Ontological maximalism
In philosophy, ontological maximalism (or metaontological maximalism) is a ontological realist position that asserts, "whatever can exist does in some sense exist".[1]
Overview
[edit]Meta-ontology deals with question related to ontology, whether there are mind independent (objective) answers to "what exists". Ontological realism asserts that reality (at least a part of it) is independent of the human mind.[2] In contrast to realists, ontological anti-realists deny that the world is mind-independent. Believing the epistemological and semantic problems to be insoluble, they conclude that realism must be false.[3]
Maximalism is one of two main metaontological positions. In a maximalist framework, any entity whose existence is consistent with the nature of this world can be taken to exist.[4]
See also
[edit]- Ontology
- Large cardinal property
- Continuum hypothesis
- Mathematical universe hypothesis
- Modal realism
References
[edit]- ^ Szubka, Tadeusz (2016-01-01). Metaontological Maximalism and Minimalism: Fine versus Horwich. Brill. ISBN 978-90-04-31265-4.
- ^ Niiniluoto, Ilkka (2002-02-07). "Realism in Ontology". Critical Scientific Realism. pp. 21–41. doi:10.1093/0199251614.003.0002. ISBN 0-19-925161-4.
- ^ Khlentzos, Drew (2021), "Challenges to Metaphysical Realism", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2023-03-21
- ^ Chalmers, David. "Ontological Anti-Realism" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on Oct 31, 2021.
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