Talk:2020–2021 China–India skirmishes

Some sources

• Fisher, Margaret W.; Rose, Leo E.; Huttenback, Robert A. (1963), Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh, Praeger – via Questia
• Garver, John W. (2006), "China's Decision for War with India in 1962", in Robert S. Ross (ed.), New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy, Stanford University Press, ISBN 978-0-8047-5363-0, archived from the original (PDF) on 28 August 2017
• Hoffmann, Steven A. (1990), India and the China Crisis, University of California Press, ISBN 978-0-520-06537-6
• Lamb, Alastair (1964), The China-India border, Oxford University Press
• Lintner, Bertil (2018), China’s India War: Collision Course on the Roof of the World, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-909163-8
• Maxwell, Neville (1970), India's China War, Pantheon Books, ISBN 978-0-394-47051-1
• Raghavan, Srinath (2010), War and Peace in Modern India, Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 978-1-137-00737-7
• Woodman, Dorothy (1969), Himalayan Frontiers: A Political Review of British, Chinese, Indian, and Russian Rivalries, Praeger – via archive.org

Territorial changes source

This article reports that "A summer of fighting saw India lose control over about 300 square kilometers of land along the disputed mountainous terrain". It has amazing 3D maps of the territorial changes.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-11-01/china-gained-ground-on-india-during-bloody-summer-in-himalayas

Effect of the October 2024 agreement on territorial changes

Under the October 2024 agreement between India and China, disengagement has been agreed only in Depsang and Demchok, Ladakh.

This is only with respect to the last two remaining friction points — Depsang and Demchok — and there is no change in status at the other friction points where buffer zones were set up since the disengagement from 2020-2022.
Former diplomats and military officers also advised caution on the continued presence of buffer zones which are in the Indian territory.

— The Hindu, 27 Oct 2024

The buffer zones set up in Indian territory after the skirmishes of 2020 still remain inaccessible for India.

The two armies had established no-patrol buffer zones ranging from 3 km to 10 km, primarily on the Indian side of the LAC.
While there is now an agreement on patrolling rights in the Depsang Plains and Demchok, sources indicate that the situation at other friction points—such as those in the Galwan Valley and Pangong Tso, where troop disengagement occurred two years ago alongside the establishment of buffer zones – will remain unchanged.

— Bharat Shakti, 22 Oct 2024

While there was agreement on patrolling rights in Depsang Plains and Demchok, sources said the situation at the other friction points — in Galwan Valley and Pangong Tso — where disengagement of troops was achieved two years ago with creation of buffer zones would remain the same.

— Indian Express, 22 Oct 2024

Those buffer zones at Galwan, north bank of Pangong Tso, the Kailash Range and the larger Gogra-Hot Springs area, varying from 3-km to 10-km, are largely on what India considers to be its own territory.

— Times of India, 26 Oct 2024

The frictions between the two sides in the Depsang Plains and Demchok region have long been regarded as "legacy issues" predating the Chinese incursions of 2020.

— Business Standard, 22 Oct 2024

The assertion that the pre-2020 status has been reached along the entire border is false.

The pact does not include the buffer zones that were earlier created by altering the status quo at multiple transgression points, including the Galwan Valley where Chinese troops had killed 20 Indian soldiers in 2020.
It is very clear that the minister and the government are trying to keep the domestic audience in good humour by making such unsubstantiated claims. India had ceded further territory to the Chinese under the earlier agreements by creating buffer zones within India-claimed lines instead of insisting on a return to the pre-transgression status quo of April 2020.

— The Telegraph, 26 Oct 2024

Based on the above, the description in the infobox that speaks about the the territorial changes that have happened since 2020 should not be reomved from the article. The Discoverer (talk) 08:05, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

Map caption

Most of this was removed because it is undue and I don't see a source going into such details. CurryCity (talk) 05:33, 30 December 2024 (UTC)

The source describes the ownership situation as unclear. "There has been no consistent line that both countries have used for these areas" and "the reality lies somewhere in between". Maintaining as you have that it's Indian territory in wikivoice misrepresents the source. CurryCity (talk) 05:38, 30 December 2024 (UTC)

You are contesting the caption of an image. The purpose of a caption is to describe the image and, if it is not obvious, explain how it relates to the topic of this page, which is done in the second sentence. The footnote explains the claim made in that sentence, by providing detail about the map, some of which have been described by reliable sources.

The purpose of the caption is not to summarise the sources. The purpose is to describe map. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 09:44, 30 December 2024 (UTC)

Many parts of the explanation seem to be original research and overly detailed. It's difficult to follow what lines are exactly being described. Neither source attributes these claims as a direct cause of the 1962 war, which is not surprising, because there were multiple reasons more important than territory. Even if you were to say China's claim has expanded, it's equally important and relevant with respect to such maps and images that there has been no consistent line that both countries have used for these areas. CurryCity (talk) 09:54, 2 January 2025 (UTC)

Here is the text of the footnote:

Even though the map is of very low resolution, it is apparent that the Chip Chap River, a headwater of the Shyok River is shown entirely within Ladakh, as are the Depsang Bulge, Galwan Valley, Chang Chenmo Valley, the western half of the Pangong Lake and the Spanggur Lake. The Republic of China never claimed any of these territories. The present-day People's Republic of China expanded the territorial claims in 1960 and fought the 1962 war to enforce them.

References

There is no mention of any "lines" here. Nor is there any mention of the "cause" of the 1962 war.

Please state what your objection to this text is. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 20:30, 2 January 2025 (UTC)

Ok, I guess you are interpreting the clause fought the 1962 war to enforce them as stating a cause of the war. I am happy to reword it to: "enforced it through the 1962 war".

From the Karackattu citation, I can highlight the following passages:

(p. 591): In both these official Chinese maps, the site of the current conflict, i.e. the area of the Galwan river valley, is unambiguously shown as lying in Indian territory, besides the fact that the Shyok, Chip-Chap and Galwan valleys belong to the Indus water system in terms of the geography of watersheds in those areas (Figure 1)

You removed the phrase "in Indian territory" in this edit. It needs to be put back.

The Figure 1 in the source also makes clear how PRC has expanded its claims from 1951 to 1960.

(p. 593): Chinese maps did, in practise, show the trijunction of Jammu and Kashmir with Xinjiang and Tibet at Lanak La – based on the Macartney-MacDonald alignment (leaving a part of Aksai China in India; Chinese maps discussed in the previous paragraphs included)

Trijunction at "Lanak La" means that the Chang Chenmo River is in Indian territory. Following the "Macartney-MacDonald alignment" means that Chip Chap River, bulk of the Galwan River and all the tributaries of the Chang Chenmo such as Khugrang, Changlung etc. are in Indian territory. In particular the Gogra pasture that China occupied during the conflict and later agreed to leave as "buffer zone" is in Indian territory. It also occupied part of the Khugrang River valley and later insisted on it being "buffer zone". Etc., etc. Do I need to go on? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 02:57, 3 January 2025 (UTC)

While it may be true that PRC expanded on ROC claims, but the boundary has never been officially settled or demarcated. I don't know whether the following accurately characterises your reasons, but it appears to me that by interpreting the Macartney line using geographical details, which are not stated explicitly by the sources, and by writing the skirmish area as Indian territory outside the context of claims, you have shifted the meaning toward that it's been settled as Indian, but China launched skirmishes again into this area?

It seems that the 1962 war and the line of actual control have put this on China's side for a long time, so why add an old ROC map in the "Causes" section about the 2020 skirmishes? China's 1960s line or claim already exceeded it, and India claims the entire Aksai Chin much deeper to the northeast regardless of the Macartney line. CurryCity (talk) 08:54, 6 January 2025 (UTC)