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Siege of Poti (1770–1771)

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Siege of Poti (1770–1771)
Part of the Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774)

A tower of the Poti Fortress
Date14 October 1770 – 17 February 1771
Location
Poti, Ottoman Empire
42°9′0″N 41°40′0″E / 42.15000°N 41.66667°E / 42.15000; 41.66667
Result Ottoman victory[1]
Belligerents
 Ottoman Empire  Russian Empire
Kingdom of Imereti
Principality of Mingrelia
Commanders and leaders
Unknown Gottlieb Totleben
Nikolai Iazikov [ru]
Solomon I
Katsia II Dadiani
Strength
Under 7,000[a] Over 2,000[b]
Casualties and losses
Unknown Heavy
Siege of Poti (1770–1771) is located in Europe
Siege of Poti (1770–1771)
class=notpageimage|
Location within Europe
Siege of Poti (1770–1771) is located in Georgia
Siege of Poti (1770–1771)
Siege of Poti (1770–1771) (Georgia)

The siege of Poti[c] was a military siege undertaken by Russia, the Kingdom of Imereti, and the Principality of Mingrelia from 14 October 1770 to 17 February 1771 against the Ottoman city of Poti. The siege was part of the Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774), and resulted in an Ottoman victory.[5]

Background

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After the battle of Khresili in December 1757, the Ottomans attacked the Kingdom of Imereti multiple times between 1758 and 1766, but they could not subjugate Solomon I. They were eventually forced to sign a treaty with Imereti, a term of which was that Imereti was no longer an Ottoman vassal but an independent kingdom under Ottoman protection. One of the only concessions to the Turks was an annual tribute of 60 women of any ethnic origin, which Solomon I failed to honor.[6]

18th-century portrait of Solomon I

In May 1769, during the Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774), Solomon traveled to Tbilisi to meet with Heraclius II, King of Kartli-Kakheti. The two kings agreed to request five regiments of soldiers from Russia to join their war against the Ottoman Empire, contingent upon the guarantee that Georgian interests would be safeguarded in a future peace treaty with the Ottomans.[7] In response, the Russians dispatched (at first) a small contingent from Moscow in August 1769 with General Gottlieb Heinrich Curt von Totleben at its head.[8] Catherine the Great gave explicit orders to Totleben that he should utilise Georgian troops rather than Russian ones as much as he can. Although Solomon wanted to recapture his own capital (Kutaisi) from the Ottomans, Totleben disagreed and unsuccessfully besieged Şorapani instead in October 1769.[9]

Portrait of Catherine the Great, c. 1770

Prelude

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Catherine the Great was made aware of Gottlieb Totleben's behaviour and his constant feuds with Kings Solomon I and Heraclius II. Although she regularly received letters of complaint from both kings, she told them that they needed to listen to Totleben and implement his advice since he was an "experienced" field commander.[10] Fearing that the Russian expedition into Georgia may self-destruct due to constant clashes between the Georgian kings and Totleben, Catherine appointed as her personal agent Captain Nikolai Danilovich Iazikov [ru] of the Semyonovsky Life Guards Regiment on 9 July 1770 to report on matters in Georgia.[11] He was accompanied by other officers and captains such as Ivan Lvov,[12] and was helped in his role by important figures such as Catholicos Anton.[13]

18th-century portrait of Heraclius II

Totleben wanted to secure the major port city of Poti for the Imperial Russian Navy so that it gained a foothold into the Black Sea.[14] As such, he marched onto Poti on 14 October [O.S. 3 October] 1770 with thousands of soldiers, and was accompanied by the forces of King Solomon I and Prince Katsia II Dadiani.[15]

Map of the Ottoman-Russian border (as distinguished by the red line), c. 1745

Siege

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The siege was protracted and lasted for months. For some time, Solomon I was blocking any Turkish aid intended for Poti in Guria. Nikolai Danilovich Iazikov [ru] wrote on 5 February 1771 to Chancellor Nikita Panin that "we live under constant cannonfire and rifle shots", stating "our only salvation is that our enemy forgives us". At this point, the original Russian force (which numbered over 2,000) was reduced to 1,200 men, mostly due to diseases and a lack of supplies. Totleben, on the other hand, incessantly feuded with those around him.[4]

Portrait of Gottlieb Heinrich Curt von Totleben, c. 1761

With the prolonged siege turning out to be a failure, Solomon I tried to have Totleben withdraw from the city. In response, Totleben attempted to provoke the nobilities of Mingrelia and Guria into rebellion against him.[14] However, before any outcome had been achieved, he was reported to the imperial court at Saint Petersburg by several of his officers. Iazikov regularly wrote to Chancellor Nikita Panin about this issue, and in one letter he remarks: "The Count [Totleben] cannot be endured, down to the last person among the local people, and it seems to me, that if the Count stays here for the future campaign, that [we] can expect nothing but evil".[16] Panin showed this report to Catherine the Great, which prompted her to relieve Totleben of his command and recall him in disgrace to Russia on 24 January 1771.[16]

18th-century portrait of Nikita Panin

Totleben was eventually forced to lift the siege of Poti on 17 February [O.S. 6 February] 1771, after four months of besieging the fortress.[17] Although multiple factors (such as rampant disease and an extreme lack of supplies) contributed to this defeat, Totleben decided to withdraw from the area when he heard on 14 February that a 6,000-strong[2] Ottoman-Abkhazian force under the leadership of Kelesh Ahmed-Bey Sharvashidze (Prince of Abkhazia) and another Sharvashidze were coming to the aid of the Poti garrison.[3]

Aftermath

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After Totleben failed to take Poti, he blamed Solomon I and Katsia II Dadiani in a letter to Zakhar Chernyshev for having pressured him to leave the city and for not aiding him adequately. In reality, Totleben had to withdraw after the Pasha of Akhaltsikhe led an attack onto the Kingdom of Imereti in eastern Georgia; as well as the fact that a joint 6,000-strong Ottoman-Abkhazian army was en route to the fortress to relieve the garrison.[2][18]

The Pashalik of Akhaltsikhe (Childir Eyalet) within the Ottoman Empire, c. 1795

Despite Totleben being called in disgrace to Saint Petersburg, he was not only unpunished, but was rewarded by the Empress for his actions.[19] Meanwhile, the command of the Russian expeditionary forces in Georgia was transferred to Major general Aleksey Nikolaevich Sukhotin [ru]. He arrived to Georgia in May 1771 to find that the Russian soldiers were "naked, without horses, and almost without arms".[20] However, Sukhotin was not any better than Totleben. He had even poorer relations with Kings Solomon I and Heraclius II, and did not take their advices seriously. As with Totleben, he was also disliked by the local populace.[21] Sukhotin would besiege Poti with 4,000 soldiers in the summer of 1771, despite protests from Solomon I.[3] He was forced to retreat after 2,000[19] of his men (half of his army) died as malaria ravaged his camps.[1][14] Sukhotin himself was also afflicted with the disease, though he was able to recover.[22]

With the expedition in Georgia mostly ending in failure, Catherine the Great ordered for the withdrawal of troops from the North Caucasus Line in May 1772 after Russia had entered the Caucasus for the first time in its history in 1770.[14] The Ottomans, under the leadership of Süleyman Pasha,[23] took advantage of this and captured Kobuleti, annexing it into the Trebizond vilayet.[21]

Map of Georgia, c. 1775

Notes

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  1. ^ Although an overall figure of under 7,000 is given, most of these soldiers did not participate in a battle. The number of the garrison of Poti numbered no more than 1,000. However, hearing of a 6,000-strong joint Ottoman-Abkhazian force marching onto the city, Totleben was forced to lift the siege and withdraw completely from Poti.[2][3]
  2. ^ Reduced to 1,200 by 5 February 1771, mostly due to disease and a lack of supplies.[4]
  3. ^ Turkish: Poti Kuşatması; Russian: Осада Поти; Georgian: ფოთის ალყა

Citations

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  1. ^ a b Rayfield, Donald (2012). Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia. London: Reaktion Books. p. 243. ISBN 9781780230306.
  2. ^ a b c Georgia, Ivan Sytin. Military encyclopedia, Vol. 8, Vasily Fedorovich Novitsky (ed.).
  3. ^ a b c Gamakharia, Beradze & Gvantseladze 2011, p. 286.
  4. ^ a b Zagareli, Alexander A., ed. (1891). Грамоты и другие исторические документы XVIII столетия относящиеся к Грузии [Charters and Other Historical Documents of the XVIII Century Related to Georgia] (PDF) (in Russian). Vol. 1. Saint Petersburg: Типография В. Киршбаума. pp. XXII–XXIII.
  5. ^ Kudava, Buba; Saitidze, Gocha, eds. (2018). Tao-Klarjeti. Historical and Cultural Essays. Tbilisi: Artanuji Publishing. p. 203. ISBN 9789941478727.
  6. ^ მარიამ ლორთქიფანიძე, ოთარ ჯაფარიძე, დავით მუსხელიშვილი, როინ მეტრეველი (2012). საქართველოს ისტორია [History of Georgia] (in Georgian). Vol. III, Tbilisi. p. 398.
  7. ^ Tabuashvili, Apolon (2018). "The Issue of Georgian Captives in the Crimea in the 18th Century" (PDF). МАИАСК (10). Ness Ziona: Kimmeria Publishing House: 331. doi:10.24411/2219-8857-2018-00014. ISSN 2219-8857.
  8. ^ Shirokorad, Aleksandr B. [in Russian] (2009). Rusların Gözünden 240 Yıl Kıran Kırana Osmanlı Rus Savaşları [240 Years of Violent Ottoman-Russian Wars from the Russian Perspective] (in Turkish). Translated by Batur, Ahsen. Istanbul: Selenge Yayınları. p. 141. ISBN 9789758839636.
  9. ^ Lang 1957, p. 166.
  10. ^ Gvosdev 2000, p. 36.
  11. ^ Gvosdev 2000, p. 37.
  12. ^ Gvosdev 2000, p. 38.
  13. ^ Lang 1957, p. 187.
  14. ^ a b c d Davies, Brian L. (2016). The Russo-Turkish War, 1768–1774: Catherine II and the Ottoman Empire. London: Bloomsbury. p. 134. ISBN 9781472512932.
  15. ^ Gamakharia, Beradze & Gvantseladze 2011, p. 285.
  16. ^ a b Gvosdev 2000, p. 39.
  17. ^ Gamakharia, Beradze & Gvantseladze 2011, pp. 285–286.
  18. ^ Beradze, Tamaz (1980). "კაცია II დადიანი" [Katsia II Dadiani]. ქართული საბჭოთა ენციკლოპედია, ტ. 5 [Georgian Soviet Encyclopedia, Vol. 5] (in Georgian). Tbilisi: Metsniereba. p. 444.
  19. ^ a b Lordkipanidze, G.; Chumburidze, D.; Gogitidze, M. (2020). Грузины в войнах Персидской, сманской и Российской империи (1600–1918) [Georgians in the Wars of the Persian, Ottoman, and Russian Empires (1600–1918)] (PDF) (in Russian). Tbilisi: Georgian National Academy of Sciences. p. 88.
  20. ^ Lang 1957, p. 172.
  21. ^ a b Assatiani, Nodar; Janelidze, Otar (2009). Alasania, Giuli; Goff, Ken (eds.). History of Georgia. From Ancient Times to the Present Day. Tbilisi: Publishing House Petite. p. 173. ISBN 9789941906367.
  22. ^ Lang 1957, pp. 172–173.
  23. ^ Allen, William E. D. (2023). A History of the Georgian People: From the Beginning Down to the Russian Conquest in the Nineteenth Century. Routledge Library Editions: Colonialism and Imperialism. Vol. 2. New York City: Routledge. p. 207. doi:10.4324/9781003368434. ISBN 9781032436890.

References

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