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Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc.

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Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc.
Argued January 7, 2002
Decided March 19, 2002
Full case nameRagsdale, et al. v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc.
Docket no.00-6029
Citations535 U.S. 81 (more)
122 S. Ct. 1155; 152 L. Ed. 2d 167
Case history
Prior218 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 2000); cert. granted, 533 U.S. 928 (2001).
Holding
29 CFR 825.700(a) is contrary to the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 and beyond authority of the Secretary of Labor. United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reverse and remanded.
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
John P. Stevens · Sandra Day O'Connor
Antonin Scalia · Anthony Kennedy
David Souter · Clarence Thomas
Ruth Bader Ginsburg · Stephen Breyer
Case opinions
MajorityKennedy, joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, Scalia, Thomas
DissentO'Connor, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer

Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81 (2002), is a U.S. labor law case, concerning the scope of federal preemption against state law for labor rights.[1]

Facts

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Ragsdale claimed her job was unjustly terminated. The Department of Labor had a penalty to make employers notify employees of the rules for securing more generous family or medical leave, than existed under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) guarantees employees 12 weeks unpaid leave.

Opinion of the Court

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The Supreme Court held by five to four that the FMLA precluded the right of the Department of Labor to draft penalty rules.

Dissent

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Justice O'Connor dissented (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer) holding that nothing prevented the rule, and it was the Department of Labor's job to enforce the law.

The Court today holds that the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA or Act), 29 U. S. C. § 2601 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V), clearly precludes the Secretary of Labor from adopting a rule requiring an employer to give an employee notice that leave is FMLA qualifying before the leave may be counted against the employer's 12-week obligation. Because I believe the Secretary is justified in requiring such individualized notice and because I think that nothing in the Act constrains the Secretary's ability to secure compliance with that requirement by refusing to count the leave against the employer's statutory obligation, I respectfully dissent.

See also

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References

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  1. ^ Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81 (2002).
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