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The foreign relations of the People's Republic of China guides the way in which it interacts with foreign nations. As a great power and emerging superpower, China's foreign policy and strategic thinking is highly influential. China officially states it "unswervingly pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. The fundamental goals of this policy are to preserve China's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, create a favorable international environment for China's reform and opening up and modernization construction, maintain world peace and propel common development."^[1] An example of a foreign policy decision guided by the PRC's "sovereignty and territorial integrity" is its not engaging in diplomatic relations with any country that recognizes the Republic of China (Taiwan), which the PRC doesn't recognise as a separate nation.^[2]^[3]^[4] China is a member of many international organizations; holding key positions such as a permanent member on the UN Security Council.

Institutions of foreign policy

Like most other nations, China's foreign policy is carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the Foreign Affairs Ministry is subordinate to the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group of the Communist Party of China, which decides on policy-making.

Unlike most other nations, much of Chinese foreign policy is formulated in think tanks sponsored and supervised by, but formally outside of the government. One distinctive aspect of Sino-American relations is that much of the foreign policy discussion takes place between interlocutors who form the think tanks.^{[citation needed]} Because these discussions are unofficial, they are generally more free and less restricted than discussions between government officials. China is also distinctive for having a separate body of Chinese strategic thought and theory of international relations which is distinct from Western theory.^{[citation needed]}

History of foreign policy

Since its establishment, the People's Republic of China has worked vigorously to win international support for its position that it is the sole legitimate government of all China, including Hong Kong (Foreign relations of Hong Kong), Macau (Foreign relations of Macau), and Taiwan (Foreign relations of the Republic of China). Until the early 1970s, the Republic of China government in Taipei was recognized diplomatically by most world powers and the UN. After the Beijing government assumed the China seat in the United Nations in 1971 (and the ROC government was expelled) and became increasingly more significant as a global player, most nations switched diplomatic relations from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China. Japan established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1972, following the Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China, and the United States did so in 1979. The number of countries that have established diplomatic relations with Beijing has risen to 171, while 23 maintain diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (or Taiwan).^[5] (See also: Political status of Taiwan)

Both the PRC and ROC make it a prerequisite for diplomatic relations that a country does not recognize and conduct any official relations with the other party.

After its founding, the PRC's foreign policy initially focused on its solidarity with the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc nations, and other communist countries, sealed with, among other agreements, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed in 1950 to oppose China's chief antagonists, the West and in particular the United States. The 1950–53 Korean War waged by China and its North Korea ally against the United States, South Korea, and United Nations (UN) forces has long been a reason for bitter feelings. After the conclusion of the Korean War, China sought to balance its identification as a member of the Soviet bloc by establishing friendly relations with Pakistan and other Third World countries, particularly in Southeast Asia.

By the late 1950s, relations between China and the Soviet Union had become so divisive that in 1960, the Soviets unilaterally withdrew their advisers from China. The two then began to vie for allegiances among the developing world nations, for China saw itself as a natural champion through its role in the Non-Aligned Movement and its numerous bilateral and bi-party ties. In the 1960s, Beijing competed with Moscow for political influence among communist parties and in the developing world generally. In 1962, China had a brief war with India over a border dispute. By 1969, relations with Moscow were so tense that fighting erupted along their common border. Following the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and clashes in 1969 on the Sino-Soviet border, Chinese competition with the Soviet Union increasingly reflected concern over China's own strategic position. China then lessened its anti-Western rhetoric and began developing formal diplomatic relations with West European nations.

Around the same time, in 1971, that Beijing succeeded in gaining China's seat in the UN (thus ousting the Republic of China on Taiwan), relations with the United States began to thaw. In 1972, President Richard M. Nixon visited China. Formal diplomatic relations were established in 1978, and the two nations have experienced more than a quarter century of varying degrees of amiable or wary relations over such contentious issues as Taiwan, trade balances, intellectual property rights, nuclear proliferation, and human rights.

In late 1978, the Chinese also became concerned over Vietnam's efforts to establish open control over Laos and Cambodia. In response to the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, China fought a war with Vietnam (February–March 1979).

Chinese anxiety about Soviet strategic advances was heightened following the Soviet Union's December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Sharp differences between China and the Soviet Union persisted over Soviet support for Vietnam's continued occupation of Cambodia, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Soviet troops along the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia—the so-called "three obstacles" to improved Sino-Soviet relations.

In the 1970s and 1980s, China sought to create a secure regional and global environment for itself and to foster good relations with countries that could aid its economic development. During the reign of Mao, China was a closed country. After his death, authorities took the reformers led by Deng Xiaoping. In 1983 President of China becomes 74-year old Li Xiannian, one of the longest serving politicians in the leadership of China. He visited many countries and thus began opening China to the world. Li Xiannian was the first president of China, who visited the United States in 1985. Li also visited North Korea. In 1986 Queen Elizabeth II arrived in official visit to China.^[6]^[7] To this end, China looked to the West for assistance with its modernization drive and for help in countering Soviet expansionism, which it characterized as the greatest threat to its national security and to world peace.

China maintained its consistent opposition to "superpower hegemonism," focusing almost exclusively on the expansionist actions of the Soviet Union and Soviet proxies such as Vietnam and Cuba, but it also placed growing emphasis on a foreign policy independent of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. While improving ties with the West, China continued to closely follow the political and economic positions of the Third World Non-Aligned Movement, although China was not a formal member. Poopy is stinky, and the Chinese know this very well. Brown cats meow.

In the immediate aftermath of Tiananmen crackdown in June 1989, many countries reduced their diplomatic contacts with China as well as their economic assistance programs. In response, China worked vigorously to expand its relations with foreign countries, and by late 1990, had reestablished normal relations with almost all nations. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991, China also opened diplomatic relations with the republics of the former Soviet Union.

Recent foreign policy

In recent years, China's leaders have been regular travelers to all parts of the globe, and it has sought a higher profile in the UN through its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and other multilateral organizations.

Closer to home, China has made efforts to reduce tensions in Asia; its relations with its Asian neighbors have become stable during the last decades of the 20th century. It has contributed to stability on the Korean Peninsula, cultivated a more cooperative relationship with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Brunei, Cambodia, Burma, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam), and participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum. In 1997, the ASEAN member nations and the People's Republic of China, South Korea and Japan agreed to hold yearly talks to further strengthen regional cooperation, the ASEAN Plus Three meetings. In 2005, the "ASEAN Plus Three" countries together with India, Australia and New Zealand held the inaugural East Asia Summit (EAS). Relations have improved with Vietnam since a border war was fought with the one-time close ally in 1979. A territorial dispute with its Southeast Asian neighbors over islands in the South China Sea remains unresolved, as does another dispute in the East China Sea with Japan.

China has improved ties with Russia. President Putin and President Jiang, in large part to serve as a counterbalance to the United States, signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in July 2001. The two also joined with the Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to found the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in June 2001. The SCO is designed to promote regional stability and cooperate to combat terrorism in the region.

Relations with India have also improved considerably. After years of competition, general distrust between the two (mostly over China's close relationship with Pakistan and India's with the former Soviet Union) and a border war, relations in the 21st century between the world's two most populous states have never been more harmonious, as they have started to collaborate in several economic and strategic areas. Both countries have doubled their economic trade in the past few years, and China became India's largest trading partner in 2010. The two countries are planning to host joint naval exercises. In 2003, China and India held negotiations for the first time since the Sino-Indian War of 1962 on a major border dispute: however, the dispute over Aksai Chin and South Tibet is not settled, and plagues Sino-India relations. While New Delhi has raised objections to Chinese military-aid to arch-rival Pakistan and neighboring Bangladesh, Beijing similarly objects to India's growing military collaboration with Japan, Australia and the United States.^[8]^[9]

China has border and maritime disputes, including with Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin and with Japan. Beijing has resolved many of these disputes. Notably on July 21, 2008, Russia finally resolved the last remaining border dispute along the 4300 km border between the two countries by ceding a small amount of territory to China.^[10]^[11] China also reached a 2000 agreement with Vietnam to resolve some differences over their maritime borders, though disagreements remain over some islands in the South China Sea.

During the late 1990s and early 21st century, Chinese foreign policy appeared to be focused on improving relations with Russia and Europe to counterbalance the United States. This strategy was based on the premise that the United States was a hyperpower whose influence could be checked through alliances with other powers, such as Russia or the European Union. This assessment of United States power was reconsidered after the United States intervention in Kosovo, and as the 20th century drew to a close, the discussion among thinktanks in China involved how to reorient Chinese foreign policy in a unipolar world. This discussion also occurred in the context of China's new security concept, which argued that the post–Cold War era required nations to move away from thinking in terms of alliances and power blocs and toward thinking in terms of economic and diplomatic cooperation.

China had long been a close ally of North Korea but also found a valuable trading partner in South Korea and eventually took a role in the early 2000s as a proponent of "six-party talks" (North Korea, South Korea, Russia, Japan, the United States, and China) to resolve tensions on the Korean Peninsula. China was instrumental at brokering talks with North Korea over its nuclear program, and in 2003, there was a concerted effort by China to improve relations with the ASEAN nations and form a common East Asian market. These foreign policy efforts have been part of a general foreign policy initiative known as China's peaceful rise. On November 15, 2005, Hu Jintao visited Seoul and spoke of the importance of both countries' contributions for regional peace and cooperation in economic development.

However, China's opposition to the bid of two of its important neighbors—India and Japan—to become permanent members of the United Nations Security Council has proved to be an irritant in their respective relationships. Japan, with its large economic and cultural influences in Asia, is seen by China as its most formidable opponent and partner in regional diplomacy. The two sides established diplomatic relations in 1972, and Japanese investment in China was important in the early years of China's economic reforms and ever since.

At a national meeting on diplomatic work in August 2004, China's President Hu Jintao reiterated that China will continue its "independent foreign policy of peaceful development," stressing the need for a peaceful and stable international environment, especially among China's neighbors, that will foster "mutually beneficial cooperation" and "common development." This policy line has varied little in intent since the People's Republic was established in 1949, but the rhetoric has varied in its stridency to reflect periods of domestic political upheaval.

In 2005, there was talk of the European Union lifting its arms embargo, however the United States has objected to this.^[12]

In 2007, Foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang made a statement about the eight-point diplomatic philosophy of the People's Republic of China:^[13]

China will not seek hegemony. China is still a developing country and has no resources to seek hegemony. Even if China becomes a developed country, it will not seek hegemony.
China will not play power politics and will not interfere with other countries' internal affairs. China will not impose its own ideology on other countries.
China maintains all countries, big or small, should be treated equally and respect each other. All affairs should be consulted and resolved by all countries on the basis of equal participation. No country should bully others on the basis of strength.
China will make judgment on each case in international affairs, each matter on the merit of the matter itself and it will not have double standards. China will not have two policies: one for itself and one for others. China believes that it cannot do unto others what they do not wish others do unto them.
China advocates that all countries handle their relations on the basis of the United Nations Charter and norms governing international relations. China advocates stepping up international cooperation and is against unilateral politics. China should not undermine the dignity and the authority of the U.N. China should not impose and set its own wishes above the U.N. Charter, international law and norms.
China advocates peaceful negotiation and consultation so as to resolve its international disputes. China does not resort to force, or threat of force, in resolving international disputes. China maintains a reasonable national military buildup to defend its own sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is not made to expand, nor does it seek invasion or aggression.
China is firmly opposed to terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. China is a responsible member of the international community, and as for international treaties, China abides by all them in a faithful way. China never plays by a double standard, selecting and discarding treaties it does not need.
China respects the diversity of civilization and the whole world. China advocates different cultures make exchanges, learn from each other, and complement one another with their own strengths. China is opposed to clashes and confrontations between civilizations, and China does not link any particular ethnic group or religion with terrorism.

In 2011, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi outlined plans for an "integrated approach" that would serve China's economic development.^[14]

The United States Department of Defense in a 2011 report stated that China continues to use nationalism in order to increase support for the Communist party and to avoid internal criticism. However, this may also make it more difficult for Chinese foreign policy moderates to calm down tensions and avoid inflexibility during international conflicts.^[15]

Diplomatic relations

Trans-national issues

The People's Republic of China has 14 neighbouring nations by land, and 7 neighbours by sea (8 if counting Taiwan). Only Russia has as many neighbouring nations (14 by land, 12 by sea). Many disputes have arisen and resolved and many yet are undetermined.

International territorial disputes

Territorial disputes with other countries include:^[16]

Both the China (People's Republic of China) and the Taiwan (Republic of China) officially claim to be the legitimate government of "China", including Taiwan and nearby islands currently controlled by the Republic of China. The Republic of China (Taiwan) does not actively pursue its claims on the mainland.
10 features in the Yalu (Korean: Amnok) river are in dispute with North Korea.
Boundary with India in dispute; see Aksai Chin, South Tibet and the borders along the states of Arunachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand with Tibet Autonomous Region.
Portions of the boundary with Bhutan (China and Bhutan have not yet established diplomatic relations, nevertheless negotiations are ongoing as of 2008).
Claims Japan-administered Senkaku Islands (Diaoyutai), as does the Republic of China.
Paracel Islands administered and occupied by the People's Republic, but claimed by the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Vietnam.
Involved in a dispute with the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal.
Involved in a complex dispute over the Spratly Islands with the Republic of China (Taiwan), Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and possibly Brunei.
Exclusive Economic Zone disputes with North Korea in the Yellow Sea; South Korea in the Yellow and East China Seas; Japan in the East China Sea (ja:東シナ海ガス田問題, zh:东海油气田问题); Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia in the South China Sea.

Bloomberg News reports that these disputes are undermining China's attempts to charm its neighbors away from American influence.^[17] Due to a lack of natural allies or friends, China has come to rely more on military power to resolve these disputes. China has made double digit percentage increases in its military budget for many years, though as a percentage of its fast growing GDP falling from 1.4% in 2006 to 1.3% in 2011.^[18] This may lead to a self-fulfilling prophesy of China causing its own encirclement by nations that are ever more firmly aligned against an increasingly well armed and dominant China.^[19]

Refugee asylum

Refugees by country of origin are: 300,897 (from Vietnam), estimated 30,000-50,000 (from North Korea)

People trafficking

Findings of the legislative framework in place in different countries to prevent/reduce human trafficking. The findings are from the 2011 Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report^[20]

China is a source, transit, and destination country for women, men, and children trafficked for purposes of sexual exploitation and forced labor; the majority of trafficking in China is internal, but there is also international trafficking of Chinese citizens; women are lured through false promises of legitimate employment into commercial sexual exploitation in Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, and Japan; Chinese men and women are smuggled to countries throughout the world at enormous personal expense and then forced into commercial sexual exploitation or exploitative labor to repay debts to traffickers; women and children are trafficked into China from Mongolia, Burma, North Korea, Russia, and Vietnam for forced labor, marriage, and sexual slavery; most North Koreans enter northeastern China voluntarily, but others reportedly are trafficked into China from North Korea; domestic trafficking remains the most significant problem in China, with an estimated minimum of 10,000–20,000 victims trafficked each year; the actual number of victims could be much greater; some experts believe that the serious and prolonged imbalance in the male-female birth ratio may now be contributing to Chinese and foreign girls and women being trafficked as potential brides.^[16]

US State Department Tier rating: Tier 2 Watch List - "China failed to show evidence of increasing efforts to address transnational trafficking; while the government provides reasonable protection to internal victims of trafficking, protection for Chinese and foreign victims of transnational trafficking remain inadequate."^[16]

Illicit drugs

Chinese drug laws are very harsh, and the death sentence for traffickers is not unusual. Many foreigners have been sentenced to death in China for drug trafficking.^[21]^[22]^[23]^[24]^[25]

China is a major transshipment point for heroin produced in the Golden Triangle region of Southeast Asia. There is a growing domestic drug abuse problem and it is a source country for chemical precursors, despite new regulations on its large chemical industry.^[16]

International organizations

Membership in International Organizations:^[16]

China holds a permanent seat, which affords it veto power, on the Security Council of the United Nations (UN). Prior to 1971, the Republic of China on Taiwan held China's UN seat, but, as of that date, the People's Republic of China successfully lobbied for Taiwan's removal from the UN and took control of the seat.

Membership in UN system organizations

UN General Assembly and Security Council
Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN
UN Conference on Trade and Development
UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UN High Commissioner for Refugees

Other memberships

Major international treaties

The People's Republic of China has signed numerous international conventions and treaties.^[16]

Treaties signed on behalf of China before 1949 are applicable only to the Republic of China on Taiwan. Conventions signed by Beijing include: Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency Convention; Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; Chemical Weapons Convention; Conventional Weapons Convention; Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident Convention; Inhumane Weapons Convention; Nuclear Dumping Convention (London Convention); Nuclear Safety Convention; Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Convention; Rights of the Child and on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography Convention (signed Optional Protocol); and Status of Refugees Convention (and the 1967 Protocol).

Treaties include the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (signed but not ratified); Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol); Treaty on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Pelindaba, signed protocols 1 and 2); Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Treaty on Outer Space; Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco, signed Protocol 2); Treaty on Seabed Arms Control; and Treaty on the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (Treaty of Rarotonga, signed and ratified protocols 2 and 3).

China also is a party to the following international environmental conventions: Antarctic-Environmental Protocol, Antarctic Treaty, Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, Tropical Timber 83, Tropical Timber 94, Wetlands, and Whaling.

Relations by region and country

Africa

With China's growing influence around the world, Beijing has now set its efforts on Africa. China's focus in Africa is not a recent occurrence. In the 1960s and 1970s, Beijing's interest centered on building ideological solidarity. Following the Cold War, Chinese interests evolved into more pragmatic pursuits such as trade, investment, and energy.^[26] Sino-African trade quadrupled between 2000 and 2006. China is Africa's third largest commercial partner after the US and France, and second largest exporter to Africa after France. It is notably ahead of former colonial power Britain in both categories.^[27] Some western nations' hesitance to become closely involved with countries they believe to be poor in the human rights field, such as Sudan, have allowed China an opportunity for economic cooperation.^[28]

File:World revolution1.jpg

Mao-era poster with the slogan "Chairman Mao is the great savior of the revolutionary peoples of the world."

The establishment of modern Sino-African relations dates back to the late 1950s when China signed the first official bilateral trade agreement with Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Somalia, Morocco and Sudan. Zhou Enlai made a ten-country tour to Africa between December 1963 and January 1964. Relations at that time were often reflective of China's foreign policy in general: China "began to cultivate ties and offer[...] economic, technical and military support to African countries and liberation movements in an effort to encourage wars of national liberation and revolution as part of an international united front against both superpower".^[29]

Diplomacy

Early modern bilateral relations were mainly affected by the Cold War and the communist ideology. China originally had close ties with the anti-apartheid and liberation movement, African National Congress (ANC), in South Africa, but as China's relations with the Soviet Union worsened and the ANC moved closer to the Soviet Union, China shifted away from the ANC towards the Pan-Africanist Congress.^[30] China adopted several principles, among them supporting the independence of African countries while investing in infrastructure projects. The Somali Democratic Republic established good relations with the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War era. When Somalia sought to create a Greater Somalia, it declared war on Ethiopia, with the aid of the Soviet Union, Somalia took the Ogaden region in three months, but the Soviet Union shifted its support from Somalia to Ethiopia, and Ethiopia retook the Ogaden region. This angered Siad Barre, and expelled all Soviets advisors and citizens from Somalia, but Somalia maintained good relations with China, which segrated with the traditional Russian Communism. During the Cold War a few smaller nations also entered in alliances with China, such as Burundi under Michel Micombero.

The Political status of Taiwan (officially the Republic of China) has been a key political issue for the People's Republic of China (PRC). In 1971, the support of African nations was crucial in the PRC joining the United Nations (UN), taking over the seat of the ROC on Taiwan.^[31] However, while many African countries such as Algeria, Egypt and Zambia have stressed their support to "one-China policy" others such Swaziland, Burkina Faso, The Gambia and São Tomé and Príncipe are maintaining relations with Taipei.^[32] For the quest of a permanent UN seat for Africa, Nigeria, the largest African country, relies on Chinese support while Egypt looks to U.S. backing.^[33]

Since 1997, around 40 African heads of state have visited the PRC.^[34] The ministerial meeting, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), held in Beijing in October 2000 was the first collective dialogue between the PRC and African nations.

Economic relations

In 1980, the total Sino-African trade volume was US$1 billion.^[35] In 1999, it was US$6.5 billion^[36] and in 2000, US$10 billion.^[35] By 2005, the total Sino-African trade had reached US$39.7 billion before it jumped to US$55 billion in 2006, making China the second largest trading partner of Africa after the United States, which had trade worth US$91 billion with African nations. The PRC also passed the traditional African economic partner and former colonial power France, which had trade worth US$47 billion.^[37] In 2010, trade between Africa and China was worth US$114 billion^[35] and in 2011, US$166.3 billion.^[38] In the first 10 months of 2012 it was US$163.9 billion.^[38]

There are an estimated 800 Chinese corporations doing business in Africa, most of which are private companies investing in the infrastructure, energy and banking sectors.^[39] Unconditional and low-rate credit lines (rates at 1.5% over 15 years to 20 years)^[40] have taken the place of the more restricted and conditional Western loans.^[39] Since 2000, more than US$10 thousand million in debt owed by African nations to the PRC has been canceled.^[40] Even though Africa has gained from commodity exports to China, Chinese exports to Africa as well as Chinese business practices isn't helping so much, says Mohamed Gueye. Problem, what problem?

Millitary relations

Military cooperation goes back to the Cold War period when China was keen to help African liberation movements. Apart from some traditional allies such as Somalia and Uganda, China also had military ties with non-aligned countries such as Egypt. Military equipment worth $142 million was sold to African countries between 1955 and 1977.^[40] Two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, military relations are now^{[needs update]} based on business interests rather than ideology.

There is no Chinese military presence in Africa other than that used in peacekeeping.^{[citation needed]} In 2004, China deployed around 1,500 soldiers under the UN umbrella, dispatched between Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.^[40] China is also present via its military attachés; as of 2007, it has 14 attachés in 14 different African countries while there are 18 African countries who maintain their attachés in Beijing.^[41] Apart from peacemaking, China provides military training and equipment to a few countries, though this does not require military forces to be deployed.

Culture

Foreign students at Huazhong Agricultural University, Wuhan

Africa is a host of three Chinese cultural centres. The first overseas Chinese centre was opened in Mauritius in 1988.^[42] Two other followed in Egypt and Benin. The Confucius Institute, which focuses on the promotion of the Chinese language and culture, has 20 centers distributed around 13 African countries.^[43]

Historically, little is known about early African immigration to China, although there is no doubt and much consensus that the human species was originally from Africa. Due to recent developments in relations,^[ambiguous] many^[quantify] have been relocating for better opportunities. Places dubbed 'Little Africa' and 'Chocolate city' are increasingly receiving new immigrants, mostly Nigerians. Most of the African immigrants are concentrated in the area of Guangzhou with an estimated number of 20,000.^[44] It is estimated that there are around 10,000 illegal African immigrants in China and police crackdowns have intensified since early 2009.^[45]

In contrast, early Chinese immigration to the African continent is slightly better documented. In 1724, a few Chinese convicts were brought as labourers to South Africa from the Dutch East Indies (modern-day Indonesia) by the colonial Dutch Empire. In the early 19th century, another wave of immigrants came to South Africa as workers brought by the British to work in agriculture, infrastructure building and mining.^[46] In recent years, there has been an increasing presence of Chinese in Africa. Estimates vary by source though Xinhua, China's official news agency, states that there are no less than 750,000 Chinese nationals working or living in Africa.^[46] The number of Chinese illegal immigrants remains unknown.

Due to the low prices of Chinese-made weaponry and military equipment, an increasing number of African countries shifted their source of supply from traditional providers such as Russia to China.^[47] However, the selling of arms to some states accused by Western countries of war crimes, such as Sudan, have prompted criticism in the West (see Criticism section below).^[48]

Criticism

Scholars have argued that the PRC's supporting authoritarianism and autocracy in Africa is counter-productive both for long-term Chinese policy towards Africa, and to the African people. The PRC's involvement currently benefits primarily the elites, an opportunistic practice for which it has been criticized by humanitarians and others.

The Zimbabwean example is relevant. Relations between China and Robert Mugabe's regime in Zimbabwe have also been the focus of criticism by a few Western countries. China was accused of supplying Zimbabwe with jet fighters, vehicles and other military equipment.^[49] China declared in 2007 that it was dropping all kinds of assistance and limiting assistance to humanitarian aid.^[50] In July 2008, the Chinese diplomacy asked Mugabe "to behave" though critics see that as a way for China to protect its own interests in this country should a regime change.^[51]

The PRC's role in Africa has sparked much criticism, mainly by Western countries who accuse it of "neo-colonialism".^[52]^[53] As a response to such criticism, China issued the Nine Principles to Encourage and Standardise Enterprises' Overseas Investment, a charter and guide of conduct to Chinese companies operating abroad.^[54] Other criticism include the flooding of the African markets with low-cost Chinese-made products, thus harming the growth and the survival of local industries and businesses.^[55]

Central Asia

As the Chinese economy booms, a major priority is securing natural resources to keep pace with demand, and investment into China's central Asian neighbors are doing leaps and bounds to meet this demand. Chinese oil companies have invested into Kazakh oil fields, China and Kazakhstan have constructed an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China and are planning to construct a natural gas pipeline. In Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, China has invested in hydroelectric projects. In addition to bolstering trade ties, Beijing has contributed aid and funding to the region's countries. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, of which China is a founding member, is also becoming increasingly important in Central Asian security and politics. Many observers believe that beyond fostering good-neighborly relations, China is also concerned with securing its borders as it emerges as a world power.^[56]

Arab World

Sino-Arab relations have extended historically back to the first Caliphate, with important trade routes, and good diplomatic relations. Following the age of Imperialism, the Sino-Arab relations were halted for several centuries, until both gained independence in the 19th and 20th century. Today, modern Sino-Arab relations are evolving into a new era, with the SACF (Sino-Arab cooperation Forum) helping the PRC and the Arab nations to establish a new partnership in an era of the growing globalisation.

Medieval Era

During the Tang dynasty, when relations with Arabs were first established, the Chinese called Arabs 大食(Dàshí or Dashi).^[57]^[58] In modern Chinese, Dashi means Great Food. The modern term for Arab is 阿拉伯 (Ālābó or Alabo).

The Arab Islamic Caliph Uthman Ibn Affan (r. 644-656) sent an embassy to the Tang court at Chang'an.^[59]

Although the Tang Dynasty and the Abbasid Caliphate had fought at Talas, on June 11, 758, an Abbasid embassy arrived at Chang'an simultaneously with the Uyghur Turks in order to pay tribute.^[60]

The Caliphate was called "Da Shi Guo" (ta shi kuo) 大食國.^[61]

A Chinese captured at Talas, Du Huan, was brought to Baghdad and toured throughout the caliphate. He observed that in Merv, Khurasan, Arabs and Persians lived in mixed concentrations.^[62] He gave an account of the Arab people in the Tongdian in 801 which he wrote when he returned to China.

Arabia [Dashi] was originally part of Persia. The men have high noses, are dark, and bearded. The women are very fair [white] and when they go out they veil the face. Five times daily they worship God [Tianshen]. They wear silver girdles, with silver knives suspended. They do not drink wine, nor use music. Their place of worship will accommodate several hundreds of people. Every seventh day the king (Caliph) sits on high, and speaks to those below saying, ' Those who are killed by the enemy will be born in heaven above; those who slay the enemy will receive happiness.' Therefore they are usually valiant fighters. Their land is sandy and stony, not fit for cultivation; so they hunt and eat flesh.

^[63]^[64]^[65]^[66]

This (Kufa) is the place of their capital. Its men and women are attractive in appearance and large in stature. Their clothing is handsome, and their carriage and demeanor leisurely and lovely. When women go outdoors, they always cover their faces, regardless of whether they are noble or base. They pray to heaven five times a day. They eat meat [ even] when practicing abstention, [for] they believe the taking of life to be meritorious.

^[67]

The followers of the confession of the “Dashi” (the Arabs) have a means to denote the degrees of family relations, but it is degenerated and they don’t bother about it. They don’t eat the meat of pigs, dogs, donkeys and horses, they don’t respect neither the king of the country, neither their parents, they don’t believe in supernatural powers, they perform sacrifice to heaven and to no one else. According their customs every seventh day is a holiday, on which no trade and no cash transactions are done, whereas when they drink alcohol, they are behaving in a ridiculous and undisciplined way during the whole day.

^[68]

An Arab envoy presented horses and a girdle to the Chinese in 713, but he refused to pay homage to the Emperor, said, he said "In my country we only bow to God never to a Prince". The first thing the court was going to do was to murder the envoy, however, a minister intervened, saying "a difference in the court etiquette of foreign countries ought not to be considered a crime." A second Arab envoy performed the required rituals and paid homage to the Emperor in 726 A.D. He was gifted with a "purple robe and a girdle".^[69]

There was a controversy between the Arab ambassadors and Uyghur Khaganate Ambassadors over who should go first into the Chinese court, they were then guided by the Master of Ceremonies into two different entrances. Three Da shi ambassadors arrived at the Tang court in 198 A.D. A war which was raging between the Arabs and Tibetans from 785-804 benefited the Chinese.^[70]

According to Professor Samy S. Swayd Fatimid missionaries made their Dawah in China during the reign of al-'Aziz bi-Allah.^[71]

Mercenaries

In 756, over 4,000 Arab mercenaries joined the Chinese against An Lushan. After the war, they remained in China.^[72]^[73]^[74]^[75]^[76] Arab Caliph Harun al-Rashid established an alliance with China.^[77] The Abbasid caliph Abu Ja'far Abdallah ibn Muhammad al-Mansur (Abu Giafar) was the one who sent the mercenaries.Several embassies from the Abbaside Caliphs to the Chinese Court are recorded in the T'ang Annals, the most important of these being those of (A-bo-lo-ba) Abul Abbas, the founder of the new dynasty, that of (A-p'u-ch'a-fo) Abu Giafar, the builder of Bagdad, of whom more must be said immediately; and that of (A-lun) Harun al Raschid, best known, perhaps, in modern days through the popular work, Arabian Nights. The Abbasides or " Black Flags," as they were commonly called, are known in Chinese history as the Heh-i Ta-shih, " The Black-robed Arabs."^[78]^[79]^[80]^[81]^[82]^[83]^[84] ^[85]^[86]^[87]^[88]^[89]

Trade

In Islamic times Muslims from South Arabia traded with China.^[90] Southern Arabia major exporter of frankincense in ancient times, with some of it being traded as far as China. The Chinese writer and customs inspector Zhao Rugua wrote on the origin of Frankincense being traded to China:

"Ruxiang or xunluxiang comes from the three Dashi countries of Murbat (Maloba), Shihr (Shihe), and Dhofar (Nufa), from the depths of the remotest mountains.^[91] The tree which yields this drug may generally be compared to the pine tree. Its trunk is notched with a hatchet, upon which the resin flows out, and, when hardened, turns into incense, which is gathered and made into lumps. It is transported on elephants to the Dashi (on the coast), who then load it upon their ships to exchange it for other commodities in Sanfoqi. This is the reason why it is commonly collected at and known as a product of Sanfoqi."^[92]

Ruxiang was the Chinese name for frankincense, and Dashi the Chinese name for Arabia.

20th Century

Republic of China Chinese Muslim National Revolutionary Army General Ma Bufang with the with the Kuomintang ambassador to Saudi Arabia in 1955.

The Republic of China under the Kuomintang had established relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the 1930s. The Chinese government sponsored students like Wang Jingzhai and Muhammad Ma Jian to go the Al-Azhar University to study. Pilgrims also made the Hajj to Mecca from China.^[93]

Ma Bufang in Egypt in 1955.

Chinese Muslims were sent to Saudi Arabia and Egypt to denounce the Japanese during the Second Sino-Japanese War.^[93]

The Fuad Muslim Library in China was named after King Fuad I of Egypt by the Chinese Muslim Ma Songting.^[94]

In 1939 Isa Yusuf Alptekin and Ma Fuliang were sent by the Kuomintang to the Middle eastern countries such as Egypt, Turkey, and Syria to gain support for the Chinese War against Japan.^[95]

Egypt maintained relations until 1956, when Gamal Abdel Nasser cut off relations and established them with the communist People's Republic of China instead. Ma Bufang, who was then living in Egypt, then was ordered to move to Saudi Arabia, and became the Republic of China ambassador to Saudi Arabia.

Ambassador Wang Shi-ming was a Chinese Muslim, and the Republic of China ambassador to Kuwait.^[96] The Republic of China also maintained relations with Libya, and Saudi Arabia.

By the 1990s all Arab states cut off ties with the Republic of China and established ties with the People's Republic of China instead.

The relations between China and the Arab League as an organization, officially started in 1956, yet it was in 1993, when the Arab League opened its first Office in China, when former Secretary general Essmat Abdel Megeed went to an official Visit to Beijing, in 1996, the Chinese president Jiang Zemin visited the Arab League headquarters during his visit in Cairo, to become the first Chinese leader to have an official visit for the Arab League.[1]

Sino-Arab Cooperation Forum

In the opening ceremony of the Forum in 2004, Chinese foreign minister Li Zhaoxing said that "the Arab world is an important force in the international arena, and that China and Arab countries enjoy a time-honored friendship."

"Similar histories, common objectives and wide-ranging shared interests have enabled the two sides to strengthen cooperation," he said. "No matter how the international situation changes, The PRC has always been the sincere friend of the Arab world."

The Sino-Arab Cooperation Forum was formally established during President Hu Jintao's visit to the League's headquarters in January 2004. Hu noted at the time that the formation of the forum was a continuation of the traditional friendship between China and the Arab world and an important move to promote bilateral ties under new circumstances.

Li stated that "the establishment of the forum would be conducive to expanding mutually beneficial cooperation in a variety of areas."

"The PRC has submitted four proposals. First, maintaining mutual respect, equitable treatment and sincere cooperation on the political front. Second, promoting economic and trade ties through cooperation in investment, trade, contracted projects, labor service, energy, transportation, telecommunications, agriculture, environmental protection and information. Third, expanding cultural exchanges. Finally, conducting personnel training," he said. Arab foreign ministers attending the meeting agreed that the formal inauguration of the forum was a significant event in the history of Arab ties with China. They submitted a variety of proposals on promoting Sino-Arab friendship and cooperation. At the conclusion of the meeting, Li and Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa signed a declaration and an action plan for the forum. Li arrived in Cairo on Sunday evening for a three-day visit to Egypt, the last leg of a Middle East tour that has taken him to Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Oman.

The 2nd SACF was held in Beijing in 2006, it discussed the PRC proposal of a Middle east Nuclear-free, and the peace process between Palestinians and Israelis. while the 3rd SAFC is set to be held in Bahrain 2008

Comparison

	Arab League	China
Population	360,029,936	1,338,612,968
Area	13,953,041 km² (5,382,910 sq mi)	9,640,821 km² (3,704,427 sq mi )
Population Density	24.33/km² (63 /sq mi)	139.6/km² (363.3/sq mi)
Capital	Cairo	Beijing
Largest City	Cairo - 6,758,581 (17,856,000 Metro)	Shanghai - 19,210,000 Municipality
Organisation and Government Type	Regional organisation and Political union	People's republic and Communist state
Official languages	Arabic	Mandarin Chinese
Main Religions	91% Islam, 5.8% Christianity, 4% Others	8% Buddhism, Taoism (no data), 1.5% Islam, 1% Christianity
GDP (nominal)	$1.898 trillion ($7,672 per capita)	$9.712 trillion ($7,240 per capita)

The Joint Communiqué

One of the major Joint Projects involves the Environment, the AL and PROC signed the Executive Program of the Joint Communiqué between the Environmental Cooperation for 2008–2009

The League of Arab States and the Government of People’s Republic of China signed the Joint Communiqué on Environmental Cooperation (referred to as the Joint Communiqué) on June 1, 2006. The Joint Communiqué is an important instrument that aims to deepen the regional environmental partnership between the two parties. Since the signing of the Joint Communiqué, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and the Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection have coorganized two environmental protection training courses in June 2006 and June 2007 respectively, in China.

In order to implement article 4 of the Joint Communiqué, both parties shall develop this Executive Program for 2008 and 2009. It aims to enhance the cooperation between the League of Arab States and the PRC in the field of environmental protection, which is in line with the common aspiration of the two parties and their long term interests, and will help to promote the friendship between the two parties.

The two parties will try to involve relevant government departments and sectors, and will actively promote and seek cooperation on the projects and activities in the following areas:

01*Environmental Policies and Legislation 02*Biodiversity Conservation 03*Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, Waste Management and Control of Other Kinds of Pollution 04*Cooperation on Combating Desertification and Managing Water Resources in Arid Areas 05*Coordinating the Stand on Global Environmental Issues 06*Environmental Industry 07*Enhancing Environmental Education and Raising Public Awareness in Environment 08*Other Projects that the two may develop and implement other projects of common interest after negotiating with relevant government departments and sectors. 09*Financial Arrangements 10*Final Provisions

This treaty was signed by Arab Ambassador Ahmed Benhelli Under secretary general Am Moussa's Approval, and Xu Qinghua Director General Department for International Cooperation, Ministry of Environmental Protection.^[97]

South Asia

China's current trade volume with all South Asian nations reaches close to US$20 billion a year.

Beijing runs trade surpluses with many partners, including Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Fast on the heels of the U.S. offer of nuclear power plants to India, PRC Authorities hava helped Pakistan establish nuclear power plants of its own to meet its nuclear needs, which officially consist primarily of energy requirements, although, as per certain perspectives, this could be used for Pakistani and PRC military, quite possibly defence, purposes. The PRC also lends to and invests in South Asian nations with low-cost financial capital, to help their development sector, especially with the current economically struggling countries of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal^[98]

Pakistan

Modern relations between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the PRC take root mostly in diplomatic actions taken by Deng Xiaoping and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto during the 1970s, partiially as a component of the Chinese economic reform .^{[citation needed]} More recently, China has signed several free trade agreements with Pakistan as well as several bilateral trade agreements such as the Early Harvest Agreement and the establishment of a duty free export zone (Sost Dry Port) in Pakistan's Northern Areas. Pakistan and China, as per common knowledge and perspective, are arguably strong allies and trade and contacts have steadily increased over the years. China continues to invest heavily into Pakistan, and is providing assistance in the development of that country's 3rd major port at Gwadar,^[99] timber transhipments from Mozambique, as well as improving infrastructure and the development of a pipeline from the said port towards China's western regions.^[100] Trade and goodwill between Pakistan and The PRC are relatively strong due to the bordered Muslims area of Xinjiang, who used Pakistan as a transit to Mecca/Makkah for pilgrimage. Pakistani students often go to China to study while Chinese workers come to Pakistan to work on infrastructure projects. Pakistan ceded a portion of Kashmir. They also share the Karakoram highway, one of the highest paved roads in the world. Pakistani and PRC authorities collaborated on everything from Nuclear and space technology where help was provided by China to Pakistan, to cruise missile and naval technology, where Pakistan helped China get hold of western technology which it could otherwise not acquire.

India

Despite lingering suspicions remaining from the 1962 Sino-Indian War and continuing boundary disputes over Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, Sino-Indian relations have improved gradually since 1988. Both countries have sought to reduce tensions along the frontier, expand trade and cultural ties, and normalise relations.

A series of high-level visits between the two nations have helped improve relations. In December 1996, PRC President Jiang Zemin visited India during a tour of South Asia. While in New Delhi, he signed with the Indian Prime Minister a series of confidence-building measures for the disputed borders. Sino-Indian relations suffered a brief setback in May 1998 when the Indian Defence minister justified the country's nuclear tests by citing potential threats from the PRC. However, in June 1999, during the Kargil crisis, then-External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh visited Beijing and stated that India did not consider China a threat. By 2001, relations between India and the PRC were on the mend, and the two sides handled the move from Tibet to India of the 17th Karmapa in January 2000 with delicacy and tact.

Since 2004, the economic rise of both the PRC and India has also helped forge closer relations between the two. Sino-Indian trade reached US$36 thousand million in 2007, making China the single largest trading partner of India.^[102] The increasing economic reliance between India and China has also bought the two nations closer politically, with both India and China eager to resolve their boundary dispute.^[103] They have also collaborated on several issues ranging from WTO's Doha round in 2008^[104] to regional free trade agreement.^[105] Similar to Indo-US nuclear deal, India and China have also agreed to cooperate in the field of civilian nuclear energy.^[106] However, China's economic interests have clashed with those of India. Both the countries are the largest Asian investors in Africa^[107] and have competed for control over its large natural resources.^[108] India and China agreed to take bilateral trade up to US$100 billion on a recent visit by Wen Jiabao to India

Japan

Having fought two wars against Japan (1894–95 and 1936–45), China's long-standing concern about the level of Japan's military strength surfaces periodically, and criticism of Japan's refusal to present a full version of the atrocities of World War II in its textbooks is a perennial issue. The relationship between China and Japan has been strained at times by Japan's refusal to acknowledge its wartime past to the satisfaction of China. Revisionist comments made by prominent Japanese officials and some Japanese history textbooks regarding the 1937 Nanjing Massacre have been a focus of particular controversy. Sino-Japanese relations warmed considerably after Shinzo Abe became the Prime Minister of Japan in September 2006, and a joint historical study conducted by China and Japan released a report in 2010 which pointed toward a new consensus on the issue of World War 2-era atrocities.^[109] However, in the early 2010s, relations cooled once more, with Japan accusing China of withholding its reserves of valuable rare earth elements.^[110]

Southeast Asia

China's geopolitical ambitions focus on Southeast Asia, where Beijing is intent upon establishing a preeminent sphere of influence. China has pursued this ambition with a diplomatic campaign designed to bind the region to China - politically, economically, and militarily.^[111]

Historically, China's relations with the region has been uneasy, due to the country's involvement with the Vietnam War, the Malayan Communist Party during Malayan Emergency and Communist Insurgency War in Malaysia, as well as the Communist Party of Indonesia and 30 September Movement in Indonesia. As a result, previously friendly relations with Indonesia under the Sukarno government broke off in 1967, and were not restored until 1990, while diplomatic relations with Malaysia were not established until 1974. China's conflict with the government of Vietnam over the support of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia resulted in the Sino-Vietnamese War and other border conflicts. China's relationship with Singapore is good, and the latter is one of only three countries that can enjoy visa-free entry to the country, starting April 17, 2011.^[112]

In 2002, The PRC and ASEAN agreed to create a code covering conduct in the South China Sea, that has yet to be finalized.^[113]

In 2010, the PRC claimed "indisputable sovereignty" over the South China Sea, but said that the other nations in the area could continue to navigate its waters.^[114] Ted Carpenter of the Cato Institute has called these claims "breathtakingly bold".^[115]

In 2011, China objected to a growing collation of nations that were grouping together to resist Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea, saying that these nations could not "counterbalance and contain China as they expected."^[116] Later that year China updated its strategy to "prevent more members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations from joining the Washington-led containment policy", through the use of "Dollar Diplomacy."^[117] This has proven more effective with the poorer ASEAN countries, as these are dependent on Chinese support.^[118]

Europe

The end of the long-held animosity between Moscow and Beijing was marked by the visit to China by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989. After the 1991 demise of the Soviet Union, China's relations with Russia and the former states of the Soviet Union became more amicable as the conflicting ideologies of the two vast nations no longer stood in the way. A new round of bilateral agreements was signed during reciprocal head of state visits. As in the early 1950s with the Soviet Union, Russia has again become an important source of military matériel for China, as well as for raw materials and trade. Friendly relations with Russia have been an important advantage for China, offsetting its often uneasy relations with the United States. Relations with Europe, both Eastern and Western, generally have been friendly in the early 21st century, and, indeed, close political and trade relations with the European Union nations have been a major thrust of China's foreign policy in the 2000s. In November 2005, President Hu Jintao visited the United Kingdom, Germany, and Spain and announced China's eagerness to enter into greater political and economic cooperation with its European partners.

Western hemisphere

Recent years have seen Beijing's growing economic and political influence in South America and the Caribbean. During a visit to Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Cuba in November 2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao announced US$100 billion worth of investment over the next decade.^[119]^[120]^[121] For instance, Cuba is turning to Chinese companies rather than Western ones to modernize its crippled transportation system at a cost of more than US$1 billion, continuing a trend of favoring the fellow communist country that has made Beijing Cuba's second-largest trading partner after Venezuela in 2005.^[122] In addition, China is expanding its military-to-military contacts in the region. China is training increasing numbers of Latin American and Caribbean region military personnel, mainly due to a three-year old U.S. law surrounding the International Criminal Court that has led to a sharp decline in U.S.-run training programs for the region.^[123]^[124]

Caribbean

Caribbean regional relations with People's Republic of China are mostly based on trade, credits, and investments which have increased significantly since the 1990s. For many Caribbean nations the increasing ties with China have been used as a way to decrease long time over-dependence on the United States.

Additionally, China's policy in the region was the utillisation of "dollar diplomacy" or the attempts to switch many nations from recognizing Taiwan as an independent nation instead to the recognition of the "One China" policy in exchange for Chinese investment.

More recently, during various visits by several Chinese diplomats to the Caribbean region a deal was signed for China to help establish the Confucius Institute at the Mona Campus of the University of the West Indies, with a possible additional one to be establish at the Cave Hill Campus.^[125] These agreements are part of the basis of teaching Mandarin Chinese language courses at the regional University.^[126]^[127]

China has also expanded several levels of cooperation with the Caribbean region. China and the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago were said to have formed an agreement where asphalt from Trinidad and Tobago would be exported to China during its construction boom in preparation for the 2008 Beijing Olympics.^[128]^[129] In exchange, China has led several construction projects in Trinidad and Tobago and the Caribbean region via Chinese owned construction companies. Trinidad and Tobago has also^{[clarification needed]} mooted the idea of starting direct shipments of oil and liquid natural gas direct from Trinidad and Tobago to China, to fuel the later's growing need for resources to fuel their economy.

As the Caribbean political heads of government have had several messy run-ins^[which?] with the Bush administration in the United States with respect to recent demands, China has been more sympathetic to the Caribbean position globally and has stepped up military training exercises in the Caribbean for example in direct response to several sanctions placed on governments in the Caribbean region for not following the wishes of the Bush administration.

Several capital-works or infrastructural projects across the Caribbean region have also been financed by the Chinese government.

Barbados

Diplomatic relations between Barbados and the People's Republic of China were established on 30 May 1977.^[130] China began providing Barbados with diplomatic aide with the construction of the Sir Garfield Sobers Gymnasium (1986), and other projects such as: construction assistance for the Sir Lloyd Erskine Sandiford Conference and Cultural Centre (1994), and renovating Bridgetown's Cheapside Market building (2005). In 2005, China exported US$ 19.19 million worth of goods, while importing only $211,000 from Barbados.^[130]

The current Chinese Ambassador to Barbados is Xu Hong,^[131] who heads the embassy in Christ Church, Barbados. Hong replaced the former Ambassador Wei Qiang^[132] in 2012. The current Barbadian Ambassador to Beijing, China is the country's former Prime Minister Sir Lloyd Erskine Sandiford.^[133]

In 2004 Barbados obtained Approved Destination Status by the government in China.^[134]^[135]^[136] Barbados and China are members of the United Nations, the Caribbean Development Bank and the Group of 77.

Following the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, the Barbadian prime minister visited the Chinese Embassy to personally sign the book of condolence to the nation.^[137]

Over the years a number of building projects have been carried out with Chinese government assistance these include: The Wildey Gymnasium,^[138] two adjustments on the Lloyd Erskine Sandiford Conference And Cultural Centre, a Home Vegetable Growing Experimental Center, embroidery, grass weaving and feather handicraft. A consideration was also giving according to the Prime Minister of Barbados, David Thompson for China to assist with the opening of a new cruise ship facility in Barbados.^[139]

Chinese Premier Wen said that China would like to join hands with Barbados in deepening cooperation in the areas of trade, tourism, architecture, and cultural exchange.

China's export volume to Barbados in 1999 reached US$2,035,000, while imports from Barbados were at US$13,000.

Both nations have additionally signed bilateral agreements including a Double taxation agreement and a Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments treaty.

The Chinese government remains one of the main stakeholders in the Barbados-based Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), which lends to the various territories throughout the Caribbean region.^[140]^[141]

Cuba

Cuban–Chinese relations are the interstate relations between China and Cuba. The relations are based on trade, credits, and investments which have increased significantly since the 1990s. China is Cuba’s second largest trading partner after Venezuela. At a ceremonial trade gathering in Havana in early 2006, China’s ambassador to Cuba said “Our government has a firm position to develop trade co-operation between our countries. The policy, the orientation, has been determined. What’s left is the work to complete our plans.”^[142]

Bilateral trade between China and Cuba in 2005 totaled US$777 million, of which US$560 million were Chinese exports to Cuba.^[143] China is sending a growing amount of durable goods to Cuba. Chinese goods have become the primary tools both in the planned revitalisation of Cuban transport infrastructure and in the “Energy Revolution” of 2006 to provide electricity to the Cuban populace.

SINOPEC, the Chinese state oil company, has an agreement with state-owned CUPET (Cuba Petroleum) to develop oil resources. As of mid-2008, SINOPEC had done some seismic testing for oil resources on the island of Cuba, but no drilling.^[144] The company also has a contract for joint production in one of Cuba's offshore areas of high potential yield, off the coast of Pinar del Río,^[145] but had done no off-shore drilling as of mid-2008.^[144]

In November 2005, PetroChina Great Wall Drilling Co., Ltd. and CUPET held a ceremony for the signing of two drilling service contracts, to provide di;^[146] Great Wall Drilling has provided drilling rigs for oil exploration on Cuba's north coast.

Oceania

The People's Republic of China maintains diplomatic relations with eight countries in Oceania: Australia, Fiji, the Federated States of Micronesia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu whilst Republic of China (Taiwan), has diplomatic relations with the other six. The Pacific is an area of intense and continuous diplomatic competition between the PRC and the ROC, with several countries (Nauru, Kiribati, Vanuatu) having switched diplomatic support from one to the other at least once. Both the PRC and the ROC provide development aid to their respective allies. the PRC also wants to establish a preeminent sphere of influence in the Pacific Islands.

PRC Policy

In 2003, the People's Republic of China announced it intended to enhance its diplomatic ties with the Pacific Islands Forum, and increase the economic aid package it provided to that organisation. At the same time, PRC delegate Zhou Whenzhong added: "[T]he PIF should refrain from any exchanges of an official nature or dialogue partnership of any form with Taiwan".^[147]

In 2006, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao announced that the PRC would increase its economic cooperation with Pacific Island States. The PRC would provide more economic aid, abolish tariffs for exports from the Pacific's least developed countries, annul the debt of those countries, distribute free anti-malaria medicines, and provide training for two thousand Pacific Islander government officials and technical staff.^[148]

Also in 2006, Wen became the first Chinese premier to visit the Pacific islands, which the Taipei Times described as "a longtime diplomatic battleground for China and Taiwan". Similarly, according to Ron Crocombe, Professor of Pacific Studies at the University of the South Pacific, "There have been more Pacific Islands minister visits to China than to any other country".^[149]

In 2007, Xinhua, the official press agency of the PRC, stated that Pacific Islands Forum member countries had "spoke[n] highly of the generous assistance China has provided to the region over the past many years and expressed the hope for a further enhanced cooperation with China".^[150]

In December 2007, Dr John Lee of the magazine Islands Business asked himself and his readers:

"Why is China so interested in the Pacific? After all, despite the differences in size, population, wealth, and influence between China and islands in the region, the Chinese have literally rolled out the red carpet for Pacific leaders. Meetings between Chinese and Pacific leaders are not perfunctory ‘meet and greets’ in the bland boardrooms of hotels. They are often elaborate state functions with all the bells and whistles that state meetings can offer. [...] In a word, the Chinese want ‘influence’. China sends more diplomats around the world than any other country. [...] In terms of the Pacific, there is a more disturbing game being played out, namely the ‘chequebook diplomacy’, that is taking place between China and Taiwan in their competition for diplomatic recognition at the expense of the other. Taiwan matters profoundly to China—and it is largely why China is interested in the Pacific."^[151]

That same month, John Henderson of Canterbury University stated that, in his view, many Pacific Islanders are worried "that their livelihood is being taken away by Chinese traders coming in, often getting in buying political privileges, playing a role in rigging elections". Henderson suggested that the 2006 anti-Chinese riots in Tonga and Solomon Islands could be repeated in countries such as Fiji and Vanuatu. He added that this might lead the PRC to increase its role in the region further, in order to protect ethnic Chinese Pacific Islanders.^[152] A spokesman for the Chinese embassy in Fiji, Hu Lihua, responded by stating: "China does not pose a military threat to any other country. China opposes all forms of hegemonism and power politics and will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion."^[153] A representative of Fiji's Chinese community similarly rejected the idea that there might be anti-Chinese riots in Fiji, and added: "The Chinese in Fiji have an excellent relationship with locals and we contribute toward the economy. We have been successful in understanding local customs. Many of us have learnt the language and have assimilated."^[154]

The final report of the April 2008 Australia 2020 Summit addressed China's influence in the Pacific in the following terms:

"It was noted that so far China did not seem interested in exporting its political values. Its interaction with the region was economically focused or motivated by rivalry with Taiwan.

Noting China’s growing military power and its emerging role as a major aid donor in the region, participants agreed that while China’s visibility had increased rapidly there remained uncertainty over what it was seeking to achieve, especially in the long term. Securing energy supplies was one obvious goal. One strand of thought that had emerged was that the Chinese themselves were not entirely clear about their aims in the region."^[155]

In June 2008, a report from the Lowy Institute stated that China's aid policy towards the Pacific was almost certainly aimed solely at encouraging Pacific countries not to grant diplomatic recognition to Taiwan, and that there was no sign of the PRC attempting to increase its military influence or its access to the region's natural resources.^[156] Reuters reports that, according to the Institute's findings, "China's chequebook diplomacy in the South Pacific and secrecy over its aid programme to small island nations is having a destabilising impact on the region", due to "concerns that dollar diplomacy was influencing local politics."^[157] A spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry responded: "This assistance is on the basis of mutual benefit. It must help the local economy to develop and promote people's livelihoods. China would never interfere in these countries' internal affairs."^[158]^[159]

In June 2009, parliamentary delegations from four Pacific Island countries were jointly received by Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. The delegation comprised Isaac Figir, Speaker of the Congress of the Federated States of Micronesia, Tu'ilakepa, Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of Tonga, Manu Korovulavula, head of the Public Accounting Commission of Fiji, and Billy Talagi, head of the Legislative Committee of Niue (a dependent territory of New Zealand).^[160]^[161] The delegation also met Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, who spoke of increased "economic and trade cooperation"; Xinhua reported that the Pacific Island legislators "expressed appreciation for China's assistance" and "reiterated their countries' adherence to the one-China policy".^[162]

In August and September 2010, the People's Liberation Army Navy began an unprecedented "goodwill visit" to its Pacific allies, touring Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Tonga, New Zealand and Australia. Its aim, as reported by the People's Daily during the ships' four-day stop in Tonga, was "enhancing friendship and strengthening military cooperation".^[163]

In April 2011, the Lowy Institute issued a new report noting that China, in its approach to the Pacific, had been "shifting from grant aid to soft loans", which were "leading to increasing problems of indebtedness" and "making Pacific governments vulnerable to political pressure from Beijing". The report suggested that countries may struggle to repay the loans within the set timeframe, and that "outstanding loans may well tie Pacific countries to Beijing", in a context of diplomatic competition with Taipei. The report also noted, however, that some loans "are destined for projects that will create economic growth; growth that will create jobs, reduce poverty and help make repayments".^[164]

In May 2011, addressing the University of South Pacific in Suva, PRC Ambassador to Fiji Han Zhiqiang stated that Sino-Pacific cooperation had resulted in "plenty of substantial outcomes and benefits for the people in this region". He indicated that the volume of trade between the PRC and Pacific Island countries had increased by about 50% between 2009 and 2010, reaching € 2.46 billion. The value of PRC exports to the region that year was € 1.74 billion (up by 42% from 2009), whilst the value of its imports from the Pacific Islands was € 730 million, up almost 100%. PRC investments in the Pacific Islands in 2010 -primarily to Samoa, the Marshall Islands, Papua New Guinea and Fiji- had reached almost € 72 million.^[165]

In April 2012 China continued to widen its diplomatic influence with loans and aid with the region.^[166]

ROC Policy

In September 2006, the first regional summit of all Taiwan's Pacific Island allies took place, and was hosted by Palau, in Koror. The meeting brought together ROC President Chen Shui-bian and delegates from the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, Nauru, Palau, Solomon Islands and Kiribati.^[167] It was to become a regular event, known as the Taiwan-Pacific Allies Summit.^[168]^[169] A second regional meeting was hosted by the Marshall Islands in October, and President Chen attended.^[170] This resulted in the Majuro Declaration, in which Taiwan's six Pacific allies re-stated their recognition of the ROC's sovereignty, and promised to support the ROC's attempts to join the United Nations.^[171]

Also in June 2007, the ROC donated an aid package of € 700,000, distributed among eight Pacific regional organisations.^[172]

In January 2008, following the victory of the Kuomintang in the ROC's elections, Kuomintang MP Yang Li-huan stated that under the new government Taiwan's interest in the Pacific could decrease.^[173] Three days later, however, it was confirmed that ROC Vice-President Annette Lu would lead a diplomatic visit to the Marshall Islands, Nauru and Solomon Islands.^[174]

In March 2008, new President-elect Ma Ying-jeou was reported as saying that his government would put an end to Taiwanese "cheque-book diplomacy" in the Pacific.^[175] In May of that same year, Ma called for what he referred to as a "cease-fire" in the competition between the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China for diplomatic allies. This followed a scandal due to allegations that Taiwan's Foreign Minister James Huang had attempted to buy Papua New Guinea's diplomatic allegiance.^[176] In October, Taiwan cancelled a scheduled summit between itself and its Pacific Island allies. Although the authorities cited "preparation problems", Radio Australia commented that "the decision appears to be an attempt by the new administration of President Ma Ying-jeou to keep the island's diplomatic activities low-profile and avoid offending China".^[177] Taiwanese authorities later stated that the summit had been "postponed" rather than cancelled.^[178] In June 2009, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that President Ma would "attend a [...] leadership summit between Taiwan and its South Pacific allies" in autumn. The summit, hosted by Solomon Islands, would be attended by the "heads of state of Taiwan’s six allies in the region" and would focus on "countering the current economic contraction, climate change and how to strengthen the fisheries industry". Upon announcing the summit, the Ministry added that Ma had "developed a fondness for the Pacific region during his previous visit to Solomon Islands when he saw a handful of children at a market selling betel nuts and watermelons while wearing shirts donated by the people of Taiwan".^[179]

In July 2009, the ROC donated over €40,000 in a scholarship scheme benefiting students from a number of Pacific countries, including those -such as Fiji or Papua New Guinea- which do not grant it diplomatic recognition. It also donated €288,000 for regional development assistance programmes, to be used notably on access to water, sanitation and hygiene, renewable energy, solar photovoltaic assessments, fisheries management, education and youth training.^[180]

Taiwan has asked to be recognised as an official dialogue partner of the Pacific Islands Forum. That status is currently awarded to The PRC.^[181]

Bilateral relations

Australia

Australia recognises the People's Republic of China and as an emerging and developing economy, China is a very important trading partner and destination for Australian raw material export for the growth of Australian economy. The two countries are currently strengthening their economic relations. The 2007 election of Kevin Rudd as Prime Minister of Australia has been seen as favourable to Sino-Australian relations, notably in view of the fact that he is the first Australian Prime Minister to speak fluent Mandarin, and that closer engagement with Asia is one of the "Three Pillars" of his foreign policy.

In 2004, Rudd, who at the time was Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, had delivered a speech in Beijing entitled "Australia and China: A Strong and Stable Partnership for the 21st Century".^[182]

In February 2008, Australia reportedly "chastised Taiwan for its renewed push for independence" and "reiterated its support for a one-China policy".^[183] In April, however, Rudd addressed Chinese students at Peking University,^[184] and, speaking in Mandarin, referred to "significant human rights problems in Tibet".^[185]^[186] Rudd also raised the issue in talks with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, in a context of "simmering diplomatic tension" according to TV3.^[187] In August 2008, Rudd met Wen once more, and expressed his concerns on "questions of human rights, of religious freedom, of Tibet, of internet freedom".^[188] For Australia-Taiwan relations that Australia does not object Taiwan's participation in international organization where such consensus has already achieved, and Australia-Taiwan relations are commercially and unofficially-driven, such as the Australia-Taiwan Business Council, which is based in Sydney,^[189] and with the understanding of people-to-people contacts in areas of education, science, sports and arts, see.^[190]^[191]^[192]^[193] Australian Consulate-General in Hong Kong is responsible for Visa and Citizenship matters for applicants in Taiwan.^[194]

Fiji

Fiji recognises the People's Republic of China. Fiji was the first Pacific Island country to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, in 1975.^[195] Fiji's current ambassador to China is Sir James Ah Koy.^[196] China's ambassador to Fiji is Cai Jinbiao.^[197]

Among the Pacific Island countries, Fiji was, in 2010, the second largest importer of PRC exports, after Papua New Guinea, and had a trade deficit of A$127m in its trade relations with China.^[198]

Fiji's foreign policy under Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase (2000–2006) was (in the latter's own words) to "look north" - i.e., strengthen its relations with Asia in general and China in particular. Qarase stated: "We look now for new markets, where there is flexibility of entry and a readiness to meet the export needs of small, isolated island countries. This is what we would like to engage on with China as we increasingly look north for the answers to our trade and investment aspirations."^[148]

In 2005, Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian visited Fiji, where he was greeted by government delegates with "full traditional Fijian ceremony of welcome" - although he did not meet his counterpart President Josefa Iloilovatu, nor Prime Minister Qarase. Ambassador Cai expressed China's "disappointment" at Fiji for having authorised the visit. Later that year, relations were slightly strained once more when Fiji supported Taiwan's wish to join the World Health Organization.^[199] Nonetheless, Qarase's government did not vary from its official recognition of the "One China" policy.

Following the military coup in Fiji in December 2006, the PRC distanced itself from the Western nations which condemned the overthrow of Qarase's government. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs deputy director general Deng Hongbo stated:

"We have always respected Fiji's status as an independent nation and we have called on the other countries to do the same and reconsider their attitudes towards Fiji and the current situation in the country."^[200]

The post-coup "interim government" led by Commodore Frank Bainimarama has continued Qarase's "look north" policy. In July 2007, Finance Minister Mahendra Chaudhry responded to the contrast between Western criticism and Chinese support for Bainimarama's government:

“Fiji has friends in China, it has friends in Korea, it has friends in [...] other Asian countries. We’re no longer relying on Australia and New Zealand. And in any event, the United States was not doing much for Fiji anyway.”^[201]

Later that year, a China/Fiji Trade and Economic Commission was set up to enhance economic relations between the two countries.^[202] The PRC has maintained a position of support, calling on other countries to show "understanding" for Fiji's situation.^[203] And although Fiji has no diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the latter's Trade Mission representative in Fiji, Victor Chin, has also called on the international community not to pressure Fiji: “I think we should give the interim government the benefit of the doubt. They committed to have an election when everything is ready. I think we should take their words [sic] for it.”^[204]

In March 2008, following unrest in Tibet, Fiji expressed its support for China's actions in dealing with rioting in Lhasa.^[205] Shortly thereafter, police in Fiji arrested seventeen people who were protesting in support of Tibet outside China's embassy in Suva. Those arrested were "mainly women who had gathered peacefully", according to a Radio New Zealand International correspondent, and included human rights activist Shamima Ali.^[206]

A May 2008 article in the Sydney Morning Herald stated that "China's aid to Fiji has skyrocketed since the coup in December 2006", from €650,000 to over €100,000,000. The author of the article commented: "Just as Australia and other Western donors are trying to squeeze [Fiji's] rebel Government, China has dramatically stepped up its aid, effectively dissipating any pressure Western donors might have been generating." The author suggested that China did not wish to risk antagonising Fiji and thus unwittingly push the Bainimarama government towards seeking aid from Taiwan: "China clearly finds itself boxed into a corner. On the one hand, Western states are asking it to help isolate the new dictatorship in Fiji. On the other, China faces the risk of losing a Fiji starved of funds to its renegade province, Taiwan."^[207]

In August 2008, while on a visit to China, Commodore Bainimarama spoke of the "very close and cordial relations that our two countries share in our trade, cultural and sporting linkages", and added:

"Fiji will not forget that when other countries were quick to condemn us following the events of 1987, 2000 and 2006, China and other friends in Asia demonstrated a more understanding and sensitive approach to events in Fiji. The Government of the People’s Republic of China expressed confidence in our ability to resolve our problems in our way, without undue pressure of interference."^[208]

In February 2009, at a time when Fiji was facing pressure from the Pacific Islands Forum over its apparent lack of progress towards a restoration of democracy, Chinese Vice-President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Fiji and met Prime Minister Bainimarama.^[209] On that occasion, Xi stated that he wished to "further enhance [Sino-Fiji] exchanges and cooperation in such fields as culture, education, public health and tourism". Xinhua reported that, during Xi's visit, China and Fiji had "signed a number of cooperative deals" by which China would provide Fiji with "economic and technical assistance".^[195] China committed itself to increasing its imports from Fiji. Bainimarama, for his part, re-affirmed his country's recognition of the One China policy, and, as reported by Fiji Village, "thanked the Chinese government for fully recognizing Fiji's sovereignty and adopting a policy of non-interference in its domestic affairs".^[210]

In May, Vice-President of Fiji Ratu Epeli Nailatikau described Fiji's "relationship with the government and the people of the People's Republic of China as one of its most important".^[211]

In June 2009, the Fiji Democracy and Freedom Movement, an organisation founded in Australia to campaign for the restoration of democracy in Fiji, sent a petition to the Chinese embassy in Canberra, asking China to "withdraw support for the military regime".^[212] At the same time, Australian Foreign Minister Stephen Smith asked China "not to use [its] contacts with Fiji to undermine efforts to pressure Fiji to hold elections".^[211]

Despite close relations between Fiji and the PRC, Taiwan provides continuous free medical assistance to the country. A Taiwanese medical team visits Fiji on an annual basis to offer its services in hospitals and clinics. The Fiji government has expressed its gratitude for the help.^[213]

Kiribati

Kiribati, under the current government of President Anote Tong, recognises the Republic of China.

From 1980 to 2003, Kiribati recognised the PRC. Relations between China and Kiribati then became a contentious political issue within Kiribati. I-Kiribati President Teburoro Tito was ousted in a parliamentary vote of no confidence in 2003, over his refusal to clarify the details of a land lease which had enabled Beijing to maintain a satellite-tracking station in the country since 1997, and over Chinese ambassador Ma Shuxue's acknowledged monetary donation to "a cooperative society linked to Tito".^[214] In the ensuing election, Anote Tong won the presidency after "stirring suspicions that the station was being used to spy on US installations in the Pacific".^[215] Tong had previously pledged to "review" the lease.^[216]

In November 2003, Tarawa established diplomatic relations with Taipei -a decision which The Age referred to as "play[ing] the Taiwan card"^[215]-, and Beijing severed its relations with the country. For the PRC, the presence of the satellite-tracking station had made relations with Kiribati relatively important; the station had, in particular, been used to track Yang Liwei's spaceflight.^[217] Therefore, for three weeks the PRC called upon I-Kiribati President Anote Tong to break off relations with Taiwan and re-affirm his support for the "One China" policy. Only after those three weeks did the PRC sever relations,^[218] thereby losing the right to maintain its satellite-tracking base in Kiribati. The Republic of China began providing economic aid to Kiribati, while Kiribati began supporting Taiwan in the United Nations.

In 2004, President Tong said he believed the PRC was still trying to exert influence over his country.^[219] The comment was mainly due to the PRC's refusal to remove all its personnel from its closed embassy.^[217] Tong stated that the Chinese personnel, who remained in Kiribati against his wishes, were handing out anti-government pamphlets; he told New Zealand journalist Michael Field: "I am sure if we did this in Beijing we would be in jail in half a second".^[220] Tong's brother and main political opponent, Harry Tong, responded by accusing Taiwan of having too much influence on Kiribati, and notably of influencing the country's clergy.^[219]

In 2008, Taiwan settled Kiribati's unpaid bills to Air Pacific, enabling the airline to maintain its services from Tarawa to Kiritimati.^[221]

In November 2010, despite their lack of diplomatic relations, the People's Republic of China was one of fifteen countries to attend the Tarawa Climate Change Conference in Kiribati, and one of twelve to sign the Ambo Declaration on climate change issued from the conference.^[222]

Marshall Islands

The Marshall Islands recognise the Republic of China, and is one of the few countries to maintain an embassy in Taipei. The magazine Islands Business reported that President Litokwa Tomeing, elected in January 2008, might break off his country's diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and turn instead to the PRC.^[223] However, in office Tomeing expressed continued support for ties with Taiwan and met with the Vice President of the ROC, Annette Lu, when she visited the Marshall Islands on January 29, 2008.^[224]

Federated States of Micronesia

The Federated States of Micronesia recognise the People's Republic of China. In 2007, the FSM opened an embassy in Beijing.^[225]

Nauru

Nauru, under the current government of President Marcus Stephen, recognises the Republic of China.

In 1980, Nauru first established official relations with the Republic of China. In 2002, however, the government of Rene Harris established relations with the PRC,^[226] which entailed a solemn recognition of the "One China" policy by Nauru.^[227] Consequently, Taiwan severed its relations with Nauru, and accused the PRC of having bought Nauru's allegiance with a financial aid gift of over € 90,000,000.^[228] A reporter for The Age agreed, stating that "Beijing recently bought off a threat by Nauru to revert to Taiwan only six months after opening ties with the mainland, offering a large loan to Nauru's near-destitute Government".^[215]

In 2003, however, Nauru closed its newly established embassy in Beijing. Two years later, ROC President Chen Shui-bian met Nauruan President Ludwig Scotty in the Marshall Islands. In May 2005, the ROC and Nauru re-established diplomatic relations,^[229] and opened embassies in each other's capitals. The PRC consequently severed its relations with Nauru.

The Republic of China is one of Nauru's two foremost economic aid partners (the other being Australia). In return, Nauru uses its seat in the United Nations to support the ROC's admittance bid. Taiwan also provides regular medical assistance to Nauru, sending specialised doctors to the tiny country's only hospital.^[230]

In 2007, Scotty was re-elected President of Nauru, amidst claims that his electoral campaign had been funded by Taiwan.^[231] Scotty's opponents claimed that the ROC wanted to ensure that a pro-Taiwan government remained in power. Scotty was replaced by Marcus Stephen in December 2007. Following Stephen's election, ROC President Chen Shui-bian telephoned him to congratulate him, assure him of the ROC's continued assistance for Nauru, request Nauru's continued support in return, and invite him to visit Taiwan.^[232] Nauru has retained its relations with the ROC under the new government.

Given that it has already changed its foreign policy twice, Nauru remains the focus of diplomatic competition between Beijing and Taipei. In 2006, according to the New Statesman, President Scotty "was allegedly accosted by a horde of screaming Chinese officials who tried to drag him on to a plane to Beijing just as he was boarding one bound for Taipei".^[233]

In 2008, Nauru co-submitted a proposal to the United Nations, requesting that the United Nations General Assembly consider enabling "Taiwan's participation in the activities of UN specialized agencies". The proposal was rejected.^[234]

In 2011 it was revealed via Wikileaks that Taiwan had been paying a "monthly stipend" to Nauruan government ministers in exchange for their continued support, as well as a smaller sum to other Members of Parliament, as "project funding that requires minimal accounting". Reporting on the story, the Brisbane Times wrote: "One MP reportedly used his Taiwanese stipend to buy daily breakfast for all schoolchildren in his district, while others were happy to just pocket the cash". A "former Australian diplomat with close knowledge of politics in Nauru" stated that Nauruan President Marcus Stephen, Foreign Minister Kieren Keke and former President Ludwig Scotty, among others, had all accepted "under the counter" funding from Taiwan. The leaks revealed that "Chinese [PRC] agents had also sought to influence Nauru's elections through cash payments to voters, with at least $40,000 distributed in one instance in 2007".^[235]

Wikileaks also revealed that Australia had, at one time, been "pushing" Nauru to break its relations with Taiwan and establish relations with the PRC instead. Then President Ludwig Scotty had reportedly resisted on the grounds that it was "none of Australia's business".^[235]

In late 2011, Taiwan "doubled it health aid" to Nauru, notably providing a resident medical team on a five-year appointment.^[236]

New Zealand

New Zealand recognises the People's Republic of China. Diplomatic relations were first established in 1972. the PRC diplomatic representative to New Zealand, Zhang Limin, is also accredited to New Zealand's associated territories, the Cook Islands and, since 2008, Niue. The People's Republic of China in December 2007 became the first country to establish official diplomatic relations with Niue,^[237] and provides economic aid to the Cook Islands.^[238]

In September 2007, New Zealand reaffirmed its adherence to the "One China" policy.^[239]

In April 2008, New Zealand became the first developed country to sign a free trade agreement with the PRC.^[240]

On 29 September 2008, New Zealand's delegate in United Nations openly praised the improving relations between the two governments of Beijing and Taipei.^[241]

In July 2009, Niuean Premier Toke Talagi stated that, if development aid were not forthcoming from New Zealand, he would request aid from China instead.^[242]

Palau

Palau recognises the Republic of China, and is one of the few countries to maintain an embassy in Taipei. The ROC provides scholarships to Palauan students, as well as computers for Palauan schools. In 2008, Mario Katosang, Palau’s Minister of Education, stated:

"We were given 100 Windows-based computers by Taiwan. The education sector uses predominately Apple Macintosh computers, so I mentioned that we may also need software. Taiwan immediately delivered 100 brand new copies of Windows XP, and offered to train our computer technicians."^[243]

Papua New Guinea

Papua New Guinea recognises the People's Republic of China. Diplomatic relations were established in 1976, soon after Papua New Guinea became independent.

Papua New Guinea is one of China's biggest trade partners in Oceania. Papua New Guinea exports far more to the PRC than does any other Pacific Island country, and imports three times more from the PRC than does any other such country. It is also one of the few countries in the region to maintain a trade surplus in its relations with China; its surplus reached a record high of A$427m in 2010.^[198]

In 1999, the government of Prime Minister Bill Skate recognised Taiwan. Skate lost power less than a week later, and Papua New Guinea's diplomatic recognition reverted to China.^[244]

In 2003, the PRC's embassy in Port Moresby published a statement of concern in reaction to comments in the Papua New Guinea press questioning the justification for PNG's relations with the People's Republic. The embassy statement insisted that relations between the two countries were mutually beneficial, reasserted the PRC's claims to Taiwan, and concluded: "It is our sincere hope that the local [PNG] media will report on China and its relations with PNG in a just and objective way, so as to further enhance the mutual understanding and friendship between the peoples of our two countries."^[245]

In July 2003, PNG Governor General Sir Silas Atopare visited the PRC, re-affirmed his country's adherence to the One China policy, and, according to a statement published by the PRC's embassy, "thank[ed] the government and the people of China for their commitment in providing aid to PNG's development".^[246]

In 2005, relations cooled somewhat when Papua New Guinea, along with Fiji, supported Taiwan's wish to join the World Health Organization.^[199]

In May 2008, Taiwan's Foreign Minister James Huang resigned, along with two other top officials, after wasting over €19 million in a failed attempt to win diplomatic recognition for the Republic of China from Papua New Guinea. The misuse of the money caused public outrage, forcing Huang's resignation.^[247] Papua New Guinea's foreign minister Sam Abal subsequently confirmed that his country had no intention of recognising Taiwan.^[248]

A few days later, it was announced that members of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force would receive training provided by the PRC. Traditionally, military training aid in Papua New Guinea had been provided by Western countries, namely, Australia, New Zealand and the United States.^[249]

Samoa

Samoa recognises the People's Republic of China. Relations were established in 1975.^[250]

In the late 1980s, China began sending doctors to the Samoan National Hospital, and sent over a hundred over the following two decades.^[250]

Samoa significantly increased its volume of imports from China in the late 2000s, while also increasing its exports to that country. In 2010, Samoa reached a record trade deficit in its relations with China, at A$70m.^[198]

In 2007, the PRC provided Samoa with an x-ray machine and several volunteer doctors.^[251] In 2008, the PRC donated over €1,360,000 to Samoa to fund its education policies.^[252]

In March 2008, following unrest in Tibet, the speaker of the Samoan Fono (legislative assembly), Tolofuaivalelei Falemoe Leiataua, stated that foreign leaders should not interfere with China as it deals with "internal affairs", and that they should not meet the Dalai Lama.^[253]^[254]

In June 2008, Samoa announced it would be opening diplomatic missions in China and Japan - the country's first diplomatic offices in Asia.^[255] In September, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement indicating that China and Samoa have always "conducted fruitful cooperation in the fields of economy, trade, agriculture, sports, culture, education and health, as well as international affairs", and that China intended to "make more tangible efforts to support Samoa's economic and social development".^[256]

In 2010, a PRC government-funded PRC-Samoa Agricultural Demonstration Farm was established in Nu'u with an aim "to train the Samoan farmers on voluntary basis through Chinese agricultural planting techniques". About 500 Samoan farmers received training from Chinese agricultural experts.^[250]

In 2011, 57 Samoan students were studying in China on a Chinese government sponsorship.^[250]

Solomon Islands

Solomon Islands recognises the Republic of China, and is one of the few countries to maintain an embassy in Taipei. The two countries established diplomatic relations on May 23, 1983.^[257] A Republic of China consulate general was set up in Honiara, and upgraded to an embassy two years later.^[258] Since 2011, the Republic of China's ambassador to the Solomons is Laurie Chan, a Solomon Islands national of Chinese ethnic background, and a former Solomon Islands Minister of Foreign Affairs who supported his country's continued relations with Taiwan.^[259]

Despite a lack of diplomatic recognition, however, Solomon Islands trades more with the People's Republic than with Taiwan. In 2009, over half the country's exports went to the People's Republic of China, and Solomon Islands maintained a trade surplus of A$161m in its trade relations with that country. In 2010, that surplus increased to a record A$258.^[198]

In 2006, Honiara's Chinatown suffered extensive damage as it was looted and burned by rioters, following a contested election result. It had been alleged that ethnic Chinese businessmen had bribed members of Solomon Islands' Parliament.^[260] Joses Tuhanuku, President of the Solomon Islands Labour Party, stated that the election "has been corrupted by Taiwan and business houses owned by Solomon Islanders of Chinese origin".^[261] Many Chinese-Solomon Islanders left the country.

After pro-Taiwan Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare was ousted in a vote of no confidence in December 2007, and replaced by Derek Sikua, ROC President Chen Shui-bian telephoned Prime Minister Sikua, offering his congratulations and Taiwan's continued aid, and requested the Sikua government's continued diplomatic support. Chen also invited Sikua to visit Taiwan,^[232] which he did in March 2008. Sikua was welcomed with military honours by Chen, who stated: "Taiwan is the Solomon Islands' most loyal ally. [...] Taiwan will never forsake the people or government of the Solomon Islands."^[262] Solomon Islands has continued to recognise the Republic of China under Sikua's leadership.

Later that same month, Taiwan's president-elect Dr. Ma Ying-Jeou met Australia's former Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, and reportedly promised to put an end to Taiwanese "cheque book diplomacy" in the Solomons. This led Downer to comment: "Under the Chen Shui-bian regime there has been a lot of Taiwanese cheque book diplomacy in Solomon Islands. So I'm glad to hear that's coming to an end."^[263] Sikua, however, criticised Downer for interfering in relations between Honiara and Taipei:

“The Government of Solomon Islands will continue to work closely with the Government of Taiwan and other development partners as it strives to provide a better quality of life for its people. I hope that Mr Downer will find something more appropriate to comment on than on issues that are within the sovereign jurisdiction of independent states and governments to deal with and decide on.”^[264]

The editor of the Solomon Star reacted irritably to Downer's comments:

"Just when we thought he’s gone and good riddance, he’s back. Alexander Downer is now in Taipei and telling the Taiwanese how to run their relations with the Solomon Islands. [...] Just who does Mr Downer think he is? [...] Relations between Taiwan and the Solomon Islands are none of this yesterday man’s business. Taipei should tell Mr Downer to butt out."^[265]

The Taiwanese government subsequently stated, through its deputy director-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Department of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Victor Yu, that Downer had "misunderstood" Ma:

"Cooperation and development programs are an obligation and the responsibility of every advanced nation in the international community. They should not be described as 'checkbook diplomacy'. [...] All the resources that the nation has contributed are project-oriented and have generated substantial positive effects on the local economy and on society. Downer distorted what Ma actually meant."^[266]

On April 17, 2008, the editorial of the Solomon Star was devoted to the Solomons' relationship with Taiwan, which it described as follows:

"First, thanks to Taiwan, for all the support it is providing to help bring better health services here. There’s always suspicion about Taiwan’s aid in this country despite the fine sounding intentions under which it is given. [...] Our politicians undoubtedly exploit Taiwan’s need to keep Solomon Islands as one of the nations recognising it as a country in its own right. But there should be no doubts about this week’s launch of the Taiwan Medical Centre at the National Referral Hospital. This is tangible, beneficial and transparent help. It underscores Taiwan’s role as a true, democratic friend of Solomon Islands. May there be more such help given this way."^[267]

In July, it was announced that Taiwanese doctors would be providing free medical care to Solomon Islands villagers,^[268] and that unskilled Solomon Islands workers would be granted access to the Taiwanese labour market.^[269] At the same time, Taiwan was funding rural development projects in the Solomons.^[270] Taiwan has also pledged to provide SI$ 10 million to Solomon Islands in 2009 and 2010, to enable the government to abolish school fees paid by parents and provide free primary and secondary education to Solomon Islands children.^[271]

During the campaign for the 2010 general election, candidate and former Prime Minister Francis Billy Hilly announced that, if elected, he would break off relations with the ROC and establish them with the PRC. Dr Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, of the University of Hawaii, commented that Taiwan funded constituency development programmes in the Solomons, and that Members of Parliament were thus unlikely to support any severing of diplomatic relations with the ROC.^[272] Billy Hilly was unsuccessful in regaining a seat in Parliament.

Tonga

Tonga recognises the People's Republic of China. Relations were first established in 1998.

In 2000, noble Tuʻivakano of Nukunuku (later to become Prime Minister) banned all Chinese stores from his Nukunuku District. This followed alleged complaints from other shopkeepers regarding competition from local Chinese.^[273] In 2001, Tonga's Chinese community (of about three or four thousand people) was hit by a wave of about a hundred racist assaults. The Tongan government decided not to renew the work permits of over 600 Chinese storekeepers, and admitted the decision was in response to “widespread anger at the growing presence of the storekeepers”.^[274]

That same year, however, Tonga and the PRC decided to strengthen their "military relations".^[275] In 2008, the PRC provided Tonga with military supplies worth over €340,000.^[276]

In 2006, rioters caused severe damage to shops owned by Chinese-Tongans in Nukuʻalofa.^[260]^[277]

In April 2008, Tongan King George Tupou V visited China, reaffirmed his country's adherence to the "One China" policy, and, according to the Chinese State news agency Xinhua, "supported the measures adopted to handle the incident in Lhasa".^[278] King Tupou V also met Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie to "enhance exchange and cooperation between the two militaries". Xinhua stated that China and Tonga have "fruitful cooperation in politics, economy, trade, agriculture and education, and kept a sound coordination in regional and international affairs".^[279]

In early 2010, Chinese aid to Tonga included assistance in the reconstruction of Nuku'alofa's central business district; "an agricultural project in Vaini"; health clinics set up in Vava’u and Vaini; the provision of seven Chinese doctors for a two-year period; and an allocation of € 2.2 million "for social and economic development", including "soft loans and interest free loans to the Tonga Government".^[280]

In April 2011, the Lowy Institute reported that, of all Pacific countries, Tonga was carrying the highest burden of debt from Chinese loans, amounting to 32% of Tonga's Gross Domestic Product. Simultaneously, the International Monetary Fund warned Tonga was "facing debt distress", a "very high possibility that Tonga [would] be unable to service its debts in the future".^[164]

Tuvalu

Tuvalu recognises the Republic of China. Taiwan maintains the only resident foreign embassy in Tuvalu. This is located in Funafuti.

Tuvalu supports the ROC's bid to join the United Nations, and Taiwan has provided Tuvalu with "several mobile medical missions".^[281]

In 2006, Taiwan reacted to reports that the People's Republic of China was attempting to draw Tuvalu away from the Republic of China. Taiwan consequently strengthened its weakening diplomatic relations with Tuvalu.^[282]

Vanuatu

Vanuatu recognises the People's Republic of China. In November 2004, Prime Minister Serge Vohor briefly established diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, before being ousted for that reason in a vote of no confidence the following month.^[283]^[284]

In 2006, Vanuatu signed an economic cooperation agreement with the PRC, whereby the latter was to assist Vanuatu's economic development, and remove tariffs on imports from Vanuatu. The PRC also added Vanuatu to its list of approved tourism destinations for Chinese tourists. Ni-Vanuatu trade minister James Bule said his country had also requested China's assistance "in supplying machines so we can establish a plant in Vanuatu to produce bio fuel".^[285] By contrast, Opposition leader Serge Vohor has said China is exerting too much influence on the ni-Vanuatu government's policy.^[283]

In May 2009, Vanuatu appointed its first ever ambassador to China, former Minister of Finance Willie Jimmy.^[286] Jimmy "call[ed] [...] for China to have a foot firmly planted in the Pacific through Port Vila", which -the Vanuatu Daily Post remarked- "no doubt caused ruffled feathers among other foreign diplomatic partners".^[287]

In July 2010, Chinese Ambassador Cheng Shuping announced that China would fund a number of projects in Vanuatu, "including the National Convention Centre and the expansion of Prime Minister’s Offices", as well as "the design and reconstruction of the Francophone Wing of the University of the South Pacific Emalus Campus".^[288]

References

^ http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/
^ Williams, David (January 8, 2008). "China-Taiwan tussle in Bim politics". BBC News. Retrieved July 13, 2010. Beijing and Taipei often trade insults over which is using "dollar diplomacy" in the form of offers of aid or cheap loans to curry influence around the world. The 'One-China' policy ensures that nations cannot have official relations with both China and Taiwan. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |trans_title= (help); line feed character in |quote= at position 159 (help)
^ Ninvalle, Pete (April 27, 2007). "China halts St. Lucia work". BBC News. Retrieved July 13, 2010. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |trans_title= (help)
^ Erikson, Daniel (January 8, 2010). "China in the Caribbean: The New Big Brother". Star Publishing Company. Retrieved July 13, 2010. China's overall strategy for the Caribbean has been driven by a desire to ensure the security of Chinese offshore financial holdings, woo countries with infrastructure projects and investment deals to ensure support for China in multilateral organizations, and promote the crucial "One China" policy to isolate Taiwan on the world stage. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |trans_title= (help)
^ "Background Note: China". Bureau of Public Affairs. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved March 10, 2011.
^ Anderson, Kurt (May 7, 1984). "History Beckons Again". Time. Retrieved August 19, 2011.
^ Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip with Chinese President Li Xiannian
^ "Politics/Nation". The Times Of India. August 23, 2007.
^ "Wargame with India not to put China in a closet: US admiral". The Hindu. Chennai, India. August 24, 2007.
^ Business Standard Article - Russia ceded approximately 174 km² figure
^ Economist article including map of new Russia-China Border
^ EU arms embargo
^ Beijing likens Cheney criticism to nosy neighbor
^ Ho, Stephanie. "Chinese Foreign Relations to Focus on More Active Diplomacy." Voice of America, March 7, 2011.
^ Office of the Secretary of Defense (May 6, 2011). Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2011 (PDF). Annual Report to Congress (Report). Retrieved February 16, 2012.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f China, CIA World Factbook
^ Forsythe, Michael and Sakamaki, Sachiko China's Asian Charm Offensive in `Shambles' Over Disputes With Neighbors Bloomberg News, September 26, 2010
^ "China Raising 2012 Defense Spending to Cope With Unfriendly ‘Neighborhood’." Bloomberg News. March 4, 2012.
^ "China’s Defense Spending Dilemma." Wall Street Journal. March 5, 2012.
^ 2011 Trafficking in Persons Report
^ Three Filipino drugs mules on death row in China will eventually be executed despite winning a rare reprieve amid intense Philippine lobbying, the Chinese ambassador in Manila said
^ A South African woman has been executed in China for smuggling drugs into that country, eNews reported
^ China executed four convicted drug traffickers and sentenced at least 15 others to death Tuesday as the nation marked global anti-drug day, state press reported.
^ British media angry with drug dealers in China was sentenced to death ask for diplomatic pressure
^ Russian woman engaged in drug smuggling was sentenced to death
^ The Heritage Foundation China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States
^ International Committee of the Fourth International Western concern at China's growing involvement in Africa
^ Political Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: U.S. Capabilities and Chinese Operations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2007
^ Muekalia 2004, p.6
^ Taylor 2000, p. 93
^ "From "brothers" to "partners": China, Africa building strategic ties". Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Arab Republic of Egypt. Retrieved March 14, 2009.
^ "China woos Taiwan's African friends". afrol.com. Retrieved March 14, 2009.
^ "Africa and the UN Security Council Permanent Seats". pambazuka.org. Retrieved March 14, 2009.
^ "China-Africa Relations". Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China. Retrieved March 14, 2009. {{cite web}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |work= (help)
^ ^a ^b ^c Cite error: The named reference wsj was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^ chinaembassy.org.zw Sino-African Relations
^ "China boosts African economies, offering a 'second opportunity'". Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved March 14, 2009. ^{[dead link‍]}
^ ^a ^b "Mozambique-China Trade Continues to Grow". allafrica.com. December 9, 2012. Retrieved December 9, 2012.
^ ^a ^b "Africa, China Trade" (PDF). Financial Times. Retrieved March 14, 2009.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d "China's trade safari in Africa". Le Monde Diplomatique. Retrieved March 14, 2009.
^ "Military backs China's Africa adventure". Asia Times. Retrieved March 14, 2009.
^ "Out of Africa". China Daily. Retrieved March 14, 2009.
^ "Confucius Institute Bridges Friendship between China and Africa". cri.com.cn. Retrieved March 14, 2009.
^ "Evan Osnos, Letter from China, "The Promised Land"". The New Yorker. Retrieved March 14, 2009.
^ "China's 'Little Africa' is under pressure". globalpost.com. Retrieved March 14, 2009.
^ ^a ^b "China and Africa: Stronger Economic Ties Mean More Migration". Migration Policy Institute. Retrieved March 14, 2009.
^ "Russian, Chinese weapons compete in Africa". upiasia.com. Retrieved March 14, 2009.
^ "China 'is fuelling war in Darfur'". BBC. July 13, 2008. Retrieved March 14, 2009.
^ Beresford, David (April 18, 2008). "Chinese ship carries arms cargo to Mugabe regime". guardian.co.uk. London. Retrieved March 14, 2009.
^ Spencer, Richard (August 31, 2007). "China is to withdraw backing for Mugabe". telegraph.co.uk. London. Retrieved March 14, 2009.
^ Evans, Ian (July 26, 2008). "Robert Mugabe forced into talks with opposition after China told him 'to behave'". telegraph.co.uk. London. Retrieved March 14, 2009.
^ Blair, David (August 31, 2007). "Why China is trying to colonise Africa". telegraph.co.uk. London. Retrieved March 14, 2009.
^ "China as Africa's 'angel in white'". Asia Times. Retrieved March 14, 2009.
^ "The Forest for the Trees: Trade, Investment and the China-in-Africa Discourse" (pdf). Barry Sautman, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology Yan Hairong, University of Hong Kong. Retrieved March 14, 2009.
^ "China in Africa - Is China Gaining Control of Africa's Resources" (pdf). Golobal Researcher. Retrieved March 14, 2009.
^ YaleGlobal Online Central Asia: China's Mounting Influence
^ Chinese History - Non-Chinese peoples and neighboring states Dashi 大食
^ A century of Chinese research on Islamic Central Asian history in retrospect
^ Twitchett, Denis (2000), "Tibet in Tang's Grand Strategy", in van de Ven, Hans (ed.), Warfare in Chinese History, Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, p. 125, ISBN 90-04-11774-1 {{citation}}: More than one of |pages= and |page= specified (help)
^ Schafer, Edward H. (1985) [1963], The Golden Peaches of Samarkand: A study of T’ang Exotics (1st paperback ed.), Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, p. 26, ISBN 0-520-05462-8
^ E. Bretschneider (1871). On the knowledge possessed by the ancient Chinese of the Arabs and Arabian colonies: and other western countries, mentioned in Chinese books. LONDON 60 PATERNOSTER ROW.: Trübner & co. p. 6. Retrieved June 28, 2010.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)(Original from Harvard University)
^ Harvard University. Center for Middle Eastern Studies (1999). Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic review, Volumes 5-7. Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University. p. 89. Retrieved November 28, 2010.
^ E. Bretschneider (1871). On the knowledge possessed by the ancient Chinese of the Arabs and Arabian colonies: and other western countries, mentioned in Chinese books. LONDON: Trübner & co. p. 7. Retrieved June 28, 2010.(Original from Harvard University)
^ Donald Leslie (1998). The integration of religious minorities in China: the case of Chinese Muslims. Australian National University. p. 10. ISBN 0-7315-2301-6. Retrieved November 28, 2010.
^ Hartford Seminary Foundation (1929). The Muslim world, Volume 19. Published for the Nile Mission Press by the Christian Literature Society for India. p. 258. Retrieved November 28, 2010.(Original from the University of California)
^ Donald Daniel Leslie (1998). "The Integration of Religious Minorities in China: The Case of Chinese Muslims" (PDF). The Fifty-ninth George Ernest Morrison Lecture in Ethnology. p. 5. Retrieved November 30, 2010.
^ Harvard University. Center for Middle Eastern Studies (1999). Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic review, Volumes 5-7. Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University. p. 92. Retrieved November 28, 2010.
^ Wolbert Smidt (2001, mis en ligne le 27 septembre 2002). "A Chinese in the Nubian and Abyssinian Kingdoms (8th Century)". Chroniques yéménites [En ligne], 9. Retrieved Consulté le 14 décembre 2010.. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
^ E. Bretschneider (1871). On the knowledge possessed by the ancient Chinese of the Arabs and Arabian colonies: and other western countries, mentioned in Chinese books. LONDON: Trübner & co. p. 8. Retrieved June 28, 2010.(Original from Harvard University)
^ E. Bretschneider (1871). On the knowledge possessed by the ancient Chinese of the Arabs and Arabian colonies: and other western countries, mentioned in Chinese books. LONDON: Trübner & co. p. 10. Retrieved June 28, 2010.(Original from Harvard University)
^ Samy S. Swayd (2006). Historical dictionary of the Druzes. Vol. Volume 3 of Historical dictionaries of people and cultures (illustrated ed.). Scarecrow Press. p. xli. ISBN 0-8108-5332-9. Retrieved April 4, 2012. The fifth caliph, al-'Aziz bi-Allah (r.975-996). . . In his time, the Fatimi "Call" or "Mission" (Da'wa) reached as far east as India and northern China. {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)
^ Oscar Chapuis (1995). A history of Vietnam: from Hong Bang to Tu Duc. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 92. ISBN 0-313-29622-7. Retrieved June 28, 2010. {{cite book}}: More than one of |pages= and |page= specified (help)
^ Joseph Mitsuo Kitagawa (2002). The religious traditions of Asia: religion, history, and culture. Routledge. p. 283. ISBN 0-7007-1762-5. Retrieved June 28, 2010. {{cite book}}: More than one of |pages= and |page= specified (help)
^ Bradley Smith, Wango H. C. Weng (1972). China: a history in art. Harper & Row. p. 129. Retrieved June 28, 2010. {{cite book}}: More than one of |pages= and |page= specified (help)
^ Hugh D. R. Baker (1990). Hong Kong images: people and animals. Hong Kong University Press. p. 53. ISBN 962-209-255-1. Retrieved June 28, 2010. {{cite book}}: More than one of |pages= and |page= specified (help)
^ Charles Patrick Fitzgerald (1961). China: a short cultural history. Praeger. p. 332. Retrieved June 28, 2010. {{cite book}}: More than one of |pages= and |page= specified (help)
^ Dennis Bloodworth, Ching Ping Bloodworth (2004). The Chinese Machiavelli: 3000 years of Chinese statecraft. Transaction Publishers. p. 214. ISBN 0-7658-0568-5. Retrieved June 28, 2010. {{cite book}}: More than one of |pages= and |page= specified (help)
^ Marshall Broomhall (1910). Islam in China: a neglected problem. LONDON 12 PATERNOSTER BUILDINGS, E.C.: Morgan & Scott, ltd. p. 25. Retrieved December 14, 2011. CHAPTER II CHINA AND THE ARABS From the Rise of the Abbaside Caliphate With the rise of the Abbasides we enter upon a somewhat different phase of Muslim history, and approach the period when an important body of Muslim troops entered and settled within the Chinese Empire. While the Abbasides inaugurated that era of literature and science associated with the Court at Bagdad, the hitherto predominant Arab element began to give way to the Turks, who soon became the bodyguard of the Caliphs, " until in the end the Caliphs became the helpless tools of their rude protectors." Several embassies from the Abbaside Caliphs to the Chinese Court are recorded in the T'ang Annals, the most important of these being those of (A-bo-lo-ba) Abul Abbas, the founder of the new dynasty, that of (A-p'u-cKa-fo) Abu Giafar, the builder of Bagdad, of whom more must be said immediately; and that of (A-lun) Harun al Raschid, best known, perhaps, in modern days through the popular work, Arabian Nights.1 The Abbasides or " Black Flags," as they were commonly called, are known in Chinese history as the Heh-i Ta-shih, " The Black-robed Arabs." Five years after the rise of the Abbasides, at a time when Abu Giafar, the second Caliph, was busy plotting the assassination of his great and able rival Abu Muslim, who is regarded as " the leading figure of the age " and the de facto founder of the house of Abbas so far as military prowess is concerned, a terrible rebellion broke out in China. This was in 755 A.d., and the leader was a Turk or Tartar named An Lu-shan. This man, who had gained great favour with the Emperor Hsuan Tsung, and had been placed at the head of a vast army operating against the Turks and Tartars on the north-west frontier, ended in proclaiming his independence and declaring war upon his now aged Imperial patron. The Emperor, driven from his capital, abdicated in favour of his son, Su Tsung (756-763 A.D.), who at once appealed to the Arabs for help. The Caliph Abu Giafar, whose army, we are told by Sir William Muir, " was fitted throughout with improved weapons and armour," responded to this request, and sent a contingent of some 4000 men, who enabled the Emperor, in 757 A.d., to recover his two capitals, Sianfu and Honanfu. These Arab troops, who probably came from some garrison on the frontiers of Turkestan, never returned to their former camp, but remained in China, where they married Chinese wives, and thus became, according to common report, the real nucleus of the naturalised Chinese Mohammedans of to-day. ^ While this story has the support of the official history of the T'ang dynasty, there is, unfortunately, no authorised statement as to how many troops the Caliph really sent.1 The statement, however, is also supported by the Chinese Mohammedan inscriptions and literature. Though the settlement of this large body of Arabs in China may be accepted as probably the largest and most definite event recorded concerning the advent of Islam, it is necessary at the same time not to overlook the facts already stated in the previous chapter, which prove that large numbers of foreigners had entered China prior to this date. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help); More than one of |pages= and |page= specified (help); line feed character in |quote= at position 12 (help)CS1 maint: location (link)
^ Frank Brinkley (1902). China: its history, arts and literature, Volume 2. Vol. Volumes 9-12 of Trübner's oriental series. BOSTON AND TOKYO: J.B.Millet company. p. 150. Retrieved December 14, 2011. It would seem, however, that trade occupied the attention of the early Mohammedan settlers rather than religious propagan dism; that while they observed the tenets and practised the rites of their faith in China, they did not undertake any strenuous campaign against either Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, or the State creed, and that they constituted a floating rather than a fixed element of the population, coming and going between China and the West by the oversea or the overland routes. According to Giles, the true stock of the present Chinese Mohammedans was a small army of four thousand Arabian soldiers, who, being sent by the Khaleef Abu Giafar in 755 to aid in putting down a rebellion, were subsequently permitted to * * settle in China, where they married native wives. The numbers of this colony received large accessions in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries during the conquests of Genghis, and ultimately the Mohammedans formed an appreciable element of the population, having their own mosques and schools, and observing the rites of their religion, but winning few converts except among the aboriginal tribes, as the Lolos and the Mantsu. Their failure as propagandists is doubtless due to two causes, first, that, according to the inflexible rule of their creed, the Koran might not be translated into Chinese or any other foreign language; secondly and chiefly, that their denunciations of idolatry were as unpalatable to ancestor-worshipping Chinese as were their interdicts against pork and wine. They were never prevented, however, from practising their faith so long as they obeyed the laws of the land, and the numerous mosques that exist throughout China prove what a large measure of liberty these professors of a strange creed enjoyed. One feature of the mosques is noticeable, however: though distinguished by large arches and by Arabic inscriptions, they are generally constructed and arranged so as to bear some resemblance to Buddhist temples, and they have tablets carrying the customary ascription of reverence to the Emperor of China, — facts suggesting that their builders were not entirely free from a sense of the inexpediency of differentiating the evidences of their religion too conspicuously from those of the popular creed. It has been calculated that in the regions north of the Yangtse the followers of Islam aggregate as many as ten millions, and that eighty thousand are to be found in one of the towns of Szchuan. On the other hand, just as it has been shown above that although the Central Government did not in any way interdict or obstruct the tradal operations of foreigners in early times, the local officials sometimes subjected them to extortion and maltreatment of a grievous and even unendurable nature, so it appears that while as a matter of State policy, full tolerance was extended to the Mohammedan creed, its disciples frequently found themselves the victims of such unjust discrimination at the hand of local officialdom that they were driven to seek redress in rebellion. That, however, did not occur until the nineteenth century. There is no evidence that, prior to the time of the Great Manchu Emperor Chienlung (1736-1796), Mohammedanism presented any deterrent aspect to the Chinese. That renowned ruler, whose conquests carried his banners to the Pamirs and the Himalayas, did indeed conceive a strong dread of the potentialities of Islamic fanaticism reinforced by disaffection on the part of the aboriginal tribes among whom the faith had many adherents. He is said to have entertained at one time the terrible project of eliminating this source of danger in Shensi and Kansuh by killing every Mussulman found there, but whether he really contemplated an act so foreign to the general character of his procedure is doubtful. The broad fact is that the Central Government of China has never persecuted Mohammedans or discriminated against them. They are allowed to present themselves at the examinations for civil or military appointments, and the successful candidates obtain office as readily as their Chinese competitors. {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help); More than one of |pages= and |page= specified (help); line feed character in |quote= at position 123 (help)Original from the University of California
^ Frank Brinkley (1904). Japan [and China]: China; its history, arts and literature. Vol. Volume 10 of Japan [and China]: Its History, Arts and Literature. LONDON 34 HENRIETTA STREET, W. C. AND EDINBURGH: Jack. p. 150. Retrieved December 14, 2011. It would seem, however, that trade occupied the attention of the early Mohammedan settlers rather than religious propagan dism; that while they observed the tenets and practised the rites of their faith in China, they did not undertake any strenuous campaign against either Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, or the State creed, and that they constituted a floating rather than a fixed element of the population, coming and going between China and the West by the oversea or the overland routes. According to Giles, the true stock of the present Chinese Mohammedans was a small army of four thousand Arabian soldiers, who, being sent by the Khaleef Abu Giafar in 755 to aid in putting down a rebellion, were subsequently permitted to * * settle in China, where they married native wives. The numbers of this colony received large accessions in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries during the conquests of Genghis, and ultimately the Mohammedans formed an appreciable element of the population, having their own mosques and schools, and observing the rites of their religion, but winning few converts except among the aboriginal tribes, as the Lolos and the Mantsu. Their failure as propagandists is doubtless due to two causes, first, that, according to the inflexible rule of their creed, the Koran might not be translated into Chinese or any other foreign language; secondly and chiefly, that their denunciations of idolatry were as unpalatable to ancestor-worshipping Chinese as were their interdicts against pork and wine. They were never prevented, however, from practising their faith so long as they obeyed the laws of the land, and the numerous mosques that exist throughout China prove what a large measure of liberty these professors of a strange creed enjoyed. One feature of the mosques is noticeable, however: though distinguished by large arches and by Arabic inscriptions, they are generally constructed and arranged so as to bear some resemblance to Buddhist temples, and they have tablets carrying the customary ascription of reverence to the Emperor of China, — facts suggesting that their builders were not entirely free from a sense of the inexpediency of differentiating the evidences of their religion too conspicuously from those of the popular creed. It has been calculated that in the regions north of the Yangtse the followers of Islam aggregate as many as ten millions, and that eighty thousand are to be found in one of the towns of Szchuan. On the other hand, just as it has been shown above that although the Central Government did not in any way interdict or obstruct the tradal operations of foreigners in early times, the local officials sometimes subjected them to extortion and maltreatment of a grievous and even unendurable nature, so it appears that while as a matter of State policy, full tolerance was extended to the Mohammedan creed, its disciples frequently found themselves the victims of such unjust discrimination at the hand of local officialdom that they were driven to seek redress in rebellion. That, however, did not occur until the nineteenth century. There is no evidence that, prior to the time of the Great Manchu Emperor Chienlung (1736-1796), Mohammedanism presented any deterrent aspect to the Chinese. That renowned ruler, whose conquests carried his banners to the Pamirs and the Himalayas, did indeed conceive a strong dread of the potentialities of Islamic fanaticism reinforced by disaffection on the part of the aboriginal tribes among whom the faith had many adherents. He is said to have entertained at one time the terrible project of eliminating this source of danger in Shensi and Kansuh by killing every Mussulman found there, but whether he really contemplated an act so foreign to the general character of his procedure is doubtful. The broad fact is that the Central Government of China has never persecuted Mohammedans or discriminated against them. They are allowed to present themselves at the examinations for civil or military appointments, and the successful candidates obtain office as readily as their Chinese competitors. {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help); More than one of |pages= and |page= specified (help); line feed character in |quote= at position 123 (help)CS1 maint: location (link)Original from Princeton University
^ Arthur Evans Moule (1914). The Chinese people: a handbook on China ... LONDON NORTHUMBERLAND AVENUE, W.C.: Society for promoting Christian knowledge. p. 317. Retrieved December 14, 2011. ough the actual date and circumstances of the introduction of Islam into China cannot be traced with certainty further back than the thirteenth century, yet the existence of settlements of foreign Muslims with their Masjids at Ganfu (Canton) during the Tang dynasty (618—907 CE) is certain, and later they spread to Ch'uan-chou and to Kan-p'u, Hangchow, and perhaps to Ningpo and Shanghai. These were not preaching or proselytising inroads, but commercial enterprises, and in the latter half of the eighth century there were Moslem troops in Shensi, 3,000 men, under Abu Giafar, coming to support the dethroned Emperor in A.d. 756. In the thirteenth century the influence of individual Moslems was immense, especially that of the Seyyid Edjell Shams ed-Din Omar, who served the Mongol Khans till his death in Yunnan A.d. 1279. His family still exists in Yunnan, and has taken a prominent part in Moslem affairs in China. The present Muslim element in China is most numerous in Yunnan and Kansu; and the most learned Moslems reside chiefly in Ssuch'uan, the majority of their books being printed in the capital city, Ch'eng-tu. Kansu is perhaps the most dominantly Mohammedan province in China, and here many different sects are found, and mosques with minarets used by the orthodox muezzin calling to prayer, and in one place veiled women are met with. These, however, are not Turks or Saracens, but for the most part pure Chinese. The total Moslem population is probably under 4,000,000, though other statistical estimates, always uncertain in China, vary from thirty to ten millions; but the figures given here are the most reliable at present obtainable, and when it is remembered that Islam in China has not been to any great extent a preaching or propagandist power by force or the sword, it is difficult to understand the survival and existence of such a large number as that, small, indeed, compared with former estimates, but surely a very large and vigorous element. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help); line feed character in |quote= at position 922 (help)Original from the University of California
^ Herbert Allen Giles (1886). A glossary of reference on subjects connected with the Far East (2 ed.). HONGKONG: Messrs. Lane. p. 141. Retrieved December 14, 2011. MAHOMEDANS: IEJ Iej. First settled in China in the Year of the Mission, A.D. 628, under Wahb-Abi-Kabcha a maternal uncle of Mahomet, who was sent with presents to the Emperor. Wahb-Abi-Kabcha travelled by sea to Cantoa, and thence overland to Si-ngan Fu, the capital, where he was well received. The first mosque was built at Canton, where, after several restorations, it still exists. Another mosque was erected in 742, but many of these M. came to China simply as traders, and by and by went back to their own country. The true stock of the present Chinese Mahomedans was a small army of 4,000 Arabian soldiers sent by the Khaleef Abu Giafar in 755 to aid in putting down a rebellion. These soldiers had permission to settle in China, where they married native wives; and three centuries later, with the conquests of Genghis Khan, largo numbers of Arabs penetrated into the Empire and swelled the Mahomedan community. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)Original from the New York Public Library
^ Herbert Allen Giles (1926). Confucianism and its rivals. Forgotten Books. p. 139. ISBN 1-60680-248-8. Retrieved December 14, 2011. In7= 789 the Khalifa Harun al Raschid dispatched a mission to China, and there had been one or two less important missions in the seventh and eighth centuries; but from 879, the date of the Canton massacre, for more than three centuries to follow, we hear nothing of the Mahometans and their religion. They were not mentioned in the edict of 845, which proved such a blow to Buddhism and Nestorian Christianityl perhaps because they were less obtrusive in ithe propagation of their religion, a policy aided by the absence of anything like a commercial spirit in religious mattters. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)
^ Confucianism and its Rivals. Forgotten Books. p. 223. ISBN 1-4510-0849-X. Retrieved December 14, 2011. The first mosque built at Canton, where, after several restorations, it may still be seen. The minaret, known as the Bare Pagoda, to distinguish it from a much more ornamental Buddhist pagoda near by, dates back to 850. There must at that time have been a considerable number of Mahometans in Canton, thought not so many as might be supposed if reliance could be placed on the figures given in reference to a massacre which took place in 879. The fact is that most of these Mahometans went to China simply as traders ; they did not intend to settle permanently in the country, and when business permitted, they returned to their old haunts. About two thousand Mussulman families are still to be found at Canton, and a similar number at Foochow ; descendants, perhaps, of the old sea-borne contingents which began to arrive in the seventh and eighth centuries. These remnants have nothing to do with the stock from which came the comparatively large Mussulman communities now living and practising their religion in sthe provinces of Ssŭch'uan, Yünnan, and Kansuh. The origin of the latter was as follows. In A.D. 756 the Khalifa Abu Giafar sent a small army of three thousand Arab soldiers to aid in putting down a rebellion. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)
^ Everett Jenkins (1999). The Muslim diaspora: a comprehensive reference to the spread of Islam in Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas. Vol. Volume 1 of The Muslim Diaspora (illustrated ed.). McFarland. p. 61. ISBN 0-7864-0431-0. Retrieved December 14, 2011. China • Arab troops were dispatched by Abu Gia- far to China. {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)(Original from the University of Michigan )
^ . p. 295 http://books.google.com/books?id=XVMuAQAAIAAJ&pg=PA295&dq=abu+giafar+chinese&hl=en&ei=28LnTsDrG8bs0gG51sTtCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CEQQ6AEwBDgK#v=onepage&q=abu%20giafar%20chinese&f=false. Retrieved December 14, 2011. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help); Missing or empty |title= (help)
^ Stanley Ghosh (1961). Embers in Cathay. Doubleday. p. 60. Retrieved December 14, 2011. During the reign of Abbassid Caliph Abu Giafar in the middle of the eighth century, many Arab soldiers evidently settled near the garrisons on the Chinese frontier. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)(Original from the University of Michigan, Library of Catalonia )
^ Heinrich Hermann (1912). Chinesische Geschichte (in German). D. Gundert. p. 77. Retrieved December 14, 2011. 785, als die Tibeter in China einfielen, sandte Abu Giafar eine zweite Truppe, zu deren Unterhalt die Regierung die Teesteuer verdoppelte. Sie wurde ebenso angesiedelt. 787 ist von 4000 fremden Familien aus Urumtsi und Kaschgar in Si-Ngan die Rede: für ihren Unterhalt wurden 500000 Taël {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)(Original from the University of California )
^ Deutsche Literaturzeitung für Kritik der Internationalen Wissenschaft, Volume 49, Issues 27-52. Weidmannsche Buchhandlung. 1928. p. 1617. Retrieved December 14, 2011. Die Fassung, daß mohammedanische Soldaten von Turkestan ihre Religion nach China gebracht hätten, ist irreführend. Das waren vielmehr die 4000 Mann, die der zweite Kalif Abu Giafar 757 schickte, ebenso wie die Hilfstruppen 785 bei dem berühmten Einfali der Tibeter. Die Uiguren waren damals noch {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)(Original from Indiana University )
^ E. J. van Donzel (1994). E. J. van Donzel (ed.). Islamic desk reference (illustrated ed.). BRILL. p. 67. ISBN 90-04-09738-4. Retrieved December 26, 2011. China (A. al-Sin):. . .After the coming of Islam, the existing trade was continued by the peoples of the South Arabian coast and the Persian Gulf, but the merchants remained on the coast.
^ Ralph Kauz (2010). Ralph Kauz (ed.). Aspects of the Maritime Silk Road: From the Persian Gulf to the East China Sea. Vol. Volume 10 of East Asian Economic and Socio-cultural Studies - East Asian Maritime History. Otto Harrassowitz Verlag. p. 130. ISBN 3-447-06103-0. Retrieved December 26, 2011. The frankincense was first collected in the Hadhramaut ports of Mirbat, Shihr, and Zufar whence Arab merchant vessels shipped it to Srivijaya, before it was then reexported to China. The term "xunluxiang" is derived form the Arab word "kundur". . . According to Li Xun, frankincense originally came from Persia.92 Laufer refers to the Xiangpu fftff by Hong Chu %Ws (? . . . Zhao Rugua notes: Ruxiang or xunluxiang comes from the three Dashi countries of Murbat (Maloba), Shihr (Shihe), and Dhofar (Nufa), from the depths of the remotest mountains. The tree which yields this drug may generally be compared to the pine tree. Its trunk is notched with a hatchet, upon which the {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help)
^ Ralph Kauz (2010). Ralph Kauz (ed.). Aspects of the Maritime Silk Road: From the Persian Gulf to the East China Sea. Vol. Volume 10 of East Asian Economic and Socio-cultural Studies - East Asian Maritime History. Otto Harrassowitz Verlag. p. 131. ISBN 3-447-06103-0. Retrieved December 26, 2011. resin flows out, and, when hardened, turns into incense, which is gathered and made into lumps. It is transported on elephants to the Dashi (on the coast), who then load it upon their ships to exchange it for other commodities in Sanfoqi. This is the reason why it is commonly collected at and known as a product of Sanfoqi.94 {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help)
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External links

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the People's Republic of China - Official website
Videos on Chinese Foreign Relations from the Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives
India-China Relations
Assertive Pragmatism: China's Economic Rise and Its Impact on Chinese Foreign Policy - analysis by Minxin Pei, IFRI Proliferation Papers n°15, 2006
China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America
Why China Will Keep Investing Abroad The New York Times, July 20, 2009
Korea Society Podcast: China's Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics and Security

[1] ttp://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/

[2] Williams, David (January 8, 2008). "China-Taiwan tussle in Bim politics". BBC News. Retrieved July 13, 2010. Beijing and Taipei often trade insults over which is using "dollar diplomacy" in the form of offers of aid or cheap loans to curry influence around the world. The 'One-China' policy ensures that nations cannot have official relations with both China and Taiwan. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |trans_title= (help); line feed character in |quote= at position 159 (help)

[3] Ninvalle, Pete (April 27, 2007). "China halts St. Lucia work". BBC News. Retrieved July 13, 2010. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |trans_title= (help)

[4] Erikson, Daniel (January 8, 2010). "China in the Caribbean: The New Big Brother". Star Publishing Company. Retrieved July 13, 2010. China's overall strategy for the Caribbean has been driven by a desire to ensure the security of Chinese offshore financial holdings, woo countries with infrastructure projects and investment deals to ensure support for China in multilateral organizations, and promote the crucial "One China" policy to isolate Taiwan on the world stage. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |trans_title= (help)

[5] "Background Note: China". Bureau of Public Affairs. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved March 10, 2011.

[6] Anderson, Kurt (May 7, 1984). "History Beckons Again". Time. Retrieved August 19, 2011.

[Queen_Elizabeth_and_Prince_Philip_with_Chinese_President_Li_Xiannian,_October_1986_(colour_photo)-7] Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip with Chinese President Li Xiannian

[8] "Politics/Nation". The Times Of India. August 23, 2007.

[9] "Wargame with India not to put China in a closet: US admiral". The Hindu. Chennai, India. August 24, 2007.

[10] Business Standard Article - Russia ceded approximately 174 km² figure

[11] Economist article including map of new Russia-China Border

[12] EU arms embargo

[13] Beijing likens Cheney criticism to nosy neighbor

[14] Ho, Stephanie. "Chinese Foreign Relations to Focus on More Active Diplomacy." Voice of America, March 7, 2011.

[DOD-china-2011-15] Office of the Secretary of Defense (May 6, 2011). Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2011 (PDF). Annual Report to Congress (Report). Retrieved February 16, 2012.

[ciaworldfactbook-16] ^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f China, CIA World Factbook

[17] Forsythe, Michael and Sakamaki, Sachiko China's Asian Charm Offensive in `Shambles' Over Disputes With Neighbors Bloomberg News, September 26, 2010

[18] "China Raising 2012 Defense Spending to Cope With Unfriendly ‘Neighborhood’." Bloomberg News. March 4, 2012.

[19] "China’s Defense Spending Dilemma." Wall Street Journal. March 5, 2012.

[TIPreport2011-20] 2011 Trafficking in Persons Report

[21] Three Filipino drugs mules on death row in China will eventually be executed despite winning a rare reprieve amid intense Philippine lobbying, the Chinese ambassador in Manila said

[22] A South African woman has been executed in China for smuggling drugs into that country, eNews reported

[23] China executed four convicted drug traffickers and sentenced at least 15 others to death Tuesday as the nation marked global anti-drug day, state press reported.

[24] British media angry with drug dealers in China was sentenced to death ask for diplomatic pressure

[25] Russian woman engaged in drug smuggling was sentenced to death

[26] The Heritage Foundation China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States

[27] International Committee of the Fourth International Western concern at China's growing involvement in Africa

[28] Political Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: U.S. Capabilities and Chinese Operations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2007

[29] Muekalia 2004, p.6

[30] Taylor 2000, p. 93

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[wsj-35] Cite error: The named reference wsj was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

[36] ssy.org.zw Sino-African Relations

[csmonitor-37] "China boosts African economies, offering a 'second opportunity'". Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved March 14, 2009. ^{[dead link‍]}

[allafrica-38] "Mozambique-China Trade Continues to Grow". allafrica.com. December 9, 2012. Retrieved December 9, 2012.

[FT-39] "Africa, China Trade" (PDF). Financial Times. Retrieved March 14, 2009.

[MondeDiplo-40] "China's trade safari in Africa". Le Monde Diplomatique. Retrieved March 14, 2009.

[41] "Military backs China's Africa adventure". Asia Times. Retrieved March 14, 2009.

[42] "Out of Africa". China Daily. Retrieved March 14, 2009.

[43] "Confucius Institute Bridges Friendship between China and Africa". cri.com.cn. Retrieved March 14, 2009.

[44] "Evan Osnos, Letter from China, "The Promised Land"". The New Yorker. Retrieved March 14, 2009.

[45] "China's 'Little Africa' is under pressure". globalpost.com. Retrieved March 14, 2009.

[migration-46] "China and Africa: Stronger Economic Ties Mean More Migration". Migration Policy Institute. Retrieved March 14, 2009.

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[49] Beresford, David (April 18, 2008). "Chinese ship carries arms cargo to Mugabe regime". guardian.co.uk. London. Retrieved March 14, 2009.

[50] Spencer, Richard (August 31, 2007). "China is to withdraw backing for Mugabe". telegraph.co.uk. London. Retrieved March 14, 2009.

[51] Evans, Ian (July 26, 2008). "Robert Mugabe forced into talks with opposition after China told him 'to behave'". telegraph.co.uk. London. Retrieved March 14, 2009.

[52] Blair, David (August 31, 2007). "Why China is trying to colonise Africa". telegraph.co.uk. London. Retrieved March 14, 2009.

[53] "China as Africa's 'angel in white'". Asia Times. Retrieved March 14, 2009.

[54] "The Forest for the Trees: Trade, Investment and the China-in-Africa Discourse" (pdf). Barry Sautman, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology Yan Hairong, University of Hong Kong. Retrieved March 14, 2009.

[55] "China in Africa - Is China Gaining Control of Africa's Resources" (pdf). Golobal Researcher. Retrieved March 14, 2009.

[56] YaleGlobal Online Central Asia: China's Mounting Influence

[57] Chinese History - Non-Chinese peoples and neighboring states Dashi 大食

[58] A century of Chinese research on Islamic Central Asian history in retrospect

[59] Twitchett, Denis (2000), "Tibet in Tang's Grand Strategy", in van de Ven, Hans (ed.), Warfare in Chinese History, Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, p. 125, ISBN 90-04-11774-1 {{citation}}: More than one of |pages= and |page= specified (help)

[60] Schafer, Edward H. (1985) [1963], The Golden Peaches of Samarkand: A study of T’ang Exotics (1st paperback ed.), Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, p. 26, ISBN 0-520-05462-8

[61] E. Bretschneider (1871). On the knowledge possessed by the ancient Chinese of the Arabs and Arabian colonies: and other western countries, mentioned in Chinese books. LONDON 60 PATERNOSTER ROW.: Trübner & co. p. 6. Retrieved June 28, 2010.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)(Original from Harvard University)

[62] Harvard University. Center for Middle Eastern Studies (1999). Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic review, Volumes 5-7. Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University. p. 89. Retrieved November 28, 2010.

[63] E. Bretschneider (1871). On the knowledge possessed by the ancient Chinese of the Arabs and Arabian colonies: and other western countries, mentioned in Chinese books. LONDON: Trübner & co. p. 7. Retrieved June 28, 2010.(Original from Harvard University)

[64] Donald Leslie (1998). The integration of religious minorities in China: the case of Chinese Muslims. Australian National University. p. 10. ISBN 0-7315-2301-6. Retrieved November 28, 2010.

[65] Hartford Seminary Foundation (1929). The Muslim world, Volume 19. Published for the Nile Mission Press by the Christian Literature Society for India. p. 258. Retrieved November 28, 2010.(Original from the University of California)

[66] Donald Daniel Leslie (1998). "The Integration of Religious Minorities in China: The Case of Chinese Muslims" (PDF). The Fifty-ninth George Ernest Morrison Lecture in Ethnology. p. 5. Retrieved November 30, 2010.

[67] Harvard University. Center for Middle Eastern Studies (1999). Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic review, Volumes 5-7. Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University. p. 92. Retrieved November 28, 2010.

[68] Wolbert Smidt (2001, mis en ligne le 27 septembre 2002). "A Chinese in the Nubian and Abyssinian Kingdoms (8th Century)". Chroniques yéménites [En ligne], 9. Retrieved Consulté le 14 décembre 2010.. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)

[69] E. Bretschneider (1871). On the knowledge possessed by the ancient Chinese of the Arabs and Arabian colonies: and other western countries, mentioned in Chinese books. LONDON: Trübner & co. p. 8. Retrieved June 28, 2010.(Original from Harvard University)

[70] E. Bretschneider (1871). On the knowledge possessed by the ancient Chinese of the Arabs and Arabian colonies: and other western countries, mentioned in Chinese books. LONDON: Trübner & co. p. 10. Retrieved June 28, 2010.(Original from Harvard University)

[71] Samy S. Swayd (2006). Historical dictionary of the Druzes. Vol. Volume 3 of Historical dictionaries of people and cultures (illustrated ed.). Scarecrow Press. p. xli. ISBN 0-8108-5332-9. Retrieved April 4, 2012. The fifth caliph, al-'Aziz bi-Allah (r.975-996). . . In his time, the Fatimi "Call" or "Mission" (Da'wa) reached as far east as India and northern China. {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)

[72] Oscar Chapuis (1995). A history of Vietnam: from Hong Bang to Tu Duc. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 92. ISBN 0-313-29622-7. Retrieved June 28, 2010. {{cite book}}: More than one of |pages= and |page= specified (help)

[73] Joseph Mitsuo Kitagawa (2002). The religious traditions of Asia: religion, history, and culture. Routledge. p. 283. ISBN 0-7007-1762-5. Retrieved June 28, 2010. {{cite book}}: More than one of |pages= and |page= specified (help)

[74] Bradley Smith, Wango H. C. Weng (1972). China: a history in art. Harper & Row. p. 129. Retrieved June 28, 2010. {{cite book}}: More than one of |pages= and |page= specified (help)

[75] Hugh D. R. Baker (1990). Hong Kong images: people and animals. Hong Kong University Press. p. 53. ISBN 962-209-255-1. Retrieved June 28, 2010. {{cite book}}: More than one of |pages= and |page= specified (help)

[76] Charles Patrick Fitzgerald (1961). China: a short cultural history. Praeger. p. 332. Retrieved June 28, 2010. {{cite book}}: More than one of |pages= and |page= specified (help)

[77] Dennis Bloodworth, Ching Ping Bloodworth (2004). The Chinese Machiavelli: 3000 years of Chinese statecraft. Transaction Publishers. p. 214. ISBN 0-7658-0568-5. Retrieved June 28, 2010. {{cite book}}: More than one of |pages= and |page= specified (help)

[78] Marshall Broomhall (1910). Islam in China: a neglected problem. LONDON 12 PATERNOSTER BUILDINGS, E.C.: Morgan & Scott, ltd. p. 25. Retrieved December 14, 2011. CHAPTER II CHINA AND THE ARABS From the Rise of the Abbaside Caliphate With the rise of the Abbasides we enter upon a somewhat different phase of Muslim history, and approach the period when an important body of Muslim troops entered and settled within the Chinese Empire. While the Abbasides inaugurated that era of literature and science associated with the Court at Bagdad, the hitherto predominant Arab element began to give way to the Turks, who soon became the bodyguard of the Caliphs, " until in the end the Caliphs became the helpless tools of their rude protectors." Several embassies from the Abbaside Caliphs to the Chinese Court are recorded in the T'ang Annals, the most important of these being those of (A-bo-lo-ba) Abul Abbas, the founder of the new dynasty, that of (A-p'u-cKa-fo) Abu Giafar, the builder of Bagdad, of whom more must be said immediately; and that of (A-lun) Harun al Raschid, best known, perhaps, in modern days through the popular work, Arabian Nights.1 The Abbasides or " Black Flags," as they were commonly called, are known in Chinese history as the Heh-i Ta-shih, " The Black-robed Arabs." Five years after the rise of the Abbasides, at a time when Abu Giafar, the second Caliph, was busy plotting the assassination of his great and able rival Abu Muslim, who is regarded as " the leading figure of the age " and the de facto founder of the house of Abbas so far as military prowess is concerned, a terrible rebellion broke out in China. This was in 755 A.d., and the leader was a Turk or Tartar named An Lu-shan. This man, who had gained great favour with the Emperor Hsuan Tsung, and had been placed at the head of a vast army operating against the Turks and Tartars on the north-west frontier, ended in proclaiming his independence and declaring war upon his now aged Imperial patron. The Emperor, driven from his capital, abdicated in favour of his son, Su Tsung (756-763 A.D.), who at once appealed to the Arabs for help. The Caliph Abu Giafar, whose army, we are told by Sir William Muir, " was fitted throughout with improved weapons and armour," responded to this request, and sent a contingent of some 4000 men, who enabled the Emperor, in 757 A.d., to recover his two capitals, Sianfu and Honanfu. These Arab troops, who probably came from some garrison on the frontiers of Turkestan, never returned to their former camp, but remained in China, where they married Chinese wives, and thus became, according to common report, the real nucleus of the naturalised Chinese Mohammedans of to-day. ^ While this story has the support of the official history of the T'ang dynasty, there is, unfortunately, no authorised statement as to how many troops the Caliph really sent.1 The statement, however, is also supported by the Chinese Mohammedan inscriptions and literature. Though the settlement of this large body of Arabs in China may be accepted as probably the largest and most definite event recorded concerning the advent of Islam, it is necessary at the same time not to overlook the facts already stated in the previous chapter, which prove that large numbers of foreigners had entered China prior to this date. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help); More than one of |pages= and |page= specified (help); line feed character in |quote= at position 12 (help)CS1 maint: location (link)

[79] Frank Brinkley (1902). China: its history, arts and literature, Volume 2. Vol. Volumes 9-12 of Trübner's oriental series. BOSTON AND TOKYO: J.B.Millet company. p. 150. Retrieved December 14, 2011. It would seem, however, that trade occupied the attention of the early Mohammedan settlers rather than religious propagan dism; that while they observed the tenets and practised the rites of their faith in China, they did not undertake any strenuous campaign against either Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, or the State creed, and that they constituted a floating rather than a fixed element of the population, coming and going between China and the West by the oversea or the overland routes. According to Giles, the true stock of the present Chinese Mohammedans was a small army of four thousand Arabian soldiers, who, being sent by the Khaleef Abu Giafar in 755 to aid in putting down a rebellion, were subsequently permitted to * * settle in China, where they married native wives. The numbers of this colony received large accessions in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries during the conquests of Genghis, and ultimately the Mohammedans formed an appreciable element of the population, having their own mosques and schools, and observing the rites of their religion, but winning few converts except among the aboriginal tribes, as the Lolos and the Mantsu. Their failure as propagandists is doubtless due to two causes, first, that, according to the inflexible rule of their creed, the Koran might not be translated into Chinese or any other foreign language; secondly and chiefly, that their denunciations of idolatry were as unpalatable to ancestor-worshipping Chinese as were their interdicts against pork and wine. They were never prevented, however, from practising their faith so long as they obeyed the laws of the land, and the numerous mosques that exist throughout China prove what a large measure of liberty these professors of a strange creed enjoyed. One feature of the mosques is noticeable, however: though distinguished by large arches and by Arabic inscriptions, they are generally constructed and arranged so as to bear some resemblance to Buddhist temples, and they have tablets carrying the customary ascription of reverence to the Emperor of China, — facts suggesting that their builders were not entirely free from a sense of the inexpediency of differentiating the evidences of their religion too conspicuously from those of the popular creed. It has been calculated that in the regions north of the Yangtse the followers of Islam aggregate as many as ten millions, and that eighty thousand are to be found in one of the towns of Szchuan. On the other hand, just as it has been shown above that although the Central Government did not in any way interdict or obstruct the tradal operations of foreigners in early times, the local officials sometimes subjected them to extortion and maltreatment of a grievous and even unendurable nature, so it appears that while as a matter of State policy, full tolerance was extended to the Mohammedan creed, its disciples frequently found themselves the victims of such unjust discrimination at the hand of local officialdom that they were driven to seek redress in rebellion. That, however, did not occur until the nineteenth century. There is no evidence that, prior to the time of the Great Manchu Emperor Chienlung (1736-1796), Mohammedanism presented any deterrent aspect to the Chinese. That renowned ruler, whose conquests carried his banners to the Pamirs and the Himalayas, did indeed conceive a strong dread of the potentialities of Islamic fanaticism reinforced by disaffection on the part of the aboriginal tribes among whom the faith had many adherents. He is said to have entertained at one time the terrible project of eliminating this source of danger in Shensi and Kansuh by killing every Mussulman found there, but whether he really contemplated an act so foreign to the general character of his procedure is doubtful. The broad fact is that the Central Government of China has never persecuted Mohammedans or discriminated against them. They are allowed to present themselves at the examinations for civil or military appointments, and the successful candidates obtain office as readily as their Chinese competitors. {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help); More than one of |pages= and |page= specified (help); line feed character in |quote= at position 123 (help)Original from the University of California

[80] Frank Brinkley (1904). Japan [and China]: China; its history, arts and literature. Vol. Volume 10 of Japan [and China]: Its History, Arts and Literature. LONDON 34 HENRIETTA STREET, W. C. AND EDINBURGH: Jack. p. 150. Retrieved December 14, 2011. It would seem, however, that trade occupied the attention of the early Mohammedan settlers rather than religious propagan dism; that while they observed the tenets and practised the rites of their faith in China, they did not undertake any strenuous campaign against either Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, or the State creed, and that they constituted a floating rather than a fixed element of the population, coming and going between China and the West by the oversea or the overland routes. According to Giles, the true stock of the present Chinese Mohammedans was a small army of four thousand Arabian soldiers, who, being sent by the Khaleef Abu Giafar in 755 to aid in putting down a rebellion, were subsequently permitted to * * settle in China, where they married native wives. The numbers of this colony received large accessions in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries during the conquests of Genghis, and ultimately the Mohammedans formed an appreciable element of the population, having their own mosques and schools, and observing the rites of their religion, but winning few converts except among the aboriginal tribes, as the Lolos and the Mantsu. Their failure as propagandists is doubtless due to two causes, first, that, according to the inflexible rule of their creed, the Koran might not be translated into Chinese or any other foreign language; secondly and chiefly, that their denunciations of idolatry were as unpalatable to ancestor-worshipping Chinese as were their interdicts against pork and wine. They were never prevented, however, from practising their faith so long as they obeyed the laws of the land, and the numerous mosques that exist throughout China prove what a large measure of liberty these professors of a strange creed enjoyed. One feature of the mosques is noticeable, however: though distinguished by large arches and by Arabic inscriptions, they are generally constructed and arranged so as to bear some resemblance to Buddhist temples, and they have tablets carrying the customary ascription of reverence to the Emperor of China, — facts suggesting that their builders were not entirely free from a sense of the inexpediency of differentiating the evidences of their religion too conspicuously from those of the popular creed. It has been calculated that in the regions north of the Yangtse the followers of Islam aggregate as many as ten millions, and that eighty thousand are to be found in one of the towns of Szchuan. On the other hand, just as it has been shown above that although the Central Government did not in any way interdict or obstruct the tradal operations of foreigners in early times, the local officials sometimes subjected them to extortion and maltreatment of a grievous and even unendurable nature, so it appears that while as a matter of State policy, full tolerance was extended to the Mohammedan creed, its disciples frequently found themselves the victims of such unjust discrimination at the hand of local officialdom that they were driven to seek redress in rebellion. That, however, did not occur until the nineteenth century. There is no evidence that, prior to the time of the Great Manchu Emperor Chienlung (1736-1796), Mohammedanism presented any deterrent aspect to the Chinese. That renowned ruler, whose conquests carried his banners to the Pamirs and the Himalayas, did indeed conceive a strong dread of the potentialities of Islamic fanaticism reinforced by disaffection on the part of the aboriginal tribes among whom the faith had many adherents. He is said to have entertained at one time the terrible project of eliminating this source of danger in Shensi and Kansuh by killing every Mussulman found there, but whether he really contemplated an act so foreign to the general character of his procedure is doubtful. The broad fact is that the Central Government of China has never persecuted Mohammedans or discriminated against them. They are allowed to present themselves at the examinations for civil or military appointments, and the successful candidates obtain office as readily as their Chinese competitors. {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help); More than one of |pages= and |page= specified (help); line feed character in |quote= at position 123 (help)CS1 maint: location (link)Original from Princeton University

[81] Arthur Evans Moule (1914). The Chinese people: a handbook on China ... LONDON NORTHUMBERLAND AVENUE, W.C.: Society for promoting Christian knowledge. p. 317. Retrieved December 14, 2011. ough the actual date and circumstances of the introduction of Islam into China cannot be traced with certainty further back than the thirteenth century, yet the existence of settlements of foreign Muslims with their Masjids at Ganfu (Canton) during the Tang dynasty (618—907 CE) is certain, and later they spread to Ch'uan-chou and to Kan-p'u, Hangchow, and perhaps to Ningpo and Shanghai. These were not preaching or proselytising inroads, but commercial enterprises, and in the latter half of the eighth century there were Moslem troops in Shensi, 3,000 men, under Abu Giafar, coming to support the dethroned Emperor in A.d. 756. In the thirteenth century the influence of individual Moslems was immense, especially that of the Seyyid Edjell Shams ed-Din Omar, who served the Mongol Khans till his death in Yunnan A.d. 1279. His family still exists in Yunnan, and has taken a prominent part in Moslem affairs in China. The present Muslim element in China is most numerous in Yunnan and Kansu; and the most learned Moslems reside chiefly in Ssuch'uan, the majority of their books being printed in the capital city, Ch'eng-tu. Kansu is perhaps the most dominantly Mohammedan province in China, and here many different sects are found, and mosques with minarets used by the orthodox muezzin calling to prayer, and in one place veiled women are met with. These, however, are not Turks or Saracens, but for the most part pure Chinese. The total Moslem population is probably under 4,000,000, though other statistical estimates, always uncertain in China, vary from thirty to ten millions; but the figures given here are the most reliable at present obtainable, and when it is remembered that Islam in China has not been to any great extent a preaching or propagandist power by force or the sword, it is difficult to understand the survival and existence of such a large number as that, small, indeed, compared with former estimates, but surely a very large and vigorous element. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help); line feed character in |quote= at position 922 (help)Original from the University of California

[82] Herbert Allen Giles (1886). A glossary of reference on subjects connected with the Far East (2 ed.). HONGKONG: Messrs. Lane. p. 141. Retrieved December 14, 2011. MAHOMEDANS: IEJ Iej. First settled in China in the Year of the Mission, A.D. 628, under Wahb-Abi-Kabcha a maternal uncle of Mahomet, who was sent with presents to the Emperor. Wahb-Abi-Kabcha travelled by sea to Cantoa, and thence overland to Si-ngan Fu, the capital, where he was well received. The first mosque was built at Canton, where, after several restorations, it still exists. Another mosque was erected in 742, but many of these M. came to China simply as traders, and by and by went back to their own country. The true stock of the present Chinese Mahomedans was a small army of 4,000 Arabian soldiers sent by the Khaleef Abu Giafar in 755 to aid in putting down a rebellion. These soldiers had permission to settle in China, where they married native wives; and three centuries later, with the conquests of Genghis Khan, largo numbers of Arabs penetrated into the Empire and swelled the Mahomedan community. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)Original from the New York Public Library

[83] Herbert Allen Giles (1926). Confucianism and its rivals. Forgotten Books. p. 139. ISBN 1-60680-248-8. Retrieved December 14, 2011. In7= 789 the Khalifa Harun al Raschid dispatched a mission to China, and there had been one or two less important missions in the seventh and eighth centuries; but from 879, the date of the Canton massacre, for more than three centuries to follow, we hear nothing of the Mahometans and their religion. They were not mentioned in the edict of 845, which proved such a blow to Buddhism and Nestorian Christianityl perhaps because they were less obtrusive in ithe propagation of their religion, a policy aided by the absence of anything like a commercial spirit in religious mattters. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)

[84] Confucianism and its Rivals. Forgotten Books. p. 223. ISBN 1-4510-0849-X. Retrieved December 14, 2011. The first mosque built at Canton, where, after several restorations, it may still be seen. The minaret, known as the Bare Pagoda, to distinguish it from a much more ornamental Buddhist pagoda near by, dates back to 850. There must at that time have been a considerable number of Mahometans in Canton, thought not so many as might be supposed if reliance could be placed on the figures given in reference to a massacre which took place in 879. The fact is that most of these Mahometans went to China simply as traders ; they did not intend to settle permanently in the country, and when business permitted, they returned to their old haunts. About two thousand Mussulman families are still to be found at Canton, and a similar number at Foochow ; descendants, perhaps, of the old sea-borne contingents which began to arrive in the seventh and eighth centuries. These remnants have nothing to do with the stock from which came the comparatively large Mussulman communities now living and practising their religion in sthe provinces of Ssŭch'uan, Yünnan, and Kansuh. The origin of the latter was as follows. In A.D. 756 the Khalifa Abu Giafar sent a small army of three thousand Arab soldiers to aid in putting down a rebellion. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)

[85] Everett Jenkins (1999). The Muslim diaspora: a comprehensive reference to the spread of Islam in Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas. Vol. Volume 1 of The Muslim Diaspora (illustrated ed.). McFarland. p. 61. ISBN 0-7864-0431-0. Retrieved December 14, 2011. China • Arab troops were dispatched by Abu Gia- far to China. {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)(Original from the University of Michigan )

[86] . p. 295 http://books.google.com/books?id=XVMuAQAAIAAJ&pg=PA295&dq=abu+giafar+chinese&hl=en&ei=28LnTsDrG8bs0gG51sTtCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CEQQ6AEwBDgK#v=onepage&q=abu%20giafar%20chinese&f=false. Retrieved December 14, 2011. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help); Missing or empty |title= (help)

[87] Stanley Ghosh (1961). Embers in Cathay. Doubleday. p. 60. Retrieved December 14, 2011. During the reign of Abbassid Caliph Abu Giafar in the middle of the eighth century, many Arab soldiers evidently settled near the garrisons on the Chinese frontier. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)(Original from the University of Michigan, Library of Catalonia )

[88] Heinrich Hermann (1912). Chinesische Geschichte (in German). D. Gundert. p. 77. Retrieved December 14, 2011. 785, als die Tibeter in China einfielen, sandte Abu Giafar eine zweite Truppe, zu deren Unterhalt die Regierung die Teesteuer verdoppelte. Sie wurde ebenso angesiedelt. 787 ist von 4000 fremden Familien aus Urumtsi und Kaschgar in Si-Ngan die Rede: für ihren Unterhalt wurden 500000 Taël {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)(Original from the University of California )

[89] Deutsche Literaturzeitung für Kritik der Internationalen Wissenschaft, Volume 49, Issues 27-52. Weidmannsche Buchhandlung. 1928. p. 1617. Retrieved December 14, 2011. Die Fassung, daß mohammedanische Soldaten von Turkestan ihre Religion nach China gebracht hätten, ist irreführend. Das waren vielmehr die 4000 Mann, die der zweite Kalif Abu Giafar 757 schickte, ebenso wie die Hilfstruppen 785 bei dem berühmten Einfali der Tibeter. Die Uiguren waren damals noch {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)(Original from Indiana University )

[90] E. J. van Donzel (1994). E. J. van Donzel (ed.). Islamic desk reference (illustrated ed.). BRILL. p. 67. ISBN 90-04-09738-4. Retrieved December 26, 2011. China (A. al-Sin):. . .After the coming of Islam, the existing trade was continued by the peoples of the South Arabian coast and the Persian Gulf, but the merchants remained on the coast.

[91] Ralph Kauz (2010). Ralph Kauz (ed.). Aspects of the Maritime Silk Road: From the Persian Gulf to the East China Sea. Vol. Volume 10 of East Asian Economic and Socio-cultural Studies - East Asian Maritime History. Otto Harrassowitz Verlag. p. 130. ISBN 3-447-06103-0. Retrieved December 26, 2011. The frankincense was first collected in the Hadhramaut ports of Mirbat, Shihr, and Zufar whence Arab merchant vessels shipped it to Srivijaya, before it was then reexported to China. The term "xunluxiang" is derived form the Arab word "kundur". . . According to Li Xun, frankincense originally came from Persia.92 Laufer refers to the Xiangpu fftff by Hong Chu %Ws (? . . . Zhao Rugua notes: Ruxiang or xunluxiang comes from the three Dashi countries of Murbat (Maloba), Shihr (Shihe), and Dhofar (Nufa), from the depths of the remotest mountains. The tree which yields this drug may generally be compared to the pine tree. Its trunk is notched with a hatchet, upon which the {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help)

[92] Ralph Kauz (2010). Ralph Kauz (ed.). Aspects of the Maritime Silk Road: From the Persian Gulf to the East China Sea. Vol. Volume 10 of East Asian Economic and Socio-cultural Studies - East Asian Maritime History. Otto Harrassowitz Verlag. p. 131. ISBN 3-447-06103-0. Retrieved December 26, 2011. resin flows out, and, when hardened, turns into incense, which is gathered and made into lumps. It is transported on elephants to the Dashi (on the coast), who then load it upon their ships to exchange it for other commodities in Sanfoqi. This is the reason why it is commonly collected at and known as a product of Sanfoqi.94 {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help)

[Masumi-93] Masumi, Matsumoto. "The completion of the idea of dual loyalty towards China and Islam". Retrieved June 28, 2010.

[94] Stéphane A. Dudoignon, Hisao Komatsu, Yasushi Kosugi (2006). Intellectuals in the modern Islamic world: transmission, transformation, communication. Taylor & Francis. p. 251. ISBN 978-0-415-36835-3. Retrieved June 28, 2010. {{cite book}}: More than one of |pages= and |page= specified (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

[95] Hsiao-ting Lin (2010). Modern China's Ethnic Frontiers: A Journey to the West. Taylor & Francis. p. 90. ISBN 0-415-58264-4. Retrieved June 28, 2010.

[96] Peter G. Gowing (July/August 1970). "Islam in Taiwan". SAUDI ARAMCO World. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)

[97] League of Arab States

[98] UCLA Asia Institute China's March on South Asia

[99] PAKISTAN – CHINA Chinese-funded port in Baluchistan to give Beijing direct access to the Middle East - Asia News

[100] Asia Times Online :: South Asia news : China-Pakistan rail link on horizon

[101] "Indo-China trade to surpass $60 bn before 2010". Business-standard.com. June 6, 2008. Retrieved November 21, 2009.

[102] Saibal Dasgupta (January 17, 2008). "China is India's largest trade ally – International Business – Biz – The Times of India". The Times of India. Retrieved November 21, 2009.

[103] "news.outlookindia.com". Outlookindia.com. Retrieved November 21, 2009.

[104] "US blames India, China for blocking Doha talks". Business-standard.com. July 29, 2008. Retrieved November 21, 2009.

[105] "India, China to work on FTA recommendations- Foreign Trade-Economy-News-The Economic Times". Economictimes.indiatimes.com. February 20, 2008. Retrieved November 21, 2009.

[106] "Front Page : India, China to promote cooperation in civil nuclear energy". The Hindu. Chennai, India. January 15, 2008. Retrieved November 21, 2009.

[107] "Article: India, China top Asian FDI list in Africa. | AccessMyLibrary – Promoting library advocacy". AccessMyLibrary. March 28, 2007. Retrieved November 21, 2009.

[108] Africa: China's Africa Overture Needs Common Touch, 16 November 2007

[Ref_ac-109] Nanjing by the Numbers. Foreign Policy. 9 February 2010.

[110] "Backlash over the alleged China curb on metal exports". The Daily Telegraph, London, 29 Aug 2010. Retrieved 30 August 2010.

[111] USCC China's Strategic Reach Into Southeast Asia

[112] "China-Singapore visa-free agreement to take effect in April" People's Daily, April 07, 2011.

[113] "The South China Sea becomes a zone of eternal dispute." The Economist, June 9, 2011.

[114] Pomfret, John. "Beijing claims 'indisputable sovereignty' over South China Sea." The Washington Post, July 31, 2010.

[115] Barton, Paul C. "Guam central to Pacific military operations." Gannett, October 19, 2011.

[116] Cheng, Dean. "China Grows More Belligerent, Unexpectedly." Aol Defense, October 5, 2011.

[117] Ten Kate, Daniel. "China Plays Down Sea Spats to Woo Asean From U.S. ‘Siren Song’." Bloomberg News, November 20, 2011.

[118] Petty, Martin. "Booming Southeast Asia in a quandary over U.S.-China rivalry." Reuters, 8 July 2012.

[119] The Heritage Foundation China's Influence in the Western Hemisphere

[120] CNS news.com China Moving to Replace US Influence in Latin America

[121] Columbia Daily Tribune Caribbean sees China acquire more influence

[122] United Transportation Union Cuba turns to China for transport needs

[123] GlobalSecurity.org China Increasing Military Ties in Latin America as Law Restricts US Military

[NationNews-124] Best, Tony (October 24, 2008). "US calls off Barbados ban". Nation Newspaper. Archived from the original on March 17, 2009. Retrieved October 24, 2008. {{cite news}}: |archive-date= / |archive-url= timestamp mismatch; September 27, 2007 suggested (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)

[125] Dells, Alicia (September 27, 2009). "Stronger link". Barbados Advocate. Bridgetown, Barbados. Retrieved September 27, 2009. The acting Prime Minister added that Barbados looks forward to welcoming the Guangdong Art Troupe to the island next month and noted that Barbados was keen on having a Confucius Institute for the teaching of Mandarin and Chinese history at the UWI Cave Hill Campus in the near future. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |trans_title= (help)

[126] Chinese And Caribbean Relations - By David Jessop, CaribbeanWorldNews.com (Friday March 20, 2009)

[127] Confucius Institute opens at UWI in Jamaica, CaribbeanNetNews.com, (Saturday, February 14, 2009)

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[131] N., A. (September 28, 2012). "China marks 63 years". Barbados Advocate. Retrieved September 29, 2012. "Since I assumed my post as the Chinese Ambassador April this year, I have been much impressed by the sound friendship between our two countries and two peoples, as well as the great potential for future development," Ambassador Xu Hong stated. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |deadurl= (help)

[FMPRC-132] "Chinese embassy to Barbados". Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. December 30, 2011. Retrieved January 17, 2012.

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[135] Caribbean Journal staff (December 17, 2011). "What China Means for Caribbean Tourism". Caribbean Journal. Retrieved September 30, 2012. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |deadurl= (help)

[136] N., A. (June 1, 2012). "Chinese tourism remains a goal". Barbados Advocate. Retrieved September 30, 2012. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |deadurl= (help)

[137] Prime Minister David Thompson signed condolence book, 21 May 2008

[138] Staff writer (September 15, 2005). "Wildey Gym Spruce-up". Nation Newspaper. Ministry of Commerce of P.R. China,. Retrieved November 30, 2009. [ . . . ] The lighting will be improved,and the air-conditioning should be better now," Walrond said. He noted that the experienced technical team from the People's Republic of China would be working with China State Construction who built the gym,as well as with about 30 Barbadians. [ . . . ] {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |pmd= and |trans_title= (help)CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)

[139] "Barbados to open embassy in China". Caribbean Broadcasting Corporation. Retrieved May 15, 2009. ^{[dead link‍]}

[140] Caribbean Development Bank (CDB): Non-Regional Members

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[142] Marc Frank, "Trade With China Primes Cuba’s Engine for Change", The Financial Times, 29 March 2006

[143] “Trade with China helps Cuba to move up a gear,” Financial Times, March 8, 2006

[McClatchy-11June2008-144] Erika Bolstad and Kevin G. Hall, "GOP claim about Chinese oil drilling off Cuba is untrue", McClatchy Newspapers, June 11, 2008

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[155] Australia 2020 final report, p.363, Australian government website

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[166] China Seeks to Star in South Pacific; Beijing Widens Diplomatic Reach With Loans, Aid, in Challenge to U.S.; Subtle Reminders in Tonga April 27, 2012

[167] "Marshall Islands president set to visit", Ko Shu-ling, Taipei Times, June 26, 2007

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[192] ttp://www.roc-taiwan.org/ct.asp?xItem=136350&CtNode=1590&mp=212&xp1=

[193] ttp://www.studyinaustralia.gov.au/taiwan

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[theage.com.au-215] Cite error: The named reference theage.com.au was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

[216] "Freedom in the World - Kiribati (2004)", UNHCR

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 }}</ref><ref name="Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip with Chinese President Li Xiannian, October 1986 (colour photo)">[http://www.bridgemanart.com/asset/422333/ Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip with Chinese President Li Xiannian]</ref> To this end, China looked to the West for assistance with its modernization drive and for help in countering Soviet expansionism, which it characterized as the greatest threat to its national security and to world peace.
-China maintained its consistent opposition to "superpower [[hegemonism]]," focusing almost exclusively on the expansionist actions of the Soviet Union and Soviet proxies such as Vietnam and [[Cuba]], but it also placed growing emphasis on a foreign policy independent of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. While improving ties with the West, China continued to closely follow the political and economic positions of the Third World [[Non-Aligned Movement]], although China was not a formal member.
+China maintained its consistent opposition to "superpower [[hegemonism]]," focusing almost exclusively on the expansionist actions of the Soviet Union and Soviet proxies such as Vietnam and [[Cuba]], but it also placed growing emphasis on a foreign policy independent of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. While improving ties with the West, China continued to closely follow the political and economic positions of the Third World [[Non-Aligned Movement]], although China was not a formal member. Poopy is stinky, and the Chinese know this very well. Brown cats meow.
 In the immediate aftermath of [[Tiananmen Square protests of 1989|Tiananmen crackdown]] in June 1989, many countries reduced their diplomatic contacts with China as well as their economic assistance programs. In response, China worked vigorously to expand its relations with foreign countries, and by late 1990, had reestablished normal relations with almost all nations. Following the [[dissolution of the Soviet Union]] in late 1991, China also opened diplomatic relations with the republics of the former Soviet Union.

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