources discusses the close relationship between episteme and techne in ancient Greek, even in Plato's dialogues such as the Theaetetus. It says : "The relation, then, between epistêmê and technê in ancient philosophy offers an interesting contrast with our own notions about theory (pure knowledge) and (experience-based) practice [in which theory is seen opposed to practice]. There is an intimate positive relationship between epistêmê and technê." It says also : "There is a second feature of technê that is vital for understanding its importance to Plato. In the Gorgias, technê is distinguished from empeiria not only by its ability to give an account but also because it seeks the welfare of its object. [...] Indeed, most accounts of knowledge in the dialogues are carried out in the context of such discussions. Even in the Theaetetus, the dialogue most often thought of as dedicated to epistemology, we find the same theme. When he argues against Protagoras’ relativism, Socrates gets the sophist to concede that some people are wiser than others when it comes to what is good for the city (167c–d)." The next passage is particularly significant, because it makes the connection between the highly abstract notion of Forms and the practical notion of techne, both strongly associated with episteme : "Plato — whose theory of forms seems an arch example of pure theoretical knowledge — nevertheless is fascinated by the idea of a kind of technê that is informed by knowledge of forms. In the Republic this knowledge is the indispensable basis for the philosophers’ craft of ruling in the city."
• Pavese 2022 : This source makes many useful points. It says, citing Bogaard, that knowledge can have practical abilities as justifying ground. It cites (Cath 2015b) to say that we should distinguish practical propositional knowledge from other kinds of propositional knowledge. It says that knowledge-how is different from propositional knowledge, because it does not entail belief. It also mentions that Plato and Aristotle considered techne to be a kind of knowledge.
• Hornsby 2012 : This source is about the important view of Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976) on knowing how as included in (relevant) knowing that. It says "Ryle thought that the possession of knowledge—whether it belongs under the head of knowledge-that or of knowledge-how—was “a mark of intelligence.” [...] In his view, both knowledge-how and knowledge-that are connected with abilities of certain sorts, as indeed are knowledge of a language or a tune or knowledge of syntax."
• Fine 2003 : This source presents a view on Plato's knowledge and Forms that rejects that episteme (knowledge) is of a different nature than doxa (belief). It is based on the fact that Plato wrote knowledge is a true belief grounded with an account. All other sources acknowledge that. For example, this is one of the statements mentionned in (Moss 2021) (see above) that align well with the modern notion of knowledge and belief. The difference with the other sources is that the "account" is an understanding, which changes the nature of the cognition. All sources agree that Plato acknowledges that we can start with a true doxa and reach episteme, but they do not conclude that episteme is a kind of doxa. Plato is so clear in so many ways that it is not. It is as if I explained that seeing a real tiger is like when we dream of a tiger, except that the tiger is real and the external senses are involved. (In this analogy, the real tiger and the real sensory process is like the account.) That does not mean the real cognition of a tiger includes a dream.
• Hintikka 1993  : First, it should be noticed that, in accordance with (Stalnaker 2009), Hintikka founded Epistemic logic in 1962, which has in some way almost the same subject as the Justified True Belief analysis of knowledge. (Hintikka 1993) says "One special use of the wh-constructions may be worth mentioning. Knowing how is used both (a) for knowing how something is done and (b) for knowing that and being able to apply to that knowledge in practice ('know-how'). The latter sense is sometimes thought to be sui generis. In reality, the corresponding sense of applied knowledge occurs in all the wh-constructions (ii) as well, as a survey of ordinary usage easily shows."
• Hintikka 1974 : The previous sources emphasized the techne, know-how and virtue aspects of knowledge. However, Plato also explained the nature of knowledge in terms of the abstract concept of Forms. This source and the next sources are about the nature of knowledge and belief in terms of Forms and sensible appearances, respectively. The last passage from Parry 2021 mentioned above explains that for Plato these were not disconnected aspects. The following quote focalizes on Plato's conclusions acknowledged (but not necessarily endorsed) by Hintikka, not on Hintikka's critical analysis of the argument

  Those 'functions' or 'ends' of the 'faculties' of knowledge and belief which serve, e.g., to distinguish each faculty from the others and which are somehow analogous to the products of a craftsman's skill were for Plato not just cognitive states in this or that man but sometimes tended to comprise also those objects which one's knowledge or opinion is about.
  [...]
  The objects of knowledge and belief are different [...] By connecting the conclusion (6) of the above argument with suitable assumptions concerning knowledge, truth, and time, Plato argues further that the different objects mentioned in (6) are the Forms and the objects of the senses, respectively.

  — Jaakko Hintikka (Hintikka 1974)

• White 2010 : This source says "This same line of thought seemingly makes Plato suggest that it is possible to have knowledge only about Forms, and that knowledge about sensible objects is impossible (Rep. 477–80, Tim. 51). Moreover he also seems to hold sometimes that we cannot have about Forms that kind of cognition, belief or opinion, that we do have of sensibles (ibid.). On the other hand, he allows that it is possible to make mistakes about Forms, and also to be in a cognitive state vis-à-vis a Form that seems indistinguishable from what he seems obliged to call false belief or opinion."
• Smith 2012 : This source says : "Plato distinguishes his cognitive capacities by an appeal to two criteria: to what the capacity is naturally related and what the capacity produces (eph’ hō te esti kai hō apergazetai – 477d1). Let us call these two conditions ‘the relata condition’ and ‘the production condition’, respectively. As I have already said, the bearer of the relata condition, for knowledge, is the Forms: the knower’s knowledge is related to Forms, whereas the believer’s belief is related to sensible particular things."
• Antognazza 2015 : This source says : "This strand of thought is characterized by key distinctions between the intelligible and the sensible, reality and appearance, knowledge and belief. In short, one of the main thrusts of Platonism (at least as historically interpreted) is the intuition that knowledge and belief are different in kind, distinguished by two different powers or faculties.21 The power of knowing is the power to apprehend or ‘see’ the Forms, or what really is; the power of opining is the power to judge (rightly or wrongly) of appearances. Like the freed prisoner of the Cave, we can only achieve knowledge by turning away from doxa and appearances."

Sources that do not correspond to background

I will continue to look for sources that provide a background, in particular, for sources that explicitly provide different arguments and that ideally respond

References

• Ayers, Michael; Antognazza, Maria Rosa (2019-04-18). "Knowledge and Belief from Plato to Locke". In Ayers, Michael (ed.). Knowing and Seeing: Groundwork for a new empiricism (1 ed.). Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198833567.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-883356-7.
• Parry, Richard (2021). "Episteme and Techne". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 ed.).
• Pavese, Carlotta (2022). "Knowledge How". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2022 ed.).
• Cath, Yuri (2015b). "Revisionary intellectualism and Gettier". Philosophical Studies. 172 (1): 7–27. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0263-y. ISSN 0031-8116.
• Hornsby, Jennifer (2012-01-06). "Ryle's Knowing-How, and Knowing How to Act". In Bengson, John; Moffett, Marc A. (eds.). Knowing How : Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389364.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-538936-4.
• Moss, Jessica (2021-01-11). Plato's Epistemology: Being and Seeming (1 ed.). Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198867401.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-886740-1.
• Fine, Gail (2003). Plato on Knowledge and Forms: Selected Essays. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Hintikka, Jaakko (1974). Knowledge and the Known. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. doi:10.1007/978-94-010-2217-0. ISBN 978-94-010-2219-4.
• Hintikka, Jaakko (1993). "Different Constructions in Terms of 'Knows'". In Dancy, Jonathan; Sosa, Ernest (eds.). A Companion to Epistemology. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. doi:10.1111/b.9780631192589.1993.00001.x. ISBN 978-0-631-19258-9.
• Stalnaker, Robert (2009). "Lecture notes 17: Epistemic Logic" (PDF).
• White, Nicholas P. (2010-01-15) [1993]. "Plato". In Dancy, Jonathan; Sosa, Ernest; Steup, Matthias (eds.). A Companion to Epistemology (2 ed.). Wiley. doi:10.1002/9781444315080. ISBN 978-1-4051-3900-7.
• Smith, Nicholas D. (2012). "Plato's Epistemology". In Hetherington, Stephen (ed.). Epistemology: The Key Thinkers (1 ed.). New York: Continuum. ISBN 978-1-4411-1783-0.
• Antognazza, Maria Rosa (2015-01-02). "The Benefit to Philosophy of the Study of Its History". British Journal for the History of Philosophy. 23 (1): 161–184. doi:10.1080/09608788.2014.974020. ISSN 0960-8788.

Further reading

• Musgrave, Alan (1993). Common Sense, Science and Scepticism : A Historical Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521436250.
• Sankey, Howard (2013-07-24). "The Scientific Method". In Curd, Martin; Psillos, Stathis (eds.). The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203744857. ISBN 978-1-135-01109-3.

Request of quotation

@Phlsph7: the section The value problem is something in progress. I believe a lot more attributions are needed, because clearly there are many points of view related to values in epistemology. It's vast. The readers need to know which one is being presented. It should not be a kind of local POV fork within the article, if I am allowed to extend the meaning of POV fork in this manner to new sections within an article. It seems to me that the section is there to place the subsection Virtue epistemology in context. It's really about Virtue epistemology that the entire section is about. I am not saying that I defend this, but I am not against this either. I only explain what the section seems to be about as far as I can tell. The field of enquiry Virtue epistemology as covered in that section is clearly not about Virtue in epistemology in general. For example, for the Stoics, virtue was essentially the highest level of techne, at the level of episteme, a level that only wise men had achieved. Someone with virtue had the automatic skill of always doing the right action. This view is not covered at all in that section.

The view that is covered in that section is an extension of the JTB analysis of knowledge and a corresponding extension of the Gettier problem. They call it "Virtue epistemology". Personally, I find this title a bit misleading given that it has not much to do with the usual concept of moral virtue. If you read the section, you will easily see that the overall pattern is simple. They consider different definitions of knowledge in terms of possible components and compare it with what one should expect from knowledge. I know that it can be confusing, because if we define, say, knowledge as justified true belief, then on what basis can we analyse this and conclude that something is missing. That is what Gettier did and the whole field of recent epistemology, at the least in a large academic circle, turned around that. Some denied that Gettier was into something useful and defended the position that even simply true belief was a valid definition of knowledge. This is what this passage in the section is about :

For Zagzebski, the value of knowledge deflates to the value of mere true belief. She assumes that reliability in itself has no value or disvalue, but Goldman and Olsson disagree. They point out that Zagzebski's conclusion rests on the assumption of veritism: all that matters is the acquisition of true belief. To the contrary, they argue that a reliable process for acquiring a true belief adds value to the mere true belief by making it more likely that future beliefs of a similar kind will be true.

A general pattern was noticed by Kvanvig and also to some degree by Williamson and perhaps others. First, one needs to better understand the Gettier problem. The Gettier problem is that if knowledge is not fundamentally connected to truth, but only connected to truth by luck, fortuitousness, etc., then it does not seem a satisfactory notion of knowledge. Most academics agreed on that and that is why the Gettier problem became so important. The pattern described in chapter 5 of Kvanvig's book The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding is the following. It seems that to address the Gettier problem one needs to assume some kind of power to get to the truth reliably so that we remove at the least some of the luck or fortuitousness associated with the environment, but this is at the expense of a practical definition of knowledge. Kvanvig refers to this as a "tension between the desiderata of the nature and value of knowledge".

Anyway, it seems to me that the sentence that you worry about "In its most general form, the value problem is to justify any particular notion of knowledge considering its possible components such as belief, truth, justification, safety, sensitivity, statistical likelihood, and anti-Gettier conditions" is a simple introduction to that field of inquiry. It is a simplification of sentences that were there before I started to edit the section. So, I am not sure where I can find a statement that would list all these possible components, but in my lectures of sources I met all of them in a context perfectly compatible with that sentence. In fact, these components are all mentioned in the Pritchard & Turri reference (which is already provided) in a manner that is compatible with that sentence. I don't find this list particularly problematic. This being said, I do not think the template {{Request quotation}} was the appropriate one to use here. This template is to be used in cases where the sources is not easily available or is in a different language than English. Otherwise, there is no justification to request a quotation from the source. Maybe you simply wanted a reference to verify this particular statement. But this statement is an introduction to the entire field and seems to me reasonably easy to verify. Dominic Mayers (talk) 21:58, 15 June 2023 (UTC)

"Someone with virtue had the automatic skill of always doing the right action." In English, that is called infallibility. Dimadick (talk) 22:25, 15 June 2023 (UTC)

I share your concerns about making the value problem exclusively about virtue epistemology. Regarding the "Quotation needed" tag: it seems that the first part of the sentence in question (In its most general form, the value problem is to justify any particular notion of knowledge considering its possible components) is not supported and is probably false. Maybe a better template would be "Verification failed". Or is there a passage that supports this wide-sweeping claim? If not, it might be better to remove it. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:10, 16 June 2023 (UTC)

It is just a name given to a field of research. The sentence is not "false" in the sense that the problem of "justifying any particular notion of knowledge considering its possible components" is indeed a central preoccupation for many recent philosophers and it defines a field of research. My understanding is that "value" is used to refer to whatever is missing in justified true belief or any other combinaison of components so that it corresponds to knowledge. The "value problem" is therefore the problem created by that missing part. The central thesis of Kvanvig in the source given is that there is an opposition in a solution to the value problem and the goal of having a practical definition of knowledge, what he might have called the "nature problem" : he says there is a tension between the "value" and the "nature" of knowledge. "Value" versus "nature" are his terminology, not mine. It might be false in the sense that the name "value problem" means something else for many people. I did not choose that name nor did I choose the scope of that section, but I see that it does correspond to a central preoccupation in some books and papers. I don't have a better name than "value problem" at this time, but that is because I don't care about names. If you can help by providing another name and sources to verify it, please do. For the time being, I will stick with that name for a lack of a better name. Besides, I am considering the possibility to have the entire section disappears and make its content a part of the core of the article and may be there will be no need to find a name for that central preoccupation. My concerns are not at all at the level of names. The important is that view points are attributed. Of course, when we do not attribute a view point, a false generalization is created as if that view point was universal. I already said that this section requires better attributions. In fact, my most important concern is that the entire article requires better attributions. If we move the content of that section in the core of the article with attributions, I think your concerns will be addressed. Dominic Mayers (talk) 10:32, 16 June 2023 (UTC)

Note added: I just looked a bit at the terminology "value problem". I found this quote in the section Secondary Value Problem of the Epistemic Value entry of The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy :

We seem to prefer having knowledge over having any proper subset of the parts of knowledge. But why should that be the case?

— Patrick Bondy, Epistemic Value in IEP

It's called the Secondary Value Problem, but it is clearly a generalization of the primary value problem described as follows in the same IEP article

We tend to prefer to have knowledge over mere true belief. The “Primary Value Problem” is the problem of explaining why that should be the case.

— Patrick Bondy, Epistemic Value in IEP

The same article suggests a third value problem, which is only that the extra value of knowledge would be of a special kind, but the article says that it was dismissed as being also a particular case of the secondary value problem. Anyway, perhaps some more details and attributions could be added to clarify the sentence, but I always acknowledged that. It's work in progress. I only wrote that sentence to simplify a long, complicated and hard to follow explanation of the value problem, which was previously given. Dominic Mayers (talk) 16:05, 16 June 2023 (UTC)

Thanks for adding the quotation. However, I don't see how it supports the sentence. It only lists different subtypes of value problems. Are you sure this is not WP:SYNTH?

The problem of the value of knowledge is an important topic in epistemology. So removing the section as a whole may not be a good idea. The term "value problem" is common.

Your understanding that ""value" is used to refer to whatever is missing in justified true belief or any other combinaison of components so that it corresponds to knowledge" is not how the term is generally used. Depending on one's theory of knowledge and the situation, some knowledge states may have no value or even a negative value. It seems you mistake "value" for "warrant": The property, whatever it is, that, if added to true belief converts it into knowledge, we may refer to as ‘warrant’. Maybe this misunderstanding is responsible for our disagreement. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:33, 16 June 2023 (UTC) Phlsph7 (talk) 17:33, 16 June 2023 (UTC)

I returned the section to what it was before. It is just that I am not convinced this discussion is going to work. Dominic Mayers (talk) 22:35, 16 June 2023 (UTC)

First of all, I must concede that I did not clearly describe the value problem, because I did not understand the expression "to account for" that was used to describe it. Two statements of the value problem found in sources are "how to account for the distinctive value of knowledge" and "how to account for the intuition that knowledge is more epistemically valuable than ...". The first statement is from Chapter 1 by Pritchard in The Nature and Value of Knowledge : Three Investigations. The chapter confirms, as it felt to me, that what you described as only three cases of the value problem are in facts ways to describe important aspects of the general and unique value problem. For example, we must at the least say why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief, which is the primary value problem. My statement the value problem is to justify any particular notion of knowledge considering its possible components was not so far away in the following sense that it contains the idea that you must understand the gap between any subpart of knowledge and knowledge. I was discouraged by the fact that you asked to consider that I was doing WP:SYNTH by combining the three problems into one. By itself combining the three into one was perfectly fine and was not at all WP:SYNTH. This made me feel very bad. But, now that I understand it, the simpler statement "how to account for the distinctive value of knowledge" seems better. The idea is that if we can account for the distinctive value of knowledge, then may be we could find a better analysis of knowledge in components that do not have the Gettier problem. The paper of Kvanvig, especially chapter 5, suggests that it is not possible, because of a generalization of the Gettier problem. Dominic Mayers (talk) 03:47, 17 June 2023 (UTC)

Thanks for the self-revert. I restored a part of your text that did not seem controversial. Feel free to remove it again if you are not happy with it. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:38, 17 June 2023 (UTC)

I cannot work in these conditions. You need to take another approach. My sentence the value problem is to justify any particular notion of knowledge considering its possible components was far from being bad. It captures the idea that we want to account for the value of what Klein 1998 calls warrant, but relative to any combinaison of components such as true belief, justified true belief, reliable true belief or other definitions that seemingly fall short from knowledge. In simpler terms, we want to account for the distinctive value of knowledge relative to any of its subparts or other definitions that fall short from knowledge. Asking whether I was doing WP:SYNTH was rude. You can ask references and even ask for quotes if you have difficulty to find the source or quotes translated in English when the source is in a different language. Then you must read the sources and discuss them, but you should not suggest that an editor is doing WP:SYNTH when you actually don't know. This was rude. Wikipedia is a collaborative environment, not an environment where some people are there to doubt and be suspicious of others. If your goal is that I stop working on this article you simply have to show no appreciation of what I am trying to explain to you here and you will have succeeded. Dominic Mayers (talk) 11:56, 17 June 2023 (UTC)

I appreciate the contributions you have made to the article so far, for example, by reworking many of the references. It is not my goal to chase you away. I questioned the verifiability of the sentence because I could not find claims in the SEP article that would support the sentence. You did not provide a quotation from the SEP article but instead added a quotation from another source (IEP). This quotation does not discuss the most general form of the value problem. It does not discuss how the value problem justifies something, like notions of knowledge. You acknowledged yourself that a misunderstanding of the sources was involved in the changes.

I'm not sure that asking about WP:SYNTH in this kind of situation is considered rude behavior. If it is, I apologize. It was not my intention to be rude. My doubts were and are about possible problems with the introduced changes, not about you as a person. Do you have suggestions on what would be a better way to communicate one's doubts in this kind of situation? Phlsph7 (talk) 14:56, 17 June 2023 (UTC)

Just discuss the content without referring to WP:SYNTH, but instead show that you read the sources by referring to the sources. If it is in the form of a question, it is that you don't know. If you don't know, stay away from any suggestion of WP:SYNTH. Discuss the sources instead. This is pleasant. I like discussing the sources. Dominic Mayers (talk) 16:44, 17 June 2023 (UTC)

References

Problematic claim

The following clain in our article seems to be problematic: Before Ferrier and Russell, epistemology was not recognized as a separate division of philosophy. This claim appears to be contradicted by various reliable sources.

• from [1]: Although the term “epistemology” is no more than a couple of centuries old, the field of epistemology is at least as old as any in philosophy.
• from [2]: Epistemology has a long history within Western philosophy, beginning with the ancient Greeks and continuing to the present. Along with metaphysics, logic, and ethics, it is one of the four main branches of philosophy, and nearly every great philosopher has contributed to it.

The claim should probably be removed. Phlsph7 (talk) 06:29, 23 June 2023 (UTC)

Your two sentences say that today's epistemologists recognize the subject matter in the view of ancient philosophers whereas the sentence you criticize says these ancient philosophers themselves did not recognize the subject matter as a division. There is no contradiction. I don't know how to remove that confusion, but it is a terrible one, because it would be like making the ridiculous claim that philosophers are in disagreement with historians and there is a polemic about such simple facts. This being said, I do not like that much what is written in that section. The idea was to set a platform to introduce the scope, by explaining the complexity of the task, but it's too long : after three paragraphs, nothing specific is said about the scope. Dominic Mayers (talk) 17:17, 23 June 2023 (UTC)

I agree with your criticism of the section "Scope and philosophical context": it's unfocused. Thanks for removing the problematic claim. The remaining paragraph does not seem to be problematic in terms of WP:V. But I'm not sure that we need it and it sounds incoherent. It's mainly made up of quotations backed by primary sources. At the beginning, Carriero compares 17th-century and contemporary philosophy. The remaining passage contrasts this with examples of how some individual philosophers have used the term "epistemology" in relation to ancient philosophy in a standard manner. It is not explained why this is a contrast. Phlsph7 (talk) 06:50, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

They are not primary sources. We say that one uses primary sources when they are used to develop original research. Otherwise, they are simply sources for the content. There is no original research. The goal is simply to exhibit the complexity of fixing the scope by citing sources that say how it is related to allied disciplines. There is a source that says explicitly that the scope requires a consideration of the link with allied disciplines. So there is no original research in the whole thing. The contrast or lack thereof that you mention is something that came along simply because some sources refer to philosophers before Ferrier and Russell and others refer to more ancient philosophers. I refused to mention these two groups as if they were similar. These two groups are very different, especially in a context where one discusses the scope, because ancient philosophers such as Plato could not possibly think in terms of a scope for epistemology. The situation is completely different for Ferrier and he explicitly discusses the relation with metaphysics. Similarly, Russell explicitly discusses the relation of epistemology with psychology and logic. Never, Plato could have done that. This being said, though the basic idea is not bad, I think the three paragraphs could be made shorter. But, please, stop using terms such as primary sources, original research, etc. that we only need to use to point a violation of a rule. Do it only when it is absolutely necessary. You breaking an important rule yourself by constantly referring to possible violation of rules. I will stop working on this article and on any other article that you follow, if you do it again, because I cannot work in an environment with suspicions and doubts about my work. Discuss the content, the sources, try to understand the plan, etc. and only mention that a rule is violated after you understand very well and it is very clear that it is violated. Dominic Mayers (talk) 07:21, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

I think you misunderstood me. I said that The remaining paragraph does not seem to be problematic in terms of WP:V.. If you quote a text from a book and use the book as the source then, in relation to the quoted claim, the book is a primary source. Using primary sources is not automatically WP:OR. See also WP:PRIMARYNOTBAD. I will try to formulate my criticism as softly as possible but I'm not sure that this is feasible without "referring to possible violation of rules". Phlsph7 (talk) 08:05, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

As a side note: this is a level 3 vital article with over a million user page views last year. Edits made to vital articles and articles with many page views receive significantly more scrutiny. So if you are concerned about mixed feedback to your edits, this would be a relevant consideration when choosing an article to work on. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:16, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

I am not against patrollers. Back to our situation, if you did not suspect a violation of a rule and even know that in itself using primary sources is not bad, then saying they are primary sources is not a very clear way to express your concern about the content. Please, avoid terms that we normally use to express a concern with respect to rules. First, it will make your point clearer. Second and more importantly, it will create a nicer environment. BTW, I temporarily removed the section, but don't take credit for it. I already had in mind to remove it, because it only set the stage for something that was not yet there : fr:Le_Coche_et_la_Mouche. Dominic Mayers (talk) 16:12, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

Scope

The three paragraphs in the https://wiki.riteme.site/w/index.php?title=Epistemology&oldid=1162031643#Scope current version of the section] are still only there to set the stage. They say a little about the scope, but not the most important. It will be easier to understand their purpose when the scope will actually be discussed. Dominic Mayers (talk) 16:56, 25 June 2023 (UTC)

I think there is still some work to be done but it looks better now. Do we have a source for the first paragraph? Phlsph7 (talk) 17:22, 26 June 2023 (UTC)

Of course, we do, but you must know it. I changed the date for Russell from 1907 to 1912, because this is the year "he set out the classic analysis of knowledge as ‘true, justified, belief’", say Floridi. This is not a better date, because more search would most likely show that he discussed a perspective on epistemology way before that. For example, he discussed the subject with Louis Couturat in private letters during the years 1897-1913. Here is an extract, in French, of his reply to Couturat around the time he published his book on Leibniz in 1900 :

La logique dont je parle, c’est une logique dans un sens moins formelle: ce qu’on pourrait appeler l’Epistémologie (...). ce que dit Leibniz sur la logique symbolique est cependant très remarquable (...)

— (R 21.6.00)

In English, it reads

The logic of which I speak is a logic in a less formal sense: what one could call Epistemology (...). what Leibniz says about symbolic logic is however very remarkable (...)

— (R 21.6.00)

The source does not say it, but the attribution (R 21.6.00) seems to correspond to a letter of Russell dated June, 21, 1900. It replies to a text of Couturat (not shown here) with (C 13.5.00) as attribution. This is consistent with all the attributions, (C 5.7.01), (C 12.5.03), (C 30.6.00), (R 30.9.04), etc. in the source. Dominic Mayers (talk) 19:35, 26 June 2023 (UTC)

False impression of a global and neutral perspective in the lead

@Phlsph7: you moved the following out of the lead:

Contemporary philosophers consider it a major subfield of philosophy, along with ethics, logic, and metaphysics, which are more ancient subdivisions of philosophy. There are different views on the relation between epistemology, natural sciences and these ancient divisions of philosophy: William Alston considers that it has historically always been a part of cognitive psychology. Quine viewed epistemology as a chapter of psychology^Sect.1.1 whereas Russell viewed it as a mix of psychology and logic. In contrast, Popper, Carnap and others in the Vienna circle considered that only objective or intersubjective knowledge should be studied in epistemology.

Your argument was that it cited individual philosophers, but I do not think this is a valid argument, because they are key philosophers and they represent many philosophers and it is useful, if not necessary, to concretely identify key view points in this manner. But there is a more serious issue. You might think that the current lead is (unlike the text you moved), more global, not centered on specific views, but instead present the large categories of questions in epistemology. This would be a complete misunderstanding of the situation in epistemology. Contemporary epistemology is currently full of debates about the validity of the concepts that are assumed valid and basic in the lead. Take the last category of question (and this is really just an example): "Philosophical skepticism, which questions the possibility of knowledge..." There is big statement being made here, as if it was the truth. We cannot do that in Wikipedia. This position on Skepticism supposes one specific notion of knowledge and also a very specific view on skepticism. Skepticism for many is only a tool, not to reject knowledge, but to reject one perspective on knowledge. Only those that insist on their view of knowledge or are not even able to step back and consider other notions of knowledge would say that skepticism rejects knowledge in an absolute manner. It could be that some philosophers adopted such skepticism (though I doubt it), but in any case Wikipedia cannot present this (almost ridiculous) position as if it was its own position, even if it is presented in some source. It needs to be attributed.

In contrast, the text that you moved out is about one of the most central aspect of epistemology and it was properly attributed.

Dominic Mayers (talk) 16:40, 1 October 2023 (UTC)

Notes

References

I am in support of the moves that have been done by Phlsph7. I come to epistemology from a skeptic perspective. The statement in the lede that "Philosophical skepticism, which questions the possibility of knowledge..." is a completely accurate statement. It does not say that skepticism denies the possibility of knowledge, it says that it questions that possibility. And this is true all the way since Pirrhonism and since Sextus Empiricus. The existence of skepticism in Ancient Greek philosophy is what forces it to deal with the question of epistemology, and the same is true regarding modern philosophy, since Erasmus and the Renaissance. I support leaving the lede precisely as it is. Thank you, warshy ^(¥¥) 17:49, 1 October 2023 (UTC)

Every thing that I wrote above remain valid if we replace "denies the possibility of knowledge" with "questions the possibility of knowledge". Some historians explain that skepticism has always been a part of a dialog between groups that have different views on knowledge and what was questioned or denied was the perspective on knowledge of other groups, not knowledge in an absolute manner. This is what some historians say and it makes so much sense that I will not be surprise that a lot of them say that. Common sense also suggests that, as it is the case today, there was no unique definition of knowledge in the past and the goal was to guide the search for a better definition of knowledge, not to question in an absolute manner the possibility of knowledge. Questioning all possible notions of knowledge seems a weird attitude today, because of course we know something in some way, and the same must have been true in the past. But, I am not interested in fighting on a single isolated sentence. It is not the individual sentences that matter, but the overall view points that are presented. I know that many contemporary epistemologists have a specific notion of knowledge based on cognitive science, not the detail of it, but enough to support the opposition internal vs external. The entire contemporary externalism/internalism debate depends on this perspective on knowledge. In mathematical logic, the opposition internal/external makes no sense. With Tarski and others we have the notion of interpretation and a corresponding notion of truth, but even Tarski himself explained (in a response to Popper) that this has nothing to do with any ontological position regarding an external physical reality, but is purely mathematical. Clearly, Carnap and others in the Vienna circle wanted to extend that objective perspective to knowledge in general. That was certainly not metaphysical in their view. On the contrary, the purpose was to avoid any metaphysical position in the same way as we do it in logic. The external/internal debate played no role in their perspective (except perhaps for observation statements). Popper adopted the same view when he described objective knowledge (and even presented observation statements in an objective manner in the logical side of his philosophy). In other words, as much it is true that some philosophers say that knowledge separated from an individual knower makes no sense, other philosophers have the opposite view that knowledge that is relative to a subject is not interesting and is part of cognitive science, not a part of philosophy (of knowledge). I would not go into Plato's view on knowledge, but I am sure you know about the notion of Forms, which was the real knowledge for Plato. A similar notion existed through the entire ancient Greek period and beyond. It shares similarity with the inter subjective knowledge (not specific to an individual) of Kant, the Vienna circle, Popper, etc. Many of them mentioned the connection. So, when the possibility of knowledge is questioned today or in the past, which notion is being questioned? Dominic Mayers (talk) 19:19, 1 October 2023 (UTC)

Of course, many recent philosophers have rejected the internalist position that says "knowledge is in the head". For example, Hilary Putnam has famously concluded on the basis of his Twin Earth thought experiment: "Meanings ain't in the head". Some philosophers such as Donald Davidson even rejected the opposition internal/external itelf, as much as he rejected other oppositions: realism/idealism, etc. The point is that the statement "... questions the possibility of knowledge" is unclear because what notion of knowledge is actually questioned is not clear. When we read the article, it becomes clear that it is justified true belief and its variants (true belief + warrant of some kind) that is being questioned, but Wikipedia cannot adopt this restricted view on knowledge. It's not knowledge that is being questioned, but a particular view on knowledge and, at some point,this would need to be corrected. Dominic Mayers (talk) 20:16, 1 October 2023 (UTC)

The notion that is being questioned by Skepticism is the notion of the possibility of knowledge, exactly as the sentence says: "Philosophical skepticism, which questions the possibility of knowledge..." All the rest of the wall-of-text full of jargon above is your own philosophy, nothing else. You can quote as many "famous" philosophers as you want (I've never heard of most of them in any case), what you are posting above is your own synthesis of these post-modern, off-the-mainstream new trends in philosophy. Thank you, warshy ^(¥¥) 20:26, 1 October 2023 (UTC)

You are joking. I cited William Alston, Bertrand Russell, W. V. Quine, Carnap, Karl Popper, Donald Davidson, Hilary Putnam (and Plato) and most of the times not directly, but using secondary sources. Wow, it's not me that is in a bubble. What are the philosophers that I should cite to be "mainstream". If we know them, then it will be fine, but the article will have to indicate that it presents their "mainstream" view point. Wikipedia cannot present their "mainstream" view as if it was the truth. The readers need to know. I just want that the readers know what view point is presented. And, it will have to put in its larger context anyway. Dominic Mayers (talk) 20:40, 1 October 2023 (UTC)

Besides, I think you missed the point that I am not focusing on this particular statement. That particular statement in itself is not a big deal. I will slowly edit the article itself (and show in doing so how much it is not neutral), and at some point I will make sure the lead summarizes the article. At that time, I might revise the sentence. The idea might be better presented in a completely different manner. Nothing is frozen. Why this negative attitude? You seem to believe that you need to protect the article against me. That's not the way to collaborate. Dominic Mayers (talk) 21:03, 1 October 2023 (UTC)

Since I am arguing here that since antiquity, and again since the Renaissance, Epistemology is first of all a function of the questions posed by Skepticism, I suggest you go read:

• Richard H. Popkin, The History of Skepticism: From Erasmus to Spinoza, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1979. (I had suggested that already to Phlsph7 in the "History of Philosophy" talk page.

As for editing the article, I will definitely be reading anything you add or change, and I will certainly revert whatever looks to me like these philosophical forays into post-modern jargon-filled (and name-dropping of any idiot that has ever published anything as a "famous philospher") philosophical streams of consciousness. warshy ^(¥¥) 21:22, 1 October 2023 (UTC)

@Warshy:, I am looking at Popkin's book. However, in view of the inadequate tone that you have taken with accusation of name dropping of any idiot and of only doing my own synthesis of these post-modern, off-the-mainstream new trends in philosophy, I decided to remove my response here and respond in your personal talk page instead. Here, I will only mention that your source is highly religiously oriented with about 320 occurences of the word "God" in a book that has about 380 pages and, thus, it is better to use other sources with other view points to respect the neutrality principle of Wikipedia. Dominic Mayers (talk) 06:44, 2 October 2023 (UTC)

I agree with Warshy's assessment that the mentioned phrase on philosophical skepticism is in tune with standard views. I also share his doubts about the lengthy response to it: it's not clear how most of the interpretative excursion reaching from mathematical logic to Plato's theory of forms is relevant to this straightforward point. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:18, 2 October 2023 (UTC)

I repeat again that I was not discussing that single phrase. This single short phrase does not deserve an excursion from mathematical logic to Plato's theory of form, but the overall subject deserves it, because it describes the opposition between a psychological view on knowledge (with belief and internal mental states being central concepts) and an objective or intersubjective view on knowledge. This fundamental opposition must be considered to situate contemporary epistemology in a larger context, which is useful to improve the article. Dominic Mayers (talk) 07:31, 2 October 2023 (UTC)

I think it's probably best to work on the body of the article before changing the lead as hopefully the lead will follow from the content of the article. So I think it was right to move these changes away from the lead now.

In terms of article content, I think there are two issues you're bringing up (unless I am misunderstanding). The first is the debate around whether knowledge is in some way internal or psychological or whether it is some kind of external objective relationship. This clearly deserves a high level of coverage; the internalism-externalism debate is very important in epistemology and should hopefully make its way into the lead eventually.

The other issue is the relationship between epistemology and psychology as disciplines. I think this is a lot less important and almost all epistemologists are going to resist attempts to identify epistemology with psychology. In fact, this idea was seen as one of the most radical aspects of Quine's naturalised epistemology, especially given that psychology is seemingly descriptive while epistemology is seemingly normative (see here for good coverage of this). Therefore, I think we should make sure not to give this viewpoint undue weight. Shapeyness (talk) 10:47, 2 October 2023 (UTC)

Thank you, because I now see a normal reply that gives me the impression we read the same sources. I am very glad that you say the internalist/extermalist debate is considered very important. I also like that you used the terms internal and psychological as synonymous in that context. Regarding the relation between epistemology and psychology as domains, it is perhaps the most important aspect of the history of how the disciplines in science and philosophy were divided. I understand that the internal/external debate is different and not historical, but a good understanding of one implies a good understanding of the other. Russell's internalism was clearly expressed in terms of epistemology being a mix of logic and cognitive psychology. Quine's internalism was expressed as epistemology being a chapter of psychology. Nowadays we see the field of psychology in a very restricted manner, perhaps more descriptive now than before. It thus seems that these great philosophers were greatly mistaken—yes you make a good point regarding the descriptive versus normative aspect. Yet they were only defending internalism.

Now, a point of clarification. The expression external objective relationship that you used is perfectly fine, but the notion of objective knowledge is something different. It is a different concept that exists at a different level, which is neither the internal or external reality, but is related to both. I do not want to defend objective knowledge as a truth here. It's not our job to do that. However, irrespective of its truth, it is a necessary and important concept if we want to situate epistemology and skepticism in a larger context, especially with respect to Plato's view on knowledge, Kant, etc. I would even say that there is no way to correctly explain the effect that different views on science had on epistemology without that context, because this reference point is needed to explain the effect of these views.

A point that could be polemical is whether the assumptions behind the internalist/externalist debate, not the assumptions behind internalism nor the assumptions behind externalism, but the assumptions behind the overall debate in itself, should be presented as truths. These assumptions are rejected in the notion of objective knowledge. For example, Popper's view was that mental states, beliefs, etc. are useful to informally introduce epistemology, but they should not be a part of epistemology per se: for Popper, epistemology should study objective knowledge. It is not our job to argue for or against objective knowledge, but neither should we make Wikipedia rejects it as if its inadequacy was a truth, because objective knowledge is not dead. There are still many people who accept Popper's approach or similar approaches based on objective knowledge. Dominic Mayers (talk) 14:32, 2 October 2023 (UTC)

Notes

Reorganisation of history in two sections

I reorganized the section on history in two sections. The first section is about understanding epistemology in terms of evolving concepts and questions. The second section is about understanding or looking at fixed contemporary epistemological concepts and questions within the history of philosophy. Some individual sentences in these two approaches might look very similar, but when we consider what is done globally, these are two completely different approaches and they must be clearly distinguished. Rather than trying to explain, here is an extract from Zagzebski 2020 that illustrates the first approach:

The idea that the knowing state is a species of the belief state undergirds the almost universal practice in epistemology of defining knowledge as true belief plus something else. But this view can be disputed since the history of epistemic concepts shows that belief and knowledge were sometimes regarded as mutually exclusive epistemic states.

It is not (yet), but it could eventually be added to the first section. Dominic Mayers (talk) 20:25, 22 October 2023 (UTC)

The paragraph about Descartes

I am now working on the paragraph about Descartes's influence in the history of epistemology. This paragraph is, of course, perfectly appropriate in this section, which takes "history" to mean the study of the evolving concepts and questions of the past that are relevant to the understanding of contemporary epistemology. Descartes and the early modern period in general are often presented as the sources of the modern internalist view, which is so central in epistemology, even though the internalist/externalist debate as we know it today only started after Gettier in 1963. I need to find sources for this. I know I have them, but I need to find them again. Comments or suggestions will be appreciated. Dominic Mayers (talk) 21:10, 24 October 2023 (UTC)

Just read (finally, since your posts seem to show that you do read a lot) the chapter on Descartes in Popkin's book that we already discussed. After you read that, I am ready to discuss the matter of Descartes, Spinoza, and the whole philosophy of the early modern period. Let's see what you come up with, other than the number of times that God is mentioned in the book... warshy ^(¥¥) 21:50, 24 October 2023 (UTC)

I was looking for sources that make a link with contemporary epistemology through the internalist/externalist debate, but a link through the skepticism debate would be fine. However, I am looking for an explicit link. I do not want to expand on Descartes and skepticism per se, but see what is the role of this part of the history in the path toward contemporary epistemology. I wish that the article remains centered on contemporary epistemology, even in that section. The role of that section is to put contemporary epistemology within its historical context. Perhaps you can tell me, according to your understanding, which part of the two chapters on Descartes in this 1979 book might contribute to that goal. Some extracts would be useful. Pages could be problematic, because there has been many editions of that book. I know that it is a bit superficial as a criteria, but the word "epistemology" does not occur at all in these two chapters. Had there been a clear intention to create a link with (contemporary) epistemology, the word would have been used. I know that skepticism is central in epistemology, but I prefer sources that make an explicit link with contemporary epistemology over a source that does not make this explicit link. Dominic Mayers (talk) 20:19, 25 October 2023 (UTC)

How in hell you can start talking about "modern epistemology" (after 1963, according to you), and the internal/external debate, without first mentioning Kant'sCritique of Pure Reason, and the concepts of Noumenon or the Thing-in-itself? And how can you start talking about these fundamental concepts for epistemology, without describing first the basic views on these matters put forward by Descartes and Spinoza? I don't think you can. But since for you all that matters is "modern epistemology" and the internal/external debate, we get this whole confusion here. And I have already mentioned this too once: Whereas Descartes and Spinoza wrote their philosophies in Latin, Kant, in the next century (the 18th), wrote his already in his vernacular German. Without a basic historic approach to the development of Philosophy in general, and of Epistemology in particular, what you get is this shallow single focus on "modern epistemology" and the internal/external debate. But the internal/external debate in modern epistemology really starts with Kant, and without clarifying that first (and studying that matter, as far as you are concerned, in my view), you cannot proceed here. If we can't talk directly and clearly about the same basic concepts, there is no sense, as far as I am concerned, in continuing discussing these matters with you here. Thank you, warshy ^(¥¥) 23:45, 25 October 2023 (UTC)

What I mean by contemporary epistemology is epistemology as it is done now in recent sources, the more recent the better, which is a standard approach for an encyclopedic article on epistemology. We want to be the most up to date as possible. We certainly want to situate this contemporary epistemology within the history of concepts and questions in philosophy. This includes recent history and less recent history. So, in this way we can cover Kant, etc. as long as you provide sources that make the link with contemporary epistemology. If needed for completeness, we can add whatever needed about Kant, Descartes, etc. However, we cannot start to cover Kant, Descartes, etc. in general. There are other articles that do so. And if you do not see that the internal/external debate is almost what epistemology was specifically about in the recent years, then I do not know which sources you read. Almost all other specifically epistemological concepts such as reliabilism, virtue epistemology, etc., can be seen as a part of this debate.

But, I am interested to know what it is that you want to say in that paragraph about Descartes. Is it just that you are unhappy that I question whether Popkin is a useful source for the specific content that I want to cover now. Dominic Mayers (talk) 00:38, 26 October 2023 (UTC)

What you're talking about is really contemporary epistemology. And I, for one, don't give a shit about it. I care only about historical epistemology. So fine, you have your interests, and I have mine. But the article about epistemology on wikipedia has to work chronologically. All your contemporary stuff can go at the end, after the development of historical epistemology is properly described. And the two sections should not me mixed up in any way, shape your form. Now, in my view you know nothing really about the history of epistemology before the current, contemporary stuff. And you also refuse to learn about it. I don't have the time now, but with time, in next months, I will go over the article again, and separate all your contemporary stuff, and move it to the end, chronologically, where it belongs. Thank you, warshy ^(¥¥) 15:58, 26 October 2023 (UTC)

It is false that I know nothing really about the history of epistemology before the current, contemporary stuff and you should not say things like that to another Wikipedian, especially when you have no evidence to support your claim. It's the opposite. A year or so ago, I knew essentially nothing about contemporary epistemology and I thought that "epistemology" was simply another name for the philosophies of Hume, Kant, the Vienna circle, Popper, etc. I felt that the current article was too much biased on a strange view that knowledge had to be analysed as a species of belief, not to mention that, in this view, some say that a belief is only knowledge if it is true and justified. I was not even aware of the 1963 Gettier problem. However, I knew about Hume, Kant, etc. When I realised that these issues, which I knew nothing about, were the essential part of an actual academic field of study, with many books, entire department devoted to it, etc., I concluded that this field, called "epistemology" disconnected itself from useful philosophy. Many sources say so. They say that epistemology today is a useless bubble of knowledge, people talking among themselves about issues that would not have interested philosophers of the past.

But, unlike you, I decided that since really, there are many sources on that specific subject, there should be an article about it and I felt appropriate that it should be named "Epistemology", because this is the way it is named in recent encyclopedia articles and in general in the literature. In the same way, an article about physics should use contemporary sources on physics, even if it is not called "contemporary physics". Dominic Mayers (talk) 17:15, 26 October 2023 (UTC)

As long as your contemporary stuff is kept separate, and chronologically at the end, where it belongs, you can do with it whatever you want. But this article is about classic, historic epistemology first. In reality, as far as I am concerned, you could take your stuff and start a new article about "contemporary epistemology." Maybe in the end you'll have to do that, if the stuff you keep adding here starts to get under my skin. But we'll see. Right now I don't have the time for this distraction. 17:56, 26 October 2023 (UTC)

I would not mind that this article is about something else than (contemporary) epistemology with only something about it at the end. I am not interested in fight about articles' title, at the least not until after the articles are well written. So, let us suppose that this article is not about (contemporary) epistemology, what would it be about? In other words, can you say a bit more what you have in mind when you say "classic, historic epistemology". One way to do that would be to give a classic book on the subject from a notorious philosopher. Would that be Popkin's book? Dominic Mayers (talk) 18:17, 26 October 2023 (UTC)

@Warshy Your comments in this thread are really concerning. An article about X, not titled "History of X", should be about the up-to-date scholarly understanding of X, and have history as one significant aspect of that coverage. "[T]he article about epistemology on wikipedia has to work chronologically" - nope, that's not how we do other articles about abstract concepts and there's no requirement we do that here. What's concerning is that you don't feel the need to advance arguments (repetition isn't an argument), but describe your own feelings as if the rest of us have to abide by them: "if the stuff you keep adding here starts to get under my skin." "I care only about historical epistemology." This is an WP:OWNERSHIP attitude and not how we are supposed to work on this collaborative project. You're also making personal attacks against other editors, which we are definitely not supposed to do. We're not a feelings-over-facts community, and if you are going to edit the article to move the most relevant content to the end, based on feelings you have, then that's disruption. I applaud what User:Dominic Mayers is trying to do, and ask both of you to properly sign your comments so this discussion isn't unnecessarily hard to follow. MartinPoulter (talk) 13:47, 2 November 2023 (UTC)

Thank you. I haven't edited this article up to this point, and don't intend to do any editing on it soon. You are right: I was mostly expressing my own feelings about the subject, basically to see if there were any other editors that concurred with some of them. Apparently there are not. I agree with your definition: "up-to-date scholarly understanding of X, and have history as one significant aspect of that coverage." That should be the guiding principle here, and you expressed it better than me. I'll refrain from further comments that may give the impression I am trying to make a personal attack, which was not my intention. Thank you, warshy ^(¥¥) 15:18, 2 November 2023 (UTC)

I find interesting what is written about Descartes versus internalism right at the start in the preface of Plantinga 1993: it says that there was a transition from externalism to internalism through Descartes. Of course, this is a contemporary concept seen in the history, because, at the time, they did not think in terms of an internalist/externalist debate. But, the transition itself is a genuine historical phenomena independent of the internalist/externalist debate. It makes me interested in finding more sources to explain better the connection between the debate per se and the way the transition is seen independently of that debate. Maybe I will find something in Majors & Sawyer 2007 given that Descartes is known to have used the idea that one has access to one’s knowledge in a privileged manner (and that is what opacity is about), a kind of argument that was not much used before him (and is opposed to semantic externalism). Dominic Mayers (talk) 00:00, 2 November 2023 (UTC)

The new paragraph about Descartes

Here is what I propose:

Some arguments used in the contemporary externalist/internalist debate in philosophy of mind refer to the relation between mind and body that Descartes introduced in the early modern period. Descartes' answers to epistemological questions are not so easily related to contemporary justificatory views in naturalized epistemology and in the epistemological counterpart of this debate in particular, but both debates have been related and constitute together a fundamental part of contemporary epistemology and of key contemporary epistemological concepts such as virtue epistemology. Descartes is well known for his dualism, but he is mostly known for his skeptical approach. He used this approach, not to deny that the objects of sensory experiences follow precise laws that can be known, but to gain certainty in the mind side, in the cogito, and he used this as a platform to get to other truths. In that respect,  Descartes was influenced by Plato. However, Descartes argued for a different kind of dualism. The new aspect of Cartesian dualism, with no counterpart in Plato's dualism, is the existence of a real physical world behind the sensory experiences with its own laws and a real mental substance behind our mental experiences and a causal relation between these two worlds. The part of this view, which says that "the external world is real but known to us only indirectly, is called indirect realism. In that sense, Descartes was the father of modern realism and, for realists, of modern philosophy as well. Descartes's interactionism (interaction between the physical reality and the substance of the mind) was abandoned in the nineteenth century because of the growing popularity of philosophical mechanism. Realism itself was not abandoned, only the coexistence of an independent substance behind the mind was abandoned.

Dominic Mayers (talk) 13:51, 2 November 2023 (UTC)

Thank you for posting this here first, and thank for including Popkin in your refs. The ref pointing to him should have a page number too, so it can be verified. Other than that, according to the guidelines explained to me above by MartinPoulter you did a good job. Thank you, warshy ^(¥¥) 15:32, 2 November 2023 (UTC)

Thanks for your continued efforts at improving this article. On the prose level, your draft reads well. On a short look, I couldn't find the discussion of the relation of Decartes' dualism to the internalism-externalism debate and virtue epistemology in the Popkin 1979. What is the page number of the relevant text?

It seems you directly copied the sentence "This view, in which the external world is real but known to us only indirectly, is called indirect realism" from Frankish 2020. You have to be very careful with this since it is a copyright violation. Please make sure to remove any other sentences that were directly copied or closely paraphrased. The relevant policies are WP:COPYRIGHT and WP:CLOSEPARAPHRASE. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:32, 2 November 2023 (UTC)

Regarding copyright, I only forgot to put it in quote. I did not use Popkin as a source for the relation of Descartes' dualism to the internalism-externalism debate and virtue epistemology, but for the next sentence. Popkin says nothing about internalism/externalism. The relation is claimed in that first sentence, but not explained. The sentence from Popkin was only added for completeness. It is Descartes's dualism that is easily related to the externalist/internalist debate. This is going to be explained with sources, of course, at some point in the article. I am sure, you have no doubt that sources made this obvious connection. Here, the first sentence is just a lead sentence to motivate the paragraph in the context of contemporary epistemology: its point is going to be expanded and sourced in the article. Dominic Mayers (talk) 17:19, 2 November 2023 (UTC)

Thanks for addressing the copyright problem by using a quotation. The claim about the relation of Decartes' dualism to the internalism-externalism debate and virtue epistemology is not obvious so this should be backed up by a references to ensure verifiability. Phlsph7 (talk) 14:17, 3 November 2023 (UTC)

Of course, the link must exist in sources. Otherwise, the paragraph is useless. The subject is contemporary epistemology. If there is no link with contemporary epistemology (and the only link imaginable is with the externalist/internalist debate), then I was completely wrong in discussing Cartesian dualism. However, the fact that the link is not immediately given would not be a valid reason to remove the content. You need to have reasons to believe that the link is not verifiable to remove it. Instead, you should positively try to source the link. This is what collaboration is about. Dominic Mayers (talk) 14:28, 3 November 2023 (UTC)

I'm in no way opposed to collaboration and anyone willing to help get this draft ready for inclusion in the article is welcome. Reviewing is one form of collaboration. However, finding sources for a text someone else wrote can be time-consuming, especially if the claims are rather specific and not covered by overview sources. For example, I took the time to have a look at the articles on internalism-externalism debate and virtue epistemology from the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy and the internet encyclopedia of philosophy ([3], [4], [5], and [6]). Correct me if I'm wrong but as far as I can tell, they do not directly support the claim about Descartes' dualism. This could imply that the claim is not that widely accepted. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:33, 4 November 2023 (UTC)

All these sources are indeed centered on contemporary epistemology. They are also tertiary sources and that is another issue, which I will not discuss here, though it's not unrelated to the point I am going to make. There are many sources that complain that the entire field of contemporary epistemology too much ignored the true history of philosophy and this can be seen in these sources (and perhaps even more, because they are tertiary sources on the subject). I believe that Wikipedia do not have to follow the tertiary sources you mentioned and can, and even should, also present other points view about contemporary epistemology, which are more like an external view on the field. I do not start with my personal point of view and look for sources to support it. I start with the general idea that the true historical perspective is important and then see that there is a paragraph on Descartes and, therefore, I look for sources that cover specifically the link between the history of Cartesian concepts and contemporary epistemology. Dominic Mayers (talk) 13:17, 4 November 2023 (UTC)

Wiki Education assignment: Adult Development Fall 2023

This article was the subject of a Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment, between 11 September 2023 and 11 December 2023. Further details are available on the course page. Student editor(s): Eid1803 (article contribs).

— Assignment last updated by Jskalski (talk) 20:10, 9 November 2023 (UTC)

Link to German article on Epistemology

In the list of links to articles in other languages German seems to be missing even though there is an article called "Erkenntnistheorie" that links to this English article (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erkenntnistheorie). I could not figure out how to add German to the list myself or I am lacking the necessary admin privileges. Maybe anybody who has the necessary privileges to edit that list could help out? Greetings Sidonius (talk) 10:40, 13 November 2023 (UTC)

@Sidonius: As I understand it, the language links are taken from wikidata. The English article is linked to https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q9471. The German article is linked to https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q116930361. One way to fix this would be to link the German article to https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q9471. Before you do that, you should probably check to corresponding talk pages to see whether there is a reason for having the German article linked to a different item. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:49, 13 November 2023 (UTC)

OK, I will look into it. The English page that redirects to Epistemology is linked to the wikidata-page where the German article points to. Probably a left over from earlier times. Greetings Sidonius (talk) 08:09, 14 November 2023 (UTC)