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Hwasong-8

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Hwasong-8
TypeBallistic missile (U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and South Korea claim)[1][2]
Missile with hypersonic glide vehicle (North Korean claim)
Service history
Used byKorean People's Army Strategic Force
Production history
Designed2021
Specifications
Length14.5 m (48 ft)[3] or 18.5 m (61 ft)[4]
Diameter1.4 m (4.6 ft)[3] or 1.8 m (5.9 ft)[4]
WarheadHypersonic glide vehicle
'nuclear'[5]
EngineLiquid-propelled engine
Operational
range
About 2,000–4,000 km (1,200–2,500 mi)[6]
Maximum speed Mach 6 (7,400 km/h) (South Korean claim)[7]
Guidance
system
guided with vehicle[8]
Launch
platform
6-axle TEL[3]

The Hwasong-8 (Korean: 《화성-8》형; Hancha: 火星-8型; lit. Mars Type 8) is a North Korean missile claimed to be mounting a hypersonic glide vehicle, which was first tested on 27 September 2021. The first launch occurred in September, a month with a total of four missile launches. As it is supposedly a hypersonic missile, the higher speed would allow it to reach its target in shorter time and additional maneuverability would give it a better chance at defeating missile defenses.[9] Japanese tracking data from a test launch suggest it is a hypersonic ballistic missile, as North Korea described it.[10]

It is possible that the Hwasong-8 was renamed to Hwasong-12B between September 2021 and July 2023.[11]

Design

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Missile

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Images of the Hwasong-8
image icon Launch of the missile
image icon The missile, as displayed in Self-Defence 2021

As launched

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The missile has been reported to be based on either a shortened Hwasong-14 first stage, or a Hwasong-12.[8][12] However, the distance between the verniers and the main chamber on the motor suggest that the base of the missile is the Hwasong-14, as it has a slightly longer gap between those. Compared to the original Hwasong-14, the fuel tanks of the main stage would have been shortened by around a quarter.[4]

The hypersonic vehicle is mounted on top of the missile, and has a shape typical to other such vehicles, such as the DF-ZF,[13] with fins for the aerodynamic control of the vehicle while in flight. However, as data for the trajectory of the missile was not released, it is impossible to determine the trajectory of the reentry vehicle, although the missile was unlikely to have flown over Japan in a flatter trajectory, while a lofted trajectory is unsuitable for testing such vehicles, as the glide vehicle would then reenter at a near-vertical angle.[8]

The missile is the sixth consecutive successful flight of the Paektusan (RD-250) rocket motor, which is also used by the Hwasong-12, -14 and -15 but also demonstrated other technologies, such as the ampoulisation of fuel, where fuel can be loaded into the missile months or years before a launch, reducing the time for preparing a launch of a liquid fuel missile.[14][8] However, the actual impact of ampoulisation may have been overstated, as it appears that rather than the Soviet method of fueling and sealing the submarine-launched ballistic missile at the factory; instead, what is likely used is just the use of storable liquid fuel, which has probably already been practised on the Hwasong-10 and onwards, or the addition of membranes to seal off the propellent tank until launch. The use of 'ampoules' also signifies the importance of liquid fueled missiles in North Korea, that it is unlikely to develop a fully solid-fuel missile force, furthered by the fact that North Korea has had more experience with developing liquid fuel missiles.[13]

According to the Joint Chief of Staff, the missile 'could be intercepted', if it flies at a speed of Mach 3.[14] However, if it can reach hypersonic speeds, it would be able to reach the southern regions of South Korea in around a minute, compared to five or six for a Scud missile, which could be too short a time to alert missile defences.[9]

As displayed at Self-Defence 2021

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The missile displayed at the defence exhibition in October 2021 had some noticeable differences, compared to the version that was launched in September. In the exhibition, the warhead was most likely mounted on a Hwasong-12[4] and the missile was seen mounted on a MAZ-547, also used by the Hwasong-12, though that is a 'significantly' longer missile than was tested in September. It is unknown whether the main stage of the rocket used for the Hwasong-8 launch would be used for future launches, or be used for different payloads in the future.[13]

History

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The plans to launch 'hypersonic' missile were already indicated in the 8th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea as part of the Five-Year Plan for Defense Science Development,[15] where Kim Jong Un also listed other weapons, such as solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles.[8][16] Although North Korea already has missiles like the Hwasong-11A (KN-23) and Hwasong-11B (KN-24),[8] gliding vehicles are likely more able to survive missile defenses, and the experience from these short-range missiles would have helped the development of this missile.[8]

Hwasong-8 made its public debut on 27 September 2021, when a test-fire was carried out. On 11 October 2021, Hwasong-8 was displayed at the "Self-Defence 2021" military exhibition.[3]

List of Hwasong-8 tests

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There has been one known test so far:

Attempt Date Location Pre-launch announcement / detection Outcome Additional Notes
1 27 September 2021[12] Ryongrim County[12] None Success Pak Jong-chon oversaw the test, amongst other officials who also attended.[17]

The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that the missile was "in the initial stage of development" and that it would take North Korea "a significant amount of time" to deploy the missile.[12]

However, the data, such as the trajectory of the missile, and the claimed range and apogee were not officially released by South Korea, but were instead from anonymous sources quoted by Yonhap, and nor was there an official assessment of the flight of the missile.[8]

The South Korean 'anonymous' claim was a range less than 200 km and a height of 60 km,[13] while the Japanese Ministry of Defence said that it flew to 30 km.[18] The missile did not follow a ballistic trajectory.[19]

The two possibilities are that the reentry vehicle did not separate correctly, or that the reentry vehicle simply then flew under the coverage of South Korean radar.[13]

Impact of the 27 September 2021 test

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The launch of the missile also served a political purpose, in demonstrating the government's ability to continue bolstering its deterrence, showing the accomplishments while also potentially giving legitimacy and prestige at a time where there is much attention paid towards hypersonic missiles. It also likely served an international purpose, as the launch had indeed attracted a wide range of attention, such as 'joining a race headed by major military powers to deploy the advanced weapons system', as Reuters wrote,[20] or that it 'could change the military equation in East Asia', according to a CNN commentary.[21] However, the majority of ballistic missiles of North Korea already reenter at hypersonic speeds, but the still improve chances in survival of the warhead, although these reentry vehicles are significantly more expensive than a traditional reentry vehicle, and is unlikely to form more than a small part of its missile force. This has also appeared to be part of a growing arms race in Korea,[22] with this missile demonstrating its technological prowess over South Korea.[13]

MaRV version

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Main article: Hwasong-12A

Hwasong-8 has an version fitted with maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV). Its presumed official designation is Hwasong-12A.[11] The missile is also known as Hypersonic Missile Type 2 (Korean: 극초음속 미사일 2형) under South Korean naming convention.[23]

It was test-fired twice, on 5 January and 11 January 2022.[24]

See also

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References

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  1. ^ "USINDOPACOM Statement on DPRK Missile Launch".
  2. ^ Choi Soo-hyang (January 6, 2022). "(3rd LD) N. Korea says it test-fired hypersonic missile to bolster strategic capabilities". Yonhap News Agency. "South Korea and the U.S. detected the ballistic missile with our intelligence assets and are capable of responding to it," the South's Joint Chiefs of Staff spokesperson Col. Kim Jun-rak told a regular press briefing.
  3. ^ a b c d "S/2022/668" (PDF). United Nations Security Council. 7 September 2022. Retrieved 2025-01-29.
  4. ^ a b c d ""Hypersonic glider" missile Hwasong-14A". www.b14643.eu. Retrieved 2025-01-29. Note: Hwasong-14A is not the official designation, it is the name using in the source for describing Hwasong-8.
  5. ^ "Hwasong 8 Ballistic Missile with a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle Military-Today.com". Military Today. Archived from the original on 9 May 2022. Retrieved 2021-11-19.
  6. ^ "북, 극초음속 미사일·신형 ICBM·SLBM…신무기 총동원" [North Korea mobilizes new weapons including hypersonic missiles, new ICBMs, and SLBMs]. JoongAng Ilbo (in Korean). Retrieved 2025-01-29.
  7. ^ Song Sang-ho (11 January 2022). "(7th LD) N. Korea's improved ballistic missile traveled at Mach 10: JCS". Yonhap News Agency.
    Warning: this article describes another launch of a as of now unidentified missile but provide a mention of the speed of last week's missile.
  8. ^ a b c d e f g h "Observations on the 28 September 2021 Hypersonic Missile Test of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea". oneearthfuture.org. Archived from the original on 2021-11-20. Retrieved 2021-11-19.
  9. ^ a b "[아침햇살146] 북한이 요즘 선보인 무기들과 관련해". 주권방송 (in Korean). 2021-10-05. Archived from the original on 2021-11-14. Retrieved 2021-11-19.
  10. ^ Gale, Alastair. "What Are Hypersonic Missiles and Who's Developing Them?". WSJ. Retrieved 2022-11-14.
  11. ^ a b "North Korean nuclear weapons, 2024" (PDF). Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Retrieved 2025-01-08.
  12. ^ a b c d "North Korea tested new 'hypersonic missile': state media". NK News. 2021-09-28. Retrieved 2021-11-19.
  13. ^ a b c d e f "Six Takeaways From North Korea's "Hypersonic Missile" Announcement". 38 North. 2021-10-13. Retrieved 2021-11-20.
  14. ^ a b "North's Hwasong-8 is a new hypersonic missile". Korea JoongAng Daily. 29 September 2021. Retrieved 2021-11-20.
  15. ^ "로동신문". rodong.rep.kp. Archived from the original on 2021-11-20. Retrieved 2021-11-20.
  16. ^ Panda, Ankit. "What Biden Should Know About North Korea's New Nuclear Plans". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved 2021-11-20.
  17. ^ "Academy of Defence Science test-fires a new type of hypersonic missile". The Pyongyang Times. Retrieved 2021-11-19.
  18. ^ "North Korea launches 'short-range' missile toward East Sea, Seoul says". NK News. 2021-09-27. Retrieved 2021-11-20.
  19. ^ "North Korea Launches Hypersonic Missile Into Sea: State Media". Missile Threat. 2021-09-28. Retrieved 2021-11-20.
  20. ^ Cha, Sangmi (2021-09-29). "N.Korea joins race for new hypersonic missile with latest test". Reuters. Retrieved 2021-11-20.
  21. ^ Analysis by Brad Lendon (29 September 2021). "Analysis: North Korea says it tested a hypersonic missile. If true, it could change the military equation in east Asia". CNN. Retrieved 2021-11-20.
  22. ^ Bluth, Christoph; Greene, Owen. "Missile tests: how North and South Korea became locked in a dangerous arms race". The Conversation. Retrieved 2021-11-20.
  23. ^ See the image in following news: Kim, Yongrae (2022-01-06). "진화하는 北 극초음속미사일…속도 음속 5배이상·사거리도 늘어". KODEF researcher (in Korean). Yonhap News Agency. Retrieved 2022-01-07.
  24. ^ "DPRK Military Parade Viewbook 2022" (PDF). Open Nuclear Network. 2022-04-21. Retrieved 2025-01-04.
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