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conscripts

Why are the soviet 1-2 million dead fast conscrips forgotten ? Blablaaa (talk) 23:16, 14 April 2010 (UTC) the "Wordl War II casualties" article gives 1.5 . they shoulöd be included.

Two Western scholars, Michael Ellman and S. Maksudov (Soviet Deaths in the Great Patriotic War: A Note. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 46, No. 4, Soviet and East European History (1994), pp. 671-680) have analysed Soviet population losses during WWII. I reproduce their conclusions in full:
"(1) The majority of Soviet war deaths were non-military. Most of the Soviet citizens who died in the war were civilians.
(2) The official figure from 1990 onwards of the population loss of the USSR as a result of the war was 26-27 millions. This figure consists almost entirely of excess deaths. It also includes, however, to an uncertain extent, net emigration. It is an estimate of 'population loss during the war' and includes both victims of Soviet repression and Soviet citizens who died fighting on the German side. The figure of 26-27 million fits in well with current knowledge and seems relatively reliable. The main area of doubt concerns the possible underestimate of the population of the territories annexed in 1939-40 (and remaining in the USSR after 1945) and in 1944-45. This may well have produced an underestimate of the total population loss, but the underestimate of the number of war deaths would be less of an underestimate because of the substantial emigration from the newly annexed territories.
(3) The 26-27 million figure is not a complete estimate of the population loss by the territories which formed the USSR after 1945, since it excludes the population loss of almost 2 million Germans, Finns and Japanese expelled from (or who fled from) territories occupied by the USSR.
(4) The 26-27 million figure understates the demographic effect of the war since it excludes the results of the fall in the birth rate during the war. Allowing for this, the hypothetical demographic loss of the USSR resulting from the war at the end of 1945 (i.e. the difference between the actual population on 31 December 1945 and an estimate of what it would have been then in the absence of the war) is roughly 35-36 million. The precise figure depends on the counterfactual assumption made about the birthrate in the absence of the war (if the prewar crude birth rate is used it would be about 40 million) and the estimate used for wartime births. The total demographic effect at later dates is still higher.
(5) The current official figure for military losses is 8.7 million. There are reasons for thinking that, as an estimate of deaths caused by the war of those serving in the regular armed forces (including the border troops and internal troops of the NKVD) it is about 900 000 too high. On the other hand, it excludes deaths among conscripts captured before they reached their unit and deaths of non-conscripted fighters not in the regular armed forces, such as partisans, local anti-aircraft defences, police in frontier areas, militarised transport employees, militarised fire service employees etc.
(6) The main unresolved issues at present in this area concern the breakdown of non-military casualties, although some preliminary work has already been done on this."
My conclusion is that the figures presented in the article are correct and adding 1.5 million would be a synthesis. They are already listed as civilian losses.--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:43, 14 April 2010 (UTC)
my conclusion is 1.5 million fast concrips are military. listing them as civilians is faking statistics and excluding 1.5 million soldiers is .... . the world 2 casualties page includes them , then this "subpage" should not do different . if u want do it different than u should discuss with the guys who decided to include them on the world war 2 casualties pageBlablaaa (talk) 23:46, 14 April 2010 (UTC)
Wikipedia is not a source for itself. If most reliable sources state that the military losses of 8.7 million is a correct number (or probably even too high), we have simply stick to these sources. With regards to the WWII casualties article, it clearly separates military losses and conscript reservist losses, and it is correct, because these men even got no armament, were not assigned to any military units, and, by all commonsensual criteria were civilians.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:48, 15 April 2010 (UTC)
i will ask the guys of the world war 2 casualties page what they think about the conscripts. i really dont understand why this page includes them and u dont want here on this subpage. That wiki is no source is correct but not what i mean. the world war 2 casualties page carefully written and i simply ask myself why u think u know it better like them. who decided here that conscripts are civilians? regarding the too low: even on the battle of kursk(43) research of red army soldiers graves show that many of them were not even listed men. but i guess we both will never know how much soviets really died. Blablaaa (talk) 08:22, 15 April 2010 (UTC)

Beligerents

Belarusian Central Rada was nominally the government of Belarus from 1943–44. Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia was a NGO. Both of them weren't states, therefore, I see no reason to include them into the Belligerent section.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:20, 20 September 2009 (UTC)

I partly agree. However, if this is the standard, why are the Polish Underground "State" and the Polish Committee of National Liberation listed as belligerents? Both of these could hardly be considered states, the former being a resistance movement, and the latter a "committee for liberation" (like the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia). This is a double standard at its worst. Lt.Specht (talk) 01:38, 20 September 2009 (UTC)

That is simple. Poland never surrendered, so it continued to be a belligerent from 1 Sept 1939 to May 8 1945. Therefore both the Polish Underground "State" and the Polish Committee of National Liberation may be considered successors of the pre-war Polish state. In addition, they performed really independent military activity and fielded a considerable amount of troops. Nothing of that was done by Rada or a committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia. Similarity in names is misleading in that case.--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:11, 20 September 2009 (UTC)
In regards to the Polish Committee (which was only recognized by the Soviets), taken from its wiki page, "It exercised control over Polish territory re-taken from Nazi Germany and was fully sponsored and controlled by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics", "the Soviet Union started to transfer power in the Soviet-controlled areas of Lublin, Białystok, Rzeszów and Warsaw Voivodships to the PKWN. Actual control over those areas remained in the hands of the NKVD and the Red Army", "Similar events took place in many of the other East European states under control of the Red Army, as, for example, in Romania in March, 1945, where a Communist government was elected through a combination of vote manipulation, elimination and forced mergers of competing parties." Seems like a "State" on par with Rada and Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (which did too field a large amount of troops and performed nominally independent, Russian Liberation Army, Rada also provied a significant amount of manpower and formed Commando units). The Polish Underground State could be arguably a belligerent, but the Polish Committee of National Liberation is no more qualified than Rada or the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia. Sources are needed for both the Underground State and the Polish Committee of National Liberation which claim they are belligerents, in my opinion, if both Rada and the Committee of Russian Liberation are going to be double standard-excluded from the infobox. Lt.Specht (talk) 02:54, 20 September 2009 (UTC)
Of course, the Polish Committee was recognized only by the Soviets (that, by contrast, didn't recognized the London Poles), however, it eventually laid a ground for formation of the new Polish state, People's Republic of Poland. The latter was subsequently recognized by other states (including Western democraties), that post factum legitimated the Commitee. With regards to Soviet control of Wojsko Polskie, I don't think a degree of such a control was higher than that of Anglo-American control of Free French forces.
By contrast, Rada was not recognized even by Germans themselves, they fielded no military troops in their own uniform, the Russian Liberation Army didn't exist until 1944 and it participated in almost no hostilities against the Red Army. In addition, the linkage between the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia and the Russian Liberation Army in unclear for me.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:02, 20 September 2009 (UTC)
Belorussian Central Rada is about as much separate combatant as Reichskommissariat Ostland and Reichskommissariat Ukraine or even less. Although on other hand I am not really sure if comparison of Polish Committee and Free French is appropriate either. Anyway there seems to be annoying tendency to put as much separate combatants/commanders in infoboxes as possible, making infoboxes annoyingly long, and this article is pretty extreme case of that.--Staberinde (talk) 10:25, 20 September 2009 (UTC)
I didn't compare political autonomy of Polish Committee and Free French. My major point was that (at least, initially) French forces were subordinated to the Anglo-American high command, similarly to the Polish troops in East, that were subordinated to the Soviets. This fact, taken separately, means nothing.--Paul Siebert (talk) 13:39, 20 September 2009 (UTC)
I think it's appropriate to include the Free French into the belligerents box. After all, like Poland, it served on behalf of the Soviet Union, and it did take an active role within the campaign. Ricky id (talk) 10:01, 10 May 2010 (UTC)

Bandera as a commander

Stepan Bandera shouldn't be listed as a commander as he was in charge of a political movement (OUN) not a state or an army. And Bandera was allied with Nazi Germany only until 1941 (basically when they advanced into Ukraine). I think he should be removed.

At least state that he was a commander on Germany's side until 1941. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.1.55.127 (talk) 20:15, 26 May 2010 (UTC)

POW

Rudger Overmans 1 million is estimated POWS killed Confirmed are 363,000

Overy clearly writes 3,6 Million confirmed killed

For Estimated Soviets POW killed then you get 5 million

But you can not compare estimated killed for one side and have confirmed, and even down graded for the other side

You are comparing 2 different things.

The estimated includes, people who died whilst they were surrendering, and there are no hard facts behind estimated just as the word says estimated.

But there are hard figures on 3,6 million Soviet POW killed in German camps from 41-45

And 363,000 German Pows killed in camps from 1941-1955 fifty five

Townssequal (talk) 21:46, 25 May 2010 (UTC)

Can't really understand any of this. If you are citing numbers from Overy, which I believe you are, the numbers you are citing for German POWS is according to Soviet records, "Soviet records show...", which are hardly a neutral source. The number you also cite is only the number of German deaths as according to Soviet records, not all Axis deaths. Overmans also notes the official Soviet records number, then gives an independent estimation, which was in the article before. Coincidentally, the numbers given for Soviet deaths from Overy is "2.54 million to 3.3 million". The other two sources which were cited for Soviet deaths gave the figures of roughly 1.2–3.3 million, which wording was probably chosen before to include those estimations as well. Lt.Specht (talk) 08:56, 31 May 2010 (UTC)


The problem is that you are using confirmed Soviet powes dead by German hands, VS estimated Germans dead by Soviet hands, either you use confirmed German vs Confirmed Soviet which is 363K confirmed Dead German in soviet hands vs 3,6 million confirmed Dead Soviets by German hands OR you use estimated vs estimated, and do not mix the 2. And Rudger Overman Estimates that 1 million Germans were killed whilst surrendering or in transit to surrender and the same figure for the Soviets is 5,6 million, and in NO sources do they states that ONLY 1 million Soviet pows died, show me what page in what books says that. And you can not use the source that clearly says 3,6 million died, and use that exact same source to say 1.2 million died. Richard Overys Book Stalins Russia, Hitlers Germany clearly says 3.6 million it does not anywhere say 1.2 million or 3.3 million but 3.6 Townssequal (talk) 12:51, 19 June 2010 (UTC)

Ukrainie as a belligerent.

I removed Ukraine from the belligerents' list. First, the source seems to be incorrect, the actual source seems to be not Abbott Peter, Pinak Eugene. Ukrainian Armies 1914 - 1955 (2004), OspreyPublishing, p41, but Peter Abbott, Oleksiy Rudenko Ukrainian Armies 1914-55, Volume 412 of Men-at-arms series Osprey Publishing, 2004 ISBN 1841766682, 9781841766683. Secondly, I do not understand what concrete source's statement supports the idea that UIA represented whole Ukraine (please, provide a quote). Thirdly, UIA involvement in Eastern Front hostilities insufficient to talk about it as a separate belligerent. --Paul Siebert (talk) 04:24, 28 October 2009 (UTC)

Re: Silver bullet. Don't understand what do you mean. I always support a uniform application of similar criteria to all sides. If I missed something, please let me know.
1. Re: "A non-seperate UIA attacked both Germans and Soviets during the same period" 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS Galicia (1st Ukrainian) had only one engagement with the Red Army (Brody). During that battle it fought with (not against) other German divisions, so I do not understand what do you mean. If you mean anti-partisan activity, I doubt it can be considered a separate belligerence.
Re: 2. See the section below.
Re: 3. I didn't remove Croatia because, by contrast to Spain, I found no information on that account (neither pro nor contra). However, you have to take into account that Croatia, by contrast to Spain, was an Axis country. One way or the another, it is not in the list now.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:09, 20 November 2009 (UTC)
PS. Sorry, I just noticed it is still in the list. I am not sure if we really need to have it here, however I am still hot sure if its removal is completely justified. Let's discuss it if you want.--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:29, 21 November 2009 (UTC)


I did not mistook the UIA and 14th SS for one unit. However, the 14th waffenSS division was the sole military unit composed from Ukrainians that was involved in more or less serious engagement with regular Soviet troops. With regards to UIA, it was just a was a group of Ukrainian nationalist partisans acting in behalf of theOrganization of Ukrainian Nationalists. The latter was a Ukrainian political movement, so it could neither represent the Ukrainian nation as whole (you are absolutely right here) nor be considered a separate belligerent (CPSU, or American Democrats weren't a separate belligerents in WWII).--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:56, 21 November 2009 (UTC)
Re: 1. No. In actuality, I didn't mix them, my point was that 14th division was the only unit composed of the Ukrainians that was involved in more or less serious engagement with the Red Army. Contribution of other Ukrainian formed troops was too negligible to speak seriously about a belligerence.
Re: 2. Al-Qaida didn't claim it represented any nation. It represented itself, and, in that sense, can be considered a belligerent. It is impossible to compare relative military contribution of Al-Qaida in the Afghan war and UIA's contribution in Eastern Front.
Re: 3. I didn't compare UIA and US democrats. I compared OUN and democrats. Democrats, as a ruling party, waged the war against the Axis, however, not Democrats, but the US was a belligerent. We cannot list every political party, having or not having their own military wing, as a separate belligerent.--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:18, 22 November 2009 (UTC)
Re:

By that logic Stepan Bandera shouldn't be listed as a commander as he was in charge of a political movement (OUN) not a state or army. And Bandera was allied with Nazi Germany only until 1941 (basically when they advanced into Ukraine). I think he should be removed. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.1.139.41 (talk) 14:30, 10 May 2010 (UTC)

The overwhelming majority of Ukrainians fought in the RKKA. Statistically, they killed more axis troops than Americans. Bandera and such cannot serve as a representative of the Ukrainian people. With res[ect, Ko Soi IX (talk) 14:15, 21 July 2010 (UTC)

Cold War Propaganda cliches

There are a lot of propaganda cliches in text.

  • "Nazi-Soviet pact" is completely incorrect. "Side A - side B pact" is usually considered as military pact. But it was non-aggression pact, not military one.
  • "Stalin refused to believe early arrival of war". No source for it.
  • "After Great Purge Stalin promoted unexperienced commanders". There is presumption that former commanders were more experienced. And which source claims it? Only Goebbels leaflets which were dropped to Soviet trenches in 1941. Executed high commanders had almost same experience as new commanders. For example, Tukhachevsky was born in 1893, Blucher in 1889, Timoshenko in 1895, Zhukov in 1896, Konev in 1897, Vasilevsky in 1895. Military service - since 1914. In Red Army - since 1917-1918. Where is difference? Maybe, Tukhachevsky was very experienced in 1920 when he was Front Commander? And Treaty or Riga was result of his "experience"?
    Also there is an assumption that unexperienced officers became after Great Purge. But unexperienced officers were result of expansion of Red Army. Red Army multiplied in 3-4 times in 1939-1941, so it created a lot of vacancies for officers.
  • "Stalin promoted obscurantists like Kulik who opposed mechanization". Yes, Kulik opposed. But he wasn't Narkom of Defence. Kliment Voroshilov and Semion Timoshenko were Narkom of Defence, and they reduced quantity of cavalry divisions. They were for mechanization of Red Army.
  • "Joseph Stalin bore the greatest responsibility for the disasters at the beginning of the war". Stalin became main military leader only on 8 August 1941. For which disaster he bore responsibility? Maybe, for Bialostok-Minsk pocket which was created before 3 July 1941? For Uman cauldron which was created in 2 August? For Smolensk and Roslavl pocket created in July 1941? Or maybe he bore responsibility for Viazma and Briansk pockets? Front Commanders promised Stalin to stop Wehrmacht under Viazma and Briansk, Stalin trusted to more competent Konev and Yeriomenko - and that's his guilt? Only battle of Kiev may be considered as result of Stalin decisions.
  • "Following the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland, the Baltic states and Bessarabia in 1939–40, Stalin insisted that every fold of the new territories should be occupied; this move westward left troops far from their depots in salients that left them vulnerable to encirclement". It's look like that Red Army didn't build bases in West Bielorussia, Ukraine, Baltic states and Bessarabia, that there wasn't Molotov Line there. It's comlete lie.
  • "Stalin was desperate not to give Hitler any provocation that could be used as an excuse for an attack; this caused him to refuse to allow the military to go onto the alert even as German troops gathered on the borders and German reconnaissance planes overflew installations." He allowed the military to go onto the alert - in the night from 21 June to 22 June.
  • "Stalin ensured that propaganda always mentioned his leadership of the war". Where is source?
  • "The German invasion therefore caught the Soviet military and leadership largely by surprise, even though Stalin did receive a message from his intelligence detailing information on the attack". Another myth. No intelligence message detailed the time and nature of attack. There was a lot of false alarm, and Red Army generals decided it was desinformation. And no source told about 22 June, no source told that the war would begin without declaration. On the contrary, Soviet intelligence wrote that Eastern offensive would begin only after fall of Britain or after German ultimatum. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 78.36.201.142 (talk) 10:07, 22 July 2010 (UTC)


Hello I notice you mention Cold-War cliches. But your list (the ones I am familiar with) would all seem to be correct. For example the Red Army and society was hampered by Stalin's purges. The Soviet and Nazi's cooprated in dividing up Eastern Europe, militarily in Poland. The Soviet Union was warned repeatedly that Hitler would invade by Churchill for example, but Stalin refused to believe it. Is this Russian histiography? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.86.243.150 (talk) 10:58, 8 October 2010 (UTC)

The whole issue of the impact of the purges on the command structure and the ability of those who led the Red Army in 1941 is entirely speculative. Indeed, those in the high command who are credited with the success of the Red Army in 1945 are also those who are in command positions at the start of the war in 1941. Zhukov himself was Chief of Staff right through the preparations for the war, until July 1941, after which he was demoted temporarily.

It is ultimately very hard to say who bore the most responsibility for the disaster of June and July 1941, but I note that it is common to complain that the French lost in 1940 because all of their generals were old, and had outdated methodologies, while the exact opposite is argued about Russia in 1941, in that it is common to say that it was because the most "experienced" officers were purged.

To rephrase this argument could we say that the French lost in 1941 because their officers were the most "experienced", and the Russians got badly mauled in 1941 because they had new younger generals in command who supported modern theories of armored warfare? Indeed it was D.G. Pavlov who took the brunt of the blame for the loss at Bialystok and he was the most experienced armored warfare captain that the Russian possessed since he was chief of Russian armoured operations in Spain during the civil war.

More bluntly one might ask, perhaps the French general staff might have needed some purging, given the results that Gaemlin provided in 1940 for the French. He was indeed a very experienced officer.

Personally I think one has to look deeper into this riddle because in my view the mythology that command incompetence was the key to failure in 1941 was an idea that took root in 1941 when Pavlov and others were blamed for the disaster: on this basis D.G. Pavlov took the brunt of the blame. This view was largely accepted in official circles in the west at the time because Russia was so closely allied with the Western powers. After the war this view seems to shift slightly in the west, with the addition of the idea that the incompetence of command was the result of Stalin's purges.

Bandera

Why is S. Bandera marked with polish flag? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 147.213.117.99 (talk) 19:59, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

Maybe it was changed because Bandera had Polish citizenship? -11:13, 24 July 2010 (UTC) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.52.76.202 (talk)

Reason for Germany's Defeat in Introduction

I think its too strong to say

The Eastern Front was decisive in determining the outcome of World War II, eventually serving as the main reason for Germany's defeat.

It could easily be argued that declaration of war on the USA was the main reason, if there is actually a main reason. Without US involvement, North Africa, the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal would most probably have been lost to the Axis. There would have been no Italian Landing and no D-Day. Allied strategic bombing would be limited to night bombing by RAF Lancasters, and no British fighters could fly escourt beyond France. German industrial capacity would have been greatly increased, they would have had more resources to devote to the Eastern Front, they might have developed a strategic bomber force instead of focusing on fighter production etc. In any case the War would have lasted much longer and Germany would have had a much longer window to bring into mass production many of its more advanced weapons like the Elektroboat, Jet Aircraft....

All this is conjecture...but its enough doubt to show that the Eastern Front was not the main reason for Germany's defeat. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Patrickobi (talkcontribs) 09:31, 8 July 2010 (UTC)

I think it is perfectly apt that the Easter Front is listed as the main reason. So many other factors were crucial, and each can be argued its critical place in the scheme, but none resulted in so many casualties to Germany as did the Eastern Front. Binksternet (talk) 14:50, 8 July 2010 (UTC)
Some scholars (e.g. Glantz) argue that after Stalingrad and Kursk the USSR was able to win the war alone (although at terrible cost). The opposite was not true: neither the US, nor the UR were able to defeat Germany had it been victorious in the East: imagine, Hitler's military plants moved to Ural, so no strategic bombing is more possible, Germany got an access to virtually unlimited resources (oil, grain, tungsten), 80% of Wehrmacht (not the pale shadow of the Wehrmacht's self that met the Americans in Normandy in 1944) relocated to Western Europe and Africa, Japan doesn't have to keep hre best fighting force, Kwantung Army, in Manchuria, and can relocate it, e.g. to Burma. Although the US would probably be able to protect themselves against German landing in any event, noone could guarantee survival of the Western democracies in that case. Therefore, the lede statement is quite correct.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:35, 10 July 2010 (UTC)
Some scholars (e.g. Glantz) argue that after Stalingrad and Kursk the USSR was able to win the war alone (although at terrible cost) . after what? after stalingrad or Kursk. I highly doubt that glantz claims the red army was able to win the war after stalingrad without allies. Also never forget that the pure fact that great britain existed was enough to tie up german pretty much resources. Calling something the "major" factor would imply this factor alone was enough ? is this correct? my english is not perfect.Blablaaa (talk) 07:12, 10 July 2010 (UTC)
Well, why do you think that Red Army couldn't defeat Wehrmacht after Stalingrad without Allies?

Six obvious things may be worth mentioning, just to put this in perspective, though to be clear, I do agree that the greatest damage to Germany was done by the Red Army (in the interests of honesty, I must admit my bias: I'm British). 1) They started out on the wrong side: The British Commonwealth and the French were fighting from 1939, the British Commonwealth being the only forces to fight Germany throughout (for over a year, this was done alone). On the other hand, the Soviets were fighting hand in hand WITH Germany for the first couple of years, and instead of fighting on behalf of others only responded when they themselves were invaded. Given that it was the independence of Poland that was the initial issue, it is only expediency and treaty technicalities that prevented a British and French declaration of war on the USSR as well, for the same reasons. 2) Geography: The Soviets were fighting on their home soil for the most part, only after Hitler had taken over their territory quite substantially - geography was a major factor in any case, the elimination making Russia and Germany neighbours - no Eastern D-Day was necessary. Moreover, Berlin is in the East of Germany, and hence nearer the USSR. 3) Numbers: More Germans died on the Eastern Front than elsewhere, but several times more Russians died - due to their Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Soviets had put themselves in a situation where they had to fight for their survival - a sixth (?) of their own dying. 4) Methods: Given this last point, their greatest advantage was a huge population and a dictator who didn't care about sacrificing this population: "One dead is a tragedy - a million dead is a statistic." 5) Focus: The Soviets were only fighting on this front, whereas the other allies were spread over the world - also fighting the Italians in Africa and more significantly the Japanese across the Pacific, an arena the Soviets had no involvement in until after the US bombed Hiroshima (and Russia still claims Sakhalin, spoils from this venture). 6) Most obviously, the damage to Europe inflicted by the Soviet government for the next several decades, and the massacres, genocides and war crimes committed by them, make the defeat of the Germans look almost pointless in Soviet-occupied territory. 41.185.117.226 (talk) 00:39, 21 August 2010 (UTC)

Hey, Cold War was over 20 years ago, but you're carefully writing that era's cliches about USSR:) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.52.80.99 (talk) 12:11, 30 August 2010 (UTC)
I'd like reveal you some secrets. Berlin wasn't in the East of THAT Germany. Berlin was in the center of Third Reich. Before atomic bombing of Japan it suffered a lot of terror bombings with casual bombs. Japan surrendered only after Manchurian operation. "Every sixth was killed" - it was Poland, not USSR. 190 million (Soviet population) wasn't advantage before 300 million (Third Reich and conquered territories). Also I really want to listen to cruel stories, where USSR fought hand-in-hand with Germany for 1.5 years, why Britain and France couldn't declare war to USSR for Poland in 1939, but were ready to declare it for Finland in 1940, and what damage was inflicted by Soviet government in Eastern Europe.--12:37, 30 August 2010 (UTC) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.52.80.99 (talk)

Hey, don't get too annoyed - remember my opening sentence. First point: this is an historical article, so the state of the former USSR today is irrelevant. Which cliches in particular? That Stalin wasn't a very nice guy? Second point: yes, it's true - for much of the war Berlin was in the centre, but under the 3rd Reich Germany's geography changed quite rapidly, and probably wouldn't have extended quite so far East if the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact had not enabled it to. The point remains: Germany's and Russia's cooperative gobbling of Poland resulted in an immediate land boundary between the 3rd Reich and a more than twice as populous USSR, and Hitler's invasion (though initially successful due to the Soviet government's initial incompetence) was ultimate suicide. Third point: I doubt it was the Manchurian operation, since something rather more important happened on August 9 1945, other than that - and yet another thing happened three days before... and they were rather terrible, too. 3rd point: By 'every sixth was killed' I refer to the USSR, and I retract - an eighth is more accurate. Nevertheless it is clear a lot of good people died, and some would say far more than would have even under the circumstances, had the Soviet government and dictator of the time not had a murderous ideology. You seem to get quite emotional and rather incoherent towards the end of the paragraph, and I genuinely can't make out what you're getting at. The UK and US never declared war on the USSR over Finland. By the standards of 1939 they may well have, had they not had other issues closer to home to deal with. Finland allied itself with Hitler briefly to save itself from Stalin, just as the UK allied itself to the Stalin to save itself from Hitler. Finally, are you asking what damage was done by the Soviet government in Eastern Europe? From the kulaks through to the gulags, and decades of murderous economic, religious and personal oppression resulting in deaths by the shipload? The propaganda wasn't THAT convincing, was it? But let's not make this discussion page a political fight blog (possibly too late). —Preceding unsigned comment added by 41.185.115.143 (talk) 19:49, 24 October 2010 (UTC)

Notice that up to 80% of German divisions were destroyed by Soviets. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.145.208.146 (talk) 11:50, 23 November 2010 (UTC)

Is the postal stamp an adequate alternative for the Reichstag photo?

I don't think it is. Firstly, it is a primitive picture which only schematically depicts the historical photo. This is like presenting a sketch of Guernica, made by a child, as a free equivalent of the Picasso's painting. Secondly, the post stamp was issued in DDR, now non-existent Soviet puppet state, which also diminishes the value of this picture.
In summary, although I appreciate J Milburn's efforts to find a free equivalent, the image provided by him is hardly an adequate equivalent.--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:34, 11 September 2010 (UTC)

It would probably be better to continue this discussion there [1].--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:25, 13 September 2010 (UTC)
No, it wouldn't. I've now understood at least part of your last post. Honestly, completely honestly, do we need another massive long discussion? Ok, the image I added may not be ideal for a number of reasons, but at least it's free. This article does not seem to suffer too terribly from the overuse of non-free content, which is a great thing- let's try and keep it that way. J Milburn (talk) 00:46, 17 September 2010 (UTC)
File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-R77767, Berlin, Rotarmisten Unter den Linden.jpg may be a better alternative than the postage stamp. If there is any one article where the Raising a flag over the Reichstag should go, it is the Battle of Berlin. -- Petri Krohn (talk) 01:47, 17 September 2010 (UTC)


Belligerents Question?

Does anyone know why the Hellenic State is listed as a Belligerent, they didn't send troops surely did they? I haven't heard this before. Free France listed as being on the Soviet's side because they contributed a fighter squadron, but so did Great Britain (according to the Free French Fighter Squadron wikipage, I am afraid to say I haven't heard this before) but is not listed. Why not the British Empire and the United States which provided substantial aid (which Stalin and other leading Communists said won the war I believe but not sure who said they said that!) and naval forces deliverying aid (and took substantial casualties for the British at least) to the Soviet Union in convoy (as well as the Anglo-American bombing raids which is listed as being the most effective help offered by the Wesren Allies in Soviet/Russian textbooks I believe). Why for example isn't Vichy France listed (which definetly sent troops in a Legion) and Indeed (Fascist) Spain? If the Hellenic State is listed what about Fascist volunteers like Leon Degrelle should they get a mention (I notice that on some of the battles in the Second Gulf War 'Foreign Jihadis' are listed, maybe something like that is needed?)? On the other Side The Soviet Union is listed but what about the various 'Free Forces'(i.e. Communist controlled) they set up such as Polish and Czechslovakian, there were Austrian and German 'Committees' too (the German one did field troops at the end of the war certainly). I suppose in the same logic there were the puppet Russian forces Germany at the end of the war too. What about Estonia and Latvia both sides conscripted forces there as well as various formations in the SS towards the end of the war. What about the 'Forest Brothers' who fought both the Nazi's and the Communists in the Ukraine and (to a smaller extent both) in the Baltic states when the Germans were retreating? Should a mention of the (Communist) Partisans be mentioned? Including the Polish home army which was an ally at times with the Soviet Union and an enemy before (presumably in the 1939-41 occupation though I don't know this for a fact) and afterwards? What about the amaller Polish Communist underground-army. The Warsaw Gehetto uprising and Jewish Partisans? The various Yugoslavian Partisans (he Eastern Front eventually reached here after all)? The SOE (including Jewish members from the Mandate of Palastine) and also the OSS. Crikey! This is getting confusing! It was meant as more of a question rather than a rant honest! What do people think. Is there a format that should be followed for this? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.86.243.150 (talk) 10:50, 7 October 2010 (UTC)

I dont think it makes much sense to mention the Hellenic state. It was only a puppet government without much support and didnt sent any troops. If we add them we have to add other Axis puppet governments like Serbia, Albania, Macedonia and so on too, despite they had no significance for the eastern front. StoneProphet (talk) 14:24, 15 October 2010 (UTC)

Occupation and repression

Please proove that unknown corpses on the picture

File:Victims of Soviet NKVD in Lvov ,June 1941.jpg
Victims of Soviet NKVD in Lviv, June 1941.

are political prisoners and unknown place is Lviv in june 1941. If not, delete it or change description (killed jews etc.).

Also, note that this article is about eastern front, including heroic and bloody struggle with fascism, this article is not dedicated to Stalin repressions. It is not political ring for polish "patriots" etc., so if you are crazy about Stalin-thrillers and corresponding blablabla you can go to relevant page and troll there. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.145.208.129 (talkcontribs)

Please note that political statements are to be avoided in Wikipedia (see WP:NPOV). This image is derived from book Lwów pod okupacją sowiecką (Lviv under Soviet occupation) by Jerzy Węgierski (published in Warsaw, 1991) and I see no reason to question its authenticity. DJ Sturm (talk) 15:38, 24 November 2010 (UTC)
I am sure that this is an interesting book and Jerzy Węgierski is true przekopatriot, but can you, or, maybe, Jerzy Węgierski proove that corpses are 1)political prisoners 2)executed by NKVD 3)in Lviv. However, I think that it is off-topic, and should be removed and placed in appropriate article anyway. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.145.208.129 (talkcontribs)
The book by Jerzy Węgierski is enough proof for us until we see another book which refutes it. Binksternet (talk) 05:40, 25 November 2010 (UTC)

There is a whole article http://wiki.riteme.site/wiki/NKVD_prisoner_massacres. No need to place this content in each page you see in wiki.

The following pictures were added in order to better illustrate the section:

File:Hjalmar Mäe welcomes soldiers of 20th Waffen-SS Division 1944.jpg
Hjalmar Mae welcomes soldiers of Estonian 20th Waffen-SS Division
Map from Stahlecker's report entitled "Jewish Executions Carried Out by Einsatzgruppe A". Estonia is marked as "judenfrei"

—Preceding unsigned comment added by 188.17.84.103 (talk) 13:34, 25 November 2010 (UTC)

Ideologies

Ok, this article has real problems with ideology generally.

This is an article to do with a military conflict between two major powers during WWII on the Eastern Front At the beginning of the article the reader starts of with a lengthy explanation of the terms of use of the term "World War Two -- Eastern Front -- Great Patriotic War, which is boring, and seems to be the result of some discussions people are having about calling the war by its "Soviet/Russian" name and the generally accepted western English name. Is it really necessary to do this right at the beginning of the article? Can't this be trimmed down, with section spun off on "naming" to other pages?

More importantly, we move to the "Ideologies" section and what we have is a few "theoreticals" about why the Soviet Union and National Socialist Germany hated each other. I don't see any similar discussion of politics in any other section about WWII about what was made Hitler despise the French "ideology" and I don't think we need one here. Why?

Case in point about the problem of discussing "ideology" in this "military" article is the segment that claims Stalin paid "lip service" to spreading Marxism and Leninism globally, while plotting to make "socialism in one country" and using "socialism in one country" as "excuse to industrialize". This is highly, highly theoretical, theoretical and political, not to mention ideologically disputable. I mean (seriously) did Great Britain use "capitalism" as an "excuse" to "industrialize"... and does one really need an "excuse" to industrialize? What does industrialization have to do with "socialism in one country", as opposed to "world socialism". What were they supposed to do? De-industrialize in order to create "world socialism"? Bit silly, that.

These issues are way to complex and "ideological" to compress into a single paragraph, and these subjects deserve their own pages to do service to them, and they do not really have a place in a discussion of the grand strategic and military activities in this front in WWII. If people want to do deeper research into the complex issues of National Socialism under Hitler, and Soviet ideology under Stalin, they can look for those subjects elsewhere.

This article should try and restrict itself to the main lines of the actual military conflict. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 206.248.134.109 (talk) 11:10, 25 December 2010 (UTC)

I do not agree. Every problem can be compressed into a few sentences. The article would lack dimension if it had only combat activities sections. Part of the causes of the war were the ideologies. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 17:15, 25 December 2010 (UTC)

Sure, and that should be properly contained in the more general article about World War II, not an article about the "Eastern Front" which is a specific military operational theater of World War Two. You will not find similar discussions of ideologies in Wikipedia pages relating to other theaters of operations, such as the Normandy invasion, which begins simply with an introduction, a discussion of the strategic parameters of those operations, and then Allied perpetration and German preparations and so forth. Same with the article on Fall Weiss, which offers a brief summary of the basis of the territorial dispute. The articles on Fall Gelb and Fall Rot are similarly lacking in any discussion of fundamental ideological disputes between the parties.

This article seems to be doing too many things at once. It is either a discussion of the "Eastern Front", as a military operational theater in World War two, or it is actually an article on "the Great Patriotic war" more generally speaking, in which case it should be titled as that. Indeed, the article should decided what it really is, since it seems redundant in the context of the existing article about "Operation Barbarossa".

If one intends to create an article about the general political basis of the conflict between the Soviet Union and Germany in 1941 beyond military affairs, then it should not be called "Eastern Front". "Front" is specifically a precise military term. Eastern Front, should simply redirect to the Barbarossa article. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 206.248.134.109 (talk) 20:37, 25 December 2010 (UTC)

Belligerents

I removed the US from the infobox, because economic aid hardly can be considered as belligerence. --Paul Siebert (talk) 04:32, 26 December 2010 (UTC)

Number of Soviet citizens fleeing the Nazi German invasion

Perhaps the numbers of Soviet citizens that were forced out of their homes by Nazi Germany should be added, the estimates are:

  • Contemporary Soviet military affairs: the legacy of World War II, Page 4

Jonathan R. Adelman,Cristann Lea Gibson Another 17 to 25 million people fled eastwards in the path of the German advance in 1941 and 1942

  • The Bread of Affliction: The Food Supply in the USSR During World War II

William Moskoff page 30-31 Gives 16,5 milion

  • US intelligence perceptions of Soviet power, 1921-1946

Léonard Leshuk page 182 In fact though, 20 million was close to the true number of for the post-Barbarossa formal evacuation

Since it seems the largest forced movement of people during the time of WW2 and its aftermath, this perhaps should be added.--MyMoloboaccount (talk) 00:09, 28 December 2010 (UTC)

Is there any way to find out how many of those millions left their homes voluntarily and how many were victims of deportations (see population transfer in the Soviet Union)? DJ Sturm (talk) 03:22, 28 December 2010 (UTC)
Most deportations (except deportation of Volga Germans) took place later, so most probably these 20 million people left their homes voluntarily (or they were the military plants' personnel).--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:04, 28 December 2010 (UTC)
I do not mean they were deportations. I mean that they were forced by Nazi agression.--MyMoloboaccount (talk) 10:25, 28 December 2010 (UTC)
As Soviet sources repeatedly described 1941 deportations as "evacuation", I believe that those numbers may include 1941 deportations from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. DJ Sturm (talk) 13:13, 28 December 2010 (UTC)
These deportations occurred mostly before June 22. The total number of deported after that date was negligible as compared with the number of 20 million.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:47, 28 December 2010 (UTC)
Yes, well, we can't be sure that the numbers MyMoloboaccount gave us are only about what happened since June 22, especially if they come originally from Soviet sources. DJ Sturm (talk) 18:28, 28 December 2010 (UTC)
I think MyMoloboaccount should present the quotes from these sources to demonstrate in what context these figures are mentioned. Regarding the validity of the sources, these books seem to be written by Western scholars. If you believe they are not reliable, please, provide an evidence.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:35, 28 December 2010 (UTC)

Template:"Romanian military actions in World War II" on eastern front articles

Hi, I would like to invite some editors for discussion of the use of this Template:Romanian_military_actions_in_World_War_II template, which is spreaded on eastern front articles, here: Template_talk:Romanian_military_actions_in_World_War_II. StoneProphet (talk) 16:47, 1 March 2011 (UTC)

"during the later phases of the conflict"

"during the later phases of the conflict" is in the lead, so it needs to be strong and solid. As far as we know, there was substantial Lend-Lease (and other) support to the USSR from quite early in the campaign, and the support continued until 1945 at least (that's three or four years of support) so I'm puzzled by this caveat in the lead. Can we remove it? --Demiurge1000 (talk) 04:09, 5 March 2011 (UTC)

According to Alexander Hill, The Journal of Military History 71 (July 2007), p. 773–808, only Britain provided help for the USSR in 1941-first half of 1942. American help was essentially limited with thawing of the Soviet assets and allowing them to purchase some armaments and materials. In addition, the USA provided far more help for the UK than for the USSR. However, since British help started to arrive almost immediately after Barbarossa started and, despite its limited scale, had played substantial role during the most critical WWII battles (Moscow and Stalingrad), the "during the later phases of the conflict" refers to the US only. I don't think we need to remove it, just to re-phrase. In addition, since I have no idea on what "financial aid" the lede is talking about (Lend-Lease was a material aid), I removed that.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:39, 5 March 2011 (UTC)
Thanks, I think this is an improvement. However, there is still an issue of emphasis here. The Eastern Front lasted approximately four years, and as I understand it, of that four years, the USA provided help for approximately three years, and the UK for closer to four. The current phrasing could leave the reader wondering if the USA aid was only for the final year or final couple of years of the conflict. It also disrupts the flow of the lead somewhat.
I think the best place for making fine distinctions about how much aid was provided and for how long, is in the body of the article, not in the lead. However, at present, it's in the lead but not discussed at all in the body! How about moving discussion of this (the timing of the aid, not the aid itself) to the relevant section in the body of the article, maybe incorporating the source you mention? --Demiurge1000 (talk) 12:17, 8 March 2011 (UTC)
Sorry for not answering immediately. I agree with this your suggestion. What concrete text do you propose?--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:06, 8 April 2011 (UTC)

Mistake in the description of one of the photographs on the main "Eastern Front (World War II)" wiki page

One of the description of a photograph on this page suggests that the tanks shown are Tiger 1s. This is incorrect. The photograph is either of a Panther or late model Mark 4 tanks. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Tulsa90 (talkcontribs) 18:42, 8 April 2011 (UTC)

Judging by the description of original photograph provided by Bundesarchiv, it is Tiger I. It is definitely not a Panther (the barrel shape is different). It can be (theoretically) Panzer IV, however, it more resembles Tiger I. In any event, if you want to change the caption, please, provide a source.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:00, 8 April 2011 (UTC)

New photos

RIA Novosti donated 100 new photos to Commons. They would be great in this article. [2] USchick (talk) 21:55, 27 June 2011 (UTC)

Ukrainian insurgent army were not collaborators

It was built as a military guerrila force against Nazi and communists. 195.137.203.26 (talk) 14:07, 10 May 2011 (UTC)

I agree. If collaborationism is cooperation with enemy forces against one's country, then fighting for the independent Ukraine was not collaborationism, even if partially sharing the same goals with Germans. DJ Sturm (talk) 14:27, 10 May 2011 (UTC)
That is hardly correct. Since no independent Ukraine existed during this time (independent East Ukraine was a co-founder of the USSR, and it voluntarily joined it in 1922, and West Ukraine was a part of Poland, which was annexed to the UkrSSR), their country could be either the USSR (for Eastern Ukrainians), or Poland (for Western Ukrainians). Since Germany was at war against both these countries, any collaboration with Germany is a collaboration with enemy forces. The fact that Ukraine would become independent in future does not change a situation much.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:59, 15 July 2011 (UTC)
The independence of Ukraine is irrelevant here. The UPA troops did not consider themselves neither Polish nor Soviet citizens.--Jaan Pärn (talk) 17:54, 15 July 2011 (UTC)
I understand that. However, do you think self-identification matters in this case? If we take Estonia as an example, we can speak about the citizens of the illegally annexed state, who continued to consider themselves as the citizens of this state, not of the USSR. That fact, not the future re-gaining of independence by Estonia does not allow us to speak about any treason when we discuss Estonians and the USSR during the WWII. However, during the WWII time Ukraine was one of the members of the USSR, and both Eastern and Western Ukraine was a part of this state. Of course, Ukrainian insurgents could consider themselves not the Soviet citizens. However, that does not change the fact that the Ukrainian state did exist during that time, and that it was a part of the USSR, and no other Ukraine (except some self-declared semi-state entity, which was not recognized by anyone) existed during that time.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:11, 15 July 2011 (UTC)
Moreover, following your logic, everyone who claims that he is not a citizen of some certain state (despite his actual legal status) is automatically immune against any accusation in collaboration with enemy of this state...--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:19, 15 July 2011 (UTC)
Estonia is a bad example here. Perhaps the involvement of the Palestine Liberation Organization during the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would be more accurate for people without citizenship. You would not treat the organisation fighting for the unrecognised Palestinian State as Arab collaborators and traitors of Israel just because the latter may have technically considered them Israeli citizens, would you? This article lists the Ukrainian nationalist commanders separately, indicating separate belligerency. They genuinely regarded themselves as citizens of an independent Ukraine, rendering their Polish or Soviet citizenships a mere technicality. This is not a matter you can just formally dismiss.
However, where the Estonian example does apply, is the common situation where an (unrecognised) state has two or more enemies at a time, who are in turn enemies to each other. The traditional concept of collaboration does not apply here, as fighting an enemy would end up on the other enemy's side sooner or later. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 09:12, 16 July 2011 (UTC)
By contrast to Palestine, Ukraine was a state that legally and voluntarily joined the USSR as a co-founder. The annexation of Western Ukraine was questionable, however, (i) it is not questionable now (noone questions the fact that this land belongs to Ukraine as a successor of the UkrSSR), (ii) the goals of the Ukrainian nationalists was not to create the independent state in West Ukraine, but to convert the existing state (East+West Ukraine, i.e. UkrSSR) into the non-Communist independent state. In other words, their action were aimed against the existing Ukrainian state entity (which had equally the same rights as other founding members of the USSR had), so they were insurgents. Although insurgence is not a treason per se, collaboration with the enemy of the current state authorities is. --Paul Siebert (talk) 20:38, 16 July 2011 (UTC)
PS For sources, see, e.g. John A. Armstrong. Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe. The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Sep., 1968), pp. 396-410. The author speaks about OUN's "affinity" towards Nazism, about strong influence of Italian fascism on EE nationalists, and about their "collaboration" with Nazi, although sometimes "reluctant".--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:54, 16 July 2011 (UTC)
I won't argue against the sources. My point was that I can understand why it is complicated to assess the insurgents as collaborators. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 09:02, 17 July 2011 (UTC)
I agree that the subject is rather complicated, and, in my opinion, both categorical statements ("they were collaborators" and "they were not collaborators") are oversimplification.--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:45, 18 July 2011 (UTC)

Spain?

Would it be fair to list Spain as an Axis belligerent, flag and all? It's contribution was certainly up there with Slovokia and Croatia. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 165.200.85.39 (talk) 14:43, 15 July 2011 (UTC)

This question has already been discussed. See talk page archives. Although some Spaniards did participate in the Eastern front hostilities as the Wehrmacht soldiers, Spain did not. This country was neutral, its role was just to authorise some of its citizens to take a personal oath to Hitler and to join German armed forces.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:52, 15 July 2011 (UTC)

Military casualties

According to German casualties in World War II, German casualties on Eastern Front were 2,742,909 dead as of 12/31/1944. This article says the number was 4,000,000. Both pages are citing the same source, R. Overmans. Is there explanation to this inconsistency?—Евгений Пивоваров (talk) 08:38, 23 June 2011 (UTC)

There is no inconsistency here, because the Eastern Front hostilities ended in May 9, 1945, not in December 12, 1944. In 1945, more than 60% of German troops fought against the Red Army, and, accordingly, more than a half of total casualties in 1945 were sustained in the East. Added together, these figures give 4 millions. --Paul Siebert (talk) 15:47, 15 July 2011 (UTC)
This should be correct. I personally believe that even a larger part than 60 % of the German casualties in 1945 come from the Eastern front, because it was a slightly different kind of war, and the picture I have is that desperation was far more significative in the Eastern parts of Germany.EriFr (talk) 05:45, 6 September 2011 (UTC)

Military casualties II

I have a question about the number of German POW dead in Soviet captivity. Of the 2,008,000 men listed as missing or unaccounted for after the war Overmans states that it seems "plausible while not provable" that half (~1,000,000 men) died in Soviet custody. I have never figured out how this statement corresponds with the 363,000 men listed as total number of men dead in Soviet capitivity? EriFr (talk) 20:06, 30 August 2011 (UTC)

horses

fascinating article. but i wonder if many of these writings of the Eastern Front are not missing a bit of the ordinary picture. take the photos for example. most are of fancy german tanks and airplanes. but what of this quote from Horses_in_World_War_II article?

"Infantry and horse-drawn artillery formed the bulk of the German Army throughout the war; only one-fifth of the Army belonged to mobile panzer and mechanized divisions"

Pictures like these are probably more representative of the experience of the average person:

i don't feel like i have a good feel for where to put this information into the article, but i thought it might be interesting to discuss the issue. Decora (talk) 16:40, 11 November 2011 (UTC)


Information about importance of the Eastern Front

Barely readable and poorly formatted discussion

Hello,

I'd like to express my view about this information of the Eastern Front importance provided in the article:

"The Eastern Front was decisive in determining the outcome of World War II, eventually serving as the main reason for Germany's defeat."

In fact the Eastern Front was the theater that drained most blood from the Germans. But most historians agreed that if it had fought alone, the USSR victory would be questionable at least.

I think the article appears to give the the idea that the Soviets would win anyway, which as I already said above, is at least questionable by most. Information about the substancial Lend Lease aid is provided (something of constant debate), but fells in contradiction with the other information I quoted.

My suggestion would be change it to or something like: "The Eastern Front was the most important direct theater of operations for the defeat of Germany".

What are your opinions about this?

Are we addressing the wrong problem here? If most historians agree that the USSR would most likely not have won alone, then we should simply make sure to say so clearly (suitably referenced), not tweak the wording of the lead to alter what ideas the reader might or might not take away from the article as a whole. And in fact, maybe we already do say so, later in the article?
I have a suspicion that the half-sentence that concerns you is likely to have been discussed here in considerable detail in the past, so I don't know if some of those discussions should be taken into account too.
Either way, if the change you suggest is implemented, I would say it definitely doesn't need the word "direct", since that implies something that doesn't seem to be the case. --Demiurge1000 (talk) 14:12, 22 September 2011 (UTC)

Demiurge, I didn't thought when created this topic. This is an encyclopedia after all. We need to provide te people with information about the facts, not tweak their views about alternative history, right?(the post has been made by user:Marcelo Jenisch--P.S.)

(Firstly, I recommend you to sign your posts by typing four tildas)
Secondly, the statement "But most historians agreed that if it had fought alone, the USSR victory would be questionable at least." is not correct. For instance, such a reputable scholar as David Glantz believes that the victory was possible, although it would be more costly. The reason for that was simple: the USSR won the most decisive battles, the battles of Moscow and Stalingrad, virtually alone, because no considerable military of economic aid from the West had been provided by that moment. After Stalingrad, it was impossible for Germany to win (just to make separate peace with the USSR).--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:59, 22 September 2011 (UTC)

He belives it was POSSIBLE. I just said it would be at least questionable.

And about the Western Allies irrelevant aid at the start, I suggest you to read this: http://www.historynet.com/russias-life-saver-lend-lease-aid-to-the-ussr-in-world-war-ii-book-review.htm

And what about the participation of the Allies in holding a good portion of the Axis troops in Europe and the Japanese in the Asia (the Chinese, too) and Pacific don't count?

And I belive the Western Allies could defeat Germany by themselfs in the same way the Soviets. ;) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Marcelo_Jenisch (talk) 19:26, 22 September 2011 (UTC)

Re Asia, the situation is reverse: the largest Japanese Kwantung army was concentrated along the Amur river, so the USSR kept 750,000 troops and 1000 tanks in Far East. By virtue of their presence, these Soviet troops were tying down the best Japanese land army, which would be instrumental somewhere else (e.g. in continental China or Burma).
Re the ability of the Allies to defend Germany. We have an example, the Ardennee offensive. Even the remnants of the Wechrmacht, which was a pale shadow of its former self appeared to be capable to almost defeat combined British and American troops. Without the Red Army Omaha would become a huge Dieppe.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:33, 22 September 2011 (UTC)
In Asia, the situation is reverse only if you want to see it in this way. The IJA probably would have launched an offensive against the Russians if it was not deeplt envolved with the ALLIED China. This also woud meant Army equipment and industrial production priority, not extremely expensive naval production.
Your example of the Battle of the Bulge is only showing your ignorance, on the same way you already did by saying the Russians would be capable of win the war alone just because they win more battles in the historic context. Superficial analyze and thought.
Get some facts:
All of Russians first-class aviation gasoline was supplied by the USA. A great deal of food was American. Their boots, most of the uniform material was as well. Plus rubber for the their tires, all their aluminum, fully 1/3 of their munitions, over 500,000 trucks which were all far better than any Russian produced during the war (about 200,000). The 9000 or so tanks supplied by the Allies were a small amount but helped. Upgunned (76mm) Shermans were a big part of the Russian drive through the Balkans, where hundreds of them participatedm and had a measure of success. Aerocobras, P40s, C-47 and A-20's (18000+) all considerably assisted the Russian war effort. Almost all telephone communication was over American phones late in the war. The Russians produced 92 locomotives during the war. They got 2000 through lend-lease. The numbers go on and on, but a picture of the value of Lend-Lease should start making itself clear.
The Western Allies had far more than a marginal role in defeating the Germans. This role was to tie down the majority of manufactured items being in the west and not in the east.
Well over half the Luftwaffe was engaged in the west from 1942-45, and 75% of German aircraft casualties were against the Western Allies. Each U-boat cost 5 million marks to build. The Germans built over 1000. A panther tank cost 117 thousand marks. That means about 40,000 German tanks were not built so that the Germans could wage the war of the Atlantic. Think 40,000 panthers might have made a difference on the Eastern Front? Each V2 rocket cost in labor and material, the same as 3.5 fighter planes. The Germans launched over 3000 V2's. Do the math on that.
The British and Americans deployed over 20,000 heavy bombers against the Germans, suffering horrendous casaulites, and also doling out great destruction. The Russians never developed one.
There were also 10000 heavy caliber anti-aircraft guns defending the reich. Do you think those would have shored up German defenses in the east?
What would have happend if Rommel's Africa corps and the 30+ german divisions in France would have been in the don bend in the fall of 1942 protecting Stalingrad, instead of waiting for the British and Americans to land? What would have happed if the 400,000 good troops station in Norway could have helped Army Group North capture Leningrad? What would have happened if the 30+ divisions fighting in Italy and the Balkans for the Germans could have been freed to fight against the Russians in the south? What would have happed if in 1944, the German armies trying to hold the Allies out of France would have been sent to BelaRussia in prior to Bagraton?
The Germans were never really able to muster much more than half their real strength against the Ruissias. They were fighting a technological war against the brits and americans that required a huge effort from a manufacturing standpoint to counter. Russians give the allies no credit for tying down so many German resources and destroying so many others (30% of total production in 1944) with their strategic bombing campaign.
I suppose if I lost 25 million peple in the war, I might feel the same way. But that would be ignoring the real facts regarding the relative contribution of the Western Allies in the defeat of the German nation. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Marcelo Jenisch (talkcontribs) 21:56, 22 September 2011 (UTC)
Firstly, please, I'll appreciate if you will use colons to format your responce properly (in the same way I've done for you). That makes the thread more readable.
Secondly, in responce to your post I have to say the following.
Re IJA offensive, yes, I think the USSR had no chances against the whole Axis in the case if Britain and the US never existed. However, in this case the Axis would never formed: Hitler was very suspicious of Japan, and there would be no Germano-Japanese alliance. Regarding the Japanese decision not to attack the USSR (in Dec 1941 and Dec 1942), they did plan to do so in the case of major Soviet defeats under Moscow or Stalingrad. However, that hadn't happen, and the role of the Western allies was minimal in that. In addition, as some scholars believe, the Khalkhin Gol (Nomonhan) lesson was duly learnt by the IJA staff.
Re "Your example of the Battle of the Bulge is only showing your ignorance" Please, clarify.
Re Lend Lease, let the sources to speak for themselves:
"...it must be stressed that the major impact came after the Soviet counterattack and the beginning of German retreat. Such aid directly and indirectly helped defeat the German forces, and was in such a way a substitute for a second front, but it did little to defend the USSR from the initial onslaught."
"It is nonsense to repeat the figure of four per cent of Soviet wartime production and disingenuous to disparage western aid - a feature evident in Soviet literature and one criticized even by Khrushchev. It is nonetheless true (and this is a point repeated in some Soviet works) that Britain and the Empire received far more than the USSR from the United States. Lend-lease, in this respect, may be seen as a temporary substitute for foreign trade. Britain was a major trading nation, highly dependent on imports, especially for food and raw materials. The USSR, on the other hand, was an economy with little trade dependence whose foreign trade turnover had fallen steadily during the 1930s. Lend-lease was more of a substitute for home production." (Lend-Lease and the Soviet War Effort Author(s): Roger MuntingSource: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Jul., 1984), pp. 495-510)
Re "This role was to tie down the majority of manufactured items being in the west and not in the east." Figures, please.
Re "That means about 40,000 German tanks were not built" And what crew was supposed to drive these tanks? Germany had a desperate situation with personnel, due to the Eastern front.
Re "The British and Americans deployed over 20,000 heavy bombers against the Germans, suffering horrendous casaulites" ... that had been sustained vainly. Read the American Strategic Bombing Survay, for example. Only by late 1944, when the Allies realised that the real target of these bombing had to be oil storage and transportation facilities the bombing started to be efficient.
Re "The Russians never developed one." For example, Pe-8. In addition, only two countries, the US and Britain, adopted the doctrine according to which the bombing of civilian target would have a strategic value.
Re "There were also 10000 heavy caliber anti-aircraft guns" They were too heavy to be suitable for usage in the wast territories of European Russia.
Re Rommel etc. Taking into account that the total number of German division in the East was several hundreds, I don't think their impact would be too dramatic.
Re "The Germans were never really able to muster much more than half their real strength against the Ruissias." That is simply untrue. The real numbers were as follows:
Number of the Axis troops
Year Total in the West
1941 3,767,000 23%
1942 3,720,000 20%
1943 3,933,000 37%
1944 3,370,000 38%
1945 2,330,000 40%
(Source David Glantz) I would say, the number had never been less then 60% in the East.
--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:10, 23 September 2011 (UTC)


":::Firstly, please, I'll appreciate if you will use colons to format your responce properly (in the same way I've done for you). That makes the thread more readable."

Gonna writte clearly now. Just don't edit my posts for any reason. I don't like this.

":::Re IJA offensive, yes, I think the USSR had no chances against the whole Axis in the case if Britain and the US never existed. However, in this case the Axis would never formed: Hitler was very suspicious of Japan, and there would be no Germano-Japanese alliance."

I think it would be REALLY difficult. Still it cannot be said it would be impossible. I'm not saying that confractuations are facts, my goal is try keep this whole thing in the confractuation zone. Therefore mather of personal opinion only. You that are trying to put confractuations as facts.

"Regarding the Japanese decision not to attack the USSR (in Dec 1941 and Dec 1942), they did plan to do so in the case of major Soviet defeats under Moscow or Stalingrad. However, that hadn't happen, and the role of the Western allies was minimal in that. In addition, as some scholars believe, the Khalkhin Gol (Nomonhan) lesson was duly learnt by the IJA staff."

Minimal? Stalin loved the oil embargo that Roosevelt put in Japan. It could have been this very factor that saved his neck. The Japanese were a military government, and both the Army and Navy did put pressure for their attacks. The attack in the in the Pacific was purely desesperation. If Roosevelt didn't mather with the Soviets, it was just question to give the Japanese their oil and good will to put them against Stalin. However at this time the US was already allied with the Soviet cause. And I don't remember were I read now, but the US embassador even treath the Japanese embassador in a conversation if they launched an attack against the USSR.

And the use of "Britain and the US never existed" was too much in my view. The Axis were an Allience. US and European countries could simple remained neutral. Also they had the Anti Commie pact. Germany, Italy, Japan and their Allies could perfectly launched a war against the USSR to eliminate a treat and share it's resources.

About Nomonhan, the IJA staff learned some serious lessons on how to FIGHT the Soviets with it. The Army never give up of the idea of attack the USSR. Even the Navy had some simpaty for the cause if it's advance in the Pacific would not be halted. War between the two countries was probably inevitable. Get rid of the Communist treat was one of the largest security problems for Japan. Matsuoka's secretary comments this in the World at War Banzai episodie, he said: "But when an integration against the north parted [the oil], the Army naturally joined up with the Navy". Obviously, the Army only choosed this way for maintain the war in China and be able to fight the Soviets in the future because the critical resources needed.

Re::: The Battle of the Bulge:

"Please, clarify"

Why you don't see the aspects of the battle from the Allied side?

Why the Soviets can loose several battles like they did in Barbarossa and their mistakes being extremely analized and justified by "intelectual" (not infrequentely with leftist tendencies) individuals like you, but when the case is with the Western Allies they are criticized by one supposedly less than expected performance based in anachronism?

Battles are won by several factors. Anachronism is not nice here. The Western Allies won in the Bulge. The Soviet sucess in Bagration for instance, was not guaranteed when it was launched. It could had end up much worse than in the Bulge. With even defeat.

Re::: Lend Lease:

Yes, the Soviets could produce everything they needed. But look the link I posted above. The importance of the Lend Lease is well illustrated. Also, no Lend Lease, less material produced, more casualities for the Soviet side, and less for the German side. The course of battles could have changed for both sides, specially the Soviets. The Soviets would resist this and the combined offensive of all the Axis powers? Pehaps, isn't? I'm just trying to point all this is something of impossible complexity, and therefore should be let in the field of personal opinions.

"That means about 40,000 German tanks were not built And what crew was supposed to drive these tanks? Germany had a desperate situation with personnel, due to the Eastern front"

Perhaps they wouldn't have if they could master their forces there from the start; less casualities, more experienced personal and refined tanks, and vice versa for the Soviets, you know...

Also the money and the time spent with the subs for example, could had be used to solve many other problems, produce even more refined weapons and in greather numbers, including nuclear weapons.

Re::: The Anglo-American bombing, some things:

Most of the Luftwaffe in Europe, as well as it's casualities, nice isn't? If in one area the Germans were most superior to the Russians, this area was in the air. Vital for offensive and deffensive operations. The Luftwaffe would be capable to expand this advantage even more with specialized aircraft and aeronautical technology devolped just to be focused against the VVS (the Soviet Air Force). I have much confidence the German Air Force alone against it was more than capable of add prohibitive losses on the Russians as well as it did with the USAAF unescorted bombers.

Lots of AA guns, lots of personal, lot's of ammunition.

Lots of night fighters (and a lot of expensive technology and research for better night fighting systems).

A lot of destruction in the cities, reconstruction work of factories when more could be build, not rebuild. Less production. Less production quality.

Dispersion of factories for avoid bombing. Less production.

Chaos for delivery of the manufactured belical material. Influence in the battles.

LOTS of money.

Lots of German lifes lost. A good less chance of win the East. That in the end was confirmed.

I'm here to "fight" with you as long as I can. But one thing you already admitted: you don't belive the USSR could hold all the Axis countries together. Repeating, I said this would be much difficult, but not impossible. Just don't want confractuations as truth. Wars are like plane crash investigation, it's usually not one or the big factor, but several of them together. ;) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Marcelo Jenisch (talkcontribs) 17:02, 23 September 2011 (UTC)

Continuing...

   German heavy AA guns in the West:

"They were too heavy to be suitable for usage in the wast territories of European Russia."

The Flak guns were excellent. They were used with excellent results against the Russians. At the start the 88mm flak was the German gun capable of deal with the armor of the T-34 from any angle.

"Re Rommel etc. Taking into account that the total number of German division in the East was several hundreds, I don't think their impact would be too dramatic."

Mate, as I already told you above, every situation deservers detalist attention and consideration of it's consequences. For example, +500,000 troops to perhaps sucesfully defeat the Soviet counter attack in Moscow could have desastrous consequences in subsequent events. Gross numbers are no everything. I can't belive someone who has PHD in anything can tell such a thing. I will not even add the full strenght of the Japanese and Italians here.

"Re "The Germans were never really able to muster much more than half their real strength against the Ruissias." That is simply untrue. The real numbers were as follows:"

Same above. The numbers only don't matter much. It's the way they are and can be employed. The Germans would love not to have the African front to have 30,000 higly trainned troops instead of the Romanians to defend treir flanks in Stalingrad. The excess of numbers the Germans employed in the West was well enough to have possibility to make a crucial difference.

The Russians want "justice" in the West by their participation in the war. The problem is they will not found this justice while they wanted to say they won the war by themselfs. They played a very important role, directing inflicting the heaviest casualities in the Germans. Still, there's no guaranteed they would make it alone. In fact the chances were low.

They need (and you also need Siebert) to think about the Allies in WWII as the arms of an Army. You have artillery, logistics, infantary and so forth. All have their importance. Not only the infantrymen (USSR) just because they were most exposed and usually take more casualities.

By the way, I suggest you to put the entire content of this article in the WWII one and rename it "The Great Patriotic War". The only relevant conflict after WWI was the war against the Soviet Union and Germany. The other Allies were mere oportunists. Mother Russia that won and would won regardless of the situation always. =D

Your post is hard to read. Please reformat it according to standard rules. Thanks.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:07, 24 September 2011 (UTC)

"Hard to read" so you didn't answer for this?

Siebert, go find another excuse because this is one I'm already tired. My post can be very well understood.

I'll not reformat it, just add the key points for you:

Re::: number of Axis troops:

The numbers only don't matter much. It's the way they are and can be employed. The Germans would love not to have the African front to have 30,000 higly trainned troops instead of the Romanians to defend treir flanks in Stalingrad. +500,000 troops to perhaps sucesfully defeat the Soviet counter attack in Moscow could have desastrous consequences in subsequent events. Gross numbers are no everything. I can't belive someone who has PHD in anything can tell such a thing. I will not even add the full strenght of the Japanese and Italians here.

Re::: view about the importance of the Soviet participation:

The Russians particulary, want "justice" in the West by their participation in the war. The problem is they will not found this justice while they want to injusticed the West on the same way they did behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War. They played a very important role, directing inflicting the heaviest casualities in the Germans. Still, there's no guaranteed they would make it alone. In fact the chances were low. And the Western Allies also could won the war. Great Britain and the US were determined to fight the Germans. They managed to obtain crucial air superiority to proceed with the Normandy landings taking on and destroying most of the LW. There's one sad habit among many historians today to disregard the Westerns capability to wage war against Germany.


They need (and you also need Siebert) to think about the Allies in WWII as the arms of an Army. You have artillery, logistics, infantary and so forth. All have their importance. Not only the infantrymen (USSR) just because they were most exposed and usually take more casualities. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Marcelo Jenisch (talkcontribs) 12:51, 24 September 2011 (UTC)

Since the talk pages are not a soapbox, any general discussion of the article's subject does not belong to here. I can respond on the concretely and politely formulated, and well formatted posts. However, I am not obliged to answer on the posts like this.
I can answer on two key questions you asked in your last post, because they are more concrete.
Re number of Axis troops. Your statement is based on some assumptions that are not obvious for me and that need to be confirmed by non-fringe reliable sources.
Firstly, you assume that the troops in the East were less trained. Do you have a proof for that?
Secondly, you assume that the troops that were specially trained and equipped for the desert campaigns would be highly valuable for two winter campaign in Central Russia. What this assumption is based on?
Thirdly, you forgot that even it the case of the British neutrality some troops had to be stationed in the occupied France, Norway, and, especially, Yugoslavia and Poland, who continued the partisan war, and who were tying down considerable Axis troops.
And, finally. I agree that it is quite possible to construct some imaginary world where the Axis could win. However, that is totally artificial. For example, in the absence of USA, Germany would never sign a pact with Japan, so the structure of the military blocks would be quite different.
Re view about the importance of the Soviet participation.
I am not talking about any "justice". I prefer to speak in the term of reliable sources.
Re The possibility of the US and British victory, that cannot be theoretically ruled out, however, I cannot imagine how could it happen. And, despite the fact that I do not like such speculations, let's speculate on that in the same way you just did. So...
I don't consider a scenario when the USSR was neutral, because that situation could not last long. I also do not consider a scenario of the Germano-Italo-Japano-Soviet aliance, because in that situation the Alliet victory would be impossible. Therefore, we consider the possibility of the Soviet defeat in 1942, which was the most plausible.
The USSR has been defeated, so Germany and Japan established the land road to Japan, got an unlimited access to Soviet oil, grain and tungsten ore. Consequences would be devastating.
Firstly, Japan obtain massive technological and industrial aid from Germany, which shifts the balance of naval power to the Japanese side (or, at least, makes the American victory totally impossible); Micronesia, Melanesia, Indonesia and Philippines etc remain Japan forever.
Secondly, Japan does not need to keep its best Kwantung Army in Manchuria; Burma is successfully conquered.
Thirdly, Hitler send 20 more divisions (for example, a Guderian's Panzer army) to Libya; that is sufficient to take Cairo and Suez canal. Middle east greets the Germans; pro-German fractions in Iraq comes to power. India is surrounded by the Axis troops, and the only connection with its metropolia is performed around the Cape of Good Hope; I am not sure the pro-German forces would prevail in India in this situation, however, that is highly likely.
Fourthly, the access to the Soviet oil dramatically increased the production of diesel fuel in Germany (their well developed synthetic fuel industry produced needed amount of gasoline, however, they could not produce diesel fuel using this technology). That intensified German naval operations in Atlantic.
Fifthly, Germany re-located all its military plants to East Ukraine and Urals. American bombers cannot reach there plants, so the steady military production rises dramatically.
And, finally, taking into account that by the moment the WWII started more than a half of all Nobel prize winners lived in the German speaking world, and taking into account that, despite the decline of the fundamental science in Germany under Nazi, the applied science and technology were in an excellent shape, and, taking into account that the Germans were the pioneers in development of electron computers, rockets and atomic fission, it is highly likely that the vast resources that were at the disposal of Germany in an absence of the Eastern front guaranteed that the first atomic bomb would be developed in Germany, and, accordingly, would explode over London or New York.
I don't think my speculations have lesser ground that yours.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:31, 24 September 2011 (UTC)

"::Firstly, you assume that the troops in the East were less trained. Do you have a proof for that?"

Don't remember to have said this.

"::Secondly, you assume that the troops that were specially trained and equipped for the desert campaigns would be highly valuable for two winter campaign in Central Russia. What this assumption is based on?"

Troops not needed to be trained for the desert, as they would not be needed.

"::Thirdly, you forgot that even it the case of the British neutrality some troops had to be stationed in the occupied France, Norway, and, especially, Yugoslavia and Poland, who continued the partisan war, and who were tying down considerable Axis troops."

No Allies, forgot? Such occupations would not existed.

"::And, finally. I agree that it is quite possible to construct some imaginary world where the Axis could win."

Perhaphs, isn't? That war could had endless outcomes.

"However, that is totally artificial. For example, in the absence of USA, Germany would never sign a pact with Japan, so the structure of the military blocks would be quite different."

Why? Japan wished to destroy the Soviet treat. The Anti-Comintern was signed before the Axis pact. It would be absolutely natural, the own Japanese told this to the Germans:

Italic textFollowing the invasion of the USSR on June 22, 1941, pressure was made on the Japanese government to join the invasion. On July 9, 1942, Ribbentrop tried to convince Ōshima to urge his government to join the attack on the Soviet Union, his main argument being that "never again would Japan have such an opportunity as existed at present to eliminate once and for all the Russian colossus in eastern Asia".[10] On March 6, 1943, Ōshima delivered Ribbentrop the following official statement from the Japanese government:

   "The Japanese Government absolutely recognize the danger which threatens from Russia and completely understand the desire of their German ally that Japan on her part will also enter the war against Russia. However, it is not possible for the Japanese Government, considering the present war situation, to enter into the war. They are rather of the conviction that it would be in the common interest not to start the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese Government would never disregard the Russian question"Italic text

http://wiki.riteme.site/wiki/Hiroshi_%C5%8Cshima

"I don't think my speculations have lesser ground that yours."

They really don't have. Unless we have a time machine to try validate confractuations as factualities.

But listen, you already adressed the problem here (your problem in fact). I just told you the Soviet victory was not guaranteed against the Axis alone, the view from most historians. But you cited the Soviet Union WOULD win WWII alone regardless of it's alliance with the Western countries. You even cited the opinion of Robert Geoffs. I sent him an e-mail and he kindly ansewer me his point, here is the content:

Italic textDear Marcello,

You are missing my point. The western military contribution to the defeat of Hitler only became important after the Soviets had survived Operation Barbarossa and defeated the Germans at Moscow and after the Red Army turned the tide of the war at Stalingrad. These victories were achieved by the Soviets largely on their own resources. Yes it was useful that the British and Americans tied down some German forces and resources in 1941-1942 but I don't think this was decisive to the outcome of events on the Eastern Front. The important contribution of the western allies came later when their lend-lease supplies and military campaign in the west greatly facilitated the Soviet march to Berlin. That vital western contribution was recognised and appreciated by the Soviets at the time (as it is by Russians today) and by me in my book Stalin's Wars.

You should note that my argument is the the Soviets "could' have won WW2 alone not that they "would" have won had they fought alone against Hitler. I argue that they could have won alone not because I am certain that is what would have happened but in order to emphasise the centrality and importance of the Soviets to the war's course and outcome. It is certainly not my intention to belittle the contribution of the British, the Americans and the other allies of the Soviets. Indeed, for me the greatest pity of WW2 is that the Grand Alliance did not long survive the war.

Best wishes,


GeoffItalic text

I still don't have a formed opinion about the impact of the LL. In fact it's an open case while all the necessary archives be realised. But you see, he just wants to say the Soviet Union was the centrality of the war. I never denied this. All I want to say is that, despite such centrality, their victory would not be guaranteed against the Axis alone. Enough of repeat this.

You don't want to agreed with changes in the article, I don't care. I don't want such changes anymore, I'm sick of this discussion with you. Everyone with common sense can understand what I wanted to mean.

Respect your opinion, I hope you respect mine. Thanks for the attention.

Marcelo — Preceding unsigned comment added by Marcelo Jenisch (talkcontribs) 19:14, 26 September 2011 (UTC)

I am not sure what Robert Geoff do you mean? Afaik, I cited the opinion of David Glantz. I also cited Geoffrey Roberts, however, he is hardly an authoritative expert in WWII, he focuses more on the history of the USSR.
One way or the another, I totally agree with the thesis that the victory of the USSR in the war against Japan, Germany, Italy and all Axis satellites taken together would be not obvious. In my previous post, I meant the European theatre alone. In any event, I totally agree with the opinion of the author you quoted, although I am not sure I understand who he is.
However, it is necessary to note, that, although the victory of the USSR alone would be highly questionable, the victory of the Anglo-American alliance against the Axis would be totally impossible had the USSR been neutral or had it been conquered by Germany. I don't think the scenario I have outlined in my previous post had any flaws or omission. This course of events would be highly plausible, had the USSR been defeated at Moscow or Stalingrad.
Sincerely,
--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:22, 26 September 2011 (UTC)


The number of german troop in the Bulge, is five times less that Kursk. Compare to the Eastern Front, the Bulge is just a cuties little Skirmish. And remember that there is 18 German division (sources 12thSS) compare to 55 American divisions. "American give 9000 tank to the USSR?" it might be true, that is how Sherman earn the name of "the coffin of five brothers" seriously the Soviet tank and german tank are almost the same in quality. Compare the King Tiger to the Pershing, who will win?? then compare King tiger to IS-2. Also Those German troop holding up in France are unlikely waiting for the Western Allies to land, think about the French Partisan that keep raiding German troops. The Soviet would have defeat Germany, "Moscow" They not even receive any support by then. In the battle of Berlin, the USSR shoot 8 millions shells in the begining, more than the entire wesntern allies did in Europe. I'm not saying that the Western Front is not important, the western allies did help the Russian in defeating Germany. The Eastern Front remain the most decisive part of the European war. If not against the Russian, those seven million German casualities, and tonnes of their resources will be useful against the Western Allies, probable result in the defeat of Allies forces imagine million more of German in the Bulge and 40,000 more fighter aircraft.

"Pat" — Preceding unsigned comment added by 124.176.214.240 (talk) 00:00, 29 September 2011 (UTC)

Dear Marcelo Jenisch,
Consider a possibility to format your posts properly, otherwise I'll have to do that for you. Your refusal to format your posts is unacceptable.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:35, 29 September 2011 (UTC)

Done. But I preffer to just provide a text from the British historian Richard Overy that express very well my view: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/how_the_allies_won_01.shtml

Thanks. I am familiar with the views of Overy, and what is says is that Britain was at the point of defeat in 1942, the USA had no army, and to compensate the deficiency of their land forces they preferred to rely on bombing and on providing of the economic help to the USSR, who was responsible for most fightings. That is essentially how I see the situation.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:09, 30 September 2011 (UTC)

Neighter me or Oliver had denied the importance of the USSR in the land figthing. But in my opinion you are minimizing the importance of the Western Allies efforts for make the things considerably easier for the Soviets to a point were defeat or stalement with the Germans were real possibilities.

So the article will be kept like it is? Both the Western Allies and the Soviets had a common enemy [Nazi Germany], a common enemy that was defeated by their joint effort, and the Soviets will still be claimed as inflicting the ultimate victory? Marcelo Jenisch (talk) 15:26, 1 November 2011 (UTC)

Having a common enemy and contributing equally is not the same. In addition, not all Allies had the common enemy: thus, the US/UK fought against Japan in Pacific in 1941-44, but the USSR didn't. In contrast, the USSR fought against Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Finland, but other Allied did that only nominally. More importantly, although the European Axis was defeated by joint efforts, these efforts are hard to compare. Therefore, I do not think we need to change anything in the article in that respect.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:48, 1 November 2011 (UTC)

I don't think it's hard to compare. The main argument for the USSR being "the decisive victorius" is that the West could not have resisted or defeated the Nazis without it. But this is equally valid for the Soviets without the West. So, I don't see any "hard to compare" effort here. Just an article with an impartial view, trying to place the USSR as the only way of survival for the West, without considerate the hypocrisy of this. This is the same thing of the Cold War, but now we are having the "Eastern" version of it, while we can finally have the so desired impartial view. Marcelo Jenisch (talk) 00:49, 2 November 2011 (UTC)

Ah, and look this: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4508901.stm

"Throughout the Cold War, and ever since, each side has tended to see its own contribution as decisive."

Now, tell me that this article is not impartial? Marcelo Jenisch (talk) 15:38, 2 November 2011 (UTC)

The difference is quite clear. The key battles that pre-determined the outcome of the WWII (the battle of Moscow and the battle of Stalinrgad) were fought and won by the USSR alone, without appreciable help from the western partners. Of course, one can speculate that Rommel's divisions could serve as a straw that broke a camel's back, but these are just speculations: we don't know (and will never know) if their contribution could have changed the outcome of the Eastern front campaign. However, what we know for sure is that all Allied victories over the European Axis, starting from El Alamein and ending with the Battle of Bulge, were possible exclusively due to the fact that starting from 1941 on 65 to 80% of German troops fought in the East, and the Eastern front was the top priority of Germany. The USSR could probably win even alone (although noone can tell that for sure), however, it is quite obvious that the Western Allies had no chance to win Germany fighting alone.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:28, 2 November 2011 (UTC)

Ah, Moscow and Stalingrad were won alone? LOL

Yeah... just an apreciable part of the Luftwaffe was in the West, just almost a million men were in the occupied territories, the Germans needed to split their resources and industry between the Eastern and Western fronts, while the Russians were only fighting the Germans. Still, THEY WON, isn't? It's very interesting to discuss with people like you because the global war context passes very away.

And about the Lend Lease at the start well, here it is: http://www.historynet.com/did-russia-really-go-it-alone-how-lend-lease-helped-the-soviets-defeat-the-germans.htm

Another one about the importance of the LL in put Soviet aviation in the air: http://www.oilru.com/or/47/1006/

Just add two things: Luftwaffe fully in the East, no high octane fuel. Likely Soviet defeat. I can us this same logic of yours, but will not.

"However, what we know for sure is that all Allied victories over the European Axis, starting from El Alamein and ending with the Battle of Bulge, were possible exclusively due to the fact that starting from 1941 on 65 to 80% of German troops fought in the East, and the Eastern front was the top priority of Germany."

The Eastern Front taking more resources doeosn't mean it was decisive.

In fact, it's interesting to see what the Germans think of this, like Ribbentrop's view of the causes of the defeat:

  • Unexpectedly stubborn resistance from the Soviet Union
  • The large-scale supply of arms and equipment from the US to the Soviet Union, under the lend-lease agreement
  • The success of the Western Allies in the struggle for air supremacy.

Why the Eastern Front was not mentioned alone?

The situation in Africa could not been much better for Rommel. The logistics were very poor due to the RN. Also, why the Allies performed so poorly sometimes? perhaps because they were sending a lot of equipment to the Soviets, eh? it was from their interest to keep the Germans slipted in two fronts. But no, the Soviets did everything!

Also, keep underestimating the bombing campaing, the destruction of 75% of the Luftwaffe in the West and the spliting of it's capability, the submarine campaing that could have been turned into massive resources to "probably" won the war in the East. Excellent...

"USSR could probably win even alone (although noone can tell that for sure), however, it is quite obvious that the Western Allies had no chance to win Germany fighting alone"

This was the best one until now. Now I know PHD really doesn't make anyone free from lack of moral and ignorance. Marcelo Jenisch (talk) 19:13, 2 November 2011 (UTC)

Marcelo, don't take this seriously. What PhD are you talking about? There is no such thing as an anonymous PhD. First, it is not verifiable. See the Essjay controversy. Second, even real credentials mean next to nothing without a reputation. There are of course issues serious enough for many to retain anonymity, that's understandable, but then the solution is to leave one's credentials behind altogether rather than to flash them around anonymously. Judge people by their edits. Colchicum (talk) 00:19, 3 November 2011 (UTC)
Re: "just an apreciable part of the Luftwaffe was in the West, just almost a million men were in the occupied territories, the Germans needed to split their resources and industry between the Eastern and Western fronts, while the Russians were only fighting the Germans." "almost million men" was a result of the very fact that Germany had occupied almost whole Europe, and tells nothing about the contribution of Britain/US. "split their resources and industry between the Eastern and Western fronts" There was virtually no Western front during that period, so I do not understand what are you talking about. Regarding the rest, as I already wrote, I do agree that Britain/US did play some role, however, this role was hardly decisive.

":Re Luftwaffe. Since it dominated over VVS during the first part of the war (simply due to poor training of Soviet personnel), it is highly unlikely that further shift of the balance could have a decisive effect. Those battles had been won on ground."

The full Luftwaffe presence in numbers would likely allow a much quicker advance of the German Army. It also would allow more sorties to be flown per day, increasing considerably the efficiency of the operations. Also, the lack of training your mentioned was a fact, but was corrected in a great degree due to the relief of the pressure by the LW's tranferences to the West, so more pilots could remain in the rear to be trained. That way the effort would be futile in my view, their only hope was trow the rookies into the enemy to perhaps find another non military exit. You need also to considerate the high octane fuel provided by the West. This was vital for the VVS (Soviet Air Force) in WWII. I posted a link for this above. Also there's the aluminum, which the abundance of it was in the Canada hand's at the time. It was provided in great quantities to the Soviets and helped a lot to improve the quality of their aircraft. Considerating all those factors, I can say they were already likely decisive. I can't see the VVS being capable of hold such an unfavourable casuality ratio from much time.

Also, while the fall of Moscow would be certainly a big blow to the Soviet effort, perhaps already a decisive one, to complement this, I belive it would be likely it also would produce the necessary spark for a Japanese intervention in the Far East. They would likely stay much more docile with the West in this scenario, and would not advance over French Indochina to avoid a conflict with the Western Powers. Then the Soviet situation would only become worse.

Another consideration is that more time the Soviets remained under Nazi occupation, worse their situation. David Glanz belives without the Lend Lease, the war in the East would lasted 12-18 months more. This considerating all the other things historically as they were. While the Lend Lease question is still in dispute, surely it made the war much shorter, as Glaz says. But the problem with a war lasting longer, and much longer in this scenario, and will not even put a likely Japanese intervention here, is that millions of Soviet citizens would starve to death without the Lend Lease aid. Millions more would be killed by the Nazis. The Nazis controlling territories with larger populated areas such as they did historically, for a long a long time, were enough for them at least retreat and decrease the Soviet man power considerably to a point of exaustation. Even because the industrial production and agriculture would need much more works without the Lend Lease.

So, when you take one side out in a World War, everything starts to became chaotic. And you can't just pick one factor I mention and say "this would not be decisive". You need to take all of them, and many others I didn't mentioned, and sum them together. Then you will have a general picture of the subject, and not a good one for the USSR in my opinion.

":Re Ribbentrop, it is a primary source, and should be treated accordingly."

Here's another one, about the bombing:

"The real importance of the air war consisted in the fact that it opened a second front long before the invasion in Europe . . . Defence against air attacks required the production of thousands of anti-aircraft guns, the stockpiling of tremendous quantities of ammunition all over the country, and holding in readiness hundreds of thousands of soldiers, who in addition had to stay in position by their guns, often totally inactive, for months at a time . . . No one has yet seen that this was the greatest lost battle on the German side.

—Albert Speer (1959)"

And to give more credibility of everything I mentioned, read Kruschev's words about Stalin and the Lend Lease here: http://books.google.com.br/books?id=nR0f25dmbn0C&pg=PT169&lpg=PT169&dq=stalin+lend+lease+nikita&source=bl&ots=zPpNv5TwgT&sig=hWxmxbgLRGjz_cI7AEg2jSWqh7U&hl=pt-BR&ei=kq6xTuyiGoLb0QGSr6WzAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CEEQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q&f=false

And to let clear, this is JUST about the Lend Lease in the war context.

My primary sources seems ok. Them, and my presented logical arguments have the same constation: war would likely be lost without the joint effort.

":Re Rommel. Do you seriously think logistic problems could not be resolved had Germany not been deeply involved in the battles in the East?"

Horses and trucks can't swim. But they can move to the USSR.

"Do you think Hitler could not sent 30 more division to North Africa had the Battle of Moscow been won by Germany?"

He didn't had how to. Germany was not a naval power to send so much troops to Africa. And Italy was vulnerable to large scale operations. Britain, on the other hand, would be capable of send a lot more of equipment to secure the ports had the Lend Lease to the Soviets didn't existed. And I will say more: Germany was not the superpower most people, including you, think, mainly against the Western Allies. In fact, I think the Western Allies not only did have the capability to defeat Germany, but also had it more than the Soviets. Their strategy, with things like the strategic bombing and submarine warfare was not only not so bloodly as the battles in the Eastern Front, but was also very efficient. Most people say they found the Eastern Front a horror, that's why they call it "decisive", but they can't accept the nature of the very efficient technological warfare in the Western Front, and therefore like to play down the Western Allies participation.


"A major recipient of American help was Britain, not the USSR, so this argument does not work here."

From my last posted link about the Lend Lease:

  • *By the end of 1941 Britain had delivered 466 tanks out of the 750 promised.
  • A total of 699 Lend-Lease aircraft had been delivered to Archangel by the time the Arctic convoys switched to Murmansk in December 1941. Of these, 99 Hurricanes and 39 Tomahawks were in service with the Soviet air defense forces on January 1, 1942, out of a total of 1,470 fighters. About 15 percent of the aircraft of the 6th Fighter Air Corps defending Moscow were Tomahawks or Hurricanes

The Royal Navy could supply all those things much more easly, and with more quantity to Africa. Specially without the Pacific. Not to mention with the USN without the Pacific, too. And about the planes, make no mistake they would be transfered soon had the Germans not send their troops to the East.

About the quantity, yes, Britain received more. And this has three reasons: geographical proximity, industrial cooperation with the US, and simply necessity. The UK didn't had the resources of the USSR, while the USSR didn't have, or was difficult to it obtain certain resources. Also, they were also in war with Italy, Germany, and with Japan. Different geographical enemies, more resources need.

One more factor regarding planes and the general war: Germany didn't had oil to match Britain and America. It didn't had to prolongued offensives, as well as defensives. If they didn't capture the oil fields of the Middle East, they would be doomed. It was a major factor for the launch of Operation Barbarossa, Hitler was already antecipating a possible American intervention.

":Re bombing campaing, as I already said, it was surprisingly inefficient until late 1944. See, e.g. American Strategic Bombing Survey."

Just about the Bomber Command:

The greatest contribution to winning the war made by Bomber Command was in the huge diversion of German resources into defending the homeland; this was very considerable indeed. By January 1943 some 1,000 Luftwaffe night fighters were committed to the defence of the Reich – mostly twin engined Me 110 and Ju 88. Most critically, by September 1943, 8,876 of the deadly, dual purpose 88 mm guns were also defending the homeland with a further 25,000 light flak guns – 20/37 mm. The 88mm gun was an effective AA weapon, it was a deadly destroyer of tanks and lethal against advancing infantry. These weapons would have done much to augment German anti-tank defences on the Russian front.

To man these weapons the flak regiments in Germany required some 90,000 fit personnel, and a further 1 million were deployed in clearing up and repairing the vast bomb-damage caused by the RAF attacks. To put this into perspective General Erwin Rommel's German forces defending Normandy in 1944 comprised 50,000 men, and their resistance caused the Western Allies grave problems.

This diversion to defensive purposes of German arms and manpower was an enormous contribution made by RAF Bomber Command to winning the war. By 1944 the bombing offensive was costing Germany 30% of all artillery production, 20% of heavy shells, 33% of the output of the optical industry for sights and aiming devices and 50% of the country's electro-technical output which had to be diverted to the anti-aircraft role.

From the British perspective it should be noted that the RAF offensive made a great contribution in sustaining morale during the dark days of the war, especially during the bleak winter of 1941-42. It was the only means that Britain possessed of taking the war directly to the enemy at that time.

- Richard Overy, in Why the Allies Won, covers well the American bombing campaing, and rates it as crucial, together with the submarine warfare and the Eastern Front. And this, again, only in the historical war context. It's hard to imaginate what the German production and tecnological level would turn themselfs without the bombing. To at least a drawn with the Soviets, I think it would be fair to say.

":One more point. I have a feeling that during our dispute we lost perspective. What concrete changes to the article do you propose?--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:49, 2 November 2011 (UTC)"

The Eastern Front contributed considerably to Germany's defeat, and consequently to the war itself. It's importance in the ground war surely should have a spot on, as well as the German Army casualities there (but this needs attention, because it's a wrong popular view: casualities in the East were justified by more combat, resistance of the the German soldiers to surrender to the Communism, and other things). About it's contribution, for the sake of neutrality, I think we, as an enclyclopedia, should just provide the historical view: both sides tend to regard their participation as decisive.

:Regarding your last point, could you please explain what part of my statement quoted by you raises your objections and why?--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:51, 2 November 2011 (UTC)

Sorry if I offend you. It was your lack of the global war view I was reffering to. Marcelo Jenisch (talk) 21:22, 2 November 2011 (UTC)

"almost million men" was a result of the very fact that Germany had occupied almost whole Europe, and tells nothing about the contribution of Britain/US.

Most of those were not occupation troops. Rather than that, they were regular troops waiting an invasion. Hitler needed to maintein those troops there in the same way the Soviets needed to maintend man against Japan and Turkey. Had Hitler not had a very dissuasive force in the West, the Western Allies would simply invade. There's a famous quote of him telling about the importance of maintein the integrity of the West.

"split their resources and industry between the Eastern and Western fronts" There was virtually no Western front during that period, so I do not understand what are you talking about".

The one that needed a good number troops stationed, the one that needed a lot of resources to provide air defense (and were the Luftwaffe was sacrified), the one that held the bases for the extremely expensive submarine warfare that would have been very relevant if had it's resources applied to East, the one that not allow Hitler to take the Middle East oil, and the one that allowed the USSR receive most of it's Lend Lease. A single decisive front that in it's existence made WORLD War II in WWII, and in it's non existence nobody can tell what would have happened. That's the Western Front.

Regarding the rest, as I already wrote, I do agree that Britain/US did play some role, however, this role was hardly decisive.''''

Seriously mate, I think you are joking with me here. If after everything I wrote here, including statements from primary sources - including the own dictator of the USSR - you still think the Western front only "did play a role", than you are really not being impartial here. In fact, you that are trying to promote the Eastern Front as "everything" in WWII, while I'm just trying to promote a neutral view of both fronts in a World War, were people over the world have different views about the importance of each front.

And to let this very clear: you CAN'T say the USSR would have won the war alone. You simply can't. There's no "it would likely won" or not, the complexity of this kind of statement is beyond imagination, as my big texts already undoubtedly proofed. And this is equally valid for anything regarding the Western Allies. The most fair thing in this article would put that both the Western Allies and the Soviets tend to regard their participations as decisive. Only this. Marcelo Jenisch (talk) 01:14, 3 November 2011 (UTC)

Re "Most of those were not occupation troops. Rather than that, they were regular troops waiting an invasion."

I suggest you to avoid accusing me in the lack of global thinking in future.

You have lack of global thinking. Your troops argument let this very clear, as the Germans started to more and more take troops out of the Eastern Front as the war progressed.

No. But I have an opposite feeling. I do not promote the idea that the Eastern Front was "everything": by its scale it constituted about a half of the WWII as whole, including the Pacific war. By contrast, you insist that the very fact that two fronts existed does allow us to claim both of them were decisive.

You can't see one front without the other. Everything you say about the East being decisive, I can say the same about the West. But you already showed your partiality towards the Soviets very clear, claiming that would be "impossible" for the Western Allies defeat the Germans alone. Who is joking here? I can take seriously a person that can't recognize a tecnological, non bloodly, but still decisive war as the one in the West?


You quote various primary sources, however, primary sources should be used with cautions, and no conclusions can be drawn based on them per our policy. By contrast, I use secondary sources, and one of them (Bellamy, the ref can be found in the article) says:

"This conflict (Eastern Front. -P.S.), which ended sixty years before this book's completion, was a decisive component - arguably the single most decisive component - of the Second World War. " (p. xix)
Accordingly, the article says:
"The Eastern Front was decisive in determining the outcome of World War II, eventually serving as the main reason for Germany's defeat."
I do not see why this statement caused your objections. This statement transmit the author's thought quite adequately, and it does not imply that EF was the sole reason of the Germany's defeat, and the only component that determined the outcome of WWII. What else do you need?--Paul Siebert (talk) 12:43, 3 November 2011 (UTC)

Well, if the main reason was "well supported" by the West help, then ok.


I explicitly request you to restore my post which you modified. The discussion will continue only after that. In addition, I found your habit to turn the talk page into a mess inappropriate. That contradicts to the talk page guidelines.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:19, 3 November 2011 (UTC)

To let the things clear here:

In Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory, Colin Gray defined an operational decisive victory as "a victory which decides the outcome to a campaign, though not necessarily to the war as a whole".

Source: http://wiki.riteme.site/w/index.php?title=Talk:Eastern_Front_(World_War_II)&action=edit&section=5

Paul Siebert acted with desconsideration towards the Western Allies and their contributions against the Germans. The explanation of the "decisive" term let this very clear. Therefore there's nothing wrong with this article, but yes with misinterpretation of the term. As well as for myself, I hope Siebert understands this from now on. And I'd like to apologize with him for my offenses.


Apologies accepted. However, the second issue remains unresolved. You turned the talk page into a mess, so it is unclear who wrote what, you forget to sigh, you modified the posts of other users. In this situation, any continuation of the discussion in impossible. I strongly recommend you to read talk page guidelines (the link has been provided above), because by ignoring them you simply show that you do not respect your opponents.--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:20, 6 November 2011 (UTC)

I'm sorry but I took the liberty to collapse the discussion above. If valid and/or useful points were made during this discussion, please summarize them below. --ElComandanteChe (talk) 21:19, 6 November 2011 (UTC)