Talk:Amin al-Husseini/Archive 9

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Hans Döhle

On 21 July 1937, Al-Husayni paid a visit to the new German Consul-General, Hans Döhle, in Palestine. He repeated his former support for Germany and 'wanted to know to what extent the Third Reich was prepared to support the Arab movement against the Jews.

This looks much like one would expect, but it is disturbing that there is no citation provided. I have googled the quotation, and the names, for a half an hour, in Google Books and Google generally, and only come up with three sites, two fanatically anti-Arab, the other citing this page from Yahoo answers. Of course, the whole section is cherrypicked. Al-Husayni met with everyone he could enlist in his anti-Zionist cause. He met with the American consul-general just a month later, and asked him about American opposition to imperialism, i.e. one people taking over a land occupied already by another people, and whether the Jewish lobby would be able to change America's traditional good relations with Arabs. It looks from the page as though all Husayni did was check out Nazis. The Nazis, as Nicosia notes, only gave briefly some minor aid to the Palestinians in mid 1938 when they wanted to send a signal to the English not to interfere with their project in Czechoslovakia, whose invasion was to coincide, on Hitler's orders, with a rise in disorders in Palestine, in order to make life difficult on two fronts for the British, and have them yield in Central Europe. Nishidani (talk) 12:06, 20 June 2008 (UTC)

I don't have information about this BUT that sounds clear to me he must have looked for support in all directions.

I suggest we remove this and try to find wp:rs sources concerning his research of support against the British and the Zionism.

Ceedjee (talk) 07:08, 21 June 2008 (UTC)

Well, Ceedjee, I don't know whether we 'have to remove it just because it lacks so far an RS. I've no strong feelings either way. One solution would be to conflate the two passages as they exist, Wolff (well documented), Hans Döhle (not so) and add the bruited Eichman encounter in a long paragraph on his work to enlist German assistance (and note that he canvassed also other governments as well, just to avoid unncessary implications that he was only interested in Nazi backing). At the time, of course, this wasn't as suspicious as it looks, since the Nazi regime's success led to a very large surge in Jewish immigration and the WZO itself negotiated with them in the same period to withhold a boycott and to implement the Haavara agreement. As Wolff acutely marked, some of these people were quite dumb as to what really was going on!

I've real elsewhere about Hans Döhle, the passage looked reasonable to me, it's just, yesterday, in working to remedy many of the lacunae, I found to my surprise I came up against a brick wall on this, which I thought would be the easiest to fix. Generally, the real and substantial case against al-Husayni comes later - and, in my view, there is no need, even for a Zionist (if they are rationally tough-minded) to try to blacken his name too early when he blackened it himself (apart from the hostility his line aroused among many Palestinians: I can add to that with refs to Ted Swedenburg's great book, later). Regards as always Nishidani (talk) 07:25, 21 June 2008 (UTC)

As to your request for further work on his canvassing for support, this is from my files:-

Husayni also met with the American Consul George Wadsworth in the same period (August 1937, a month after the encounter with Döhle) where he affirmed his belief that America was remote from imperialist ambitions and therefore able to understand that Zionism represented a hostile and imperialist aggression directed against an inhabitedc country’. In a further interview on Aug 31 Husayni expressed fear of Jewish influence in the US that might tip it to side with the Zionists. See Lawrence Davidson America's Palestine: Popular and Official Perceptions from Balfour to Israeli Statehood, University of Florida Press, 2001 p.239

Nishidani (talk) 07:36, 21 June 2008 (UTC)

(2) Strange no secondary source is used to confirm that Husayni testified before the Shaw Commission with a copy of the Protocols in his hand. The ref is.Palestine Commission on the Disturbances of August 1929, Minutes of Evidence (London 1930), Vol 2 page 539 paragraph 13,430, page 527 paragraph 13,107 (interview on 4/12/1929), which looks perfect, but being a primary source, needs to be controlled, since no reader can access it with reasonable ease.Nishidani (talk) 16:58, 21 June 2008 (UTC)

al-Husayni and Fascism

I have asked for citations for the following:

• al-Husayni's belief that Palestinian Muslims were enthusiastic about the new regime and looked forward to the spread of Fascism throughout the region.

I have checked Nicosia's book on this. He is citing from Wolff's telegram, and that is exactly what the telegram says, according to Nicosia's The Third Reich and the Palestine Question p.85 (bottom of page). The whole passage comes from Nicosia, and is properly cited in the original note. Nicosia does suggest that all Palestinian leaders used this kind of euphoric rhetoric. Regards Nishidani (talk) 17:08, 22 June 2008 (UTC)

• of an Arab state of a Fascist nature.

al-Husayni is a Muslim leader, Muslim teachings and Fascist teachings don't go along. al-Husayni says in his diaries[1] "I have considered Germany a friendly country because the enemy of your enemy is your friend" and "I sought cooperation with Germany not for the sake of Germany, and not believing in Fascism that I don't believe in its principles, but because I believe that if Germany wins the war, Zionists will not stay in Palestine." Imad marie (talk) 11:54, 21 June 2008 (UTC)

I think we should consider adding, eventually, a section on his memoirs in which quotations like the two you have given, are added, in order to present al-Husayni's interpretation of his own life and political choices. There's another, specifically on Jews, rather regretful, which Pappé mentions, which should be added ('amid the great verbiage remaining from that period, an uncharacteristic statement by Amin stands out - that if it were not for the Balfour Declaration, he would have consented to Jewish immigration and settlement'). If you can find it in the Memoirs, all the better (certainly for our companion Ceedjee who has strong grounds for challenging anything sourced from Pappé!) Nishidani (talk) 14:39, 21 June 2008 (UTC)

Husayni's maxim sums up much manoeuvering in the 30s. Even Germany and Russia applied it, with the Luftwaffe training illegally in the Ukraine when it was not supposed to exist, since both Stalin and Hitler, though structurally arch-enemies, found it convenient to collaborate against their common enemy, the West/the capitalist West. That there was a general excitement in Arabic countries about the turn to a military-national stateform in Europe in that period is well documented (I footnote the point in the section on Wolff.,). There were a considerable number of Jews who subscribed to fascism, some even after the race laws were passed in 1938. Jabotinsky himself admired the fascist model, until 1938. Haganah had its training camps, (Betar units were trained by fascist military experts in Civitavecchia) the Palestinians built theirs. England was the common enemy, and England's rising enemies were Germany and Italy, both of whom however wanted to negotiate an entente with England, in exchange for which they wouldn't cause problems for that country by backing Arab independence movements. There was a lot of backing in English upperclass circles for Hitler and for Mussolini (admired by Churchill) throughout this decade, so that, in itself, there was nothing 'abnormal' geopolitically in Arab attempts to enlist aid from these countries in order to shake off the English. Ibn Saud himself negotiated for arms from Hitler, as did Jewish agents working to stock the Haganah with better armaments, in terms of the Haavara agreement. Most of the time each side knew what, under the table, the other was doing. Historians must be careful not to write comic book versions painting a manichean good/bad story, but look at the total context, which makes many look rather shabbier than popular narratives admit.

Specifically, I am now checking through my copy of Renzo de Felice's huge 7 volume history of Mussolini and his times, and there's quite a bit on Husayni and Italy. I'll post the relevant information in due course. I'd be careful, Imad, about saying 'Muslim teachings' and 'fascist teachings' don't go together. Anything goes with anything else depending on who rules the roost, and how things can be twisted for political effect. Catholic teachings don't go with Nazism or Fascism necessarily, but there were priests and theologians who tried to work out a compromise, to make them look compatible, and Popes who negotiated with both. I know what you mean of course, and it is understandable given the huge and, to me, obscene efforts made even by certain established intellectuals in the West to draw an ontological equation between Islam and fascism, a thing I find absurdly hypocritical in its 'holier than thou' historical sanctimoniousness since we in Europe spawned the ideological bases and political forms for much of the genocidal violence of modernity, we put mass death on an industrialized installment plan, and should be extremely careful of pointing fingers, especially at civilisations with no such comparable record of extremist violence, civilisations that, in the acme of European and Western global warfare, were often the victims of a terror that exceeds qualitatively anything these countries beyond our frontiers have done in their struggle to emerge with their own values intact. Let's work patiently and with rigorous honesty before these complexities. Nishidani (talk) 13:19, 21 June 2008 (UTC)

What I meant by "don't go together" is that no Muslim leader would work to establish "an Arab state of a Fascist nature", or "look forward to the spread of Fascism throughout the region". That's nonsense, and a propaganda. Imad marie (talk) 13:44, 21 June 2008 (UTC)

I've no doubt that we have to closely control every statement on this page, and thoroughly justify things like this from highly reliable sources, before we allow such assertions to stand. Many sources used in the composition of the page were unreliable or part of a partisan historiography that was more intent on making wild accusations stick than in analysing the history of the man with equanimity. Perhaps I should explain that when I use the word 'Fascism' I think in very specific terms, of fascism as a fundamentalist doctrine based on a constructed racial and cultural myth of origins used to vector in, or frog-jump, underdeveloped countries with a large non-urban/or/agrarian population into a militarized industrial developmental state. The formulation is that made by Gregor in his 1979 work. It is basically a combination of glorious origin-myths with an authoritarian design for industrialization. In one sense, I can see that the non-racist character of Islamic teaching certainly militates against the kind of fascism classically developed in Europe. But 'fascist' ideologies, like any ideology 'free-marketism' 'capitalism' ,'communism' show what, rather loosely, one calls a meme drift in our global world, so that elements of an ideology are picked up for their rhetorical utility. Saddam is often called a 'fascist', because part of his use of the myths of the nation from high antiquity resembled the national mythmaking of fascism. But he could equally be called a 'communist', because he learnt much from the collected works of Stalin. He certainly, whatever his protestations, did not think in traditional 'Islamic' terms. I and a few other editors here are well aware of the propaganda element, and we all intend to see to it that this article will be polished to fit to the letter wiki policies on NPOV, esp. regards using the best sources. This will not mean giving al-Husayni the image he would want to be remembered through, undoubtedly, but, at the same time, it will give a neutral account of what he thought and did, whatever the consequences for his self-image or for the image some rather doctrinaire pro-Zionist pamphleteers would prefer to be concocted. That's our job, and anything you can come up with to enrichen our understanding, esp.from his memoirs, is most welcome. Modernisation in countries within the Arabic cultural sphere has usually meant destroying the traditional legal authority of islamic scholars. In so far as the state assumed administrative control of a legal system formerly subject to islamic law, and turned it into a secular authority, the margin for an autonomous sphere of authority to caution the leader, and challenge his power, was reduced drastically. In that sense, a strictly 'Islamic' leader could no more be a modernising fascist than a hasid could be a technocratic democrat. Well, these are all simplifications of complex issues. Just a thought. Regards Nishidani (talk) 14:30, 21 June 2008 (UTC)

Imad, you remarked earlier:

Muslim teachings and Fascist teachings don't go along. al-Husayni says in his diaries[2] "I have considered Germany a friendly country because the enemy of your enemy is your friend"

I have now found a secondary source that interprets the whole movement of Arab nationalism's relations with Italy and Germany in the period exactly in these terms. Al-Husayni had intimate contacts with Italy at the time, and the foremost Italian historian of the modern age now interprets these relations in precisely these words. He writes that a certain tradition of sympathy for Germany existed since WW1, since Germany was then an ally of the Ottomans and then notes that in recurring to German assistance one should not interpret this as in itself a sign of fascist tendencies

'E questo, sia ben chiaro, non -come pure è stato sostenuto da vari autori - per una presunta affinità della loro ideologia con quelle nazista e fascista, che non esisteva, ma in forza della logica tutta politica che vede nei nemici (in atto o potenziali) dei propri nemici i propri amici, specie se essi hanno già dato prova - e questo era appunto il caso della Germania ed ancor più dell'Italia - di essere interessati, nella stessa logica politica, a sostenere la loro causa' '

'It should be quite clear that this relation (arose) not, as a number of authors have nonetheless argued, because of a presumed affinity of their ideology with that of the Nazis or Fascists, no such thing existed, but by virtue of the wholly political logic (of events) that saw in the enemies (in deed or potentially) of their own enemies their own friends, particularly if the latter have already provided evidence - and this was, precisely, the case with Germany, and all the more so, with Italy -of being interested, in terms of the same political logic, in giving support to their cause'(Renzo de Felice, Mussolini l'alleato. L'Italia in guerra 1940-1943, vol.1., Einaudi, Turin, 1990 pp.212-213.

So independently of whatever suspicions authors might entertain about al-Husayni's real motives, historians of the first rank read his behaviour in the same terms as he later did.Nishidani (talk) 17:19, 21 June 2008 (UTC)

Additions

I'm adding quite a bit of extra material, which can be wittled down, along with the rest of the text, in a final recension. The extra material will contextualize the Mufti's actions and the movement in a far more broader context than the simplistic Husayni-Hitler/Jew/English pattern resident on the page. Italy, as the Germans recognized, had a far stronger direct interest in that area than the Nazis, and there is considerable documentation on this (those interested might consult Renzo De Felice,Il fascismo e l’Oriente, pp.245ff.). Hitler dealt with the Jews, provided arms via the Haavara Agreement; the Saudis dealt with Hitler to get arms for Husayni; Hitler supported the English against the Arabs, the Arabs sought support from Mussolini, as did Jabotinsky, Hitler, as did Stern. All of this against an international scenario of geopolitical manooeuvering of considerable complexity. Clearly we cannot cram the page with too much material extraneous to Husayni's life. But having a text that eventually gives us some fair notion of the wider context will allow us to take the scalpal to it later, and trim the whole text down to a more fluently succinct account. The bit about Al-Qassam, for example, looks mighty odd, not only because in Henry Laurens' book, there is no connection between al-Husayni and the Haifa leader (who in any case was allied on the ground with groups hostile to the Husayni clan) until much later. The text cited itself is full of maybe's and 'perhap's'. But rather than excise, I think, at the moment, clarifying with more material is the main task at hand.Nishidani (talk) 12:14, 21 June 2008 (UTC)

Shai Lachman

The account here is based on innuendo rather than evidence. As I will edit in tomorrow, al-Husayni according to many accounts helped the British authorities, whose confidence he held, quell things over this period, like the October 1933 riots. One cannot base an account on suggestive innuendos when the reliable source does not in turn ground them in solid archival documentation.Nishidani (talk) 20:52, 21 June 2008 (UTC)

al-Husayni's memoirs

There is some useful information in al-Husayni's memoirs [3] that can be included in this article:

• His view of Nazism (page 164):

(A)

واعتبرت المانيا بلدآ صديقآ لأنها لم تكن دولة مستعمرة ولم يسبق لها أن تعرضت بسوء لأية دولة عربية أو اسلامية, ولأنها كانت تقاتل أعداءنا من مستعمرين و صهيونيين, ولان عدو عدوك صديقك, و كنت موقنآ, أن انتصار المانيا سينقذ بلادنا حتمآ من خطر الصهيونية و الاستعمار

I have considered Germany to be a friendly country, because it was not a colonizing country, and it never harmed any Arab or Islamic country, and because it was fighting our colonialist and Zionist enemies, and because the enemy of your enemy is your friend. And I was certain that Germany's victory would definitely save our countries from the danger of Zionism and colonization.

(B)

وفي المانيا سعيت جاهدآ لتقديم العون المتواضع الذي استطيعه لقضيتنا الفلسطينية و لسائر الأقطار العربية و بعض الأقطار الاسلامية, و لدعوة كافة المخلصين لقضية فلسطين و القضايا العربية, الى التعاون مع المانيا, لا من اجل المانيا و لا ايمانآ بالنازية التي لا اعتنق مبائدها و لم تخطر لي ببال, بل لأني كنت, و لا ازال, على يقين بأن لو انتصرت المانيا و المحور لما بقي للصهيونيين من أثر في فلسطين و البلاد العربية

And in Germany I worked hard to provide my humble assistance to our Palestinian cause and to all Arab countries and some Islamic countries, and to call on all those sincerely committed to our Palestinian and Arab causes to cooperate with Germany, not for the sake of Germany and not believing in Nazism, whose principles I don't subscribe to and never thought of, but rather because I was, and still am, certain that had Germany and the Axis countries won, then Zionists would not have remained in Palestine and the Arab countries.

• Antisemitism

Page 96:

(C)

ولما قلت له: ان مقاومتنا للوطن القومي اليهودي لم تكن بحافز من التعصب الديني بل كانت دفاعآ عن كياننا, و ذودآ عن بلادنا,

Then I told him (Mussolini): our resistance to the "Homeland for the Jewish people" was not motivated by our religious fanaticism, but was rather (a matter of) defending our existence and countries"

Page 147:

(D)

وأن معركتنا مع الصهيونيين ومن يدعمهم و يؤيدهم من المستعمرين هي معركة مفروضة علينا فرضا, وليس لنا فيها خيار, فلا مناص لنا من قبول تحدي الأعداء

Our battle with the Zionists and the colonialists who support them is a battle that was forced upon us, we had no choice in it, and we have no choice but to accept the challenge of the enemies.

• Holocaust

(E)Page 127, al-Husayni's reaction after Himmler tells him that they have killed 3 million Jews:

فاستغربت هذا الرقم و لم أكن أعلم شيئآ عن ذلك من قبل, وقد سألني هملر, لهذه المناسبة, كيف تفكرون في تصفية القضية اليهودية في بلادكم؟ فأجبته: اننا لا نريد منهم الا ان يعودوا الى البلاد التي جاؤوا الينا منها, فقال: لن نسمح لهم بالعودة الى ألمانيا أبدآ.

I was surprised to hear this number, and I knew nothing about it before. Then Himmler asked me: by the way, how do you plan to solve the Jewish case in your country. I answered: we want nothing from them but to return to the countries they came from. Himmler said: we will never allow them to get back to Germany.

• aaa

(F) Page 197, al-Husayni talking about himself sending letters to Nazi leaders and other leaders in the years 1943/1944 asking them to stop the Jewish immigration to Palestine:

فالواقع اني عندما أرسلت تلك المذكرات الى المسؤولين من رجال الرايخ الألماني, والدول المشار اليها, لم أكن ابتغي ابادة اليهود, لكني كنت أسعى جاهدآ لمنع طوفان الهجرة اليهودية العدوانية الرامية الى اغراق فلسطين و اخراج أهلها منها, كما حدث بعد ذلك فعلآ بمساعدة بريطانيا و الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية.

The fact is, when I sent those letters to the Nazi leaders, and to the referred to countries, I did not intend to exterminate the Jews, but I was trying hard to stop the flooding of the offensive Jewish immigration that was aiming to flood Palestine and expel its people. Which did happen later on with the help of Britain and USA.

Imad marie (talk) 13:26, 22 June 2008 (UTC)

Passage E.::The whole passage is translated by Henry Laurens, La Question de Palestine vol.2 Fayard, Paris 2002 p.469. Laurens regards it as having all the appearance of an authentic memory and sums up.

'En revanche, il est clair qu'il identifie progressivement son combat en Palestine à celui de l'Allemagne contre le judaisme mondial. La lecture de l'ensemble des passages de ses Mémoires consacrés à son séjour en Europe montre une assimilation du contenu de l'antisémitisme européen, avec les deux grandes thématiques de l'identification du judaisme avec le capitalisme financier (les Anglo-Saxons) et du coup de poignard dans le dos (les Juifs sont les responsables des deux conflits mondiaux). En revanche, une visione raciale de l'histoire du monde est totallement absente de sa perspective générale. Il a été reçu avec honneurs dans les milieux dirigeants du nazisme et il en fait un récit nettement complaisant. Il n'exprime aucun regret sur son attitude et sur ses choix, mais rappelle que l'extermination des Juifs d'Europe a été le fait des Allemands et qu'il ne porte aucune responsabilité dans la prise de décision comme dans ses modalités d'exécution. Dans l'ensemble de ses écrits postérieurs à 1945, il n'a pas d'attitudes négationnistes, alors qu'è l'époque du procès Eichmann (1960) des hommes politiques arabes de première importance adopteront ce type de discours.' pp.469-470

Laurens therefore argues that the overall cast of his memoirs shows Husayni did gradually assimilate his antizionist battles in Palestine with Germany's challenge to (the specious threat of (a) world Jewry, in that he associated Judaism with financial capitalism as embodied in the English and (b) with the 'stab in the back' theory in Nazi propaganda that Jews were behind both world wars. But his perspective lacks any touch of a racial vision of world history (fundamental to Nazi and Fascist ideology). In the postwar period, he, unlike many prominent Arab leaders, never denied the Holocaust. He had nothing to do with it, it was something Germany did, and he did not regret the choices he made. No one is under an obligation to accept al-Husayni's views. One is obliged to register them correctly, and then annotate them with whatever judgements historians made (Schwanitz says he 'feigns' to be surprised, Laurens thinks this an authentic expression of Husayni's experience at the time Nishidani (talk) 14:05, 22 June 2008 (UTC)

Imad I have made a few stylistic changes to make the English run more smoothly. Please check them to see if I have intuited the meaning correctly, in order to avoid my creating misapprehensions. In the meantime thank you for the great work. One point in (B) we read 'rather because I was, and still am, certain that if Germany and the Axis countries win, then Zionists will not remain in Palestine and Arab countries.' This is in the present and future tense, meaning that the passage was either written during the war, or at, when he wrote this passage long after the war, he still believed the Axis countries would win in the distant future. I think it must be the former, but that is how it reads in English. In any case, we can wait until other editors fluent in Arab check the quotes, endorse or modify them, and then use them for the text. Nishidani (talk) 13:41, 22 June 2008 (UTC)

Thank you for your changes, you did not change the meaning of the passages. About (B), you are right, al-Husayni spoke of the win as (past) in Arabic, so he wrote the passage after the end of the war, I modified the passage accordingly, thanks for the correction. Imad marie (talk) 14:22, 22 June 2008 (UTC)

I added (F), al-Husayni talking about his efforts to stop the Jewish immigration to Palestine. Imad marie (talk) 10:41, 24 June 2008 (UTC)

Thanks again Imad. Getting the pertinent, essential parts of this useful info in will take a little time since there will have to be, if I may take Ceedjee's approval of my proposal as fairly authoritative (no one has challenged it yet), a fairly rigorous reorganization of the material from the war. That structural reorganization, as opposed to editing in more info in relevant sections, will have to be first proposed in draft form on this talk page, where we can discuss it at length. Once we have consensus, we can then paste it in.Nishidani (talk) 10:55, 24 June 2008 (UTC)

ok for me. :-) Ceedjee (talk) 12:07, 24 June 2008 (UTC)

Palestinian-redundant?

I've restored 'Palestinian'. There was by then a distinct Palestinian identity. The Permanent Executive Committee, presided over by Musa Kazim, and composed of both Muslims and Christians first began to refer to 'Palestine' and the Palestinians in official documents redacted to put their position before the Mandatory authorities as far back as 26 July 1928, and in those documents the added adjective 'Arab' is dropped. See Henry Laurens, La Question de Palestine, Fayard, Paris 2002 vol.2 p.101. To say simply 'Arab' is to blur over the extraordinarily conflictual relationships at the time, with Jordan, Egypt, Syria etc each endeavouring to manipulate the Palestinian situation to their own national advantage, and with distinct Palestinian groups variously at odds with their 'Arab' supporters abroad. Nishidani (talk) 09:10, 25 June 2008 (UTC)

Historians debate when the separate Palestinian Arab identity developed, but I don't feel like getting into that discussion now. There are two problems with saying that the "Palestinians and Arabs" were defeated:

1. In 1948, the term "Palestinian" referred to both Palestinian Arabs and the proto-Israeli Jews that lived within the borders of the British Mandate for Palestine. Palestinian Arabs lost the war, but Palestinian Jews won the war.
2. Palestinian (and I'm referring to Palestinian Arabs) are a subset of Arabs. Saying that Palestinians and Arabs lost the war is like saying that humans and mammals nurse their young. Its redundant at best and confusing at worst. --GHcool (talk) 18:27, 25 June 2008 (UTC)

1. Hence before 1948, you are saying with extraordinary naivity, every reference to 'Palestinians' in the history books must necessarily refer to the Jewish population as well, despite the fact, as anyone could easily show, that, despite your political definition of the term, historical narratives then and now habitually refer to the Palestinians and the Jews. The word Palestinian Jew is one thing, the word 'Palestinian' is another. Come now. This is simply not good form, and very poor scholarship. When Khalidi speaks of the formation of Palestinian identity he is not talking about Jewish identity in Palestine. The distinction is absolutely necessary because nations existed around 'Palestine' which laid respective claims to that territory or contested Jewish claims, and those nations, once the war was lost by them, refused to designate the 'Arabs' as Arabs. They put them down on paper as Palestinians. Do we really have to repeat the same futile argument, which has as its object only a Zionist denial that there is such a thing as a separate historical identity to Palestinians. That was supposed to be dead and buried decades ago.
2. Palestinians ethnically are not a subset of 'Arabs'. They are like most populations a mixture of a large number of peoples. There were Circassians, Bosnian, Tinkers, Crusader Christians, Armenians, Russians, Germans, Turks, Kurds etc. The word 'Arab' in the ethnography of the region from 17th-early 20th century constantly makes a sharp distinction between the majority fellahin (regarded usually as the remnant of the oldest population, admixed with whatever African, Egyptian, and Arab elements drifted in) and Bedouin. The 'Bedouin' referred to the Arab population proper. You are confusing genetic, national, social and cultural identities, which is commonplace, but should not be repeated in an encyclopedia. Nishidani (talk) 19:27, 25 June 2008 (UTC)

1. Khalidi refers specifically to Palestinian Arabs when he speaks of "Palestinian identity." Its been a while since I picked up Khalidi's book, but if I remember correctly, he does not leave the term "Palestinians" (referring to the Arab population of the British Mandate for Palestine) ambiguous in the same way that Nishidani's proposal does.
2. In every relevant sense, Palestinian Arabs are a subset of Arabs. No Palestinian from 1948 would argue that he or she is not an Arab. No Palestinian in 2008 would argue that he or she is not an Arab.

The problem with how the way the sentence reads now is that it implies two things: (1) that the Palestinian identity (however one defines it) was as fully formed then as it is in 2008 and (2) that "Palestinians" were the losers of that war. The 1947–1948 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine, which lead to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, was between two populations of Mandatory Palestine, i.e. it was a Palestinian vs. Palestinian war. To say that Palestinians lost the war is like saying that Americans lost the American Civil War. --GHcool (talk) 20:21, 25 June 2008 (UTC)

Oh come off it. It implies no such thing. A generic label 'Jew' /'American' does not imply a 'fully formed identity' (identical over time). Israeli identity is still fluid, read Haaretz on Falasha and even Russian resistances to assimilation. Not for that are they denied the label 'Israelis'. Why do you make these absurd suggestions? Boorstin's 3 vol 'The Americans' calls British, Dutch, German populations resident from early times in America, 'Americans'. Why is it that, when 'Palestinian' is used, out come the spectacles, the microscopes, the nano-spectographic lens, to worry the guts out of the word, when in no other ethnic case I am familiar with, is this generic use of a term problematical? (Because the 'narrative' is larghely written with a vested Zionist or Israeli interest in its implications).

Daniel Barenboim says that he is a Palestinian (and an Israeli , a Jew, an Argentinian and a Spaniard), and has a Palestinian passport to prove it. He has never claimed to be an Arab. Look, young man, provide me with several books for these extraordinarily simplistic obiter dicta. There are Armenian, Kurdish (al-Kurd is appended to names), Samaritan Palestinians, Circasian Palestinians, Bosnian Palestinians, Catholic non-Arab Palestinians, to cite but a few examples. Everybody should know this. You read the literature, it's not difficult to substantiate. What is it you want? to bog us down in another futile equivocation for two weeks? These articles are hopelessly simplistic, after several years work, and I, for one, have a lot of work to do helping to bring them to a minal level of intelligibility. The argument you are raising has been raised and debated endlessly, one solution creates ten problems, ad infinitum.

Please don't use analogies with other civil wars. Zionism insisted from the outset, it is in documentation throughout, that its purpose was to have a homeland, to make a Jewish majority, and turn that homeland into a ethnically Jewish state (1917: the word 'state' is used in Weizmann's correspondence). The Jews in Maandatory Palestine were 'Palestinians' in official paperwork, but among themselves 'Jews' heading for a Jewish state, a place called 'Eretz Israel', which did not conceive, except in public rhetoric, that there would be a binational state of fellow citizens called, like them, Palestinians because, though Arab, they would share with the Jews a common identity. There is no analogy to be made with the United States, which was formed and federated by a common fight, existed for several decades with a common identity, until one issue brought on a civil war. I prey you to have some consideration for the woeful lack of substance in so many articles, and for the need to work on that, and not on the fribbly fringes of POV hypernuancing Nishidani (talk) 21:20, 25 June 2008 (UTC)

GHCool has asked civily proper questions and look what he gets in return. Here are the questions:

• Historians debate when the separate Palestinian Arab identity developed.

• There are two problems with saying that the "Palestinians and Arabs" were defeated:
• In 1948, the term "Palestinian" referred to both Palestinian Arabs and the proto-Israeli Jews that lived within the borders of the British Mandate for Palestine. Palestinian Arabs lost the war, but Palestinian Jews won the war.

• Palestinian (and I'm referring to Palestinian Arabs) are a subset of Arabs. Saying that Palestinians and Arabs lost the war is like saying that humans and mammals nurse their young. Its redundant at best and confusing at worst.

• Khalidi refers specifically to Palestinian Arabs when he speaks of "Palestinian identity." … he does not leave the term "Palestinians" (referring to the Arab population of the British Mandate for Palestine) ambiguous in the same way that Nishidani's proposal does.

• In every relevant sense, Palestinian Arabs are a subset of Arabs. No Palestinian from 1948 would argue that he or she is not an Arab. No Palestinian in 2008 would argue that he or she is not an Arab.

• The problem with how the way the sentence reads now is that it implies two things: (1) that the Palestinian identity (however one defines it) was as fully formed then as it is in 2008 and (2) that "Palestinians" were the losers of that war. The 1947–1948 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine, which lead to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, was between two populations of Mandatory Palestine, i.e. it was a Palestinian vs. Palestinian war. To say that Palestinians lost the war is like saying that Americans lost the American Civil War.

Nishdani, I would expect you to stay civil and Assume good faith. The following invectives are not acceptable.

• you are saying with extraordinary naivity.
• Come now. This is simply not good form, and very poor scholarship.
• Do we really have to repeat the same futile argument, which has as its object only a Zionist denial.
• You are confusing genetic, national, social and cultural identities, which is commonplace, but should not be repeated in an encyclopedia.
• Oh come off it. It implies no such thing... Why do you make these absurd suggestions?
• Why is it that, when 'Palestinian' is used, out come the spectacles, the microscopes, the nano-spectographic lens, to worry the guts out of the word, when in no other ethnic case I am familiar with, is this generic use of a term problematical? (Because the 'narrative' is largely written with a vested Zionist or Israeli interest in its implications).
• Look, young man, provide me with several books for these extraordinarily simplistic obiter dicta.
• Everybody should know this. You read the literature, it's not difficult to substantiate. What is it you want? to bog us down in another futile equivocation for two weeks? These articles are hopelessly simplistic, after several years work.
• I prey you to have some consideration for the woeful lack of substance in so many articles, and for the need to work on that, and not on the fribbly fringes of POV hypernuancing. Itzse (talk) 21:57, 25 June 2008 (UTC)

Thank you, Itzse, for your support, but I wish you had helped by deconstructing Nishidani's faulty arguments rather than scold him for his uncivil tone. Although Nishidani's tone does leave much to be desired, it is his usage of logical fallacies (namely non sequiturs) that make his conclusions unconvincing:

I recommended disambiguating the Palestinian Arabs from the Palestinian Jews. Nishidani's response was "Why is it that, when 'Palestinian' is used, out come the spectacles ..." and his claim that history has been written by Zionists. Both are total non-sequiturs because they don't directly address the point: that the word "Palestinian" in the context of the 1940s is an ambiguous term. The indirect suggestion appears to be to not disambiguate a clearly ambiguous term. This amounts to telling me to shut up. Asking somebody to shut up doesn't make one a winner in an argument (especially when the other person doesn't shut up).

Several books I have read on the period (most recently O Jerusalem by Dominique Lapierre and Larry Collins) refer to "Palestinian Arabs" and "Palestinian Jews." The term "Palestinian" is not a universally accepted term for the Arabs of Mandatory Palestine during the 1940s just as the term "Israeli" is not a universally accepted term for the Jews of Mandatory Palestine.

That long Zionist history lesson is an red herring because it doesn't address the question of whether the Jews of Mandatory Palestine were also called "Palestinians." I seem to recall reading about Golda Meir speaking in the U.S. and referring to her people as "Palestinian Jews."

The American Civil War and the 1947–1948 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine were, as Nishidani points out, born out of very different circumstances. The point I was making is that both sides were "Americans" just as both sides in the Palestinian civil war were "Palestinians." That's the nature of a civil war. --GHcool (talk) 22:46, 25 June 2008 (UTC)

In particular, said analysis disregards the pan-arab identity developing (and Nasser's rise will attest to that) and the Pan-Syrian identity developing. Just because zionism has a vested interest in antithesis to the Palestinian identity, doesn't make it automatically wrong either. MiS-Saath (talk) 05:32, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

Itzse. I don't assume good faith blindly. People enamoured of appeals to WP:AGF at times show small trace of it. Their language is impeccably polite, their thought all POV in its hidebound attachment to a cause, and no compromises are possible (speaking generally, without reference to any specific person). I take arguments in good faith when they have the appearance of being intelligent, and directed at NPOV composition.

Yesterday before being dragged into what I consider an inane argument which wastes invaluable time, I came across a highly reliable source which, though mildly pro-Palestinian, documented a traditional hostility to Jews in Hebron. I've edited that page quite a lot. Like many well-informed Israelis, I regard squatter settlements in that area as violent, racist indeed, to use both David Shulman and Avishai Margalit's words 'barbaric' in the treatment of Palestinians. The 1929 Hebron Massacre page has a note also in it, from a Jewish source, attesting to the amicable relations between Jews and Muslims prior to the 1920s. So what was I to do? Keep quiet, and ignore the evidence? Putting it in would, after all, console pro-Israeli editors with a vested interest in keeping that page tilted to a basically Jewish narrative. Irrespective of what was personally a distasteful consequence, I made two edits, inserting that information, which tells against the 'Palestinian' narrative. That is, without blowing my trumpet, what showing good faith in the purposes of wiki is about. Most editors with whom I argue show absolutely no interest in the encyclopedia as an encyclopedia, they are dead-set on territorial management and conquest of narrative, or in defending a national position and securing a systemic bias in I/P articles. They are no doubt in 'good faith' in their own understanding of the world. I ignore that kind of 'good faith'. I look at my interlocutor's record for scrupulous editing towards the complex needs of historical facts to judge what an edit is about. Far too many edits are, permit me, fatuous hairsplitting for nationalistic-ethnic ends. If I lose my poise at times, well, haul me to the wikicops and have an indictment laid. I'll pay the price. I do not think the present instance represents good faith editing: to the contrary it smacks of nationalistic editing which, faux de mieux, adopts language that blurs an extremely important distinction, about which I have, today, written several pages. I will not post them until, however, my interlocutor explains exactly what he means by two confident assertion, for which I can find no documentation, that:

(A)

’In every relevant sense, Palestinian Arabs are a subset of Arabs‘

That is obvious but meaningless for the purposes of the argument, since I have been arguing that to describe the non-Jewish inhabitants of Mandatory Britain as all Arabs is patently false. GHcool then writes:-

(B)

’Palestinian (and I'm referring to Palestinian Arabs) are a subset of Arabs'

Here (B) shows that the apparent obviousness of (A) disguises a problem. For GHCool lets it be known that Palestinian, when not referring to 'Jewish Palestinians' of the period, for him means 'Arab'. If by Palestinian, GHcool means Arab, then there can be no debate, but only an edit war. For he is denying what even Benny Morris admits. In the 1948 war, debates and policies about which of the many distinct cultural and ethnic groups to expel or drive off were frequent, as one attacked villages with, variously, people of Maronite, Circassian, Bosnian, Egyptian, Salabyin, Kurd, Armenian, Turk, Bedouin, Fellahin, Greek and Latin origins.

So, over to GHcool. When is a Palestinian an Arab and when is he or she not an Arab? Why could Golda Meir, whom he now enlists, say her people were Palestinian Jews, when Palestine was not a state but a Mandatory territory, but deny (elsewhere, notoriously) that there was ever a Palestinian people (non-Jewish), even in Mandatory Palestine, because they have never had a state? A Jew can be a Palestinian without a state (1919-1948) but a Palestinian cannot be a Palestinian without a state. This accounts for my vehemence. The distinction being made under the table, as I will show later, is based on racial modes of classification. But that is to anticipate. Nishidani (talk) 15:25, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

GHCool; I didn't think that you needed my help to deconstruct Nishdani's faulty arguments; they were strong enough, with little to add and there is a lot that I can learn from you in that regard, in the way you argue. I just couldn't take it anymore, that here you are trying to argue in good faith and in return you get invectives instead of arguments (each invective equals one failure to debunk an argument!). I am constantly taken to task by HG and others for failure to AGF in their eyes. My respond is sometimes similar to Nishdani's; but in the exact reverse, but still it doesn't go with them. I Itzse am held to such a high standard that I am required to Assume good faith; not blindly; which everyone is supposed to, as that is the meaning of AGF; but even when editors declare their pro-Arab stance, like Nishdani; and even when it can be proven that an editor is pushing their view; like a, b, c and d; I'm told to AGF anyway. I have no interest and no agenda to tilt WP to a pro-Israel POV. I would be more then happy if we can have a neutral encyclopedia; and that's what I'm here for, and that is my agenda; I have no other agenda on these articles. So Nishdani; can you make a similar statement, as to what is your agenda (GHCool's you believe you know already), so that I can assume good faith blindly in the future? Itzse (talk) 16:56, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

Now, for a factual thing again. its not obvious that the task infront of the arab armies was infact in support of the palestinians, and not diving palestine among their respective nations, which they evidently partly did. only years later will the 'palestinian issue' be entrusted back into palestinian hands from jordanian ones. the loss in the war was arab simply because the palestinians were not a 'side' in it, except for perhaps an irregular brigade (Holy war army) better described (courtesy of wikipedia) as the husayni's personal army. this is a complex issue.

Now, don't be disassued by debates. they're a part integral to the wikipedia system. AGF that editors DO want to write an encyclopedia, otherwise we'll go nowhere. i'd be happy to hear your response to the above claims and the ones in my original post as well, maybe (probably) i'll learn something new. MiS-Saath (talk) 17:05, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

I think you discuss a difficult matter. Because, there is no good choice. Indeed, if we talk about :

• Palestinans and Jews, we could be accused of defending a pro-Palestinian pov, denying the rights of Israelis on Palestine.
• Arabs and Jews, we could be accused of defending a pro-Israeli pov, denying the (Arab) Palestinian identity.

I think it is clear that when the Palestine Mandate existed, its unhabitants, the Palestinians, were as well Jews (mainly Zionists) and Arabs (mainly Muslims), so there were the Jewish Palestinians and the Arab Palestinians.
Personnaly, when I have to face this difficulty, I try to talk about the Palestinian Arabs and about the Yishuv, trying to avoid the word Jew because of potential picturing as the fight as being a religious one when it is mainly nationalist.
Regards, Ceedjee (talk) 17:48, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

Note: most of the Jews that were in Palestine in 1948 were actually immigrants from various countries. So how can we refer to them as "Palestinians" ?! Imad marie (talk) 18:31, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

Because they held citizenship of the british mandate of Palestine, and maybe because other people identified them as such. what looks absurd today, may have been just fine 60 years ago. Couple that with lack of prevalance of palestinian identity as it exists today (denying that palestinian identity developed by leaps in the last few decades is not giving enough credit to their political development), and you get quite a complex picture. MiS-Saath (talk) 19:14, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

Ceedjee and Mis-Saath; right on target. Itzse (talk) 19:45, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

Thx ;-)

Imad Marie,

I agree with MiS-Saath : they were Palestinians because they (most) were among the legal immigrants who were granted permission to settle in Palestine by the Mandatory Power (with the agreement of the League of Nations).

I also understand your point that it is strange to put at the same level a man who has just arrived in comparison with a sabra. But have in mind that some scholars argue that Palestine has developed due to the Zionism immigration that generated an Arab immigration...

I think we can hardly argue in that direction.

Ceedjee (talk) 20:07, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

A further complication is the traditionally free migratory space of bilad a-sham. up until the dawn of nationalism, clans would migrate in and out rather freely. non-permanent settlements were much more common then today. the current definition of palestinian refugee adopted by UNRWA reflects that, and that's just one example. MiS-Saath (talk) 05:11, 27 June 2008 (UTC)

Let's keep things simple. This is not about 'Jewish Palestinians' (though Moshe Dayan, like many Jewish memorialists of the period, never thought of himself as a 'Palestinian'. From birth he was, he says, raised as a Jew in 'the land of Israel' that others called Palestinian (Story of My Life p.24)to cite but one of many instances). The fact that Jews had Palestinian citizenship under the Mandate is being used instrumentally to deny to the non-Jewish remnant after the nakba the right to identify themselves as 'Palestinians'. Overnight 'Palestinian Jews' became Israelis (all agree). Overnight non Jewish Palestinians, by whose fiat no one will explain, became 'Arabs', though no Arab country accepted them as anothing other than of Palestinian nationality. The move is obvious and cynical. This is about the proper language, not the politics of language, to describe the non-Jewish Palestinians of the Mandate who lost out, a small but significant component of which was not 'Arab', but ethnically other (Circasians were Caucasian Sunnis), Maronites were Christians. Ben-Gurion in a famous note, when several years earlier annotating the sorts of peoples (several) up for listing in the category of those to be driven out, listed the Circasians as 'Arabs', ignorantly, but because they were, confessionally Sunnis. Elsewhere, 'Arabs' refers to an ethnic group. etc,.etc, etc. In 1948 several of these ethnic groups were driven out with the 'Arab' (understood confusedly as an 'ethnic' and a 'confessional' blanket term) population (Morris). To insist on 'Arab' is to blur a distinction on the level of facts. To add a (non-Jewish) Palestinian qualifier covers all cases. Not to accept this fidelity to the complexities of history is to conveniently wipe off the record the fact that non-Arab non-Jewish groups were also driven out or fled. It was an exodus for many of them. What's the problem. No one denies the facts. Then, lossen up, be less fixated on ideological advantages, use your imaginations and find a verbal solution that is adequate to the factual complexities.Nishidani (talk) 09:24, 28 June 2008 (UTC)

My point is different than the point brought up by GHcool. the main argument is that the palestinians were no longer a party to the war anymore (having been defeated prior to the war), therefore the loss in that particular war was an arab loss. the 'palestinian matter' was entrusted to the hands of the king of jordan, and no palestinan force (except said Holy War Army, which was the husseini irregular private army, and was a very minor one). it's further claimed that the arab armies represented their own aspirations and not necessarily palestinian ones, in particular when you judge the actions post-war (annexation of the west bank and the uselessness of the "All Palestine Government", widely described as a farce even among the pages of this encyclopedia). The claims made by Shlaim are also telling about this, and i don't think you can blame him for any love of zionism. to sum it up, the palestinians were not a side by themselves and even their interests were represented only as a pretense. MiS-Saath (talk) 10:01, 28 June 2008 (UTC)