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State consequentialism

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State consequentialism[1] is a modern minority theoretical interpretation of Mohist consequentialist ethics in Sinology, often intersecting with Chinese Legalism. Sinologist Fraser of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy interprets Mohist consequentialism, dating back to the 5th century BC, as the "world's earliest form of consequentialism, a remarkably sophisticated version based on a plurality of intrinsic goods taken as constitutive of human welfare".[2] An ancient Chinese State consequentialist might evaluate the moral worth of an action based on how it contributes to the basic goods of a more particular entity: a state,[1] with social order, basic material wealth, and population growth valued by both Mohists and "Legalists" like Shang Yang. The term has also been applied to the political philosophy of the Confucian philosopher Xunzi.[3]

Although some scholars have argued Mohist consequentialism as a type of state consequentialism, Mohism more generally holds that right and wrong are determined by what benefits all the people of the world. While some Mohists did serve in states, the Mohist ethical concern is generally to benefit all people, considered as an aggregate or a community, not just a particular political entity, such as the state.[4]

Since there was no literal pre-Han Legalism category, although some of the Han Feizi is critical of Mohism, as one of the major forces of the Warring States period it is nonetheless relevant as one theoretical framework for interpreting the work. Considering peace beneficial and war harmful, Mohist participation in warfare was generally defensive, serving as military engineers; Shang Yang and the Han Feizi both advocate offensive warfare in the interest of the state. As one of State Consequentialism's more recent advocates, professor Tao Jiang attempts to reconcile it with more generalist Mohist consequentialism with the idea of the state coming to encompass "all under Heaven", making the human world and state identical and bringing warfare to an end.

Consequentialism

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It is the business of the benevolent man to seek to promote what is beneficial to the world and to eliminate what is harmful, and to provide a model for the world. What benefits he will carry out; what does not benefit men he will leave alone (Chinese: 仁之事者, 必务求于天下之利, 除天下之害, 将以为法乎天下. 利人乎, 即为; 不利人乎, 即止).[5]

— Mozi, Mozi (5th century BC) (Chapter 8: Against Music Part I)

Unlike utilitarianism, which views pleasure as a moral good, "the basic goods in Mohist consequentialist thinking are... order, material wealth, and increase in population".[6] During Mozi's era, war and famines were common, and population growth was seen as a moral necessity for a harmonious society. The "material wealth" of Mohist consequentialism refers to basic needs like shelter and clothing, and the "order" of Mohist consequentialism refers to Mozi's stance against warfare and violence, which he viewed as pointless and a threat to social stability.[7]

Stanford Sinologist David Shepherd Nivison, in The Cambridge History of Ancient China, writes that the moral goods of Mohism "are interrelated: more basic wealth, then more reproduction; more people, then more production and wealth... if people have plenty, they would be good, filial, kind, and so on unproblematically".[6] The Mohists believed that morality is based on "promoting the benefit of all under heaven and eliminating harm to all under heaven". In contrast to Bentham's views, state consequentialism is not utilitarian because it is not hedonistic or individualistic. The importance of outcomes that are good for the community outweigh the importance of individual pleasure and pain.[8]

Shen Dao

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Eirik Harris, modern translator of Shen Dao's fragments, has an essay including a State Consequentialist interpretation of Shen Dao, from the Warring States period. One of Shen Dao's fragments say's that the ruler's position was established to benefit the state, rather than the other way around. The text suggests that whatever benefits the state 'ought' to be done, namely to make it stronger, stable and well ordered as to better ensure it's survival.

Shen Dao does still seem to have a moral grounding, but Harris takes his reasoning as primarily based on the consequences of actions for the state. Shen Dao does claim that an orderly state will benefit the people, and assumes that a ruler might have such goals. But he never claims them as 'intinsicly valuable, or as the ruler's "fundamental aim", and never claims he should always take those actions which benefit state order or the people. The ruler simply 'ought' to follow Shen Dao's advice if he desires 'consequences' like a strong, orderly state and welfare, as might be assumed.[9]

Sources

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  • Pines, Yuri (2024). Dao Companion to China's fa Tradition. Hebrew University of Jerusalem: Springer. ISBN 9789048129270.

References

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  1. ^ a b Ivanhoe, P.J.; Van Norden, Bryan William (2005). Readings in classical Chinese philosophy. Hackett Publishing. p. 60. ISBN 978-0-87220-780-6. "he advocated a form of state consequentialism, which sought to maximize three basic goods: the wealth, order, and population of the state
  2. ^ Fraser, Chris, "Mohism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , Edward N. Zalta.
  3. ^ Deen K. Chatterjee (6 October 2011). Encyclopedia of Global Justice. Springer. p. 1170. ISBN 978-1-4020-9159-9. in this sense, one can interpret Xunzi's political philosophy as a form of state utilitarianism or state consequentialism
  4. ^ Fraser, Chris (2016). The Philosophy of the Mozi: The First Consequentialists. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 17, 249.
  5. ^ Di Mo; Xunzi; Di Mo Xunzi Fei Han; Professor Burton Watson (1967). Basic Writings of Mo Tzu, Hsün Tzu, and Han Fei Tzu. Columbia University Press. p. 110. ISBN 978-0-231-02515-7.
  6. ^ a b Loewe, Michael; Shaughnessy, Edward L. (2011). The Cambridge History of Ancient China. Cambridge University Press. p. 761. ISBN 978-0-521-47030-8.
  7. ^ Van Norden, Bryan W. (2011). Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy. Hackett Publishing. p. 52. ISBN 978-1-60384-468-0.
  8. ^ Jay L. Garfield; William Edelglass (9 June 2011). The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy. Oxford University Press. p. 62. ISBN 978-0-19-532899-8. The goods that serve as criteria of morality are collective or public, in contrast, for instance, to individual happiness or well-being
  9. ^ Pines 2024, p. 94.