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hi, @User:Newm30 The 129th Regiment is part of the Missouri National Guard where and is not the same as the 129th Fd Arty Bn. See http://www.32nd-division.org/history/ww2/32ww2-1.html I suggest that a link to the 1st Bn of the 120th would be misleading, since it was the 2/120th that was redesignated the 129th. The 1st Bn page would need some rework before it could accurately support a link to that page, even though it does discuss A battery there. (without substantially more detail that in the Draft:Battle of Buna-Gona. I suggest that if you want a link from this page for the 129th, it would be more appropriate to create a new page (and then tidy up the 1/120th's page. Regards Cinderella157 (talk) 03:14, 20 December 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Hi @User:Cinderella157, upon reading the article on 1st Battalion, 120th Field Artillery Regiment, did the 129th reform as the 120th? Im not sure on US lineages and references. I found this webpage http://badger.state.wi.us/agencies/dma/32nd/120th/HISTORY.HTM, but couldn't open it due to blocking. Regards Newm30 (talk) 22:23, 21 December 2014 (UTC)[reply]

hi, @User:Newm30 the following is copied from the 32nd Div web site (the link above I gave) The three existing artillery regiments (120TH, 121ST and 126TH) were converted into four battalions (120TH, 121ST, 126TH and 129TH; three battalions of 105mm howitzers and one battalion of 155mm howitzers).

  • The 1ST Battalion, 120TH Field Artillery Regiment became the 120TH Field Artillery Battalion, 105mm howitzer, track-drawn, on 31 January 1942.
  • The 2D Battalion, 120TH Field Artillery Regiment became the 129TH Field Artillery Battalion, 105mm howitzer, track-drawn, on 31 January 1942.
  • The 1ST Battalion, 121ST Field Artillery Regiment became the 121ST Field Artillery Battalion, 155mm howitzer, track-drawn, on 16 January 1942.
  • The 1ST Battalion, 126TH Field Artillery Regiment became the 126TH Field Artillery Battalion, 105mm howitzer, truck-drawn, on 31 January 1942.

Regards, Cinderella157 (talk) 00:26, 22 December 2014 (UTC) Cinderella157 (talk) 00:31, 22 December 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks @User:Cinderella157. Did you happen to find out whether 129th reformed (reorganised) as the 120th on 9 June 1947. Regards Newm30 (talk) 01:46, 22 December 2014 (UTC)[reply]
There is a little detail about the gun at Buna-Gona in Milner but apart from that, you now know everything I do. Regards, Cinderella157 (talk) 02:16, 22 December 2014 (UTC)[reply]

new section

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Added new section re MacArthur. Comments welcome @User:AustralianRupert and others. Cinderella157 (talk) 12:50, 14 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]

@Hawkeye7: has done a lot of work on the MacArthur article itself and might be able to offer some comments on this too depending on his other commitments etc. Anotherclown (talk) 23:05, 14 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
What are we doing?! This is supposed to be the Order of Battle. Merge all this stuff into the Battle of Buna-Gona article!!!
This is a response to dealing with size in the main article. You are welcome to take this up. Cinderella157 (talk) 12:18, 15 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Some comments:
  • Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, chief-of-staff to General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, had glibly referred to the Japanese coastal fortifications as "hasty field entrenchments." First of all, Sutherland was not a lieutenant general then; he was not promoted to that rank until February 1944. "glibly" is POV. Moreover, Sutherland is right; they were hasty field entrenchments; but the tactics and technology to tackle them was lacking.
Done rank and POV (glibly as quote) though all the material I have indicates that they were well designed and constructed and in cases, well in advance (as they had been overgrown, which added to their camouflage) and made effective use of locally available materials. Do you have sources other than Southerland? What is your basis for saying they were hasty field entrencments? Cinderella157 (talk) 06:55, 17 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
  • Allied command had failed to make effective provision for supply of artillery or tanks believing quite mistakenly that air support could replace the need for these. This is incorrect; while the air generals had great (and misplaced) faith in air support, it was not shared by the ground generals.
In this, I am not talking about the generals "on the ground" but at GHQ/LHQ - being taken in by Kenney's optimism. Should I make this clearer? How do you suggest?Cinderella157 (talk) 22:42, 16 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
I would just state Kenney's optimism. It is not clear how much faith anyone had in it.
This is in the lead and it is referenced. Also, the statement is developed in what follows. This is not my work in total, so I cant't speak to every statement. Having said that, how do you suggest we deal with this given the citations. Was GHQ swayed by Kenny's representations? It appears so. Given this is a statement in the lead, how would you change it? Cinderella157 (talk) 11:14, 17 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
  • Scanty, ill-informed intelligence led MacArthur to believe that Buna could be taken with relative ease This is incorrect. Willoughby predicted a perimeter defence of the airfield and beachhead at Buna. Using Ultra, he estimated the defenders at up to 2,000 men. This matched Vasey's estimate, based on prisoner interrogations. Willoughby did not believe that the Japanese would reinforce Buna, but he also did not believe that they would withdraw unless there was a major defeat at Guadalcanal. See Milner pp. 138-139 The estimate was too low; there were about 5,500 Japanese in the area. This would be a recurring issue in SWPA.
Out by 2.5 times and this was the effective combat strength. The actual strength including hospitalised, service units and labour units was even higher. An assessment that this was made up of dispirited forces defeated on the Kokoda Trail? The nature the terrain and the extent of the fortifications were not identified? And there were MacArthur's demands. I acknowledge that Willoughby's assessment was closer to reality than the 32nd's but the sources still indicate that it was "scanty and ill-informed" and that MacArthur believed it could be taken with relative ease. Cinderella157 (talk) 06:47, 17 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
  • [MacArthur] had no understanding of the conditions faced by his commanders and troops Very improbable given his thirty years of jungle experience. I wouldn't trust that source either.
He never visited the front - at least Blamey did. The closest he got was tea and scones at McDonalds or thereabouts. Yet he continually made unreasonable and unrealistic demands. "Where you have a company on your firing line, you should have a battalion; and where you have a battalion, you should have a regiment. And your attacks, instead of being made up of two or three hundred rifles, should be made up by two or three thousand... Your battle casualties to date compared with your total strength are slight so that you have a big margin to work with." This sentiment is expressed in multiple sources. What more can I say? Cinderella157 (talk) 23:01, 16 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
  • Pressure applied by MacArthur has been attributed to both protracting the duration of the battle and increasing the number of Allied casualties experienced. That is not supported by Milner (p. 370), which is the source.
From Milner (p369-370): "... troops suffered heavy casualties while being hastily pressed forward in repeated attacks ... Throughout the fighting, General Eichelberger had been a man under pressure [from MacArthur]". Milner contributes to supporting this statement as does Brune, also cited. Cinderella157 (talk) 22:41, 15 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
That MacArthur exerted pressure is not in dispute; nor that there were heavy casualties. It is your conclusion that is suspect. Remember that the longer the troops remained in the forward area, the greater the casualties from diseases, particularly malaria, which were an order of magnitude greater than the battle casualties. And while it might seem that moving slowly and systematically and pounding the enemy with artillery before attacking is the go, the Australians found that this was not the case. See Moremon, Threlafall, Dexter etc. Hawkeye7 (talk) 23:25, 15 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Milner goes on to say: "hurrying the attack had become the leitmotiv of the campaign." I take your point regarding disease but the counterpoint is that in squandering resources in futile attempts as a result of haste they were not available to be used in a more effective way and a failure to give time for planning and reconnaissance likely doomed many of the efforts before they commenced (see Harry Katekar). I recall that some of the best results were achieved by small scale probing akin to "peaceful penetration". Much is said about the lack of effectiveness of CAS and of friendly fire incidents but not much is said about bombing of targets in depth, even though this was eventually adopted and there is no mention of incendiary munitions. I recall fire missions in support of attacks being very limited and then doubled up because something went wrong (like the troops weren't in place) and the artillery had no real effect in any case because it was too limited - probably would have been better to spend more time in prep and planning and stockpile a bit more ammo too. I am not talking about "systematic pounding" it is about achieving effective suppressing fire if not neutralising fire. There is a difference between unreasonable haste and protracted delay. Having said all that, I think that Brune supports the statement. McAuley also says something to the same effect too. Cinderella157 (talk) 04:28, 16 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Suppressing or neutralising means that the gunners take shelter while the bombardment occurs. The idea is to move quickly so they don't have time to set up before the attack. The trick is getting close enough to attack the targets without hitting friendly troops. Identifying the target correctly was also a problem in jungle warfare. As you already wrote, the techniques for CAS had not yet been devised. (Also, the number of available aircraft in 1942 was far too few. Most of the work came down to the A-20s of the 89th Bombardment Sqn) Hawkeye7 (talk) 06:40, 17 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
I come back your original comment. Is it valid to say that MacArthur's pressure ultimately protracted the battle, particularly given the sources cited and, if not, how would you amend the lead, given that this is in the lead and supported in the body? Cinderella157 (talk) 11:43, 17 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
What reliable source have you got that says that the battle was thereby protracted? Dean? Milner? Hawkeye7 (talk) 20:57, 17 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Brune. Also, the comment is further developed in the aftermath of the main article using other references. There, it also observes the relationship between time and casualties by disease. It is also developed in the MacArthur section. His exhortations for speed were precipitous in the failing of endeavours - and hence protracting. Did commanders respond to this pressure by throwing troops into attacks with little prospect of any significant gain? Cinderella157 (talk) 03:12, 18 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
  • Blamey had been told that the 41st Division was better than the 32nd but whether this was true at the time the 32nd Division was deployed is unclear.
    Actually, it was, although still not that good. As Eichelberger explained, the 32nd was chosen because it had to move camp anyway.
The source I have makes this statement at about the time the 41st was being sent - hence the circumspection. I am aware that the 32nd was chosen mainly because it was going to move in any case. I don't have a ref to say that the 41st was better trained at the earlier time. Cinderella157 (talk) 22:13, 15 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Fair enough!! The 41st arrived in Australia with a reputation as the top-ranked National Guard division in the Army, based upon its performance in training exercises in the US. But MacArthur was unimpressed with the 41st when he inspected it in May 1942, and in September 1942 Eichelberger and his staff rated both it and the 32nd as unprepared for combat. He noted that the 41st had conducted no live-fire exercises, nor any night manoeuvres. (Shoretal (1987), pp. 38-39) Hawkeye7 (talk) 23:55, 15 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
  • The Americans had not been prepared physically for the rigors of war[31] let alone the particularly harsh conditions they would face in New Guinea Very true; but this was also true of the Australians.
Also true, perhaps but, while the sources comment on training of militia units, they don't comment on fitness - 66% casualties in II/126th after taking a month to move 210 km. The AIF was physically battle hardened. The militia, if not trained, was aclimatised and had been engaged in manual labour. Cinderella157 (talk) 04:44, 16 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
The US Army had some personnel problems as well. Due to this, the average infantry soldier was below the Army's average in height, strength and fitness. The AIF was definitely more battle hardened, but even so, the environment in New Guinea was more demanding that what they had encountered before. Nor was Port Moresby as demanding as the Owen Stanley Range. Canungra was still in the future. Hawkeye7 (talk) 06:40, 17 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
I acknowledge your comment but how should the article be amended? Cinderella157 (talk) 11:51, 17 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
BTW Canugra - been there, done that. Cinderella157 (talk) 11:51, 17 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Me too. That the Australian Army was preparing to fight the war in Vietnam again did not escape critical comment, but in retrospect was a better idea than anyone thought. What we have to bear in mind is that so many of the things that we took for granted had not been thought of in 1942. Hawkeye7 (talk) 20:57, 17 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
  • Odd. Neither John Rogers nor Clarence D. Martin have Wikipedia bios. Both are eligible,
  • Papuans provided Division G2, Brigadier General Charles Willoughby, with information that led him to believe the Japanese garrison at Buna was about a battalion That's not supported by the source. And he put the Japanese strength at five battalions.
"The natives provided the Division G2 with information that led him to believe the Japanese garrison at Buna was about a battalion." copied from the source. Cinderella157 (talk) 03:16, 15 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
There's a simple error here. Willoughby was the G-2 at GHQ back in Brisbane. The source says the 32d Division G-2. That was Colonel Gordon Rogers. Hawkeye7 (talk) 20:48, 15 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Done Cinderella157 (talk) 21:57, 15 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
  • Alternative view Peter Dean's view represents the consensus of historians and is therefore that of Wikipedia. It is not a rationalisation.
Dean acknowledges that his is not the general view. The point in putting this post up was to represent his view in the most appropriate way. It is put forward by Dean that there are reasonable and rational reasons for MacArthur to require haste while most sources indicate that these were more self-motivated (acknowledged by Dean). To this extent, he rationalises MacArthur's actions and hence the phrasing. Dean's hypothesis is that there were reasonable strategic reasons for demanding haste, based on the strategic relationship with Guadalcanal and that the position there was (perceived to be still) tenuous. The deficiency in the cited material is that it does not address intelligence assessments following the naval battle and the extent to which MacArthur was aware - ie did assessments from Guadalcanal change, when did they change, was MacArthur aware of these assessments and were these assessments sufficient to maintain or change an assessment that haste was (still) required? I don't have the luxury of ready access to an academic library and do not have sources that indicate this is now a widely held position. Your initial statement does not help improve this section. Cinderella157 (talk) 13:25, 15 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
I not only have the luxury of access to academic libraries, including two devoted to military history, I also have direct access to Peter Dean and other military historians. Peter's view is the consensus of military historians. He is not expressing a minority view, he is responding to a common misconception. Reports indicated the position on Guadalcanal was precarious until after the Battle of Guadalcanal in mid-November. Hawkeye7 (talk) 20:48, 15 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
"Reports indicated the position on Guadalcanal was precarious until after the Battle of Guadalcanal in mid-November." And this is a deficiency I have identified, since the battle at Buna-Gona commenced in mid-November. Withstanding this, you are obviously better positioned wrt this being a widely held view to justify MacArthur's demands for haste. This is the only reference I have found that expresses this particular view. Cinderella157 (talk) 07:06, 17 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
  • MacArthur, after being ordered to evacuate the Philippines No, only MacArthur was ordered to leave the Philippines.
Done Cinderella157 (talk) 03:21, 15 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
  • Major General Frank Berryman (Blamey's chief of staff and head of operational planning) Berryman was Blamey's deputy chief of staff; the Operations officer at Adv LHQ was Colonel T. W. White.
Done Cinderella157 (talk) 04:46, 15 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
  • The efficacy of naval bombardment against shore targets and in support of amphibious or land operations in coastal areas is well documented True, but a naive reader might think that this means it was good, when it was not.
What I do know of NGS is that it is accurate (in direct fire but needs to be observed for indirect fire, just like any artillery), has a relatively long range and a platform is capable of producing a high volume of fire (Paget reports HMAS Vendetta's 6 guns capable of 100 rounds per minute). the lethality is comparable to land based ordnance of a similar weight but at 50 lb for a 4.7" gun, this is twice that of a 25 pounder (about 33 lb for a 105 round). In short, it is better than a poke in the eye with an hot stick - particularly when the only place you can site your guns is the middle of the deep blue. You say it is not good - compared to what and by whom? Cinderella157 (talk) 22:43, 16 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Everything you said about CAS also applies to NGS. In 1942 they didn't have NGS parties or Joint Assault Signals Companies. Moreover, I think we are wasting bytes because it was never an issue at Buna. The first Allied Naval bombardment in SWPA was in the Lae operation in September 1943. Actual NGS was not employed in SWPA until the Admiralty Islands in February 1944. Hawkeye7 (talk) 06:40, 17 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Some sources say that NGS should have been used. Within the constrains of WP, I try to make the point that NGS wasn't an option, notwithstanding that it "might" have been an alternative. The question is whether the text needs to be altered (given you say we are wasting bytes)? Cinderella157 (talk) 10:34, 17 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
I would omit the first and final paragraphs, and rewrite the third without the POV and the repetition of the quote we just gave. I also would note that they did go to Buna, not just could have. Putting this together:

By so writing, Blamey made serious mistakes in his assumptions regarding such naval forces[293] The Japanese had never operated large ships in the waters between Milne Bay and Buna. Japanese ships making attacks on Milne Bay had used a route avoiding that passage. They had access to the pre-war route from Rabaul and approached Buna–Gona from the north.

Australian soldiers from Blamey down were familiar with the naval support of the 9th Division at Tobruk. Carpender's reluctance to risk his ships was viewed in this light. Hawkeye7 (talk) 20:57, 17 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
"Naval support" is a section within "Fire support". In the intro of the main section, it refers to several authors opinioning that that NGS should have been used: "Several authors have commented on the lack of naval support and either directly or indirectly referred to the potential of naval gunfire support." The purpose of the "Naval support" section is to rebut the validity of the assertions as well as to identify the support that the Navy did provide as well as the situational limitations that existed. Removing the first and last paras removes the primary reason for the section. Those that advocate that NGS should have been used ignore the availability of the assets, the hazards in deploying them and the risk of maintaining a station off Buna-Gona. Furthermore, while Blamey did request support, it was not for NGS and, while it was not provided in the form or at the time he requested it, it was provided and was a significant contribution. I have said this all in a short para but (for me), the problem is in saying this in a wiki acceptable form. It may well be able to be said better but I think it important to address the issue of NGS. Cinderella157 (talk) 08:54, 18 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]
  • In so writing, Blamey was out of his depth, And Wikipedia is lifting Gill's text. (Also, the quote should be "frequently gone" not "gone frequently"
Done Cinderella157 (talk) 03:30, 15 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Hawkeye7 (talk) 01:26, 15 February 2017 (UTC)[reply]

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User talk:Cinderella157#Edit to Buna re US Army uniforms

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Moving discussion to better place. The following discusion was started at my TP after this revert by me with the comment: Not supported by citations existing. Please cite/discuss at TP. The initial edit as follows: Their heavy-weight herringbone twill combat uniforms were the wrong colourthough green when first issued, faded to a bright grey that was highly visible in the jungle. Cinderella157 (talk) 09:05, 16 February 2022 (UTC)[reply]

Moved OP

Hi Cinderella, I'm querying about your edit to my edit with regards to US Army HBT M1941 fatigue uniforms. The article said an almost reallydiculous remark about the uniforms being the wrong colour. I added a description to make the titbit a bit more specific. Ever since the US military had the green fatigues, those that wanted to look 'salty' or like old timers would prefer them faded to a bright grey that was just as bad as the Imperial tan, GI khaki. Could you please revert the edit or can we discuss it? Thank you.Foofbun (talk) 07:35, 16 February 2022 (UTC)[reply]

Foofbun, to my knowledge, the the amendment made is not supported by the existing citations that support the text in question. If you have a WP:RS to add, it "might" be amended. However, all uniforms fade. The initial shade is perhaps more informative. However, reading the passage more fully, it was clearly a lighter, rather than a darker shade of green - which was how they were modified/dyed. Cinderella157 (talk) 09:05, 16 February 2022 (UTC)[reply]
  • Pardon me, Cinderella, I usually received notification if someone has responded to me, in this case I hadn't received one. I believe the issue of a dye so thick that it resembled paint and didn't allow the cloth to "breath" is a highly interesting matter, as is combining two separate colours that may have been the problem, Foofbun (talk) 07:45, 19 February 2022 (UTC)[reply]
    • BTW, what is the problem with Osprey books? I've seen errors in the plates now and then (I've actually had a friend's image in one of their plates) but why is this an unreliable source? I can't think of any other books with wide distribution specialising in military uniforms. Please explain. Thank you.Foofbun (talk) 08:47, 19 February 2022 (UTC)[reply]
Foofbun - To the dye, it was a cock-up. It dried like paint, quite probably because it was paint. How they got "dark green" is not all that material to an encyclopedic article written in summary style. It is unnecessary detail which falls to WP:NOTEVERYTHING. That it was "still not dry as the men wore their uniforms to New Guinea" isn't that material either. It took weeks, not days to depart Brisbane and arrive at Buna. It is editorialising? Further, the statement is being attributed to existing sources, which probably don't support the statement.
To the Osprey sources. They are being cited to support the text quoted above. It is not that they are unreliable. It is that they don't verify the text being added: that they faded to a "bright grey" and that they were "highly visible". Even the unfaded sage green would probably have been too light and unsuitable. Cinderella157 (talk) 11:35, 19 February 2022 (UTC)[reply]
  • Thank you very much for your courtesy, patience and understanding Cinderella. Funny, in all these years I can't recall a single American war movie about New Guinea. When watching Objective Burma I noticed one of the technical advisers was from the 503rd PIR that of course was in NG; the web gear (grenade pouches) they wore in the film was like what the 503rd wore in NG. I recall back in the day of green fatigues some training manuals still suggested using paint as makeshift camo, I cringed when I read that, knowing of those horrid dyed uniforms. (I prattle on like Grandpa Simpson)Foofbun (talk) 20:01, 19 February 2022 (UTC)[reply]
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